Q.

State and explain rule of interpretation as laid down in Heydons case.

Ans: Introduction to the Mischief Rule

1. The literal and golden rules are concerned with finding out what Parliament SAID. The
mischief rule is applied to find out what Parliament MEANT. It looks for the wrong: the
mischief which the statute is trying to correct. The statute is then interpreted in light of
this. The rule is based on the Heydons Case [1584] VERY OLD! in which certain
steps were identified as a way of interpretation.
2. Heydons Case [1584] veryy olddd! In this case it was stated that judges should:
1.Consider what the law was before the Act was passed;
2.Identify what was wrong with the law;
3.Decide how Parliament intended to improve the law through the statute in question;
4.Apply that finding to the case before the court.
3. This was a sincere 16 th century attempt to discover the intention of Parliament and to
apply it to cases before the courts.
4. In other words 1.What was the law before the statute? 2.What was wrong with that law?
3.How did Parliament intend to correct this? 4.Apply this statute in that context.
5. The difference between the rules Although it points to a kind of middle ground between
the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule, the golden rule is not, in a strict
sense, a compromise between them. Like the plain meaning rule, the golden rule gives
the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning.
6. However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature's
intention, the golden rule dictates that a judge can depart from this meaning. In the case
of homographs, where a word can have more than one meaning, the judge can choose the
preferred meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but applying this would lead to a
bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.
7. The mischief rule aims to interpret statute to what it meant regardless of the wording, by
referring to any previous statutes for the same purpose and how did Parliament intend to
improve that statute in the new worded one. It also needs to find out the mischief in the
case in order for it to be used.

Case Laws
Smith v. Hughes [ii]
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The brief facts were that the defendant was a common prostitute who lived at No. 39 Curzon
Street, London, and used the premises for the purposes of prostitution. On November 4, 1959,
between 8.50 p.m. and 9.05 p.m. the defendant solicited men passing in the street, for the
purposes of prostitution, from a first-floor balcony of No. 39 Curzon Street (the balcony being
some 810 feet above street level). The defendants method of soliciting the men was
(i)

to attract their attention to her by tapping on the balcony railing with

some metal object and by hissing at them as they passed in the street

(ii)

beneath her and

having so attracted their attention, to talk with them and invite them to
come inside the premises with such words as Would you like to come
up here a little while? at the same time as she indicated the correct door
of the premises.

It was contended on behalf of the defendant, inter alia, that the balcony was not in a Street
within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959, and that accordingly no
offence had been committed. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances the
appellant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of s. 1(1) of the Act are in this
form: It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place
for the purpose of prostitution.
Lord Parker CJ said Case that she being a common prostitute, did solicit in a street for the
purpose of prostitution, contrary to section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act, 1959. It was found
that the defendant was a common prostitute, that she had solicited and that the solicitation was in
a street. The defendants in this case were not themselves physically in the street but were in a
house adjoining the street, on a balcony and she attracted the attention of men in the street by
tapping and calling down to them. At other part the defendants were in ground-floor windows,
either closed or half open. The sole question here is whether in those circumstances each
defendant was soliciting in a street or public place. The words of section 1(1) of the Act of 1959
are in this form: It shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or
public place for the purpose of prostitution. Observe that it does not say there specifically that
the person who is doing the soliciting must be in the street. Equally, it does not say that it is
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enough if the person who receives the solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For
my part, I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act.
Everybody knows that this was an Act intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk
along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way,
it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a
doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in
each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For
my part, I am content to base my decision on that ground and that ground alone.
Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [iii]
The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement
of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences against the Person Act 1861 makes it an
offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be
an absolute defence for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out abortions
provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions
were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered
by nurses it was Held: It was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at
doing away with back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the
nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defence
in the 1967 Act.
Elliot v Grey[iv]
The defendants car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He
was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on
the road. The defendant argued he was not using the car on the road as clearly it was not
driveable. It was held: The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used
on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of
an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the
hazards created by others.
Corkery v Carpenter[v]
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The defendant was riding his bicycle whilst under the influence of alcohol. S.12 of the
Licensing Act 1872 made it an offence to be drunk in charge of a carriage on the highway. It
was held: The court applied the mischief rule holding that a riding a bicycle was within the
mischief of the Act as the defendant represented a danger to himself and other road users.
According to S.12 of the Licensing Act 1872, a person found drunk in charge of a carriage on
the highway can be arrested without a warrant. A man was arrested drunk in charge of a bicycle.
According to the plain meaning rule a bike is not a carriage. Under the Mischief rule the bicycle
could constitute a carriage. The mischief the act was attempting to remedy was that of people
being on the road on transport while drunk. Therefore a bicycle could be classified as a carriage.
DPP v Bull[vi]
A man was charged with an offence under s.1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which
makes it an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a public street or public place
for the purposes of prostitution. The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds that
common prostitute only related to females and not males. The prosecution appealed by way of
case stated.
The court held that the Act did only apply to females. The word prostitute was ambiguous
and they applied the mischief rule. The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the
work of the Wolfenden Report into homosexuality and prostitution. The Report only referred to
female prostitution and did not mention male prostitutes. The QBD therefore held the mischief
the Act was aimed at was controlling the behaviour of only female prostitutes.

Brown v. Brown [vii]

In Brown v Brown, Sir Jocelyn Simon P said that the disadvantage of the old law on
condonation of adultery was that, though a resumption of cohabitation might actually promote a
reconciliation which had yet taken place, a wronged spouse might be reluctant to resume
cohabitation in case it did not succeed and he or she would then have lost the right to complain
of the matrimonial offence. The provision in s 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1963 (now
contained in s 42 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965) that adultery shall not be deemed to be
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condoned by reason of a continuation or resumption of cohabitation between the parties for a

period of up to three months was, therefore, limited to cases within this mischief- where the
cohabitation was with a view to effecting a reconciliation, and did not extend to cases where it
was in consequence of re3conciliation.
Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax [viii]
By s 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, In computing the total income of any
individual for the purpose of assessment, there shall be included so much of the income of a wife
or minor child of such individual as arises indirectly or directly In CIT v Sodra Devi the court
observed that the legislature was guilty of using an ambiguous term. There is no knowing with
certainly as to whether the legislature meant to enact these provisions with reference only to a
male of the species using the words any individual or such individual in the narrower sense of
the term indicated above or intended to include within the connotation of the words any
individual or such individual also a female of the species. Holding the words any individual
and such individual as restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the species, the
court observed that the evil which was sought to be remedied was the only resulting from the
widespread practice of husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers
admitting their minor children to the benefits of the partnerships of which they were members.
This evil was sought to be remedied by the Income-tax Act. The only intention of the legislature
in doing so was to include the income derived by the wife or a minor child, in the computation of
the total income of the male assessee, the husband or the father as the case may be for the
purpose of the assessment.
RMDC v. UOI [ix]
In RMDC v Union of India the definition of prize competition under s 2(d) of the Prize
competition act 1955, was held to be inclusive of only those instances in which no substantive
skill is involved. Thus, those prize competitions in which some skill was required were exempt
from the definition of prize competition under s 2(d) of the Act. Hence, in the aforementioned
case, the Supreme Court has applied the Heydons Rule in order to suppress the mischief was

intended to be remedied, as against the literal rule which could have covered prize competitions
where no substantial degree of skill was required for success.
Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar [x]
Within the context of law, the mischief rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that attempts
to determine the legislators intention. Originating from a 16th century case in the United
Kingdom, its main aim is to determine the mischief and defect that the statute in question has
set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. When material
words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for
construction of such words of all statutes in general is the rule laid down in Heydons case also
known as mischief rule. This rule is also known as purposive construction. The rules lay down
that the court should adopt the construction which shall suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy. In Indian context the rule was best explained in the case of Bengal immunity co. v State
of Bihar.The appellant company is an incorporated company carrying on the business of
manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its
registered head office is at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory are at Baranagar in the district
of 24 Perganas in West Bengal. It is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax)
Act and its registered number is S.L. 683A. Its products have extensive sales throughout the
Union of India and abroad. The goods are dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against
orders accepted by the appellant company in Calcutta. The appellant company has neither any
agent or manager in Bihar nor any office, godown or laboratory in that State. On the 24th
October, 1951 the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Bihar wrote a letter to the
appellant company which concluded as follows :Necessary action may therefore be taken to get your firm registered under the Bihar Sales
Tax Act. Steps may kindly be taken to deposit Bihar Sales Tax dues in any Bihar Treasury at an
early date under intimation to this Department.
The principal question is whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the
appellant company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in
its petition is leviable by the State of Bihar. This was done by construing article 286 whose
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interpretation came into question and the meaning granted to it in the case of The State of
Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd 6 was overruled. It raises a question of construction of
article 286 of the Constitution. It was decided that Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 in so far as it
purports to tax sales or purchases that take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce,
is unconstitutional, illegal and void. The Act imposes tax on subjects divisible in their nature but
does not exclude in express terms subjects exempted by the Constitution. In such a situation the
Act need not be declared wholly ultra vires and void. Until Parliament by law provides
otherwise, the State of Bihar do forbear and abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State
dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such sales or
purchases for consumption in Bihar. The State must pay the costs of the appellant in this Court
and in the court below. Bhagwati, J. had agreed to the above interpretation.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Mischief Rule
Advantages:
1)

The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of

2)
3)
4)

interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules.

It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Closes loopholes
Allows the law to develop and adapt to changing needs example Royal

College of Nursing v DHSS

Disadvantages:
1. It is seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common law
was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
2. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.
3. Creates a crime after the event example Smith v Hughes, Elliot v Grey thus infringing the
rule of law.
4. Gives judges a law making role infringing the separation of powers and Judges can bring
their own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case example Smith v
Hughes, DPP v Bull.
Conclusion
As it can be seen from the case, mischief rule can be applied differently by different
judges. It is mainly about the discretion and understanding of the person applying it. Though, it
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as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules. It
usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing but it also seen to be out of date as it has
been in use since the 16th century, when common law was the primary source of law and
parliamentary supremacy was not established. It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary
which is argued to be undemocratic. In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on
behalf of the king and were therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to
remedy. This is not often the case in modern legal systems. The rule can make the law uncertain,
susceptible to the slippery slope. Therefore Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of
replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine
cases. The purposive approach is an approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation under
which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a statute, a part of a statute, or a clause
of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it was enacted.