I v II VNCH b bc t v CIP 1961? - P3 , Ht.

Cc ti liu lin quan n ch c gi n bn c trong cc bi

vit trc tng tm , hy vng bn c da vo hu t a ra
nhn xt v cuc chin va qua. Cn bi vit ny ch b tc ti liu cho
cc vn nu ra ti bi trc, vn m d lun t n 1975 n nay
vn cn bn.
- Th d nh v Hong Sa pha Vit Nam chun b qun i i gii cu
nhng phi dng li, v sao ?
- Th d nh v in Bin Ph 1954, nguyn nhn no khin M khng
trc tip tham chin ...
- V vn c d lun ch nht l v trit thoi qun i ti QK I
v II lin quan n hai Tng Ph v Tng Trng ...Cu hi l ai ra
lnh rt qun khi QK I v II ?
Ngoi vn rt qun, d lun cn bn v v Tng Ph lin quan n
v 2 triu, nhng li l chuyn nghe li t ngi khc ni ra, m khng
nu ra bng chng l audio tape ting ni ca chnh Tng Ph, ngha
l khng c main sources , nhng li c vit ra ngy 11.4.2013 ,
chuyn nh sau:
-Theo tc ga L Giang:" Sau khi nhn chc, cng vic chnh ca Tng
Ph khng phi l mt trn m lo kim tin ng hi cht. Trung T Trn
Tch, Trng Phng Qun Tr ca Qun on 2 cho bit, sau khi rt khi
Cao Nguyn v chy v ti Nha Trang, Tng Ph cn hi ng: Anh xem
c ai mun i lm tnh trng khng? Trung T Tch ngc nhin hi li:
Gi ny m Thiu Tng cn tm tnh trng lm g na? Tng Ph
bun ru tr li: Thng ny cha c 2 triu ng cho Trung Tng! (?) [1]
- Theo Tng Nguyn Khoa Nam : "ng ta ni thng vi Tng Thng
Thiu: "Ti nh gic 23 nm ri, v ti cha bao gi bit lui qun. Hy
tm mt ngi khc ch huy cuc "chy trn "ny.'' Ni xong ng vt

khu sng lc ca ng ln bn v ra khi phng hp, ng sm ca li. V

sau ng bay v Nha Trang,

khai bnh vo nm bnh vin." [2 ]

- Theo Ti liu CIA :" The regional commander, Major General Phan Van
Phu, met with Thieu yesterday and failed in his attempt to persuade the
president to send more reinforcements to the central highlands. [...]Thieu
reportedly ordered General Phu to begin withdrawing his forces from Pleiku
and Kontum provinces today and to complete the relocation by next
Monday."
Tm lc on vn trn : " T lnh qun khu, Thiu tng Phan Vn Ph,
gp TT Thiu hm qua (14.03.1975) v tht bi trong n lc thuyt phc
Tng thng gi thm qun tip vin n Ty Nguyn. --- TT Thiu ra lnh
Tng Ph bt u rt qun t Pleiku v Kontum k t ngy hm nay v
hon thnh vic di chuyn vo th hai ti." ( bo co thit lp ngy
15.03.1975 - bn vn cng b ngy 22.06.2016 ) [ 3]
Hy vng cc ti liu trnh by pha sau s gip bn c d nhn din vn
:
** - V M khng tham chin in Bin Ph 1954
The Pentagon Pentagon Papers -DoD released 2011 - ( n bn trn
Docuntmentcloud )
II. B.1 . THE INTERAGENCY DEBATE OVER U.S. INTERVENTION IN INDOCHINA
2. THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION WITH GROUND FORCES
a. The Problem Is Presented
In late 1953, the Army questioned prevalent assumptions that ground forces would not
be required in Indochina if the area was as important to U.S. security interests as the
NSC papers stated. The Army urged that the issue be faced squarely in order to provide
the best possible preparation for whatever courses of action might be undertaken. The
Plans Division of the Army General Staff pointed out that under current programs the
Army did not have the capability of providing divisional forces for operations in
Indochina while maintaining its existing commitments in Europe and the Far East. Army

also suggested a "reevaluation of the importance of Indochina and Southeast Asia in

relation to the possible cost of saving it." [4.]-B5-p68
3- THE NEW APPROACH: "UNITED ACTION"
At this juncture the Eisenhower Administration began giving serious consideration to
broadening any American military intervention in Indochina by making it part of a
collective venture along with its European and Asian allies. Secretary of State Dulles in
a speech on March 29 warned the public of the alarming situation in Indochina and
called for "united action"--without defining it further--in these words:
Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system
of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a
grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility
should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve
serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from
now if we dare not be resolute today. [4] -B11-p74
Hence, Secretary Dulles undertook the task of persuading Britain, France and the Asian
allies to participate in a coalition for "united action" in Indochina. [4]-B13 -p76
II.B.2 THE ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE "UNITED ACTION"
1. THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1954
The period between the Berlin and Geneva conferences (i.e., between February and
May 1954) unexpectedly witnessed a denouement of the Indochina drama with the
siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu, the U.S. decision not to intervene, and the unsuccessful
U.S. attempt to rally its allies together in order to form a collective force in pursuance of
"united action." - [4] B17-p81
3. "UNITED ACTION" AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EITHER NEGOTIATIONS OR TO
UNILATERAL U.S. INTERVENTION
a. Formulation of U.S. Policy
By late March the internal debate within the Eisenhower Administration had reached the
point where it was recognized that: (a) unilateral U.S. intervention in the Indochina War
would not be effective without ground forces; (b) the involvement of U.S. ground forces
was logistically and politically undesirable; (c) preferably, "free world" intervention in
Indochina to save the area from communism would take the form of a collective
operation by allied forces. This was the import of the NSC deliberations, the Ridgway
Report, the Report of Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith's Special Committee on
the U.S. and Indochina, and President Eisenhower's general train of thought.[4] B20
-p84
c. French Call for U.S. Intervention at Dien Bien Phu (April 4-5)

The French response to the proposal for united action was overtaken by military events
at Dien Bien Phu. Foreign Minister Bidault contended on April 5 that the time for a
coalition approach had passed and that the fate of Dien Bien Phu would be decided in
the next ten days.[4.] B22-p86
d. U.S. Decision Not to Intervene Unilaterally
The Congressional leaders laid down three conditions necessary for their support: (a)
formation of an allied "coalition"-type force; (b) a French declaration indicating an intent
to accelerate independence for the Associated States; (c) French agreement to
continue their Expeditionary Corps in Indochina. Thus Congressional opposition put the
brake on a possible unilateral U.S. intervention. According to a subsequent State
Department Summary:
It was the sense of the meeting that the U.S. should not intervene alone but should
attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast Asia,
and that if such cooperation could be assured, it was probable that the U.S. Congress
would authorize U.S. participation in such "United Action." . [4] B23- p87
e. British Oppose "United Action"
From April 11 to 14, Secretary Dulles visited London and Paris to attempt to obtain
British and French commitments to support his proposal for "United Action." According
to President Eisenhower, Dulles felt that he had been given assurance of Congressional
support for "United Action" if the allies approved his plan. [4.] B24- p88
f. French Oppose "United Action"
Secretary Dulles fared little better in selling "united action" in Paris than he did in
London, but for somewhat different reasons. The French were seeking a quick action to
avoid an imminent military defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles, however, refused to be torn
from a collective allied approach to the Indochina War. The French feared that a
coalition arrangement would lead to an internationalization of the war and take control of
it out of their hands. They, therefore, only desired local assistance at Dien Bien Phu
along the lines of Operation Vulture. [4] B26- p80
4. FINAL U.S. POSITION BEFORE GENEVA
a. Exchanges with the French
The American response to these various suggestions was to reiterate to the French the
necessary preconditions for American intervention: (1) complete independence for the
Associated States; (2) Congressional authorization; (3) a coalition that would include the
United Kingdom. In relation to the need for a coalition, Secretary Dulles in Paris and
Under Secretary W. Bedell Smith in Washington suggested to French officials that
France, in the same way as it had asked for American air intervention in Indochina,
should appeal for British intervention there . [4] B28- p92
c. The Washington Viewpoint
President Eisenhower, in this discussion, reiterated his firm decision that there would be
no United States military intervention in Indochina by executive action. He urged his

aides to provide help to the French in repairing three airfields in Indochina but to avoid
any undue risk of involving the United States in combat operations.
5. REAPPRAISAL OF DOMINO THEORY AFTER DIEN BIEN PHU
The fall of Dien Bien Phu, and the failure to organize an intervention through "united
action" prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference in late April, 1954, led to a
reappraisal of the "domino theory" which had been at the center of U.S. policy in
Southeast Asia since the late 1940's. The loss of Tonkin, or Vietnam, or perhaps even
all of Indochina, was no longer considered to lead inexorably to the loss to Communism
of all of Southeast Asia. [4] B30-p94
Later, as the U.S. became reconciled to a political settlement at Geneva which would
yield northern Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh regime, the concept of "united action" was
given a new twis ... The loss of Tonkin was no longer seen as leading necessarily
to a Communist take-over of other territory between China and the American
shore. [4] B31- p95

Nhn xt t pha Lin X - V vic M khng gi my bay nm bom,

khng trc tham gia trn chin in Bin Ph 1954. Vic ny Th
Tng Khushchev c ni n trong din vn 06.01.1961 vi l do l nu
M can thip th s dn n chin tranh th ba.
How is it that the U.S. imperialists, while desirous of helping the French colonialists in
every war, decided against direct intervention in the war in Vietnam ? They did not
intervene because they knew that if they did help France with armed forces, Vietnam
would get relevant aid from China, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries,
which clould lead to a world war . " [5]

** - V Hong Sa 1974.
- Theo bo co ca CIA cng b ngy 24.08.2016
A press report yesterday from Saigon, citing "military sources," stated that a force of
three ships and 200 troops will register a "symbolic claim" to the islands, suggesting that
the Vietnamese may stop short of permanent occupation.
The landings, scheduled to begin on January 31, could lead to another clash with the
Chinese Communists, although Peking would be far more reluctant to mount military
operations in the Spratlys than in the Paracels. Ambassador Martin is trying to get
the Vietnamese plans canceled.

: Theo tin tc trn bo ch bo ch ti Si gn loan ti ngy hm qua, mt

lc lng qun s s ti chim Hong Sa . Cuc b d tr vo ngy
31. thng Ging. c th dn n mt cuc ng vi quuan i TC .

i s Martin ang c gng thuyt phc pha Vit Nam hy b k hoch

ny. [6]
** - V trit thoi ti QK I v II 1975
Theo bn vn ca CIA ngy 17.03.1975 - cng b ngy 15. 7. 2016:
Under the new concept, the government is withdrawing its forces from major portions of
northern and central South Vietnam and now plans to concentrate them in the southern
half of the country and around the large population centers along the north central
coast. The objective is to retain control over as much of the heavily populated and
economically important areas of the country as possible, at the cost of virtually writing
off the remainder. - Theo khi nim mi, chnh ph s rt qun ra khi phn

ln cc tnh min Bc v Nam Trung b Vit Nam v ang ln k hoch

tp trung qun i vo na phn pha Nam ca t nc, xung quanh
cc khu dn c ng c dc theo b bin Bc Trung B. Mc tiu l kim
sot c cng nhiu khu vc ng dn c v kinh t quan trng ca t
nc cng tt, gam thiu s thit hi ti phn t cn li.
President Thieu late last week met with the commanders of Military Regions l, 2, and 3
to discuss his strategy and provide guidelines on how he wanted them to use their
forces in support of his program. In the case of MR l, the President turned down
Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong's request to keep the Airborne Division at Da
Nang and ordered him to proceed with the transfer of the division to Saigon. One of the
division's three brigades will go to Saigon early this week, and the others are scheduled
to move by the end of the month. - TT Thiu c cuc hp vi cc T Lnh QK

1,2 v 3 bn v chin thut ... TT Thiu bc b ngh ca Tng

Trng xin gi li S on D tr ng ti Nng, ra lnh n v ny di
chuyn v Si Gn .[7] A2.p10
President Thieu stated that Da Nang must be held at all costs, but acknowledged that
other positions in the northern provinces would have to be given up.
General Truong has already issued orders for government troops to Withdraw from two
district towns in Central. [...] These redeployments will seriously weaken the
government's position in MR l, outside Da Nang, especially in view of recent shifts by
North Vietnamese divisions in the Quang Tri - Thua Thien area. Large-scale communist

attacks in this area are almost certain, and General Truong believes Quang Tri Province
will be lost. He is also not optimistic about his chances for holding Hue, and we share
his view. - Tng Thng Thiu ni rng Nng phi c c th bng mi

ga , nhng tha nhn rng v tr khc ti cc tnh pha Bc b b ng

.Tng Trng ra lnh cho qun i rt qun t hai th trn min
Trung.
Vic ti phi tr s lm suy yu v th ca chnh ph trong Vng
I, pha ngoi Nng, c bit l s thay i gn y ca s on qun
Bc Vit Qung Tr - khu vc Tha Thin, cc cuc tn cng ca cng
qun trong quy m ln khu vc ny gn nh chc chn, v Tng
Trng tin rng tnh Qung Tr s b mt. ng cng khng lc quan v vic
gi Hu .[7] A3.p11
- In MR 2, Thieu's strategy concedes most of the central highlands to the communists.
President Thieu has told the regional commander, Major General Phan Van Phu, that
the recapture of Ban Me Thuot.--the capital of Darlac Province occupied by the
communists last week--was the single most important military objective in the region.
General Phu has been ordered to concentrate his military resources on accomplishing
this task and to move his forces Out of Kontum and Pleiku for the effort. The evacuation
is already in progress. When it is completed, Kontum and Pleiku provinces will, in effect,
be abandoned. - Ti Vng II , chin lc ca TT Thiu l tha nhn vic cng

sn chim hu ht vng cao nguyn. Tng Thng Thiu ni vi T

lnh Qun khu, Thiu tng Phan Vn Ph, rng vic ti chim Ban M
Thut, th ph ca tnh Darlac b cng sn chim tun qua - l mc tiu
qun s quan trng nht trong khu vc. Tng Ph c lnh phi tp
trung n lc hon thnh vic di tn lc lng di quyn ra khi
Kontum v Pleiku. Vic di tn c tin hnh. Khi hon thnh, tnh
Kontum v Pleiku s b b ri. [7] A3-p11
- The withdrawal from Kontum and Pleiku provinces is already causing serious morale
problems among government troops there. [...]
--President Thieu's military judgment is already being seriously questioned within the
South Vietnamese military. establishment. General Truong, the MR l commander, for
example, has termed the decision to transfer the Airborne Division to Saigon "irrational."

- Vic nh ga v tnh hnh qun s ca TT Thiu gy nhiu thc

mc cho tng lnh trong qun i. V d nh Tng Trng, T Lnh

Vng l, gi quyt nh iu S on D v Si Gn l "khng hp l".

[...] Vic trit thoi qun t cc tnh Pleiku Kontum gy ra tc ng
nghim trng n tinh thn qun i [ 7] A4-p12
- Government troops have taken up positions on the eastern edge of Ban Me Thuot,
and reinforcements are moving toward the town. The government will begin its
counterattack with the 23rd Division and two ranger groups, supported by airstrikes,
tanks, and artillery.
We believe that General Phu's estimate that the town can be retaken in about three
weeks is Overly optimistic, particularly in light of increasingly constrained mobility of the
South Vietnamese armed forces. The battle probably will be costly for both sides and
apparently not decisive. - Qun i chnh ph ng qun ra pha ng

Ban M Thut, v qun tip vin ang c chuyn tin ti th trn. Chnh
ph s bt u phn cng vi S on 23 v hai n vi bit ng , c
h tr bi khng qun, xe tng, v pho binh.
Chng ti tin rng c tnh ca Tng Ph c th ti chim thnh ph
trong khong ba tun l qu lc quan, c bit l tnh di ng ca cc lc
lng v trang min Nam Vit Nam ngy cng b hn ch. Cc trn chin
c l s tn tht nng cho c hai bn v dng nh khng kt qa r rt .
[7] A5-p13
- Xin m ngoc : bn vn CIA thc hin ngy 17.03, cuc hp ngy 14.03,
ni dung ph hp vi cc pht biu ca Tng Nguyn Khoa Nam ( pha
di ) l Tng Ph khng thi hnh lnh rt qun, c ngha l khng lnh
ca TT Thiu, th liu cn gi chc T lnh QK 2 c ...Thng ny
cha c 2 triu ng cho Trung Tng! - ?
- Nh Bo Php Pierre Darcourt K Nhng Ngy Gi Cui Ca Vit
Nam Cng Ha: Tng Ph V V Rt B Ban M Thut
Ti quan st rt k i t Khi. Thnh lnh ti c cm tng kh chu l hnh
nhng ta ang cho ti mt bi din vn c son sn t trc . Ti
khng mun ngt ngang ng ta. Ti cn phi nghe lun gii ca ng n
cng: cng sp sa n phn kt lun ri..V i t Khi ni tip :

Chiu ti ngy 14 thng 3, v n Pleiku hi tr, tng Ph khng cn gii

thch, cho lnh Qun on tin hnh cuc hnh qun trit thoi ngay
vo sng sm hm sau.Vo lc rng ng ngy 15 thng 3, tt c binh s
cng dn chng ca hai tnh Kontum v Pleiku vi v ri khi hai thnh
ph ni trn, b li ti ch hng chc triu m kim chin c. --- . V cng t
mi gy ra ni kinh hong kh t trong dn chng.. [...] Ti khng nh
l nhng tin tc m ng ni vi ti hm nay ch ng s tht c mt
phn no thi, nhng chc chn khng phi l tt c s tht. Ci li gii
thch lm gim nh i phn no trch nhim ca Tng Thng Thiu n
khng ng vi tnh tnh ca cc nhn vt trong cu chuyn..
"Xin i T ch gim ti c th i gp Tng Ph ch no c ?
Gng mt ng ta lnh nht tr li, v cu tr li ct ln ca ng ta lm ti
ht sc ngc nhin:
"Tng Ph b pht giam, v khng th tip ai c ht"' [8]
Nh Bo Php Pierre Darcourt ngy 7-4-1975, Gp Tng Nguyn Khoa
Nam ( Chuyn TT. Thiu V Tng Ph )
[...]
- Anh gii thch th no v s sp xy ra min Trung?
Tng Nam chng tay ln thnh gh ng ang ngi, v bc tc cn nhn:
- C rt nhiu l do. M u tin v trc ht l do ng Thiu.
- Tng Tham Mu, i T Khi ni vi ti ngi chu trch nhim l
Thiu Tng Ph.
- Khng phi. Anh bit Tng Ph cn hn ti na m. ng l mt cp
ch huy c kh nng, bm trn a nh mt con rn bm st tc vy. [...]
Cn Pleiku v Kontum: cn 2 trung on thuc S on 23 B Binh.
Pleiku l mt cn c Khng Qun quan trng ca mt s on Khng
Qun, khng thiu mt th g t lng thc n n dc.

Tng Ph quyt nh nh v khng c. ng ta xc nh vi cc s

quan ca ng nh vy. Tuy nhin ngy 14 thng 3, Tng Thng gi ng v
Cam Ranh v cho lnh ng phi lui qun. By gi chng ti bit c l
cuc bn ci rt l si ng y sng gi. Tng Ph t chi khng thi
hnh lnh. ng ta ni thng vi Tng Thng Thiu: "Ti nh gic
23 nm ri, v ti cha bao gi bit lui qun. Hy tm mt ngi khc
ch huy cuc "chy trn "ny.'' Ni xong ng vt khu sng lc ca ng ln
bn v ra khi phng hp, ng sm ca li. V sau ng bay v Nha
Trang, khai bnh vo nm bnh vin. Chuyn u c kh khn g vi ng
ta u, v anh cng bit l ng ta lun lun b kh chu vi hai l phi ca
ng.
- i T Khi li xc nh vi ti l Tng Ph bay v Pleiku v cho
lnh trit thoi vi gi sau .
- l lun thuyt chnh thc. B Tng Tham Mu qu quyt l khi v n
Pleiku, Tng Ph ni vi t lnh ph ca ng "ti cho ng hay mt b
mt ln, l chng ta s phi sm di tn ht cc v tr ca chng ta". V t
lnh ph ny lp tc bo tin cho cc s quan, v cuc trit thoi c thi
hnh ngay lc . Ti gp Tng Ph Si Gn ngy hm kia, ng ta
xc nhn vi ti l ng ta khng bao gi ra lnh trit thoi.
[...]
- Nh vy th ai l ngi ra lnh trit thoi?
- Chnh l ng Thiu. Sau khi Tng Ph t chi khng thi hnh lnh,
Tng Thng Thiu bo cho i T Tt, t lnh ph ca ng Ph, mt s
quan Bit ng Qun v giao cho ng ny chc v T Lnh Vng. [...]
Tng Thng Thiu cng phi gnh hon ton trch nhim trong vic b
thnh ph Hu v Vng I Chin Thut. Tng Trng c 3 s on u t
lo phng th Vng ny, S on 1 B Binh, s on Thy Qun Lc
Chin, v s on D. Nhng ngy 20 thng 3, Tng Thng Thiu v s b
o chnh, nn cho rt s on D a ngay v Si Gn lm cho

Tng Trng ng trc mt l hng qu rng trong h thng phng th

ca ng. [9 ]
Kt lun, cc bi vit va qua ngi vit nhn mnh n khong thi
gian t 1961 n 1971, c l bn c cng ng rng chnh sch ca
M trong thi gian ny nhm chng Lin X. Vy xin c cu hi tip rng
trong khong thi gian ny d thuc ng Cng Ha hay ng Dn Ch,
t Chnh Ph Kennedy n chnh ph Nixon u c chung mc tiu chin
lc l chng Lin X, vy phi chng c mt chnh ph " black
Government "
cc ch trng, chnh sch quc gia c iu hnh
lin tc ?
c cu tr li cho cu hi trn xin mi c cc ti liu sau ca BBC,
Global Research ,The Telegrap... lin quan n Bilderberg group ,
Financial Oligarchy ( coi phn c thm )
Ht
Tr li bi: Bi 1 v: Bi 2
Bi sau vi tiu :CIA: Nhu ordered...bn ngi M -.N Nhu: Pht
t l nn-nhn ca
CIA - Ngo Dinh Nhu ( 1963 ) :
** if necessary, stand independent of the U.S. (July 2 )
** GVN had sufficient reserves to continue operating for twenty years.
( July 2 )
** relations with North Vietnam would have inevitable political
repercussions on the fighting morale and political clarity of SVN
population . ( Sept. 6 )

** neither GVN nor any other government could possibly negotiate

with Hanoi either openly or secretly, except after having won a
guerrilla war (Sept.6)
** ng Nhu : Pht t l nn-nhn ca mt cuc pht-trin qu ca
Pht-Gio . ( Sept. 6 )
** Ngo Dinh Nhu on possible reduction in foreign aid ( Sept. 12 )
** ordered Vietnamese soldiers to open fire on Americans...( Sept. 12
)
** Vn ng Nhu lin h vi min Bc l c tht hay l " n chin
thut " tng k tu k ...?
DV
NGUN:

[1] - L Giang :Trn nh quyt nh (Bi cui)

http://motgoctroi.com/Mtmchuyen/MTMT2013/TranDanhQuyetDinh_03.htm
http://trachnhiemonline.com/Dien-Dan/DD-130413--LuGiang-TranDanhQuyetDinh-BaiC
uoi.htm
[2]-.Pierre Darcourt - "Vietnam, Qu'as Tu Fait De Tes Fils" do Editions Albatros, Paris
xut bn. Nov.1975-Vit Nam Qu M Oan Khin -Cu i T Dng Hiu Ngha dchdo T sch Ting Qu Hng n hnh. Ta cc trch on do to bo t. Nh xut
bn Ting Qu Hng, Virginia 22/02/2008 https://vietbao.com/a219650/nha-bao-phap-pierre-darcourt-viet-ve-nhung-ngay-gio-cuoi
-cua-viet-nam-cong-hoa-7-4-1975-gap-tuong-nguyen-khoa-nam-nghe-chuyen-tt
[3]- CIA Library-the president's daily brief 15 march 1975 - CIA
Mar 15, 1975 - Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2016/07/15
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006014746.pdf

[4]- The Pentagon Papers was the name given to a secret Department of Defense
study of U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967, prepared
at the request of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1967. Relesead Jun. 2011
-Upload : DocumentCloud is provided by Investigative Reporters and Editors Inc., a
nonprofit corporation. -Copyright Agent: Mark Horvit - Investigative Reporters and
Editors -141 Neff Annex University of Missouri - Columbia, MO. Trang I -p5 - v t
trang B5-p68 n trang B31- p95
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/205504/pentagon-papers-part-ii.pdf
[5]- CIA Library - Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961 - CIA
Nov 4, 2003 - Approved For Release 2003/11/04 - Trang 68
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1961-06-16.pdf
[6]- CIA Library - The president's daily brief 31 january 1974 - CIA Jan 31, 1974 - 3.
TD-Secret 25X1. Declassified in Part - Approved for Release 2016/06/22
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006007661.pdf
[7]- CIA Library -The president's daily brief 17 march 1975 - CIA
Mar 17, 1975 - released July 15, 2016 - T trang A5.p10 n trang A5.p13.
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006014747.pdf
[8]-. Pierre Darcourt - Ibid
https://vietbao.com/a219613/nha-bao-phap-pierre-darcourt-ke-nhung-ngay-gio-cuoi-cua
-viet-nam-cong-hoa-tuong-phu-va-vu-rut-bo-ban-me-thuot-duong-mon-7b-20-00
[9] - Pierre Darcourt - Ibid
.https://vietbao.com/a219650/nha-bao-phap-pierre-darcourt-viet-ve-nhung-ngay-gio-cuoi
-cua-viet-nam-cong-hoa-7-4-1975-gap-tuong-nguyen-khoa-nam-nghe-chuyen-tt

c thm ;
CIA: Position papers for President Ngo Dinh Diem visit USA 1957
Approved For Release 2003/08/18 :
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R000700500014-9.pdf
** Telegraph: What is the secret Bilderberg group? 9 June 2016
...claimed it controls the US Republican Party, the European Union, and wants to create
a Fourth Reich. by Robert Midgley

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/09/what-is-the-secret-bilderberg-group/
** BBC :Study- US is an oligarchy, not a democracy - 17 April 2014
What in the world? Pieces of global opinion - The US is dominated by a rich and
powerful elite. - So concludes a recent study by Princeton University Prof Martin Gilens
and Northwestern University Prof Benjamin I Page.
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-echochambers-27074746
** Global Research: The True Story of the Bilderberg Group and What They May Be
Planning Now - A Review of Daniel Estulin's book - By Stephen Lendman Global Research, May 25, 2014 + Global Research- 1 June 2009
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-true-story-of-the-bilderberg-group-and-what-they-maybe-planning-now/13808
** The Bilderberg Club: a secret society of the richest and most influential people
conspiring to achieve a world government - D. Estulin - The November-December,
2005 issue of the Kingston Eye Opener (Box 3514, Kingston, ON, Canada, K7L 5J9)
published an interview of editor Geoff Matthews with Daniel Estulin, Communications
Training Specialist, who wrote a book on the Bilderbergers: Daniel, could you please
define Bilderberg for our readers.
http://www.michaeljournal.org/bilder.htm
** Oligarchy Government-- Oligarchy, government by the few, especially despotic
power exercised by a small and privileged group for corrupt or selfish purposes.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/oligarchy
** The U.S. Is Run by a Financial Oligarchy: The Ruling Elite, Money & the Illusion of
Progress (1993) - Simon Johnson wrote that "the reemergence of an American
financial oligarchy is quite recent," a structure which he delineated as being the "most
advanced" in the world. Jeffrey A. Winters argues that "oligarchy and democracy
operate within a single system, and American politics is a daily display of their interplay.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1f2r_-1biSkt