VILLANUEVA vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: This is a petition for review assailing the

decision of the Court of Appeals.
Orland Villanueva was married to Lilia CanalitaVillanueva in 1988. Orland eventually
filed for annulment of their marriage by reason of
force and duress employed on him in order to
marry Lilia who was then pregnant. He claims to have
received harassing phone calls and visits
from three men. He also claims that the never
cohabited and that he couldnt have impregnated
her before marriage and that the child died upon
delivery. Lilia however contests that he freely
entered into the marriage and that they lived together
for one month and he wrote her letters
while he was in Manila. He visited her and knew of
her pregnancy and the child dying because
of premature birth. The case was dismissed and
Orland was ordered to pay Lilia damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled
RULING: The court ruled in the negative. The court
said that it took Orland four years to claim that
he was coerced into the marriage which then justifies
the possibility that he is asking for the
annulment of said marriage by reason of a bigamy
case he is facing. Also, his being a security
guard must have given him proper knowledge when it
comes to defending himself making the
claims of force due to facts stated above untenable.
Also, his claim that they did not cohabit is
not a ground for the annulment of marriage especially
since he failed to prove that this was due
to fraud, intimidation, lack of consent and the other
grounds for annulment.
Aquino vs. Delizo 109 Phil 21
FACTS: Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in
September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with
the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that
she was pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal
Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage
contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear
nor presented any evidence. CFI-Rizal dismissed
petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage,
which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari
to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as
alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as
would annul a marriage.

HELD:The concealment by the wife of the fact that at

the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a
ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was
allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to
say that her pregnancy was readily apparent
especially since she was naturally plump or fat. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the womans abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of
the abdomen more general and apparent. In the
following circumstances, the court remanded the case
for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
Almelor vs RTC G.R 179620
FACTS: Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are
both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11
years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with
Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh
disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children
are often unconventional and was the cause of their
frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of
imposing discipline towards their children but is
remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more
affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida
also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as
evidenced by ahis unusual closeness to his male
companions and that he concealed his homosexuality
from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught
Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone
and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel
kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null
and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by
reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality
(Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTCs
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two
can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per
se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the
concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case
at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a
homosexual. The lower court should not have taken
the publics perception against Manuels sexuality. His
peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as
an indication of his homosexuality for those are not
conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so.
Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual,
there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the

case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such

sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas consent
had been vitiated by such.

been otherwise altered had he known all these facts

prior to the marriage because he would lie to every
opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his
case.

Rayray vs Chae Kyung

Sin vs. Sin GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001
FACTS: Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea.
Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a
marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior
to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray
however later found out that Lee had previously lived
with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by
saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to
have more than one partner and that it is legally
permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal
impediment to her marriage with Rayray. Eventually
they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed
before lower court of Manila for an action to annul his
marriage with Lee because Lees where abouts
cannot be determined and that his consent in
marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage
had he known prior that Lee had been living with
other men. His action for annulment had been duly
published and summons were made known to Lee but
due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be
declared in default. The lower court denied Rayrays
action stating that since the marriage was celebrated
in Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case
and that the facts presented by Rayray is not
sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayrays marriage with Lee is
null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine
courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As far as
marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle
is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower
court is however correct in ruling that Rayrays
evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with
Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police
clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to
marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the
other men which is considered bigamous in
Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance
is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who
prepared it and there is no competent document to
establish the identity of the same. Also, through
Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a
person who cohabited with other men before to marry
another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is
aware that if it were a previous marriage that is
concerned then that could be a legal impediment to
any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given
credence in claiming that his consent could have

FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a
Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence Fled, in September 1994, a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
In June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences
petition and throughout its trial since the State did not
participate in the proceedings.
While Fiscal Jabson Fled with the trial court a
manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he
found no collusion between the parties; thus, he did
not actively participated therein
Other than having appearance at certain hearings,
nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be
declared even with the absence of the participation of
the State in the proceedings.
HELD: NO. Throughout the trial in the lower court, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. After
Fling a manifestation in the trial court that he found on
collusion between the parties, the fiscal did not
actively participate therein and neither did the
presiding judge take any step to encourage him to
contribute to the proceedings. The task of protecting
marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere proforma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a
true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid
one as well. This is made clear by the following
pronouncement (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
disagreement or opposition as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the
equivalent Function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095 (underscoring ours).

Article 48 of the amily Code states that in all cases

of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of
the state to take steps to prevent collusion
bet ween the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification
briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case maybe, to the petition. The
records are bereft of an evidence that the State
participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the
case is remanded for proper trial.

MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private
respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a
son. However, their once sugar coated romance
turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private
respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a
case of adultery against private respondent and the
latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were
convicted of the crime charged.

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall

deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either
as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of
the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for
adultery is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with
Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory
penalties. The penalty of prision correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA,
that the crime of adultery does not carry the
accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives
the person of the rights to manage her property and to
dispose of such property inter vivos.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano 107 Phil 35

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the

repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the conviction of the respondent of the
crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.

FACTS: Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano

were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter
discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with
Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where
she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered
that the wife was going out with several other man
other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished
her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his
wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson
Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition
for legal separation to which defendant manifested
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a
petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the

crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in
the conjugal property?

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano

constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed by
the Family Code.

HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry

the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences
of civil interdiction:

HELD: Florencianos admission to the investigating

fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is
not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article
48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a
confession of judgment, a confession done in court or

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed

a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages imputing psychological
incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pretrial of the said case, petitioner and private
respondent
entered
into
a
COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.

through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the

adultery independent of the defendants statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be
based on the confession but upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendants
confession. The petition should be granted based on
the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
REPUBLIC vs IYOY
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Crasus Iyoy was
married to Fely Iyoy in 1961 and this marriage gave
birth to five children. Fely Iyoy eventually left for the
States to provide for their family in 1984 and in less
than a year sent Crasus documents to sign with
regard to a divorce that she applied for. Crasus
eventually found out that Fely married Stephen
Micklus in 1985 and their relationship has conceived
of a child. Crasus eventually questioned the validity of
Felys subsequent marriage. The Court of Appeals in
deciding this case sided with Fely.
ISSUE: Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by
a Filipino from the United States is valid and
recognized in the Philippines
RULING: The court decided in the negative and
reversed the Appellate Courts decision. Basing
from the facts, Fely only became a citizen in 1988 and
acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying
Micklus a year after. This means that paragraph two
of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a
way that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the
time the divorce was acquired and therefore
she does not have the capacity to remarry and the
marriage is still considered as subsisting. The Civil
Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to
family laws and status are governed by Philippine
laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a
Filipino Citizen then, is not permitted by our laws to
acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized
in the Philippines.
LAM vs CHUA
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Lam and Chua were married in the eyar 1984 and
said marriage conceived a son. Chua
claims that Lam was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations. To justify the
claims, Chua says that he is irresponsible and keeps
on asking for money for luxury items. Lam does not
support his family and he rarely comes home. He was
also said to be a womanizer and mismanages their
conjugal properties. With this set-up, Chua had no

choice but to agree to dissolution of their conjugal

partnership of gains and separation of properties. This
was granted by the regional trial court. The spouses
have been living separately and Chua seeks the
nullification of her marriage with Lam. Chua presented
evidence stating the facts given above but failed to
show how much is needed for child support. The case
was reopened at her instance and she presented
evidence showing that Lam has been married twice
before their marriage which renders it bigamous. The
Trial Court declared their marriage void and ordered
Lam to pay child support of 20,000 a month. This was
contested by Lam stating that a common fund was
agreed upon wherein they would both contribute
250,000 each for the support of their
child. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage should
be declared null and void for psychological
incapacity or for being bigamous in nature and
whether or not the 20,000 monthly support is justified.
RULING:
The court ruled in the affirmative on the first issue and
declared it null and void by reason
of bigamy. It was sufficiently proven that Lam was
previously married and incapacitated to
marry again. Said claim was not even contested by
Lam through his petitions which only
questioned the monthly support. He then is estopped
from questioning the nullification of
marriage. With regard to the second issue, the court
decided that the monthly support was not
justified because it was decided beyond the scope of
the questions raised. Also, Chua failed to show the
amount of support actually needed and so the court
upheld the cpncept of a fund agreed upon.
BUCCAT vs BUCCAT
FACTS:
Petitioner met defendant in 1938 and married her the
same year. Eighty nine days into the
marriage, defendant gave birth to a child. It is for this
reason that petitioner is seeking the annulment of
their marriage. He said she claimed to be a virgin
entering into the marriage. The court decided in favor
of the defendant despite the fact that she did not
appear. The court found it untenable that petitioner
did not notice that defendant was pregnant at the time
of marriage because she was about 6 months
pregnant then. Upon appeal, said decision was
affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be declared
annulled based on the evidence adduced
RULING: The court affirmed the decision of the lower
court. This is due to the fact that it was
impossible for a person whose intelligence cannot be
questioned, being a first year law student, to not have
noticed the severe stage and advanced stage that the

person he was marrying was in at that time. His claim

of developed abdomens being normal is not
something the court can accept because it was not
just a normal developed abdomen but one in an
advanced and severe stage of pregnancy. The court
cannot accept that there is fraud.
Tolentino v Villanueva (56 SCRA 1)
Facts:
on April 1962 romulo tolentino filed a suit for
annulment of his marriage to helen villanueva,
alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud,
because immediately after the marriage celebration
he found out that villanueva was pregnant despite the
fact that he had no sexual relation with her prior to the
marriage. And after the marriage celebration they did
not live as husband and wife. Villanueva left his
house and did not know her whereabouts until
January 1962, when he discovered that she was in
Cebu.
The said marriage was solemnized by QC judge.
Virtucio on september 1959.
Villanueva failed to file her responsive pleading
despite the fact that she receive a summon and a
copy of the complaint.
Petitioner filed on June 13 1962 a motion to declare
her in default. And set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
June 28, 1962. An order from respondent declared
private respondent in default, but pursuant to the
provision of article 88 and 101 of the civil code of the
philippines. The said case was referred to the city
fiscal of manila for investigation whether collusion
exist between the parties.
directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within
sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event
of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial
of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and
likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City
Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other
documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information
and guidance.
Thru counsel, petitioner submits to the fiscal only a
copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the
case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel
requiring him to bring petitioner with him as well as
copies of other documents in connection with the
annulment case.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962,
informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not
comply with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily
expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962,
petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge
to set the date for the reception of his evidence on the
ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted
a report of his findings despite the lapse of sixty (60)
days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the
City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
The respondent judge denied the motion of
petitioner unless he submits for interrogation to be

able for the city fiscal to report whether or not there is

collusion between the contracting parties.
The respondent judge dismissed the petition for the
reason that the petitioner is not willing to
submit for interrogation by the fiscal in pursuance to
the provision of article 101 (2) of the new civil code.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
same to his petitioner.
Issue:
WON the lower court is correct dismissing the
petition on the ground of fraud because the same was
based merely on stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.
Ruling:
Yes, where the husband filed a case for annulment for
the ground of fraud (concealment of pregnancy), and
the wife fail to file her responsive pleading. The court
refers the case to the fiscal for further investigation.
However, the petitioner refused to show his evidence
or be interrogated by the fiscal, hence the court
dismissed the complaint for annulment. Investigation
of fiscal is prerequisite where the
defendant has defaulted. Articles 88 &101 of the civil
code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and
legal separation based on stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment and in case of nonappearance of defendant, the court shall refer the
case to the prosecutor to know if collusion between
the parties exists. The action for annulment or divorce
shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged
in the complaint are proved.
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of
the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph
2, shall be observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there
is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and
rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of
marriage and of the family are sacred and therefore
are as much the concern of the State as of the
spouses; because the State and the public have vital
interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
Cardenas v. Cardenas (98 phil 73)
This is an action to annul the marriage entered into by
and between Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia Rinen
upon the ground that when said marriage was entered
into on April 1948, the plaintiff to whom he had
been married on July 10, 1927 was still alive.

Facts:
That plaintiff and defendant Leoncio Cardenas were
married at Malate, Manila on July 10, 1927, before
Minister George W. Wright, as evidenced by the
original marriage contract.
That defendants Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia
Rinen were married at Badoc, Ilocos Norte, on April
10, 1948, before Justice of the Peace Vicente
R. Campos, as evidenced by a certification issued
by the Municipal Treasurer of said municipality and
dated July 27, 1951.
That defendant Leoncio Cardenas admitted in his
sworn affidavit dated August 17, 1945, that he was
legally married to Eulogia Bigornia.
That the U.S. Veterans Administration found from the
records on file in said office that Eulogia Bigornia de
Cardenas is the legal wife of Leoncio Cardenas, as
evidenced by the letter of Orvile A. Bobcock, Chief,
Registration Section, Vocational, Rehabilitation and
Education Division of said U. S. Veterans
Administration, dated March 11, 1952, and marked as
Exhibit D for the plaintiff.
That there has been no divorce, separation,
dissolution or annulment of the marriage between the
plaintiff and defendant Leoncio Cardenas up to the
present.
That the authorization of Rev. George W. Wright to
solemnize marriage does not appear in the records of
the Bureau of Public Libraries. The said minister is no
longer at his residence as mentioned in the marriage
contract and that the office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila has no record of the marriage
license of plaintiff and defendant as evidenced by the
defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Leoncio
Cardenas and Florencia Rinen is valid even though
he has a subsisting marriage with Eulogia Birgornia
De Cardenas?
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the appellants.
Upon this stipulation the Court rendered judgment
declaring that the marriage between the defendants
Leoncio Cardenas and Florencia Rinen entered into
on April 19, 1948 is null and void ab initio. The
appellants insist on their contention that there is
nothing in the stipulation which shows that Minister
George W. Wright had authority to solemnize the
marriage between Leoncio Cardenas and Eulogia
Bigornia; that it does not appear in the stipulation of
facts that a marriage license was issued to enable
them to marry.
A marriage license as provided for in article 53,
paragraph 4, of the new Civil Code and in section 7 of
the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613
), which took effect on August 30, 1950 and
December 4, 1929, respectively,
was not required by General Orders No. 68, the law in
force on 10 July 1927 when the marriage was entered
into by and between Cardenas and Bigornia. The
marriage certificate attesting that a marriage
ceremony was performed by a minister named
George W. Wright gives rise to the presumption that

all legal formalities required by law had been

complied with the fulfilled. If the minister was not
authorized to perform such marriage ceremony it was
incumbent upon the defendants to show such lack of
authority on
the part of the minister.
In disposing of this appeal we did not overlook article
88 of the new Civil Code which provides that "No
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts . . .." This article and article
101 on legal separation of the same Code
contemplate the annulment of a marriage or legal
separation where the parties might secure the
annulment of their marriage or their legal separation
by collusion. In this case the possibility of such
collusion is remote, because the interest of the two
wives are conflicting.
Apart from this, the marriage certificates are evidence
and cannot be deemed to be a stipulation of facts.
Silva vs. CA
Facts: Silva, a married businessman, and Gonzales,
an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the
benefit of marriage, they have two (2) children namely
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Their relationship
was not in good term when Gonzales decided to
pursue her acting career over his (Silva) vigorous
objects. The assertion was quickly refuted by
Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never
stopped working
throughout their relationship. Until they decided to
parted ways.
On February 1986, Silva filed a petition for
child custody/ visitation rights before RTC
Branch 78 Quezon, City, where it was opposed by
Gonzales because Silva often engaged in gambling
and womanizing, which she was afraid that it could
affected the moral and social values of the children.
On April 7, 1989, RTC granted the petition for visitorial
rights his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays,
but in no case should he take out the children without
the written consent of the mother or respondent
herein.
Gonzales got married to a Dutch national and they
emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica
Natalia. ht up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening
of his character.
Every child has the right to protection against
exploitation, improper influences, hazards and other
conditions or circumstances prejudicial to his physical,
mental, emotional, social and moral development.
The children concerned are still in their early
formative years of life. The molding of the character of
the child starts at home. A home with only one parent
is more normal than two separate houses - (one

house where one parent lives and another house

where the other parent
with another woman/man lives). After all, under Article
176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are
supposed to use the surname of and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother.
ISSUES: WON petitioner could get his visitation rights
to his children and if Silva is fit as a father figure to his
children.
HELD: YES. The allegations of respondent against
the character of petitioner, even assuming as true,
cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner
an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to
the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and
degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product
of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness,
would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting
a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate
children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a
father who is deprived of his children of tender
ages."[i][6]
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more
than a parents natural desire to be able to call on,
even if it were only on brief visits, his own children.
The
trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary measure,
i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children
without the written consent of the mother."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is
REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of
the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No
cost
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas and Sol Gen
Nature of the Case: Direct Appeal from RTC decision,
a petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
He was married to the respondent but was shocked of
the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was
granted. Desirous to marry another woman he now
loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil
Registry Office and was informed that the foreign
decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
marriage as dissolved with the RTC where
respondent failed to submit any response. The RTC
denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner
lacked locus standi. Thus, this case was filed before
the Court.

ISSUES: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the

FC extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction fro the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
HELD: The alien spouse cannot claim under the
second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code
because the substantive right it establishes is in
favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second par of Art 26 of the
Family Code.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Art 26 of
the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
the petitioner of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
petitioner, being a naturalized Canadian citizen now,
is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the
authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity
to aliens national law.
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
Facts:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who
acquired properties in the USA and in the Philippines
during the marriage. They have 2 children. According
to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David
abandoned his family and lived with his mistress.
Further, she claimed that they executed a joint
affidavit where he renounced all his rights and interest
in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines.
After learning of Davids extra-marital affair, Leticia
filed a petition for divorce before the Superior Court of
California. Divorce was granted and judgment was
duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as
well as all the couples properties in the USA.
Leticia then filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and
Davids failure to comply with his obligation under the
same. David demanded that the conjugal partnership
properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated since a divorce decree was already
entered.
The RTC regarded that since the parties are US
citizens, their marriage is hereby declared
DISSOLVED pursuant to the divorce decree. Thus,
the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia

as one for liquidation of the absolute community of

property instead of an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property. Their property was classified as
absolute community because they did not execute
any marriage settlement before the solemnization of
their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family
Code.
Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the
doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law
should apply because the court cannot take judicial
notice of the US law since the parties did not submit
any proof of their national law. The court adjudicated
the Philippine properties to David subject to the
payment of the childrens legitimes.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision and directed
the equal division of the Philippine properties between
the spouses and both should pay their children the
amount of P520,000.00.
In the present petition, David insists that CA should
have recognized the California Judgment which
awarded the Philippine properties to him and allowing
Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment considering that she
was already granted all US properties by the
California court.
Issues: 1. Whether the marriage between David and
Leticia has been dissolved pursuant to the divorce
decree issued by the Superior Court of California;
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of
property is proper in accordance with the Family Code
Held: 1. The trial court erred in recognizing the
divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. Foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. A copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as
a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer
has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be
issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in

which the record is kept, and authenticated by the

seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented. Even if
we
apply
the
doctrine
of
processual
presumption,divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The
trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that: Any
of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
for judicial separation of property:
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have
been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The records of this case are replete with evidence
that both parties had indeed separated for more than
a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable.
First, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living
separately since 2003 when David decided to go back
to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second,
Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented
herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once
confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita
listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually
separated for at least one year, the petition for judicial
separation of absolute community of property should
be granted

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,

PETITIONER, VS. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
RESPONDENT.
Facts: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized
American citizen. After obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner. On 18
November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines.
on February 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate
of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one
of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed
a similar petition.
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed
her petition for letters of administration. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is
only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged
with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Thus, not being an interested party
and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The petitioner claims that the reasoning is illogical
stating that on the one hand, she was acquitted of
bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her
marriage with Orlando was invalid.
Issue: W/N the CA must reconsider its decision in
issuing the letter of administration over the estate of
Orlando Catalan.
Ruling: The petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. It is imperative for the trial court to first
determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration
over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

FUJIKA VS. MARINAY

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national
who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay

allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She

left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the
petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the
foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
Held:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 0211-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages
are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.Rule 108,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec.
1. Who
may
file
petition.
Any
person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which

has been recorded in the civil register, may file a

verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it.
3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity
of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign
law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine
courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign

citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,

Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule
of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine
(1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic
ground
to
repel
the
foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.