Jhapz

Case no.1

SEC. 3 RULE 110

COMPLAINT DEFINED
EBARLE VS. HON JUDGE SUCALDITO
[G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987.]
FACTS:

petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincial Governor of Zamboanga

anda candidate for re-election in the 1971 local elections
private respondent Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc., filed a several
complaints with the of the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law as well as Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code against Gov. Bienvinido Ebale
petitioner filed for prohibition and certiorari in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Sur but the case was dismissed
in the petition filed before the SC, petitioner claims that the respondents City
Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of
EO264 preliminary to their criminal recourses OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE
BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING THE GOVT OFFICIALS AND EPLOYEES
WITH THE COMMISSION OFIRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED
petitioner assails the standing of respondent Anti-Graft League to commence
the series of prosecutions

Held:
Petitioner claim in EO 264 is without merit.
E.O 264 the Order that it has exclusive application to administrative, not
criminal complaints.
The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no
mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say,
"crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could
have very well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make
itself applicable thereto.
To our mind, the "procedure provided by law and regulations" referred to
pertains to existing procedural rules with respect to the presentation of
administrative charges against erring government officials. And in fact, the
afore quoted paragraphs are but restatements thereof.
It is moreover significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific
reference to "erring officials or employees . . . removed or otherwise

vindicated." If it were intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would

have employed such technical terms as "accused," "convicted," or
"acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases,
it is here material in construing the intent of the measure.
The challenge the petitioner presents against the personality of the Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines to bring suit is equally without merit.
. That the Anti-Graft League is not an "offended party" within the meaning of
Section 2, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure), cannot abate the complaints in question.
A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not
be filed by the "offended party." The rule has been that, unless the offense
subject thereof is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be
filed, for preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The
"complaint" referred to in the Rule 110 contemplates one filed in court, not
with the fiscal, In that case, the proceeding must be started by the aggrieved
party himself.
For as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by complaint or
information, both of which are filed in court. In case of a complaint, it must be
filed by the offended party; with respect to an information, it is the fiscal who
files it. But a "complaint" filed with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be
filed by any person.
Case no.2
RULE 110 SEC.3
COMPLAINT DEFINED
- VALUE OF ALLEGATION
PEOPLE VS. MENDEZ

[G.R. No. 131815. August 14, 2002.]

FACTS:

On December 9, 1994, accused-appellant Pablo Lansang, along with Noel

Murial and Victor Mendez, were charged with murder of Vidal Lareta in
Pandan , Sogod, Southern Leyte.
All of the three accused entered a plea of "not guilty." 2 Subsequently,
however, Victor Mendez and Noel Murial, with the assistance of their counsel
de officio, withdrew their negative plea and pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide. Thereafter, trial ensued against accused-appellant Pablo
Lansang.

Prosecutor established that there was a treachery to convict the accused of

murder.
The defense presented the testimonies of Noel Murial and Victor
Mendez.,that the victim, Vidal Larita, stabbed Nene Mendez on the chest so
he and Victor Mendez retaliated by killing Vidal Larita. He claimed that Pablo
Lansang took no part in the killing as he was with Nene Mendez at Sogod
Emergency Hospital.
Victor Mendez, likewise, admitted that he and Noel Murial killed Vidal Larita
and that Pablo Lansang was at the Sogod Emergency Hospital when the
killing took place.
RTC rendered decision in favor of prosecution. Accused were convicted on
murder.

Held:

SC, take exception to the trial court's finding of treachery, to wit: There was
treachery in this case and this is supported by the evidence on record when
Noel and Pablo tried to be friendly with Vidal and deceivingly respectful when
they first greeted him a "Good Evening" which the latter answered also in a
respectful way. Then, all of a sudden, Noel hacked Vidal and Pablo followed
suit, without giving Vidal a fair chance to defend himself.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make. 16 In People vs.
Lab-eo, (G.R. No. 133438, January 16, 2002) it was held that: The essence of
treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or escape.
In the instant case, treachery cannot be properly appreciated as the accusedappellant's attack against the victim was not unexpected or without warning.
The trial court also found that abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime. However, this circumstance was not specifically
alleged in the information, hence, it cannot be appreciated either as a
qualifying or an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, accused-appellant
can only be held liable for Homicide, not Murder as found by the trial court.

Case no. 3
SEC. 4 RULE 110
INFORMATION DEFINED
-

INFORMATION NOT UNDER OATH

ESTODILLO VS. JUDGE BALUMA

[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837. March 23, 2004.]
FACTS:

The respondent judge dismissed an information because he found that it was

not subscribed and sworn to by the prosecutor.
Dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn Estodillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her mother,
Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and
Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose from the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts of Child Abuse entitled
"People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie Cirilo Nocos y Urot" by
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch I, a Family
Court.
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same forming parts of
the Records in this case appearing in pages 28 and 30, the court finds that
the same is not subscribed and sworn to by the prosecutor.
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the Information will readily
show that the information had not been subscribed by the prosecutor and this
will militate against the validity of the information and towards nullity and
total worthlessness of the same.
The prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration stating that he merely
concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and that he had
properly subscribed and signed the information with the approval of the
provincial prosecutor.
The motion was granted but at the same time required the public prosecutor
to file new information incorporating formalities required by the Rules of
Court. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a manifestation stating that it will not
file new information as ordered because the same is contrary to law and
jurisprudence.

HELD:

SC ruled that, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: Sec. 4.
Information defined. An information is an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the
rules would have so provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as a
"sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by
the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated". In a case, we ruled that the information
need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the

prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto
and is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. Clearly,
respondent had confused an information from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or signed
by Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent erred in
dismissing the subject Information on the ground that it was not under oath.
The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an information as "an
accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court" (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not
require that it be under oath for otherwise, it would have provided so. On the
other hand, a complaint is defined as "a sworn statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated" (Section 5,
Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a
complaint and an information need to be under oath. But the oath is not
required when it is a public prosecutor who files the information because he
does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his position. The
position of the public prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation had
been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin and the
latter's resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.

Case no. 4

SEC. 5 RULE 110

WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
-A. RESEARCH FOR AUTHORITY
PEOPLE VS. CA
[G.R. No. 126005. January 21, 1999.]
FACTS:

Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an information for murder in connection with

the fatal shooting of Rosalinda Dy inside the office of his father, Billy Cerbo.
The information was amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused
and a warrant for his arrest was correspondingly issued.
Respondent judge, in a motion to quash warrant of arrest, dismissed the case
against Billy for insufficiency of evidence, recalled the warrant issued, and
ordered the prosecution to withdraw its amended information and to file a
new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.

. The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, his
resort to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court, in affirming the trial court held that the trial court RTC
has authority to reverse the prosecutor's finding of probable cause and
dismiss the information on the ground that the evidence presented did not
substantiate the charge.
Petioner Dy avers:
Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge
had the authority to reverse [the public prosecutor's] finding of probable
cause to prosecute accused . . . and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter
on the basis of a motion to quash warrant of arrest.

Held:

The petition is meritorious. The trial court erred in dismissing the Information
filed against the private respondent. Consequently, the Court of Appeals was
likewise in error when it upheld such ruling.
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon. Indeed, the public prosecutor
has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Therefore,
if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination.
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the
sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party,
according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. . . .
Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by the law, not only
have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according
to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a
crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the
duty not to prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie case."

Case no. 5

SEC. 5 RULE 110

WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
B. ABSENCE DURING ARRAINGMENT
VILLANUEVA VS. JUDGE ALMAZAN
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000.]
Facts:

On October 9, 1987, the complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Santo Tomas, La Union, presided over by respondent Judge, two (2)
Complaints for Grave Oral Defamation against one Teresita Nabayan. On the
same day, the respondent Judge, conducted a "preliminary examination,"
after which he issued an order downgrading the crimes charged to simple
slander.
The Court conducted the necessary preliminary examination to determine
the existence of probable cause by asking searching questions to the
witnesses for the prosecution. In the course of investigation, the Court is
convinced that the offense committed by the accused was just simple
slander.
On January 21, 1998, accused Teresita Nabayan was arraigned in the
absence of the public prosecutor, who did not receive any calendar of cases
for that day.
The principal issues for resolution here concern the propriety of the
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent judge, and the
arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases. Corollarily, the
downgrading of the said cases, and denial of complainant's motion to inhibit
respondent judge from trying the same cases are denounced.
The Court Administrator found respondent judge administratively liable and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, with stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

Held:

The Supreme Court found merit in the recommendation of the Court

Administrator.

SC ruled that, respondent judge was careful to refer to his challenged action
as a preliminary examination. Be that as it may, when he concluded that the
proper charge should be simple slander, after examining the complainant and
her witnesses in subject criminal cases, respondent Judge, in effect,
conducted a preliminary investigation. Not only was such preliminary
investigation defective; it was a patent error because no preliminary
investigation is required for criminal cases cognizable by Municipal Trial
Courts. It is only required for those cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Consequently, the respondent judge was devoid of jurisdiction or authority to
reduce the charge to simple slander.
In the present cases, the respondent judge showed his ignorance not only of
the scope of his authority to conduct preliminary investigation but also of the
procedure to follow in conducting a preliminary investigation.
Equally erroneous was the action of respondent judge in proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused in subject criminal cases without the participation
of a government prosecutor. The Court need not belabor the point that as the
officer in charge of prosecuting criminal cases for the government, rudiments
of due process require that the public prosecutor must be afforded an
opportunity to intervene in all stages of the proceedings. Here, it cannot be
denied that the public prosecutor assigned to handle Criminal Cases Nos.
3097 and 3098 was not notified by respondent judge of the scheduled trial of
said cases. That the public prosecutor in the said criminal cases had an
arrangement with the respondent Judge as early as June 1997 that trial of
cases requiring his appearance be transferred from the previous Tuesday
schedule to Wednesdays, did not excuse the failure of the latter to notify the
former of the scheduled trial on January 21, 1998 (a Wednesday) in subject
criminal cases.

Case no. 6
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTION
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
- ABSENCE DURING TRIAL
ENRIQUEZ VS. JUDGE VILLARTA.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1398. February 27, 2002.]
FACTS:

The complainant, Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez, was counsel for the accused in
Criminal Case No. 215-98 for malicious mischief, before the court of
respondent judge. The criminal case involved the alleged malicious cutting by

the accused Venancio Santos of the branches of a tamarind tree worth

P20,000.00
Complainant herein was counsel for the accused in a criminal case for
malicious mischief before the court of the respondent judge.
He filed a complaint against the respondent judge, in which he claimed that
the latter allowed the prosecution of the case to be conducted by a private
prosecutor without the participation of a public prosecutor.
He further alleged therein that the respondent judge ordered the parties to
submit memoranda which was prohibited under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Respondent judge subsequently found complainant's client guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to 25 days of imprisonment without costs.
The Office of the Court Administrator found the explanation of respondent
judge on the use of the "memorandum" as merely a lapse in language and
agreed that the intervention of a private prosecutor was authorized under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, it found respondent liable for his
failure to timely decide the case within 30 days from the date it was
submitted for decision and recommended a corresponding penalty therefor.

HELD:

SC. Agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent judge
cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private prosecutor in the
trial of Criminal Case No. 215-98.

Rule 110, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000) provides:

All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be

prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in
Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor
assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any
peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual
intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional
Trial Court.
Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that official duty was
regularly performed. This presumption is reinforced in this case by the fact
that complainant, as counsel for the accused, failed to object to the absence
of the public prosecutor, giving rise to the presumption that the intervention
of a private prosecutor was due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor.
By failing to make a timely objection, complainant must be deemed to have
waived his objection to the proceedings before respondent judge.

Case no. 7
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
1. PRESENCE OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
D. RULE ON APPEAL

SALAZAR VS. HON. ROMAQUIN

[G.R. No. 151068. May 21, 2004.]
FACTS:

On May 12, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan filed an Information in

the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, charging the petitioner with
murder.
The Provincial Prosecutor recommended no bail in this case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6002.
Barely three hours after filing the Information, the Provincial Prosecutor
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest in the
said case alleging, inter alia, that: There is an urgent need for the
issuance of Warrant of Arrest against the accused as the lives of some
people are in danger considering that the motive is political and with the
election day on May 14, 2001, there is an urgent need to protect the
public from anymore bloodshed and as wrongly or intentionally design by
the accused, if the motive is infidelity, to protect the life of her wife, Noli
Marie Salazar, who is residing on the same address in Dumaguit, New
Washington, Aklan.
On May 15, 2001, the petitioner received a copy of the Joint Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause for murder against
him which formed the basis for the filing of the Information.
On May 16, 2001, the petitioner filed in the RTC an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Lift Warrant of Arrest. The petitioner alleged,
inter alia, that he had filed a petition for review of the Joint Resolution of
the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause for murder against
him in the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion, contending that the filing
of a petition for review of the investigating prosecutors resolution in the
Office of the Secretary of Justice was not a justification for the suspension
of the enforcement of the warrant of arrest issued by the court.
On August 10, 2001, Judge Tomas R. Romaquin, who presided over Branch
2 of the court, issued an Order granting the petitioners motion to suspend
the proceedings. However, the petitioners motion to lift warrant of arrest
was denied. The petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the
order, but the court denied the same. The trial court declared that the

issues raised by the petitioner had become moot and academic since the
Secretary of Justice had denied his petition for review and affirmed the
joint resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause
against him.
The petitioner forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals on November 5, 2001, assailing the orders of the RTC.
On November 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying
due course and dismissing the petition, on the ground that the petitioner
failed to show proof of service of the petition on the respondents, as
mandated by Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to Rules 65 and 13 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended.

Held:

SC. RULED, that the contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit.

The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and represent the
respondent People of the Philippines is confined only to the proceedings
before the trial court. This is based on Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides, viz:
SEC. 5.
Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the
case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer
charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case.
This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon
elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or resolutions of the
trial court are served on the People of the Philippines through the Provincial
Prosecutor. However, in appeals before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) on
automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the People of the
Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of the Solicitor
General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines. This is
provided for in Section 35(1) Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code, viz:
(1)
Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

Case no.8

SEC.5 RULE 110

WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
2. WHERE PROSECUTOR FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE.

STAS ROSA MINING CO. VS. FISCAL ZABALA

[G.R. No. L-44723. August 31, 1987.]
FACTS:

March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials
(scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido
and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte,
then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a
resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for
Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima
facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte an Information.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal.
On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal
by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido
et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review."
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records,
reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed
said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal
case.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance
of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the
Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order
dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would
not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
"commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or

appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte"
. The question presented for determination now is after a case has been
filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his
motion to dismiss it has been denied?

HELD:

There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to

the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the
information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs.
Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the
information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do
so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already
been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of
the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and
pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested
solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of
First Instance, supra).
The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the
prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the
criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4,
Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and
void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361).
"In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear
for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the
State."
Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists,
he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse
to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the
criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what
he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the
presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to
his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs.
Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he
should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of
his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the
evidence adduced by both parties.

Case no. 9
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
3.PRIVATE OFFENSES
- A. FILLING BY A RETARDATE

PEOPLEvs. BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ

[G.R. No. 135022. July 11, 2002.]
FACTS:

On or about the 3 July 1996, in the Municipality of Calumpit, Province of

Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused Bienvenidodela Cruz also known as Jun did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design have carnal knowledge of one
JonalynYumang y Banag, a mentally deficient female person, against her will
and without her consent.
At the next hearing, the trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the
witness stand Dr. Cecilia Tuazon, Medical Officer III of the National Center for
Mental Health. Dr. Tuazon testified that she conducted a psychiatric
examination on JONALYN on 12 July 1996. She found that JONALYN was
suffering from a moderate level of mental retardation and that although
chronologically the latter was already 20 years of age (at the time of the
examination), she had the mental age of an 8 1/2-year-old child under the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Dr. Tuazon also found that JONALYN could
have attained a higher degree of intelligence if not for the fact that she was
unschooled and no proper motivation was employed on her, and that she had
the capacity to make her perception known to others. She, however,
observed that she had to "prompt" JONALYN most of the time to elicit
information on the sexual harassment incident. She then narrated that
JONALYN was able to relate to her that she (JONALYN) was approached by a
tall man named Jun-Jun who led her to a house that supposedly belonged to
her cousin, and that Jun-Jun disrobed JONALYN and raped her twice
Whether or not the complaint filed by mentally deficient victim,
independently of her relatives are valid.

HELD:
The Supreme Court the determination of the competence of witnesses to testify
rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes

their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their

understanding of the obligation of an oath.
The prosecution has proved the complainant's competency by the testimony of Dr.
Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon
that the complainant had the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate
the fact of her competency. Its only effect is to consider her testimony from the
point of view of an 8-year-old minor.Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed
by a minor.
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. . . .
xxxxxxxxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 5.
Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts when there is no fiscal available, the offended party, any peace officer or
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the
case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation
of the case to the Regional Trial Court.
xxxxxxxxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no
known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal
action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the
prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other
than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the
complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. The right to file
the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of

all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided,
except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph.

Case. No. 10
SEC. 5 RULE 110
WHO MUST PROSECUTE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
3.PRIVATE OFFENSES
- B. FILLING BY A DAUGHTER

PEOPLE VS. ERNESTO NICOLAS Y Ocampo

[G.R. No. 135877. August 22, 2002.]
Facts:

On October 21, 1997, Ernesto Nicolas sexually abused his first cousin, 53
year-old Flaviana Mendoza, who was physically paralyzed and in a very weak
state of mind and health. By reason thereof, he was charged and convicted of
the crime of rape and the maximum penalty of death was imposed upon him.
Presenting the testimony of daughters and son of the victim including the
findings of physician attended the victim the accused was convicted of the
crime rape.
Accused- appellant raised an issue on appeal for resolution.
Whether or not it is indispensable for the prosecution to present Annaliza
Urmelita, the daughter of the victim who subscribed to the complaint for
rape.

HELD:

Appellant contends that Annaliza Urmelita should have been presented in

order to identify her complaint during the trial. Appellant avers that her
failure to do so amounts to a lack of a valid complaint, because under Section
5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, such identification by
complainant is jurisdictional in a prosecution for rape. Appellant also

contends that Annaliza's non-presentation during trial violates the

constitutional right of the accused to meet and confront his accuser.
The OSG avers that considering Flaviana's state of health, it devolved upon
her children, of sufficient age and discretion, to execute the complaint on her
behalf. Note that Flaviana's own parents, said to be about aged 97, were
already too feeble for the ordeal. Her daughter Annaliza Urmelita undertook
the task and filed the affidavit-complaint sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the
court. The OSG further contends that there was no need to present Annaliza
during trial since she did not witness the rape incident. It was sufficient to
have presented her siblings Joel and Daisy who saw what had happened.
These witnesses had in fact been confronted and cross-examined by the
defense, in satisfaction of the right of the accused guaranteed under the
Constitution.
The contentions of the OSG are well-taken.
It is true that at the time, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure required a
sworn complaint of the offended party in the prosecution of rape and other
private crimes. The purpose of this requirement was to serve as a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute
the guilty parties. 19 The overriding consideration in determining compliance
with the requirement is the intent and determination of the aggrieved party
to seek judicial redress. 20 Once the requirement is satisfied by the proper
affidavit or complaint, the prosecutorial process is then commenced, and the
court could validly exercise its legally mandated jurisdiction over the rape
case.
The rule is that when the offended party has executed and subscribed to a
complaint, the prosecution before the court may be initiated by means of an
information signed by the prosecutor alone. 21 But there is nothing in the
rule that requires the complaint to still be identified in court during trial. The
rule, in our view, is not vitiated by the fact that the complaint was signed by
the daughter of the disabled and mentally ill victim. Otherwise the rule would
be requiring the impossible, which is absurd.
Annaliza Urmelita's affidavit-complaint, we believe, is sufficient compliance
with the rules. Annaliza swore to the contents of her affidavit-complaint,
which was duly filed. Moreover, all of Flaviana's other children have shown
their intent to proceed with the case by actively participating in the trial.
These include Ma. Victoria, Joel, and Daisy, who were presented as witnesses.
In our view, it is clear that the offended party's children are firm in their
resolve to seek judicial redress.
As to the alleged violation of appellant's right to confrontation, we find
appellant's contention without merit.
The right to confrontation has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the
accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by crossexamination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of the witness. 29

In this case, Annaliza was the one who signed the complaint, considering the
physical disability of her paralyzed mother. However, it was her sister Daisy
and brother Joel who saw what had happened on October 21, 1997. The
occurrences that constitute the crime charged were culled from their
testimony. Notably, appellant had the opportunity to confront both Daisy and
Joel, along with the other prosecution witnesses. Daisy and Joel were
presented in court, and their testimonies were adequately tested by the
defense who subjected them to cross-examination. Likewise, the judge had
ample opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying, and evaluate
their testimony. The judge found their testimony candid, straightforward and
credible. 30 It was not, in our view, indispensable under the circumstances of
this case to present Annaliza on the witness stand.