Cruz and Monedero vs Judge Areola and Branch Clerk of Court Janice

Yulo-Antero
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642. March 6, 2002
J. Puno
Facts:
The evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman issued a resolution recommending the filing of an
Information for estafa against Marilyn Carreon, an employee of the LTO,
relative to a criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs Marilyn
Carreopn. Accused filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation which the
respondent Judge Areola denied the motion and immediately issued a
Warrant of Arrest and released by respondent Branch of clerk. After a few
weeks, Judge Areola issued another order deferring the implementation of
the Warrant of Arrest against Carreon and granted her Motion for
Reconsideration for the reinvestigation of the case. The Office of the City
Prosecutor issued a resolution finding no cogent reason to modify, reverse,
or alter the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and recommended
that the case be set on trial. Judge Areola granted Carreons motion to
suspend further proceedings to hold in abeyance for the resolution of the
motion with regard to the resolution of the reinvestigation. Complainants
filed an instant complaint charging both Judge and his branch clerk of court
for ignorance of the law on the basis of the foregoing orders issued by them.
Issue:
Whether or not the orders of respondent Judge and the release
thereof by respondent Branch clerk of court constitute ignorance of the law
Held:
No. It must be stressed that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge
to determine probable cause personally, making it the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause.
The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The
judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus,
even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or
evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.
Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of his official duties, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, nothing less than the fundamental law of the land
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance
of warrants of arrest. A judge fails in this constitutionally mandated duty if

he relies merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer

The fact that the respondent Judge ordered the re-investigation of the
case does not in any way make him liable for ignorance of the law. In the
exercise of his discretion, he believed that a re-investigation was called for
and thus held in abeyance the implementation of the warrant of arrest.
There is no showing that he abused such discretion as it was part of the
performance of his duty under the Constitution and he could not be faulted
for it. Much more could we find fault with respondent Branch Clerk of Court
who acts under the direction of the presiding Judge and whose only role in
this complaint charged against her was to release the duly signed orders of
the respondent Judge.
Teresita Okabe. Vs Hon. Pedro Gutierrez of RTC Pasay, People of the
Philippines, and Cecilia Maruyama
G.R. No. 150185. May 27, 2004
J. Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
Cecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint2 and
filed the same with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charging
Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe with estafa. During the
preliminary investigation, the complainant, respondent Maruyama,
submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner which was subsequently approved by the city
prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a
recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the
said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan twice, firsr without
the trial courts permission, but returned here in the country. On July 14,
2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance
of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the
petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence
adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the
petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure
Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for
the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for
support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of
probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent
judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped
the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner
refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the courtroom. Petitioner

filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order
however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed a reversible error in
determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the
witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary evidence,
as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the CA made a reversible error in ruling that whatever
infirmity there was in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the same was
cured when petitioner voluntarily submitted to the respondent courts
jurisdiction when she posted bail and filed motions seeking affirmative relief
such as lift/recall hold-departure order and to allow petitioner to travel
regularly to Japan.
Held:
1.
Yes. The court agrees with the petitioner that before the RTC judge
issues a warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court 42
in relation to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the judge must
make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. The duty to make such determination is
personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and
rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that he had
conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules
of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the
Information.
In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and
conclusions in the resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding
probable cause for the filing of the Information. However, in determining the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused,
the judge should not rely solely on the said report.51 The judge should
consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counteraffidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the
case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by
the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. The rulings of this Court are
now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that an Information or complaint filed in court
shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and

their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence of the

resolution
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the information or
complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be
supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and
their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and
the resolution on the case.
2.
Yes. The court agrees with the contention of the petitioner that the
appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or
irregular preliminary investigation.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this
Court that an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused
shall be considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for
his arrest on the legalities or irregularities thereon. The new rule is curative
in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils
in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are
applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in
application.34 Besides, procedural rules as a general rule operate
retroactively, even without express provisions to that effect, to cases
pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet
undetermined at the time of their effectivity.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an
actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable
cause.36 When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other
explanation of his conduct is possible. The posting of a personal bail bond
was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not
be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her arrest.
Neither can the petitioners filing of a motion for the lifting of the hold
departure order and for leave to go to Japan be considered a waiver of her
right to assail the validity of the arrest warrant issued by the respondent
judge. It bears stressing that when the petitioner filed the motion to lift the
hold departure order issued against her by the respondent judge, her motion
for a determination of probable cause was still unresolved.
People of the Philippines vs Mamerto Abner, et al., Roberto Soler and
Domingo Abella
G.R. No. L-2508. October 27, 1950

J. Paras
Facts:
Lt. Regino filed a complaint for robbery in band with rape with the
heading In the Justice of the Pace Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur
against Mamerto Abner and others committed in the municipality of
Tinambac Province of Camarines Sur. However, justice of the peace of
Tinambac was absent and the municipal mayor refused to receive the
complaint, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur directed the Justice
of the Peace of Naga, the capital, to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. Abner was admitted to bail and the appellants Soler and
Abella executed the necessary bail bond, which was approved by the Justice
of Peace of Naga and directed the case to the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur after Abner, through counsel, waived his right to preliminary
investigation. Upon the consistent postponement of trial and disappearance
of the accused, the provincial fiscal filed a petition for the confiscation of the
bail bond and the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur granted the
same. Appellants contend that the court of first instance did not acquire
jurisdiction, because no complaint was filed in the Justice of Peace Court of
Tinambac, and reliance is placed on the allegation of the fiscal, in his motion
of September 6, 1946, that the complaint signed by Lieutenant Regino was
not so filed in view of the absence of the justice of the peace and the refusal
of the municipal mayor of Tinambac to receive said complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the CFI of Camarines Sur acquired jurisdiction over
the case of Mamerto Abner.
Held:
Yes. The bond executed by the appellants contained the following
recital: A complaint having been filed on September 17, 1946 in the justice
of the Peace Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur .." This admission, which is
subsequent to the motion of the fiscal of September 6, 1946, is inconsistent
with appellants' contention. Moreover, the proceedings had before the
Justice of the Peace of Naga and the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, in relation to the measures taken by the appellants prior to the
confiscation of their bond, carry the implication that the complaint was duly
filed. The presumption that official duty was performed has not been
destroyed. (See Sec. 2 Rule 108, Rules of Court).
It appears that the bond in question was not signed by the accused
Abner as principal; and it is contended by the appellants that it is
accordingly void. Section 1, Rule 110, of the Rules Court, provides that "bail
is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance."
A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or
magistrate duly authorized to take it, with the condition to do some
particular act, the most usual condition in criminal cases being the
appearance of the accused for trial.

The bail bond executed by the appellants, though so denominated, is

essentially a recognizance, an "obligation" contracted with the State by the
appellants, not requiring as an indispensable condition for its validity, the
signature of the accused. In addition, under the circumstances of this case,
the appellants were estopped from assailing the effectiveness of their bail
contract. If, as contended by appellants, it would be difficult, without the
accused Abner having signed as principal, for them to obtain indemnity from
or to have power and control over him, they are solely to blame.
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. vs CA, Judge Serafin Camilon & Ricardo Pronove
of CFI Rizal and Pasig, People of the Philippines, SEC, Commissioner
Edmundo Reyes of Immigration & Chief of AVESCOM
G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986
J. Fernan
Facts:
Petitioner Manotoc is one of the two principal stockholders of TransInsular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the latter into the
hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but
acts as president of the former corporation. Manotoc filed a petition to the
SEC for the appointment of a Management Committee for both Manotoc
Securities Inc and Trans-Insular Management Inc. SEC requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner. When a Torrens
title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to
be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against
petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, the investigating
fiscal filed corresponding criminal charges for estafa before the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing,
both trial judges denied the same. CA dismissed also the petition for
certiorari of Manotoc.
Issue:
Whether or not a person, facing a criminal indictment
provisionally released on bail, has an unrestricted right to travel.

and

Held:
None. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused

were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be

placed beyond the reach of the courts.
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely derive such
right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains
unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right
of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his
allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would not
have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if
it were otherwise.
Also, petitioners case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In
the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her
travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the
proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the
conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the above. Petitioner has not specified the
duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it.
Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had
posted cash indemnities.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an
absolute right. To our mind, the order of the trial court, releasing petitioner
on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated.

Issuance of Hold Departure Order of Judge Luisito T. Adaoag, MTC,

Camiling Tarlac
A.M. No. 99-8-126-MTC. September 22, 1999
J. Mendoza
Facts:
This refers to the endorsement of the Secretary of Justice concerning
a "hold-departure" order issued by Judge Adaoag, Municipal Trial Court,
Camiling, Tarlac, in Criminal Case entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Nestor Umagat y Campos." The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the
fact that the order in question is contrary to Circular No. 39-97, dated June
19, 1997, of this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of Hold Departure Order of Judge Adaoag
is valid.
Held:
No. The said circular limits the authority to issue hold departure
orders to the Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases within their exclusive
jurisdiction. Circular No. 39-97 provides:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order shall

furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Bureau of

Immigration (BI) of the Department of Justice with a copy each of the
Hold-Departure Order issued within twenty-four (24) hours from the
time of issuance and through the fastest available means of
transmittal.
3
Judge Adaoag admits his mistake and pleads ignorance of the circular.
He explained that:
a. The order is a mere request from the Commission on Immigration
b. The questioned order was issued in two criminal cases within the
Jurisdiction of the Court in the interest of the state upon motion of the
Department of Justice thru its Assistant Prosecutor
c. The court was misled into believing that the court could issue an order
requesting the Bureau of Immigration because the motion for the
issuance of a hold departure order was filed and prayed for by the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor
d. The court has no copy of Circular No. 39-97 and upon research it
found out for the first time that Hold Departure Orders shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts
Judge Luisito T. Adaoag is hereby REPRIMANDED with the WARNING.

People of the Philippines vs Cresencia Reyes

G.R. No. 101127-31. August 7, 1992
J. Regalado
Facts:
Appellant was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
37, in three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 2 and two cases
of estafa. On the three cases for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
appellant was convicted and sentenced to a total penalty of two years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine. On the two indictments for estafa, she was
found guilty and sentenced to twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua with
its accessory penalties. She was likewise convicted and imposed an
indeterminate sentence of six years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessory penalties, as well as to

indemnify the offended party. It appears that appellant is under provisional

liberty on bail in the aforesaid criminal cases, including Criminal Case No.
86-51209 (two indictments for estafa), under a corporate surety bond posted
by Oriental Assurance Corporation.
Issue:
Whether o not the accused-appellant who was convicted of estafa
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced therefor to serve
twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties and
liability for indemnification, may be allowed to and remain on bail during the
pendency of her appeal from said conviction.
Held:
No. On October 22, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 818 introduced the
amendment to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code which modifies the
penalty of estafa to reclusion perpetua if the amount exceeds 22,000 pesos.
Article 27 of the RPC provides for the minimum and maximum ranges of all
the penalties in the Code. For reclusion perpetua, however, there is no
specification as to its minimum and maximum range. Article 70 of the RPC,
in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit
has to serve more than three penalties.
Before the ratification of the present Constitution on February 2,
1987, the rule on non-bailability of a criminal offense was singularly in the
case of a capital offense (as used in Rules of CrimPro 1985, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished with death) where
the evidence of guilt is strong. Offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua,
were accordingly bailable.
With the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution against the imposition of
the death penalty, a correlative provision therein categorically declared the
unavailability of bail to persons charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Correspondingly,
the aforecited Section 3 of Rule 114 was amended to provide that no bail
shall be granted to those charged with "an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
It is suggested that since estafa is a crime against property and
supposedly not as "heinous" as crimes against persons or chastity, such as
murder or rape, it should not be equated with the latter felonies in justifying
the denial of bail to the accused. The court can take judicial notice that
multimillion or large-scale estafa cases and inveterate or professional
swindlers have inflicted untold damages and misery not only on one or two
but on countless victims in this country.
The objectives of Presidential Decree No. 818 are indubitably within
the ambit of the same legislative intendment and the foregoing justifications
(the inherent odious or outrageous nature of the crime, such as the taking of

a life or an assault against chastity, but also either the moral depravity or
criminal perversity shown by the acts of the accused, or the necessity for
protection of property in the governmental, financial or economic interests
of the country) for the imposition of higher penalties and the consequent
denial of bail to the malefactor.

Eduardo Ocampo vs Jose Bernabe, Emilio Rilloraza & Angel Gamboa,

Judges of Peoples Court (4th Division)
G.R. No. L-439. August 20, 1946
CJ. Moran
Facts:
Petitioner was arrested by the Counter Intelligence Coprs of the
Armed Forces of the United States, confined in Muntinlupa Prisons, was
turned over to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and later on filed with
the Peoples Court his application for bail under Act No. 682. The special
prosecutor contested the petitioners application pointing out petitioner as
the reason for Placido Trinidads death under the Japanese. The prosecutor
however presented no evidence and all he did was to recite the affidavits he
has in hand with no reference. Petitioner objected stating that a mere recital
is not evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which has not
been subjected to the test of cross-examination. He testified in his own
behalf in denying all the charges preferred against him and stated that said
charges are mere intrigues. The Judges of the Peoples Court (4 th Division)
denied petitioners application for bail.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecutor, by merely reciting the affidavits he has
in hand, constitute sufficient ground to deny the application for bail of
Ocampo.
Held:
No. During the hearing of the application for bail filed by the
petitioner, no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence
of guilt is strong. The general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether
charged or not yet charges, are, before their conviction, entitled to
provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong.
At the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that
the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according to Rule
110, section 7. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercise only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their contents are not sufficient since
they are mere hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.

In the case of Herras Teehankee vs Director of Prisons, the court said

that the hearing of an application for bail should be summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court. By "summary hearing" we meant such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely
to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. The course of
the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself
to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of
the hearing.
The regular trial is, to a limited extent at least, anticipated. While the
guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be determined, the quantity and
character of the proofs on this point are, for the special purpose in hand,
necessarily considered. But these objections cannot avail against a positive
constitutional command; if the Constitutional requires the court to
determine for itself whether or not the proof is evident or presumption great
in a given case, all considerations of expediency or convenience, however
potent they might be at the common law, must give way.

People of the Philippines vs Melquiades Raba, et al., Clemente

Talantor
G.R. No. L-10724. April 21, 1958
J. Bautista Angelo
Facts:
Clemente Talantor and Melquiades Raba were charged with murder
and the court as recommended by the provincial fiscal fixed the bail for
each. After their arraignment, Talantor filed an urgent motion praying that
his bail bond be reduced from P30,000 to P14,000. While the motion setting
the hearing thereof in the morning of the same date contains a notification
to the provincial fiscal, however, the latter was actually notified at 9:40
oclock in the morning of the same day. The court granted the motion for the
reduction of bail despite the lack of notice. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the fiscal on the ground that it is irregular because no proper notice
of the hearing of the motion for such reduction was given to him as required
by the rule to enable him to prove that there exists strong evidence which
would warrant the denial of the motion of the accused Talantor. The said
motion was denied by the lower court, hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the reduction of bail made by the lower court is valid
despite the lack of proper notice to the provincial fiscal.
Held:
No. The Rules of Court make it a duty of a movant to serve notice of
his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing
thereof (section 4, Rule 26). This requirement is more imperative in a
criminal case where a person is accused of a capital offense for in such a

case admission to bail is a matter of discretion which can only be exercised

after the fiscal has been heard regarding the nature of the evidence he has
in his possession.
Talantor is charged with a capital offense and while the fiscal fixed a
bail of P30,000 for his provisional liberty, its further reduction could not be
granted without hearing him because the evidence in his possession may not
warrant it.
Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce
bail on the provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof
and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice thereof be given to
said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly in reducing the bail
without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard.
The court wish however to state that the remedy the fiscal should
have availed of is certiorari and not appeal considering that the orders
herein involved are interlocutory in nature (Rule 41, Section 2).