IJSTE - International Journal of Science Technology & Engineering | Volume 2 | Issue 12 | June 2016

ISSN (online): 2349-784X

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in

Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
Mr. Sudesh Kumar
Engineer Gr-III
Department of Environmental Engineering
Projects & Development India Limited, (A Govt. of India
Undertaking Company) Sindri, Dhanbad-828122, Jharkhand,
India

Mr. Akosh Chhoker

Sr. Technologist & Govt. Analyst
Department of Environmental Engineering
Projects & Development India Limited, (A Govt. of India
Undertaking Company) Sindri, Dhanbad-828122, Jharkhand,
India

Shri. Ajay Kumar Singh

General Manager & Head of Dept.
Department of Environmental Engineering
Projects & Development India Limited, (A Govt. of India
Undertaking Company) Sindri, Dhanbad-828122, Jharkhand,
India

Mr. Praful Kose

Engineer Gr-III
Department of Environmental Engineering
Projects & Development India Limited, (A Govt. of India
Undertaking Company) Sindri, Dhanbad-828122, Jharkhand,
India

Shri Sudesh kumar

Engineer Gr-III
Department of Environmental Engineering
Projects & Development India Limited, (A Govt. of India Undertaking Company) Sindri, Dhanbad-828122, Jharkhand, India

Abstract
The main plan is to analyze the risk with help of Phast Risk Micro Version 6.7 associated in different sections which are being
carried out in POL depot, during handling, storage and distribution/or transportation, and to minimise the hazard in order to make
the working environment. As the Depot handles various petroleum products which have got many possible hazards, hence it is
necessary to evaluate the Risk from the facilities at the Depot. It is observed that
The Iso-Risk Contour (Figure. No. 05) that the acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year should be remains
mainly confined within factory premises.
Societal Risk (F/N Curve) shown in Figure no.04, developed for the plant should be remains mainly within the acceptable
limit.
Hence, we can know the installation of POL Depot will safe/unsafe from environmental risk point of view.
Keywords: POL Depot, Risk Assessment, Consequence Analysis, Job Safety Analysis and FN Curve & Iso-Risk Contour
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I.

INTRODUCTION

POL Depot is the place where petroleum oil and lubricants are stored in large Quantity and distributes in a small quantity to
another places. In POL Depot, there is the high probability of accidents during handling & storage; various hazards are faced
during storage and transportation. As we know Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) Depot consists of strategic storage of crude
oil refinery products such as Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) & High Speed Diesel (HSD) in sufficient
quantities. So there are many possibilities of hazards, like explosion, fire, BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour
Explosion), confined & unconfined vapour cloud explosions or during transportation, which may results in minor or major or
fatality, due to this there is loss of man-power and money will also occur. So a great concern is needed to minimize the
occurrence of these hazards as well as risk
II. METHODOLOGY
The Risk Assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various statutory bodies. The process of methodology
is summarized in Figure No.01. The scope of study includes mainly
Identification of potential hazard areas;
Identification of representative failure cases(shown in Table 1);
Identification of possible initiating events;
Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events(shown in table 2) and the impact zones from the
accidental scenarios;

All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

567

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
(IJSTE/ Volume 2 / Issue 12 / 102)

Consequence analysis for all the possible events;

Construct Iso-Risk Contour and F-N Curve.

Fig. 01: Classic Risk Analysis Methodology

Consequence Analysis:
Consequence analysis quantifies concentration, deaths injuries and damage.
Risk R= probability x Severity
Evaluate the magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard scenarios and their effect zones.
Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for taking precautionary measures for risk
reduction as well as for preparation of Disaster Management Plan.
Risk has been analyzed by applying the standard techniques of risk assessment and by using DNV, Technica software Phast
Risk Micro (Version 6.7)
Job Safety Analysis:
Job safety analysis is an accident prevention technique that is used to identify the potential hazard associated to the job and give
the control measure to minimize the hazards.
An analysis includes five steps:
1) Select a job.
2) Break the job down into steps.
3) Identify the potential hazards.
4) Apply the controls to the hazards.
5) Evaluate the controls.
Table - 1
Job Safety Analysis Worksheet Selected Failure Cases in Pol Depot
Sl.No.

Failure Scenarios

Failure mode

Consequence

1]

Storage Tanks on Fire

Random failure

2]

Vessel connection failure for tank outlet lines

Random failure

3]

TLF Pump Discharge Line Rupture

Random failure

4]

Gasket Failure in TLF Pump Discharge Line

Random failure

Pool fire, Jet fire and UVCE

Dispersion ,unconfined
Vapour cloud explosion,
Blast effect, pool fire.
UVCE,
Pool fire.
UVCE,

Credible/
Non Credible
Partially Credible
Partially Credible
Non Credible
Credible

All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

568

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
(IJSTE/ Volume 2 / Issue 12 / 102)

5]

3 inches dia. loading arm failure for Road Tanker Loading

Random failure

6]

Pump Mechanical Seal Failure

Mech. Seal failure

7]

Hole in TLF/TWD Pump Discharge Line (15mm)

Random failure

8]

Unloading hose failure for Tank Wagon Decantation

(TWD)

Random failure

9]

TWD Pump Discharge Line Rupture

Random failure

10]
11]

MS Road tanker Catastrophic Rupture

LAB Storage explosion Catastrophic Rupture

Sr.
No.
1.
2.
3.

Random failure
Random failure
Table 2
Major Hazard Present in POL Depot

Hazards

Factors responsible for the occurrence

Explosion
Fire
BLEVE (boiling liquid
expanding vapour
explosion )

Rapid oxidation or rapid burning.

by any external source.
Occurs when petroleum products are
accidentally surrounded by fire.

4.

Confined and unconfined

vapour cloud explosion

Confined explosions are those, which occur

within some sort of containment such as
vessel or pipe-work.
Explosions that occur in the open air are
referred to as unconfined explosions.

5.

Leakage

Bursting of storage tank, or leakage of liquid

from bottom line, or rupture of storage tank.

Pool fire.
Pool fire.
UVCE,
Pool fire.
UVCE,
Pool fire.
UVCE,
Pool fire.
UVCE,
Pool fire
Pool fire
Pool fire

Partially Credible
Credible
Credible
Credible
Non Credible
Non Credible
Non Credible

Controls
Automated hydrant system ,extinguisher
BLEVE can only be control by controlling the fire (initial
startup of fire), sprinkler system and automated hydrant
system.
For controlling unconfined vapour cloud explosion use
proper ventilation ,GMS for vapour and gas detection ,
Gas monitoring system, frisking gate, proper operation
during loading/unloading of Road tanker /rail wagons and
transportation.

Risks and Failure Probability

The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm or
damage being caused to life, property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/accidental release of
any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to failure of
component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the components of
the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire/explosion and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like:
1) Quantity and physical properties of material released.
2) Source of ignition.
3) Wind velocity, direction and atmospheric stability.
4) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby.
Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure vessels and other equipment manufactured
in India are not available nor has any statutory authority tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be
used under Indian condition.
Risk Assessment:
For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the POL Depot, following has been taken into consideration:
1) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned for selected failure case as listed
in Table No. 1 for 2F, 2B, 3D, 5D where 2F, 2B, 3D & 5D are wind speed of 2 m/sec. & stable stability class, wind speed
of 2 m/sec. & unstable stability class & wind speed of 3 and 5 m/sec. & neutral stability class atmospheric conditions
respectively.
2) Probability of wind directions has been taken from IMD data.
3) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which will result in conservative risk estimation.
4) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered.

All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

569

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
(IJSTE/ Volume 2 / Issue 12 / 102)

Fig. 2: ALARP Framework for Risk Acceptability criteria

Acceptability of Risk:
Risk evaluation is done in order to assess the impact the people being exposed both inside and outside the factory premises. The
values is generally presented in terms of chances of death per million per year. Acceptability criteria for individual fatality risk
are usually judged by comparing the values obtained in the risk analysis study to the statistical risk value of other normal human
activities.
The approach can be interpreted as dividing risk into three tiers, as is illustrated in Figure No.02.
The acceptability levels of risk for people employed within the organization are generally higher. This is because of the fact
that those employed are well aware of the risk involved and have accepted voluntarily some amount of risk while accepting the
job. This voluntary risk can be compared to the risk associated with other voluntary activities like rock climbing, motor vehicles
accidents smoking etc.
The typical acceptance criteria for societal risk and those used in the case study below are illustrated in Figure No 03.

Fig. 3: Typical criteria for Acceptable Risk

Risk of death 1 per million per year or 1x10 -6 per year inside the factory premises are generally accepted without concern and
this risk in often seen to be lower than voluntary and involuntary risk of death from human activities and other cases an
individual is exposed to.

All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

570

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
(IJSTE/ Volume 2 / Issue 12 / 102)

Fig. 4: (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Tank on Fire)

Fig. 5: (Iso -Risk Contour of any POL Terminal)

In case of any POL depot the acceptable risk of 1x10-6 per year should be remains confined within the factory boundary.
III. CONCLUSION
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment is a method, by which, we try to identify the main hazardous substance, and then try
to reduce the effect of hazard. As we spotted the main risk during filling and transportation of Petroleum Products, so with the
help of Risk Assessment, reduce the main hazards. For this purpose we will use various risk assessment methodologies by
knowing hazards consequences and by analyzing all the processes which are being carried out during handling. Safety
All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

571

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in Petroleum Oils & Lubricants (Pols) Depot
(IJSTE/ Volume 2 / Issue 12 / 102)

recommendation has been, given on basis of all above analysis to reduce the hazard during the storage and handling of Petroleum
Products. POL depot facilities mainly pose fire and explosion hazards due to unwanted and accidental releases of hydrocarbons.
This section deals with listing of various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and
consequence analysis. Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of the hazard due to various failure scenarios to
determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the distances up to which the damage may be affected. The
reason and purpose of consequence analysis are manifolds like:
It is observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Figure. No. 05) that the acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10 -6 per year
remains mainly confined within factory premises.
Societal Risk (F/N Curve) shown in Figure no. 04, developed for the plant remains mainly within the acceptable limit.
The Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis reveals that in most of the cases hazard is confined within the
plant premises.
Disaster Management Plan should be prepared for POL Depot.
For formulating safe design criteria of equipment and protection systems.
Hence, we can know the installation of POL Depot will safe/unsafe from environmental risk point of view.
REFERENCES
Schedule I, list of industries involving hazardous process , under section 2cb of The factories Act 1948.
FACTORIES ACT-1948 (AMENDED AS FACTORIES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1987).
The European Communities (Control of Major Accident Hazards involving Dangerous Substances) Regulations, 2006.
John Wiley & Sons, Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, Second Edition by CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety), October
1999, PP: 1-748 ISBN: 0-8169-0720-X.
[5] Meraj Ahsan Qureshi, Sarah Shakeel, Risk Assessment and HAZOP Study of Oil and Gas Sector , American Journal of Environment, Energy and Power
Research Vol. 1, No. 7, September 2013, PP: 151-158, ISSN: 2329-860X.
[6] The Motor Vehicle Act-1988.
[7] Sandeep Singh Sachan & Rajiv Premi, Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment in LPG Bottling Plant, IJSTE - International Journal of Science
Technology & Engineering | Volume 1 | Issue 12 | June 2015 ISSN (online): 2349-784X.
[8] Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules-1989.
[9] I.L.O (1998) Major Hazard Control - A Practical Manual.
[10] Dr. Nic Cavanagh of DNV Technica Software, U.K, Calculating Risk-Quantitative Risk Assessment for improving safety in the production and processing
of petrochemicals, June, 2001.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

All rights reserved by www.ijste.org

572