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[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.

]
MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.
Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for
respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No.
648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to
any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest."
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall
be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be
closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly
in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of
which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote
safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To
this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The
moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is
withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies

in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number."
DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents,
A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first
indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended
to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on
August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second

indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the


recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted;
that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not
allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation
and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is
untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z.
R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief
Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make
decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead,
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the
necessity of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval
of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of
buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable
in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders
of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes
of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action

necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power,
if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the
ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in
view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To
assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or
act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare
whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this:
"The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the
wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation
must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service
Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion
to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger
amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations
calculated to promote public interest.
The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed
by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.
Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights

of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then
the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order
and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in
the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to
exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the
future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes,
become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the
public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing
civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the
rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire
on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the
interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the police power many
questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon
the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice,
however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given
group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs
against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE


DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or
preliminary and permanent injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the
same apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657,
which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p.
80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied
in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules
and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms).
(Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to
be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13,
Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as
promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing
the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and
poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others,
Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation
dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to
grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing
and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This
Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the
petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are
made to apply to it:
(a)
Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

(b)
Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d)
Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section
13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon
proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of
the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers
within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as
the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
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AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4.
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the
just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological,
developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
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Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its
entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the
case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting
the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land
devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131).
Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the
primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%)
of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are
many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their
residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing
arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not
the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard
raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy
five hectares or less. The remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).

On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry
raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise
under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International
Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting
crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage,
husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals."
(Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the
constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but
as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the Constitution
the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the
constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way
toward explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word
"agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial
lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general
classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and
suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court
Justice), posed several questions, among others, quoted as follows:
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"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers
and farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed
under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by

Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry
projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a
piggery or a poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these
farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately
or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed.
(Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p. 618).
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xxx
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then
Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
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"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan.
Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural
worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at
livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and
swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands
in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections
13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and
poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final
redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from
three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to
their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and
therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its
meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are
irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will
not hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments,
or of any official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution
(Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744;
Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of
judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935

Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as
part of the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution)
and which power this Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148
SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections
3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby
MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I agree that the petition be granted.
It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its
Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the raising of livestock,
poultry, and swine in their coverage can not be simplistically reduced to a question of
constitutional construction.
It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. A close
reading however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII,
particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof," provides a basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock,
poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of the comprehensive agrarian reform
program. This accords with the principle that every presumption should be indulged
in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and the court in considering the validity of
a statute should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it
within the fundamental law. 1
The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight
when a ruling to the contrary would, in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose
of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the promotion
of social justice, by the expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock,
poultry, and swine raising by scheming landowners, thus, rendering the
comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.
The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not
the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article
II, section 1) which teaches simply that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist
between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land
exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make real differences,
to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are
no tenants nor landlords, only employers and employees.
Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."
Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential
that all the commercial hog and poultry farms combined occupy less than one

percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares of land
supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.
In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an
inconsequential portion of land is a mere incident of its operation, as in any other
undertaking, business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is
nowhere more evident when one considers that at least 95% of total investment in
these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.
These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage,
waterers, blowers, misters and in some cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills
complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3) extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such
as bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5)
deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities; (6) modern
equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities
complete with expensive tools and equipment; and a myriad other such
technologically advanced appurtances.
How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally
occupied by these structures?
The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of
agricultural tenants surfaces when one considers contribution to output. Labor cost of
livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The 98%
balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the
farmworkers inputs such as feeds and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power
cost, cost of money and several others.
Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law
rather than by tenancy law. They are entitled to social security benefits where tenantfarmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And as in any
other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and
other incentives such as free housing privileges, light and water.
Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also
fallacious in the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather
than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire domestic supply of
corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (ricebran), coconut (copra meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal). 3
xxx
xxx
xxx
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly
situated and hence, can not be treated alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions
which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage of
the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be
struck down as repugnant to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Footnotes

Republic of the Philippines vs

Heirs of Salvador N Lopez,


GR 178895, 639 SCRA 49, Jan 10, 2011
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us are two Rule 45 Petitions1 filed separately by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), through the Office of the Solicitor General, and by the Salvador N.
Lopez Agri-Business Corp. (SNLABC). Each Petition partially assails the Court of
Appeals Decision dated 30 June 20062 with respect to the application for exemption
of four parcels of land - located in Mati, Davao Oriental and owned by SNLABC from Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
There is little dispute as to the facts of the case, as succinctly discussed by the Court
of Appeals and adopted herein by the Court, to wit:
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of
160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business
Corporation. Said parcels of land are hereinafter described as follows:
Table table table
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga
issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned
landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition
pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No.
T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of
Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the
said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and
habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats
and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite
investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as
enumerated. The Investigation Report dated March 9, 1993 stated:
That there are at least 2[5] to 30 heads of cows that farrow every year and if the
trend of farrowing persist (sic), then the cattle shall become overcrowded and will
result to scarcity of grasses for the cattle to graze;
That during the week cycle, the herds are being moved to the different adjacent lots
owned by the corporation. It even reached Lot 1454-A and Lot 1296. Thereafter, the
herds are returned to their respective night chute corrals which are constructed under
Lot 1293-B and Lot 1298.
xxx
That the age of coconut trees planted in the area are already 40 to 50 years and
have been affected by the recent drought that hit the locality.
That the presence of livestocks (sic) have already existed in the area prior to the
Supreme Court decision on LUZ FARMS vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. We were
surprised however, why the management of the corporation did not apply for
Commercial Farm Deferment (CFD) before, when the two years reglamentary (sic)
period which the landowner was given the chance to file their application pursuant to
R.A. 6657, implementing Administrative Order No. 16, Series of 1989;
However, with regards to what venture comes (sic) first, coconut or livestocks (sic),
majority of the farmworkers including the overseer affirmed that the coconut trees
and livestocks (sic) were (sic) simultaneously and all of these were inherited by his

(applicant) parent. In addition, the financial statement showed 80% of its annual
income is derived from the livestocks (sic) and only 20% from the coconut industry.
Cognitive thereto, we are favorably recommending for the exemption from the
coverage of CARP based on LUZ FARMS as enunciated by the Supreme Court the
herein Lot No. 1293-B Psd-65835 under TCT No. T-12639 except Lot No. 1298, Cad.
286 of TCT No. T-12637 which is already covered under the Compulsory Acquisition
(CA) Scheme and had already been valued by the Land Valuation Office, Land Bank
of the Philippines.
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled
and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr.,
executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for the
exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they
needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner
filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption
from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that it has been operating
grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an
integral part of its grazing land.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated
March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the
ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and
exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted
that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption,
however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots 1454-A & 1296
were taken beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its reclassification to a
Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per Resolution No. 39 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental, enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR
Regional Director denied the Motion through an Order dated September 4, 1997,
ratiocinating that the reclassification does not affect agricultural lands already issued
a Notice of Coverage as provided in Memorandum Circular No. 54-93: Prescribing
the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. 7160.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent DAR.
On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the Regional
Directors ruling on Lots 1454-A & 1296 and further declared Lots 1298 and 1293-B
as covered by the CARP. Respondent ruled in this wise considering the documentary
evidence presented by petitioner such as the Business Permit to engage in livestock,
the certification of ownership of large cattle and the Corporate Income Tax Returns,
which were issued during the effectivity of the Agrarian Reform Law thereby
debunking petitioners claim that it has been engaged in livestock farming since the
1960s. Respondent further ruled that the incorporation by the Lopez family on
February 12, 1988 or four (4) months before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 was an
attempt to evade the noble purposes of the said law.
On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent prompting the former to file the instant petition.3
In the assailed Decision dated 30 June 2006, 4 the Court of Appeals partially granted
the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of
Title [TCT] Nos. T-12637 and T-12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the
"Lopez lands") from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director5 and the DAR6 Secretary
denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296
(previously under TCT No. T-12635) in Barrio Limot (the "Limot lands"). These lots
were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the
Philippines (RP T-16356).

The DAR and SNLABC separately sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were
subsequently denied in the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 08 June 2007.7
The DAR and SNLABC elevated the matter to this Court by filing separate Rule 45
Petitions (docketed as G.R. No. 1788958 and 179071,9 respectively), which were
subsequently ordered consolidated by the Court.
The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of
SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Courts ruling in Luz Farms v.
DAR.10 The DAR questions the disposition of the Court of Appeals, insofar as the
latter allowed the exemption of the Lopez lands, while SNLABC assails the inclusion
of the Limot lands within the coverage of the CARL.
The Court finds no reversible error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals and
dismisses the Petitions of DAR and SNLABC.
Preliminarily, in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45, the issues that
can be raised are, as a general rule, limited to questions of law. 11 However, as
pointed out by both the DAR and SNLABC, there are several recognized exceptions
wherein the Court has found it appropriate to re-examine the evidence presented. 12
In this case, the factual findings of the DAR Regional Director, the DAR Secretary
and the CA are contrary to one another with respect to the following issue: whether
the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock
business; and whether there was intent to evade coverage from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) based on the documentary evidence. On the other
hand, SNLABC argues that these authorities misapprehended and overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts as regards the inclusion of the Limot lands
under the CARL. These circumstances fall within the recognized exceptions and,
thus, the Court is persuaded to review the facts and evidence on record in the
disposition of these present Petitions.
The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and
are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
Briefly stated, the DAR questions the object or autoptic evidence relied upon by the
DAR Regional Director in concluding that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and
exclusively being used for SNLABCs livestock business prior to the enactment of the
CARL.
In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 13 the Court
declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions14 that included lands devoted to
livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed
that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the
livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated
agrarian reform program of the government. 15 Thus, lands devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and
thus exempt from agrarian reform.16
Under the rules then prevailing, it was the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
who was primarily responsible for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the
land sought to be excluded;17 and for ascertaining whether the area subject of the
application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988. 18
The MAROs authority to investigate has subsequently been replicated in the current
DAR guidelines regarding lands that are actually, directly and exclusively used for
livestock raising.19 As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought to
be exempted as livestock land, the MAROs findings on the use and nature of the
land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater
weight, if not finality.
Verily, factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired
expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their primary

jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence.20 The Court generally accords great
respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their
special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.21
In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection 22 found on the Lopez lands
several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats and pigs, some of which were
covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise structures on the
Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of two chutes where
the livestock were kept during nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the
enactment of the CARL was positively affirmed by the farm workers and the overseer
who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the fact
that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABCs livestock business even prior to
15 June 1988, the DAR Regional Director ordered the exemption of the Lopez lands
from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative value to the actual, on-site
investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director. The
Court finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being
used as industrial lands for livestock-raising.
Simply because the on-site investigation was belatedly conducted three or four years
after the effectivity of the CARL does not perforce make it unworthy of belief or unfit
to be offered as substantial evidence in this case. Contrary to DARs claims, the lack
of information as regards the initial breeders and the specific date when the cattle
were first introduced in the MAROs Report does not conclusively demonstrate that
there was no livestock-raising on the Lopez lands prior to the CARL. Although
information as to these facts are significant, their non-appearance in the reports does
not leave the MARO without any other means to ascertain the duration of livestockraising on the Lopez lands, such as interviews with farm workers, the presence of
livestock infrastructure, and evidence of sales of cattle all of which should have
formed part of the MAROs Investigation Report.
Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in determining
whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently conducted or
has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR
Regional Director - are to be accorded great probative value, owing to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties.23
The DAR, however, insisted in its Petition 24 on giving greater weight to the
inconsistencies appearing in the documentary evidence presented, and noted by the
DAR Secretary, in order to defeat SNLABCs claim of exemption over the Lopez
lands. The Court is not so persuaded.
In the Petition, the DAR argued that that the tax declarations covering the Lopez
lands characterized them as agricultural lands and, thus, detracted from the claim
that they were used for livestock purposes. The Court has since held that "there is no
law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry"; hence,
"tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land." 25
Applying the foregoing principles, the tax declarations of the Lopez lands as
agricultural lands are not conclusive or final, so as to prevent their exclusion from
CARP coverage as lands devoted to livestock-raising. Indeed, the MAROs on-site
inspection and actual investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being used for
livestock-grazing are more convincing in the determination of the nature of those
lands.lavvphil
Neither can the DAR in the instant case assail the timing of the incorporation of
SNLABC and the latters operation shortly before the enactment of the CARL. That
persons employ tactics to precipitously convert their lands from agricultural use to
industrial livestock is not unheard of; they even exploit the creation of a new
corporate vehicle to operate the livestock business to substantiate the deceitful

conversion in the hopes of evading CARP coverage. Exemption from CARP,


however, is directly a function of the lands usage, and not of the identity of the entity
operating it. Otherwise stated, lands actually, directly and exclusively used for
livestock are exempt from CARP coverage, regardless of the change of owner. 26 In
the instant case, whether SNLABC was incorporated prior to the CARL is immaterial,
since the Lopez lands were already being used for livestock-grazing purposes prior
to the enactment of the CARL, as found by the MARO. Although the managing entity
had been changed, the business interest of raising livestock on the Lopez lands still
remained without any indication that it was initiated after the effectivity of the CARL.
As stated by SNLABC, the Lopez lands were the legacy of Don Salvador Lopez, Sr.
The ownership of these lands was passed from Don Salvador Lopez, Sr., to Salvador
N. Lopez, Jr., and subsequently to the latters children before being registered under
the name of SNLABC. Significantly, SNLABC was incorporated by the same
members of the Lopez family, which had previously owned the lands and managed
the livestock business.27 In all these past years, despite the change in ownership, the
Lopez lands have been used for purposes of grazing and pasturing cattle, horses,
carabaos and goats. Simply put, SNLABC was chosen as the entity to take over the
reins of the livestock business of the Lopez family. Absent any other compelling
evidence, the inopportune timing of the incorporation of the SNLABC prior to the
enactment of the CARL was not by itself a categorical manifestation of an intent to
avoid CARP coverage.
Furthermore, the presence of coconut trees, although an indicia that the lands may
be agricultural, must be placed within the context of how they figure in the actual,
direct and exclusive use of the subject lands. The DAR failed to demonstrate that the
Lopez lands were actually and primarily agricultural lands planted with coconut trees.
This is in fact contradicted by the findings of its own official, the MARO. Indeed, the
DAR did not adduce any proof to show that the coconut trees on the Lopez lands
were used for agricultural business, as required by the Court in DAR v. Uy,28 wherein
we ruled thus:
It is not uncommon for an enormous landholding to be intermittently planted with
trees, and this would not necessarily detract it from the purpose of livestock farming
and be immediately considered as an agricultural land. It would be surprising if there
were no trees on the land. Also, petitioner did not adduce any proof to show that the
coconut trees were planted by respondent and used for agricultural business or were
already existing when the land was purchased in 1979. In the present case, the area
planted with coconut trees bears an insignificant value to the area used for the cattle
and other livestock-raising, including the infrastructure needed for the business.
There can be no presumption, other than that the "coconut area" is indeed used for
shade and to augment the supply of fodder during the warm months; any other use
would be only be incidental to livestock farming. The substantial quantity of livestock
heads could only mean that respondent is engaged in farming for this purpose. The
single conclusion gathered here is that the land is entirely devoted to livestock
farming and exempted from the CARP.
On the assumption that five thousand five hundred forty-eight (5,548) coconut trees
were existing on the Lopez land (TCT No. T-12637), the DAR did not refute the
findings of the MARO that these coconut trees were merely incidental. Given the
number of livestock heads of SNLABC, it is not surprising that the areas planted with
coconut trees on the Lopez lands where forage grass grew were being used as
grazing areas for the livestock. It was never sufficiently adduced that SNLABC was
primarily engaged in agricultural business on the Lopez lands, specifically, coconutharvesting. Indeed, the substantial quantity of SNLABCs livestock amounting to a
little over one hundred forty (140) livestock heads, if measured against the combined
110.5455 hectares of land and applying the DAR-formulated ratio, leads to no other
conclusion than that the Lopez lands were exclusively devoted to livestock farming.29

In any case, the inconsistencies appearing in the documentation presented (albeit


sufficiently explained) pale in comparison to the positive assertion made by the
MARO in its on-site, actual investigation - that the Lopez lands were being used
actually, directly and exclusively for its livestock-raising business. The Court affirms
the findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez
lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABCs livestock
business and, thus, are exempt from CARP coverage.
The Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for livestock and
should thus be covered by the CARL.
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut
trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that
the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber
(8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for exemption. 30
Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural
activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of
the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied
the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the
Court of Appeals.
SNLABC argues that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the factual
circumstances and overlooked certain relevant facts, which deserve a second look.
SNLABCs arguments fail to convince the Court to reverse the rulings of the Court of
Appeals.
In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary, SNLABC
requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that the corporation
needed the additional area for its livestock business. As pointed out by the DAR
Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear indication that the Limot lands were
not directly, actually and exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually
dismisses the clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words."
Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for
exemption are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and
indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC,
found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were
not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABCs
use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicants grazing lands during the
summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually,
directly and exclusively used for SNLABCs livestock business, especially since these
were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are
more suitable -- and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used -- for
agricultural purposes.
SNLABCs treatment of the land for non-livestock purposes is highlighted by its
undue delay in filing the application for exemption of the Limot lands. SNLABC filed
the application only on 07 February 1994, or three years after the Notice of Coverage
was issued; two years after it filed the first application for the Lopez lands; and a year
after the titles to the Limot lands were transferred to the Republic. The SNLABC slept
on its rights and delayed asking for exemption of the Limot lands. The lands were
undoubtedly being used for agricultural purposes, not for its livestock business; thus,
these lands are subject to CARP coverage. Had SNLABC indeed utilized the Limot
lands in conjunction with the livestock business it was conducting on the adjacent
Lopez lands, there was nothing that would have prevented it from simultaneously
applying for a total exemption of all the lands necessary for its livestock.
The defense of SNLABC that it wanted to "save" first the Lopez lands where the
corrals and chutes were located, before acting to save the other properties does not
help its cause. The piecemeal application for exemption of SNLABC speaks of the

value or importance of the Lopez lands, compared with the Limot lands, with respect
to its livestock business. If the Lopez and the Limot lands were equally significant to
its operations and were actually being used for its livestock business, it would have
been more reasonable for it to apply for exemption for the entire lands. Indeed, the
belated filing of the application for exemption was a mere afterthought on the part of
SNLABC, which wanted to increase the area of its landholdings to be exempted from
CARP on the ground that these were being used for its livestock business.
In any case, SNLABC admits that the title to the Limot lands has already been
transferred to the Republic and subsequently awarded to SNLABCs farm workers. 31
This fact only demonstrates that the land is indeed being used for agricultural
activities and not for livestock grazing.
The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the
Limot lands were not being used for livestock grazing and, thus, do not qualify for
exemption from CARP coverage. SNLABCs belated filing of the application for
exemption of the Limot lands was a ruse to increase its retention of its landholdings
and an attempt to "save" these from compulsory acquisition.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp. are DISMISSED, and the rulings of the
Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

4. Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of DAR, GR 78742, July 14,


1989

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos.
228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide
for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection.
They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O
No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the
constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or
Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for

noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not
subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or
the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to
the owner of the property expropriated.
[G.R. No. 93045. June 29, 1992.]
THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented
FERNANDO CAYABYAB, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS;
SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by
MANUEL SISON, respondents.
Cipriano A. Tan for petitioners.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengzon for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES; NOT
BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES OF COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
The Court of Appeals correctly observed the technical rules of court practice
and procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings in the Department
(formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform.
2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AGRARIAN REFORM; OPERATION LAND
TRANSFER; RETENTION OF LIMIT OF SEVEN (7) HECTARES; MANDATORY.
". . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it
reconsidered the previous ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling
is plainly and directly against the law. As the order of September 7, 1988,
stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to a
retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the
office had no discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded
by law to the landowners. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court
of justice, can deprive or deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7)
hectares which the law has reversed for them. Otherwise, the law would be set
to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there is no
administrative rule or regulation, and Our attention has not been called to it,
which would preclude the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the change the
decision of his predecessor if the ruling is patently against the law; on the
contrary, justice and equity demand, that the error should not be made to
prevail over what is correct and legal . . ."
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO APPLY THEREFOR; DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE AN ESTOPPEL OR WAIVER OF OWNER'S RIGHT THERETO.
The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7)
hectares each of their agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel
or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission was cured by their

timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the
petitioners. In the 1st Indorsement by Gregorio Sapera, Legal Officer of the
Kagawarang Pangsakahan, it was noted that as early as December 20, 1973, the
Heirs of Dr. Jose sison had been seeking exemption of their landholdings from
the Operation Land Transfer.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL CULTIVATION, NOT A MANDATORY
PRECONDITION TO BE ENTITLED THERETO. There is no merit in the
petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain
their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with
the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such area, or will now
cultivate it." The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean "that the
tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of
Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein. Which means, that while
ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas shall pertain to the
concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall
remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned Heirs of Sison therefore,
do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas, unless the
petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of
cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs ." Hence,
personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for
them to be entitled to their retention right.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. Secretary Juico's interpretation of
the owner's right of retention conforms with out own construction in
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc . vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reforms, G.R. No. 78742, August 23, 1990, where we rule that: ". . . in
case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant
shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in
the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In
case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered
as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this act. In case
the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his
right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must
exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the land owner
manifests his choice of the area for retention."
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATES ISSUED THEREUNDER; MAY BE
CANCELLED BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM. Petitioner'
contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or
jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been
issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance, recall or
cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the secretary's
administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain
heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed
seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico
properly ordered the cancellation of the certificates of Land Transfer which
had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.

D E C I S I O N
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the
Court of Appeals upholding an order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip
Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had issued
certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the
late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain
ownership of their shares if they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of
rice or corn land.
Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government
under Presidential Decree No. 27, certificates of land transfer were issued by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr.
Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering that
certificates of land transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of
Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella,
who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER
PROTEST."
Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation
report dated November 17, 1980, revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr.
Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs proindiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966.
Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had
been issued to the petitioners-tenants. LexLib
However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended
that the landholdings be included in the Operation Land Transfer. This was
affirmed in a second Reinvestigation Report dated February 9, 1982. Still
another (third) Reinvestigation Report, dated September 29, 1986, affirmed
the previous recommendation that the landholdings of the Heirs be covered by
the Operation Land Transfer.
On February 17, 1987, then Minister Heherson Alvarez dismissed the
petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison,
for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order was denied on
July 6, 1987.
On December 8, 1987, the heirs reiterated their request for
reconsideration when Secretary Philip Ella Juico succeeded Secretary Alvarez.
They stressed the fact that their individual landholdings were too small, not
exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land
Transfer.
After ordering a reinvestigation of the landholdings of the individual heirs,
an order was issued on September 7, 1988 by Secretary Juico, modifying the
orders of his predecessors. He ruled that the ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno

and Peter Sison are exempt from the Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S.
Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison, are
entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands, since they
are not owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo
Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption of their
ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than
seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land.
The tenants filed on October 27, 1988 a motion for reconsideration which
the Heirs of Dr. Sison opposed. On February 20, 1989, an order was issued by
Secretary Juico, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment
on March 29, 1990, dismissing their petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition
for review, alleging:
1.
that the order dated September 7, 1988, of respondent Secretary Philip
Ella Juico, reconsidering and reversing the orders of his predecessors dated
February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987, violates the rule on estoppel, which
prohibits the resurrection of a case after it has become final and executory;
2.
that the respondents Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison having failed to file any
application for retention within the period required by law, and having filed their
intentions to apply for retention and/or exemption only on March 13, 1987,
which was beyond the period required by law, are estopped and totally barred
from claiming such retentions or exemptions;
3.
that even assuming that the said Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison are still entitled
to file such applications for retention and/or exemption, still they are
disqualified by law to be granted the same under the provisions of P.D. 27, in
relation to LOI 474, which grant such retentions or exemptions only "if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it" (p. 6, Rollo); and
4.
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or
jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after they have been
issued to the tenants-beneficiaries.
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners herein question the propriety and legality of the order of
former Secretary Philip Ella Juico of the Department of Agrarian Reform dated
September 7, 1988, reversing and modifying the orders of his predecessors
which allegedly had attained finality after the lapse of more than five (5)
months since the order sought to be reconsidered therein contained a proviso
that "so far as this Office is concerned, this case is considered already closed"
(p. 26, Rollo). Respondent Secretary allegedly violated the rule on estoppel,
which prohibits the resurrection of a case after the decision has become final
and executory.
The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken.
The orders for the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners
had not become final and executory because the certificates had been marked
"under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the technical rules of court
practice and procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings in the
Department (formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:
". . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it
reconsidered the previous ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling
is plainly and directly against the law. As the order of September 7, 1988,
stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to a
retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the
office had no discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded
by law to the landowners. No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court
of justice, can deprive or deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7)
hectares which the law has reserved for them. Otherwise, the law would be set
to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there is no
administrative rule or regulation, and Our attention has not been called to it,
which would preclude the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, to change the decision
of his predecessor if the ruling is patently against the law; on the contrary,
justice and equity demand, that the wrong should be righted and the error
should not be made to prevail over what is correct and legal . . ." (p. 22, Rollo.)
The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7)
hectares each of their agricultural landholdings did not constitute an estoppel
or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission was cured by their
timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the
petitioners. In the 1st Indorsement by Gregorio Sapera, Legal Officer of the
Kagawarang Pangsakahan, it was noted that as early as December 20, 1973, the
Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison had been seeking exemption of their landholdings from
the Operation Land Transfer.
Whether or not each of the Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison owns more than seven
(7) hectares of riceland and other agricultural lands, is a factual issue which we
generally do not review. We are bound by Secretary Juico's finding, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, that their respective landholdings are as follows:
"Riceland Other Agricultural
Secretary Juico and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that:
"Consequently, the landholdings of Consuelo and Peter, are exempted from the
OLT Coverage, and Elisa, Renato, Jose, Josefina and Jaime are entitled to a
retention of not more than seven (7) hectares of their ricelands since they are
not the owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural lands.
However, the excess areas of the retained portion are covered by Operation
Land Transfer. With respect to Alfredo and Manuel, they are not entitled to
the exemption and/or retention of their ricelands because they are owners of
more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural lands.
"Anchored on the rule of law, the applicability of LOI No. 474 (Oct. 21, 1976) as
the Implementing measure of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972) on the foregoing facts
and circumstances is mandatory. This office does not even have the discretion
to alter the above disposition on retention limits accorded the landowners as the
law is clear and explicit on this point.

"xxx
xxx
xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the orders dated February 17, 1987 and
July 6, 1987 of this Office are hereby modified in the following manner as it is
declared and ordered that:
"1.
The ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno situated at Labrador, Pangasinan,
and the ricelands of Peter Sison situated at Labrador and Bayambang,
Pangasinan, are exempted from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer;
"2.
Petitioners Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta
and Jaime Sison are to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their
respective ricelands situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan, but the excess areas
thereof, situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, which are covered by the OLT and the
CLTs already issued, if any, to the tenants are hereby affirmed;
"3.
Petitioners Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to this
examination and/or retention of their ricelands as they are owners of more than
seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land, and the tenant-tillers thereon, if
they have not yet been issued the Certificates of Land Transfer, shall be issued
such Certificates by the Regional Director of Region I, DAR, San Fernando, La
Union;
"4.
The tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas of the
petitioners shall remain as agricultural lessees thereon and the Certificates of
Land Transfer issued to them, if any, shall be as they are hereby
recalled/cancelled; and
"5.
The tenant-farmers within the exempted and retained riceland areas are
hereby ordered to pay to the landowners the lease rentals due them; or if such
lease rentals were deposited with the Land Bank, the landowners are therefore,
authorized to withdraw the said deposits." (pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison
are disqualified to retain their shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for
failure to comply with the requirements that "such landowner is cultivating such
area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo). The Secretary interpreted that
provision to mean "that the tenants in the exempted and retained riceland areas
of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein.
Which means, that while ownership of the exempted and retained riceland areas
shall pertain to the concerned Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as
agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The concerned
Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted
areas, unless the petitioners, as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish
the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to the Heirs " (p.
23, Rollo; Emphasis ours).
Respect should be accorded to the Secretary's construction of the law
which his department administers and implements (Asturias Sugar Central Inc.
vs. Com. of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166; Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory


precondition for them to be entitled to their retention right.
Secretary Juico's interpretation of the owner's right of retention
conforms with our own construction in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms , G.R. No. 78742, August 23,
1990, where we ruled that:
". . . in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the
tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a
beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable
features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this
Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land,
he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The
tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time
the land owner manifests his choice of the area for retention." ( En Banc, Minute
Resolution.)
Petitioners' contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no
more authority or jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land Transfer after
they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance,
recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretary's
administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain
heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their ricelands (which did not exceed
seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico
properly ordered the cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which
had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Court hereby AFFIRMS it in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133507


February 17, 2000
EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA,
ROGELIO MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 dated January 28, 1998 which denied the application of petitioner heirs of
Eudosia Daez for the retention of a 4.1685-hectare riceland pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 3,
thereby reversing the Decision4 of then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres and the
Order5 of then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, both of which had
earlier set aside the Resolution6 and Order7 of then Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the same riceland from
coverage under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
The pertinent facts are:
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents
Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a
system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 8 as amended by
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 4749. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on
December 9, 1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries.
However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under
duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers 10. Armed with such
document, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of
P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to
private respondents.1wphi1.nt
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope,
declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in
Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares
of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential
lands11 in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in
Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.
On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying
Eudosia Daez's application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is
covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands
exceeding seven (7) hectares12.
On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong
requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medina's order. But on January 16,
199213 Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents
to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private
respondents' May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed under duress because
he found that Eudosia's son, Adriano, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of
Meycauayan, pressured private respondents into signing the same.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the
order of Secretary Leong in a decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia pursued her
petition before this court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18,
1992. We also denied her motion for reconsideration on November 9, 1992.
Meantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to
private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).

Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally
denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland,
this time under R.A. No. 6657.
In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo
allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of
her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual
tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law14. Aggrieved, they
appealed to the DAR.
On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of
Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution, 15 the decretal portion of which reads,
viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Resolution is hereby issued setting aside
with FINALITY the Order dated March 22, 1994 of the Regional Director of DAR
Region III.
The records of this case is remanded to the Regional Office for immediate
implementation of the Order dated January 16, 1992 of this office as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.
Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January 19,
199516.
She appealed Secretary Garilao's decision to the Office of the President which ruled
in her favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision 17 of then Executive Secretary
reads:
WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and
judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the
4.1685-hectare landholding subject thereof.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the
decision of the Office of the President.
On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.
The Court of Appeals ordered, thus:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of July 5, 1996 and Order dated October 23,
1996 of the public respondents are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the
Resolution and Order of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao respectively dated August
26, 1994 and January 19, 1995 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition which assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE
AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A MATTER OF
SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER WILL FORECLOSE
FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY
CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND,
THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN SEQUEL.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE
CITED (EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE DUE TO NON-TENANCY) AND THE
PRESENT CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT CAUSES OF
ACTION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED/OPINED
THAT THERE WAS A CUT-OFF DATE (AUGUST 27, 1985) FOR LANDOWNERS TO
APPLY FOR EXEMPTION OR RETENTION UNDER PD 27 AND THOSE WHO
FAILED TO FILE THEIR APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT


PETITIONERS (RESPONDENTS THEREIN) ARE GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
LAND SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS NO LONGER OWNED BY PETITIONERS
SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED NOT ONLY
THEIR RESPECTIVE CERTIFICATES OF LAND TRANSFER BUT ALSO THEIR
INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED AREA.19
We grant the petition.
First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers
tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must
be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is
absent, a landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent,
the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention
where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the
land is irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said
law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his
land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares.
Otherwise, his entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any
retention right20.
Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate
size does not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will
not be covered at all by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are
present. LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice
or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural
lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to
lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the landowner derives
adequate income to support his family.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not
devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even
though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of
retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2)
there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the
size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be
more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof
are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural
lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from
coverage of OLT and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a
landowner's right of retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for
retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in
one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no
procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of
the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same
land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.
Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over
the subject 4.1685 riceland.
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature21. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice

against the landowner22. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing the government
from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform23, we held that landowners who have not yet exercised
their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention rights under
R.A. No. 665724. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However,
if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had
previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still
entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27 25. Otherwise, he
is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657.
Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:
Sec. 6. Retention Limits Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of
which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size, such as
commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1)
that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of
this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for
retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose
whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the
retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from
the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to
the approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or
transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original landowner in violation
of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those executed prior to this
Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of
three (3) months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall
inform the DAR within thirty (3) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in
excess of five (5) hectares26.
defines the nature and incidents of a landowner's right of retention. For as long as
the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention
ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained, must
prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991,27 which supplies the
details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit
to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other lands
instead to avoid dislocation of farmers.

Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite
even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. 28
What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to either stay on
the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features.29
Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the government's agrarian reform program
are subject to the exercise by a landowner, who is so qualified, of his right of
retention.
Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to possess lands.
Thereafter, they are issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) after compliance with all
necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their presentation to the Register of Deeds,
result in the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor
of the beneficiaries mentioned therein30.
Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified31. Only Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all
prerequisites. Thereafter, upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds,
TCTs are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No.
2, series of 199432, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later
found to be part of the landowner's retained area.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the
status of the fee held by the owner of a parcel of land.33 As such, it is a mere
evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land itself. It cannot
confer title where no title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law34.
Thus, we had, in the past, sustained the nullification of a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a homestead patent because the land covered was not part of the public
domain and as a result, the government had no authority to issue such patent in the
first place35. Fraud in the issuance of the patent, is also a ground for impugning the
validity of a certificate of title36. In other words, the invalidity of the patent or title is
sufficient basis for nullifying the certificate of title since the latter is merely an
evidence of the former.
In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685-hectare
riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice
as to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus
issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of
deceased Eudosia Daez to retain the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 28, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision
of the Office of the President, dated July 5, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In the
implementation of said decision, however, the Department of Agrarian Reform is
hereby ORDERED to fully accord to private respondents their rights under Section 6
of R.A. No. 6657.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171972


June 8, 2011
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
TERESITA V. SALVADOR, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it.
This Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the August 24,
2005 Decision2 and the February 20, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA G.R. SP No. 86599. However, per Resolution 4 of this Court dated August 30,
2006, the instant petition shall be treated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.
Factual Antecedents
On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer,5 docketed as Civil Case No. 330, against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and
Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu.6 Respondent alleged that she is the absolute
owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 7
issued by virtue of Free Patent No. (VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino
Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador;8 that petitioners acquired possession of
the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest; 9 and that despite
several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the
subject land.10
In their Answer,11 petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia
claimed that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with
the consent and permission of respondents predecessors-in-interest, siblings
Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would
devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the
Salvador siblings.12 Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties,
petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.13
On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the parties were
ordered to submit their respective position papers together with the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence to support their respective claims.14
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision15 finding the existence of
an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
Based on the facts presented, it is established that defendant Lucia Rodriguez and
her husband Serapio Rodriguez were instituted as agricultural tenants on the lot in
question by the original owner who was the predecessor-in-interest of herein plaintiff
Teresita Salvador. The consent given by [the]original owner to constitute [defendants]
as agricultural tenants of subject landholdings binds plaintiff who as successor-ininterest of the original owner Cristino Salvador steps into the latters shoes acquiring
not only his rights but also his obligations towards the herein defendants. In the
instant case, the consent to tenurial arrangement between the parties is inferred from
the fact that the plaintiff and her successors-in-interest had received their share of
the harvests of the property in dispute from the defendants.
Moreover, dispossession of agricultural tenants can only be ordered by the Court for
causes expressly provided under Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844. However, this Court has no
jurisdiction over detainer case involving agricultural tenants as ejectment and
dispossession of said tenants is within the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Agricultural Board (DARAB). ([S]ee Sec. 1(1.4)
DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure[.])

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant complaint is hereby ordered


DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. AV-1237, with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26.17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision18 remanding the case to
the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists
between the parties.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration19 arguing that the purpose of a preliminary
hearing was served by the parties submission of their respective position papers and
other supporting evidence.
On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC
Decision dated September 10, 2003. The fallo of the new Decision20 reads:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 10, 2003 of the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO DECIDED.21
Respondent sought reconsideration22 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order 23
dated August 18, 2004.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review 24 with the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP
No. 86599.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that
no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove
that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to the tenancy
relationship.25 The CA likewise gave no probative value to the affidavits
of petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish
petitioners status as agricultural tenants.26 If at all, the affidavits merely showed that
petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the original owners. 27 And
since petitioners are occupying the subject land by mere tolerance, they are bound
by an implied promise to vacate the same upon demand by the respondent.28 Failing
to do so, petitioners are liable to pay damages.29 Thus, the CA disposed of the case
in this manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the decision rendered by the RTC of
Argao, Cebu on June 23, 2004 in Civil Case No. AV-1237 and ORDERING the
remand of this case to the MTC of Dalaguete, Cebu for the purpose of determining
the amount of actual damages suffered by the [respondent] by reason of the
[petitioners] refusal and failure to turn over to [respondent] the possession and
enjoyment of the land and, then, to make such award of damages to the
[respondent].
SO ORDERED.30
Issues
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE
SUBJECT LAND.
II.
WHETHER X X X SUCH RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS AND IS SUPPORTED WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.31
Petitioners Arguments

Petitioners contend that under Section 532 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known
as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, tenancy may be constituted by agreement of
the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. 33 In this case, there was
an implied consent to constitute a tenancy relationship as respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest allowed petitioners to cultivate the land and share the
harvest with the landowners for more than 40 years.34
Petitioners further argue that the CA erred in disregarding the affidavits executed by
their witnesses as these are sufficient to prove the existence of a tenancy
relationship.35 Petitioners claim that their witnesses had personal knowledge of the
cultivation and the sharing of harvest.36
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not agricultural tenants
because mere cultivation of an agricultural land does not make the tiller an
agricultural tenant.37 Respondent insists that her predecessors-in-interest merely
tolerated petitioners occupation of the subject land.38
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.
Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee.39
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the
parties, petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their
neighbors. In her affidavit,40 petitioner Lucia declared that she and her late husband
occupied the subject land with the consent and permission of the original owners and
that their agreement was that she and her late husband would cultivate the subject
land, devote it to agricultural production, share the harvest with the landowners on a
50-50 basis, and at the same time watch over the land. Witness Alejandro Arias
attested in his affidavit41 that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been
cultivating the subject land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio, petitioner
Lucia and her children continued to cultivate the subject land; and that when
respondents predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he would often see them and
respondent get some of the harvest. The affidavit 42 of witness Conseso Muoz
stated, in essence, that petitioner Lucia has been in peaceful possession and
cultivation of the subject property since 1960 and that the harvest was divided into
two parts, for the landowner and for petitioner Lucia.
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to
prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking.43 Except for the selfserving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show that respondents
predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Selfserving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary.44
Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest.1avvphil The
affidavits of petitioners neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-ininterest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should have
presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest 45
and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners.46
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not
ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. 47 It is incumbent upon a person who

claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites


of agricultural tenancy.48
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest
between the parties. Consequently, their defense of agricultural tenancy must fail.
The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. No error can therefore be attributed
to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondents complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the
determination of the amount of damages due respondent is proper.
Respondent is entitled to the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the subject land.
We must, however, clarify that "the only damage that can be recovered [by
respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that [in forcible entry or
unlawful detainer cases], the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful
possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the
[respondent] could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss
of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which [she] may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to [her] loss of material possession."49
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24, 2005 Decision and
the February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 86599
are AFFIRMED. This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of
Dalaguete, Cebu, to determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by
reason of the refusal and failure of petitioners to turn over the possession of the
subject land, with utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

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