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Below are some reections regarding politics and abortion.

I am sending this to you few


for feedback regarding whether or not it makes sense and is accessible enough.
It's not a defense of any particular stance, morally or even politically. It's an appeal to
demonstrate that other views are not, necessarily, unreasonable, in bad faith or
necessarily disqualifying. That said, to an extent, I do believe the bishops have been
wrong in a few areas, especially not recognizing that other consciences are within their
rights to dissent and follow different courses from their own, morally, and especially
legally and politically.
The reason I toss this out there is because, as in every election cycle, the nub for many
remains abortion, which is laudable, ne with me. The problem is, though, that they, in
my view, too facilely discount the reasonableness and good faith approaches, politically
and legally, even of those who largely agree with them morally! This comes from failures
to draw distinctions that make a difference.
Take a look if you are interested. Comment if you have time.
Wrongful Inferences from Political Stances to Moral Positions, rashly judging and
demonizing others
We cannot infer one's moral stance toward abortion from one's political stance, alone.
We cannot even infer one's legal stance from one's political stance, which may involve
pragmatic compromises and/or incrementalist approaches.
Practical approaches may or may not even be legal, but might, instead, be social or
economic. Prudential judgments discern which approaches might best reduce abortion
rates.
Legal approaches may or may not even be criminal. Other juridical approaches can
include professional boards that license, regulate and discipline practitioners, state
ethics panels, tort laws and ecclesiastical canons.
Legal approaches may apply to providers, procurers or both. No one would say that a
refusal to treat procurers as criminals is tantamount to saying that they therefore have a
right to an abortion. A decision not to criminalize its provision wouldn't mean anyone
considers it a basic human right, either.
Who would say the church says a woman has the right to an abortion just because it
doesn't support the criminalization of its procurement? Who would say society

recognizes a right to adultery just because it doesn't support its criminalization?


Persons can reasonably and in good faith disagree on the reality of personhood, the
moral status of the zygote, embryo or fetus, changes in the moral gravity of abortion as
gestation advances and on prudential judgments regarding strategies for its reduction.
Those disagreements shouldn't rashly lead to demonizations or facilely lead to political
disqualications but require one to dig deeper.
The partial birth abortion ban act has too often been used to demonize those who
opposed it on medical grounds. It, in fact, had nothing to do with when or if abortions
would occur, only addressing the how of a procedure. (Its relative gruesomeness versus
alternative procedures --- d&c, d&e, d&x --- is a whole other consideration, arguably a
contentious one). The ban, itself, in my view, was good for all sorts of reasons not salient
here.
Still, I would not, without digging much deeper, hold any lawyers and politicians who
opposed it as culpable, much less demonizable, given the stances taken by the
American Medical Association, the American Nurses Association and the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, all which, in one way or another, muddied
the medical science waters for laypersons. (I followed that part of the story more closely
than most and had my faith in them shaken).
As a general rule, in most years, 90% percent of abortions occur at 13 or less weeks
gestation; 99% at 20 or less weeks, early in the 2nd trimester; 99.9% at 24 or less weeks.
Less than 1/10th of 1% occur at 24 or more, which is measured in hundreds, not
thousands, of 3rd trimester procedures. (There are but a handful of doctors --- 4 known --who account for these). The vast supermajority of those procedures, often involving
referrals, involve lethal fetal anomalies and irreversible maternal morbidity or fatal
maternal consequences.
This is to recognize that, for all the rhetoric that Doe vs Bolton somehow opened up a
health exception hole that can be driven through by a Mack truck up until delivery, based
on the numbers and types of procedues being done in the 3rd trimester, a Tonka Toy
sized hole would sufce. When a law is 99.9% effective, good jurisprudence doesn't
further advocate absolutistic improvements. The medical profession seems to be well
capable of self-policing. As it is, the cure for what ails a mother post-viability is delivery,
which can be safely induced. Shunts can be used on infants heads to drain off excess
uids, when necessary, and caeserean sections performed.
Only after viability do thalamocortical connections form that are required for cognitive
consciousness, that distinguishing marker that differentiates human personhood. So, I
rationally get why the courts and others allow banning at, but not before, the third
trimester. Basically, they're looking for a symmetry with higher brain death and birth in
order to be consistent. While most legal statutes employ whole brain --- not higher brain

--- death as their criterion, that's because, by using brain stem death, they can stay off
that slippery slope where higher brain function might still be possible, such as in
persistent vegetative states (terminology which is repulsive to me and inaccurate).
I vehemently disagree with such an approach as codied in Roe v Wade, preferring it
being turned back over to the states, where much earlier bans, such as in Europe, could
be implemented and health exceptions much more narrowly tailored.
Quite frankly, the reasons given for later-term 20+ week abortions, by way too many
women, are morally repugnant to me. They too often match those given in early 1st
trimester abortions. Even an inordinate amount of the fetal abnormality reasons are not
morally compelling to me but are downright dehumanizing.
All that said, too much of the rhetoric is intemperate because too much of the
metaphysics is immoderate. The misconception (no pun intended) of a human zygote as
a person, ensouled, is not philosophically defensible, except in outdated, rationalistic
essentialisms.
The whole is it a deer or person in the bushes?exemplar is founded on the confusion
between a doubt of fact and a doubt of law. Whether or not a zygote is a person is not an
empirical doubt of fact but a theoretic doubt of law. It doesn't rely on a descriptive
determination which answers the question: "Is that a person?" Rather, it relies on an
interpretive explanation: "What is a person?"
As a doubt of law, then, moral probabilism allows one the freedom to follow other solid
opinions. Most people do, including a supermajority of catholics, who support in vitro
fertilization, emergency contraception, embryonic stem cell research and such.
Views from that point on then diverge even as most people impute an increase in the
moral status of the embryo as gestation advances. The super-duper-majority, even of
catholics, employ, at some point, contraceptives. The increased access to same marks a
major effort with great promise to reduce unwanted pregnancies, hence abortions.
There are many other angles to this complex moral reality and I'm willing to explore them
with anyone searching.
I suppose this is to suggest that I've seen no compelling reason to a priori consider any
candidate a demon, as based on their political stance regarding abortion, or a monster,
as based on their opposition to the partial birth abortion ban, which saved no lives, not
changing either if or when abortions would be done. Such an opposition was mounted by
a credible swath of the medical profession, which, in my view, was wRong.

No bishop, not even the Pope, would criminalize the procurement of abortion by any
woman, resorting to ecclesiastical canons and pastoral accompaniment instead. That
approach is a prudential judgment representing the best course of action in their view.
Similarly, which practical approach others decide to take regarding the providers,
involving criminalization or not, involves prudential judgments. Facilely describing any
other approach to abortion reduction --- other than criminalization --- as thereby
necessarily enabling would be wrong and inconsistent; it would have to apply equally
whether speaking of providers or procurers. There are reasonable arguments backed by
empirical data suggesting that criminalization can be, at best, ineffective, at worst,
counterproductive. And that can be true whatever one's moral stance toward abortion.
There are reasonable counterarguments. No justication for judging others.
Also, you may nd this helpful:
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/propernomenclature/phoenix-priest-offers-homily-advic
e-on-voting-but-something-is-missing/
Also, RE: Voting 3rd party?
http://hillbillypolitics.com/blog/2016/10/26/bonhoeffers-dirty-hands-and-the-2016-presi
dential-election/
We recognize a unity of mission and diversity of ministry, which includes apostalates
(even vocations) --- not only of practical service, such as corporal works of mercy, but --of prayer and witness, which, in a worldly sense, often seem impractical as mere
spiritual works of mercy. Such witnessing has always been afrmed by the church as it
helps to keep green within us our desire for the kingdom.
Still, the church in no way sets such witnessing over against our more practical concerns
--- not because it capitulates, theoretically, to worldly norms that support varying degrees
of coercive violence or governance, but --- because it accommodates, pastorally, our
radical human nitude, compassionately responding to our human weakness.
Concretely, then, this is to recognize that the church has always and continues to highly
value eremetic (think hermits), cenobitic (think monks), pacist (think Dorothy Day) and
prophetic (think protesters) approaches for their apostalates of prayer and witness to
our more eternal concerns. It no less afrms and accommodates active ministries,
articulating principles like subsidiarity, just war and remote material cooperation to help
us navigate our more temporal concerns.
Specically, then, one always enjoys the moral prerogative to vote either expressively or
pragmatically, giving witness to kingdom values or effecting worldly outcomes.
Optimally, one might enjoy both approaches. Suboptimally, one might face choosing the
lesser of two or more evils.

Of course, giving witness to the kingdom avoids any caricature like self-expression,
self-display or self-protection, precisely because it's essence is not self-centered. It's
ministry serves another mission.
Giving witness to the kingdom as a hermit or monk does not mark a retreat from some
binary choice between being in the world or not.
Giving witness to the kingdom as a pacist does not mark a retreat from some binary
choice between war and peace.
Giving witness to the kingdom as a prophet does not mark a retreat from some binary
choice between fostering good or evil.
Hermits, monks, pacists and prophets should not be cursorily and summarily
dismissed as preening their superior sanctity on some exhibitionistic platform,
educating others from some supercilious pulpit, chastising others with some paddle of
arrogance, or seeking spiritual refuge to pursue some personal, private virtuousness?
Who could advance such charges but those who have no robust sense of ecclesiology?
Those who may be called to prayer and witness only in-voke because they've rst been
con-voked! Their prayer and witness are apostalates with profoundly public dimensions,
often pervasively public outcomes, and do not deserve to have their motives so rashly
judged, as if their desire for the kingdom was not their foremost ultimate concern.
Neither expressive nor pragmatic voting ever violates acceptable norms.
All that said, I am deeply sympathetic to the pragmatic approach. I have not chosen the
life of a hermit, monk, pacist or prophet. If I lived in a swing state or any state near the
polling margins of error, including in this cycle, for example, Texas even, I could not bring
myself to vote expressively rather than pragmatically. I humanly could not help jamming
my spoke into the wheel to prevent the deliverance of one versus the other package of
hurt. The probabilistic science of modern polling affords one the "luxury" of very
calculatedly choosing to vote either expressively or pragmatically. There is no
categorical imperative to vote one way or the other, no matter where one lives or what
urgency one attaches to various outcomes.
What I celebrate with deep gratitude, when I hear my own family and friends and
neighbors voice their choices for or against one or the other candidates or issues, are
not the decisions they've made regarding HOW they will vote. Rather, I listen to the
reasons they provide for WHY they will thus vote! I, happily, without exception, nd that
those reasons reveal deeply held values that we always share and profoundly sincere
concerns that show the depth of how much we all truly care. It's an altogether different

consideration what I might think regarding their various assessments of the most likely
vs least likely case scenarios for those outcomes they consider either best or worse
case scenarios. I would suggest that our collective past experience might suitably
chastize us all regarding how incredibly difcult it is to predict, or even after the fact
prove (especially counterfactually), that a best case scenario will have been realized, a
worst case scenario averted. A certain amount of humility seems warranted? At least a
measure large enough to keep us from insulting either the intelligence or, especially, the
goodwill, of others, whom we otherwise deeply love or profoundly respect?
That's how I see it. I enjoy learning how others approach these matters.
deep peace, great love, prompt succor
A Conversation
Dear ********
I have not forgotten your invitation to Notre Dame and look forward to seeing the
improvements as Fall approaches and our life circumstances enjoy more normalcy.
Below are some reections, which I know you will value even if there's a measure of
disagreement. You've just always been a Spirit-lled discerner and thoughtful deliberator.
The chief takeaway I hope is that The Widow's Vote, Like the Widow's Mite, remains a
crucial participation in the Kingdom even when not otherwise a decisive contribution to
an election result. It still enjoys manifold efcacies!
Be well.
Deep peace and great love,
your student always,
john
Voting Angles
1) Strategic Voting - inuencing outcomes
Reasonable people can disagree regarding which administration (or even which level of
governance) will most likely effect the best, while avoiding the worst, outcomes for
values which they share.

Using one's vote to inuence an outcome, whether sooner or later, is called "strategic"
voting. Based on the historically high unfavorability ratings for both major party
candidates, it seems likely that very many people will be voting strategically this cycle,
as no major candidate adequately embodies the values so many aspire to express and
realize.
2) Expressive Voting - voicing positions
Whether individually or collectively, our votes can become "expressive" as well as
strategic. And, while we cast our individual votes in privacy, modern polling techniques
can telegraph (and amplify) --- not only our collective choices regarding candidates, but
--- our collective voices regarding issues. So, our votes can give voice to our deepest
values, whether heralding our hopes or trumpeting our dissent regarding either a moral
reality, itself, or a practical approach to that reality.
3) The ValueS of Voting
Even when our votes are not decisive in changing an election result, they will remain
crucial, pedagogically, in (re)forming public opinion, and politically, in mitigating policy
outcomes.
In our catholic tradition, we have always celebrated --- not only the extrinsic values of
practical or instrumental approaches, but --- the intrinsic values of life's higher goods,
hence expressive approaches. For example, we celebrate in our approach to truth the
often lonely voice of prophetic protest. In our approach to beauty, we celebrate the
eremitic vocation of the hermit, whose witness keeps green within us all our own
longings for the kingdom and desires for beatitude. In our approach to goodness, we
celebrate the vocation of the pacist, whose witness reminds us that eye has not seen
nor ear heard nor the heart of wo/man conceived what has been prepared for those who
love, even while, at the very same time, we celebrate the holy sacrices of those who
contribute to our armed services.
Thus, beyond the extrinsic rewards of those personal outcomes that might ensue from
voting strategically in our enlightened self-interest, we also cherish those extrinsic
rewards that advance the common good, altruistically. Social scientists create all
manner of silly voting paradoxes when modeling voting behaviors, primarily because
they ignore both intrinsic rewards and altruistic motivations, modeling only extrinsic
rewards and self-interested factors (an impoverished anthropology, both empirically and
spiritually).
The intrinsic rewards of voting expressively, even if seemingly as a lone voice crying out

in the wilderness, realize the beatitudes of our vocations as prophets, priests and kings,
celebrating truth, beauty and goodness just as prophets, hermits and pacists always
have, reminding us of life's higher gifts and witnessing to their Giver.
This all remains the case even when our votes do not ostensibly contribute strategically
or decisively to election results, which do not, alone, determine the value of one's vote,
which remains crucial as a form of participation in the Kingdom, eternally and spiritually,
even when not otherwise decisive in contributing to immediate results, temporally and
materially.
4) Choosing Approaches
In a less than perfect world, we cannot always realize, in the same instant, the values of
both expressive and strategic voting. For example, one may feel they're faced with
choosing the lesser of two evils and/or one may vote in a deeply ideologically
homogenous district or state. Most moral philosophers would agree, I suspect, that one
could defensibly choose either approach in such circumstances. They'd also hold that,
while we may all bear responsibility for expressing our values in deed, always, and in
word, if necessary, expressing one's strategic views and practical approaches to those
values is a privilege but not, necessarily, a responsibility. Simply put, one may vote in
private and keep it private! Even, then, one gives witness to the Kingdom value of
participating in the advance, however meager, of the common good, where we have
always highly valued the effects of salt, of leaven, of the widow's mite!
5) Therefore, Be It Resolved I have family, friends and acquaintances, all of large intelligence and profound goodwill,
all sharing the very same values even, who have otherwise expressed their intention to
vote for different POTUS candidates this cycle. And their reasonings, while variously
compelling to me, are intellectually defensible and morally sensible, however otherwise
subject to both known and unknown UNKNOWNS, which creates a lot of latitude for lively
speculation and stimulating conversation (potentially, anyway).
Conclusion Seems to me, anyway ...
6) Regarding Possible Policy Outcomes
a) The most critical factor in effectively reducing the abortion rate is a thriving economy.
(see attached)

Trump's geopolitical isolationism, trade protectionism and anti-immigrant nativism


would have catastrophic economic consequences.
As laudable as overturning Roe v Wade would be, it would be substantially less effective
(than fostering the economy and enhancing healthcare, particularly, contraceptive
options). Arguably, it continuesto be much less politically feasible than many seem to
imagine, year after year, cycle after cycle (even SCOTUS appointment after SCOTUS
appointment!).
In short, the economic effects of Trump's policies would be considered highly probable
by economists of every political stripe, while the 43 year old political strategy of
overturning Roe remains somewhat dubious. Incremental legal strategies can still be
effective, so this is to recommend a comprehensive strategy (political, legal & economic)
over a narrow approach (e.g. trying to stack the SCOTUS). However, it's not to say that
any given strategy (e.g. overturning Roe) should necessarily be abandoned.
b) Many long-established GOP (and other) security experts have warned us about the
substantial risks a Trump presidency would pose both to our national security and to
global stability. Supercially, it might seem that Clinton's more militaristic approach
would indeed be more likely to get us into a war on purpose, while Trump's reckless
temperament would only get us into a war accidentally. Problem is that, while her war
would be conventional, there's the haunting spectre that his could be thermonuclear.
Don't get me wrong, the former seems much more likely an eventuality than the latter.
Problem is, though, that the latter poses an existential threat, the type of risk most
prudent persons aspire --- not to manage, but --- to eliminate.
c) Stipulating, for argument's sake, that character analyses produce a draw, I would
maintain that, in my strategic view regarding social (nativism), economic (protectionism)
and foreign policy (isolationism) outcomes, HRC royally ushes The Donald.
For those who choose to vote conservatively and more expressively [2], I commend Gary
Johnson.
For those who feel the need to vote strategically [1], I've seen no robustly compelling
arguments, in my view, to vote for Trump, even though I admit there are some that are
clearly defensible, intellectually, and sensible, morally.
a round up of views re trump & scotus
while the scotus remains a compelling issue, leading conservative thinkers (like david

brooks & george will) and editorialists (at national review, weekly standard & redstate)
don't nd it a compelling argument to vote for trump
http://www.redstate.com/leon_h_wolf/2016/09/19/professional-pro-life-movement-lot-c
ommon-donald-trump/
http://dcwatchdog.org/brooks-if-david-duke-was-the-gop-nominee-would-you-say-the-su
preme-court-is-all-that-matters/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2016/09/22/trumpkins-supreme
-court-excuse-crumbles/

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/trump-protects-his-anti-abortion-ank.ht
ml

http://www.npr.org/2016/09/29/495960902/the-supreme-court-a-winning-issue-in-the-p
residential-campaign

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/why-trusting-donald-trump-on-jud
ges-is-folly/494645/
https://www.google.com/amp/www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/501461/
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.washingtonpost.com/amphtml/news/volokh-con
spiracy/wp/2016/09/24/donald-trumps-expanded-supreme-court-list-changes-nothing/
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-trump-twenty-updated/article/2004508
http://theweek.com/articles/653503/conservatives-really-want-donald-trump-save-supre
me-court-instead-hell-ruin
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438736/donald-trump-supreme-court-constitutio
n-promises-are-fantasy
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/435573/donald-trumps-supreme-court-list-too-lit
tle-too-late

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438669/donald-trump-supreme-court-trump-card
-argument-awed-hillary-clinton-may-not-be
http://www.weeklystandard.com/some-republicans-are-supporting-trump-because-of-th
e-supreme-court.-heres-why-theyre-wrong./article/2002320
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-08-04/trump-s-meaningless-vow-on-th
e-supreme-court
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/presidential-campaign/289794-the-supreme-court
-argument-for-voting-trump-isnt
https://www.google.com/amp/www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/494630/
https://www.google.com/amp/reason.com/blog/2016/08/01/is-scotus-a-good-reason-t
o-support-trump/amp
https://blogs.thegospelcoalition.org/evangelical-history/2016/09/29/the-supreme-court
-and-the-convoluted-case-for-trump/
https://redmillennial.com/2016/08/19/you-shouldnt-vote-for-donald-trump-because-of-t
he-supreme-court/
https://www.google.com/amp/www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-yoo-rabkin-trumpsupreme-court-20160815-snap-story,amp.html
As we all strive to follow divine laws, to pursue the realization and to avoid the
frustration of the values they foster, philosophically, we are guided by the love of
wisdom, contemplatively, we are guided by the wisdom of love, in both approaches
guided by the Spirit, when we thus cooperate.
In building the Kingdom, we follow both the dictates of conscience and employ the fruits
of practical discernment in devising strategies that might optimally align our approaches
to our God, others, the world and even ourselves. We cannot a priori say with certainty
whether one strategy or another will best accomplish such an alignment. More
concretely, we cannot say whether that strategy should be pastoral, juridical or even left
to individual consciences, which may be variously formed.

Should we choose a juridical approach, we cannot a priori say whether such positive
laws should be both ecclesiastical and secular, both civil and criminal, uniformly
consequential or not, exceptionless or not.
Juridical approaches cannot possibly cover every eventuality or be applied in every
concrete circumstance. Particular circumstances require a practical discernment that
yields prudential judgments, which is why even the consequences or effects of rules
need not necessarily always be the same. Further, the administration of rules should
follow the principle of subsidiarity.
But when the only tools one owns are legalistic and rigoristic hammers, I suppose every
practical and moral problem will, suspiciously, look like a juridical nail.
Amoris Laetitia, as a pastoral exhortation, voiced prophetic protest against such
approaches without addressing dogma, doctrines or canons. For those with only
juridical lenses, it was truly a foreign language.
see: http://www.peterkreeft.com/topics-more/personhood.htm
according to kreeft
if one's not an essentialist, one must be a nominalist or functionalist
if one's not an absolutist, one must be a relativist
kreeft talks about common sense as if all of its concepts were necessarily classically
dened and shared the same characteristics, mapping equally onto reality with
consistent existential implications ... but they manifestly do not ...
see:
https://www.scribd.com/mobile/document/328539784/The-Conceptual-Confusion-Infe
cting-Every-School-of-Thought
and thus caricatures all who reject his essentialist stance as if they must therefore be
vulgar functionalists
when, instead, we can avoid both essentialism and nominalism, which are opposite
sides of the same bankrupt epistemic coin with a

fallibilist, pragmatic, semiotic realism


that doesn't mistake provisional, methodological stipulations for eternal, metaphysical
verities
that prescinds from the necessary to the probable in our modal ontology
being as precise as we can but as vague as we must
afrming noncontradiction but not overusing excluded middle
as few realities are either-or much less all or nothing, hence are realized in degrees
and availing ourselves of one of common sense's most potent tools, reductio ad
absurdum
kreeft also conates analogical predications of the concept, person, when making it a
supercategory
for all the ills that come from reducing persons to functions, kreeft fails to take account
of the absurdities (condemnations of masturbation, birth control, ivf, embryonic stem
cell research, morning after pills, etc) that have been articulated in such a moral
philosophy that is too essentialisric, deductive, abstract, physicalistic, biologistic, a
prioristic and rationalistic, all at the expense of those concrete lived experiences that are
part of --- not only our common sense, which he properly esteems, but --- our common
sensibilities, which he apparently dismisses, and our common law, which he apparently
ignores
for the theology of the body is not substantively personalist but has, instead, rst taken
essentialist conclusions as self evident, then, rearticulated them in a personalist style
rather than inductively gathering the data of our common sense, common sensibilities
and common law and seeing where that has led or might lead vis a vis human
value-realizations
and kreeft imaginatively over utilizes various slippery slope consequences over against
all evidence to the contrary in our human experience regarding how well arbitrary

boundaries have indeed worked in all areas of our human traditions, in our social and
moral norms as well as legal proscriptions and prescriptions
his immersion in potentiality language ignores the wisdom of hartshorne's nonstrict
identity and buddhist distinctions like no-self and empirical self vis a vis dynamical
realities with asymmetric temporal relations
common sense, common sensibilities and common law are not syllogisms
and kreeft's decision tree is facile
a zygote is not a person and everybody knows it's not, all sylly syllogisms aside
such a belief leads to absurd consequences that violate our moral instincts, aesthetic
sensibilities, ethical intuitions, visceral reactions and abductive inferences regarding
dynamical realities
and the only cure for a vulgar functionalism, facile nominalism or absolutist essentialism
is a fallibilist, pragmatic semiotic realism, which can clarify conceptual confusion and
phenomenologically bracket those metaphysics that prove too much, tell untellable tales,
saying way more than we can possibly know
peter kreeft, abortion, personhood, essentialism, functionalism, nominalism, nonstrict
identity, asymmetric temporal relations, theology of the body,pragmatic semiotic
realism
The Conceptual Confusion in Every School of Thought
In every human value-realization across the disciplinary spectrum of human endeavor,
far more disagreement is rooted in conceptual confusion, far less in inferential mistakes.
After all, most professionals in most disciplines have learned the calculus of triadic
inference (abductive, inductive and deductive), whether reasoning formally (equations &
arguments) or informally (hypotheses & common sense) about their specic endeavors
and thus generally avoid common fallacies and logical mishaps.
In my observations regarding political philosophy, legal philosophy (e.g. constitutional
interpretation), moral philosophy, normative philosophy (logic, aesthetics & ethics),
social philosophy, philosophy of art, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion,
philosophical theology, metaphysics and epistemology ...
it has seemed to me that most schools of thought are grounded in and most disciplinary

disagreements are rooted in --a conceptual confusion, which, however implicitly, variously over- or under-emphasizes
relevant approaches or simply misapplies concepts by wrongly substituting them as
variables in this or that axiological calculus.
We can clarify such conceptual confusion by properly
1) analyzing each concept's category: Are we employing a cluster, vague, fuzzy, plualistic
or classical concept? that has been negotiated (theoretic), remains non-negotiable
(semiotic), remains in negotiation (heuristic) or non-negotiated (dogmatic)?
2) analyzing each concept's characteristics:
Is it's application variously dis/ambiguated, subjective or objective, non/arbitrary,
reasonable or absurd, in/adequate, descriptive or referential?
3) analyzing each concept's mapping to realities, which may be static or dynamical,
ordered or chaotic, patterned or paradoxical, dis/continuous, a/symmetric, ir/regular,
probable or necessary, in/determinate, a discreet event or process.
4) analyzing each concept's existential implications, which holistically will include
descriptive, evaluative, normative and interpretive moments in every axiological
movement or human value-realization.
In philosophy of law, for example, there need not necessarily be an over against contest
between originalist, textual (descriptive), intentional (interpretive), dynamical (normative)
and pragmatic (evaluative) constitutional interpretations, as an holistic cumulative case
like preponderance can be fashioned via our common sense, common sensibilities and
common law.
In philosophy of science, we best avoid all radical rationalisms, empiricisms and
positivisms, as well as such skepticisms and ignosticisms, which, aspiring to take down
metaphysics, bring down the natural sciences, too.
In moral philosophy, we've seen the sterility and faced the absurdity of those systems
that are a prioristic, absolutistic, infallibilistic, physicalistic, biologistic, essentialistic,
rigoristic, legalistic, rationalistic, idealistic and overly deductive, hence divorced from
concrete, lived experiences. Such approaches should, instead, be also inductive,
fallibilist, casuist, probabilist, open to prudential judgment & pastoral discernment,
nonjuridical, realistic and existentialist, mindful of human nitude.
In philosophical theology, we avoid the extremes of ignosticism, gnosticism, deism,
encratism, rationalism, pietism, quietism and, instead, invoke equiplausibility principles,
normative justications and cumulative case preponderances, variously employing
predicates that are apophatic, kataphatic, analogical, equivocal or metaphorical,
maintaining logical consistency, internal coherence, external congruence,
interdisciplinary consilience, hypothetical consonance, while aspiring to successful
references when successful descriptions evade us. Interpretations best consider literal,
moral, mystical and anagogical approaches.

In philosophy of art, we can thus afrm mimetic, expressivist, pragmatic and objective
hermeneutics.
And so on and so forth. Holistic approaches to the application of concepts foster their
appropriate and prevent their inappropriate employment as variables in any given
disciplinary calculus. However logically valid a given calculus might be for this or that
system (political, legal, moral, ethical, scientic, cultural, philosophical, religious, etc), the
wrongful application of concepts within such formulations will inevitably lead to
unsound, often absurd, conclusions, empirically, rationally, morally, practically and
interrelationally.
I will leave it to the reader to discern how each term above (whether in philosophy of law,
science, art, religion and so on) relates to that fugue of epistemic virtue which considers
descriptive, evaluative, normative and interpretive moments to be all necessary, none
alone sufcient, for every human value-realization, as holistically, each such moment
remains methodologically autonomous (asking distinct questions of a reality), while all
must be taken together, being otherwise axiologically integral.
A Case in Point:
Is a Zygote a Person? Conceptual Confusion
We realize most human values by using concepts that don't meet the classical denition
of "singly necessary and jointly sufcient." We realize both the lesser and higher goods of
life, for example, when using cluster, vague, fuzzy and/or pluralistic concepts, in addition
to those that have been more classically dened.
Our concepts will ordinarily be more vs less clustered vs simple, vague vs precise, fuzzy
vs discreet, pluralistic vs singular, objective vs subjective, arbitrary vs nonarbitrary,
adequate vs inadequate, even reasonable or absurd ...
as they, more or less, robustly describe vs merely reference realities that present ...
in varying degrees of continuity and discontinuity, regularity and irregularity, pattern and
paradox, necessity and chance, symmetry and asymmetry, order and chaos, determinacy
and indeterminacy, event and process, static and dynamical.
However one conceives a moral ontology, because our epistemology remains ineluctably
fallibilist, epistemic virtue requires an holistic (contemplative) approach ...
which will include not just objective aspects, which are ...
empirical (descriptive) ...
logical, ethical and prudential (all normative), but also ...

subjective aspects, which include hedonic, aesthetic and moral dispositions (all
evaluative), as well as, importantly ...
intersubjective relational realities (interpretive).
Subjective aspects, then, not only need not rob our concepts of epistemic virtue, but,
instead, can enhance their modeling power of reality, as they draw on our collective ...
moral instincts, ethical intuitions, aesthetic sensibilities, hedonic inclinations, visceral
reactions, in other words ...
our common sensibilities ...
therebybetter reecting our legitimate ultimate concerns.
Our more informal objective aspects needn't rob our concepts of epistemic virtue, either,
but can also enhance our modeling power of reality, as they draw on our ...
abductive instincts, intuitions and inferences and ...
inductive experiences, in other words ...
our common sense ...
thereby protecting us from radical empiricisms, rationalisms and gnosticisms (all silly
formalisms), which devolve into paradoxes that cannot be
dissolved paradigmatically,
resolved dialectically or
exploited via creative tensions, but must otherwise simply be
evaded, practically, via reductio ad absurdum.
This is to recognize, for example, that whatever epistemic virtues one argues might
accrue to classically dening a zygote as a human person, such as, for example,
empirical objectivity, rational deduction, conceptual precision, ethical clarity and
prudential simplicity, such a denition remains ...
woefully decient vis a vis humanity's common sense and
seriously impoverished vis a vis humanity's common sensibilities.
This is all because complex human realities --- like cause, species, person, life and death
--- require the use of cluster, pluralistic, vague and fuzzy concepts --- not because our

moral ontology doesn't enjoy objective foundations (e.g. vis a vis a theory of truth), but --because our moral theorizing remains unavoidably fallibilist, probabilistic and
incomplete (e.g. vis a vis a theory of knowledge) but, nevertheless and happily, largely
adequate.
Any doubt about a zygote's personhood, by the way, contrary to rationalistic accounts, is
not a determinable empirical or factual doubt, which would preclude a moral probabilism
for such a matter as life or death, but is a theoretic or interpretive doubt (explanatory in
nature, metaphysically indeterminable), hence a doubt of law, which precisely warrants a
moral probabilism, including a right to dissent from an authoritative teaching (whether
intrinsically via compelling argument or extrinsically via reliance on experts).

cluster concept, pluralistic concept, vague concept, axiological epistemology, evaluative


dispositions, moral probabilism, personhood, ethical intuitions, moral instincts, aesthetic
sensibilities, hedonic inclinations, abductive inference, abductive instinct, human life,
human death, common sense, common sensibilities, right to dissent, modeling power,
epistemic virtue, mimetic, expressivist, pragmatic, objectivist, apophatic, kataphatic,
logical consistency, internal coherence, external congruence, interdisciplinary
consilience, hypothetical consonance, epistemic virtue, philosophy of science,
philosophy of law, philosophy of religion, social philosophy, philosophical theology,
moral philosophy, philosophy of art, metaphysics & epistemology, conceptual
categories, conceptual characteristics, conceptual mapping, conceptual, conceptual
implications

act =
object (objective or what)
intention (subjective or why)
circumstances (who, when, where, how & consequence)
we must disambiguate the concept, act, to distinguish between the cluster concept of
act (which includes both material and formal causes) as used to refer to intrinsic evils
and the classically dened act as used to refer to a physical act (i.e. only a material
cause)
"intrinsic evils" refer to cluster concepts, which are also tautological insofar as their
moral conclusions are already included in their denitions because various physical evils
(material causes) will have already been linked to subjective intentions (formal causes),
ergo, as such they refer to this or that nexus of action, intention and motive

even once dening an act in terms of both material and formal causes, a fallibilist
epistemology resists absolutizing its proscription, conceding only its virtually
exceptionless nature
competing deontologists tie themselves up in paradoxical knots trying to preserve
absolute consistency in moral principles, such as, for example, regarding lying ... but the
real solution, in extreme cases, where our concepts strain to bear the weight exerted by
our radical human nitude, lies into a retreat from an overwrought absolutistic,
infallibilistic, rationalistic, deductivistic, a prioristic, physicalistic, legalistic, rigoristic
deontologism to a
fallibilist, probabilist, inductivist, proportionalist, casuistry, which analyzes the
exceptions that reality indeed can present for otherwise virtually --- not absolutely --exceptionless proscriptions, navigating, cumulative case-like, toward a preponderance of
holistic value-realizations
as godel made us aware, we cannot ever prove that the axioms of our formal systems
are both complete and consistent
as hawking conceded, faced with such a choice, the good money bets on consistency
and does not otherwise aspire to completeness
the practical upshot, by analogy, being that we cannot, in principle, absolutely proscribe
acts because our inventory of any relevant formal, nal, efcient, material instrumental
and logical causes remains, ineluctably, incomplete ....
so, while we ordinarily navigate quite well with virtually exceptionless intrinsic evils
employing deontological principles, we must fall back on other epistemic resources,
which better parse moral realities in more exceptional cases, hence, casusitry ...
and understand and accept that its deliverances might be merely adequate or true
enough, beautiful enough, good enough, in the same way and to the same degree that
any imago Dei will correspond to the True, Beautiful & Good
intrinsic evil, deontology, proportionalism, tautology, cluster concept, fallibilism,
casuistry, cluster concept

A Redacted Discussion from 2012


US Catholic bishops and abortion
quote:
Originally posted by Phil:My concern here has more to do with understanding what the
bishops are saying in their document on politics and conscience formation than on the
morality of abortion itself. The bishops' teachings are very clear about that; they believe

it to be gravely evil and they can never accept as legitimate a Catholic being pro-choice.
Voting for a pro-choice political candidate is another matter, however; it doesn't
necessarily imply that one is pro-choice, nor that one agrees with the candidate's
position on abortion rights. I realize that this is a much more nuanced statement than
some of the teachings that have been given on this matter.
I think you represented what the bishops have said succinctly and fairly. What they've
said about all of this has evolved over the past four decades or so. For a chronology of
this evolution, see US Catholic bishops and abortion legislation: A critique from within
the church by Charles Curran. You may remember Charlie, who was scheduled as a
guest lecturer when we were at LSU in the 70's. Curran sets out the bishops' position
statements fairly, I think, and then well demonstrates how their latest iterations are in
error, setting out to prove the thesis that the bishops have claimed too much certitude
for their position on abortion law based on four separate arguments: 1) the speculative
doubt about when human life begins; 2) the fact that possibility and feasibility are
necessary aspects involved in discussions about abortion law; 3) the understanding and
role of civil law; and 4) the weakness of the intrinsic evil argument.One of the most
articulate and, in my view, enjoyable authors on so very many things both Catholic and
philosophical is Peter Kreeft. I think he best sets forth the philosophical undergirding for
most of the bishops' (like Archbishop Chaput's) moral and legal stances on abortion:
Human Personhood Begins at Conception. Kreeft's arguments turn on his philosophical
defense of essentialism using nominalism as a foil. It is beyond the scope of this thread,
but my (devastating!) critique of Kreeft, is that the essentialism-nominalism dichotomy
is false because human evolutionary epistemology is more consistent with a fallibilist,
pragmatic, semiotic realism. Carol Tauer demonstrates how the Magisterium has been
inconsistent in her article THE TRADITION OF PROBABILISM AND THE MORAL STATUS
OF THE EARLY EMBRYO.In summary, you are correct, in my view, that the bishops
consider a pro-choice stance illegitimate. There are pro-choice stances (moral, legal
and/or political)that would not be inconsistent with the Catholic moral tradition per
Curran and Tauer, whose arguments I nd far more compelling than Kreeft's and those
who employ his philosophical grounds.[johnboy snipped here]
quote:
Originally posted by Phil:I wonder how much the sex-abuse scandals in recent decades
have contributed to a credibility gap between the Magisterium and the laity?
The scandals certainly hurt their credibility but, where the magisterium's moral doctrines
and church disciplines intersect gender, sex and life issues, the bigger problem, in my
view, has not been bad form (poor pedagogy, credibility gaps, etc) or an unreceptive
audience (non-docile spirits, non-deferential laity, intractable disobedience) but bad
substance (awed logic, erroneous presuppositions, awed metaphysics, poor
epistemology). A greater problem might be how this authoritative lapse could then
scandalize the faithful who'd then question essential dogma and faith practices. There is
much room for hope, though, really no room for despair, because the very methodologies
that could improve the magisterium's gender, sex and life deliberations (re: doctrines and
disciplines) are already established, time-honored and well-respected worldwide, both
within and without the church: the church's social teachings, which are par excellence.
REGARDING HUMAN CONCEPTS
Emotions, maternal instincts, paternal feelings, evaluative dispositions, visceral

reactions and other such moral sensibilities, all play important pre-rational and
nonrational roles which combine with our rational and supra-rational propositions to
inform our human moral calculus. So, more holistic appeals sound right-headed. The
propositional aspects, themselves, present many angles, too.The human moral subject
is more complex than many treatments of this topic seem to recognize. The way most
people actually behave and poll, and the way most legislatures codify abortion-related
issues, suggest a more complex moral object, too. Abortion, even for those who agree
regarding its moral status, is thus a much more complex legal and political reality than
can be captured by such facile labels as pro-life and pro-choice. Among Catholics, the
American gap between magisterial teaching and lay assent & behaviors is not unique,
comparable even to the gap in other Catholic countries where abortion has been
criminalized, quite begging the issue of the efcacy and jurisprudence of legislative
strategies and political remedies.Most people seem to invest a greater moral status to
the human embryo-fetus as gestation advances and moral, legal and political
consensuses thus seem to build, too. Because authoritative metaphysical
pronouncements have not been and are not likely to be made regarding human
personhood, ontologically, moral determinations will not easily ow, deontologically, in a
universally compelling manner. The weight of nonrational appeals also seems to
increase as gestation advances, militating against merely essentialistic, deontological
arguments regarding the moral signicance, for example, of blastocysts and earlier
embryos.Returning to the political crux of the opening post, the complexity of this moral
reality should at least construe against facile indictments of others' moral character
based only on their legal and political stances regarding abortion, even their moral
stance, especially if conscientiously nuanced. The question then would turn on what
relevant practical outcomes might be pursued and successfully so. We would then be in
the realm of prudential judgment, now, for example, such as questioning how prescient a
POTUS has ever been regarding the future judicial practices of SCOTUS appointees or
whether turning things over to the states would make a difference here vs there. Or
asking whether maybe increasing access to contraception might advance the cause. Or
whether the probability of neoconservative misadventures at war are far more likely with
one candidate than a change in other life issues might be for another, for example, such
as with abortion issues, which have been in political limbo for decades. I won't relitigate
these matters here in 2012 as I contributed 6 pages worth of posts in 2008 that I could
only improve on through silence.

Huma concepts are loaded, fraught - with implicit meanings.


The practical, aesthetical, relational, existential, evaluative, imaginative, participative,
abductive and other informal and/or nonpropositional horizons of concern are integrally
related to the human value-realizations that we also pursue empirically, inductively,
logically, deductively, normatively, formally and/or propositionally.
Additionally, the concepts that humans employ in reference to our manifold and
multiform value-realizations across these different horizons reect varying degrees of
epistemic warrant and normative justication in terms of their negotiability status within
and across different cohorts of inquiry - semiotic (non-negotiable), theoretic (negotiated),
heuristic (in-negotiation) and dogmatic (non-negotiated).
A concept's negotiation status depends on a variety of factors, such as which root

metaphor one employs for one's metaphysic, e.g. substance, process, etc and which
approach one takes toward metaphysical necessity e.g. essentialist, nominalist,
pragmatist, etc and whether one subscribes to an idealist or realist approach to
epistemology and/or ontology.
In other words, without a basic philosophical agreement re: epistemology and ontology,
there's little chance for successful negotiation and consensus re: a concept's status,
such that it could be employed in the various forms of human reasoning.
Without shared denitions, then shared logic and shared premises will still not yield
shared conclusions. Also, without shared aesthetic and moral sensibilities, shared
conceptual denitions will not likely result, even from philosophies that otherwise share
both an epistemology and ontology. This is because epistemic warrant, normative
justication, evaluative eco-rationality and interpretive impetus, all
methodologically-autonomous, comprise our holonic-like concepts, which are
axiologically integral.
US Catholic bishops and abortion - part 2
continued from:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/101988973/US-Catholic-Bishops-and-Abortion
quote:
Originally posted by Phil:Oh, I surely do recall Charles Curran's visit to LSU and the
controversy around all that. It was the beginning of the end of our campus ministry team.
I remember when his critique of the bishops approach you linked to came out a couple
of years ago. That, too, stirred things up quite a bit. I think we might have discussed it
here. All in all, I nd it a good summary, but I nd a few things to quibble about. E.g.,
quote:
Recently the bishops have made the argument that since abortion is an intrinsic moral
evil, it thus differs from all other legal issues such as immigration, death penalty, human
rights, or the rst use of nuclear weapons. This is a faulty argument. The primary
problem is that intrinsic evil is a moral term and not a legal term. The fact that
something is an intrinsic moral evil has nothing to do with law or legality. Aquinas
himself following Augustine was willing to accept no law against prostitution, which
according to Catholic teaching is a morally intrinsic evil. Many states in our country do
not have criminal laws against adultery, but Catholic teaching insists that adultery is an
intrinsic moral evil. No Catholic bishops have campaigned to have criminal laws against
adultery. Thus the very fact that something is an intrinsic moral evil does not mean there
should always be a law against it.
That point seems disingenuous, insofar as the intrinsic evil is more akin to murder than
anything else, and no country approves of the intentional destruction of innocent human
life, which the bishops maintain a fetus is. And they are correct on this point; a fetus is
indisputably a human life, and an individual human genome, at that, after the 3rd week of
life, for sure. Questions about ensoulment, personhood, etc. are another matter, and I
think you and Curran are correct in pointing out that excessive reliance on essentialistic
approaches to establishing such status are as weak (and as strong) as the philosophical
approach. Without rehashing old discussions, here, I don't think they need to go down
that road; biological individuality is a strong enough point to build an argument on, imo,
and they're on completely safe ground there. All that's left to discuss is the right of that

biological individual genome to its proper future versus a woman's right to carry such life
(or not) to term. Pro-choicers give more weight to the mother's right to decide; the
bishops claim that the fetus' right to life trumps, and that to terminate such a life is an
intrinsically evil act more akin to murder, which every society loathes and punishes.
If one follows the links at the bottom of those NCR pages, there was some give and take
between Curran and other responders that claries this matter. Curran was stipulating to
the magisterium's position regarding the moral reality of abortion, merely pointing out
that being an intrinsic evil, alone, would not be a sufcient reason to criminalize an act
(over against some poorly nuanced statements by bishops). That point, when coupled
with the speculative doubt regarding personhood, could contribute to a reasonable
argument against criminalization and precisely because nothing tantamount to murder
is in play, consistent with the observation that most societies, in fact, do not criminalize
abortion. I suspect Curran described such doubt as speculative in order to distinguish it
from empirical doubt, the former being a doubt of law , where probabilistic systems may
apply, the latter, a doubt of fact , where probabilism would not apply if human life and
justice are at stake, although there is some evidence in church tradition that this is not
always the case.
quote:
Originally posted by Phil:Shasha's post #5 from the top expresses the precise
sentiments I think the bishops hope that Catholics will hold to, and I strongly empathize
with this. I can even go along with Rev. Jay Scott's statement quoted above (minus the
threat of mortal sin and damnation), that Voting for a pro-abortion politician when a
plausible pro-life alternative exists constitutes material cooperation with intrinsic evil.
That's really true! Of course, one must dene what is meant by "plausible pro-life
alternative."
What gets lost in the conversation is prudential judgment, which strategies will probably
work the best to achieve the consensus goal of reducing abortions, the pro-life goal of
eliminating them. A plausible pro-life alternative must be based on results not rhetoric.
Even the who, what, when, where and how of criminalization is subject to prudential
judgment. They seem to ignore such common sense calculus as weighing, for example,
the likelihood of abortion law being changed by one POTUS candidate against the
likelihood of an imprudent war being waged by another.
quote:
Originally posted by Phil:Johnboy, you seem convinced that the gap between the
bishops' teaching and Catholic voting behavior has less to do with what you called "an
unreceptive audience" than with poorly reasoned or presented teaching. Do you really
believe most Catholics are that tuned in to what you list as inconsistent arguments,
erroneous presuppositions, awed metaphysics, poor epistemology? I only wish they
were that tuned in and reective about this matter. You also nd hope for a more
effective pedagogy on this and related issues in our social teachings. Maybe you could
say more about that sometime.
We can distinguish between being epistemologically competent and being schooled in
epistemology. The former combines common sense and love in a wisdom experienced
in one's bones. People are indeed tuned in to what I list because such a tuning is moreso
intuitive, experiential, existential, aesthetic, moral and practical, what I have often
distinguished as arising from our participatory imaginations rather than merely our
conceptual map-making. People "know" through the way they live and move and have
their being that the procreative dimension to marriage is more than an isolated physical
act, that the unitive dimension of conjugal love is important. They don't have to jump
through metaphysical hoops to gure out that masturbation and murder are not equally

grave. They "know" that distributing condoms to prevent AIDS in Africa is a no-brainer
that doesn't require a panel of bio-ethicists to deliberate. They "know" that the procreative
values to be realized in a marriage are not threatened by the use of contraception
because openness to generativity is a disposition oriented toward the lifetime of the
relationship more than any individual act. They "know" that the sacerdotal roles of a
priest are not inextricably tied to her gender. They "know" that, given an unfortunate
choice, it is innitely more morally compelling to rescue a single baby from a re at a
preschool than hundreds of frozen embryos in the cryobank next door. Of course, every
value-realization involves an axiological holon of epistemic warrant, normative
justication, evaluative eco-rationality and interpretive impetus, in other words, including
both our participatory imagination and conceptual-mapmaking, our reason and intuition,
our rational, pre-rational, nonrational and supra-rational dispositions. But human
deliberations are far more informal than formal. A casuistry immersed in metaphysical
abstractions and deductive rationalism apart from concrete lived experience loses its
relevance to the faithful, who sniff out such a awed metaphysics and poor
epistemology as true philosophers, who are people who have simply lived life well. The
erroneous presuppositions needn't be articulated formally, as they can be dismissed
reductio ad absurdum for what they are, patently absurd. All it takes to spot an
inconsistent argument is, well, inconsistency, a reality about which the magisterium is
hypersensitive, so often disingenuously maintaining that thus and such has been the
so-called constant tradition. This is one reason given for not changing the teaching on
contraception: What about all the faithful we've already sent to hell? or The faithful would
be scandalized if we changed our position! In the old days, both our social justice and
sexual morality teachings relied on approaches based in classicism, natural law and
legalism. Nowadays, our social justice theory employs three new methodologies,
respectively, historical consciousness, personalism and relationality-responsibility.
Modern Catholic social justice teachings enjoy widespread credibility due to these
updated methodologies, which are eminently transparent to human reason. Catholic
Ethics in Tension: Sexuality and Social Justice by Rev. Charles CurranAll that said, the
magisterium has been decidedly on the side of all that is true, beautiful, good and
unitive, even if often fallibly making its way in walking alongside and ministering to the
pilgrim people of God. It, among other ecclesial magisteria, is an indispensable witness
to revelation and deserving of deference and engagement in one's conscience formation.
Regarding the moral reality of abortion, because I nd the arguments compelling that
both probabilism and prudential judgment are in play, it seems to me that people of both
large intelligence and profound goodwill can disagree regarding - not only the legal and
political dimensions, but - its morality, making vilication, demonization and ad
hominem characterizations (eg you therefore, denitionally and necessarily, have a
poorly-formed conscience) of others totally off limits. It also means that I believe that not only can one vote for a pro-choice candidate, but - one can be Catholic and
pro-choice, if sufciently nuanced. Even those who are quite condent that ensoulment is
variously delayed should take into account both their own and others' moral sensibilities,
feelings and aesthetics playing an important role in moral evaluations, and couple those
with an appreciation for other probable (authoritative) opinions as exist in probabilistic
systems, along with some speculative self-critical doubt, and concede that no human life
or being, person or not metaphysically, lacks moral signicance, even if that signicance
is less than absolute, and that, therefore, no decision to abort should be made casually
or cavalierly, that no gift should be returned dismissively or without consideration.
US Catholic Bishops and Abortion - Part 3

The bishops offered various policy goals to guide Catholics as they form their
consciences and reect on the moral dimensions of their public choices. They made the
point that not all issues are equal, that their stated goals address matters of different
moral weight and urgency, some even involving matters of intrinsic evil that can never be
supported. In that category, they listed policy goals regarding abortions, euthanasia,
assisted suicide, the destruction of human embryos in the name of research, the death
penalty, imprudent resort to war, the denition of the central institution of marriage as a
union between one man and one woman. Other policy goals included comprehensive
immigration reform, poverty, development assistance, debt relief, international trade,
health care, forms of discrimination, care for creation, human rights, religious liberty and
economic justice.
Giving Curran the benet of the doubt, he was not trying to caricature the bishops'
position regarding the term intrinsic evil . The point of his critique is that the bishops did
not say enough to make clear that the term was a moral term and not a legal term,
especially given that they employed it about a dozen times on different pages in many
different paragraphs of their document. This distinction is crucial because, while
prudential judgment does NOT apply to intrinsic evils, it manifestly DOES apply to
legislative, legal and political strategies regarding those very same evils, especially in
pluralistic societies where perfect legislation remains way out of reach. Prudential
judgment thus applies to ALL of the bishops' "policy" goals even though it does not apply
to all of the moral objects addressed by those policies. The bishops have not said
enough to disarm all of the single-issue voters, who have grounded their positions in the
confusion caused by failures to distinguish between the relevance of intrinsic evil to
moral versus legal realms vis a vis its prudential judgment implications.
quote:
Originally posted by Phil: I'm still not seeing how one could be Catholic and pro-choice,
however; what kind of nuancing would allow for that?

1) One would assent to the magisterium's teaching regarding the moral reality, while
(faithfully and responsibly) dissenting from it's prudential judgments regarding practical
strategies. That's the least problematical way.
2) One might also faithfully and responsibly dissent from the magisterium's moral
teaching by invoking probabilism, especially if they've established a doubt of law,
speculatively, perhaps less so if 3) entertaining a doubt of fact, empirically, regarding the
teaching.
4) One might nd the teaching wholly unconvincing but still choose to obey the
magisterial teaching, personally, but, sincerely believing that they are unable to advance
a convincing argument in the public square, choose not to impose one's own obedient
stance on others since one's position is essentially grounded religiously and not
philosophically vis a vis the natural law approach that is transparent to human reason.
5) One might nd the teaching wholly unconvincing from a natural law perspective but,
because of deeply felt aesthetical sensibilities, evaluative posits and ineffable intuitions,

choose to obey church teaching, although, as in the foregoing example, sincerely


believing that they are unable to advance a convincing argument in the public square,
they choose not to impose their own obedient stance on others since their position is
essentially grounded non-inferentially and religiously rather than philosophically vis a vis
the natural law approach that is transparent to human reason.
Finally, because human rationality has so many integrally-related "methodologies," some
more vs less formal, one's relationship to the magisterium might sometimes be
described with the Facebook Option: It's Complicated
The temporal relationship between a human individual's past and future has most often
been viewed symmetrically, whereby human identity can be attributed to a being
whether it is viewed in its transition from past to present (as in your approach, where a
subject endures a succession of predicates) or if it is viewed in its transition from
present to future (as in Hume's approach, where there is no personal identity, as if our
account of reality could be exhausted in terms of a unitary intraobjective identity).
Between these extremes of radical continuity (of essentials vis a vis accidentals) and
discontinuity of self (shades of Buddhist thought when misapproriated), Hartshorne
proposes a nonstrict identity, specically, a nonstrict, temporally asymmetrical identity,
wherein it would make sense to claim that a person in a later state includes that person
in an earlier state, but not vice versa. This is consistent with the emergence paradigm,
which does seem so very consistent with evolutionary biology and also consistent with
ordinary human language (e.g. our use of pronouns and tenses), which is also
truth-indicative. Either of the other extremes are subject to parody and reductio ad
absurdum. This is my summary of Daniel Dombrowski's Hartshorne, Metaphysics and
The Law of Moderation, Process Studies, pp. 152-165, Vol. 21, Number 3, Fall, 1992,
which one can read here: http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2833
The future human individual, as a moral agent, will indeed have emerged as the identical
past human individual will have undergone a developmental process, which will have
taken that individual through latent, incipient, sentient, sapient and nascent stages of
human life. What your approach well establishes, in my view, is the incipient reality of an
individual human life, and, as you say, it is grounded in empirical science. The justice
implications or deontologies that ow from that ontology (even if phenomenological,
not metaphysical) per your approach (the life that grows in the womb has just as much
a right to live as its mother and father) are more controversial because, axiologically,
humankind has long distinguished between objects by assigning them moral
signicance, moral patiency and moral agency. I think most ethicists would agree that
the "ought" that inheres in the "is" of your account is the assignment of moral
signicance. Others would add more criteria, however, before assigning moral patiency.
Personhood is a concept that retains a great deal of moral relevance. Perhaps it need not
be dened metaphysically in terms of ensoulment; proceeding phenomenologically,
perhaps bioethicists will be able to one day stipulate to a "psychic" sense of person,
although such a consensus will, itself, be problematical, to be sure. For example, Carol
Tauer has suggested that, lacking precise empirical knowledge, policy makers could
attribute psychic personhood at the time of earliest brainstem activity, that is, during the
seventh week of fetal development. (In my view, this well takes into account that our
notion of "mind," including memories, is no longer tightly localized in the brain but
distributed throughout our central and peripheral nervous system and even our

endocrine system. See abstract below.) Daniel Dombrowski emphasizes sentience as a


criterion for moral patiency, hence offers the fourteenth week of pregnancy, when a
central nervous system has better developed.
Others, as you know, look for an even more robust, sapiency-approaching psychic sense
of person that could not be realized until the end of the second trimester, but
discussions like that ... well, let's just say, really violate my moral sensibilities. At any
rate, all of this talk is consistent with the way many dynamically view the moral status of
the embryo, as increasing through gestation. Long before I get sympathetic with any
phenomenological or philosophical views, I get deeply and viscerally empathetic with
the moral sensibilities of all of the beautiful women in my life, rst grandmothers, mother
& sisters, then my spouse, now my daughter, who indeed look to those bishops to
articulate, inferentially, what they already hold, intuitively. Not to say that I do not then
view the more academic accounts, both phenomenological and philosophical,
sympathetically. Those accounts move me to give the benet of the doubt to many of
the well reasoned and sufciently nuanced positions of others --- morally, legally and
politically, as long as their dissent is loyal and responsible.
My chief objection is that, there is so little consensus regarding the moral status of the
embryo vis a vis advancing gestation, from conception on ... well, abortion is too vague
a term for us to ever be calling it "akin to murder."
Carol A. Tauer, Ph.D., Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses, J Med Philos
(1985) 10 (3): 253-266.
Abstract
Public policy decisions concerning embryos and fetuses tend to lack reasoned argument
on their moral status. While agreement on personhood is elusive, this concept has
unquestioned moral relevance. A stipulated usage of the term, the psychic sense of
person, applies to early human prenatal life and encompasses morally relevant aspects
of personhood. A person in the psychic sense has (1) a minimal psychology, dened as
the capacity to retain experiences, which may be nonconscious, through physiological
analogs of memory; and (2) the potential to become a person in the full sense. Psychic
personhood merits attribution of moral personhood because (1) the experience of a
person in the psychic sense has continuity with the experience of a full person; and (2)
this experience begins to determine the development of the personal psychological
characteristics of that individual. Psychic personhood is a rationally defensible
boundary for invasive research involving human embryos and fetuses. Lacking precise
empirical knowledge, policy makers could attribute psychic personhood at the time of
earliest brainstem activity, that is, during the seventh week of fetal development.
Metaphysical Doubts & Practical Evaluations
often, there are no formal philosophical work-arounds, especially when reality, at its
margins, confronts us with epistemic, ontic and semantic vagueness, which some,
perhaps in their inability to tolerate ambiguity or because of their anxiety when presented
with paradox, try to overcome with metaphysics, saying more than we can possibly
know, telling untellable stories and, nally, proving too much
ergo, when analyzing a concept, for example, zygote, in order to determine whether or
not it successfully refers to an ontologically identical reality as some other concept, for
example, person, one must analyze --- not only the relevant descriptions of both

concepts, but also --- the evaluations, norms and interpretations that a community of
value-realizers uses when pragmatically cashing out each concept's value (iow,
observing how this society actually behaves in all contexts toward that reality to which
the concept is alleged to refer)
this might better take us beyond the confusion introduced by the false
essentialism-nominalism dichotomy, which arises both from the conation of logical
and efcient causation (e.g. sorite paradox) and from the weak modeling powers of our
competing metaphysics (static vs dynamic, substance vs process), where a vague
phenomenology of emergence will otherwise sufce to account for reality's
dis/continuities and novelty, where a pragmatic semiotic realism might, at least, help
further reduce the conceptually meaningless to the patently absurd (not a wholly formal
philosophy, i know, but it must often do because, tutt-tutt, it looks like a reign of
uncertainty)
toward such ends, Hartshorne's notion of 'nonstrict identity' contributes much value,
seems to me
See Hartshorne, Metaphysics and The Law of Moderation by Daniel Dombrowski at
http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2833
http://www.scribd.com/doc/101988973/US-Catholic-Bishops-and-Abortion
http://www.scribd.com/doc/102061435/US-Catholic-Bishops-and-Abortion-Part-2
US Catholic Bishops and Abortion - Part 4
Keep in mind that this thread focuses on one strategy for reducing or eliminating
abortion. If one listed the top ten political strategies that would be most effective,
arguably, one's POTUS vote would be somewhere on that list, higher for one who lives in
a swing state, for example.
In addition to political strategies, there are legislative and judicial initiatives, at local,
state and federal levels. One might easily make a top ten list of these, including ballot
initiatives and constitutional amendments.
One could make top ten lists for nincial, ecclesial, social, economic, cultural,
educational, familial and personal strategies.
One could then rank all of these into a 'Top 50 most likely to be effective' and then people
collectively and individually could direct and redirect time, money and other resources in
those directions.
Passion is commendable. I deeply appreciate the passion expressed here.
At the same time, for almost 40 years, it seems to me that too much passion and too
many resources have been misdirected on the least effective strategies. Rhetoric has
truly trumped results. Raising the level of the conversation is one strategy; thanks to all
who thus contribute.
There is realism, for sure. And the invitation to steer one's passions in a way that could
effect real change. Presenting the notion that there are many strategies available does
not mean that they are mutually exclusive. It doesn't mean voting is not important. It is to
suggest, however, that single-issue voting, bumper stickers, yard signs and little white
crosses, however necessary one might imagine they are, are WOEFULLY INSUFFICIENT.
It also means that, because we are dealing in the realm of prudential judgment, that a
state department, defense department and executive branch lled with neoconservative

hawks would be FAR MORE LIKELY to engage unilateral military action with insufcient
intelligence possibly setting off a regional or even world war and a self-described pro-life
POTUS would be FAR LESS LIKELY to effectively change the legal realities surrounding
abortion. An Ayn Rand-inspired, radical economic libertarian would be FAR MORE LIKELY
to frustrate the social justice aims of the Bishops and FAR LESS LIKELY to effectively
advance the Bishops' abortion-related agenda.
This realism is an invitation to MAKE A DIFFERENCE on other PRO-LIFE agenda items
rather than to be INEFFECTIVE ON ALL of them!
The Grand Old Party has cynically manipulated evangelicals and conservative catholics
for decades, giving them little in exchange for their votes. Many of the Bishops do a
great job of weighing the relative moral gravity of the Seamless Garment of Life issues
but they have done an awful job of explaining the importance of the practical outcomes
of political and legal strategies. We know that the GOP is going to rend our political tunic
on abortion, but I'm holding on to the rest of my seamless garment rather than turning it
over to some naked emperor, who has a neocon foreign policy and social justice policy
crafted by Ayn Rand.
Ontogeny Recapitulating Phylogeny, some concepts
act & existence - efcient & formal
potential & essence - nal & material
##############################
teleomatic end-stated
------------------------------------------teleonomic end-directed
--------------------------------------------hormonal sentience
--------------------------------------------neuronal sentience
instinctually abductive

---------------------------------------------striatal
sensation and perception
dombrowski's 14th week?
moral patiency
incl e.g. anencephaly
--------------------------------------------limbic
emotion and motivation
---------------------------------------------affective consciousness
incl e.g. hydraencephaly
-----------------------------------------------thalamocortical links at 25 weeks
cortical
mental sentience
learning and memory
nonreective awareness
--------------------------------------------

teleologic end-intended
--------------------------------------------sapience
inferentially abductive
cognitive consciousness
reective awareness
---------------------------------------moral agency
-----------------------------------------http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2833
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abortion_debate#Personhood
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/hyink20050504

http://groups.northwestern.edu/protest/

http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/165

Synapses are what form the overwhelming number of connections between nerves.
Since the functions of the brain depend almost exclusively on the ability of nerve cells to
communicate with each other, synapses are also key to understanding the brain. . . . The
cells that will eventually be part of the cerebral cortex [the higher brain, the foundation of
human consciousness] begin forming in the seven-week embryo. . . . They migrate to

positions in what will eventually be the cortex, where they build up in layers. . . . Before
synapses are formed, the fetal brain is just a collection of nerve cells. The fetus is
incapable of awareness or volition. . . . [The] burst of synapse formation [between 25
and 32 weeks gestation] marks the period during which the brain is transformed from a
collection of individual cells into a connected machine capable of carrying out human
thought. . . . [B]efore the wiring up of the cortex, the fetus is simply incapable of feeling
anything, including pain. . . . [S]ignals may be sent by the nerves, but there is simply
nothing to receive them. They stop at the brain stem for the simple reason that there is
nowhere else for them to go. (Morowitz and Trel 112-113, 116-117, and 158-159)

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