EXTENDED

PAPER
Circumpolar Studies NMP1010

Aarne Granlund
MSc Student Climate Change and Politics
Nord university

Arctic oil and gas resources and the Paris Agreement target of limiting
global temperatures to 2 degrees celcius

Introduction

The aim of this extended paper is to discuss the compatibility of future Arctic oil and gas
exploitation with the Paris Agreement target of keeping the global ocean and land surface
temperatures well below 2 degrees celcius during this century and beyond.

Firstly, the target is analysed from the perspective of carbon budgets which are provided by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as tools for policy makers to
distinguish the limited amount of oil, gas and coal which can be extracted and burned along
with other anthropogenic emissions in line with the stabilisation of global temperatures well
below 2 degrees celcius.

Secondly, the on-going and potential exploitation of Artic hydrocarbon resources is discussed.
This part of the extended paper aims to give a general overview of the political and economic
agendas of corporations and governments extracting in and prospecting for oil and gas in the
Arctic and outline challenges for their business as usual.

Finally, this paper provides an example of political and economic consideration about Arctic
oil and gas in Norway and concludes on key findings. Norways case reveals some of the
challenges and limitations of policy making when carbon budgets and the Paris Agreement
target are introduced into national and international corporate and policy processes.

Carbon budgets and the Paris Agreement target

The IPCCs Fifth Assesment Report acknowledges that since the pre-industrial era, humancaused greenhouse gas emissions from all sources equate to 445 585 petagrams (PgC) or
metric gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent.1 The remaining amount of anthropogenic
emissions for a likely chance of limiting the global temperatures to 2 degrees celcius is
approximately 800 PgC however, there are further risks for feed back effects in the climate
system which might affect the size of the budgets.

The carbon budgets are constructed for 1.5, 2 and 3 degrees celcius. Each temperature target
has three budgets which each give a certain percentual risk of crossing the indicated amount
of temperature rise. First of the budgets gives a 66% chance of staying below the temperature
target, second gives a 50% chance and the third and last one a 33% chance.


1 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) 1033.

Feed backs such as natural flux from the melting Arctic and sub-Arctic permafrost can
increase the atmospheric burden of greenhouse gases and thus hinder or outpace mitigation
efforts of anthropogenic emissions.2 The amount of soil organic carbon in the northern
permafrost storage is in the order of 1000 PgC or larger and this amout of carbon is
vulnerable for release especially in the higher warming scenarios under continuing high
antropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.3 If these Arctic and sub-Arctic areas begin large scale
release of permafrost carbon to the atmosphere, available global carbon budgets for
anthropogenic emissions will be further constrained.

The Paris Agreement Article 2 presents an aim to limit temperatures to 2 degrees celcius and
implies that further efforts shall be taken to pursue a stricter 1.5 degree celcius target.4 The
authoritative means to analyse if these targets are met are the nationally determined
contributions (NDC). Each party to the Agreement will provide a voluntary contribution of
best efforts to lower emissions and strenghten their commitment over time.

In their current form, these contributions do not meet the carbon budgets for a likely chance
of limiting the global temperature well below 2 degrees celcius. In fact, emissions are set to
rise under the Paris Agreement even if the NDCs are fully implemented, as illustrated in the
graphic below.5

2 Implications for the US National Security of Anticipated Climate Change (memorandum of
National Intelligence Council in September 2016) 8.
3 Olefeldt, D. et al. Nature Communications 7 (2016).
4 Paris Agreement, Article 2.1 (a).
5 The graphic shows emissions rising under the Paris Agreement, UNFCCC (2016).

Similar findings are provided in the United Nations Environment Programme Emissions Gap
Report, which indicates that the nationally determined contributions are falling 12 14 PgC
short of the 2 degrees celcius target on an annual basis.6

The gap between temperature targets and ongoing emissions profile from anthropogenic
sources has been addressed by a handful of researchers who specialise in carbon budgets and
climate change mitigation scenarios.7 At current high emissions trajectory, it seems likely that
the carbon budgets for 1.5 degrees celcius will be overshot in the coming decade.8

Based on these multiple lines of evidence, if deep mitigation of anthropogenic emissions does
not accelerate drastically in the coming years, the climate cannot be stabilised at the Paris
Agreement targets without negative anthropogenic emissions and/or geoengineering.
Negative emissions are technological or enchanced natural sinks of atmospheric carbon which
need to be scaled up and operationalised at the latest during the later decades of this century.

Geoengineering refers to deliberate very large scale artificial manipulation of the earth
system. Some options that have been discussed involve adding cooling particles to the upper
atmosphere or building space mirrors to reflect unwanted solar radiation from entering the
earth system. There are considerable risks in this approach as the climate system might react
chaotically to artificial manipulation. Geoengineering might also be done unilaterally. In this
case the perpetrator state might encounter political tension if the project would cause harm
for other states.

As the hard geoengineering option seems very dubious and risky, the 1.5C target will imply an
anthropogenic emissions overshoot. In this scenario emissions peak above the carbon budget
limit creating carbon debt for future climate action. The more is emitted during the coming
decades, the more needs to be artificially removed from the atmosphere later on. There is no
technology at scale in operation so far to accomplish this. Interestingly, Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change is currently tasked to study mitigation in line with the 1.5C target in
a Special Report.9

Pathways to 2 degrees celcius appear to give more time to bring the emissions down but are
still challenging due to inertias in energy systems, social reality and policy making.
Investments, planning and build up of complicated energy systems takes considerable time
and the assets of oil, coal and gas currently held by corporations and governments have large
financial worth. Many state budgets are heavily reliant on exploitation and export of
hydrocarbon products. Moreover, further investment in upstream production and down
stream usage in power plants, mobility and other products lock in future markets for carbon
intensive fuels.
In social reality and policy making, carbon budgets create considerable tension due to the
built-in time restraints. Lowering emissions can be beneficial for multiple reasons, including

6 UNEP Gap Report (2015).
7 See Anderson and Peters, Science 354 182-183 (2016).
8 Carbon Brief, online analysis at https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-only-five-years-leftbefore-one-point-five-c-budget-is-blown (accessed 23rd of October 2016).
9 Adopted outline for IPCC Sixth Assesment Report,
http://ipcc.ch/meetings/session44/l2_adopted_outline_sr15.pdf (accessed 23rd of October
2016).

but not limited to health benefits from cleaner air, energy security and export markets for
renewable energy systems. There are also considerable business opportunities for clean
technology. However, significant cognitive dissonance is persistent in policy making as states
and corporations open up new reserves for hydrocarbon exploitation and subsidise carbon
heavy energy the International Monetary Fund recently calculated the global direct and
indirect subsidies for hydrocarbon energy and found them to cost more than five trillion
dollars in state budgets and harm for citizens.10

Carbon budgets and the temperature targets reveal considerable inconsistencies in policy
making processes and economic consideration.11 What is commonly known as evidence-based
policy tends to be distorted by political expediency and ideological considerations. The
political process is by nature very complicated and inconsistent. Rallying around a
temperature target seems to bring various actors and interests together as an umbrella for
global climate action, but the carbon budgets and nationally determined contributions reveal
the quantified truth.

It might be tempting for mitigation experts to create theoretical frame works for emissions
reduction which put deep and costly mitigation further out to the future. This appears to have
happened with economic modelling in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), which inform
policy makers on the lowest-cost viable pathways for limiting the global temperature to
agreed targets.12 These models have begun to introduce large scale carbon dioxide removal
for future mitigation as shown in graphic below.13

10 How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? IMF Working Paper WP 15/105 (2015)
11 Geden, WIREs Clim Change 7:790-797 (2016).
12 Ibid. at 793.
13 Anderson and Peters, Science 354 (6309) 182-183.

While such modelling can create imaginary solutions and enable focusing investment in new
technologies, it can also promote immediate inaction which is socially and politically more
comfortable than deep restructuring of the industrial civilisation and social realities. There
have been two historical occasions when carbon emissions have declined at very rapid rates.
The first case was the fall of the Soviet Union which saw 5-6% annual cuts in emissions over
sustained periods of time. The other instance was the rapid build up of nuclear power plants
in France and Sweden and among a few other countries in the 70s and 80s.

Paris Agreement has ignited a growing market of renewable energy, which has seen very
drastic price reductions rivalling fossil fuel prices even without subsidies.14 Most of the new
global energy investments in recent years have indeed been in renewable energy and energy
efficiencies. It might be possible for the parties to the Paris Agreement to strenghten their
emissions cuts in coming years and decades due to the proliferation of these new technologies
and approaches. It must still be kept in mind that electricity is just one contributor to global
greenhouse gas emissions other sectors like mobility, heating, cooling and agriculture must
essentially be decarbonised in a few decades too.

This is a tall order considering the fact that some sectoral emissions appear to be growing
rapidly, namely in aviation and shipping. There are no immediate technological pathways to
decarbonise these sectors. The choice for aviation emissions reduction appears to be a
financial market mechanism which buys off-sets that pay for mitigation on other sectors. The
scale of required carbon management from this scheme is staggering if the system would
pay for afforestation or reforestation and subsequent burning and carbon capture use or
storage, it would require massive areas to function.15

It is apparent that the global economy and civilisation in its current form has an emissions
floor. This means that even if fossil fuels are not used in the future for electricity, heating and
cooling, remaining emission sectors keep on emitting. Thus, factored negative emissions will
be a feature of future climate policy regardless of technological or economic viability.

The immediate repercussions of streghtening climate policies and market penetration of
renewables fall mostly on coal generated electricity coal is getting squeezed out from the
Western markets by losing in price to natural gas.16 Natural gas emits less carbon dioxide
when it is burned but there are systematic issues with leakage of methane from the
production stream.17 Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas with a shorter atmospheric
lifespan than carbon dioxide.

The overall situation with carbon budgets and the Paris Agreement temperature target
appears to call for immediate and deep reductions in emissions from all sectors and possibly
large-scale deployment of negative emissions as soon as the technology comes available at
scale. The situation also calls for most of the hydrocarbon reserves to be left unburned.18

14 Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report, International Energy Agency (2016).
15 Creutzig, GCB Bioenergy 8, 4-10 (2016).
16 World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency (2015).
17 US EPA has taken action to curb these system emissions
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-first-ever-standards-cut-methaneemissions-oil-and-gas-sector (accessed 24th of October 2016).
18 McGlade and Elkins, Nature 157 187-190 (2015).

Further research points to a similar conclusion of the total available hydrocarbon exploitation
within given IPCC carbon budgets as shown in this graphic.19

Oil and Gas in the Arctic

Arctic is primarily defined as the area in the Northern Hemisphere north of the Arctic Circle
where there the sun does not set during the summer solstice and does not rise during the
winter solstice. Secondary definitions include the area above the arctic tree line or the
isotherm, including locations where the average daily summer temperature does not rise
above 10 degrees celcius.

Arctic has vast oil and gas resources. According to the United States Energy Information
Administration (EIA), the area likely contains 22 percent of worlds undiscovered
conventional oil and gas.20 Conventional resources are crude oil or raw natural gas which can
be extracted from the ground by drilling and subsequent natural flow or pumping. In addition
to undiscovered resources, the Arctic has large discovered oil and gas fields with 500 million
barrels of oil equivalent of recoverable oil and natural gas and there are approximately 61 of
these large fields in Canadian Northwestern Territories, Russia, Alaska and Norway.21

The United States Geological Survey estimates that there are 421 billion barrels of oil
equivalent in oil and gas resources to be yet discovered, with most of the resources being
natural gas and natural gas liquids in the West Siberian Basin and the East Barents Basin.22
The challenge for exploitation of these reserves are many but one of the key issues is the high
infrastructure cost distances are long and the environment is unforgiving especially due to
recent climate changes such as the melting of the Arctic and sub-Arctic permafrost which
threatens the function of oil and gas pipelines.23 In addition to permafrost stability, the

19 Skys the Limit, Oil Change International (September 2016) available at
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2016/09/OCI_the_skys_limit_2016_FINAL_2.pdf
(accessed 24th of October 2016).
20 Arctic Oil and Gas Potential, Energy Information Agency (2009).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Implications for the US National Security of Anticipated Climate Change (memorandum of
National Intelligence Council in September 2016) 8.

changing environment poses forest fire risks. Recently a very large forest fire in the Russian
Irkutsk and Yakutia regions threatened the Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean pipeline.24 It is
without doubt that the Arctic continues to warm at spatial rates of 2 to 5 times faster than the
global average for decades to come. The trends and events which are currently observed will
intensify in the medium and long term making the challenges even harder.

Even without the recent accumulating climate impacts the Arctic is a hard environment to
operate in. The winters are cold and long requiring special equipment and training for
workers, which themselves are harder to attract since the mission areas are inhospitable and
have harsh weather conditions.25 While the oil and gas industry has ongoing problems due to
budget restraints and a now more so a bad public image, the conditions in the ground are
becoming even more prohibitive.

The environmental conditions are not limited to impacts on worker satisfaction. The Arctic
terrain is hard to operate in during summer due to abundance of wetlands and sinking
marshes during winters the icing danger and threat from sea ice to the facilities, support
operations and shipping are factors which limit operational capability. It has been thought
that declining sea ice extent and volume in the Arctic Ocean would enable new oil and gas
operations but this narrative is highly optimistic.

The situation in the Arctic is changing, not purely improving in terms of mechanised
operations. While it is true that there is new open water for limited periods in the Arctic
summer months, the movements of ice are now unprecedented and new storm activity is
being observed along the ice edges.26 In addition to its failure in 2012, recently Shell Oil
encountered problems with its Arctic drilling campaign when a Finnish icebreaker tasked to
assist it ran aground and got a large hole in its hull.27

In terms of costs of the oil and gas product, the current low-price environment does not
encourage operations expansion in the Arctic. International Energy Agency (IEA) has looked
at multiple scenarios for future oil prices and in the low price outlook sees 50 dollars per
barrel until the end of this decade.28 In this scenario, most of the Arctic oil resources would be
too costly to exploit as the break even prices for costly exploitation are in the 80 to 100 dollar
range.

Natural gas doesnt fare well in the IEA outlook either. It is considered less carbon dioxide
intense than coal, but there are issues with systematic leakages however, natural gas seems
to compliment the added renewables capacity well. The bridge fuel theory is appreciated in

24 The Siberian Times (20th September 2016) available at
http://siberiantimes.com/ecology/others/news/n0740-oil-pipes-threatened-by-forest-firesamid-disputes-over-the-scale-of-destruction/#.V-JzFhiR6Wo.twitter (accessed 24th of
October 2016).
25 EIA, Arctic Oil and Gas Potential (2009).
26 Arctic Sea Ice 2016, Yale Climate Connections (2016) available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9YcgtH15tjw (accessed 25th of October 2016).
27 FuelFix (7th of July 2015) available at http://fuelfix.com/blog/2015/07/07/shells-arcticicebreaker-damaged-in-alaska/#33766101=0 (accessed 25th of October 2016).
28 World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency (2015).

politics and in the industry but researchers are suspicious.29 Further questions remain on
how efficiency measures will effect natural gas demand in addition to tightening policies on
fugitive emissions.

In political reality the 2 degree carbon plans will most likely include natural gas with carbon
capture, use and storage. The United States main plan will be revealed in November 7-18
2016 at Marrakech Conference of the Parties 22 and it is said to include large amounts of
natural carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS).30 If the technology delivers and can be scaled
up cost effectively, it might ease the carbon budgets for further natural gas exploitation but
not at scale comparable to using any of the Arctic resources.

If Integrated Assessment Models are used to create scenarios which limit the global
temperature to 2 degrees celcius with a high possibility, oil and gas resource exploitation in
the Arctic is completely off limits. 31 The spatial distribution of unburnable hydrocarbon
reserves is an important concept especially for the Arctic. McGlade and Elkins estimate the
Arctic to hold 100 billion barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic meters of gas in the fields within
the Arctic Circle.

Political agenda for states and corporations which hold hydrocarbon assets or other
resources seems to be very straight forward. Exploitation must be done swiftly as the
resources are uncovered. The only limiting factor thus far has been the price situation. Some
states are very reliant on resource exploitation since the continuing operation of the industry
finances the state budgets. However, the conventional Artic resources of oil and gas are a
special case. There are multiple restraints on further exploitation which in combination will
hinder operational capabilities and unless the prices increase abruptly, it seems rather
unlikely that the Arctic resources would be fully utilised.

Some policy measures have lately promoted this view. Russian government issued a
moratorium on new off-shore oil and gas licences in the countrys Arctic shelf.32 However, the
United States government seems to support further exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon
reserves.33 The policy narrative is that of energy independence and security of supply, which
is some what understandable due to security problems in the traditional areas of oil and gas
production in the Middle East and very large institutional demand of the United States
military which especially appreciates security of supply.
United States is including two Arctic areas in its 2017 2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and
Gas Leasing Program. Understandably this has been opposed by environmental

29 Jakob and Hilaire, Nature 517 150-152 (2015).
30 Bloomberg, International Environmental Reporter (25th of October 2016) available at
http://www.bna.com/us-unveil-path-n5798207913/ (accessed 25th of October 2016).
31 McGlade and Elkins, Nature 157 187-190 (2015).
32 WWF (8th September 2016) available at
http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?277770/Russia-puts-a-hold-on-Arctic-drilling (accessed
25th of October 2016)
33 Arctic Energy Centre (26th of October 2016) available at http://us11.campaignarchive2.com/?u=1c33004bfb34daf2e33e01730&id=b19af7d35d&e=2935161bfb (accessed
26th of October 2016).

organisations. The areas are in the Chuckhi and Beaufort seas, as shown in the graphic
below.34

It is unclear if the new Program Areas have been assessed in line with the Paris Agreement
target of limiting temperatures well below 2 degrees celcius or the ensuing carbon budget
restraints on new Arctic oil and gas development. In practice, it seems that selling these leases
might not result in actual exploitation of the reserves.35 There are considerable technical and
financial restraints besides the wider political climate targets.

How ever the Arctic situation develops, there might be pure market risks for oil and gas
companies in the future. The Carbon Tracker is an independent financial think thank which
specialises in analysing the future risks for the hydrocarbon industry resulting from market
disruption of renewable energy and electric mobility. In their view, financial markets have
built up a carbon bubble which entails the 2795 PgC of carbon assets of which large parts are

34 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2017 2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Leasing Program (15th of March 2016).
35 LeVine in Arctic Deeply (18th of May 2016) available at
https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2016/05/18/why-the-big-rush-to-sellarctic-oil-leases (accessed 26th of October 2016).

likely to remain unburned due to market and policy dynamics.36 This view is commendable
and addresses private oil and gas company financials in a relevant way. However, it is unclear
what governments response to the Paris Agreement will deliver. Much of the known reserves
are in goverment held assets.

As indicated in the nationally determined contributions to the Conference of Parties 21 in
Paris, growing global energy demand is currently saturated by fossil fuels while renewables
attract more investment and eat up the growth along with efficiencies, bulk of the world
energy is stubbornly of the fossil origin. Any impact on Arctic oil and gas exploitation from the
market decline of these products is still decades away and can be only distinguished as the
origin of financial retreat from the area until economic data from multiple years shows the
trend.

Arctic Oil and Gas in Norway

Norway is currently the worlds seventh biggest producer of natural gas at a percentual share
of 3.4 from the total share and the worlds third biggest net exporter.37 European Union is
Norways main export market 20% of European gas demand is covered by these exports. Oil
and gas constitute a significant source of trade income at 450 billion Norwegian kronor per
year and at 39% of Norways total exports.38

The modern Norwegian society is largely the result of historical and current revenues from oil
and gas production. Norway has been an active participant in global climate policy while on
the other hand relying on the hydrocarbon industry for prosperity. The current nationally
determined contribution for climate mitigation mentions the 2 degree temperature target and
affirms commitment to emissions reductions in line with the said target.39

Norway has opened the Barents Sea area for petroleum activity. This area is considered a
frontier area because there is limited knowledge of geology, the technical aspects of
exploitation pose challenges and there is lack of infrastructure.40 The Barents Sea area is
beyond the Arctic Circle and it can be counted to belong to the spatial scope of Arctic oil and
gas reserves.

The most recent licensing round for prospects on the Norwegian shelf was announced in
January 2015 and it included 54 blocks in the Barents Sea, including completely new areas for
exploration. In 2016 the Norwegian Ministry for Petroleum and Energy issued ten production
licences in the Barents Sea. Arctic areas for Norwegian licences can be found in the upper part
of this graphic.41

36 The Carbon Tracker Initiative, brochure available at http://www.carbontracker.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/New_Brochure_CTI_web_v21.pdf (accessed 26th of October
2016).
37 Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency (2016) 13.
38 Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (29th of February 2016).
39 Norways NDC, available at
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/Norway/1/Norway%
20INDC%2026MAR2015.pdf (accessed 26th of October 2016).
40 Norwegian Petroleum, Exploration Policy (2016).
41 Norwegian Petroleum, Exploration Policy (2016).

It is unclear if the Norwegian government consulted the IPCC carbon budgets or mitigation
scenarios while deliberating about opening up the Barents Sea area for hydrocarbon
exploration. It appears that Norway will fulfill its nationally determined contribution by
purchasing off-sets from the European Union emissions trading system.42 Off-sets are an old
tactic in climate policy and have proven not to work at scale. The Kyoto Protocol was based on
market measures and did not deliver effective global greenhouse emissions cuts.

It is notable that state oil company Statoil has acknowledged climate science to be
authoritative and the Chief Executive Officer of the company Eldar Saetre sees the market
disruption of electric mobility and renewable energy affecting the companys core businesses
in oil and gas.43 Furthermore, climate science and mitigation are not divisive political objects
in Norway as they are in for example the United States politics. The necessity for climate
action is a shared theme in Norwegian society at large, at least as an aspiration.

The emissions profile of Norwegian society is rather unique. Power generation emissions are
almost non-existent due to the fact that electricity and heating are generated by the vast

42 European Perceptions on Climate Change, Cardiff University (June 2016).
43 Climate Home (19th of October 2016) available at
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/10/19/statoil-chief-rise-of-electric-cars-willshrink-oil-industry/ (accessed 26th of October 2016).

hydro power capacity. At a typical Western European carbon footprint of 11 tonnes of annual
carbon dioxide equivalent, these emissions are mostly from North Sea oil and gas fields.44
Domestically the country is taking climate action by elecrifying personal car transport,
investing in carbon capture and storage and financing action to limit tropical forest
deforestation.

Regardless of transparency and open debate, opening the Arctic for oil and gas exploration
has triggered a recent law suit against the Norwegian government. The law suit is brought by
Greenpeace and local non-governmental organisation Nature and Youth on the grounds that
opening the Arctic for oil and gas activity is illegal under the Norwegian constitution and the
Paris Agreement commitment of limiting temperatures well below 2 degrees.45

It will be highly interesting to see how the law suit plays out. The Paris Agreement is a fresh
construct and will enter into legal force in November after it was ratified by the European
Union on the 30th of September 2016. If the law suit is constructed with a carbon budget
narrative for Arctic areas, as there are scientific grounds to limit Arctic hydrocarbon
extraction, it would make for a powerful statement on the importance of the Paris Agreement
targets.

If this narrative is taken further, for the 1.5C target being written in the Agreement, states
would be mandated to being research and possibly the construction of negative emissions
technology at a massive scale in just a few decades since it is scientifically obvious that the
1.5C carbon budget will be overshot during the 2020s. After all, at current NDC input those
kind of approaches to climate mitigation will have to be used at some point in the future any
way.

Conclusions

Multiple independent lines of evidence indicate that global climate policy is not yet coherent
with the mitigation science for 2 degrees celcius temperature target, as described in
authoritative carbon budgets and consequently not in nationally determined contributions of
governments. Futhermore, there are significant and yet somewhat unquantified systemic
risks in the response of the climate system to the anthropogenic forcing which could
drastically decrease the size of available budgets.

Cognitive dissonance in climate policy is a salient feature of the modern political system and it
will probably not ease without large market shifts towards low-carbon energy and mobility as
the companies and governments exhibit very little change in their behaviour even past the
historical Paris Agreement.46 The problem appears to be especially visible in actions of
governments and corporations whose main profits are derived from resource extraction this
might mean oil, gas and coal but also wood and pulp products. Arctic oil and gas resources are
no exceptions in government and industry motives of exploitation and expansion of their
economic interests.

44 European Perceptions on Climate Change, Cardiff University (June 2016).
45 UPI (18th of October 2016) available at http://www.upi.com/Business_News/EnergyIndustry/2016/10/18/Greenpeace-sues-Norway-over-Arctic-oil/9191476794991/?fs
(accessed 26th of October 2016).
46 Geden, WIREs Clim Change 7:790-797 (2016)


If the constructed ambiguity of the Paris Agreement targets is materialised and quantified in
concrete policy plans of governments and in economic strategies of the hydrocarbon industry,
then there are legal avenues to hold various actors accountable in national jurisdictions
international law is not enforceable and the Paris Agreement contributions are voluntary. The
carbon budgets set measurable and tangible dead lines and quantifiable policy markers
instead of vague and ambigous framings such as 2050 decarbonisation, low-carbon economy
or net negative emissions.

There are two concepts which are useful in understanding inconsistency and hesitancy in
taking climate action in line with deep mitigation targets such as keeping the global
temperature well below 2 degrees celcius. The first concept is pathway dependency once
the state or corporation has built up financial and technological systems for resource
extraction, it is very hard if not impossible to steer policy away from continuing the operation
of such systems. Once the resources are extracted, the global energy market makes sure they
are burned policy measures might shift the immediate guilt elsewhere by devising pricing
mechanisms or develop grandiose plans for rapid future mitigation, negative emissions or
geoengineering.

An other concept closely related to pathway dependancy is lock-in. Once the technology to
burn is manufactured and installed, there is continuous demand for the resource. When
cheaper options displace the incumbent system, burning is restricted or seized altogether.
This is especially true for fleets of power plants and transportation vehicles which have slow
turn over rates it is viable to see a scenario where personal road mobility might be
electrified quite rapidly. It is much harder to imagine a situation where functioning and
profitable industries would automatically close down or limit their operations independently.

Social reactions such as legal challenges or large scale removal of the social acceptability of oil,
gas and coal exploitation might push some climate policies closer to what the evidence from
mitigation science requires but these kind of developments are hard to predict or model.
Deep mitigation plans and statements are political objects which keep larger and more
uncomfortable economic and policial considerations at bay.

Short-term mitigation options are technologically limited due to pathway dependency and
lock-in of carbon heavy power generation and mobility. As the Arctic case clearly illustrates, it
is the price mechanism and natural barriers which keep further exploitation at bay.

References

Reports and Official Documents

Fifth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013)

Implications for the US National Security of Anticipated Climate Change, memorandum of
National Intelligence Council of the United States (2016)

Paris Agreement, UNFCCC (2015)

UNEP Gap Report, United Nations Environment Programme (2015)

Adopted Outline for Sixth Assessment Report, IPCC (2016)

How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies?, International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP
15/105 (2015)

World Energy Outlook, International Energy Agency (2015)

Skys the Limit, Oil Change International (2016)

Arctic Oil and Gas Potential, United States Energy Information Agency (2009)

Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report, International Energy Agency (2016)

Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency (2016)

European Perceptions on Climate Change, Cardiff University (2016)

Norways Nationally Determined Contribution to ADP, Government of Norway (2015)

Articles

Olefeldt, D. et al. Circumpolar distribution and carbon storage of thermokarst landscapes
Nature Communications 7 (2016)

Anderson and Peters, The trouble with negative emissions Science 354 182-183 (2016)

Geden, The Paris Agreement and the incoherent inconsistency of climate policymaking
WIREs Clim Change 7:790-797 (2016)

Jakob and Hilaire, Unburnable fossil-fuel reserves Nature 517 150-152 (2015)

McGlade and Elkins, The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global
warming to 2C Nature 157 187-190 (2015)

Media and Internet

Carbon Brief, Only five years left before 1.5C carbon budget is blown (19th of May 2016)
https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-only-five-years-left-before-one-point-five-c-budget-isblown (accessed 23rd of October 2016)

United States Environmental Protection Agency, EPA releases the first-ever standards to cut
methane emissions from the oil and gas sector (15th of February 2016)
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-first-ever-standards-cut-methaneemissions-oil-and-gas-sector (accessed 24th of October 2016)

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