Ambrosius 2016 - Article JUA

BLUE CITY . . . RED CITY?
A COMPARISON OF
COMPETING THEORIES OF CORE COUNTY
OUTCOMES IN U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS,
20002012
JOSHUA D. AMBROSIUS
University of Dayton
ABSTRACT: The Red/Blue dichotomy describing presidential elections, while criticized, is ubiquitous:
Red states vote Republican, Blue states Democratic. Locally, suburban and rural counties are often Red,
urban counties Blue. This overgeneralization misses the Republican share of urban centers. This study
analyzes the 20002012 presidential elections in core counties of metropolitan areas with populations
over 250,000. Possible explanations for urban election outcomes cover three theoretical groupings:
sociodemographics, culture, and economics. Several prominent explanatory variables from each are
compared. Changes from 20002004 to 20082012 are highlighted given the 2008 economic crash
and President Obamas race and urban identity, which permitted him to cut President Bushs core
county share in half. Regression analyses find that sociodemographic and cultural features account for
most variation for all elections, while economic indicators add little explanatory power. In contrast to
conventional thinking, economics mattered most in 2004, culture increased in importance in 20082012,
and urban foreclosures positively influenced McCain in 2008.
he first two U.S. presidential elections of the twenty-first century (2000 and 2004) spurred concerns
about the increased polarization of the American electorate. Pundits and scholars divided states into
Red and Blue columns based on whether they supported Republican (traditionally, Grand Old Party
or GOP) candidate George W. Bush or his Democratic challengersAl Gore in 2000 and John Kerry
in 2004. Blue states covered the Northeast, upper Midwest, and the West Coast; Red states covered
the bulk of the nations heartlandincluding the Southern, Plains, and Mountain states. A closer
examination of the Red/Blue map circulated in the media revealed that at the county level, the United
States was even more Red than the state map indicated. It appeared that the bulk of U.S. territory
supported Bush, including most rural and suburban counties, while Democratic support was isolated
to large urban areas with greater population densities. Sperling, Helburn, George, Morris, and Hunt
(2004) describe this division as retro versus metro America. This metropolitan support allowed both
Gore and Kerry to capture about half (more in Gores case) of the national popular vote, if not the
elections themselves.
This notion that cities in general are Blueand getting bluertook on new meaning in the third
and fourth presidential elections of the twenty-first century (Meckler & Chinni, 2014). The 2008
electionpitting Senators Barack Obama and John McCain against one anotherwas called a game
changer, the dawn of a new era in U.S. presidential politics (Heilemann & Halperin, 2010). President
Obama became not only the first nonwhite and African American president, but also the first truly
urban president, hailing from Chicago. Obamas election, and reelection in 2012, confirmed that the
Direct correspondence to: Joshua D. Ambrosius, University of Dayton, Department of Political Science, 300 College Park
Dayton, Ohio 454691425. E-mail: jambrosius1@udayton.edu.
JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 38, Number 2, pages 169195.
C 2015 Urban Affairs Association
Copyright
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0735-2166.
DOI: 10.1111/juaf.12184
170 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016
American people are indeed comfortable with the idea of a black, urban president. Obama garnered
an even higher proportion of urban votes than his two white predecessors, Gore and Kerrybolstered
in part by higher turnout by minority voters (Smidt et al., 2010). Obamas urban identity appealed to
both blocs of the urban electorateminorities and white progressives, meaning he even performed
better than his Democratic predecessors in predominantly white cities like Minneapolis and Portland.
Despite this monolithic view that cities are Blue, it appears that some cities are bluer than others
and some are even solidly Red, even in the era of President Obama. States and cities can be Blue
or Red based on the dynamics of the election. States like Kansas, Oklahoma, and Nebraska are all,
or nearly all, Redeven most urban countiesprompting accounts like Franks (2004) Whats the
Matter With Kansas? Why is it that some urban areas, even in Blue states, lend majority support to
Republican presidential candidates? Possible explanations for urban voting outcomes can largely be
divided into three categories: sociodemographics, culture, and economics.
The 2000 and 2004 presidential electionsin which Bush was elected and reelectedset the
tone for the culture war thesis. It was thought that in 2008 and 2012 voters would look past
cultural differences and instead emphasize the recent, and prolonged, economic downturn in their
decision making. The fact that Obama was African American and, in 2008, the Republican vice
presidential candidate Sarah Palin was a woman added unusual demographic dynamics to the fray.
Detailed analysis of election returns must be done to determine what local-level factors influenced
the outcome and the relative importance of these factors in the nations urban centers. Such a study
would create a baseline by which to compare future urban performances by candidates of both parties.
This study uses regression analysis to isolate the most important factors determining the 2000
2012 two-party, popular vote shares in the core countiesthose containing the central cityof
metropolitan areas with populations over one-quarter of a million people. Explanations for election
outcomes, and thus groupings of independent variables, are divided into the three aforementioned
categories. Furthermore, changes in variables effects across the period are highlighted given Obamas
race and urban identity, a contrasting feature between the 20002004 and 20082012 election periods.
While most findings endorse conventional wisdom, the analysis does find that the sociodemographic
and cultural factors account for nearly all of the explained variation for all four election years, while
economic factors add minimally to the explanatory power of the models. In contrast to conventional
thinking, economic conditions mattered the most in 2004 and cultural factors increased in importance
over the 2008 and 2012 elections. Implications for the future of presidential politics and elections
are many.
No academic scholarship has attempted to explain election patterns in core counties with an
emphasis on why some continue to vote Republican. The findings, which both support and, in some
areas, question conventional thinking, provide a reference point to evaluate how well conventional
theories explain urban voting patterns and how well past trends continue to hold in the future. This
detailed, quantitative analysis goes further than popular journalistic accounts of the urbanrural
divide (e.g., Meckler & Chinni, 2014).
PRESIDENTIAL VOTING: STUDIES AND THEORIES
Studies of presidential election support are done at the individual, state, and county levels.
Individual-level studies rely on survey data collected from voters, likely voters, or the general
adult population. State or county studies use demographic and economic data from the U.S. Census
Bureau and other government agencies to explain election results. County-level studies minimize the
problem of ecological fallacy compared with studies using states as the unit of analysis (Kim, Elliott,
& Wang, 2003; McKee & Teigen, 2009). Numerous past studies utilize county-level election data,
although only more recent studies attempt to account for spatial autocorrelationa problem arising
from the geographic maxim that places closer together are more similar than those farther apart (Kim
et al., 2003; Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007; McKee & Teigen, 2009; Tobler, 1970).
Limited scholarly literature in political science has addressed the question of what distinguishes
Red and Blue cities (or core counties). These labels are absent from election studies, and most
media reports, altogether. One economics study did use these labels but merely to highlight cultural
I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 171
distinctions between cities (in the mold of Richard Florida) and to negatively correlate Floridas
creativity index with 2004 support for Bush without controlling for other factors (Tiemann, DiRienzo,
& Das, 2008; also see Florida, 2005). Bloggers have sporadically used this terminology (Easterly,
2010; Tietack, 2010). One non-scholarly study has examined Conservative and Liberal cities (rather
than the terms Red and Blue), but without explaining the determinants of cities political cultures
(Alderman et al., 2005).
The only scholarship to analyze anomalous Red urban centers in depth, without using the term Red
cities, are the quantitative and qualitative analyses of electoral exceptions in the 2000 through 2008
presidential elections conducted by Morrill, Knopp, and Brown (2007, 2011). They label these Red
core counties as one type of electoral anomaly: large central or core metropolitan counties carried
by Bush or McCain (Morrill, Knopp, & Brown, 2007, p. 535).
County-level indicators, many of which represent individual-level hypotheses at the aggregate
level, can be divided into several main categories that capture three theories of electoral outcomes:
sociodemographics, culture (political and otherwise), and economics. These sets of variables compare with another county-level studys claim that voters are influenced by demographic, economic,
and political factors (Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007, p. 484). Possible corresponding theoretical perspectives include identity politics, the culture war thesis, and rational voters concerns for
maximized utility, respectively. These three groupings also capture most of the categories used by
Chinni and Gimpel (2010) to classify all U.S. counties in their well known book Our Patchwork
Nation.1 While the variables across these groupings are typically used to explain election outcomes
in all counties, this present study examines their utility in describing electoral dynamics in an urban
subsection of counties.
Sociodemographics
Demographic and socioeconomic factors clearly influence individual voting behaviors and thus
presumably also influence the collective behavior of communitiesthat is, the proportion of all votes
cast for one party or the other. Race is a very influential predictor of voter turnout, political participation, party identification, and candidate supportwith some attributing this to racial solidarity
(Chong & Rogers, 2005; Tate, 1991). Since the New Deal era, white individuals have been more
likely to support Republican or conservative candidates than members of minority races. It follows
that whiter cities will cast more votes for Republican presidential candidates; and the inverse, largely
African American cities will lend greater support for Democrats. African American candidates (like
Obama) on the ballot further increase voter turnout and support within the black community (Hill,
Herron, & Lewis, 2010; Tate, 1991; Whitby, 2007).
Another key demographic predictor is age, believed to have had an especially important effect in
the 2008 presidential election. Observers have long decried the lack of turnout among younger
Americans (Levine & Lopez, 2002; Nickerson, 2006). The 2004 election was seen as a turning point with significant increases in youth turnout (Lopez, Kirby, & Sagoff, 2005). The 1829
age demographics turnout increased sharply from 40% in 2000 to 51% in 2008, whereas other age
groups remained flatter (Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2009). Young voters tend to support the
Democratic Partyas they did in favor of Obamathus implying that larger proportions of young
voters will negatively influence community support for the GOP. A possible reason for the high
youth vote in 2008 was this groups passionate response to the rhetoric of change promoted by the
Obama campaign (Levine, Clark, Haygood, & Muenchen, 2011; Von Drehle, 2008).
Socioeconomic differences also play important roles in determining voter preferences. Wealthier
individuals are popularly assumed to vote Republican, while more educated voters tend to vote
Democratic. Research findings, however, indicate an interesting paradox: rich people vote Republican but rich states vote Democratic; poor people vote Democratic but poor states vote Republican
(Gelman, Park, Shor, Bafumi, & Cortina, 2008). Income is highly correlated with another socioeconomic variable, educational attainment, which is also thought to favor Democratic candidates in
recent elections.
Race, age, and education serve as independent variables in this study, representing key sociodemographic characteristics. These are captured by proportion of African Americans, proportion of
persons between 18 and 29 years of age, and proportion of those over 25 years of age who have earned
a bachelors degree or higher. Per capita income covaries with education and is thus eliminated from
the analysis to avoid multicollinearity problems and because education has a more pronounced effect
on the outcomes. Gender is an important determinant of individual party support but is omitted from
consideration because society is generally split 5050 between male and female with minimal variations. Minor deviations from this norm are unlikely to affect the aggregate outcome of county-level
election returns.
In addition to the aforementioned demographic factors, an additional variable bridging geography
and demographics warrants examinationpopulation density. McKee and Teigen (2009) argue for
controlling for compositional attributes like population density in community-level studies in addition
to typical economic, social, and cultural predictors. An influential post-2012 Internet analysis,
promoted by Richard Florida and The Atlantic Cities website (Florida, 2014; Florida & Johnson,
2012), was conducted by Dave Troy (2012), showing that 800 persons per square mile represents
a crossover point at which people switch from voting primarily Republican to voting primarily
Democratic. Troy writes that, below 800 people per square mile, there is a 66% chance that you
voted Republican. Above 800 people . . . there is a 66% chance that you voted Democrat. This
study tests whether population density exerts a similar effect when only considering high-density
core counties instead of all U.S. counties.
Culture
Any contemporary discussion of electoral politics in the United States is incomplete without
reference to the culture war, often considered the foundation of the Red/Blue dichotomy. The culture
war thesis is rooted in the work of Wuthnow (1988) and Hunter (1991, 1994) who argue that American
society (including the religious and political spheres) are becoming increasingly polarized between
traditional/orthodox/conservative and modern/progressive/liberal factions. Recent presidential and
congressional elections brought this cultural restructuring to the fore and spawned allegations of an
extremely polarized publicparticularly the 2000 and 2004 elections (Jacobson, 2005). These recent
elections not only pitted Republican versus Democrat and conservative vs. liberal, but also religious
vs. secular, Red state vs. Blue state, and suburban/rural vs. urban (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005,
2008; Gimpel & Karnes, 2006; Sperling et al., 2004). Some scholars debate this perspective arguing
that the culture war is a mythperpetuated by elites and the mediaand that most Americans
reside somewhere in the purple middle (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2006; Fiorina, 2005;
Wolfe, 1999). Others find that views on morality issues are more complex and less bipolar than
commonly perceived (Craig, Martinez, Kane, & Gainous, 2005). Despite claims that the God gap
an electoral division between churchgoers and nonattendershad subsided by the 2008 presidential
contest, evidence suggests that similar religious voting patterns have persisted into the Obama era
(Smidt et al., 2010).
Whether or not the public is as polarized as media accounts suggest, clear differences do exist
between traditionalists and modernists on culture war issues (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005, 2008;
Hunter, 1991, 1994). Many of these differences relate to conflicting views of sexuality. Even Wolfe
(1999), who purported to debunk the culture war, cited the nature and morality of homosexuality as
the sole, major moral issue dividing American political culturea division that only becomes more
evident as the debate over same-sex marriage intensifies. Patriotic support for the U.S. military and its
foreign interventions is also a source of moral conflict and electoral division between conservatives
and progressivesespecially the battle over President Bushs Iraq War (Lacombe & Shaughnessy,
2007).
Religion is a powerful predictor of individuals stances on cultural and moral issues and thus the
party platforms and candidates they support (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005, 2008). Members of traditionalist religious denominationsprimarily those within the Evangelical Protestant traditionand
those in most denominations who attend church frequently tend to align themselves with conservative
positions against abortion, homosexual relationships, same-sex marriage, sex education, and pornography (Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Hardinge, 2004; Jelen, 1986; McIntosh, Alston, & Alston, 1979).
Furthermore, those in the United States who participate in religious services more often have found
a comfortable home on the conservative end of the political spectrum and within the Republican
Party (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2005, 2008; Smidt et al., 2010). Given the conventional distinction
between more religious Bible belt communities and more secular communities, it can be assumed
that religious composition also has an effect at the aggregate level.
To capture cultural distinctions between communities, proportions of Evangelical Protestants,
military veterans (among the population 18 years of age and over), and same-sex households are
represented in this studys model. The Evangelical variable represents the main tradition in the traditionalist cultural camp. Other traditions, such as Roman Catholicism and mainline Protestantism, are
divided much more equally between the two parties (Smidt et al., 2010). Because Mormons tend to
share Evangelicals commitments to conservative social values, and Mitt Romneya Mormonwas
the Republican candidate, the Mormon proportion of the population is added to an additional specification for 2012. The veteran variable serves additionally as a proxy for patriotism or support for U.S.
military operations (Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007). Members of the U.S. military are commonly
assumed to support the Republican Party in higher numbers. Finally, the same-sex household variable
should signify tolerance of diversity and perhaps support for gay rights and same-sex unions (Florida,
2005). This variable is not without controversy and measurement error, but it is the best available
proxy for gay and lesbian households and tolerance of their presence in communities.
Economics
The economy has long represented a central political issue because individuals are assumed to seek
utility maximization, usually conceived of in economic terms. James Carvilles campaign mantra
while working for the 1992 Clinton campaign, The Economy, Stupid, has forever ingrained this axiom into our national political consciousness (Kelly, 1992). Local economic conditions are important
determinants of local-level voting outcomes in presidential elections (Abrams & Butkiewicz, 1995;
Blackley & Shepard, 1994). According to economic and rational choice voting models, individuals
should vote in favor of their perceived best interest. However, voters cannot always do this due to a
lack of information or surplus of misinformation. In addition, other factors intervene that question
the assumption of rationality, such as culture (Frank, 2004; Wheelan, 2010).
Each of the most recent four presidential elections was affected differently by economic conditions.
The 2000 debate occurred during good economic times and centered on how the U.S. government
should spend its surpluspay down the debt or refund it to the taxpayers by granting expansive tax
cuts (Chait, 2007). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent recession intervened
after the election, but by the time of the 2004 campaign the economy was recovering and voters
seemed relatively contentat least enough to focus on other issues like the two wars and moral
values. By the 2008 election, though, the economic crash, rising unemployment, and the housing
crisis completely altered the terms of the campaigns and debates (Economist, 2008; Erikson, 2009;
Hill et al., 2010). This economic recession lingered into, and even beyond, the 2012 election season.
The sharp rise in foreclosures brought on by the bursting housing market bubble was thought to
affect the 2008 election in some way, particularly in the key battleground states that experienced
some of the highest foreclosure rates: Nevada, Florida, Ohio, Colorado, and Indiana. Some thought
these states would rebel against the Bush Administrations perceived collusion with Wall Street,
while others feared that millions of foreclosed upon householders would care more about their
nonpolitical affairs than for voting (J. E. Miller, 2009; P. G. Miller, 2008). Ultimately, Obama won
the presidencypartially as a result of carrying all five of these swing states that had gone for Bush
in 2000 and 2004. Many of these states were also plagued by high unemployment rates. Did high
foreclosure and unemployment rates really have such a grave effect on 2008 support for the GOP in
these states and their constituent communities? No research has explicitly addressed this question,
although one study asked a related question regarding the effect of declining home values on the
election (Zimmer, 2010). Another study estimates that the housing crisis (along with the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan) added nearly 6 percentage points to Obamas national vote total (Hill et al., 2010).
The unemployment rate lagged one month prior to the election is a good measure of economic
conditions at the time of the election and is hence included in this study (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier,
2000, p. 200). Furthermore, the percent of manufacturing employment is included to represent
support for American industry and labor unionsa chief Democratic constituencyalthough rates
of union membership in the manufacturing sector have declined from previous levels. In a separate
specification with no correlate for 2000, 2004, or 2012, the foreclosure ratein separate longer term
and short-term versionsis included to explain the 2008 urban outcome.
METHODS
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study asks a series of research questions or groups of questionssome descriptive and
some explanatory. For ease of analysis, each question is labeled with a Q and a number while each
corresponding hypothesis (or set of hypotheses) is labeled with an H and a matching number.
Q1: How do the presidential popular votes in the core counties of large urban areas compare to the
national popular vote for each of the last four elections?
H1: A greater proportion of the presidential popular vote in the core counties goes for the Democrats
than in the nation as a whole. In essence, this sample of urban counties is more Blue than the
population of all counties.
Q2: In what ways do Red core counties differ from Blue core counties? The defining feature of a
Red core county is a Republican victory in the presidential popular vote. The composition of
Red core counties changes from election to election. Aside from this clear electoral difference,
what other socio-demographic, cultural, and economic differences are there between the two?
Have these differences changed over the past 12 years given Bushs national victory in 2000
and Obamas victory in 2012?
H2: Blue urban centers are more sociodemographically diverse (i.e., more African Americans),
young, educated, culturally progressive, and, economically, exhibit higher manufacturing levels
but also higher unemployment rates than Red core counties. This latter prediction is based on the
assumption that Blue core counties have higher population densities and urban proportions
areas often hit worst by economic downturns. Furthermore, differences between Red and Blue
core counties are more pronounced in the Obama era than the Bush era.
Q3: Have the core counties voting Republican noticeably changed over the past four elections?
In other words, to what extent does Red status in one election predict Red status in the next
election?
H3: The correlation between Bushs Red core counties and McCains core counties is lower than
the correlation between Bushs 2000 and 2004 counties. The correlation between McCain and
Romneys core counties is strong again because of the continued reduction in urban support for
the Republican ticket (i.e., Romneys inability to perform at Bushs level in the urban centers).
Q4: What is the importance (for the Republican vote share) of a core county being located in a Red
state? In other words, what is the correlation between Red core counties in a current election
and Red states in the previous election? Has this changed over the course of the four elections?
H4: Location in a Red state exerts a positive effect on Republican support in urban centers that
declines in importance over the course of the four elections (as Obama flipped several states
from Red to Blue).
Q5: To what extent does the proportion of the core county located within the central citys limits
determine the Republican candidates percentage of the vote? Has this effect changed over the
past four elections?
H5: More urbanized core counties (i.e., those with more land or population inside the central city)
are less likely to vote Republican than those with higher suburban proportions. In other words,
proportion within the central city is negatively correlated with support for the GOP and became
stronger over the course of the analysis period (see Florida, 2014).
Q6: Ultimately, which variables and blocks of variables (sociodemographic, cultural, and economic) most explain the proportion of a core county voting Red in a presidential election?
Have the effects of the variables and blocks changed over the four elections?
H6: The sociodemographic variables (proportions of young, black, and educated voters), urban
measures (population density and central city proportion), and the culturally progressive variable (same-sex households) exert a negative effect on Republican support in the core counties.
The culturally conservative variables (proportions of veterans, Evangelical Protestants and,
in 2012, Mormons) and a Red state dummy variable are positive for the Republicans. For
the economic variables, share of employment in manufacturing and the foreclosure rate (for
2008 only) have negative effects for the Republicans. Additionally, higher unemployment rates
negatively affected the Republican vote share in 2004 and 2008 (when there was a Republican
incumbent), but positively affected the Republican candidate in 2000 and 2012 (when there
was a Democratic incumbent). Finally, the sociodemographic variables maintain a considerable effect across all elections while cultural factors decline in importance and the economic
variables increase in standing across the four-election period.
Case Selection
The units of analysis for this study are counties, not cities. It is difficult to acquire sufficient data
at the city level on several of the key variables. Counties are the smallest areal units for which a
range of applicable variables are available and which have maintained consistent boundaries over
time (McKee & Teigen, 2009). To isolate the subsample of counties, a list of all metropolitan areas
with populations over 250,000 in 2000 was first assembled (N = 126). One-quarter of a million
people was chosen as a cutoff point so that the sample would include both megacities and midsized cities. Smaller and nonmetropolitan cities are not the focus of this study. The core county
containing the central city was selected. The smaller of two cases was removed when core counties
were contiguous to avoid excessive spatial dependence.2 This is a particular problem in California
and the Northeast where a considerable amount of territory is covered by contiguous urban areas,
or megalopolis regions. Eliminating adjacent counties avoids having two or more observations
representing a single urban area. Geographys first law is that places nearer one another are more
alike than places farther apart (Tobler, 1970). While any spatial sample is nonrandom and subject to
regional bias, the selection of a county subsample and the removal of adjacent cases allow one to
run ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis as opposed to a spatial lag or error model. If
ones sample includes the entire population of states or counties, a spatial model is superior to OLS
(Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007). Spatial regression techniques require geographic contiguity and
are thus prohibited in analyses of selective counties unless the observations are transformed (Kim
et al., 2003, p. 744). Tests for spatial autocorrelation applied to these data, when the noncontiguous
counties (islands) are converted to central points and then Thiessen polygons (see Appendix A),
find that spatial dependence is not a problem.3 The final analytic sample size is 92, which is listed
alphabetically by central city in Appendix B and mapped in Figure 1.
Data and Variables

Data were collected from various sources. The presidential election results for selected counties
were collected initially from the websites of major media outlets and corroborated later by respective
state secretaries of state. Total votes cast for the Republican and Democratic candidates were recorded
and summed.4 The percentage of the two-party vote total was calculated for each party with the
proportion voting for the Republican candidate, multiplied by 100, serving as the dependent variable
of interest. Furthermore, a Red core county dummy variable was created for additional analysis,
coded 1 if the Republican candidate received greater than 50% of the vote, otherwise 0. Other
FIGURE 1
Core Counties included in the Analytical Sample
scholars have also used support for the GOP as the dependent variable in similar county-level studies
(Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007; McKee & Teigen, 2009).
Election results for 1996 to 2008 were also used to create one of the two added control variablesa
Red state dummy. Many studies of U.S. presidential elections control for region of the country such
as South and non-South (e.g., Gelman et al., 2008). These measures are arbitrary, depending on
the preference of the researcher. Given the Red/Blue state rhetoric, it seemed fitting to control for
whether the county was located within a Red (Republican) or Blue (Democratic) state in the previous
election by constructing a 1/0 dummy for Red states. Elections are paired as follows: 2000/1996,
2004/2000, 2008/2004, and 2012/2008. This rationale is based on two premises: (1) the previous
election divides the nation into two regions, politically and culturally; and (2) it is relatively
difficult for a candidate of the opposite party to switch a state (aside from the handful of swing
states) from the prevailing column without a concerted combination of money, electioneering, and
more favorable environmental conditions. Additional regional control variables are eliminated from
this study to limit the number of variables in the models given the relatively minimal sample size.
This Red/Blue strategy also negates the need to control for the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates home states. Other scholars believe that one must control for home states because
candidates enjoy unusual support at home (Lacombe & Shaughnessy, 2007). This is unnecessary
because most candidates home states supported their political party in the previous election and
are likely to do so in the future (Bushs Texas, Kerrys Massachusetts, McCains Arizona, and
Obamas Illinois). It is more important that their home states are Red (Texas and Arizona) or Blue
(Massachusetts and Illinois). Contemporary exceptions are Gores loss of Tennessee in 2000 and
Romneys loss of Massachusetts in 2012 (Perez-Pena, 2000). These are examples of a states extant
Redness or Blueness trumping the home-state effect.
A second control variable is the central citys share of the core county population. Because this
analysis purports to capture Red and Blue cities but must measure variables instead at the county
level, this variable removes the effect of suburbanization from the other variables. The coefficient on
this variable captures the effect of a stronger or weaker central city on the vote outcome. This variable
was measured in 2000 and applied to the models for the 20002008 elections and then remeasured
in 2010 and applied to the 2012 election. Another variable capturing the central citys share of the
countys land area in square miles was calculated but is not included in the regression models. A
third control variable is population density for the entire countytotal population divided by the
countys square miles. This variable was updated for each election year.
The sociodemographic and several cultural independent variables are from the U.S. Census (2000
and 2010) or the American Community Survey (ACS; 2004, 2007, and 2011). Data for 2000 and
2004 were paired with election results for the same years. Election returns for 2008 were paired with
2007 data.5 Election data for 2012 were paired with 2010 Census data and, in the case of same-sex
households, 2011 ACS data. These variables include age (percentage between 18 and 29 years of age),
black (percentage African American only), education (percentage over 25 with a 4-year bachelors
degree), veterans (percentage over 18 who have served in the military), and same-sex households
(percentage of total households composed of two unrelated individuals of the same sex). This samesex variable is not a perfect measure of gay and lesbian couples because it includes platonic same-sex
roommates, but it is theoretically correlated with a true measure of gay and lesbian households.
Church membership data from the Religious Congregations and Membership Study (RCMS) are
available for 2000 and online for 2012 (Jones et al., 2002).6 The Glenmary Research Center, which
administered the 2000 RCMS, reports a county-level variable totaling Evangelical Protestants from
the many denominations and congregations that fit within this tradition. The count was divided
by the total population. Like the urban population control, Evangelical Protestant remains constant
across the first three election models but was measured anew in 2010 for the 2012 election model.
Additionally, given Romneys Mormon faith, the 2010 percentage of the population claimed as
members by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) is added to the 2012 model in a
separate specification.
It must be noted that changes in the observed values for all of the sociodemographic and cultural
variables may not represent a true change in the phenomenon being measured. For example, decennial
Census data are not completely comparable with ACS data, which are based on estimates derived
from a smaller sample. Changes observed in the Census data from 20002010 are most reliable. In
addition, the RCMS data on Evangelical Protestants are not necessarily comparable over the same
10-year period due to possible changes in the ways denominational data were reported.
Economic indicators exert more immediate impacts on election outcomes and thus must be measured closer to the election date. The unemployment rate in previous years (such as that recorded in
previous Census data) matters little for the election if recent months have seen sharp decreases or
increases. In the case of the 2008 election, the economic downturn is thought to be one of the chief
predictors of individual, county, and state outcomes. Thus, indicators must capture this downturn.
Unemployment was included in all four models and was measured by the seasonally-unadjusted rate
for the month of September preceding each election. This is likely to be the last rate calculated and
announced publicly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics prior to the November election.7
The manufacturing rate was collected from the U.S. Census Bureaus County Business Patterns
(CBP) series for 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2010. It is calculated by dividing the number of the labor
force employed in the manufacturing sector by the total labor force.8 This variable captures the
general society-wide trend of deindustrialization and related economic changes, such as the rise of
the service-oriented economy. It might also serve as a proxy for labor union power.
The housing market and foreclosure crisis were key points of debate in the 2008 election. Two
foreclosure rates were obtainedthe rate of total housing units entering foreclosure in October 2008,
released prior to the election by the website and service RealtyTrac (RT; a short-term measure); and
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD) Neighborhood Stabilization
Programs (NSP) estimated rate of mortgages in foreclosure over the 18-month period January, 2007
through June, 2008 (a longer-term measure). The RT rate, lagged one month, captures the conditions
in communities immediately prior to voting, while the HUD estimation more-fully captures the state
of the overall crisis leading into the election season.9 These two variables were switched in and out
of the 2008 base model.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and abbreviated sources for all
dependent and independent variables for all four election years.

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for Core County Dependent and Independent Variables, 20002012
DV:
GOP Votes (%)
IVs:
Age (1829%)
Black (%)
Educ. (BA% of 25+)
Vets (% of 18+)
SameSex HHs (%)
Evang. Prot. Members (%)
Manufact. (% of jobs)
Unemploy. Rt. (% of LF), Sept.
Pop. Density (pers./sq. mi.)
City Pop. (% of county)
Red St. (prev. election dummy)
HUD Foreclos. (% of mortgages),
2007 mid-2008
2000
2004
2008
2012
45.93
(12.42)
46.36
(12.32)
40.38
(11.69)
41.58
(12.51)
Media/
SECSTATEs
17.85
(2.77)
18.56
(14.28)
27.38
(6.53)
12.60
(3.22)
0.72
(0.30)
13.76
(10.18)
10.95
(5.29)
3.71
(1.03)
2147.68
(4366.68)
54.58
(38.33)
0.28
15.97
(1.95)
19.70
(14.40)
30.04
(7.35)
11.27
(3.69)
0.72
(0.41)
16.78
(2.13)
19.77
(14.13)
30.52
(7.17)
10.10
(3.23)
0.81
(0.37)
Census/ACS
9.11
(4.28)
5.29
(1.17)
2091.12
(4221.48)
8.66
(4.09)
6.10
(1.39)
2203.35
(4417.38)
18.28
(2.92)
19.11
(14.25)
31.11
(7.25)
8.87
(3.18)
0.66
(0.35)
16.46
(10.47)
8.10
(3.20)
7.75
(1.72)
2253.99
(4468.77)
53.97
(39.11)
0.30
Media/SECSTATEs
HUDNSP
RealtyTrac
0.59
RT Foreclos. (% of units), Oct. 2008
LDS Members (%)
0.61
4.89
(2.17)
0.26
(0.27)
Sources
Census/ACS
Census/ACS
Census/ACS
Census/ACS
RCMS
Census/CBP
BLS
Census/ACS
Census/ACS
1.89
(6.35)
RCMS
Notes: Mean(Std. Dev.); 2000 data applied to 2000-2008 elections; 2006 or 2007 data; 2010 or 2011 data.
Statistical Methods
Several descriptive and explanatory methods of analysis are used to answer the research questions,
including examination of descriptive statistics, difference of means tests, bivariate correlations (phi
and Pearson coefficients), and OLS regression analyses regressing percent support for the Republican candidate on the aforementioned sociodemographic, cultural, and economic characteristics and
the several controls. OLS regression is an appropriate technique given the nature of the dependent
variable and the fact that the units of analysis are noncontiguous without significant spatial dependence. While one could transform the dependent variable for use in an OLS model, it remains as
a proportion multiplied by 100 in this study, following other scholarship.10 This allows for better
interpretation of the regression coefficients.
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The following section presents the test results of the abovementioned hypotheses. Tables 2
through 9 are numbered in order of the research questions and hypotheses they addressR1/H1
through R6/H6, respectively. Tables 79 all address R6/H6.
Table 2 compares two-party popular vote totals and proportions for the United States and the 92
core counties for each of the past four presidential elections. Figure 2 presents total core county

TABLE 2
Two-Party Popular Votes and Proportions for U.S. and 92 Core Counties, 20002012
Year
Candidates
U.S. Pop. Vote
U.S. Proportions
Core County
Pop. Vote
Core County
Proportions
2000
George W. Bush (R)

Al Gore (D)
50,456,002
50,999,897
49.73%
50.27%
12,180,177
16,352,996
42.69%
57.31%
2004
George W. Bush (R)

John Kerry (D)
101,455,899
62,040,610
59,028,444
100.00%
51.24%
48.76%
28,533,173
15,220,812
19,886,370
100.00%
43.36%
56.64%
2008
John McCain (R)

Barack Obama (D)
121,069,054
59,948,323
69,498,516
100.00%
46.31%
53.69%
35,107,182
13,179,247
21,541,327
100.00%
37.96%
62.04%
2012
Mitt Romney (R)

Barack Obama (D)
129,446,839
60,932,015
65,909,191
100.00%
48.04%
51.96%
34,720,574
13,587,372
21,551,440
100.00%
38.67%
61.33%
126,841,206
100.00%
35,138,812
100.00%
FIGURE 2
Total Core County Votes by Party, 20002012
votes by party in graphic form. The sampled counties account for between one-quarter and one-third
of the national popular vote for the four elections. This share increased from 2000 to 2004, but
despite Obamas unprecedented minority turnout, the core county vote total declined absolutely and
proportionately in 2008, increasing slightly in 2012. A key finding from Table 2 is that Bush garnered
approximately 43% of the core county vote in 2000 and 2004, even increasing his performance in
these counties as he won reelection in 2004. In 2008 and 2012, Obama held McCain and Romney
to approximately 38% of the core county vote. In other words, Obama was able to shave about
five pointsor over two million votesoff of the Republicans urban performance. Romneys core
county increase over McCains was quite minimal, amounting to fewer than half a million votes and
less than three-quarters of a point.
Another item of note from Table 2 is that Bushs relative urban success and McCain/Romneys
poor urban performances did not necessarily mean the difference between victory and defeat. Given
the margins of defeat the Republicans endured in 2008 and 2012, a Bush-style performance in these
92 core counties would not have made up the difference necessary to obtain victory in the national
popular vote.
Table 3 compares Red and Blue core counties means for the variables under study for the first
and last elections of the analysis period, 2000 and 2012. Core counties are assigned a color based

TABLE 3
Comparison of Means for Red and Blue Core Counties, 2000 and 2012
2000
GOP Votes (%)

Age (1829%)
Black (%)
Educ. (BA% of 25+)
Vets (% of 18+)
SameSex HHs (%)
Evang. Prot. Members (%)
LDS Members (%)
Manufact. (% of jobs)
Unemploy. Rt. (% of LF), Sept.
Per Capita Income
Pop. Density (pers./sq. mi.)
City Pop. (% of county)
N
Notes: NS = Not Significant; p < .05;
Red/Bush
Blue/Gore
56.56
18.03
15.58
27.08
13.59
0.64
18.51
2.69
11.70
3.47
21,803
815.39
54.83
39
38.10
17.73
20.75
27.59
11.88
0.78
10.27
0.59
10.40
3.89
22,504
3128.04
54.39
53
2012
Sig.
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
Red/Romney
Blue/Obama
56.76
17.60
11.93
27.67
11.12
0.51
22.73
4.98
8.71
7.18
24,894
697.43
51.06
21
37.09
18.49
21.24
32.12
8.21
0.70
14.60
0.98
7.92
7.92
27,938
2714.38
54.84
71
Sig.
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
p < .01; p < .001.
FIGURE 3
Core Counties Won by Presidential Party, 20002012
on the victor of the popular vote (i.e., who received greater than 50%). Figure 3 graphically displays
the proportion of the 92 core counties won by the Republican and Democratic candidates in all four
elections. Bush won a slightly different share of 39 core counties in 2000 and 2004, while McCain
and Romney respectively won 18 and 21 in 2008 and 2012. See Appendix C for a listing of Red
core counties by central city divided into several categories (for example, Reliably Red Cities and
Bush Cities, Obama Cities).
Figure 4 translates the table in Appendix C into map form. Rather than mapping the outcome
of a single election, or including maps for all four elections, this figure maps four categories of
core counties: (a) reliably Red counties won by the GOP in all four elections; (b) reliably Blue
counties won by Democrats all four times; and (c) swing countiesthose won by Bush at least once
and then Obama at least once (as well as the one county won by Romney only in 2012 Volusia
County, FLhome of Daytona Beach). Interestingly, this map shows that, although there may be
higher shares of Blue core counties in the Northeast, for example, Red and Blue cities are distributed
surprisingly randomly throughout the map.
There are noticeable differences between Red and Blue core counties when simply comparing
means. However, the most interesting observation from Table 3 is that, of the twelve independent
variables compared in the table, the share demonstrating statistically-significant differences between
FIGURE 4
Red, Blue, and Swing Core Counties, 20002012
Red and Blue increased from four in 2000 to seven in 2012. In 2000, Red core counties featured higher
proportions of veterans and Evangelicals and lower shares of same-sex households and population
densities. In 2012, these findings were maintained but, in addition, Red core counties featured fewer
proportions of African Americans and college-educated adults as well as lower per capita incomes.
While not achieving statistical significance, Red core counties also exhibit more Mormons and
manufacturing jobs and lower unemployment rates. Manufacturing was the only variable to display
the opposite of what was predicted. The only independent variables to switch the direction of the
difference between the two elections was the proportion of the population between the ages of 18
and 29 and the urban proportion. Bushs core counties did exceed Gores in the proportion of the
youngest voters by a quarter of a point, while this flipped in 2012 with Obamas counties exceeding
Romneys by almost a full point. Bush also performed better in counties with larger central cities
than Romney.
The only noteworthy differences between Bushs and Romneys Red core counties are a nearly
four-point reduction in the average African American proportion and a 0.13 reduction in the average
same-sex household proportion. All other differences between Bush and Romney counties (e.g.,
lower manufacturing proportions and higher unemployment rates) pattern after societal trends also
evident in the Blue core counties.
Table 4 assesses changes in the proportion of Red core counties. Bushs 39 core counties exhibited
a 0.822 (0.001 level of significance) correlation between the 2000 and 2004 elections. Bushs
proportion of core counties was cut in half by 2008from 42% to 20%with McCains counties
only exhibiting a correlation of 0.575 (0.001 level). Romneys core counties increased by three, or
3.2 percentage points, over McCains with a correlation of 0.907 (0.001 level).
Table 5 displays the correlations between Red core counties and location within a Red state in the
previous election. The share of Red core counties located within a Red state increased sharply by over
200% between 1996 and 20002004 only to decrease again in 2008. Interestingly, the correlation
between being a Red core county and being within a Red state dropped with each election year,
ultimately losing significance with the 2012 election results.

TABLE 4
Support for GOP Candidates in Core Counties, 20002012
Year
Candidate
# Won
% Won
2000
George W. Bush
39
42.39%
2004
George W. Bush
39
42.39%
2008
John McCain
18
19.57%
2012
Mitt Romney
21
22.83%
Notes: N = 92;
Correlation
0.822
0.575
0.907
p < .001; phi coefficient.
TABLE 5
Correlations between Red States and Support for GOP Candidates in Core Counties, 1996/20002008/2012
Year
# Red State
Counties
% Red State
Counties
Correlation with Next

Presidential Election
1996
2000
2004
2008
26
54
56
28
28.26%
58.70%
60.87%
30.43%
0.487
0.407
0.283
0.203
Notes: N = 92;
p < .001; phi coefficient.
TABLE 6
GOP Core County Support Correlated with Urban Proportions, 20002012
Year
Candidate
Correlation with Citys

Share of Population
Correlation with Citys

Share of Land Area
2000
2004
2008
2012
George W. Bush
George W. Bush
John McCain
Mitt Romney
0.319
0.301
0.320
0.329
0.426
0.392
0.390
0.411
Notes: N = 92;
p < .01; p < .001; Pearson coefficient.
Table 6 presents the correlations between GOP support in the core counties and these counties
urban proportionsmeasured by both population and land area within the central city limits. There
is a significant negative correlation (ranging from 0.301 and 0.426) between Republican support
and higher urban proportions. The negative correlation with urban population shares was smallest in
2004 when Bush performed best in these counties.
Tables 7 through 9 present the regression results. Tables 7 and 8 exhibit OLS regressions explaining GOP support (i.e., the Republican candidates share of the two-party vote). Table 7 displays
four comparable models for all elections under analysis. Table 8 shows revised specifications for
2008 and 2012 with respective foreclosure and Mormon rates added. These models are no longer
comparable to the others and are therefore included in a second table. Table 9 presents the change
in the R-square statistic when additional blocks of variables are added to the equation. In other
words, it represents the additional variation in GOP support explained by including additional explanatory variables. Independent variables are again divided into three blockssociodemographics,
cultural factors, and economic conditions. For the purposes of this table, population density and
urban proportion are counted in the sociodemographic block and Red state is in the cultural
block.
The OLS results shown in Table 7 find that the 11 base variables account for approximately
three-quarters of the variation in the dependent variable, percentage support for the Republican

TABLE 7
OLS Results Explaining GOP Core County Support, 20002012
Constant
Age
2000
2004
2008
2012
50.363
50.238
36.541
55.993
0.344
(0.080)
0.452
(0.515)
0.107
(0.062)
0.866
(0.220)
9.338
(0.260)
0.566
(0.474)
0.014
(0.004)
0.628
(0.086)
0.000
(0.086)
0.066
(0.207)
2.603
(0.096)
0.765
27.952
92
0.146
(0.033)
0.365
(0.420)
0.053
(0.028)
0.499
(0.130)
9.950
(0.241)
0.472
(0.387)
0.094
(0.040)
1.064
(0.089)
0.000
(0.119)
0.013
(0.041)
7.005
(0.255)
0.727
23.018
92
Black
Educ.
Vets
SameSex
Evang.
Manufact.
Unemploy.
Pop. Dens.
City Pop.
Red St.
Adj. R2
F
N
Notes: B(Beta); p < .05;
1.010
(0.159)
0.313
(0.365)
0.383
(0.228)
0.506
(0.151)
4.042
(0.133)
0.360
(0.297)
0.337
(0.117)
2.731
(0.259)
0.000
(0.014)
0.030
(0.095)
5.162
(0.207)
0.758
26.977
92
0.700
(0.127)
0.407
(0.492)
0.170
(0.104)
0.962
(0.265)
9.037
(0.286)
0.563
(0.490)
0.168
(0.059)
0.868
(0.103)
0.001
(0.289)
0.103
(0.343)
4.841
(0.203)
0.800
34.156
92
p < .01; p < .001 (given in bold).
candidate. The adjusted R-square increases slightly each year up to 0.80 in 2008 but then declines to the second highest in 2012, 0.77. Each model is checked for multicollinearity with no
tolerance scores below 0.20.11 Most variables carry the expected sign and are consistent across
all 4 years, with the exceptions of age, manufacturing, and population density. Veterans, Evangelicals, and Red state are all positive; black, education, same-sex households, and city proportion
are all negative. All of these variables attain significance in at least one election, but some lose
significance in several. Black, same-sex, and Evangelical are consistently significant in all four
elections.
Age is positive from 2000 to 2008 but negative in 2012, but only significant in the 2004 and
2008 elections. Manufacturing is negative in 2000 and positive from 2004 to 2012, although it is
the only variable unable to attain statistical significance in at least one of the models. The earlier positive effect and 2012 sign change on the young voter variable is puzzling, but the effect
of the manufacturing variable is negligible in all models so a sign change on it is of less concern. Unemployment is a consistent negative predictor but only significant in 2004. Population
density is negative in the former two elections and positive in the latter two but only significant
in 2008.
Interestingly, while population density is not a consistently significant variable in the regression
models, further analysis shows that Troys (2012) crossover point of 800 persons per square mile
holds just as much for the core counties alone as it does for total U.S. counties. The four-election
average cutoff density, where two-thirds of counties below voted for the Republican candidate and
two-thirds of counties above voted for the Democrat, was about 810. The actual point has trended
downward since 2004 from about 840 persons to near 790 persons in 2012. In other words, the
Democrats are lowering this crossover point in urban areas by capturing more lower density urban
market share.

TABLE 8
Revised OLS Results Explaining GOP Core County Support, 20082012
Constant
Age
2008 II
2008 III
2012 II
31.550
32.574
0.846
(0.154)
0.384
(0.464)
0.138
(0.085)
1.057
(0.292)
9.626
(0.305)
0.596
(0.519)
0.292
(0.102)
1.387
(0.165)
0.001
(0.302)
0.096
(0.319)
3.457
(0.145)
54.703
0.459
(0.107)
0.428
(0.487)
0.064
(0.037)
0.794
(0.202)
9.387
(0.261)
0.638
(0.534)
0.035
(0.009)
0.516
(0.071)
0.000
(0.053)
0.053
(0.165)
0.836
(0.031)
6.318
(0.148)
0.811
33.602
92
0.323
(0.164)
0.787
29.076
92
0.742
(0.135)
0.405
(0.489)
0.045
(0.028)
1.024
(0.283)
9.432
(0.299)
0.620
(0.540)
0.219
(0.077)
1.833
(0.218)
0.001
(0.271)
0.091
(0.302)
3.306
(0.139)
1.059
(0.197)
Black
Educ.
Vets
SameSex
Evang.
Manufact.
Unemploy.
Pop. Dens.
City Pop.
Red St.
HUD Foreclos.
RT Foreclos.
LDS
Adj. R2
F
N
0.810
33.303
92
Notes: B(Beta); p < .05;
p < .01; p < .001 (given in bold).
TABLE 9
R Square Change by Block of Explanatory Variables, 20002012
Block
2000
2004
2008
2008 II/III
2012
2012 II
Range
SocioDems.
Culture
Economics
0.492
0.265
0.003
0.481
0.264
0.043
0.441
0.375
0.009
0.441
0.375
0.020/0.021
0.490
0.299
0.004
0.490
0.323
0.003
4449%
2638%
04%
Notes: Socio-Dems. (Age, Black, Educ., Pop. Dens., City Pop.); Culture (Vets, Same-Sex, Evang., Red St.); Economics (Manufact.,
Unemploy.); 2008 II/III add Foreclos. to Economics, 2012 II adds LDS to Culture.
When comparing across the election years, there are numerous observations about the comparative
predictive power of each consistent variable. The power of the black proportion increased significantly
after dipping slightly in 2004, with a standardized coefficient (beta value) exceeding 0.50 in 2012.
Age, education, and unemployment mattered most (by beta value and significance) in 2004, while
veterans, same-sex, Evangelicals, population density, and city proportions mattered most in 2008.
The predictive power of Red state declined across the period, ultimately losing significance in 2012.
The most powerful variables across all models are black and Evangelical. These are the only variables
to exceed an absolute beta of 0.3 in all years and exceed 0.4 at all, both at least twice. In other words,
when all variables are standardized regardless of their units of measurement, black and Evangelical
proportions stand out as consistently exerting the comparatively strongest impacts for the Democratic
and Republican Parties, respectively.
Table 8 gives the results of revised OLS models for 2008 and 2012 with the added foreclosure measures and the Mormon proportion, respectively. The 2008 Model II adds the longer term
foreclosure rate and Model III adds the short-term foreclosure rate. The addition of this economic
variable adds minimally to the explained variation (about one point) and decreases the constant
by 45 points, but does little to alter the directions and effects of the other variables. Most notably, adding foreclosures gives significance to unemployment and about doubles its effect size,
nearing but not exceeding this variables powerful 2004 effect. Both foreclosure measures exert a significant and positive effect on support for McCain. Compared to black and Evangelical,
the foreclosure effect is moderate (by beta) but comparable with most of the other significant
variables.
Table 8 also features the revised 2012 Model II with the Mormon measure. The inclusion of this
cultural variable adds over two points to the explained variation, lowers the constant by 1.3 points,
and removes significance from the city proportion variable. It also diminishes the power of Red state
even further to a beta value of just 0.03. Other than these, most variables maintain significance and
effects comparable to the 2008 base model.
Table 9 reports the R-square change (nonadjusted) with the addition of each block of variables for all election models, including the revised models from Table 8. The initial blockthe
three sociodemographic variables plus the two population controlsaccounts for just under half of
the variation in support for Republicans. Each year is around 48%, except 2008 which dips to 44%.
The cultural block accounts for 26% or more additional explained variation. The 2008 election was
again the standout year with, this time, culture explaining considerably more of the variation38%.
The economic variables add very minimally to the explained variation with the R-square increasing
as little as 0.003 in 2000 and 2012 Model II. The 2004 election stands out, with economics accounting
for an additional 4% of the vote. The revised models for 2008 with the foreclosure rate added boast
the second highest electoral influence of economics with the economic variables explaining 2% over
demographics and culture.
Alternatively, one can enter the blocks in a different orderthus providing a different picture
of each blocks comparative performance. Using 2004 as an example (because economics appear
strongest this year), if the economic block is entered first, it accounts for 25% of the variation.12
If the cultural block is entered first, it accounts for 46%. Seen this way, sociodemographics and
culture are almost equal in their collective predictive powers. Economicseven in its most important
yearexplains half the variation that demographics and culture do.
DISCUSSION
Most hypotheses are supported by the analysis, with a few notable exceptions. This discussion
addresses each hypothesis in turn.
H1: This descriptive hypothesis is confirmed by the analysis. A greater proportion of the presidential popular vote in the core counties supports the Democrats than in the nation as
a whole. Indeed, these urban counties are considerably Bluer than the population of all
counties.
H2: This hypothesis is partly confirmed, although several differences were not statistically significantparticularly in 2000. In 2012, Blue urban centers were more African
American, educated, culturally progressive, dense in population, and economically better off in
income per person than Red core counties. Red core counties were more culturally conservative
if numbers of veterans, same-sex-households, and Evangelicals are an indication. Furthermore,
differences between Red and Blue urban centers do appear more pronounced under the Obama
presidency than at the beginning of the Bush years. Interestingly, Red and Blue core counties did not differ significantly in terms of young voters, LDS members, manufacturing jobs,
unemployment rates, or urban proportions.
H3: This hypothesis is confirmed. The correlation between Bushs core counties and McCains
core counties was indeed lower than the correlation between Bushs counties in the first
two elections since 2000. The correlation between McCain and Romneys core counties
was strong because of the sustained low level of support for the Republican ticket in urban
centers.
H4: This hypothesis is also supported. Location in a Red state did exert a positive effect on
Republican support in the core counties, but it also declined in importance over the four
elections as Obama was able to turn several Red states Blue in 2008 and 2012. In fact, the
correlation between location in a Red state and status as a Red core county did not achieve
significance between 2008 and 2012.
H5: This hypothesis is confirmed as well. Higher proportions of land and people within a central city
are indeed correlated inversely with Republican support. This negative population correlation
has increased in magnitude since 2004.
H6: This set of hypotheses is mostly supported, with some notable exceptions. Several sociodemographic variables (proportions of black and educated voters), central city proportion, and
the culturally progressive variable (same-sex households) all exerted a negative effect on Republican support. The culturally conservative variables (proportions of veterans, Evangelical
Protestants, and, for 2012 only, Mormons) and the Red state dummy variable were positive
for the Republicans. Share of employment in manufacturing was not significant for any election years and was only negative, as predicted, in 2000. The sign change on manufacturing
does not represent a real change in electoral forces because the effect for all years is indistinguishable from zero. Unemployment was consistently negative across all years, not just
2004 and 2008 as predicted. Other anomalies included the positive effect of young voters
from 2000 to 2008 (significant for 20042008) and population density in 2008 and 2012
(significant for 2008 only). Perhaps future modelling should include additional age categories
for all voters rather than a single category for young voters. This is beyond the scope of
this study, which only sought to test the assertion that younger voters are flocking to the
Democratic Party in urban areas. This anomalous finding for core counties deserves further
investigation.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the positive effect of the foreclosure rate when added to
the 2008 election model. Higher incidences of foreclosure were associated with greater support for
McCain in the 92 core counties. This is at odds with the argument that clear Obama victories in
Nevada, Florida, Ohio, Colorado, and Indiana describe a positive effect for the Democratic Party (or,
conversely, a negative effect for the GOP). Admittedly, there was no statistically significant bivariate
correlation between the vote outcome and the foreclosure variables alone. But when controlling for
other factors in a regression analysis, higher urban foreclosure rates favored McCains campaign
both in the longer and short terms. The use of two distinct foreclosure ratesfrom different
sources and calculated using different denominators (mortgages and housing units, respectively)
gives this finding more power. It is possible that this effect is a fluke created by the interactions
of the variables in the model or that it is capturing the effect of an omitted independent variable.
Another possible explanation might be that this variable is in part capturing the presence of investor foreclosuresa driving force behind higher urban foreclosure rates (Gilderbloom, Ambrosius,
Squires, Hanka, & Kenitzer, 2012).
Ultimately, the sociodemographic variables did maintain a dominant effect across all elections.
However, the cultural factors did not decline in importance but rather gained explanatory power in
2008 and 2012the period when the economic recession was thought to dominate the election.
Conversely, the economic variables did not increase in standing across the period but reached their
peak performance in 2004the year of values voters and the culture wars. Identity variables
were (and are) alive and well when it comes to predicting presidential election outcomes in urban
areas. Evangelical identity continued to matter in the same way in 2008 and 2012 as 2000 and 2004.
In fact, Evangelical support for the GOP only intensified with an increase in the beta value of 0.2
between 2004 and 2008. The black and two urban variables became three of the most important
predictors (along with the cultural factors) in 2008. The African American proportion mattered even
more in 2012. These findings can be attributed to Obamas urban identity and attractiveness as a
candidate in urban areas and among urban populations including African Americans. In sum, this
study supports theories of identity politics and the culture wars while challenging economic voting
modelsat least in the aggregate and at the urban scale.
Other scholarship examining recent presidential election returns for all U.S. counties produced an
R-square statistic representing approximately 42% of explained variation (Lacombe & Shaughnessy,
2007). This study finds that a model capturing sociodemographic, cultural, and economic factors
explains 73%81% of the variation in the votes of the core counties of large urban areasnearly
twice as much. In essence, these variables hold greater predictive power in urban centers than in the
nation as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This studys chief contributions lie in the analysis of local-level voting data and the adaptation
of conventional variables to explain urban electoral outcomesparticularly in the anomalous cases
where Republicans still carry core counties containing large central cities. Most pundits continue to
talk about state-level presidential election returns, due to the structure of the Electoral College, but
local studies are on the rise. Local observers emphasize the urbanrural dividesuch as Meckler
and Chinnis (2014) recent Wall Street Journal cover story highlighting the increasing demographic,
cultural, and political differences between urban and rural counties, such as Jackson County (Kansas
City; a part of this study) and Cedar County (El Dorado Springs) in Missouri, respectively. They
cite data analyzed by David Wasserman of The Cook Political Report who measures an interesting
version of this divide: how well Democratic presidential candidates perform in counties with Whole
Foods grocery stores and in those with Cracker Barrel restaurants. They write, In 1992, Bill Clinton
won 60% of the Whole Foods counties and 40% of the Cracker Barrel counties, a 20-point difference.
That gap has widened every year since, and in 2012, Mr. Obama won 77% of Whole Foods counties
and 29% of Cracker Barrel Counties, a 48-point difference. Blue cities are getting bluer, but what
about the 23% of Whole Foods counties that still vote Republican in the Obama era?
This study has attempted to explain this counterintuitive practice by using conventional election
predictorssociodemographics, culture, and economicsto explain past election outcomes in a
subset of counties: those containing the central cities of the nations largest metropolitan areas. Using
support for the Republican candidate as the dependent variable, most findings confirm conventional
wisdomfor example, the negative effects of the African American and same-sex household proportions and the positive effects of Evangelical and veteran proportions on GOP support. These
hypothesized relationships from individual and national (county- or state-level) research hold their
expected effects in this analysis of urban centers. However, in other areas, the urban nature of the
community sample produces counterintuitive resultssuch as the positive finding of the foreclosure
rate.
While these core counties are majority Blue, the Bush years saw 42% of the core counties go
Red. The 2008 election reinforced many existing patterns, but did lead to several factors gaining
in importance due to Obama the candidate. Looking ahead to 2016 and beyond, the question is as
follows: Will the next Republican candidate be able to gain enough urban support to regain the
one-quarter of these core counties that jumped ship to the Democratic Party? Economic conditions
were said to pull Red states and cities away from the GOP. But this research finds that one of the
key hypotheses about foreclosures did not match the voting experience of the core counties of the
nations largest metropolitan areas.
Red core counties have actually exhibited better economic conditions in some areasincluding
higher proportions of manufacturing jobs (unexpected) and lower unemployment rates (although the
difference is not statistically significant)despite having lower per capita incomes. Furthermore, the
unemployment rate was not statistically significant in 2008 and 2012 as a predictor of the election
outcome like it was in 2004. It seemsat least in this urban subsection of U.S. countiessome
of the most important factors in 2008 and 2012 were the turnouts of the key constituencies of the
respective parties. Despite the increased importance of the Evangelical variable for the GOP (ensured
by McCains selection of running mate Palin in 2008), the Democrats benefited in 2008 and 2012
from increases in the importance of racial minorities, the urban vote, and the perception of the
moral high ground on gay and lesbian rights issues. One must be careful to not draw too many
conclusions based on the aggregate variables in this study, lest we embrace the ecological fallacy,
but these findings do seem to bolster some claims of other researchers, pundits, and campaign
consultants.
Smidt and colleagues (2010) wrote that Obamas great concern for 2012 was whether he could
maintain the kinds of exceptional turnout and support enjoyed in 2008. Despite Republican vice
presidential candidate Paul Ryans claim that extraordinary urban turnout cost the Republicans the
2012 election, both Romney and Obama increased their urban turnouts just slightly (Johnson, 2012).
Nationally, Romney was able to obtain about 1 million more votes than McCainabout 400,000 of
which came from these 92 counties. Obama only increased his urban total over 2008 by approximately
10,000 votes while losing 3.5 million popular votes nationally.
While a Bush-style performance in these core counties would not have won McCain or Romney
the election, it is clear that as urban areas growand suburban and rural areas take on more and
more urban characteristicsthe Republican Party will increasingly find itself at a disadvantage in
presidential contests. The GOP cannot afford to write off these populous counties and hope to win.
Certainly, as pundits and politicians have all claimed, Republicans must make strides to diversify
both their candidates and their base. The partys continued support for culturally conservative stances
and policies wins them considerable support amongst veterans, Evangelicals, and Mormons, but has
been unable to win them the presidency since 2004.
On the other hand, the Democrats also have a serious challenge of their ownpicking a successor to the first urban president. Without Obamas charisma, diversity, and urban identity, the
party risks going back to the comparatively lackluster urban performances of Gore and Kerry, both
older, white males like McCain and Romney. Regardless of who Democrats pick, it seems unlikely
that the Republicans have any candidate up their sleeves who could perform as well as or better
than Bush in the nations urban centers (and Bush was by no means an urban candidate, frequently
promoting the image of a Texas cowboy). No matter who the Democrats choose, he or she will
by default defeat the Republican nominee in these core countiesbecause as the African American ousted chairman of the Republican National Committee Michael Steele said days before the
2012 election, the Republican Party is not ready for folks like me (Smith, 2012). Add to this
that the party continues to alienate the views of many Americans on economics, same-sex marriage, and immigration and this means the increasingly urban future will be increasingly dim for
the GOP.13
Perhaps the findings of this study will help each major party to refine their platforms to not only
play to their strengths, but also reach voters in the counties predisposed to oppose them. Targeted
messages, such as the Obama campaigns efforts to reach Evangelicals, and community organizing
around voter engagement could change some of the patterns evident over the dozen years at the
beginning of the millennium. But taken as a whole, this research shows that the Republicans have
the larger hurdle before them as they attempt to overcome the prevailing winds of demographic and
cultural trends.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I especially thank Laura Reese and the three anonymous reviewers who provided sugges-
tions that greatly strengthened this article. I also express gratitude to two of my mentors who provided methodological
advice, Frank Goetzke and Jason Gainous, and to my former graduate assistant Michael Spafford who helped collect
the 2012 data. Furthermore, I recognize those who provided constructive criticism of earlier drafts of this paper at
the Midwest (2013) and Kentucky (2012, 2013) Political Science Associations (KPSA). Nonetheless, any remaining
errors are my own. Finally, I acknowledge KPSA for honoring an earlier version of this paper with the David Hughes
Memorial Award for most outstanding paper presented by a faculty member.
APPENDIX A
CORE COUNTIES CONVERTED TO CENTRAL POINTS WITH THIESSAN POLYGONS
APPENDIX B
92 CORE COUNTIES IN ANALYTICAL SAMPLE (LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY
CENTRAL CITY)
Central City
Albany
Albuquerque
Allentown
Atlanta
Austin
Baltimore
Baton Rouge
Birmingham
Boise
Boston
Buffalo
Charleston
Charlotte
Chattanooga
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Colorado Springs
Columbia
Columbus
Corpus Christi
Dallas
Dayton
Daytona Beach
Denver
Des Moines
Core County
Albany County
Bernalillo County
Lehigh County
Fulton County
Travis County
Baltimore City
East Baton Rouge Parish
Jefferson County
Ada County
Suffolk County
Erie County
Charleston County
Mecklenburg County
Hamilton County
Cook County
Hamilton County
Cuyahoga County
El Paso County
Richland County
Franklin County
Nueces County
Dallas County
Montgomery County
Volusia County
Denver County
Polk County
State
NY
NM
PA
GA
TX
MD
LA
AL
ID
MA
NY
SC
NC
TN
IL
OH
OH
CO
SC
OH
TX
TX
OH
FL
CO
IA
(Continued)

Central City
Detroit
El Paso
Fayetteville
Flint
Fort Myers
Fort Wayne
Fresno
Grand Rapids
Greensboro
Greenville
Harrisburg
Hartford
Houston
Indianapolis
Jacksonville
Kansas City
Knoxville
Lansing
Las Vegas
Lexington
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Madison
Memphis
Miami
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Mobile
Nashville
New Brunswick
New York City
Newark
Omaha
Orlando
Pensacola
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Portland
Poughkeepsie
Raleigh
Reno
Rochester
Rockford
Sacramento
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jose
Seattle
Shreveport
South Bend
Spokane
St. Louis
Syracuse
Tampa
Tulsa
Core County
Wayne County
El Paso County
Cumberland County
Genesee County
Lee County
Allen County
Fresno County
Kent County
Guilford County
Greenville County
Dauphin County
Hartford County
Harris County
Marion County
Duval County
Jackson County
Knox County
Ingham County
Clark County
Fayette County
Pulaski County
Los Angeles County
Jefferson County
Dane County
Shelby County
MiamiDade County
Milwaukee County
Hennepin County
Mobile County
Davidson County
Middlesex County
Kings County
Essex County
Douglas County
Orange County
Escambia County
Philadelphia County
Maricopa County
Allegheny County
Multnomah County
Dutchess County
Wake County
Washoe County
Monroe County
Winnebago County
Sacramento County
Salt Lake County
Bexar County
San Diego County
San Francisco County
Santa Clara County
King County
Caddo Parish
St. Joseph County
Spokane County
St. Louis City
Onondaga County
Pinellas County
Tulsa County
State
MI
TX
NC
MI
FL
IN
CA
MI
NC
SC
PA
CT
TX
IN
FL
MO
TN
MI
NV
KY
AR
CA
KY
WI
TN
FL
WI
MN
AL
TN
NJ
NY
NJ
NE
FL
FL
PA
AZ
PA
OR
NY
NC
NV
NY
IL
CA
UT
TX
CA
CA
CA
WA
LA
IN
WA
MO
NY
FL
OK
(Continued)

Central City
Virginia Beach
Washington
West Palm Beach
Wichita
Wilmington
WinstonSalem
Worcester
Core County
State
Virginia Beach City

District of Columbia
Palm Beach County
Sedgwick County
New Castle County
Forsyth County
Worcester County
VA
DC
FL
KS
DE
NC
MA
APPENDIX C
CHANGING ALLEGIANCES OF RED CORE COUNTIES (LISTED ALPHABETICALLY
BY CENTRAL CITY), 20002012
Reliably Red Cities

Boise, ID
Chattanooga, TN
Colorado Springs, CO
Corpus Christi, TX
Fort Myers, FL
Fort Wayne, IN
Fresno, CA
Greenville, SC
Jacksonville, FL
Knoxville, TN
Mobile, AL
Pensacola, FL
Phoenix, AZ
Salt Lake City, UT
Spokane, WA
Tulsa, OK
Virginia Beach, VA
Wichita, KS
Bush Cities,
Obama Cities
Romney but not

McCain Cities
Austin, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Birmingham, AL
Charleston, SC
Charlotte, NC
Cincinnati, OH
Dallas, TX
Fayetteville, NC
Grand Rapids, MI
Greensboro, NC
Harrisburg, PA
Houston, TX
Indianapolis, IN
Lexington, KY
Omaha, NE
Poughkeepsie, NY
Raleigh, NC
Reno, NV
Rockford, IL
San Antonio, TX
San Diego, CA
Shreveport, LA
South Bend, IN
Tampa, FL
WinstonSalem, NC
Daytona Beach, FL
Grand Rapids, MI
Omaha, NE
Notes: Won by both Bush and Obama at least once; Won only by Romney; Won by both Bush and Romney, but not McCain.
ENDNOTES
1 This study was planned and carried out without reference to Chinni and Gimpels (2010) variables. However,
after analysis and presentation, one reader noted a similarity to their 12 community types. Chinni and Gimpel
create sociodemographic (Minority Central), cultural/religious (Evangelical Epicenters, Mormon Outposts), and
economic categories (Industrial Metropolis) in which to fit all U.S. counties. It is a bit of a stretch to claim one
single variable is the dominant force for each county. The 92 counties included in this study are spread across
several of the 12 types and no substantial patterns are readily evident beyond simple generalizations (such as that
Minority Central and Industrial Metropolis counties tend to vote Democratic).
2 In cases where the central city crosses two or more counties, the county with the largest share of the city population
was chosen. Several cities (Baltimore, St. Louis, and Virginia Beach) are considered as counties by their state and
thus included in the sample as cities. Volusia and Orange Counties, Florida, come closest to being contiguous of
all counties in the sample. While the two do touch in a very small area, they are separated by Seminole County.
Several additional counties were removed due to missing data on one or more of the cultural independent variables.
3 One option to diagnose the presence of spatial autocorrelation in this data set is to create a spatial weights matrix
based on distance. Another option, which would allow the construction of a spatial model after diagnosis, is to
convert the core counties to points, convert them again to Thiessen polygons, and then create a spatial weight file
based on contiguity. The creation of the Thiessen polygons allows one to determine neighbors through first-order
rook contiguity. See Appendix A for the resulting map. Both options produced the same resultsMorans I and
Lagrange Multiplier (both lag and error) tests produced statistics that were not significant at the 0.05 level. Morans
I is close to 0 in each election model (for example, 0.017275 in 2012)which, if 0, would signify complete spatial
randomness. This compares to all-county studies with Morans I statistics between 0.50.6 (much closer to 1,
which would mean perfectly clustered; see Kim et al., 2003). Because the LM (lag) was closest to significance
(0.10 level), I ran a spatial lag model for each year and found that the spatially lagged dependent variable is not
significantnor is the likelihood ratio test.
4 Third party support is not taken into account. However, in cases where electoral fusion is present, such as New
York state, all votes cast for the two major party candidates are talliedincluding those cast for third parties
nominating the major party candidates. For example, in 2012, the Romney/Ryan ticket appeared on both the
Republican and Constitution Party ballots and the Obama/Biden ticket was nominated by both the Democratic
and Working Family Parties in New York.
5 The 2007 data were collected prior to the 2008 election and analyzed before 2008 ACS data were released.
6 Updated 2010 RCMS data are available at the county-level online at the Association of Religion Data Archives
website: www.thearda.com/rcms2010/.
7 Unemployment rate lagged one month is the standard practice in predicting election outcomes (e.g., LewisBeck & Stegmaier, 2000). One could, in theory, lag the measure of unemployment furtherparticularly if
the emphasis of the analysis was to really understand the nature of unemployments effect on the outcome.
Some have also used perceived unemployment and found even stronger effects (ibid). In this case, the focus is on capturing the general effect of economic conditions and, as such, this variable serves more as a
proxy of economic conditions at the time of the election. In most of the election years under study, there
were not any major demonstrated shifts in unemployment in the month or two immediately prior to the election. Thus, September unemployment is generally consistent with unemployment lagged by several additional
months.
8 These manufacturing proportions of the labor force do include a degree of employees who work in the core
county but do not reside there. An exploratory analysis of a diverse (in geography and size) subsample of 10
core counties, to assess the degree of differences between manufacturing employment by place of employment
and, alternatively, place of residence, found that these two measures are very similar in most cases. The average
absolute difference for these 10 was 0.38 of a percentage point in 2011 and they are thus highly correlated.
Nonetheless, the hypothesized effect of this variable is not wholly based on the aggregated political preferences
of manufacturing employees. Rather, it captures the electoral effect of communities having greater proportions
of manufacturing employmentwhich may affect the aggregate political behaviors of the county beyond just the
individuals employed in the sector (similar to how having significant employment in the coal industry affects the
politics of Appalachian states like West Virginia).
9 The correlation between these two foreclosure measures is 0.690, significant at the .001 level.
10 Because this study employs OLS regression, predicted values less than zero or over 100 are possible. However,
use of a logistic transformation of the DV to make it nonbounded [ln(y/1 y)] does not alter the directions and
significance levels of the variables and the predicted values using the ratio variable do not go below 0 or above
100 (nearly all proportions are in the linear part of the sigmoidal curve). Thus, for ease of interpretation of the
coefficients, this study follows other county-level presidential election studies (e.g., Lacombe & Shaughnessy,
2007) that also leave the dependent variable in percentage ( 100) form. A related concern is that the ratio
dependent variable does not distinguish between counties of different sizes. A population control variable added
to the models is not significant and does not alter the findings.
11 The highest correlation and lowest tolerance scores amongst the independent variables shows that population
density and city proportions come closest to a multicollinearity problem. However, the tolerance scores still
exceed a conventional 0.20 cutoff point. Income per capita was removed from analysis due to its high correlation
with education.
12 In 2008, the combination of manufacturing, unemployment, and foreclosures (when entered as the first block)
accounts for about 15% of the explained variation in core county support for McCain.
13 Immigration and the rise of Latino voters are not addressed by this study (in order to keep the number of variables
down) but deserve considerable attention in other national and urban-oriented studies.
REFERENCES
Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2005). Why cant we all just get along? The reality of a polarized America. The
Forum, 3, Article 1, DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1076.
Abramowitz, A., & Saunders, K. (2008). Is polarization a myth? Journal of Politics, 70, 542555.
Abrams, B. A., & Butkiewicz, J. L. (1995). The influence of state-level economic conditions on the 1992 U.S.
presidential election. Public Choice, 85, 110.
Adamczyk, A., & Pitt, C. (2009). Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: The role of religion and cultural context.
Social Science Research, 38, 338351.
Alderman, J., Borkar, G. G., Garrett, A., Hogan, L., Kim, J., Le, W., . . . Wickersham, C. (2005). The most conservative
and liberal cities in the United States. The Bay Area Center for Voting Research. Retrieved July 16, 2013, from
http://alt.coxnewsweb.com/statesman/metro/081205libs.pdf
Ansolabehere, S., Rodden, J., & Snyder, J. M. Jr. (2006). Purple America. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20,
97118.
Blackley, P. R., & Shepard, III, E. M. (1994). A statistical analysis of the effect of state-level economic conditions on
the 1992 presidential election. Public Finance Quarterly, 22, 366382.
Chait, J. (2007). The big con. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Chinni, D., & Gimpel, J. (2010). Our patchwork nation: The surprising rruth about the real America. New York,
NY: Gotham Books.
Chong, D., & Rogers, R. (2005). Racial solidarity and political participation. Political Behavior, 27, 347374.
Craig, S. C., Martinez, M. D., Kane, J. G., & Gainous, J. (2005). Core values, value conflict, and citizens ambivalence
about gay rights. Political Research Quarterly, 58, 517.
Easterly, W. (2010, November 2). Red states and blue cities: Divided well endure anyway. Aid Watch. Retrieved July
17, 2013, from http://aidwatchers.com/2010/11/red-statesblue-cities-and-other-cool-maps/
Economist. (2008, September 18). The financial crisis and the election: The politics of despair. Retrieved July 15,
2013, from http://www.economist.com/node/12262221
Erikson, R. S. (2009). The American voter and the economy, 2008. PS: Political Science and Politics, 42, 467471.
Fiorina, M. P. (2005). Culture war? The myth of a polarized America. New York, NY: Pearson Longman.
Florida, R. (2005). Cities and the creative class. New York, NY: Routledge.
Florida, R. (2014, April 10). Americas most sprawling cities are also the most Republican. The Atlantic Cities.
Retrieved April 12, 2014, from http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2014/04/americas-mostsprawling-cities-are-also-most-republican/8832/
Florida, R., & Johnson, S. (2012, November 26). What Republicans are really up against: Population density.
The Atlantic Cities. Retrieved July 16, 2013, from http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2012/11/whatrepublicans-are-really-against-population-density/3953/
Frank, T. (2004). Whats the matter with Kansas? How conservatives won the heart of America. New York, NY: Henry
Holt.
Gelman, A., Park, D., Shor, B., Bafumi, J., & Cortina, J. (2008). Red state, blue state, rich state, poor state: Why
Americans vote the way they do. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gilderbloom, J. I., Ambrosius, J. D., Squires, G. D., Hanka, M. J., & Kenitzer, Z. E. (2012). Investors: The missing
piece in the foreclosure racial gap debate. Journal of Urban Affairs, 34, 559582.
Gimpel, J. G., & Karnes, K. A. (2006). The rural side of the urbanrural gap. PS: Political Science and Politics, 39,
467472.
Hardinge, T. (2004, August). Beliefs about youth and attitudes toward sex education. Paper presented at the American
Sociological Association annual meeting, San Francisco, CA.
Heilemann, J., & Halperin, M. (2010). Game change: Obama and the Clintons, McCain and Palin, and the race of a
lifetime. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Hill, S. J., Herron, M. C., & Lewis, J. B. (2010). Economic crisis, Iraq, and race: A study of the 2008 presidential
election. Election Law Journal, 9, 4162.
Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture wars: The struggle to define America. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Hunter, J. D. (1994). Before the shooting begins: Searching for democracy in Americas culture war. New York, NY:
Free Press.
Jacobson, G. C. (2005). Polarized politics and the 2004 congressional and presidential elections. Political Science
Quarterly, 120, 199218.
Jelen, T. G. (1986). Fundamentalism, feminism, and attitudes toward pornography. Review of Religious Research, 28,
97103.
Johnson, L. (2012, November 13). Paul Ryan: Obama win given by urban areas. Huffington Post. Retrieved July 17,
2013, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/13/paul-ryan-obama-win_n_2121348.html
Jones, D. E., Doty, S., Grammich, C., Horsch, J. E., Houseal, R., Lynn, M., . . . Taylor, R. H. (2002). Religious
congregations and membership in the United States 2000: An enumeration by region, state and county based
on data reported for 149 religious bodies. Nashville, TN: Glenmary Research Center.
Kelly, M. (1992, October 31). The 1992 campaign: The DemocratsClinton and Bush compete to be champion of change; Democrat fights perceptions of Bush gain. New York Times. Retrieved July 17, 2013,
from http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/us/1992-campaign-democrats-clinton-bush-compete-be-championchange-democrat-fights.html
Kim, J., Elliott, E., & Wang, D. (2003). A spatial analysis of county-level outcomes in US Presidential elections:
19882000. Electoral Studies, 22, 741761.
Kirby, E. H., & Kawashima-Ginsberg, K. (2009). The youth vote in 2008. The Center for Information
and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement. Retrieved July 15, 2013, from http://civicyouth.
org/PopUps/FactSheets/FS_youth_Voting_2008_updated_6.22.pdf
Lacombe, D. J., & Shaughnessy, T. M. (2007). Accounting for spatial error correlation in the 2004 presidential popular
vote. Public Finance Review, 35, 480499.
Levine, K. J., Clark, N., Haygood, D. M., & Muenchen, R. A. (2011). Change: How young voters interpreted the
messages sent during the 2008 presidential election season. American Behavioral Scientist, 55, 479501.
Levine, P., & Lopez, M. H. (2002). Youth voter turnout has declined, by any measure. The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement. Retrieved July 17, 2013, from http://
civicyouth.org/research/products/Measuring_Youth_Voter_Turnout.pdf
Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual Review of Political
Science, 3, 183219.
Lopez, M. H., Kirby, E., & Sagoff, J. (2005). The youth vote 2004. The Center for Information
and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement. Retrieved July 16, 2013, from http://civicyouth.
org/PopUps/FactSheets/FS_Youth_Voting_72-04.pdf
McIntosh, W. A., Alston, L., & Alston, J. P. (1979). The differential impact of religious preference and church
attendance on attitudes toward abortion. Review of Religious Research, 20, 195213.
McKee, S. C., & Teigen, J. M. (2009). Probing the reds and blues: Sectionalism and voter location in the 2000 and
2004 U.S. presidential elections. Political Geography, 28, 484495.
Meckler, L., & Chinni, D. (2014, March 21). City vs. country: How where we live deepens the nations
political divide. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved April 12, 2014, from http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303636404579395532755485004
Miller, J. E. (2009, January 6). Did home foreclosure rates predict the next president? Foreclosure Deals. Retrieved July
16, 2013, from http://www.foreclosuredeals.com/wp/did-home-foreclosure-rates-predict-the-next-president/
Miller, P. G. (2008, October 4). Will foreclosures change the presidential election? OurBroker.com. Retrieved July 15,
2013, from http://www.ourbroker.com/foreclosures/will-foreclosures-change-the-presidential-election/
Morrill, R., Knopp, L., & Brown, M. (2007). Anomalies in red and blue: Exceptionalism in American electoral
geography. Political Geography, 26, 525553.
Morrill, R., Knopp, L., & Brown, M. (2011). Anomalies in red and blue II: Towards an understanding of the roles
of setting, values, and demography in the 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections. Political Geography, 30,
153168.
Nickerson, D. W. (2006). Hunting the elusive young voter. Journal of Political Marketing, 5, 4769.
Perez-Pena, R. (2000, November 9). The 2000 elections: Tennessee; Loss in home state leaves Gore depending
on Florida. New York Times. Retrieved July 17, 2013, from http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/us/the-2000elections-tennessee-loss-in-home-state-leaves-gore-depending-on-florida.html
Smidt, C., den Dulk, K., Froehle, B., Penning, J., Monsma, S., & Koopman, D. (2010). The disappearing God gap?
Religion in the 2008 presidential election. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Smith, M. (2012, October 21). Michael SteeleGOP Not Ready for Folks Like Me/ Huffington Post. Retrieved July
16, 2013, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-smith/michael-steele-gop-not-re_b_1985841.html
Sperling, J., Helburn, S., George, S., Morris, J., & Hunt, C. (2004). The great divide: Retro vs. metro America. Sausalito,
CA: Polipoint Press.
Tate, K. (1991). Black political participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. American Political Science
Review, 85, 11591176.
Tiemann, T., DiRienzo, C., & Das, J. (2008). Red cities, blue cities: Creativity, growth and politics. Elon University
Department of Economics Working Paper Series, Working Paper 200802. Retrieved July 17, 2013, from
http://org.elon.edu/econ/WPS/wp2008--02.pdf
Tietack. (2010, July 2). Blue cities more patriotic than red cities. Daily Kos. Retrieved July 17, 2013, from
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/07/02/881123/-Blue-Cities-more-Patriotic-than-Red-Cities
Tobler, W. R. (1970). A computer movie simulating urban growth in the Detroit region. Economic Geography, 46,
234240.
Troy, D. (2012, November 19). The real Republican adversary? Population density. Dave Troy: Fueled by Randomness.
Retrieved July 15, 2013, from http://davetroy.com/posts/the-real-republican-adversary-population-density
Von Drehle, D. (2008, January 31). The year of the youth vote. Time. Retrieved July 16, 2013, from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1708836,00.html
Wheelan, C. (2010). Introduction to public policy. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
Whitby, K. J. (2007). The effect of black descriptive representation on black electoral turnout in the 2004 elections.
Social Science Quarterly, 88, 10101023.
Wolfe, A. (1999). One nation after all: What Americans really think about God, country, family, racism, welfare,
immigration, homosexuality, work, the right, the left and each other. New York, NY: Penguin.
Wuthnow, R. (1988). The restructuring of American religion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zimmer, M. (2010). Home prices and the 2008 presidential election: Evidence from state level data. Social Science
Journal, 47, 439446.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Joshua D. Ambrosius is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Master of
Public Administration Program at the University of Dayton. His research interests include urban and
housing policy, regional governance, and religious organizations. His academic work has appeared
in such journals as Journal of Urban Affairs, Housing Policy Debate, American Review of Public
Administration, Journal of Urbanism, Local Environment, and Interdisciplinary Journal of Research
on Religion.

Ambrosius 2016 - Article JUA

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ambrosius 2016 - Article JUA

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

BLUE CITY . . . RED CITY?

170 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 171

172 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 173

174 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 175

Data and Variables

176 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 177

178 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

RT Foreclos. (% of units), Oct. 2008

LDS Members (%)

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 179

U.S. Pop. Vote

George W. Bush (R)

George W. Bush (R)

John McCain (R)

Mitt Romney (R)

180 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

GOP Votes (%)

Notes: NS = Not Significant; p < .05;

p < .01; p < .001.

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 181

182 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

p < .001; phi coefficient.

Correlation with Next

p < .001; phi coefficient.

Correlation with Citys

Correlation with Citys

p < .01; p < .001; Pearson coefficient.

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 183

Notes: B(Beta); p < .05;

p < .01; p < .001 (given in bold).

184 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

Notes: B(Beta); p < .05;

p < .01; p < .001 (given in bold).

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 185

186 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 187

188 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 189

190 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 191

Virginia Beach City

Reliably Red Cities

Romney but not

192 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 193

194 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 38/No. 2/2016

I Core County Outcomes in U.S. Presidential Elections I 195

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

You might also like