FORTICH VS.

CORONA
289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998
TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law
DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court or quasijudicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which substantially
modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes
final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said agency has
lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from
agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a
hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997.
The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998
elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-win resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the win-win resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory, had any
legal effect.
HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and
executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1)
motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying
its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and
basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body
must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes
once and for all

FIRESTONE TIRE V. CA
353 SCRA 601

FACTS:
Fojas Arca and Firestone Tire entered into a franchising agreement wherein the former had the privilege to purchase on credit the
latters products. In paying for these products, the former could pay through special withdrawal slips. In turn, Firestone would
deposit these slips with Citibank. Citibank would then honor and pay the slips. Citibank automatically credits the account

of Firestone then merely waited for the same to be honored and paid by Luzon Development Bank. As this was the
circumstances,
Firestone believed in the sufficient funding of the slips until there was a time that Citibank informed it that one of the
slips was dishonored. It wrote then a demand letter to Fojas Arca for the payment and damages but the latter refused to
pay, prompting Firestone to file an action against
it.

HELD:
The withdrawal slips, at the outset, are non-negotiable. Hence, the rule on immediate notice of dishonor is non-applicable to the
case at hand. Thus, the bank was under no obligation to give immediate notice that it wouldn't make payment on the subject
withdrawal slips. Citibank should have known that withdrawal slips are not negotiable instruments. It couldn't expect
then the slips be treated like checks by other entities. Payment or notice of dishonor from respondent bank couldn't be expected
immediately in contrast to the situation involving checks.
In the case at bar, Citibank relied on the fact that LDB honored and paid the withdrawal slips which made it automatically
credit the account of Firestone with the amount of the subject withdrawal slips then merely waited for LDB to honor and
pay the same. It bears stressing though that Citibank couldn't have missed the non-negotiable character of the slips. The
essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit instrument lies in its freedom to be a
substitute for money. The withdrawal slips in question lacked this character.
The withdrawal slips deposited were not checks as Firestone admits and Citibank generally was not bound to accept the
withdrawal slips as a valid mode of deposit. Nonetheless, Citibank erroneously accepted the same as such and thus, must
bear the risks attendant to the acceptance of the instruments. Firestone and Citibank could not now shift the risk to LDB for
their committed mistake.

Atty Dara DigestPublic Interest vs. ElmaG.R. no. 138965 March 5 2007PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., LAUREANO T. ANGELES, and
JOCELYN P.CELESTINO, vs.MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel and as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, and RONALDOZAMORA, asExecutive Secretary, Accused AppellantFacts:For
consideration is the omnibus motion, dated 14 august 2006, whererespondent Magdangal Elma sought the following:
1.
the reconsideration of the decision in the case Public Interest Center Inc., et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, et.al ( GR. NO.
138965), promulgated on30 June 2006;
2.
The clarification of the dispositive part of the decision ; and
3.
The elevation of the case to the court en banc.The solicitor general, in behalf of the respondent, filed an omnibus motion,dated 11
august 2006 with substantially the same
allegation.R e s p o n d e n t E l m a w a s a p p o i n t e d a s C h a i r m a n o f T h e P r e s i d e n t i a l Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) ON 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential legal counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumiration that he
may receive as CPLC. Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional and therefore, null and
void. In its decision, the court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondents as PCGG chairman and
CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of section 7(2) OF ARTICLE ixb of the 1987 constitution, since these are incompatible offices. The duties of CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal
advice on the action of
theh e a d s o f v a r i o u s e x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s a n d a g e n c i e s a n d r e v i e w i n g investigations involving heads
of executive depart6mnets. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are subject to the review of
the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible. The court also decreed that the strict prohibition under section 13 Article VII
of the 1987 constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG chairman nor CPLC is a
secretary, under sectary or assistant secretary. However, had the rule hereunder been applicable to the case, the defect of these
two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section allows the concurrent holding of position only when
second post is required by the primary function of the first appointments and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
Although respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the second appointment, the primary functions of
the PCGG chairman do not require his appointment as CPLC. Ruling
1.
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents omnibusmotion, we find that the basic issues that were
raised have already been passed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus, the court denies the respondents
motion for reconsideration.
2.

In response to the respondents request for clarification, the court ruled that respondents Elmas concurrent appointments as
PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments
void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his office as PCGG
Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
3.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to c o u r t e n b a n c . W h a t a r e i n q u e s t i o n
i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a r e t h e constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and
nott h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f a n y t r e a t y, l a w o r a g r e e m e n t . T h e m e r e application of the constitutional provisions
does not require the case to b e h e a r d a n d d e c i d e d e n b a n c . C o n t r a r y t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e respondent,
the decision of the court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. It should be noted
that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7 February 1989 clearly provides that the court en banc is not
an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a division may be appealed. WHEREFORE, the respondents motion for
consideration and for elevation of this case of court en banc is hereby DENIED. All our dreams can come true if we have the
courage to pursue them. Walt Disney-Teacher: ok class ano ang gusto nyong maging pag laki? ikaw Gloria ano anggusto mong
maging pag laki mo?Gloria (Istudyante): ako mam gusto ko pong maging abogado para makatulongsaaaa kapwaaaaTeacher:ok very
good ikaw Daniel ano ang gusto mong maging pag laki mo?Daniel(Istudyante): ako mam gusto ko png maging doktor paraaa
makatulog sakapwaaaTeacher:ok verygood ikaw naman juan? Ano ang gusto mong maging pag lakimo?Juan(Tamad Istudyante): ako mam
gusto ko png maging KAPWA para maymatulungan sila.

DE CASTRO VS. JBC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section
15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five
most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments,

they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being
an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the
short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or
to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,
Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15,

Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself,
most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is
consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14
and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
Case Digest: G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950. 85 Phil 522

Gregorio Perfecto, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Bibiano Meer, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required plaintiff-appellee to pay income tax upon his
salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted this action in the
Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the
reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that unless and until the Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax
Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", salaries of judges are not included in the word
"income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First,
when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of
judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges compensation, the Federal
principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them.

ENDENCIA VS. DAVID

FACTS
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance in Manila declaring section 13 of RA No. 590
unconstitutional and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Pastor
Endencia and to Justice Fernando Jugo the income tax collected on their salary. When the SC held in the Perfecto case that
judicial officers exempt from salary tax because the collection thereof was a decrease or diminution of their salaries which is
prohibited by the Constitution, the Congress thereafter promulgated RA No. 590, authorizing and legalizing the collection of
income tax on the salaries of judicial officers.
Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional

ISSUE

HELD

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duly of the
courts to declare the act unconstitutional. Section 13, RA No. 590 is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase found in section 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution which refers to the salaries of judicial officers. This act
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province
and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature may not legally provide therein that a statue be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thus the unconstitutionality of Section 13 of RA No. 590.

NITAFAN vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284
FACTS:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during
their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it isanathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to representations that
the Court shall direct itsFinance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus,
on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.
HELD:
No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally
approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make
the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in
ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the
Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the
fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of
Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and
should share the burden of general income taxation equitably. Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed
DE LA LLANA VS. ALABA

FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the
occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners
justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has
been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the
Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices from their services. What
is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to
a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Re

Gonzales,

160

SCRA

771

(1988)

Fast factsRaul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court to Justice Fernan.
Theletter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan
andasking to do something about this. The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan special prosecutor
like a fiscal; ombudsman.Administrative Case No. 3135Resolution dated February 1988 entitled Miguel Cuenco v Honorable
Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the Courtresolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack
of merit.
The Court resolved to requireCuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded
serious accusations againstFernan.Important principles of AC 3135Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer who
under the Constitution is required to be a Member of thePhilippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer.Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other
method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally whileholding his
office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental
law.Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions.
There is fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The
Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. It is just that,
this member must first be removed from office viaimpeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. Should
the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him.Reason for ruling.
Without the rule, Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of chargeswhich might be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who,for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of
judicial authority by the Court. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be disbarred are the
impeachable officers
In

Re:

Raul

M.

Gonzales

Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was
said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring
to thecharges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something
about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by
Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held
administratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.

Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office
Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the SC may
be removed only by impeachment.
The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal
from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is
merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be determined.
A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held
liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE
JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, Tanodbayan/Special;
Prosecutor forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court, together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for comment within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez to do something about this. The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February
1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
intervention by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez to file responsive pleading Supreme
Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayans intervention. The Court
DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of
the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the
Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.
In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had
granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating
to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading
as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuencos
Motion for Reconsideration. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be succinctly
formulated in the following terms.

A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of
such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or
any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office. The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135 in the following terms: There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution).
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumbent
and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in
respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are
not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar. (Emphasis supplied) This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
1 the Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. There are exceptions, however, like constitutional
officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec.
2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption.
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method;
otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office,
would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation
on the New Constitution, states that judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law.
The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of
the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter
punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the
impeachment

process

(The

Constitution

the

Philippines,

pp.

465-466).
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not
thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action in accordance with law may not prosper. 2 The provisions of the 1973 Constitution
we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: Sec. 2 The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.

A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment,
he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial
independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection
of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other
parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from the
foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a
Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. The Clerk of Court
is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.

Re

Gonzales,

160

SCRA

771

(1988)

Fast factsRaul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court to Justice Fernan.
Theletter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan
andasking to do something about this. The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan special prosecutor
like a fiscal; ombudsman.Administrative Case No. 3135Resolution dated February 1988 entitled Miguel Cuenco v Honorable
Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the Courtresolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack
of merit.
The Court resolved to requireCuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded
serious accusations againstFernan.Important principles of AC 3135Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer who
under the Constitution is required to be a Member of thePhilippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public
officer.Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other
method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally whileholding his
office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental
law.Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions.
There is fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The
Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. It is just that,
this member must first be removed from office viaimpeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. Should
the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him.Reason for ruling.
Without the rule, Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of chargeswhich might be brought against them by
unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who,for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of
judicial authority by the Court. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be disbarred are the
impeachable officers
In

Re:

Raul

M.

Gonzales

Facts: Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded a letter-complaint to Justice Fernan. The letter was
said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter). The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring
to thecharges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something
about it. The Supreme Court furnished a copy to Gonzales, the per curiam Resolution of the SC, dismissing the charges made by
Cuenco against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. In that resolution, Cuenco was asked to show cause why he should not be held
administratively liable for making serious accusations against Fernan.
Issue: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office

Held: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a
qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged
criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of the SC may
be removed only by impeachment.
The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal
from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under
the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that the members and other constitutional officer are entitled to immunity from liability. What the court is
merely saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability ma be determined.
A member of the SC must first be removed from office, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held
liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior in appropriate proceedings.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING HONORABLE
JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT. R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez, Tanodbayan/Special;
Prosecutor forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-complaint, dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court, together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for comment within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important
implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr. Gonzalez to do something about this. The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February
1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135, which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any
intervention by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr. Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez to file responsive pleading Supreme
Court en banc to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayans intervention. The Court
DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of
the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan in which Resolution, the
Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit.
In the same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had
granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating
to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court treated this pleading
as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuencos
Motion for Reconsideration. It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be succinctly
formulated in the following terms.
A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of
such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or

any other court with any offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would
amount to removal from office. The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135 in the following terms: There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be dismissed. Members of the
Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from
office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution).
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members incumbency, would in effect be to circumbent
and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of the Court may be removed from office only by
impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in
respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the Commission on Audit who are
not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1][1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine
Bar. (Emphasis supplied) This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
1 the Court said: The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. There are exceptions, however, like constitutional
officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides: Sec.
2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption.
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method;
otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office,
would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation
on the New Constitution, states that judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law.
The above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is quite apparent from the explicit character of
the above provision that the effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter
punished in accordance with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the scope of the
impeachment

process

(The

Constitution

the

Philippines,

pp.

465-466).
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject of
prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not
thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action in accordance with law may not prosper. 2 The provisions of the 1973 Constitution
we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution: Sec. 2 The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed
from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural
requirements that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment,

he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that
may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial
independence and separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection
of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other
parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. It follows from the
foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against a
Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings. The Clerk of Court
is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M. Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which
is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed.

FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was
P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.

CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their no report, no release policy. Hence,
CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the
same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is constitutional

HELD: DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed,
such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.

The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as
an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them
from the national coffers.

By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission which
is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This
conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no
release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of
which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the
event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.