Written Response- Nov.

8 2016 Session
For MCMP Colloquium: Central Topics in Philosophy Of Science
Dr. Catherine Herfeld

Scientific Valuation of Statements

Ramn Gutirrez del Arroyo Abreu

It cannot be negated we perceive correlation between events. Even when

confronted with the problem of induction, it is manifest that an event is always
propitiated by another. To avoid confusion we have to differentiate between natural
events and statements that represent them, since they are not the same!
Facts, hypothesis and conclusions are statements used to in science which in
regards with different degrees of verosimility with nature, that only arise after
corroboration. If science deals only with corroboration, then Poppers is correct in
stating that it does not tell the truth about nature, but an approximation of it. He
does well in calling empirical statements objective, since its corroboration depends
on recurrent testing and repeatable experimentation. He also mentions that intersubjective testing does not presupposes the truth of nature. This is fairly easy to
expose since it can very well be the case that all the scientists who performed a
specific experiment had the same bad data to begin with. Naturally this will lead to
an experiment outputting the same result on each case for every experiment,
although it is nature-factually wrong.
In classical logic, we usually say that a natural language statement is true or false
depending on their valuation. Particular statements are in the same way evaluated
and assigned a truth value. But this assignment is a synthetic one. By this we mean
that the opposite of a statement is not its contradiction. Given that these
statements are phonetic or written symbols that represent properties of an object, it
is curious that they are regarded as true or false. The matter gains some clarity
once we stipulate that the valuation of the statement depends on logical valid
concatenates and not on the actual event it represents. As Popper suggests,
theories in science are then forced to be verosimile descriptions of natural events.
What follows is that scientific theories do not assign valuations to natural events 1,
but only to the empirical statements.
To better understand this, let us ponder upon the following example:
Let us imagine a world where everyone believes that the earth is flat, that is, the
statement the earth is flat is true since it has not yet been falsified. Saying the
earth is round is false because it has not been corroborated. Defenders of the
former statement will rest their assumptions on our immediate perceptions, which
seems to corroborate their hypothesis. By looking at our surroundings it seems
obvious that the earth is situated over a flat surface). It comes the day when Ana,
the scientist, proves that the earth is a sphere. Now the earth is round is true, and
the earth is flat is false.
Some may say that the statement the earth is flat was actually false the whole
time and the earth is round was always true. It is precisely here where we wish to
1 By natural events we mean that which occurs in nature independent of human
perception.

Written Response- Nov. 8 2016 Session

For MCMP Colloquium: Central Topics in Philosophy Of Science
Dr. Catherine Herfeld

make a distinction. The earth would be round in this universe no matter what
humans perceive of it, and it will not be possible that it is flat. Yet, there was a time
when the statement the earth is flat was considered to be true. This is why we
cannot say that scientific theories are true or false, because the ontology of logical
language does not rely on physical existence. We can only hope that our
statements description represent a very similar picture of the reality they envision.
I also share Poppers insight that sometimes in the sciences there seems to be an
oversight of the demarcation between a natural event and a logical statement. If we
believe Popper to be right, and assert that which is corroborated by empiricisms
draws the limit between science and metaphysics, then we can introduce the
following question Given the duality of the valuation of synthetic statements like the
ones proposed in our example, how can an object be and not be at the same time?
An object of nature, as the rule of contradiction stipulates cannot be and not be.
I believe that we can circumvent the contradictory properties of statements if we
define logical statements as fictional objects. A statement by itself says nothing. On
the other hand, a natural event has real causation, in the sense that even without
human intervention, properties of objects or events will be influenced by other
objects or events. In order to be able to agree upon our perceptions we color such
natural events with language-based statements.
Because language is made up and agreed upon, we can give it any valuation we like
without contradiction. Only when we attach a natural object or event to it does it
magically gains contradictory properties, and only after logical rules have been
applied to it. Because scientific theories are made of statements, the same applies.
An empirical statement does not mean anything unless it is paired with a natural
event or object.
From true statements we can derive other undiscovered statements, which, when
discovered, will be regarded as other facts, hypothesis or conclusions. Yet, if we
stumble irrationally upon a statement which in the future will stand for a fact, but
has not yet been proven, we will not call it a fact or a conclusion; and neither would
we value it as logically true. It seems that an empirical statement is nothing more
than a verbal or written confirmation aided by perception; that which intersubjective testing understand to be a faithful description of a natural event.
Let us suppose the set of all possible empirical arguments. Some of them will be
identical descriptions of natural events, even of those events which humans cannot
or have not perceived. We would not say that these unknown statements are true
since no one has proved them, but would we call them false? I do not believe we
should. It surely is the case that men has not even imagined real natural events,
and thus these events may not even have language representations. If unproven
statements were to be regarded as false, what would be the value of that which has
no statement?
We cannot state as false that which has not been tested. I am inclined to value as
false that which was tested but not corroborated, but I cannot accept as false all of

Written Response- Nov. 8 2016 Session

For MCMP Colloquium: Central Topics in Philosophy Of Science
Dr. Catherine Herfeld

which has not been proven. To bypass this problem, there should be a valuation
which is neither of the classical ones; a neutral valuation.

References