VDA.

DE NAZARENO v CA

Accretion, Alluvium: Arts. 440 - 475; Art 58, PD 1067 (Water Code) Arts. 502, 420;
FACTS: Private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which
their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. However
private respondents allegedly stopped paying rental, hence Antonio Nazareno and petitioners
filed a case for ejectment with the MTC CDO City. Decision was rendered against private
respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area
being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant,
however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands
Respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report
to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent
to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private
respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications.
Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario
rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno
by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may
file public land applications covering their respective portions.
Petitioners claim that the subject land is private land being an accretion to his titled property,
applying Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the subject land is public land
This Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code,
requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual
and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3)
that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast).
These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case, give to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects of the
current of waters.
However, they admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other
filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling
materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the action of the waters or the current of
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.

THAT DEPOSIT IS DUE TO THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER, MANDATORY.- In

Republic vs. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect
of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code all
deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature. Thus, in Tiongco vs. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by
the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the case at bar, the subject land was the
direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill
operations.

Divinagracia vs. Parilla

S. Co-ownership (Arts. 484 501) & Partition - Arts. 1078- 1105; Art. 434;
Partition (Rule 69, Rules of Court); Arts. 91 129 (ACP & CPG); Art. 26, FC
Arts. 147-148, 152, 153 & 159, FC; RA 4726 Condominium Law
FACTS: Conrado Sr owned a parcel of land located in Iloilo City. During his lifetime he
contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita Palermo whom he had 2 children
(Cresencio and Conrado,)(b)the second was with Eusela with whom he had 7 children (Mateo,
Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio Ceruleo, and Cebeleo).
After Conrado Srs death, some of the children sold their respective interests over the subject
land to Santiago however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares,
Santiago was not able to have TCT No. T12255 cancelled and the subject document registered
because of other heirs refusal to surrender the said title. This fact,
Due to failure to partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint1 dated
January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for receivership
The RTC ordered, among others, the partition of the subject land. CA set aside the RTC Rulings
and, consequently, dismissed Santiagos complaint for judicial partition.25 It held that Felcons
siblings, as well as Maudes children, are indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the
subject land and, thus, their noninclusion as defendants in Santiagos complaint would
necessarily result in its dismissal
ISSUES: whether or not the CA correctly: (a) ruled that Felcons siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and
Maudes children are indispensable parties to Santiagos complaint for judicial partition; and (b)
dismissed Santiagos complaint for his failure to
implead said omitted heirs.
HELD: (a)With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires
that all persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as
such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.3
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and
illegitimate, who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr.,
Cresencio, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo,
Rogelio, and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and,

thus, pursuant to the rules on representation under the Civil Code,4 their respective interests shall
be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct
ascendant have vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as
indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiagos
complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.s interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding
therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.s interest
over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to Article
9726 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children,
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiagos omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint
for partition defective.
Santiagos contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and,
thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As correctly
noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court
must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for
partition.7 Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and
finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.8
In this case, while it is conceded that Santiago bought the interests of majority of the heirs of
Conrado, Sr. as evidenced by the subject document, as a vendee, he merely steps into the shoes
of the vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from that of the
vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners thereof, thus necessitating the
joinder of all those who have vested interests in such land, i.e., the aforesaid heirs of Conrado,
Sr., in Santiagos complaint.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for
judicial partition renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present.9 Therefore, the CA correctly
set aside the November 29, 2002 Decision and the April 4, 2003 Order of the RTC.
(B)However, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiagos
failure to implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of
Fian, Sr.,10 the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case
Civil Law Partition CoOwnershipIn actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of
coownership. Santiagos contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of
the heirs and, thus, they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit.
As correctly noted by the CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of coownership. The
court must initially settle the issue of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition.

Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of coownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
(During his lifetime, Conrado Nobleza contracted two marriages. The first marriage with Lolita
Palermo produced siblings Cresencio and Conrado, Jr. The second marriage produced siblings
Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado also
sired illegitimate children, namely Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo Sr., pre-deceased
Conrado, and was survived by his children, Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito,
and Gaylord. Cabeleo, Sr. Also pre-deceased Conrado Sr., and was survived by his wife, Maude,
and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.. After Conrado Srs death, Conrado, Felcon (in
representation of his late father Mateo Sr., and his siblings) Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia,
Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective shares over the lot covered by TCT No. T12255 owned by Conrado Sr., for a consideration of P447,695.66, thru a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale. The other heirs, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude
(in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children) did not sign, however. The
same parties also executed a Supplemental Contract, agreeing that Santiago will pay only
P109,807.93 up front, the balance to be paid upon partition of the subject land. He was not able
to have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled, however, because the other heirs refused to surrender the
said title. Since the other heirs failed to partition the land, Santiago filed a petition for judicial
partition and receivership of the subject land. In answer, Ceruleo, Celedodion, and Maude
asserted that Santiago had no legal right to the action for partition because a) Santiago did not
pay the full purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset
of Conrado Sr. and Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the
same.
The RTC in a Decision, ordered the partition of the subject land between Santiago, on one hand,
and Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand
and, consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owners
duplicate certificate in favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the
heirs of Mateo, Sr. Through the document, Santiago became a co-owner of the land, and as
such, had the legal right to demand partition, although he did not validly actuire Mateo Srs share
as Felcon did not have the authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo Sr., share. Upon
reconsideration, the RTC ordered Santiago to pay the balance (P337,887.93) upon partition of the
land. Respondents filed appealed to the CA, which set aside the RTC ruling, and dismissed
Santiagos complaint for partition, for failure to include Felcons siblings, as well as Maudes
children,, who are indispensable parties to the judicial partition, the non-inclusion of which
necessitated the dismissal of the complaint.)

TORRES v LAPINID
FACTS: (Vicente V. Torres), Mariano Velez (Mariano) and Carlos Velez (petitioners)
filed a Complaint6 before RTC Cebu City praying for the nullification of the sale of real property
by respondent Jesus Velez (Jesus) in favor of Lapinid; the recovery of
possession and ownership of the property; and the payment of damages.
Petitioners alleged that they are coowners of several parcels of land including the disputed Lot.
Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners and other
coowners. a judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement signed by the parties
wherein they were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof
and distribute them to all the coowners. However, the agreement was later amended to exclude
Jesus as an authorized seller.
Pursuant to their mandate, the petitioners inspected the property and discovered that Lapinid was
occupying a specific portion by virtue of a deed of sale executed
by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. It was pointed out by petitioner that as a consequence of what they
discovered, a forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid.
ISSUE: Whether Jesus, as a coowner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in
favor of another person.
HELD: We answer in the affirmative. A coowner has an absolute ownership of his undivided
and pro indiviso share in the coowned property.A coowner has an absolute ownership of his
undivided and pro indiviso share in the coowned property. He has the right to alienate, assign and
mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no
personal rights will be affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code: Art. 493.
Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. A coowner is an owner of the whole
and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a
portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his coowners have no right to enjoin a coowner who
intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.
In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his coowned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the coowners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus
from the date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected,
the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as coowner of an
ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common.20 Thus, from the perfection of
contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid eventually became a coowner of the property.
The Supreme Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete
portion before partition of coowned property. Each coowner only possesses a right to sell or

alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition,
such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the
sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did
not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation
Civil Law CoOwnershipA coowner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the coowned property.
A coowner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the coowned property. He has the right to
alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights
will be affected. This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code: Art. 493. Each coowner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
coownership. A coowner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his coowners have no right to enjoin a coowner who intends to
alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.