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LAWS

R.A. 7160, Section 305, paragraph (e): Trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out,
except in the fulfillment of the purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.

R.A. 7160, Section 305, paragraph (l): Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those
exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and operations of the local
government units.

R.A. 7160, Section 308: Every local government unit shall maintain a General Fund which
shall be used to account for such monies and resources as may be received by and disbursed
from the local treasury. The General Fund shall consist of monies and resources of the local
government which are available for the payment of expenditures, obligations or purposes not
specifically declared by law as accruing and chargeable to, or payable from, any other fund.

R.A. 7160, Section 309: There shall be maintained in every provincial, city, or municipal
treasury the following special funds:
xxxx
(b) Trust Funds shall consist of private and public monies which have officially come into the
possession of the local government or of a local government official as trustee, agent or
administrator, or which have been received as a guaranty for the fulfillment of some obligation.
A trust fund shall only be used for the specific purpose for which it was created or for which it
came into the possession of the local government unit.

P.D. No. 1445, Section 3, paragraph (4): Trust funds refer to funds which have come officially
into the possession of any agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent, or
administrator, or which have been received for the fulfillment of some obligation.

P.D. No. 1445, Section 3, paragraph (8): Government agency or agency of the government, or
agency refers to any department, bureau or office of the national government, or any of its
branches and instrumentalities, or any political subdivision, as well as any government-owned
and controlled corporation, including its subsidiaries, or other self-governing board or
commission of the government.

P.D. No. 1445, Section 4, paragraph (3): Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only
for the specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.

JURISPRUDENCE

Consolidated Cases Decided En Banc


Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013.
Social Justice Society (SJS) President Samson S. Alcantara vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon in his
capacity as Senate President, et al., G.R. No. 208493, November 19, 2013.
Pedrito M. Nepomuceno vs. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209251,
November 19, 2013.

An appropriation made by law, under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount
of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word appropriation,
which means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose, and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in
which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by
law, an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be detailed and as broad as Congress
wants it to be for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in
the case of Guingona, Jr.:

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except
that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may
be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current
fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or
special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and
certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present.

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in the State of Nevada v. La Grave:

To constitute an appropriation, there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated
purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the
public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the
intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must
be the primary and specific purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To
reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and
allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate
becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an appropriation
made by law under contemplation of the Constitution.

Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012.

Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted
the accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no
criminal intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime.

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of
diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to
another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoros act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted,
constitutes the crime of technical malversation.

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