ABELLA, KAREN RIZEL B.

CRIMINAL LAW 1
People vs. Madarang, 332 SCRA 99, [G.R. No. 132319] (May 12,
2000)

FACTS:
After having a quarrel, accused stabbed his wife causing her death. He
was then charged with Parricide. He claimed that he was in the state of
insanity during that incident for he cannot recollect what happened. He
further claimed that according to the doctor in NCMH, wherein he was
admitted, there was a high possibility that he was already suffering from
insanity prior to his commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption
from liability for the crime he committed.
RULING:
No. He is not exempt. In the Philippines, the courts have established a
more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that
there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or
that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The issue of insanity is a question of
fact. The state or condition of a mans mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior. Establishing ones insanity requires testimony of an
expert witness, such as a psychiatrist. The proof must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged.
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from
schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed
his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. The arguments advanced by
the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one,
his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident
amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. None of the
witnesses declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms associated with
schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident.
Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of
distinguishing right from wrong.

ABELLA, KAREN RIZEL B.

CRIMINAL LAW 1
Llave vs. People, 488 SCRA 376. [G.R. No. 166040] (April 26, 2006)

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, a 12 year old boy, raped a minor, 7 years of age.
The trial court found the accused to have acted with discernment based on
the evidence of the prosecution that accused pushed the victim towards the
vacant house and sexually abused her. It also considered petitioners
declaration that he had been a consistent honor student. He was then found
guilty of rape; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused-appellant acted with discernment.

RULING:
Yes. He acted with discernment. The Court ruled that discernment
means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the offense
to understand the differences between right and wrong and the
consequences of the wrongful act. The prosecution is burdened to prove that
the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance,
attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act,
but also after and during the trial.
In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the rape
incident, as well as his behavior during the trial showed that he acted with
discernment. The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being
discovered by the prosecutions witness, petitioner immediately stood up and
ran away. Thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges against
him and that private complainants father was looking for him, petitioner
went into hiding. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding clearly
conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral depravity of his act and
that he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed
innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts,
he would have immediately confronted private complainant and her parents
and denied having sexually abused their daughter. The fact that petitioner
was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor student further
reinforces the finding that he was possessed of intelligence well beyond his
years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other minors of his age
could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.

ABELLA, KAREN RIZEL B.

CRIMINAL LAW 1
People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 [G.R. No. 106210], (Jan. 30, 1998)

FACTS:
Manalili, thru Garcia, contracted Lising to affect the arrest of Robert
Herrera the suspect in killing his brother. Unfortunately, Lising and his
companions arrested and killed wrong persons. The trial court found the
defendants guilty of the crime of double murder qualified with treachery and
aggravated by premeditation. Garcia prays that his liability be mitigated on
grounds of lack of intent or motive, acts made under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and in the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Garcia acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force and in the impulse of uncontrollable fear.
RULING:
No, Garcia did not act under the compulsion of an irresistible force and
in the impulse of uncontrollable fear. The court ruled that to be exempt from
criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or uncontrollable fear
must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. The
compulsion must be of some character as to leave the accused no
opportunity for self-defense in equal combat or for escape.
Garcia's participation and presence from the time the abduction was
hatched, up to the killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well
aware of Manalili's plans. He was instrumental in introducing Lising to
Manalili. Likewise, Lising's intention to silence both Cochise and Beebom at
the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was known to him. He did not do
anything to deter the commission or to report the crimes immediately
thereafter. In fact, he stated that he and Lising saw each other after the
incident but never mentioned anything about it, which only goes to show
their intention of concealing the crime.

People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 138 [L-32265] (May 16, 1983)

ABELLA, KAREN RIZEL B.

CRIMINAL LAW 1

FACTS:
Defendants robbed the house of Dr. Gana and thereafter, killed
the latter. The trial court found them guilty for robbery with homicide. Ramos
and two other accused claimed exemption from any criminal liability because
their acts and participation in the criminal design of Boy Andy, one of the
accused, was under compulsion of an irresistible force and under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
ISSUES:
criminal liability.

Whether or not Ramos and the two others are exempted from

RULING:
No. They are not exempted from criminal liability. The court finds no
reason to differ from the conclusions reached by the trial court in finding
herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
defense invoked by the appellants that they acted in view of the irresistible
force and uncontrollable fear of Boy Andy in the unfortunate incident which
resulted in the death of Dr. Mariano Gana is devoid of merit.
Basis of these two exempting circumstances is the complete absence
of freedom. In the case at bar, appellants Ramos, Sublechero and Caluya
failed to show that they resisted the threats of Boy Andy and that in spite of
their resistance they were still forced to act in accordance with his wishes.
Their fear of Boy Andy was merely speculative and there was complete
absence of real or reasonable fear for one's life. Had appellants wanted to,
they would have easily overpowered Boy Andy who was alone.

People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil. 530, [No. 45186] (Sept. 30, 1936)

ABELLA, KAREN RIZEL B.

CRIMINAL LAW 1

FACTS:
Accused went to a thicket to respond to the call of nature. When
she emerged from the thicket, her clothes was stained with blood, staggering
and showing signs of not being able to support herself. Her neighbor came to
her aid and brought her home. They found a body of a new-born baby in the
thicket where the accused had gone few moments ago. Accused claimed it
was hers. The physician declared that the accused gave birth in her own
house; thereafter, threw her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court
gave credit to his opinion and charged the accused with infanticide.
ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is guilty of infanticide.

RULING:
No. Accused is not guilty of infanticide. The court ruled that infanticide
and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or
consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere
imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in
the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order
that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the accused, in causing her
child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
wilfully, consciously or imprudently. Accused was not aware of her childbirth, or if
she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable to take her child from the thicket
where she had given it birth due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be
considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance
so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.