American Philological Association

Epicurus: All Sensations are True

Author(s): Norman W. DeWitt
Source: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 74 (1943), pp.
19-32
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/283586
Accessed: 12-05-2015 02:13 UTC
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Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

Vol. lxxiv]

19

II.-Epicurus: All Sensations Are True

NORMAN
VICTORIA COLLEGE,

W. DEWITT
UNIVERSITY

OF TORONTO

The aim of thisarticleis to show reasonsforbelievingthat the statementin

the heading is false as usually understood. It is absurd; the documentationis
deficient,misleading,and fromprejudicedsources; advocates of its validitygo
beyondtheirauthorities. It is inconsistentwithEpicurus' theoryof perception,
his terminology,
his account of vision, his classifications,his treatmentof the
criteriain his Principal Doctrines,his account of heavenly phenomenain the
letterto Pythocles,and his recommendations
to students. Ancientproofsof it
are polemical sophistries. Modern misinterpretations
have arisen from the
ambiguityof &XqO@is,
whichhas threemeaningsin Epicureanism:1. real or selfexistent; 2. relatively true; 3. absolutely true.

withjudgments.

Sensations have been confused

It is not a difficult
task to findboth generaland specificreasons
fordoubtingthe truthof the allegation that Epicurus believed all
sensationsto be truein the senseof dependable. Of generalreasons
the mostcogentis the absurdityof the idea. It contradictshuman
experienceand tends to equate the sensationsof madmen and the
sane. It also diminishesthe necessityof establishingthe criteria
of truthapart fromthe sensations,and it raises the question why
Epicurus should have gone to such pains to set up a canon ranking
in importancewith his physicsand ethics.
Anotherreason of a generalnatureis the characterof the documentation and the bias of its sources. Explicit evidence in the
literaryremains of Epicurus is extremelyscanty and the implicit
evidence has been largely overlooked. The external testimonia
derivechieflyfromthewritingsofCiceroand Plutarch,bothofwhom
wereinterestedin placingEpicurusin an unfavorablelight. Lastly,
no ancient philosopherwas so universallycalumniatedas Epicurus
and modern scholarshiphas not yet emancipated itselffromthe
entails of inheriteddetraction.
The zeal of these detractorsis sufficientto place the impartial
student keenly on his guard. John Masson wrote:' "The first
principleof the Epicurean theoryof knowledgeis that all sensations
are of themselvesreliable." This goes beyond all authority. Epicurus undoubtedlydid say that all sensationswere true but this is
I Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet (London, 1909) 132.

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Norman W. DeWitt

20

[1943

not to say that they are all reliable. He assumed that theirreliability varied according to distances. Neither is it rightto speak
here of a "first principle." There can be no comparisonamong
essentials. The canon was based upon threethings,the sensations,
the feelings,and the general concepts.2 These formeda tripod,3
and one leg of a tripodcannot be more importantthan another.
Specific reasons call for fullerdiscussion. According to Epicurus the act of perceptionis a click of recognitionbetweena presentationfromwithoutand a generalconceptwithin.4 For example,
let us assume with Diogenes Laertius that a horseor a cow stands
within the range of vision.5 From its body a stream of images,
et3wXa, impinges upon the eyes of the spectator. This exerts a
of
pressure,
rwEpEuluo',6 whichcauses a motionor reaction,
KIP?77tS,7
occurs
coincidence
If
cognizance.
which the mind, 3dawota,takes
betweenthe impressedimage and one of the generalconcepts,KoLvat
PO ,rtS, 8 or anticipations, rpoXt4',Ets,9then recognition,bralho9tts,
takes place and the resultis an rbraloOtfla. For instance,the spectatorrecognizesthe animal as a horse. Thus the Epicurean theory
of perceptionor apperceptionis essentiallyone of recognitionand
in this articlewill be so named.
The process may be stated as a formulaor as an equation:
sensation plus general concept equals a recognition. When this is
fulfilledthe sensationis true. Laertius states it clearlyas a general
principle:10"the fact of the occurrenceof the recognitionsguarantees the truthof the sensations." This statement,however,implies
a negative: "the non-occurrenceof the recognitionsreveals the
falsity or indecisivenessof the sensations." This would be the
case if the horseor the cow were so distantor the lightso dim that
recognitionwas impossible. If, on thecontrary,all sensationswere
true,as is alleged,everysensationwould resultin a recognitionand
betweenan alacrOats and an firalaoqats,
therewould be no difference
which is so absurd as to call forno furtherargument.
Diog. Laert. 10.31.
He was accused of borrowing it from the Tripod of Nausiphanes: D.L. 10.14.
4 Nowhere expressly stated but inferable from numerous passages.
5 D.L. 10.33.
6 Ibid. 50.
7 Ibid. 51.
8 Ibid. 123, or gvvotat69, 77.
9 Ibid. 124.
2
3

10 Ibid.

32.

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Vol. lxxiv]

Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

21

In spite of the factthat Epicurus professedto avoid the creation

of technical terms11he clearly indicated by the terminologyhe
between true and false presentations. A
employed the difference
, 13 while all
true presentationis a 4avraala 12 or a aaoT-rTTK?7 brtfoX
othersare styled 4avra4uara 14 or 4avprac,uol.15 For example, in one
and the same context he calls the visions of dreamersand their
likes 4avrTaoAoL in contrast to a aXvTrTaKX?
and Laertius
brt3X,1'6
employsthe synonympreciselywhen he styles the visions of madmen Oavpraiuara.l7
Heavenly phenomenaare denoted by Epicurus
himselfby one or otherof these terms18 because theybelongin the
class of ra aoavi-,19 thingssituated beyond the range of accurate
observation.
The phrase 4aVraao-mi '7rt3oXt
is itselfa reason forrejectingthe
120 iS good
statementthat all sensationsare true. The wordbrC#OX
Attic only in the sense of "addition" or "onslaught" and it is not
listed in Diels' Die Fragmenteder Vorsokratiker,
but in Jamblichus
and in the Greek commentarieson Aristotle21 it is frequentin the
meaning "view," both in visual and in intellectualdenotations.
For the reason that it is a neutralterm,implyingneithertruthnor
falsity,it usually requiresdefinition:thus operationsof the mind

are called by Epicurus

irq3oXtaL r?s

tavotas,22and these if true, are

styled avpraarKal. The usage is similarwith the sensations: used

alone, brq3oXtn
would be as neutralas a'lt-Oqots;it requiresthe addition
of Oavrao-Tuc to denote a true sensation.23 This practicewouldbe
senselessif,as is alleged, all sensationsare true.
The Epicurean theoryof vision is too well known to call for
redescription. It will here sufficeto call attentionto the fact that
all images dischargedby externalobjects are subject to detrition
11 Ibid. 13,37-38,72.

Ibid. 28, 50 bis, 80; Norman W. DeWitt, Iept' J?avraolas, TAPhA

414-427.
13 D.L. 10.50, 51, 147.
14 Ibid. 75 bis, 88, 102, 1 10.
12

70 (1939)

15 Ibid. 51.

16 Ibid.
17
18

19

51.
Ibid. 32.

Ibid. 88, 102, 110.

Ibid. 104.

DeWitt, op. cit. (see note 12) 421 and note 17.
See previous note.
22 D.L.
10.38, 51, 147.
'
23 The
later Epicureans would not have added the q5avrao-rwKat
brtoXat' to the
criteria unless they denoted forms of truth: D.L. 10.31.
20

21

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Norman W. DeWitt

22

[1943

duringtheirpassage fromthe source to the eyes of the observer.4

Those fromthe greaterdistancesare entirelydispersed;those from
intermediatedistances are blurred, and only those from nearer
objects are capable of resultingin recognitions. The truthof these
statementsis not only assumed but, as I believe, expresslystated,
forin the long paragraphtreatingof the streamsof imagesEpicurus
is greatlyconcernedto explain theirfrequentfailureto reach the
observer.25 Clear vision is stated to depend upon highvelocityand
"because interferenceand non-interthe absence of interference,
ference are equivalent to speed and slowness." Following this
comes a briefdigression;thenhe resumesby sayingthat the unsurpassable finenessof the images accounts for their unsurpassable
speed, all maintainingan even course "according as no obstacle
or few obstacles obstructan infinitenumberof them,but at the
outset many obstacles do obstructsomewhatan infinitenumberof
them." 26 Next he speaks of the instantaneousnessof the creation
of the images, of the uninterruptedcontinuityof the flow,and of
theircapacity to preservefora long time the relativepositionand
arrangementof the atoms in the solid object, "even if at times
confused." In all thisit is manifestthat Epicurus,whileexplaining
the mechanismof vision,feelsobliged to account forits limitations,
whichwould not have been the case had he believed that all sensationswere truein the sense of reliable.
distinctions,
Cicero alleged that Epicurus abolished definitions,
and classifications.27This is one of his misleadingaccusations, a
half-truth. It is perfectlytrue that Epicurus discouragedthe pursuit of such studies as rhetoricand logic,because he believed then
24

Hermann Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887) frag. 247, p. 180, 24-36; Lucr. 4.353-

25

D.L. 10.46-48.

359.

26 At

the end of the sentence the text is corrupt but no new word need be intro-

'
&VTLK7rTeIt,
-Aya
I propose to read: 7rpo's ro Arelpots abnTrv /,u7v &VTLK6PW67rrty
duced.
The MSS have vrp& rci &7relpy for my rpos
rOXXa be' Kac a&reLpots eWiS a'vTLK6rTet rt.
Tro a7rEpoLpS, roXXa7s for my 7roXXa,and a&rLK67rreLVfor my &VTLK67rtL. Bailey, Epir4B'aropp4 and retains 7roXXas, making the
curus (Oxford, 1926) reads rp6s <rep>

latter referto atoms, which in the previous twenty-fivelines have not been mentioned.
To him it then seems to mean: "and besides nothing or very few things hinder their
emission by collisions, whereas a body composed of many or infiniteatoms is at once
I doubt whether the text justifies this version; Hicks, in the
hindered by collisions."
Loeb translation adopts Bailey's emendation but by an oversight fails to put it into
Greek text. In his Stoic and Epicurean, 233-234, appears a quite differentversion.
According to Bailey's note the foreign editors are of various minds.
27 De Fin. 1.7.22.

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Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

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to lead to vanity and ostentation;28 therewas danger of them becoming ends in themselves. Yet he would have been a fool to
ignorethemas instruments
of knowledge. EVen in the scant sixtyeight pages of text survivingfromhis writingsthereis no paucity
of admirable definitions,distinctions,and classifications. He does
not parade them, it is readily admitted,but by his casual use it
may be seen that he divided phenomenainto such classes as 3-Xaand opaTa-ai6paTa.
The invisible world of
&atrqa, oavepa-aq!avp,
atoms and void belongs in the firstand thirdclasses.29 Heavenly
phenomenaare aqavp7,30 because thoughvisible,theyare beyond the
rangeofclear and dependablevision. The use of-thesetermsshould
alone sufficeto show that in his thinkingnot all sensations were
regardedas true.
A like conclusion may be drawn from his casual division of
3 and r&arapovTa.32
sensationsinto ra lrpoo-avovwra
The former must
await confirmation, rwappS,33
while the latter are already dependable evidences, vaip-yetator cvap,ytu.ara. Of the formerthe most

familiarexample is that of the tower,whichmust await the nearer

view to determineif it be round or square.34 One of the urgent

warnings to students is to attend diligently to

ras 7rapobvas

frtq3oXas,35

the immediateperceptions,whetherof the mind or the senses, a

quite unnecessarycaution if impressionsfroma distance had possessed in his thoughtequal validitywithclose views.
Those who have taken Cicero at his word when he accused
Epicurus of abolishingdistinctionswill findtheiracquiescence disturbedby No. 23 of the Principal Doctrines: "If you fightagainst
all the sensations,you will not even have a standard by reference
to whichyou may judge thoseofthemwhichyou say are deceptive."
From this it is justifiableto inferthat Epicurus believed in sifting
the sensations,rejectingsome and accepting others. Had he accepted all sensationshis positionwould have been equally absurd
as that of the scepticswho rejected all. Epicurus was too good a
controversialistto have placed himselfin that predicament.
Sent. Vat. 45.
D.L. 10.38 bis, 39; 59, 62.
80 Ibid. 104.
31 Ibid. 38, 147 bis.
32 Ibid. 147; cf. 82 bis.
33 Ibid. 147; verb, 50, 51 bis.
34Ibid. 34; Lucr. 4.353-363, 500-506.
5Ibid. 38; cf. 82.
28
29

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24

[1943

Norman W. DeWitt

Equal cause for rejecting Cicero's specious criticismmay be

foundin No. 24 of the PrincipalDoctrines,which,somewhatfreely
translated,begins as follows:" If you reject a given sensation and
fail to distinguishbetween (1) the judgment formedand (2) the
impressionawaiting confirmationand (3) the impressionalready
made clear by virtue of the sensation and (4) the feelingsand
(5) everyvalid judgmentof the mind,you will by the absurd judgment (No. 1 above) throwinto confusionall the rest of the sensations with the resultthat you will reject the-whole criterion."
Certainlyeven Cicero would have been compelledto admit that
this sentence was the product of a mind that made distinctions,
divisiones,which, as he alleged, Epicurus had abolished. Let us
examine it with care. First of all, it is manifestlydirectedagainst
the sceptics,who denied the validity of the sensations. Second,
if,as was done by them,all sensationsare rejected,the resultmust
be a state of doubt or indecision,AKpLUoa, and indecisionis equivalent to unhappinessor rapax'. This statementis not an inference
of the writer'of this article. It is clearly inferablefromthe preceding Principal Doctrine, No. 22: "We must take into account
the real end (of Nature) and every dependable sensation,to which
we referour judgmentsas a standard; otherwiseeverythingwill be
filleduvithindecisionand turmoil." This furnishesthe reason why
in No. 23 he introducesthe feelings,ra ira6Ot. Indecisionor turmoil
of mind is to Epicurus a pathological condition. It is a sickness
of the soul,36which must be remedied. The cure is to be foundin
the study of philosophy,of whichthe fruitis a firmfaithin knowlThis, in its turn,can be attained only if we
edge, 7rt-Tts0fatos.37
know the end establishedby Nature, rO TfXOs ris 4WTEsW, mentioned
in No. 25, and along with it must be taken into account every
dependable sensation, -rakavriV EipyaELav. This statementwould
be meaninglessif all sensationswere true.
We are now in a positionto interpretthe rest of No. 24. Let
us take the trite example of the distant tower. It is possible to
recognizeit as a tower. This is " the impressionalready made clear
by virtue of the sensation,"

rT rapov irKaT7

a rnV a'T6@o-v.

It can-

not as yet, however,be determinedwhetherthe tower is round

or square. This is " the impressionawaiting confirmation,"ro
36 The analogy between medicine and philosophy is assumed by Epicurus: D.L.
10.122, 138; Sent. Vat. 54 (Us. 220).
37 D.L. 10.63, 85.

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Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

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irpoo-,gvov.Yet the unwary person decides, let us say, that the

tower is round. This is "the judgment formed,"rO botavO,uevov.

Such an unwaryperson representsthose who accept all sensations

as true and reliable. Their erroris dealt with in the rest of the
Doctrine: "but if in your inferentialideas you shall accept as true
both every impressionthat awaits confirmation
and every impression that does not await it, you will not eliminatethe one that is
false and the result will be that you will have preservedevery
ground of controversyand litigation between truth and error."
Such reasoningis not characteristicof a man who abolished distinctionsand believed all sensationsto be true.
Those who have given credenceto the paradox that "the senses
cannot be deceived," 38 would finddisquietingreadingin the letter
to Pythocles. Heavenly phenomena are there classed among the
aiavii,39 that is, aa'r!u,uaTa or Oavraoauot,40
whichfailto register
in
the mind a sure recognitionor firatoOrni,a.Consequently,the evidences forexplainingthem must be sought in earthlyphenomena,
ra 7rap'rluv
or bvapy7iuaTa. The latter
patvpoEpva,4 whichare b'Eap-yEtat
" are observedas theyare while the phenomenain the heavens are
not." 42 In one passage it is observedthat the impressionof color
is impairedby distance more rapidlythan the impressionof size 43
and that firesin the distance may be largeror smaller than they
seem to be.4 There is anotherpassage of somewhatdubious meaning which Bailey translatesas follows:" But thosewho assume one
cause fightagainst the evidence of phenomena and fail to ask
whetherit is possible for men to make such observations."4 It
may be questioned whetherthis is true to the text but it may be
true to the meaning,and if so, the translatorhas scored a point
against himself,for, as will be shown, he champions the alleged
doctrineof the infallibilityof all sensations.
In the brieftreatmentof the same topic of heavenlyphenomena
in the letter to Herodotus may be found a pungent sentence in
which studentsare exhorted"to despise those who do not under38
39

R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New York, 1910) 215.

D.L. 10.104.

Ibid. 88, 102, 110.

88.
42 Ibid. 87.
3 Ibid. 91, lemma.
44 Ibid. 91.
45 Ibid. 98.
40

41 Ibid.

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Norman W. DeWitt

26

[1943

stand thingsthat owe theirexistenceor occurrenceto a singlecause

or to several causes and concedeclear visionfromdistances."46 In
the same letterhe notes that visual images are oftenblurred47 and
he notesthat sounds are sometimesso indistinctas merelyto render
us aware of somethingexternal.48 Toward the end of the letter4
that of the sensations
is to be foundone of his casual classifications,
othersand those that
with
intoKOLVaL and Ltat,those that are shared
are peculiar to the individual. Students are urged to attend to
both, that is to pool theirexperiences. This procedurewas calculated to multiplythe checks against error,which would hardlybe
needfulif all sensationswere believed to be true.
It has been remarkedby Bailey that "the Epicureans rejected
both the Platonic dialectic and the Aristotelianlogic." 50 This is
true: Metrodoruswrote Against the Dialecticians and nine books
against the Sophists;50a Hermarchus wrote Against Plato and
Against Aristotle.505 Both were contemporariesof Epicurus and
were possiblydelegated to these tasks by the master. The Megarians he dealt with himself.5"Thus the school was bred in controversy. It would thereforebe a mistaketo thinkthat the members
lacked smartness. Even in sophistriesEpicurus was no novice.
The proofhe advances forthe infinityof the universeis a specious
fallacy.52 Sheer sophistryis the famous defenceof the dependabilityof the sensationswhich he seems to have put forwardin his
controversywith the sceptics. At any rate, both Lucretius and
Laertius have recordedit."
This argumenthas three prongs: 1. a similarsensation cannot
because theyare equivalent in validity; 2. dissimirefutea sinmilar,
lar cainniotrefutedissimilar,because their spheres of validity are
Bailey and I-licks botlh adopt Useiler's neat but needless eruiendation,
ivapyeta in Epicurean usage: Usener, 247, p. 179.20-21.
46

Ibid. 80.

wrapo'v,rwv.. Sextus Empiricus righitlynotes that 4Pavraala equals

47

48
49

50

D.L. 10.48.
Ibid. 52.

Ibid. 82.
Op. cit. (see note 26) 413 foot.

50a
Sob
51

D.L. 10.24.

Ibid. 24-25.

D.L. 10.27.

Ibid. 41; Lucr. 1.958-964; Cic. De Div. 2.50.103. His argument would be just
as valid if the universe were only a mile wide. Naturally there is no point of view
thinkable outside of to 7rav.
53 D.L.
10.32; Lucr. 4.478-521.
52

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Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

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not the same; 3. reason cannot refutethe sensations,because all

reason depends upon the sensations.
Of these three sophistriesthe firstis the shallowest: a similar
sensation cannot refutea similar. For example, the observersees
that the oar in the water appears to be bent. This sensation is
true. Yet the observercan take the oar out of the water and see
that it is not bent. The eyes have refutedthe eyes, as even Plutarchadmitted.53a
The second sophistryis the silliest: dissimilar cannot refute
dissimilar. Let us say that the observerhears the bleating of a
sheep; the sense of taste is powerlessto deny the evidence of the
ears. Again, if the hand feelsthe coldnessof snow the ears cannot
deny the evidence of touch. Or again, the nose cannot deny that
to the eyes the oar in the water appears to be bent. It is readily
admitted,of course, that the general statement,one sense cannot
refuteanother,possesses a specious semblance of profundity,but
it is effectiveas an argumentonly if the adversaryis.deceived. Its
functionis exclusivelydefensive. As a proofof the infallibilityof
the sensationsits value is nil, thoughit is an excellentproofof the
smartnessof Epicurus,whomCicerodeclaredto be inermisac nudus
on the side of logic.54
Far more deceptive,because neitherso shallow nor so silly, is
the thirdprongof the argument:reasoncannotrefutethe sensations
because reason is dependent upon the sensations. This is true in
one sense and falsein another. The sense in whichit is trueis this:
reason in the aggregatecannot refutesensation in the aggregate,
because reason depends upon the senses forits data. The sense in
which it is false is this: reason in the aggregatecannot refutethe
particularsensation. Reason, it may be observed,heremeans that
commonreservoirof experiencewhichaccumulatesfromthe observation of the two classes of sensation,KOcvcLa and 't'&at,to whichthe
individualwas urgedto attend diligently.55Of thisit is the proper
functionto check the truthor falsityof the individual sensation.
For example, the inexperiencedor thirst-crazedtravellerin the
desert may be deceived by a mirage of water in the sky, but the
sane traveller,drawingupon the experienceof othertravellersalong
with his own, knowsit to be an illusion. In this sense reason conContra Coloten 25.1121c (Us. p. 186.18-20).
De Fin. 1.7.22.
55D.L. 10.82.
53a

54

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Norman W. DeWitt

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[1943

stantlyrefutesthe sensations. As a principleit is assumed, therefore,that not all sensationsare true.

Such of the testimoniaof external origin as seem to support
of sensationare readilyexplained in other
beliefin the infallibility
ways. Of these none is more familiarthan the words of Cicero:
qui(sensus) si omnesverierunt,ut Epicuri ratiodocet, tumdenique
poteritaliquid cognosci et percipi.56 In this text "verus" stands
for aXr10rsin the Greek testimoniaand it is not found there to be
replaced by more specifictermssuch as a'4Ev6's. This leaves room
for ambiguityin all versions: the meaningmay be "true" in the
sense of "reliable" and its synonyms,or it may be "real" in the
sense of independentlyexisting. The visions of madmen and
dreamers,according to Epicurus, are true in the latter sense but
not in the former;they are not kavTaoiatbut oavTrauiara

or kavTao/iol.

To this ambiguitymay be traced the contentionthat Epicurus

believed all sensationsto be reliable.
The above.sentence of Cicero declares that the possibilityof
of all sensations,but
knowledgedepends,not upon the infallibility
upon their reality,that is, their material origin; they must have
theircause in materialdischargesfrommaterialobjects. To Epicurus this is the only possible contact between man and external
reality. The position so taken has a bearing upon his theoryof
perception. On a previouspage I definedthis as a click of recognitionbetweena presentationfromwithoutand a general concept
within. In that connectionit was not necessaryto mention the
part played by language. Now this is necessary. According to
Epicurus, Nature, not man, originatedlanguage.57 Perceptionis a
triangularprocess, a click of recognitionbetween a presentation
fromwithout,a generalconcept within,and a name.58 This is its
simplest formand results in a simple predication: 'vapUpro'sEortV,
" It is a man." Having learned this the student is enabled to
understandthe verborumvis et natura orationis,"the significance
of words and the nature of predication."59 This, to Epicurus, is
the meaningof meaning. The name is an integralpart of the perception or recognition. If the name fails to suggest itself, the
sensationfalls shortof registeringtruthfully.
"6De Fin. 1.20.64.

D.L. 10.75-76; Lucr. 5.1028-1090.

D.L. 10.33, 37-38.
59 De Fin. 1.19.63.

57

58

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Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

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There remainsa challengingargumentagainst Epicurus which

I quote from Bailey because he states it in an extremeform:60
"Now Epicurus saw clearly enough that to admit the falsityof a
singlesensationwould overthrowhis whole system:forif one sensation is false, thereis no reason why any should be true, forall
have equal validity." The reasoninghereis such as to leave room
forseveral doubts. 1. About the question of equal validity: The
distant view will never possess the validityof the near view; there
must be infinitedegrees of validity graded from zero upwards.
2. The argumentin this form,so faras I have discovered,is found
only in three passages of Cicero.60a 3. These passages all stem
fromworkswrittenafterthe death of Tullia, whichcommittedhim
definitelyto the campaign against Epicureanism. 4. He neverenlarged upon his reasoning,leaving the ambiguous word "false"
undefined. This invites us to recognizea bit of smart polemic.
The fifthflaw is especially damaging. A basis of support is
revealedby Bailey's footnoteto be soughtin No. 24 of the Principal
Doctrines,
whichbegins:a' Tt EKJaXe?s a7rXw7sal-Oi7aow. In his Epicurus he translatesthis, omittinga7rXw&s
by an oversight,"if you
reject a singlesensation." This amounts to reading Cicero's language into the text, si unus sensus semel in vita mentitussit.60b
The Greek text justifiesno such precision,which would call for

EL Kat ,utav a'tffO?1ctpV

EKfaXeLtsor

perhaps et a'taoOvou'
-VptVOiV.

Neither

is any such precisionneedfulforreadingintelligently

the remainder
of the Doctrine. The correctrenderingseems to be "if you shall
reject absolutelyany given sensation."
The flaws mentionedabove along with the forced translation
are perhaps sufficient
to nullifythe argumentas Bailey framedit,
but the simplestformof the criticismmay be refutedwith equal
certainty. Cicero very astutely leftit in such a shape: 61 Si ullum
sensus visum falsum est, nihil percipi potest. Yet, whatever the
wordingmay be, the answer is the same: the example of the oar
in the water alone and by itselfrefutesthe criticism. Visually the
presentationis true62 but it is false to the fact; it lies. No one,
however,is deceived. The individualis at libertyto take the oar
The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928) 253.
N.D. 1.25.70; Acad. 2.25.79; 2.32.101.
60bAcad. 2.25.79.
61Acad. 2.32.101.
62 Luer. 4.436-442,
462-468.
60

60a

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Norman W. DeWitt

30

[1943

out of the water and let the eyes refutethe eyes. All the senses
functionas checks upon themselvesand upon one another. They
are recognizedcriteriaand exist forthis purpose. If all the sensations were true in the sense of reliable,therewould be no need of
other criteria. The establishmentof a canon presumesthat some
sensations, and a multitude of them, will be indecisive or misleading.
"Epicurus drew no distinctionbetweensaying that a thingwas
This is the statementof
aXrOlEs and saying that it was vGrapXov." 6
criticsin exhibiting
among
almost
unique
is
who
Sextus Empiricus,
clearly defines
who
also
he
is
It
no prejudice against Epicurus.
be "true "
would
parlance
aXrAs in anothersense,whichin modern
of the
view
near
the
in thesenseof "photographic."64 For example,
towershows it to be large and square; the distant view receivesit
as small and round. Both of these, he says,64 according to the
Epicureans, are equally true in the sense that the image, 4avraota,
has registereditselfwith fidelity. In the same passage it is said
that to declare the one view to be true and the other false is just
as naive as to say that the distantsound of clashingcymbals or of
a shout is falsebecause it is faintand the near sound is truebecause
it is loud. On this principlethere may be numberlesstrue views
of the towerand numberlesstrue auditions of a sound. This is a
exposition. There is nothingin Lucretiusto equal
verysatisfactory
it forlucidity;at times the poet took rathertoo much forgranted.
Yet there is one fundamentalupon which all our authorities
of the criteria. The lexiconrightly
seem to fail us, the functioning
definesa criterionas "a means forjudging or trying." Too often
in our handbooks it is assumed to be the agency of judgment. If
the data be assembled,even thoughexplicitstatementsare lacking,
Epicurus will be found to be clear on this point. The criteria
the evidence for
themselvesperformno functionbeyond furnishing
a judgment. The second factor,which may or may not be operative, is the involuntaryjudgment or opinion, a6a, or botaaoruKc7
that the toweris round.
65 forexample, it is hastilyinferred
This factoris no more, or little more,rational than the sensation
Itvoa

Usener, op. cit., frag. 244.

Ibid., frag. 247, p. 180.6-36 and p. 181.1-6.
64a Ibid., lines 29-36.
65Rat. Sent. 24 or D.L. 10.147.
63

64

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Vol. lxxiv]

Epicurus: All SensationsAre True

31

itself. The third factoris the intellect,&6YaLpLa,66which functions

like a judge, siftingand weighingthe evidence furnishedby the
criteria. This factoralone is rational.
Truth and errorare assumed to be litigants. Between them
there is a legal contest, a&Atorqo-ts or KpmLS.67 -The chief witnessesare the sensationsand all are truthfulbut theirevidencemay
favorerror;one sensation may testifythat the oar in the water is
bent but othersensationswill testifythat it is not, and the weight
of the evidence decides in favor of the truth. Opinion, on the
contrary,the involuntaryand unreasonedaction of the mind,may
testifytruthfully
or falsely.68 Supplementaryevidence is therefore
necessary,which the criteriafurnish. This may be corroborative
or the opposite,h'rLwapPTbp7loLsor &L,rwaprbprnoLs. The finaljudgment
takes the formof a predication,Kar77y6p7/,a, whichis the functionof
the intellect,badoLoa, guided by rational procedure, Ka-ra Xoyov.
Thus "true" has three meanings: 1. true in the sense that ro
acX7EOsequals r6 ov or ro 'vra#pxov, self-existent
or arising fromthe
self-existent;in this sense all sensationsare true; 2. true in a relative sense,as all visual or auditorysensationsare truewhenjudged
relativeto the distance fromthe externalcause; 3. true in an absolute sense, as a judgmentis true. Of thisabsolute truththe sensations are not judges, only witnesses.
What then shall we say was the meaningof the statement"all
sensationsare true" as Epicurus framedit? All answersmust be
inferentialor interpretativebecause we have no word direct from
the authorhimself. I believe that the onlyreal threatto his theory
of knowledgearose fromthe possibilityof self-createdfantasiesas
in the case of dreamersor the insane. Hence arises his insistence
that even dreams must possess a materialbasis. If this is correct,
thenaX706s is synonymouswithr6 'vrapxov, just as Sextus Empiricus
asserted. All other problems of sensation were soluble by the
canon.
His theoreticalproblem is to be clearly distinguishedfromhis
practical procedure. As a philosopher he was engaged in the
struggleforsurvivalin a den ofphilosophers,manyofthemsceptics.
66 The word vois seems to have been shunned by Epicurus because of its Anaxagorean and Platonic connotations; a dozen examples of ta&ota are found in the sixtyeight pages of his extant works. A grant from the American Council of Learned
Societies has enabled the writer to prepare an index.
67 Rat. Sent. 24, end.
68 Usener, op. cit.,
frag. 247, p. 181.6-15.

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Norman W. DeWitt

32

[1943

Beforethemhe maintainedthe doctrinethat all sensationsare true

in the sense of real. In practicehis attitudewas thoroughlypragmatic,like that of the modernscientist. He looked upon sensations
as possessingan infiniterange of validity.
In conclusion I ventureto collate certain representativestatements of modernscholarswhich seem to me unwarrantedamplifications of the principlethat "all sensationsare true." Zeller was
a primeoffender:69 "we mustallow that sensationas such is always,
and must under all circumstances,be trusted." He was followed
by Masson: 70 "all sensations are reliable." Both are refutedby
the triteEpicurean example of the oar in the water; the sensation
is true but it is not trustworthy. Zeller also wrote:71"if all sensations as such are true,the saying of Protagorasnecessarilyfollows
that foreach individualthat is truewhichseems to him to be true."
This is refutedby the fact that Epicurus urged his disciples to
check their own observations by those of others.72 Hicks, who
adherescloselyto Zeller,wrote: 73 " the senses cannot be deceived."
Yet many of our sensationsare worthlesson account of distances.
74 "It may indeed be
Bailey goes fartherthan his predecessors:
that
Epicurean physics and ethics are
said without exaggeration
of the supremeprincipleof the
in
fields
but the elaboration many
of sensation." This is overexaggeration. Epicurus has
infallibility
left us epitomes of his physics and ethics, which he required his
disciplesto memorize,but neveronce in themdid he thinkit worth
while to mentionthat "all sensationsare true."
The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (London, 1880) 426.
cit. 132. See note 1.
cit. 431. See note 71.
72 See note 49.
73 See note 38.
74 Op. cit. 274.
See note 60.

69

70 Op.
71 Op.

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