Deluge Valve Sprinkler Systems

The Deluge system is designed to protect high hazard areas containing a severe fuel hazard with a high heat
release rate by bringing a large number of open sprayers into action simultaneously in the event of a fire.
The most common approach of detecting a fire is the use of a sprinkler detection line permanently charged by
air. In the event of a fire, the sprinkler detector heads directly affected by the fire will operate. The immediate
drop in air pressure within the detector line releases the pressure against the Deluge valve diaphragm unit
causing the Deluge Valve to open and discharge water through all the open water spray nozzles to rapidly
control and extinguish the fire.
The fire fighting properties of the Deluge valve system can be considerable enhanced with the introduction of
foam solution into the systems water supply. Enhanced foam Deluge systems are ideal for the protection of
hazards such as the storage and handling of flammable liquids in aircraft hangars, oil refineries and chemical
plants etc.
A typical Deluge valve system comprises of a control valve, a sprinkler operated detection system and a
dedicated water supply system. For small or confined high hazard risk areas, Multiple Controls can be used
instead of sprinklers. The Multiple Control is a distribution valve containing its own detection element. When
this element is triggered, it supplies water to a small number of nozzles located within its zone of protection.
They are available in 20, 25, 32 40 or 50mm sizes.
The size of the Deluge valve, its flow rate, the system water supply pressure and type of detection system are
all determined by the size and type of fire risk involved

Sprinkler Discharge Heads

Overview
The water discharged from the sprinkler is distributed by the deflector over the location of the fire. The area
protected by each sprinkler is determined by the hazard and can vary from 9m2 to 21m2. The selection of the
deflector is based upon the specific application, its upright or pendent position within the sprinkler distribution
pipework and its spray pattern.
Sprinklers are manufactured with three different connection sizes (10, 15 and 20mm) which have different
water outputs (57, 80 and 115litres/minute respectively) at a flow pressure of 1 bar. The sprinkler bulb is
designed to operate at a predetermined temperature. A range of operating temperature ratings is available from
between 57 182 degrees Centigrade.

Conventional sprinklers
These can be mounted in either the upright or the pendent position and the deflector is designed to spray a
proportion of the water discharge on to the surface of the ceilings.

Upright and pendent spray sprinklers

Spray sprinklers are used for applications where all the water needs to be discharged downwards.

Sidewall sprinklers
These are primarily used to keep ceilings clear of pipework for aesthetic reasons or to avoid having to disturb
existing ceilings when installing pipework. Each sprinkler protects up to 17m2 in light hazards and 9m2 in
ordinary hazards.

Horizontal sidewall sprinklers with extended coverage

These are specifically designed to give an extended coverage of water distribution. This type of sprinkler must
have a fast response bulb. One sprinkler can protect an area of up to 21m2.

Medium Velocity Deluge Nozzle

These are specifically designed to give an extended coverage of water distribution. This type of sprinkler must
have a fast response bulb. One sprinkler can protect an area of up to 21m2.

High Velocity Deluge Nozzle

These are specifically designed to give an extended coverage of water distribution. This type of sprinkler must
have a fast response bulb. One sprinkler can protect an area of up to 21m2.

Fast response sprinklers for life safety

In a fire, few deaths result from direct contact with flames. The greatest threat comes from inhalation of the
products of combustion such as carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen chloride and
other toxic gases, and the heat of the gases.
The response time of a fast response sprinkler ensures that the life threatening level of toxic gases and
temperature are never reached. There are people who cannot escape by their own efforts, such as in hospitals
or homes for the aged, and sprinklers provide valuable time for those in charge to assist their escape.

Water Supply Systems

Overview
An essential part of all sprinkler systems is an adequate water supply. The Towns Main is the most
economical method of ensuring an adequate water supply, providing there is always sufficient volume of water
and pressure available for the sprinkler system to operate at full demand for a period of 60 minutes.
Where this water supply requirement is not practical or achievable from a Towns Main supply, Tyco Fire &
Integrated Solutions can provide an LPCB approved galvanised water storage tank. The connection to this tank
should be from an un-metered Towns Main or Fire Main capable of refilling the tank from empty in 36 hours
and able to provide a minimum flow of 185 Litres/minute.
The size of the water storage tank and the water supply pump is designed to provide a fully hydraulically
calculated water supply operating on full demand for a period of 60 minutes.
100% duty end suction type LPCB approved fire pumps can be installed to draw water from the water storage
tank under flooded suction conditions. These fire pumps can be electric motor or diesel engine driven
depending on system requirements. Sprinkler system water pressure maintenance is provided by an
electrically powered jockey pump.

Deluge Verification

Overview
Deluge verification is the testing and maintenance of deluge systems to ensure compliance to design and
performance criteria. Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions provide the best range of services and expertise to meet
the desired standards on Deluge Verification comprising:

Inspections
Wet and dry performance testing
Engineering and maintenance
Pipework cleaning

We have a comprehensive team of experienced, highly trained engineers to carry out this specialised work
worldwide.

Hardware configuration of redundant safety integrated

systems
Control system architects apply redundancy selectively to ensure reliability while minimizing
false alarms. Here are some of the strategy options.
Robert I. Williams, PE

09/06/2013

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Major SIS (safety integrated system) suppliers provide redundant hardware

configurations based on 1oo2 (1 out of 2), 2oo3, and 2oo4 configurations.
Applications of these configurations are designed to provide a higher level of
reliability while simultaneously reducing the probability of a false trip shutting
down a process unnecessarily. This discussion reviews how these strategies
developed along with a more detailed overview of two redundant architectures
commonly applied in large-scale SIS SIL3 applications, namely 2oo3 and
2oo4 as applied by Triconex and Honeywell, respectively. These two major

companies are only examples as similar hardware configurations are available

from other SIS suppliers.
This article is intended to stimulate discussion among users, SIS suppliers,
and other SIS specialists to elaborate on the benefits, advantages, and
disadvantages of implementing redundant hardware configurations according
to relevant SIS industry standards from ISA and IEC. You can comment
directly via the online version of this article, or by sending an email to the
address listed at the end.
Basic SIS architectures

1oo1This simplex output circuit opens the switch to de-energize a device

and shut down the process safely. A safe failure would be when the contacts
open without an associated cause, which would be classified as a nuisance
trip, although such events are not without their associated negative economic
impact to the overall process facility. A dangerous failure would be if there was
indeed a safety shutdown cause and the contacts failed to open. This could
be caused by the contacts overheating and becoming welded closed over
time. Such events are classified as a failure to operate on demand.
1oo2This approach has two outputs (1oo1) in series for a normally closed
and energized safety shutdown circuit. Only one SIS has to function to initiate
a shutdown. Of course, having two 1oo1 circuits presents twice the potential
for nuisance failures, which can be costly due to the loss of revenue for the
overall process. However, it is a safer circuit since only one contact is required
to operate to achieve a shutdown and the probability of a dangerous failure to

operate on demand is much lower. Neither 1oo1 nor 1oo2 has any ability to
reduce the potential for nuisance trips.
2oo2These systems have the outputs wired in parallel, requiring both
contacts to operate to initiate a process shutdown. Since the contacts are in
parallel, nuisance trips by one contact are reduced but the obvious drawback
that a dangerous failure scenario with a failure to operate on demand is
doubled, making the system less safe.
As shown, 1oo2 and 2oo2 systems are not effective for both safety and
nuisance trips. However, with SIS diagnostics it is possible to achieve higher
availability, referred to as 1oo2D (1oo2 with diagnostics).
Advanced SIS architectures
2oo3 or triple modular redundancy (TMR) safety shutdown systems are
commonly used for applications such as gas turbines, compressors, and
heaters, and for individual process units within a refinery such as coker units.

As the switching diagram indicates, the 2oo3 configuration requires two out of
three channels to agree as to the output even though the third does not. If
only one SIS trips its pair of contacts, one of the legs still remains closed so
the process continues operating. Real-world systems use a voting scheme to

maintain the output when 2oo3 are OK but the third signal is ignored, allowing
for a fault tolerant configuration.
Industrial implementations
Industrial installations built by major vendors use more sophisticated versions
of these basic concepts. The examples that follow describe how two major
SIS suppliers provide diagnostics to achieve their 2oo3 and 2oo4
configurations. These companies and other suppliers that use similar
approaches can provide the necessary data for MTBF (mean time between
failures), failure probabilities, and failure to operate on demand, which serve
as the basis for a complete SIS implementation evaluation.
2oo3 as triple modular redundancy
Every Trident system contains three main processors (MPs), A, B, and C.
Each MP controls a separate channel and operates in parallel with the other
two. A dedicated I/O control processor on each MP manages the data
exchanged between the MP and the I/O modules. A triple I/O bus, located on
the base plate, extends from one column of I/O modules to the next using I/O
bus cables.

The I/O control processor polls the input modules and transmits the new input
data to the MPs. The MPs then assemble the input data into tables, which are

stored in memory for use in the voting process. The input table in each MP is
transferred to its neighboring MP by the TriBus. After this transfer, voting takes
place. The TriBus uses a programmable device with direct memory access to
synchronize, transmit, and compare data among the three MPs.
If a disagreement occurs, the signal value found in two out of three tables
prevails, and the MPs correct the third table accordingly. One-time differences
which result from sample timing variations are distinguished from a pattern of
differing data. The MPs maintain data about necessary corrections in local
memory. Built-in fault analyzer routines flag any disparity and use it at the end
of each scan to determine whether a fault exists on a particular module.
Three good, four better?
One question to consider is whether the double redundancy concept, 2oo4, is
considered safer or less safe due to the additional hardware and software
involved.
Quadruple modular redundant (QMR) architecture is based on 2oo4D (D
refers to inherent diagnostics) voting, dual-processor technology in each QPP
(quad processor pack, the processing module of the system). This means that
it is characterized by an ultimate level of self-diagnostics and fault tolerance.
The QMR architecture is realized with a redundant controller. This redundant
architecture contains two QPPs, which results in quadruple redundancy
making it dual fault tolerant for safety.
The 2oo4D voting is realized by combining 1oo2 voting of both CPUs and
memory in each QPP, and 1oo2D voting between the two QPPs. Voting takes
place on two levels: on a module level and between the QPPs.

Process safety practitioners have debated the pros and cons of various
redundant configurations for many years. Have you been part of these
conversations? Send us your thoughts on maintaining the delicate balance of
overall safety vs. avoiding nuisance trips. Comment online or send me an
email.