Professional Documents
Culture Documents
of Liberalism
Pierre Manent
like the democratic revolution that Tocqueville both contemplated and analyzed.
I understand revolution as the crystallization of new principles of collective order,
with the various effects of reworking and
reordering the world that these principles
will soon have on human life in all its
aspects.
The Revolution of the Rights of
Man: An Effort at a Definition
How can we most appropriately approach
this crystallization of new principles, this
moment of the rights of man? It seems to
me that the history of philosophy provides
the most relevant point of reference: the
revolution was really inaugurated when
the notion of the rights of man was philosophically articulated, that is, during the
second half of the seventeenth century.
Where did this notion come from? To
what did it respond? It responded to the
following problem: What, it was asked, is
the best possible government for Christian
peoples? By Christian peoples I mean
the peoples who have heard and accepted
the Christian message of a new City, of a
true universal community.
This Christian affi rmation introduced
an unprecedented political problem: How
can each political body govern itself, while
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The state and the market, or the market society, are therefore the two poles of
the liberal order. They need one another;
they mutually condition one another. The
market society needs the state to establish
and enforce rules, fi rst of all the fundamental rule, that of the equality of rights.
On its side, the state needs the market in
order to have at its disposal the greatest
amount of power. It is by leaving men free
to follow their interests, freely exercising
their independence and their talents, that
the greatest amount of wealth and, hence,
power are produced. The enemies of liberal regimes discovered this to their great
cost during the previous century.
All this is quite fi ne, you might be
tempted to say, but we are in the middle
of a crisis, at once economic and financial, that is shaking the very foundations
of the liberal order. Isnt liberalism itself
called into question today in its fundamental arrangements, perhaps even in its very
principle?
The Current Crisis
Does the current crisis radically call into
question this order of movement that I
sketched above? It is obviously impossible
to answer this question with complete
assurance at this point. The crisis has not
fully revealed all its economic effects, and
we can only conjecture about its near- or
long-term political ones. This uncertainty
being admitted, I will say that the crisis we
are experiencing does not seem to me in
and of itself to call into question the liberal
revolution.
What is often designated as the return
of the state in todays circumstances does
not contradict the original liberal formula.
I myself just underscored the importance
of the states role in the production of the
conditions of what we might call liberal
life based upon human equality and freedom. Perhaps this is a good time to observe
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that what passed for liberal in the historical period that has just ended was in fact
a considerable modification of liberalism.
I would explain the point this way. We
had movedwithout particularly noticingfrom liberal government to what
I might call the neo-liberalism of rules.
The latter rested upon the principles that
Hayek articulated with great care and
amplitude, which go under the famous
phrase spontaneous order. The problem with Hayek, to put it a little disrespectfully, is not that he was too liberal
(which is often heard), or ultra-liberal;
it is rather something that Raymond Aron
pointed out: he had a false idea of liberal
regimes, of what I would call real liberalism. He saw liberalisms superiority in the
progressive elaboration of a set of rules that
no one in particular designed or willed but
which are accepted because of their great
effectiveness, not only for the economic
order but more generally for civilization
itself. This is the spontaneous order of
which he made himself the theoretician.
What this view neglects is the extent
to which liberalismfar from being the
confident, even quietist abandonment
to a spontaneous orderinitially was, and
always remains, the search for and the construction of better government. To be sure,
as I indicated above, this better government realizes itself by leaving men as free
as possible, by granting them a heretofore
unprecedented latitude for action. But the
government, as I also said, harvests the fruits
of this freedom in increased prosperity (and,
hence, growing revenues), by a more and
more accurate grasp of societys needs,
and finally, by greater means and capacity
for action. It would only be partially true,
but illuminating in this context, to say that
liberal regimes have carried the day because
they govern better than their rivals.
On the other hand, it is true that the
liberal order necessarily, even structur-
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To defend freedom of opinion is certainly noble and necessary, but it does not
tell us what a judicious opinion is or how
to form one. To defend the right to the
pursuit of happiness is certainly noble and
necessary, but it does not tell us how to
pursue happiness. Liberalism is a doctrine
so powerful that it has defeated all other
political, philosophical, and religious doctrines. And yet, among them all, it is the
only one that does not provide a positive
rule for the conduct of life. Those who
oppose some religiously inspired rule or
law to liberalism are rarely the friends of
human liberty, but they point out a real
weakness in the liberal order. Not that we
have any desire to receive orders, but how
can we orient ourselves in the world when
the only thing we hear is, Youre free!?
It is this inherent and troubling indetermination of liberal liberty that feeds much
of the protest against liberal corruption,
which we unfortunately, if understandably,
have a tendency to dismiss too quickly.
How can liberalism overcome this difficulty? We cannot be content to say,
Youre free; do what you will and dont
ask questions! To this real difficulty liberalism responds with faith (either implicit
or explicit) in the future convergence and
coincidence of external liberty and internal
dispositions. Freedom of opinion will lead
necessarily to an increasingly true opinion.
That, at least, is the hope. In the same way,
the right to pursue happiness will lead necessarily to a growing happiness for individuals. At least, that is the hope. If one
didnt believe this, the desire for liberty
would be in vain. The same Benjamin
Constant who declared, Let the government content itself with being just, we will
assume the task of being happy, was led to
recognize that the goal of humanity was
not so much free happiness as improving
[itself ], indicating that it was impossible
to consider human life seriously without
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desiring for it a goal beyond that of liberty. Liberty is perhaps the best condition
for human action, but it cannot by itself
give any fi nality or purpose to it. It was
not a coincidence that faith in progress
accompanied the development of liberal
civilization: the intrinsic difficulty of liberal doctrine, its anthropological indeterminism, can only be overcome by faith in
the future.
What happens, then, when faith in the
future disappears or is seriously weakenedwhen one no longer believes that
freedom of opinion will always lead to
significantly truer opinions, when one
no longer believes that the free pursuit of
happiness will produce significantly happier individuals? It seems to me that even
before the crisis occurred this faith had
already become considerably weakened.
One could already see signs of our loss of
confidence in the capacity of human nature
to attain the natural objects of its desire,
even to get within hailing distance of such
an end. We are subject to a deep internal
weakness that merits at least as much attention as the more visible economic crises.
To be sure, one could say: we must find
our way out of liberal indetermination and
fi nd the truth or true happiness. But how
can we avoid falling back into the political and religious dogmatism and despotism
from which liberalism has happily delivered us? Are we therefore condemned to
vacillate between an increasingly empty
freedom and truths arbitrarily decreed?
If I had found a way of escaping from
this unsatisfactory (even depressing) set
of alternatives, you would certainly have
already heard about it! If anyone had convincingly, or even plausibly, proposed a
way of reuniting freedom and truth, we
would all know of it! I believe that we have
to acceptup to a certain point, in a spirit
of manly resignationthe indeterminate
character of our liberal liberty, and hence,
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to use a Tocquevillian trope: we are condemned for the foreseeable future to sail in
open waters. At the same time, it seems to
me good for liberal liberty itself to enter
into dialogue with something other than
itself. The candidates one can point to for
such a dialogue are numerous, they can be
found both within and without the West.
Here is what I suggest.
If we return to the point of departure that I briefly sketched at the outset,
we recall that liberalism is a response or
a purported solution to the theologicalpolitical problem of the Christian world.
One could say: liberalism embarked upon
a recomposition or reworking of the
Christian world by putting in parentheses
the question of the truth and instituting
radically new conditions of human action.
The question that is thus posed to usone
I do not claim to resolve, but which we
ought to consideris the following: is the
new liberal orderthe one that Europeans began to establish in the sixteenth or
the seventeenth centuryself-sufficient,
or does it merely represent a modification
or reworking of the Christian condition?
Historians and contemporary observers
often ask if liberalismor democracy
has solid roots or a promising future in
cultural areas outside of those where
Christianity existed. They ask, for example, if Japan is truly a liberal democracy,
even though it was governed for the past
fi fty years by the same Liberal Party. I have
neither the time nor the expertise to take
up this aspect of the question. I will simply
expand a remark that I already made.
It seems to me that the fi rst hypothesisliberal self-sufficiencycan be entertained if the liberal world effectively tends
toward an end or condition where liberty
encounters, I will not say the truth, nor
will I say happiness, but a configuration of
human affairs such that one can say that we
have arrived at a human order that, if not
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1 This is a reference to the French political theorist Marcel Gauchets contention that Christianity is the religion
that prepares the way for secularism, for the human order that defi nitively leaves religion behind. (Translators note)
2 The centrality of Europes theological-political problem to the genesis and doctrinal foundations of liberalism
is a central theme of Manents An Intellectual History of Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
(Translators note)
This essay was originally delivered at the Institut franais in Prague on March 6, 2009 and will appear as the preface
to a new Italian edition of Pierre Manents Histoire intellectuelle du libralisme. It is published in Modern Age with the
permission of the author.
Translated by Daniel J. Mahoney and Paul Seaton
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