Memorial On Behalf of Accused

5th RCL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015
IN THE SESSION COURT OF CHANDIGARH
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015
State
Prosecution
Vs.
Vivek and Others
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
Memorial on behalf of Accused
Accused
TABLE OF CONTENT
Content
Page
1. Index of Abbreviation
2. List of references
3. List of cases
4. Statement of jurisdiction
5. Statement of fact
6. Statement of issues
7. Summary of pleadings
10
8. Detailed pleadings
12
9. Prayer
25
INDEX OF ABBREVIATION
Section
Sections
Paragraph
Paragraphs
Accused
A.P.
Andhra Pradesh
A.C.
Appellate Cases
AIR
All India Reporter
Anr.
Another
Bom.
Bombay
Cri.L.J.
Criminal Law Journal
Cr.P.C
Criminal Procedure Code
IPC
Indian Penal Code
Mad.
Madras
n.
Note
Ors.
Others
P.W.
Prosecution Witness
SC
Supreme Court
SCC
Supreme Court Cases
Sd/-
Signed
Supp.
Supplementary
U.P.
Uttar Pradesh
U.S.
United States
U.T.
Union Territory
v.
Versus
LIST OF REFERENCES
LIST OF BOOKS REFERRED
Indian Penal Code, 1860, Bare Act by Universals

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , Bare Act by Universals
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Bare Act by Universals
Constitution of India, Bare Text by Universals
Law of Crimes, Ratan Lal and Dheeraj Lal, 34th edition 2014, Lexis Nexis
Law of Crimes, K.D. Gaur 5th edition, 2014, Universals Law Publication
Law of Evidence, Ratanlal and Dhirajlal 24th edition, Lexis Nexis Publication
Supreme Court Cases, 2014
Supreme Court Yearly Digest 2014
LIST OF WEBSITES
www.courtnic.nic.in
www.manupatra.com
http://indiankanoon.org/
www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in
judis.nic.in
LIST OF CASES
1. Rashid Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(1974) 4 SCC 264
2. Banka Naiko v. State of Orissa
AIR 1976 SC 2013
3. Abhimanya Biswas v. Abdul
AIR 1981 Cal 444
4. State of Punjab v Amarjit Singh
AIR 1988 SC 2013
5. Shanti v State of Haryana
AIR 1991 SC 1226
6. Bajrang v State of Rajasthan
1993 CrLJ 134(Raj)
7. Public Prosecutor, HC of AP v. Pothula N Rao
1993 CrLJ 2729
8. Imran Khan v. State of MP
1995 CrLJ 17 (MP)
9. Nand Kishor v State of Maharashtra
1995 CrLJ 3706 (BOM)
10. Surendar Kumar v State
1997 CrLJ 1737 P&H
11. State of H P v Jog Raj
1997 CrLJ 2033 (HP)
12. State of Orissa v. Parasuram Naik
AIR 1997 SC 3569
13. Meka Ramaswami v Dasri Mohan
AIR 1998 SC 774
14. Nanahau Ram v Stat of MP
AIR 1998 SC 912
15. Pawan Kumar v State of Harayana
AIR 1998 SC 1958
16. Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of AP
AIR 1999 SC 3455
17. State of Karnataka v Shankar
2000 CrLJ 917(KANT)
18. State of UP v Mahesh Chandra Pandey
AIR 2000 SC 3631
19. Arvind Singh Vs State of Bihar
AIR 2001 SC 2124
20. Kamalakar Nandram Bavasar v State of Maharashtra
AIR 2004 SC 503
21. Kanti Lal v State of Rajasthan
(2009) 12 SCC 498
22. Satbir Singh v State of Haryana
2011 CrLJ 604 P&H
23. Ranjit Singh v State of Punjab
(2011) 15 SCC 285
24. Vadlokonda Lenin v State of A.P
(2012) 12 SCC 260
25. Mustafa Shahadal Shekh v State of Maharashtra
(2012) AIR (SCW) 5308
26. Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar
(2014) 8 SCC 273
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Learned Session Court, has the jurisdiction to decide this case, and this jurisdiction has been
conferred to it through section 177 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 which says that every
offence shall ordinarily be inquired and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed
The Learned Trial Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this matter as per section 26 of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which says that, any offence under Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) may be tried by the Court of Session. Moreover through Schedule-1 of Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973, the Court of Session is competent to here and decide the matter.
The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including the rights and
obligations of the Parties, arising from its judgment on the questions presented in the case.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The counsel on behalf of accused person would humbly submit before the Learned session court
that following are the facts of the present cases
1. That following is the list of persons involved
A-1
Vivek
Husband of deceased
A-2
A-3
PW-1
PW-2
PW-3
PW-4
PW-5
PW-6
PW-7
Gopal Krishan
Pushpa
Neha
Veena@Meena
Naresh
Ravi
Umesh
Dr. P Nadda
Raj Kumar
Father-in-law of deceased
Mother-in-law of deceased
Deceased
Colleague/Neighbor of deceased
Colleague/Neighbor of deceased
Neighbor of deceased
Brother of deceased
Medical Practitioners
Father of Deceased
2. That, A-1 and PW-1 got married on 10th December 2011 at the insistence of A-2
and A-3.
3. That, deceased was much pampered child, and was pursuing journalism through
correspondence from Delhi.
4. That A-1 was a hardworking ambitious person, who was living with his parents in
Chandigarh.
5. That both deceased and the A-1 were busy in their own life, and never had time to
get into any matrimonial relationship
6. That, deceased was too demanding, and even denied to bear a child until and
unless A-1 left her parents to live life solely with deceased.
7. That due to ongoing examination, deceased often used to come home for lunch.
8. That on 3rd march 2014, deceased came to home and was found engulfed in fire
by A-1, A-2, A-3, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4.
9. That PW-6 gave first aid treatment to the deceased and referred her to PGI
Chandigarh.
10. That, deceased was declared brought dead in Chandigarh PGI.
11. That a false case has been lodged against the Accused Persons under section 302,
304B read with section 34 of IPC, 1860.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Is it a Dowry Death as per section 304B of IPC?
2. Is it an offence punishable under section 302 of IPC?
3. Do the accused persons have any Common Intention?
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS.
The counsel on behalf of the accused would humbly submit before the Learned Session
Court
1. That, the accused persons have wrongly been accused under section 302,304B read with
section 34 of IPC, 1860.
2. That, the accused persons never asked for any property or cash. And that they completely
deny the fact that they ever took any amount in cash.
3. That, the accused person never committed any sort of cruelty on the deceased in any
manner; rather the deceased herself threatened the accused persons to initiate false
charges against them under section 498A of IPC, 1860.
4. That, the deceased demanded highly expensive gifts and denied to bear any child, which
was also cruelty by the deceased on accused persons.
5. That, though the death of the deceased was caused under unnatural circumstances, it
never involved any of the accused persons. Neither has there been any demand of dowry
raised, nor has the prosecution produced any such evidence.
6. That, sole evidence that the prosecution has is the dying declaration; which is not
acceptable in court for being fabricated, and due to the reason that proper procedure was
not follower while recording the statement.
7. That, the case of prosecution is purely based on story and fabricated statements.
8. That, case of prosecution is purely based on circumstantial evidences and is full of doubt.
9. That, the accused persons should be acquitted of all the charges, reason owing the lack of
evidences, benefit of doubt and non-establishment of the guilt
10
DETAILED PLEADING
1. Is it a Dowry Death as per section 304B of IPC?
Court
1. That, the death of deceased, was not a dowry death as it does not meet the essential
ingredient of section 304B of IPC, 1860.
2. That, Section 304B of IPC, 1860 says that Where the death of a woman is caused by
any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances
within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for,
or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry
death, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
3. That, the death of the deceased was caused within seven years of the marriage and
according to postmortem reports the death was caused due to burns on the body of the
deceased, but the death was merely an accident and not a murder.
4. In Pawan Kumar v State of Harayana1 and in Meka Ramaswami v Dasri Mohan2
Honble Supreme Court held that there was no proof of any demand. Hence the fact that
death took place within 4 months was not sufficient to convict. Thus mere fact that the
deceased died after 2 years 2 months and 21 days cant be the reason for conviction of the
accused persons.
5. That, most important essentials of section 304B of IPC, 1860 which are cruelty, and
demand of dowry are absent.
6. That, for cruelty, A-1 never committed any cruelty on the deceased and the facts for the
same are clear enough to support this. The deceased was over ambitious and demanding
in nature. Instead, she denied bearing a child unless A-1 got separated from A-2 and A-3.
1 AIR 1998 SC 1958
2 AIR 1998 SC 774
11
This shows that the deceased had a coercive nature, and that she denied performing
matrimonial obligation, and thus a cruelty was done by her over her A-1.
7. That, the deceased gave a threatening to accuse A-1, A-2 and A-3 under section 498A of
IPC, 1860, and make them understand the power of a woman. Moreover, the threatening
of deceased, to falsely accuse the accused persons under section 498A signifies that there
was never any cruelty done on her, which very well signifies that the deceased had a bad
intention against her in-laws.
8. That, 304B of IPC, 1860 says that soon before the death the deceased was subjected to
cruelty but the prosecution has failed to produce any such witness, which was obvious
as the accused person never subjected the deceased with cruelty.
The Rajasthan High Court in Bajrang v State of Rajasthan3 has held that cruelty soon
before death for demand for dowry are necessary constituent without which the offence is
not complete
9. That, threatening of deceased of false acquisition, and denial to bear any child was
cruelty done on the accused person, rather than accused person doing cruelty over the
deceased.
The Honble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar4 held that the face
that S 498A IPC is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of
pride amongst provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled
wives. simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this
provisions
10. That, the deceased was surely aware of laws, specially related to women, it can be seen
from the fact that she knew how to misuse legal provision.
11. That, the deceased knew that there was no threat from the in-laws on her life, as; if she
knew she would have definitely reported it to someone, for the fact that she knew the
3 1993 CrLJ 134(Raj)

4 (2014) 8 SCC 273
12
laws very well. And no such report, owing to threat to the life of deceased has been
discovered or produced by the prosecution.
12. That, there has never been any demand of dowry raised.
13. That, the prosecution has never given any evidence to support their claim, that the
accused persons demanded dowry.
14. That, A-1 never accepted any sum, as claimed by the PW-7 (father of deceased) during
the course of investigation.
15. That, the statement of PW-7 has not been recorded in front of magistrate, neither there
was any primary witness supporting the claim of PW-7, thus the claim of PW-7 is not
admissible. More over this claim is simply a self creation of prosecution and PW-7 to
falsely accuse the accused persons.
Honble Supreme Court has said that the relatives of the deceased women have got a
tendency to accuse the in-laws without any reason
16. That, the most important ingredients of section 304B IPC, 1860 which are cruelty and its
relation with demand of dowry have not been established. And so the case of prosecution
fails.
17. In state Himachal Pradesh v Jog Raj5, Honble High Court held that, no conviction
because the alleged demand of rupees 15000 was not proved and was not itself a dowry
demand, and as the prosecution has failed to produce any witness and evidence
supporting the fact that demand of dowry was raised by the accused persons, accused
persons cant be convicted.
18. In State of UP v Mahesh Chandra Pandey 6 Honble Supreme Court held that the
accused cannot be convicted under the section unless there is reliable evidence regarding
demand of dowry again it states the same principle as held by Himachal Pradesh High
Court
5 1997 CrLJ 2033 (HP)
6 AIR 2000 SC 3631
13
19. In Nand Kishor v State of Maharashtra7 the court referred to Shanti v State of
Haryana8 where Honble Supreme Court held that all ingredients of section 304B of the
sections must exist conjunctively. There must be nexus between cruelty and harassment to
raise the presumption of dowry death under section 113B of Indian Evidence Act.
Thus, as the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of accused person under section
304B, the burden of proving innocence does not shift of the accused persons, by
automatic exercise of section 113B of Indian Evidence Act. And, thus, the accused
persons remain innocent.
20. In Mustafa Shahadal Shekh v State of Maharashtra 9 that held that the prosecution
under section 304B of IPC cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment
and cruelty was related to demand for dowry and was caused soon before death This
judgment of Supreme Court again strengthens the innocence of the accused persons that,
they have falsely been accused by the Prosecution under section 304B of IPC, 1860.
21. That, for the aforesaid reasons, the accused persons should not be held guilty under
section 304B of IPC, 1860
7 1995 CrLJ 3706 (BOM)

8 AIR 1991 SC 1226
9 2012 AIR (SCW) 5308
14
2. Is it an offence punishable under section 302 of IPC?

Court
1. That, the accused persons clearly deny the unfortunate death of deceased to be murder,
rather it was mere accident.
2. That, the most important ingredient of murder is intention of the accused to murder the
deceased, which is absent.
3. That, the conduct of the deceased before her accidental death clearly establishes that the
accused persons had never threatened to kill or harassed for any reason, the deceased.
Instead the deceased threatened the accused person to falsely accuse them of cruelty
under section 498A of IPC, 1860; nonetheless, the accused persons, and specially A-2 and
A-3 were always silent and ignorant of the acts of deceased.
4. That, due to ongoing examination, deceased often used to go home for lunch, which
clearly signifies that she did not had a strained relationship with her in laws to an extent
which prosecution wants to establish. Moreover, only inference which can be drawn from
this conduct of deceased is that, she wanted to have that important family time, which is
having lunch together, to be spent with the family.
5. That, death of deceased was an accident; the broken door of the kitchen signifies that,
accused persons were outside the kitchen and in process of saving the life of the
deceased, they broke the door. The story goes like this
a. the deceased came for lunch
b. the deceased went in the kitchen
c. by some reason which is not known to any one, the door got closed and deceased
got engulfed in flames
d. after hearing the screams of the deceased the accused persons broke the door to
save her
e. the same scream was heard by the PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4
15
f. PW-2 and PW-3 came in at the very same time, when the accused persons entered
the kitchen, and to their surprise the accused persons standing still, which was
totally coincident and not intentional.
g. As the situation panicked, A-1 and A-2 reached with water and blanket
respectively to save the deceased. So this act clearly signifies that they had no
intention of killing her
6. That, the prosecution did not clear beyond reasonable doubt, that how and why the door
got closed, and for the same they dont have any established witness. Hence due to lack
of evidences, it is not right to convict the accused persons.
7. That, no evidence have been discovered and presented before the court, and so conviction
purely on the basis of hypothesis of the prosecution is too unlawful.
8. That the story of prosecution is based on hypotheses and circumstantial evidences.
Honble Supreme Court in Vadlokonda Lenin v State of A.P 10, held that circumstances
on which prosecution relies must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt and such
circumstances must be capable of giving rise to an interference which is inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except the guilt of accused it is only in such an event that conviction
of accused, on basis of circumstantial evidence brought by prosecution, would be
permissible in law and the fact that there are other hypothesis possible and that such
hypothesis are more strong and supported by evidences than that of the prosecution,
quashes the hypothesis of the prosecution that the accused persons have murdered the
deceased.
9. That, the Prosecutions case has got a wonderful story but has never been able to produce
any witness or evidence to confirm that the act done by appellant was done under full
sanity, The Honble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v State of Punjab 11, basic onus
remains on prosecution and the onus does not change merely because victim is the wife
and appellant the husband and the incident happened in a matrimonial home.
10 2012 XII SCC 260 /para 12/
11 Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 15 SCC 285
16
10. That, as per the story of prosecution, the deceased in her dying declaration said that her
mother-in-law Pushpa had poured kerosene over her and her husband Vivek has set
her on Fire, as per the judgment of Honble Supreme Court, if a dying declaration is
complete in itself it is too doubtful. Here in this case, as per the prosecution, the deceased
has made everything clear in her dying declaration, and on the other hand as per
prosecution the postmortem report says that deceased died due to 90% burn injuries; both
the facts of the prosecution are very much contradictory, as in no case a person having
90% burn injuries would be fit to speak even a word.
11. That, the dying declaration of the deceased was fabricated evidence and has been created
by prosecution to accuse the accused persons. This can be established by the fact that, as
per the story of prosecution, the dying declaration was given to PW-2 which was
overheard by PW-4, and then was subsequently made to PW-5. What is to be noted here
is that all the witnesses made by the prosecution are interested parties in the deceased
and, such a witness is too hostile, and so such admission is not possible.
12. That, PW-6, who attended the deceased, was the only prudent person to record such
declarations, if the deceased was such an aggrieved party; she should have made the
dying declaration to PW-6 as well, when she was alive. If she was able to give dying
declaration to PW-2 and PW-5 and with such intensity that a person standing at some
distance was able to hear it, then the deceased should have also made such a declaration
in front of PW-6, as before stated, the deceased was well acquainted with knowledge of
law. She should have made her statement before the doctor
13. That, the examination of witness who heard the declaration of the deceased is not done
yet, which is too important to admit the declaration in the court and to secure fast and fair
trial, as more is the time given to the witnesses, more will be the fabrication in the facts.
If the witnesses are not examined, the declaration is not admissible.
14. That, the story of prosecution is purely made to falsely accuse the accused persons who
are very innocent.
17
15. That, the Calcutta High Court in Abhimanya Biswas v. Abdul12 held that, a dying
declaration is not a proof of truth of its contents but only of facts stated.
16. That, the prosecution wants to solely convict the accused persons on the dying
declaration, which is highly doubtful, Honble Supreme Court in Paparambaka
Rosamma v. State of AP13 held that where conviction is solely based upon the dying
declaration, there is obligation on the part of the court to consider with extreme care and
caution both the dying declaration and also the evidence of the witness supporting it
17. That, for a dying declaration to be admissible under section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act,
1872, there should be a medical certificate of a doctor to certify that the person making
the declaration is fit to do so, but here in this case there was no certificate issued by any
doctor to say whether the deceased was fit to make a dying declaration or not. Thus, for
this lack of certificate, which is immensely essential for a declaration to be admissible,
the declaration is not admissible.
Honble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Parasuram Naik14 held that the accused
husband was alleged to have poured petrol on his wife and lit fire. Extensive burn
injuries were caused. The oral dying declaration made to her mother was ruled out from
acceptance. There was absence of certificate showing her to be fit from making the
statement. Conviction of the accused was not held to be proper.
Honble Supreme Court in Arvind Singh Vs State of Bihar15 where the wife was killed
by burning, she named her in-laws and husband to have poured kerosene and set her on
fie and, she made this dying declaration before her mother shortly before her death. No
12 AIR 1981 Cal 444

13 AIR 1999 SC 3455
14 AIR 1997 SC 3569
15 AIR 2001 SC 2124
18
medical certificate was there as to her fitness for making the statement held that,
uncorroborated testimony of the mother was not worth of being accepted.
18. That, as per Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v Amarjit Singh16 held that A
declaration which is not taken in the deceased own words but is merely a note of the
substance of what she said to the police cannot be safely accepted as a sufficient basis of
conviction.And in Public Prosecutor, HC of AP v. Pothula N Rao17 held that where the
dying declaration was recorded by the investigating officer, though there was no enough
time for being recorded by local judicial officer, it was held that the dying declaration
could not be relied upon. If it is doubtful in case of police officer, its highly doubtful if
it has been give in front of an interested party. Moreover the witnesses have yet not
deposited their testimony in court before the magistrate.
19. In Surendar Kumar v State18 and Satbir Singh v State of Haryana19 the Honble
Punjab and Harayana High Court held that the deceased in her dying declaration before
stated that her husband and her mother in law used to harass her on account of bringing
dowry so she took poison herself. There was no certificate of fitness recorded by doctor
before or after dying declaration so conviction solely based on dying declaration is held
not proper
20. That, none of the witness stated the fact that the deceased had fit mental condition to give
the dying declaration. Honble Supreme Court in Nanahau Ram v Stat of MP20 has held
that the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to
make the dying declaration normally look up to the medical option but where the
16 AIR 1988 SC 2013
17 1993 CrLJ 2729
18 1997 CrLJ 1737 P&H
19 2011 CrLJ 604 P&H
20 AIR 1998 SC 912
19
eyewitness has said that the deceased as in fit or c conscious state to make the dying
declaration the medical option cannot prevail. In this case neither medical practitioner
nor the eyewitnesses have made any such statement. So the declaration stands void. And
thus this dying declaration cannot be mad soul basis of conviction, which the prosecution
wants.
The Honble Supreme Court in Banka Naiko v. State of Orissa21 held that, when dying
declaration is not properly proved it cannot be used to corroborate other evidences .
Thus here for the fact that dying declaration is full of doubts, it loses its value both as
direct evidence and as corroborative evidence
21. That, for the above mentioned facts, the dying declaration is too suspicious and should
not be accepted in any way. Honble Supreme Court in Rashid Beg v. State of Madhya
Pradesh22 held that where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon
corporative evidence
22. That, as per the dying declaration, the deceased was burnt by pouring kerosene over her;
but prosecution has failed to discover any object in which kerosene was kept, or was used
to pour kerosene, from crime scene.
23. That, the declaration made by the deceased is too doubtful as she earlier threatened the
accused to accuse them of fake dowry demand.
24. That, finally its on the discretion of the court to accept a dying declaration if its satisfied
by the arguments, but here the point is no argument in support of the declaration have
been made. Honble Supreme Court in Kanti Lal v State of Rajasthan23 held that,
admissibility of dying declaration would depend upon proximate factual concurrence of
the dying declaration, makers voluntariness and fitness capacity to narrate the fact and
the court satisfaction.
21 AIR 1976 SC 2013
22 (1974) 4 SCC 264
23 (2009) 12 SCC 498
20
25. That, the postmortem report suggests that the death was due to 90% burn injuries on
body, but it never said that burn injuries were made due to kerosene. So absence of this
important fact in postpartum report quashes that claim of prosecution. There is no
proximity of connection in the statement made by the deceased in front of PW-2 and
PW-5, and the postmortem report. Therefore the death alleged to have been caused by
A-1, A-2 and A-3 to the deceased has no proximate connection with her death and the
statement made by the deceased to the relatives should not be a statement relevant under
section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. This principle was held in Imran Khan v.
State of MP24.
26. That, when the deceased had 90% of burns over the body, was she deemed fit to give
statement under conscious mind? Because Honble Supreme Court in Kamalakar
Nandram Bavasar v State of Maharashtra25 held that there can be no dying
declaration because of extensive burns
In State of Karnataka v Shankar26, Karnataka High Court held that the relatives of the
deceased wife turned hostile; dying declaration after 90% burns did not have any
medical fitness certificate. Hence the accused are acquitted
27. That, for the above mentioned reasoning and facts, the acquisition of accused persons
under section 302 of IPC, 1860, is too vague, and so they should be remitted from these
charges immediately.
24 1995 CrLJ 17 (MP)

25 AIR 2004 SC 503
26 2000 CrLJ 1917(KANT)
21
3. Do the accused persons have any Common Intention?

Court that
1. That, there was no common intention or motive amongst the accused persons
2. That, there was absence of any pre planned act of the accused persons to kill the
deceased.
22
PRAYER
It is therefore, prayed that, your lordships may graciously be pleased In the light of
arguments advanced and authorities cited, the counsel on behalf of Accused Persons humbly
submits that the Learned Session Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that,
1. The accused persons are not held guilty of the offence and are acquitted.
and pass any order or orders as your lordship may deem fit as it deems fit in the interest of
equity, justice and good conscience.
And for this act of kindness the state shall ever pray.
23

Memorial On Behalf of Accused - 7th RLC SAQUIB RIZVI MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2015

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5th RCL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015

IN THE SESSION COURT OF CHANDIGARH

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015