PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC (PASEI) vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.

DRILON
G.R. No. 81958
June 30, 1988

FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged
principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges
the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT
OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". The measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. Department Order
No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations, thus in violation of the Art. 13,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution, providing for the workers participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment
clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be
further enforced. In May 1988, the Solicitor General in-behalf of the Secretary of Labor filed a comment
stating that the latter had lifted the deployment ban in certain countries. Furthermore, it invokes the police
power of the State in justifying the questioned guidelines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned guidelines is violative of the rights of all Filipino Workers
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the Department Order No. 1 is not violative of the righs of all Filipino
Workers. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure, which may
be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." The Court also ruled that as a general rule, official acts enjoy
a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption
logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before
the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.The
Court adhered to the requirements of a valid classification. The Court is satisfied that the classification
made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice,
the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially
domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.The Court is on its
own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure.
Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for
Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment
Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely
so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative
and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the
authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted.
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas
workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had
the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For
obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right
to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by
law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy
to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its
impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.