for an FTAA or an MPSA and have it approved also.

Until the MPSA application of SEM is approved, it cannot lawfully claim that it
possesses the rights of an MPSA or FTAA holder. But again, SEM is not qualified to apply for an FTAA or any mineral agreement,
considering that it is not a holder of a valid exploration permit, since EP 133 expired by non-renewal and the transfer to it of the
same permit has no legal value.
No, Proclamation No. 297 does not violate the following:
Article XII, Sec. 4: It is only after the specific limits of the forest lands shall have been determined by the legislature will this
constitutional restriction apply. SEM does not allege nor present any evidence that Congress had already enacted a statute
determining with specific limits forest lands and national parks. In addition, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that
prohibits the President from declaring a forest land as an environmentally critical area and from regulating the mining operations
therein by declaring it as a mineral reservation in order to prevent the further degradation of the forest environment and to resolve
the health and peace and order problems that beset the area.
There is nothing contradictory between the two. Proclamation No. 297, a measure to attain and maintain a rational and orderly
balance between socio-economic growth and environmental protection, jibes with the constitutional policy of preserving and
protecting the forest lands from being further devastated by denudation. In other words, the proclamation in question is in line with
Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution, as the former fosters the preservation of the forest environment of the Diwalwal area and is
aimed at preventing the further degradation of the same.
Yes, RA 7942 is the applicable law. Proclamation No. 297, declaring a certain portion of land located in Monkayo, Compostela Valley,
with an area of 8,100 hectares, more or less, as a mineral reservation, was issued
\
\
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite,
and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the
construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to
accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of
temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the
off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by
President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing
structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power
is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce
of man
Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public
use
Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain
Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a
valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of
PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of
PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey
Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special
Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the
President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of
public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and
465 by President Ramos.
Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in
Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been
necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose
of them as it may deem appropriate.

There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey
Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and
Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.
RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land
subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the
same. In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it
has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II,
Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and
rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or
questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the
said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

___
Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 (1982)
F: The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda, who was an Austrian living in Spain, is
void bec. it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The Court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Consti. covers not only succession by
operation of law but also testamentary succession.
HELD: We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision w/c enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Phil. landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion, notwithstanding, we uphold t