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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.131429August4,1999
OSCARBERMUDEZ,ARTUROA.LLOBRERAandCLAUDIOL.DAYAON,petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVESECRETARYRUBENTORRES,BUDGETSECRETARYSALVADORENRIQUEZ,JR.,JUSTICE
SECRETARYTEOFISTOGUINGONA,JR.,andATTY.CONRADOQUIAOIT,respondents.
VITUG,J.:
ThevalidityandlegalityoftheappointmentofrespondentConradoQuiaoittothepostofProvincialProsecutorof
TarlacbythenPresidentFidelV.Ramosisassailedinthispetitionforreviewoncertiorarionapurequestionoflaw
whichpraysforthereversaloftheOrder,1dated20October1997,oftheRegionalTrialCourt(Branch63)ofTarlac,
Tarlac,dismissingthepetitionforprohibitionand/orinjunctionandmandamus,withaprayerfortheissuanceofa
writofinjunction/temporaryrestrainingorder,institutedbyhereinpetitioners.
TheoccurrenceofavacancyintheOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutorofTarlacimpelledthemaincontestantsinthis
case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper
interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial
ProsecutorofTarlacandOfficerInChargeoftheOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutor,wasarecommendee2ofthen
JusticeSecretaryTeofistoGuingona,Jr.,forthepositionofProvincialProsecutor.Quiaoit,ontheotherhand,would
appeartohavehadthesupportofthenRepresentativeJoseYapoftheSecondLegislativeDistrictofTarlac.3On30
June1997,QuiaoitemergedthevictorwhenhewasappointedbyPresidentRamostothecovetedoffice.Quiaoit
received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive
JudgeAngelParazooftheRegionalTrialCourt(Branch65)ofTarlac,Tarlac.On23July1997,Quiaoitassumed
officeandimmediatelyinformedthePresident,aswellastheSecretaryofJusticeandtheCivilServiceCommission,
ofthatassumption.BermudezrefusedtovacatetheOfficeofProvincialProsecutorclaimingthattheoriginalcopyof
Quiaoit'sappointmenthadnotyetbeenreleasedbytheSecretaryofJustice.4Quiaoit,nonetheless,performedthe
functions and duties of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office orders and memoranda, signing
resolutionsonpreliminaryinvestigations,andfilingseveralinformationsbeforethecourts.Quiaoithadsincebeen
regularlyreceivingthesalary,RATAandotheremolumentsoftheoffice.
On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by Justice Secretary Guingona. The
threemetattheDepartmentofJusticeand,followingtheconference,Bermudezwasorderedtowinduphiscases
until15October1997andtoturnoverthecontestedofficetoQuiaoitthenextday.
1wphi1.nt

InhisFirstIndorsement,dated22September1997,fortheChiefStateProsecutor,AssistantChiefStateProsecutor
Nilo Mariano transmitted the original copy of Quiaoit's appointment to the Regional State Prosecutor Carlos de
Leon, Region III, at San Fernando, Pampanga. In turn, in his Second Indorsement, dated 02 October 1997,
RegionalStateProsecutordeLeonforwardedtoQuiaoitsaidoriginalcopyofhisappointment.Onthebasisofthe
transmittalletterofRegionalStateProsecutordeLeon,Quiaoit,asdirected,againsoassumedofficeon16October
1997. On even date, Bermudez was detailed at the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region III, in San
FernandoPampanga.
In the meantime, on 10 October 1997, Bermudez together with his copetitioners Arturo Llobrera and Claudio
Dayaon, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac,
respectively,filedwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofTarlac,apetitionforprohibitionand/orinjunction,andmandamus,
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein respondents,
challengingtheappointmentofQuiaoitprimarilyonthegroundthattheappointmentlackstherecommendationof
the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court
considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the
petition.Thesubsequentmovebypetitionerstohavetheorderreconsideredmetwithadenial.

Hence,theinstantrecourse.
ThecoreissueforconsiderationiswhetherornottheabsenceofarecommendationoftheSecretaryofJusticeto
thePresidentcanbeheldfataltotheappointmentofrespondentConradoQuiaoit.Thisquestionwould,inturn,pivot
ontheproperunderstandingoftheprovisionoftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987(BookIV,TitleIII,Chapter
II,Section9)totheeffectthat
All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendationoftheSecretary.
Petitionerscontendthatanappointmentofaprovincialprosecutormandatorilyrequiresapriorrecommendationof
the Secretary of Justice endorsing the intended appointment citing, by analogy, the case of San Juan vs. CSC 5
wheretheCourtheld:
...TheDBMmayappointonlyfromthelistofqualifiedrecommendeesnominatedbytheGovernor.Ifnoneis
qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirementsandaskfornewrecommendeeswhohavethenecessaryeligibilitiesandqualifications.
TheProvincialBudgetOfficer(PBO)isexpectedtosynchronizehisworkwithDBM.6(Emphasissupplied.)
InsistingontheapplicationofSanJuan,petitionerscallattentiontothetenorofExecutiveOrderNo.1127
Sec.1.Allbudgetofficersofprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesshallbeappointedhenceforthbytheMinister
ofBudgetandManagementuponrecommendationofthelocalchiefexecutiveconcerned....
that, they claim, can be likened to the aforequoted provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Respondentsarguedifferently.
Thelegislativeintentis,ofcourse,primordial.Thereisnohardandfastruleinascertainingwhetherthelanguagein
astatuteshouldbeconsideredmandatoryordirectory,andtheapplicationofarulinginoneparticularinstancemay
not necessarily be aptinanother8 for each must be determined on the basis of the specific law in issue and the
peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and
addressedonacasetocasebasis.Thenature,structureandaimofthelawitselfisoftenresortedtoinlookingat
thelegislativeintent.Generally,itissaidthatifnoconsequentialrightsorliabilitiesdependonitandnoinjurycan
result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as
directory,ratherthanasmandatory,incharacter.9
An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority
thereforofanindividualtodischargeandperformthedutiesandfunctionsofanofficeortrust.10Theappointmentis
deemedcompleteoncethelastactrequiredoftheappointingauthorityhasbeencompliedwithanditsacceptance
thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.11 Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of
discretion on the part of the appointing authority.12 In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate
AppellateCourt,13reiteratedinFloresvs.Drilon,14thisCourthasheld:
Thepowertoappointis,inessence,discretionary.Theappointingpowerhastherightofchoicewhichhemay
exercisefreelyaccordingtohisjudgment,decidingforhimselfwhoisbestqualifiedamongthosewhohave
thenecessaryqualificationsandeligibilities.Itisaprerogativeoftheappointingpower...15
Indeed,itmayrightlybesaidthattherightofchoiceistheheartofthepowertoappoint.16Intheexerciseofthe
powerofappointment,discretionisanintegralpartthereof.
When the Constitution17 or the law18 clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
confermentmustbeunderstoodasnecessarilycarryingwithitanamplediscretionofwhomtoappoint.Itshouldbe
herepertinenttostatethatthePresidentistheheadofgovernmentwhoseauthorityincludesthepowerofcontrol
overall"executivedepartments,bureausandoffices."Controlmeanstheauthorityofanempoweredofficertoalter
ormodify,orevennullifyorsetaside,whatasubordinateofficerhasdoneintheperformanceofhisduties,aswell
as to substitute the judgment of the latter,19 as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in
anotherway,thePresidenthasthepowertoassumedirectlythefunctionsofanexecutivedepartment,bureauand
office.20 It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of
officialsunderhimoraltogetherignoretheirrecommendations.21
ItistheconsideredviewoftheCourt,giventheabovedisquisition,thatthephrase"uponrecommendationofthe
Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be
interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially

persuasiveincharacterandnotbindingorobligatoryuponthepartytowhomitismade.22Therecommendationis
here nothing really more than advisory in nature.23 The President, being the head of the Executive Department,
couldverywelldisregardordoawaywiththeactionofthedepartments,bureausorofficesevenintheexerciseof
discretionaryauthority,andinsoopting,hecannotbesaidashavingactedbeyondthescopeofhisauthority.
ThedoctrineinSanJuan,relieduponbypetitioners,istangential.WhilethetenorofthelegalprovisioninExecutive
OrderNo.112hassomesimilaritywiththeprovisioninthe1987AdministrativeCodeinquestion,itistobepointed
out,however,thatSanJuan,24inconstruingthelaw,hasdistinctivelygivenstresstotheconstitutionalmandateon
localautonomythus:
TheissuebeforetheCourtisnotlimitedtothevalidityoftheappointmentofoneProvincialBudgetOfficer.
ThetugofwarbetweentheSecretaryofBudgetandManagementandtheGovernorofthepremierprovince
ofRizaloveraseeminglyinnocuouspositioninvolvestheapplicationofamostimportantconstitutionalpolicy
andprinciple,thatoflocalautonomy.Wehavetoobeytheclearmandateonlocalautonomy.Wherealawis
capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to
localautonomy,thescalesmustbeweighedinfavorofautonomy.
xxxxxxxxx
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as
purelydirectory,itwentagainsttheletterandspiritoftheconstitutionalprovisionsonlocalautonomy.Ifthe
DBMSecretaryjealouslyhoardstheentiretyofbudgetarypowersandignorestherightoflocalgovernments
to develop selfreliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local
autonomyisfrustratedandsetback.25
TheCourttherehasexplainedthatthePresidentmerelyexercisesgeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernmentunits
andlocalofficials,26hence,intheappointmentofaProvincialBudgetOfficer,theexecutivedepartment,throughthe
SecretaryofBudgetandManagement,indeedhadtosharethequestionedpowerwiththelocalgovernment.
Intheinstantcase,therecommendationoftheSecretaryofJusticeandtheappointmentofthePresidentareactsof
theExecutiveDepartmentitself,andthereisnosharingofpowertospeakof,thelatterbeingdeemedforallintents
andpurposesasbeingmerelyanextensionofthepersonalityofthePresident.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.Nocosts.

1wphi1.nt

SOORDERED.
Melo,Panganiban,PurisimaandGonzagaReyes,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1PerJudgeArsenioP.Adriano.
2Annex"D,"Petition,Rollo,p.40.
3MemorandumofAppealforPetitionersAppellants,pp.1415.
4PriortothereleasedoftheoriginalcopyofQuiaoit'sappointment,thenJusticeSecretaryGuingonawrotea

letteraddressedtothenPresidentRamoswhichreads:
DearMr.President:
This has reference to the appointment of Atty. Conrado T. Quiaoit as Prosecutor III (Provincial
Prosecutor)oftheProvincialProsecutionOfficeofTarlac,RegionIII.
It has been the practice in the appointment of prosecutors for the Office of the President to
consult this Department on the most qualified candidate for the position on the basis of
performance,lengthofserviceandrank.WhenthepositionoftheProvincialProsecutorofTarlac
becamevacant,wehaveexpresslyrecommendedProsecutorOscarV.Bermudeztotheposition
being the most qualified candidate based on the foregoing criteria. We are greatly concerned
and disturbed therefore when that Office has appointed Atty. Quaioit, without our comment or
recommendation.

We would like also to convey to the Office of the President the adverse sentiments from the
OfficeoftheProvincialProsecutionOfficeofTarlacgeneratedbytheappointmentofAtty.Quaioit
inapositionpaperacopyofwhichisenclosedherewith.(Rollo,p.13.)
5196SCRA69.
6Atp.79.
7Entitled,"PlacingAllBudgetOfficersofProvinces,CitiesandMunicipalitiesundertheAdministrativeControl

andTechnicalSupervisionoftheMinistryofBudgetandManagement.
8SutherlandStatutoryConstruction,Vol.3,5thed.,p.8.
9 Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd ed., p. 238, citing Miller vs. Lakewood Housing Co., 180 NE

700,81ALR1239.
10SeeIsaganiA.Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1993edition,p.187PhilippineLawDictionaryByF.B.

Moreno,ThirdEdition,p.67Black'sLawDictionary,6thedition,p.99,citingInreNicholson'sEstate,104
Colo.561,93P.2d880,884citingBoardofEducationofBoyleCountyvs.McChesney,235Ky.692,32S.W.
2d26,27.
11SeeAparrivs.CourtofAppeals,127SCRA231.
12 In the words of Justice Malcolm an "(a)ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the

exerciseofdiscretion."(Concepcionvs.Paredes,42Phil.599.)
13140SCRA22.
14223SCRA568.
15Atp.579.
16Ibid.,p.579.
17Sec.16.ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments,appoint

theheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsulsorofficersofthe
armedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedin
himinthisConstitution.HeshallalsoappointallotherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsare
nototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongress
may,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orinthe
headsofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
CommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress.(Phil.Constitution,Article
VII.)
18Sec.9.Provincial/CityProsecutionOffices.TheProvincialandCityFiscal'sOfficeestablishedineachof

theprovincesandcitiespursuanttolaw,isretainedandrenamedProvincial/CityProsecutionOffice.Itshall
beheadedbyaProvincialProsecutororCityProsecutor,asthecasemaybe,assistedbysuchnumberof
Assistant Provincial/City Prosecutors as fixed and/or authorized by law. The position titles of Provincial and
CityFiscalandofAssistantProvincialandCityFiscalareherebyabolished.
Allprovincial/cityprosecutionofficesshallcontinuetodischargetheirfunctionsunderexistinglaw.
All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendationoftheSecretary.(AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV,TitleIII,Chapter2.)
19Mondanovs.Silvosa,etal.,97Phil.143Echechevs.CA,198SCRA577citingOliverosTorrevs.Bayot,

58SCRA272andAngAngcovs.Castillo,118Phil.1468.
20Pelaezvs.AuditorGeneral,15SCRA569.
21LacsonMagallanesCo.,Inc.vs.Pano,21SCRA895.

22Cuyegkengvs.Cruz,108Phil.1147.
23SeeBlack'sLawDictionary,6thedition,p.1272.
24SanJuanvs.CSC,196SCRA69.
25Atpp.7578.
26 Sec. 4, Article X of the Constitution provides: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervisionoverlocalgovernments.Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcities
andmunicipalitieswithrespecttocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunits
arewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions."
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