Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Introduction
Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert McRuer
University of South Carolina Upstate / George Washington University
Introduction
Introduction 129
rights movement in Western Europe and much of North America.3 Lisa had
just finished her memoir, Girl in Need of a Tourniquet, a queer/crip reada
claiming, an inhabitingof borderline personality, dropping the word disorder
from the title to contest the pathologization of this disability identity. Formally
innovative, the memoir sutured together many types of discourse (medical
texts, self-help books, fairy-tale, personal email, autobiographical memory) to
evoke a stuttering, self-interrupting flood of ways of telling her particular story
instead of adhering to one voice or paradigm of illness narrative. She too was
thinking deeply about impairments not always legible in the disability rights
movement or disability studies, even if the field was about to take what Robert
has called elsewhere The Mad Turn.4
3.The keynote eventually became an article in another special issue of the JLCDS on
Able-Nationalism and the Geo-Politics of Disability.
4. The phrase, from a 2012 MLA presentation, referenced in particular the work of Margaret Price on
The back and forth in this mix generated discussion about knowing and
unknowing disability, making and unmaking disability epistemologies, and the
importance of challenging subjects who confidently know about disability,
as though it could be a thoroughly comprehended object of knowledge. We
were questioning, in other words, what we think we know about disability,
and how we know around and through it. Two weeks later, Lisa texted Robert,
Were really talking about cripistemologies here. Robert posted on Facebook
that Cripistemology is the best new word Id heard in a long time, thanking
Lisa for coining it. In that moment, the term emerged as something shared.
Traveling through bar conversations, texts, and status updates, cripistemology
refused the usual routes of academic knowledge, accumulating meaning in the
ephemera of conference chatter, social networking, and other queer gatherings.
Cripistemology is everywhere in theory, once you start looking for it. It
lurks, arguably, in places like Sedgwicks Epistemology of the Closet, a text
we find freshly useful for locating cripistemology within terminological and
geopolitical crises of our moment and for asking questions about remote
locations, styles, and modes of transmission for prohibited knowledge about
disability. Interestingly, Sedgwick was present at the inception of Crip
Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability, as Robert was writing
about Gary Fisher and secured her permission, as executor of Fishers estate,
to use one of Fishers images on the cover. In his email conversations with
Sedgwick in 2005, Robert mentioned how much resonance her own work had
for disability studies, since she had at that point written not only about Fisher,
but about HIV/AIDS more generally (and about other friends living with HIV,
most notably Michael Lynch), breast cancer, and depression. Sedgwick warmly
affirmed in response to Roberts comment on her proximity to the field that
indeed she was, as it were, in the neighborhood.
Epistemology of the Closet is not explicitly about disability and predates
Sedgwicks direct remarks on the subject, but it would be easy to include this
text in a study of the crip language that saturates Sedgwicks work (emphasis
ours):5
Epistemology of the Closet proposes that many of the major nodes of thought and
knowledge in twentieth-century Western culture as a whole are structuredindeed,
fracturedby a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual definition,
mental disability in academia, and was further substantiated in Daviss 4th edition of The Disability
Studies Reader, released in 2013 with a noticeable uptick in articles addressing mental disabilities.
5. In the following two paragraphs, we reintroduce but extend and develop an argument first put
forward by McRuer in We Were Never Identified: Feminism, Queer Theory, and a Disabled World
(150, 15253).
Introduction 131
indicatively male, dating from the end of the nineteenth century. The book will
argue that an understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must
be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree that
it does not incorporate a critical analysis of modern homo/heterosexual definition;
and it will assume that the appropriate place for that critical analysis to begin is from
the relatively decentered perspective of modern gay and antihomophobic theory. (1)
the fringe costs that would be required by the ACA if they continued to allow
part-timers to teach three, four, or five courses per semester, this population
of workers is super-exploited.7 The crisis is indicatively female because it
points toward disabling structural positions largely occupied by women, an
observation we make not as an ableist lament about more disability in the
world, but to comment on the gendered dimension of able-bodied privilege.
The shifting economy under neoliberalism is also about service and
exhausting affective labor (smile! take care of me!)labor that continues to be
gendered female. Crip theory in this crisis should ask who cares: literally, who
performs service work, but also, more coarsely, who gives a shit about you and
your need to be smiled at? Which bodies/minds/impairments in this moment
of crisis will count as authentically and publicly disabled? Which will not?
How will disability and impairment be measured? Thinking about all of this
in the twenty-first century requires attending to many topics of conversation
from that legendary weekend in Spartanburg: movements in search of theories;
mad turns; illegible disabilities; dysregulated emotions; the states power to
produce, contain, deny, or (mis)recognize impairment; disability beyond or
across borders.
Unstable Crips
Although we are writing out of the context of friendshipand toward cripistemology as marked by collaboration and convivialitywe do not want
to present the concept as something everyone in the field will find equally
appealing, or as part of an image of disability studies as a stable interdisciplinary field. Disability studies is stalled, at times, by too much consensus,
too much harmony, too much propriety, too much citing (on the same page)
of theorists articulating very different points. We propose to do some of the
difficult work of identifying these points of divergence, and to proceed without
fearing conceptual instability. Specifically, Lisa has noticed that it has become
de rigueur in certain theory circles to wince at references to identity-based or
embodiment-based knowledge (or even epistemology, as in, Arent we past
that by now?), and Robert has noticed that is equally typical among certain
other scholars to mock or disavow references to poststructuralism, pleasure,
or the slipperiness of meanings, texts, and bodies as too intellectual and,
7. All wage labor is exploitation, as surplus capital is extracted from the labor we perform, but this
group of workers merits the label super-exploitation given the extremity of the situation.
Introduction 133
from a certain angle, too queer (all lubrication and fantasy). Picture us saying
this to each other on the phone and then just sitting there, blinking. Beneath
these caricatured encampments lie meaningful conceptual differences, and
we invoke this crisis not to resolve it but to place it, odd angles and all, under
the umbrella term cripistemology, where these varied, unstable crip positions
could be construed as deeply imbricated in, and trying to do justice to, a range
of necessary and queer turns in disability studies: phenomenological, transnational, affective.8
To get at these tendencies toward instability, we begin in a differently
Sedgwickian place, with Susan Wendell, whose 1989 article, Toward a Feminist
Theory of Disability, destabilized basic philosophical assumptions about
whose knowledge matters.9 If disabled people were truly heard, Wendell
predicted, an explosion of knowledge of the human body and psyche would
take place. Instead, disabled peoples knowledge is dismissed as trivial,
complaining, mundane (or bizarre), less than that of the dominant group (104).
Her description of becoming disabled (or falling ill overnight), learning to live
with a body that felt entirely different . . . weak, tired, painful, nauseated, dizzy,
unpredictable, and recognizing that suddenly able-bodied people seemed to
me profoundly ignorant of everything I most needed to know (104), relocates
disability knowledge from nondisabled to disabled bodies and community.
She values knowledge derived from the everyday experiences of those at odds
with a world structured for people who have no weaknesses (104). She asks
good questions, like, Where does a person sit down to rest, if necessary, at the
grocery store?
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson takes up the call, a little over ten years later,
to make feminist theory accountable to the disabled women it often excludes,
invoking the rubric of standpoint epistemology:
[A] feminist disability theory presses us to ask what kinds of knowledge might
be produced through having a body radically marked by its own particularity, a
8. We allude here to McRuers comment in Crip Theory: Instead of invoking the crisis in order to
resolve it . . . crip theory . . . can continuously invoke, in order to further the crisis, the inadequate
resolutions that . . . compulsory able-bodiedness offer[s] us (31).
9. Here we shift from Sedgwick the poststructuralist to Sedgwick the phenomenologist, or the
space where she is both at once. Indeed, Sedgwick is an excellent example of the often overlooked
(or misrepresented) fact that poststructuralism does not embrace social constructionism to the
exclusion or negation of the material body: I would warmly encourage anyone interested in the
social construction of gender to find some way of spending half a year or so as a totally bald
woman (Tendencies, 12). She remains interested throughout her 1993 anthology in questions of
how to occupy most truthfully and powerfully, and at the same time constantly to question and
deconstruct, the sick role, the identity of the person living with life-threatening disease (261).
Introduction 135
capacity in the service of obligatory family time and holiday ritual (smile!), or
in my role as diversity worker in the neoliberal university and aspiring guest
lecturer in the academy at large, when that capacity risks prolonged physical
pain and debility. Driving or flying long distances hurts. It also means risking
a recurrence of incapacitating back problems comprised of muscle spasms,
mobility impairment, slowed productivity, and other costs of rehabilitation. If
it seems, at times, as if its always somethingif not back pain, then dizziness,
nausea, anxiety dreams, eye infections, inflamed ligaments in the arches of my
feetthose somethings arrive with less frequency and less disabling force when
I slow down, redefine able, and turn down the invitation to speak or visit. I
am not unable to travel; I am frequently unwilling.
The inter-implications of capacity and debility have led me to this place of
crip willfulness, which sounds like a mean place of stubborn resistance, but feels
like a calm relinquishing of fantasies that I can force things (situations, bodies,
emotions, sensations) to be other than they are. It is a refusal to insista refusal
to act in accordance with the system of compulsory able-bodiednessthat
requires individuals to mask, suppress, and disregard discomfort in the process
of determining what is possible, of what we are capable. You cannot always
close the gap between how you do feel and how you should feel, willfulness
theorist Sara Ahmed writes. Behind the sharpness of this cannot is a world
of possibility. Ahmed reclaims killjoy as a site of productive misalignment
with cultural instructions to be (or act) happy in oppressive circumstances. If a
cruelly optimistic culture insists that we fake it till we make it, the crip killjoy
refuses to play along. Describing the decision not to travel in terms of debility
(I cannot) remains, however, much easier on my relationships and professional
standing than describing it in terms of capacity (I will not), and, recalling Puar,
my commitment to insistently rendering bare the instability of the divisions
between capacity-endowed and debility-laden bodies (Prognosis, 169) works
better to bolster decisions internally than to frame them to family members or
supervisors. In such lived environments, I become a stealth cripistemologist.
Sometimes comfort comes from relaxing into debility instead of frantically
scrambling away from it. Harriet McBryde Johnson says as much in her memoir
of muscular dystrophy, Too Late to Die Young, opening with her choice at age
15 to stop forcing her body into medically prescribed straightening devices
and relaxing instead into a deep twisty S-curve (1). Since my backbone
found its own natural shape, she explains, Ive been entirely comfortable in
my skin (2). Cripistemological inversions or, in less binary terms, dysplasias
of ableist logic, might pause over the endless deferral of comfort within this
system of compulsory able-bodiednessand here I return to the scoliosis
Introduction 137
that places me on the twisted spine spectrum with Harrietto reflect on the
futility of this idea of future comfort, as it propels us further into discomfort
by working harder to finally get somewhere more comfortable: better posture,
a better professional position, or the golden years of rest and leisure, even as we
grind joints, contort muscles, and injure discs (this, too, is the cost of getting
better). The decision to be capablelike the decision to be thin (girl, I could
tell you stories)is a winding road of self-deprivation presented as a cultural
good. The decision to be unstable, incapable, unwilling, disabled (the sharpness
of this cannot) opens up a world of possibility.
Sensational Crips
Introduction 139
Disability Studies than any other university). I (Robert) have, in that pressurecooker context, at times asked my doctor whether Xanax might be right for me
and have, at times, accessed that prescription through friends when a doctor
has said, NoXanax is far too addictive. One of us (Lisa) works at a small
regional state university. In the administrative role of Director of Womens and
Gender Studies, she accesses benefits that some colleagues do not (summer pay,
a student worker to photocopy research materials, a load reduction from 4/4
to 2/2), all of which remain precarious from year to year, and faces obligations
some colleagues do not (a traditional business schedule year-round, clocking
in through an online system for reporting departures from this schedule,
a loss of scheduling flexibility). To make things ironically worse, I (Lisa)
received a salary correction in 2012 that raised my income significantly but
also subjected me to campus-wide scrutiny, shunning, and heightened micromanaging of my daily schedule and programming agenda, creating a change in
pace of life that led me to experience my body as more disabled than before the
speed-up.11 Casting an eye toward positions at research institutions, making up
a word like cripistemologies to get there, I imagine professors on a 2/2 load
with no administrative obligations who experience more control, more creative
flow, more respect for their aspirations to publish, more meaningful exchanges
with upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, more freedom, more
pleasure. The hope for a research position, the longing, the high productivity and the long hours and physical pain it requires, the anxiety, despair,
resignation (and, yes, occasional Xanax addictions): all these affects fuel and
benefit a system that increasingly construes professors as expendable bodies.12
Yet, the more gleeful existence elsewhere in the academic hierarchy is itself
an illusion. Keguro Macharias widely circulated piece On Quitting, detailing
his decision to leave a tenure-track job in LGBTQ studies at a prominent US
research university outside Washington, D.C. to return to Kenya, illustrates
all that we are getting at here: I begin to wonder, Macharia writes in 2013
(using language that has percolated and been shared for decades by women of
color feminism and queer of color critique), about the relationship between
geo-history, the saturation of space with affect, and psychic health. Macharia
laments the accelerated, isolating, racialized labor demanded of him in the
United States academy, where depression feels surrounding, womb-like, and
11. Wendell describes pace of life as a factor that determines how disabled a person is (Rejected, 90).
Likewise, Puar remarks that neoliberalisms heightened demands for bodily capacity mean no one
is ever able-bodied enough (Cost, 149).
12. This narrative is indebted to Cvetkovich for putting into words the experience in academia of
depression in the form of thwarted ambition (17).
Many of us are reaching for something else to be, something other than and
elsewhere from the new modes of exploitation such as those Macharia identifies
in the contemporary university. Such reaching and searching will inevitably
take place, Audre Lorde suggested more than 30 years ago, in a society where
the good is defined in terms of profit rather than in terms of human need (qtd
in Ferguson, Aberrations, 110). Ferguson opens his analysis of the queer work of
women of color feminism with this quotation, adding Lordes recognition that
we must recognize that we need each other. . . . There are no more single issues.
Lorde, too, imagined a less toxic world, especially in her account of living with
breast cancer, The Cancer Journals, one where healing might take place, even
as she recognized, like Macharia, that the scars would remain tender for a very
long time. And even though Macharia in the twenty-first century writes of a
different punishing system and different cosmetic reassurances than Lorde in
the twentieth (the American Academy rather than the US health-care system
and Cancer, Inc.), both systems encourage one, in Lordes words,
not to deal with herself as physically and emotionally real, even though altered and
traumatized. . . . [W]e are allowed no psychic time or space to examine what our true
Introduction 141
feelings are, to make them our own. With quick cosmetic reassurance, we are told
that our feelings are not important, our appearance is all, the sum total of self. (57)
benefit of making Lisa willing, finally, to ask for accommodations of her own
physical and psychological conditions, not only from seeing Anna model
this work, but from realizing the joy produced by working with and around
the needs of someone you care about. Disability knowledgeembodied and
relationalis about disability (knowing how long Anna can be on the phone,
knowing how long Lisa can type at a desk in a given day) and extends beyond
disability (knowing how to say no, realistically assessing timeframes for
specific tasks, incorporating self-care into the equation). Price and Shildrick
write toward the very large-scale insight that ethics itself must be rethought
(73); their call for thinking together and otherwise (74), for us, echoes parts
of the virtual roundtable that launches this double issue, as some participants
imagine cripistemology as confusing what any one individual might think,
generating alongside that confusion doubt, uncertainty, or failures to know.
The possibility of better ethical models inhabits this dimension of the term, as
the failures or necessarily partial quality of knowledge generates pressure on
each of us to ask, rather than assume, what encounters require of us.
This brings us to our own experience of disability-in-relation. Cripistemology, we joked, emerged from a queer marriage of our two scholarly styles.
Lisas creative work, in particular, is often formally innovative, intense, and
deeply personal, giving voice to at times barely articulable experiences of pain
and, paradoxically, also of pleasure. Sometimes Lisas work is about identity
(cripping a DSM category, for example). Sometimes, however, her work is
about anguish that is identity-disintegrating. Roberts work, in contrast, is
concerned with locating queerness and disability on/in the current geopolitical
and socioeconomic moment and attending to the ways in which that moment
generates specters of disability everywhere (Crip Theory, 199). This concern
encompasses many, like those in his essay on Guantnamo, whose experiences
cant or wont, for various reasons, materialize as disability, because the word
at times functions as what Gayatri Spivak calls a global master word. For
Spivak, master words innocently claim to represent all women or workers
and in the process mask the non-innocent and hierarchical relations of power
embedded in language (104). Put differently, our own fledgling cripistemological thinking surfaced orgasmically from the encounter between those
two specific (and, we hope, complementary but differently generative) ways of
knowing. Marriage, of course, was the wrong word for what happened, not
least because cripistemology emerged from a conference quickie, a drunken
one-night-stand. Crip humor aside, our different ways of knowing-in-relation
germinated into not only limited detoxification, but a sustaining crip friendship,
a relational site from which to know disability differently (Titchkosky 10).
Introduction 143
Material Crips
Introduction 145
curated at McMaster University, the authors analyze the critical and coalitional
work the exhibit made possible.
We hope it is clear in our conclusion that, in and through this abundance
of contemporary and historical cripistemological material, we are actually
suggesting something contra our opening: it is not the case that any movement
intent on changing the world must be (simply) in search of a good theory. We
hope cripistemology at its best demonstrates that theorizing is and always
should be multi-directional (and multitudinous), that it is not brought from on
high to a movement in order to fuel and direct it: disability movements, queer
movements, crip movements, and others are always and have always been
excessively and pleasurably generating new theories. Its always something,
but bodies in relation to disability in all its unstable valences make from that
something ways of knowing and being-in-common that point us beyond
truths universally acknowledged and toward proliferating crip horizons.
Acknowledgements
To turn a phrase that Robert once wrote in Crip Theory, it takes at least two
people to make a cripistemology. In truth, it has taken many more than two.
For their willingness to participate and their textured consideration of this
new term, we are grateful to the members of the virtual roundtable discussion.
Their exchange pushed us to clarify what we meant by this word, even as the
word took on a life of its own, beyond our design or imaginations. Likewise, the
authors of the articles deserve recognition for their creativity and persistence
over the course of a fairly intense two-year period of collaboration from
abstracts to final drafts. We have enjoyed the transcorporeal pleasures of this
thinking-togetherness. At a very late hour, Margaret Fink, Cassandra Hartblay,
Mara Mills, Sami Schalk, and Jonathan Hsy agreed to write the four other
Comments from the Field that work so well with the theme of our special
issues; we are very grateful for their contributions. Our editorial insights into
the articles collected here were enhanced and, at times, exceeded by the input
from our outside reviewers: Brenda Brueggemann, Elizabeth Donaldson, Beth
Ferri, Alison Kafer, Anastasia Kayiatos, Petra Kuppers, and Susannah Mintz.
Finally, we thank Lisa Duggan and Mara Mills for organizing the conference
on cripistemologies at the NYU Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality
in April 2013, an event that consolidated, problematized, and proliferated
the term in ways that shaped our evolving perspective as we developed the
introduction. We have written at length, in the preceding pages, about the
pain and distress of working in academia; moments like that conference or this
presentation of our special issues bind such pain and distress to the pleasure
of seizing opportunities to abuse the academys hospitality together.
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