CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE SOCIAL INFLUENCE: SOCIAL NORMS, CONFORMITY, AND COMPLIANCE Through the influence process we generate and manage change in the soa Won. Like moat hing, hi process an be handed poorly or wal I can bocmpayed oat [pow and lo move people avay from agave hls and Error posive drecions bereby cain the conions Terpew change oportmaics, Or, can be ied Clumsy, retin te ehone for genine movement ans inthe trot of cases, beometanging int confit and esentment ‘Thos, hee who wah fo understnd fll fhe process of percha cheng st understand jut a fully the proces Britton inlence Forweatl, hte Cureily ex inane rotor of seca See ange body of nr- maton on how, why and when th inuene proses won row afer ‘Di chapetfciss on three majo components ofthat large boy of informaion: social norms, confor, ad compliance Trough we consider hee topes ners ots fundapenta hen ta the Beavis they comprie tre gence tn nur view of he elon eats, are ese cot stk y the extent to which tee be haviors could be interpreted as purposive (but not accessar- 3y concious) emp to active avlavely sal eet of £0als: to behave effectively, to build and maintain relation- ‘Bis, and to manege sclconcept. Consequently, he Etat ftw has goss sere srg ss och ofthe material we esc Someties utc lunivnce ated behav serves mr than on ef re fi he ntti ih to what appeas to be is paay fenton Alou Me feot attce goals of vale nigh into ve Sieumstaces and moUvations Ua led to trpesonal the gus doe apply equally to the toe focal soci som, centr. and Cmpbance, ete 15t ROBERT B. CIALDINI. Arizona State University MELANIE R. TROST, Arizona State Universcy fore, differing emphases are applied in the tretiments of ‘these three topics. Before launching into substantive issues, one final ‘prefatory comment seems warranted. Rather than empha- Sing the goals ofthe influence agent, we have chosen to emphasize the goals of the influence target. Our review of the relevant literature suggested that the more intriguing, and instructive questions concerned not so much the rea sons that someone would choose to influence another as, the reasons that someone woutd choose to yield to influ- tence from another. Accordingly, we invite readers to con- sider the benefits of viowing the influence process from the perspective ofthe target person and in terms of what he or she stands to gain from change. SOCIAL NORMS A norm is, like other psychological phenomena, a con- struct that has widespread usage because it helps describe and explain human behavior. Cultural norms have been im plicated jn the existence of behaviors that seemed to be ar= bitrary and bizare from a Westem perspective (c.g. the an- cient practice of binding the feet of Chinese women or the Tas ritual of human sucsifice; Sumner, 1906), a8 well as. ‘more beneficent control mechanisms that keep anarchy at bay in most societies (0.., sanctions against unprovoked aggression; Pepitone, 1976) "Norms have been conceptualized in a variety of ways. Sumner (1906) wrote of “folkways""—habitual customs ‘exhibited by a group because they were originally expedi- cent in meeting basic needs. Sherif (1936) described norms 1s jointly negotiated rules for social behavior, the “cus- toms, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and allert Five / Interpersonal Phenomena ‘wyer RS, & Srull TK. (2986). Human cognition ints so- ial context. Psychological Review, 93, 322-359. ‘Zajone. RB. (19804). Cognition and socal cognition: bt ‘torical ie. In Festinger (Ed), Retrospections on social payehology (pp. 180-208), New York: Oxferd Uni verity Pros, “Zajone, RB. (19806). Thinking and feeling: references need ‘no inferences. American Psychologist, 35, SUVS. ‘ajone, R. (1998). Emotions. In DT Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, Te G, Lindcey (as.), The handbook of social psychology (Gh ed, Wok. 1, pp. 591-632). New York: McGraw-Hill ‘Zuckerman, M. (1989). Inferences and explanations in aftri- Inalon theory. University of Rochester, unpublished mami script152 art Five / Interpersonal Phenomena ‘ther criteria of conduct which are standardized as a conse- ‘quence of the contact of individuals” (p. 3). Pepitone (1976) added the cavoat that “by normative it means that such social bebavior is more characteristic (e.g., more uni- form) of some sociocultural collective unit than of individ tals observed at random" (p. 642). Norms vary to the ex- tent to which they are injunctive, preseribing the valued social behavior, versus descriptive, ieforming us about how others actin similar situations (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Schaffer, 1983). In addition to commonly accepted rules of desirable behav ior, norms have included rules forbidding unacceptable s0- ial behaviors, such 38 taboos against incest or infanticide, ‘nd laws or standards for conduct established by a govern- ‘ment or elected body (Triandis, 1994). “This chapter focuses on norms that are primarily social in nature. Social norms are rufes and standards that are un derstood by members of a group. and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the forve of laws. These norms emerge out of interaction with others; they may or may not he stated explicitly, and any sanctions for deviat- ing from thom come from social networks, aot the Tegal system, Social norms can include general, societal expecta tions for our behavior (Blake & Davis, 1964: Pepitone, 1976); the expectations of valued ethers for cur behavior (cage the subjective norms of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action): our own expectations for our behavior (e.g., Schiarta's [1977] personal norms); and standards that develop out of our observations of others" behavior (6g, Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren’s [1990] de- scriptive norms). There has been some debate about the usefulness of norms as an explanatory concept (cf. Darley & Latané, 1970; Krebs, 1970; Krobs & Miller, 1985), and in fac, the variely of cenceptualizations may have contributed to the ‘confusion concerning the actual role of social norms in i- recting our behavior. Recent theorcticat developments Ihave helped to clarify when and how norms can be ex- pected to affect behavior (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno 1991; Cinldini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) and to facibitate the accomplishment of basic social influence goals. We ‘will describe how social norms can help shape the desire (o act effectively, to build and maintain relationships with ‘others, and to maintain self fmage, but Grst we will diseuss social psychological theory nd research concerning how norms are formed, why they develop, and how they are transmitted to others. Formation and Transmission of Norms ‘Although norms arc common explanatory tools im the 50- cial sciences, relatively litle attention is given to thei oti- gins (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Pepitone, 1976) or to how they are shared with others (Allison, 1992). Two different perspectives speak most clearly tothe question of how 50- ial norms emerge within social systems. One perspective fangues that norms are arbitrary rules for behavior that are adopted because they are valued or reinforced by the cul ture (ef Berger & Luckiana, 1966; Opp, 1982; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pysvezyaski, 1991), An alternative perspec tive arguce that notmative behavior is functional and aids in accomplishing the goals ofthe group (¢f Allison, 1992, ‘Campbell, 1975: Sherif, 1936; Sumner, 1906). implying that ineffective or incorrect norms should not persis Ja- ‘cobs d& Campbell, 1961; Schatler & Latané, 1996).' The primary distinction between these two perspectives isthe extent to which socal arms may sustain abitary patterns of behavior. A closer examination of how norms emerge and are passed on fo others argues that both perapoctives can acoount for normative bshaviar, but tha there ae ime its to the types of behavior that wil be susepuible t ari- trary normative pressures. Societal-Vatue Perspective ‘Theorists influenced by the anthropatogical tradicions of Boas and Mead hrave long, ‘held that norms are culturally specific and capriciows, and Lat de power of any norm is derived solely from its value to the culture within which it operates. In other words, the substance of any norm is neither inherently good nor inher ently valuable; ils power is granted by its acceptance ‘within the culture (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Solomon, Groonberg, & Pyszczyaski, 1991). As noted earlier, this perspective grew oul of the dilemmas faced by carly an- thropologists. who had to reconcile seemingly bizarre be- Ihaviors in other cultres, such as cannibalism, with a West- ‘em sensibility (Sumner, 1906) Opp (1982) proposed that most norms that guide our Uaity activities bave evolved from behaviors that are per- formed and rewarded repeatedly, either directly or through ‘vicarious reinforcement from others inthe society (soe also Berger & Luckmann, 1966: Sumner, 1906). The behaviors then become the preferred responses to panticular situa- tions because of their ward power. The strength of these ‘preferences will depend on the extent to which (1) thereare ‘communication opportunities between people in the socal ‘group that allow them to pass the norm to others, (2) the ‘group is a cohesive unit and values uniform behavior, and (G) the norm is important forthe group. Once these prefer- cences are established and the costs associsted with nonnor- ‘mative behavior are made known, members of the social network will discourage any deviant tendencies by voicing what other members “should” or “ought to” do. These norms are, at that point, accepted and internalized by the group members, Sanctions, such as laws, may then develop tw support the nonns. ‘This pure reinforeement perspective leads onc 40 c0n- ‘tude that any behavior that is valued and rewarded cam be- come a norm, allowing for the emergence of arbitrary be- peshavior pattems om a cultural level. For example, if Ameri cau businesspeople were rewarded for weating “athlet supporters and tie-dyed shirts while erab-walking back- ward with basketballs in their mouths" instead of dark ‘wool business suits during the hotter summer months, they would abandon the stuffy suits for the more colorful atire (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszezynski, 1991, p. 104). Hab- crdashery customs are, in fact, an excellent example of local norma that appear to be random. Scottish men wear kilts and Montana mea wear cowboy hats-~neither of which are particulary effective in combating the cold weather of the two regions. Likewise, while choice of foods has historically been determined by what grows in a particular region, preferences for prepariny those foods vary by local tradition (e.g., Irish boiled potatoes versus French fries). Sherif (1936) noted that all humans share basic needs for food, shelter, and mating; he also believed: that “how and vader what circurnstances they will eat, rate and enjoy shelter are, (0 a great extent, regulated by ‘customs, traditions, fas and social standards” (p. 1). Also prominent in Sherit's comment is the notion thst norms ‘emerge to satisfy basic human needs and desires. Functional Perspective Other socal theorists have ar- sued that norms develop to encourage or curtail behaviors that ate connected 1 survival on either an individ level (Sherif, 1936) or a group lovel (Campbel, 1975; Pelton, 1976, Sumner, 1906) From this perspective, the coment of noms is neither arbitrary nor wiv, since the ability to de- ‘velop and communicate norms is cvolutionarly adaptive and aids in our survival asa species (Alison, 1992; Camp- bel, 1975; Schaller & Latané, 1996), We area group iv- ing spocies (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hogan, 1982; Summer, 1906) and, as such, have been selected for oUF ability to understand and imitate rues that are commonly observed in the iramediate environment (Allison, 1992) “Whether adaptive social behavior evolves via genotc AT- son, 1992; Campbell, 1975) or cultural (Bonner, 1980; ‘Campbell, 1975; Lumsden, 1988) mechanisms, norms are ‘credited with balancing the sesh desires ofthe individual with the need for social control and collective survival {Cammpbet, 1975; Freud, 1952; Trani, 1994). Schaller and Latané (1996) argue that culturally shared baie systems, such a stereotypes and noms, evolve in a ‘manner that is very similar to the natural selection of species: they emerge through selective pressures on indi viduals to communicate with others about behavior pat- tems that are offectve, relevant, and informative. That is successful norms are adaptive in promoting survivalre~ lated actions: they communicate behaviors thot are useful ‘in acquiring stats, afiicing with others, acquiring food ‘or ahelter. and mating. Unsnecessul norms lead to inaccd- ‘te o incorrect behavior, and lke maladaptive gones will ‘either replicate nor be passed on to subsequent individu Chapter 21 / Social byfuence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 153 als (see also MacNeil & Sherif, 1976). Lumsden (1988) nicely itosteated the distinction between the cultura] rela- tivity of mons and rir uimate adaptive significance He ited cultural antropologsts who had deduced that sibIng incest avoidance was “guided by idiosyncratic cultural systems of taboos and rituals” (p. 246). However, sibing incest taboos area cultural universal, appearing in nearly all societies. Moreover, more recent genetic studies have found that tere isa higher frequency of genetic deformity in the offspring of brother sister matings than in the c= spring of nonrelatives. Consistent with this functionalist Viewpoint, then, the cultural transmission of norm against sibling mating actually enbances reproductive s1¢- zis, Campbell (1975) suggests that we, as social psycho ogists, should approach th study of cultural differences ‘vith ae ond respec, cerain that bond the bizare fom Ties a Fanctional wisdom that [we] have yet to understand” (. 105) ‘This viewpoint provides a framework for integrating the socjtal-vaine and functional perspectives on norm dese ‘opment. As noted earlier, chee are customs and traditions Ata are subject to the whims and fancies ofthe culture in which they appenr, plying that there is an overarching need that must be fulfilled, but how that ned is flied ‘wll vary, depending on the local social cult and physi cal environment (Shes, 1936). For example, knowing the availabilty of a prospective romantic parter isan impor- {ant Grst step in imbaning a romantic relationship. Tie signs indicating that one is alveady atached to someone ae ccm rmunicated across a wide variety of cultures; hosiever, tose signs (e.. wing rings on fingers, dats onthe fore, ankle bracelets, facil tatloos) ean vary widely depending ‘on the culture. Greeting rituals are similarly universal, ince it 8 important co be able to distinguish fiends from ‘enemies, However, geeting expressions can range from @ kiss on the check (9a handshake to a raised. open palm, depending on th culture. In her words, seemingly icio= ayncratic norms that do not folill a more ultimate goal, ‘such as aoquring satus, maintsining social network, 1- producing, or providing shelter, are unlikely to survive to be passed om to subsequent generations (Schaller & La- tané, 1996; Sherif, 1936; Sumner, 1906), ‘Norm Transmission One of the most important charac teristics of norms is that they do nol exist if they are not shared with others, Those others can be anyone in one’s s0- cial sphere, including children, partners, family fricads, ‘coworkers, strangers, the media. However, nonms are _shared belief systems and must be examined from the por- spective of both the individual's psychological systemm and the sociocultural system in which that individual is cmbed- sed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Campbell, 1975; McKis- nan, 1980; Pepitone, 1976). “The exchange and inculcation of normative behavior san154. Part Five | Interpersonal Phenomena be accomplished in ways that vary in ther level of inten tionality. Some rules aze transmitted deliberately tosh active instruction, demonstrations, storytelling, stuals, nd ‘0 on (Allison, 1992; Lumsden, 1988). For example, some portion of the tine that young families spend at religious Services will invariably be spent waiving the todaler to sit ‘Qbietly throughout the service. Norms can also be expressed ‘more passively, via nouverbal behaviors or imitation (Alli- son, 1992; Lannsdea, 1988). For example, Snow, Jacklin, and Maccoby (1983) found that fathers were more Hikely to five dolls to their one-year-old daughtors than to their sons, 1 type of subtle encouragorent that contributes to sex dif- ferences in preferences for play activity among boys and girls (Lytton & Romney, 1991). Stil other norms may be {nferred from the behaviors of those around us, withoot any explicit training or implicit endorsement (Cialdini, Kall~ fron, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Rotle, Witke, & Messick, 1987). Boumk and Bakker (1995) ound that perceptions that one’s friends engage in ex twadyadie sexual activity positively affect one's avin will ingness to engage in i. Regardless of their origin, norms ‘must be communicated to have any effet on be avior. "This critical role of communication is emphasized by Latane’s (1996; Latané, Nowak, & Lin, 1994) dynamic s0- cial impact theory. Latané deseribes society as a “self-or- ganizing complex system composed of interacting individ ‘als each obeying simple principles of social impact” (p. 66), Using the classic components of social impact theory (Latand, 198); 22¢ the section “Conformity” io tis chap- {er}, Latané describes how the streagth ofthe souree’s per- sonal influence, the physical proximity (immediacy) of the influence targes te the source, and the number of sources ‘can account forthe clustering of societal phenomena, such fs focal dialeets. Computer simulations that have modeled this “dynamic iterative process of reciprocal and recursive influence” (Latané, 1996, p. 2) have shown that our ten- ‘dency tobe influenced most heavily by those who are clos- test im physical space produces local agreement about i= portant values and attudes. The formation of subeuttures provides space for less popular elements, but they are ‘Smaller in number and remain on the fringes of the dosni- inant group. In this way, society is viewed as a “self-onga- pizing, complex system" in a dynamic environment, as viduals both influence and are influenced by their immediate environment. Although the application of this theory to our understanding of norm transmission awaits ‘empirteal testing (Gee Schaller & Latané, 1996, fora theo~ retical application to the stereotyping process), i provides: ‘one description ofthe process by which societal norms and Jocal nonns not only can spread, but also can come to dif fer. Athongh social scientists have used norms as explana tory constructs throughout the twentieth centary the em- pirical literature specifically studying the emergence and ‘transmission of social norms” js exceedingly small. Laboratory Research on Norm Formation and Trans- mission — Sherit's (1936) classic stdies of how people interpret the autokinetic phenomenon provided a labera- tory analogue for the emergence of norms in society. The futokinetc effect isa perceptual iusion created by shin dng a small point of Tight oo a wall in a completely dark- ened room. in the absence of an extemal frame of tefer~ tence, the Tight appears to move erratically, even though it {s held pertecty stil. This novel, ambiguous stimulus pro- vided “objectively unstable situations that would permit themselves to be simictured in several ways, depending upon the character of the subjectively established refer- fence poinis” (Sherif, 1936, p. 91. When alone, subjects ‘would establish their owm range of movement within the Fist few tials, and all rubsequeat wrals would be judged ‘with respect to that personal nom. Sherif found that this personal frame of reference remained constat across ad tional testing sessions. The next step was to determine how the norm was established or changed in a social sel- ting. Half ofthe participants stated in ao individual vest- jing format and were then introduced to a group format; for the other half of the participants, this order was reversed. Sherif found thatthe group exerted a strong influence 00 the efinition of the stimulus. When teed in the group setting first, respondeats gave essentially the same esti- mates of movement, and those estimates remained stable ‘teross two additional testing sessions, even though the ange of movement varied by group on average one to five inches. When these group participants were subsoquenity ‘moved into an individual testing situation, they cartied the group norm with them. Those participants who started ‘With the individual sessions established widely divergent tstimates of movement, verying by as much as seven inches. The divergent estimates converged in the first froup session, however, and stayed close forthe next 140 {r00p sessions, although not as close as inthe participants ‘who started with the group. On the basis of these rests, Sherif (1936) concluded that unstable situations evoke confusion and uncertainty. Under such ciscumstances, people asunve that “the group rust be right” (p. 113) and Took to the group to establish a common gor. Sherif’ r= search showed how contact with others influences our in tediate pereptions of reality. This influence can aio be Jntermalized; Rohrer ets. (1954) found that people who ‘were retested individvally as much as a year after the hhorm induction sil reported the group norm. ‘Once established, how are norms perpetuated? Saccbs and Carnpbell (1961) examined the perseverance of ati {rary cultral norms using the same antokiaetic phenomne- fnon. They found that ei panicipans gave the grou? ‘norma more weight than their individual senses, even whe the group adopted an unikely position. Confederates Were instructed to report movement that ranged fom fifteen 10 seen inches, even though the average among the como besChapter 21 / Social Influence: Social Norms, Confor group was 3.8 inches. In order to determine the persever- ‘ance of norms, the confederate(s) were rotated out of the {uoup an replaced by nave patipants. Eventhough tot hysicaly present, the confederate fluence remained: the subsequent groups of naive patcipants continued to hold the aberrant norm for ap average of five genertons. Laer research demonstrated thatthe moro arbitrary the manipulated norm (-e, seventesn inches versus twelve Jnches versus no nom, the more icky is infhvence dis- appeared from the population {MacNeil & Sherif, 1976) "These studies examined the process of developing and transmiing norms bout an ambiguovs sls, but the mount of physical movernent exhibited by the point of Tight does have a “comet” answer. Sheifs (1936) re- search on the formation of aorms indicted tht inthe ab- Sence of an objective rle for beevior, people were most Tikely fo behave according 16 the group consensus. Ha this ene, the group's behavior proves a valuable heuristic, fr imple decison ae, aboot how to at effectively inthe Sinton CTversky & Kahneman, 1974), Tis motivation be accurate in our judgments and bchaviors evident in @ aiety of areas of normative sos inlocace © which We now tim ‘The Goal of Kiffeetive Action [As humans, we ate motivated to act im ways that are effec- tive in achieving our goals: we want to make accurate deci- ‘sions. White (1959) describes the motivation for compe- tence as “an organism's capacity to iateract effectively ‘with its environment” (p. 297). He further argues that in- terest in accurately perceiving and dealing with our envi- ronment is an adaptive strategy that is present from birth {in the form of focal attention and object perception), and that this “effeetance” motivation goes beyond object ma- nipulation to exploration of the social environment, in ‘order to understand and interact effectively with others. Descriptive Norms One source of evidence that people look to when trying to maximize the effectiveness of their social behavior isthe descriptive not operating in the sit- tation (Cialdii, Kallgrea, & Reno, 1991; Ciakdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Schaffer, 1983). Descriptive norms are derived from what other people do in any given situation. ‘Watching others provides information about what is “aor- tnal” io a novel or ambiguous situation (Gilbert, 1995; Stiff, 1994), When the appropriate behavior is unclear, we tend 10 rely on “social reality” as displayed by others (Pes- tinger, 1954). In addition, others’ behavior provides con- ‘ensus information: the greater the number of people who ‘espoud to the same situation in the same way, the more somrect we will perceive the behavior to be (Thibaut & Kel- Jey, 1959). & wide variety of research shows thatthe be- havior of others in our social eaviroament shapes our own 1 and Complionce 155 imerpretstion of and response to a situation, even without ‘over indettnaton; for example, Milgram, Bickman, and Berkowiez (1969) were able to induce 8 percent of pedes- trians passing « city stect comer to gaze up into space at sothing by simply having a group of confederates model the behavior. According to Cildini (1993), when we per- ‘ceive sulficiemt socal support for a particular behavior, We follow others’ Jeads because this heuristic of “social root” saves us ine and cognitive ffort while providing ‘an outcome that has a high probability of being effective, ‘We are mos likely to use the evidence of others behav- for to decide the most effective course of action when the situation is novel, ambiguous, or uncertain (Sherif, 1936: See also Deulach & Gerard, 1955; Tesser, Campbell, & ‘Mickler, 1983), and especially when te source of refer~ nce is similar vo us (Festinger, 1954), We ean maximize the effecveness ofthis tendency to model our behaviors after thes if we follow those who are not only similas to be, but sucessful ax well t would not be adaptive to ran- domly follow just anyone in our environment, Rasher, thore who snecessfully model effective behavioe will have fan advantage over those who do not. As noted by ADison (1992), “Imitation may Be ubiquitous but it ix not indis- ‘riminate” (p. 284); and poople should be more likely to {tnitate those who have Visible signs of success, uch as ‘wealth, power, oF stats Tn effer to determine the effects of descriptive norms con behavior, Calin. Reno, ad Kalgren (3990) designed 2 series of studio in natural settings to examine titering behavior. These investigators manipulated the descrip ‘ont for fitering behavior by cootelling the amount of it ter ina varity of environmen («parking garige, am amusement park); the envionment was either clean (ant- liering descriptive non) or litered(gro-Litering deserp- tive norm). Subjects were always conveniently provided a hhandbill to toss (with, for example, a reminder to drive carefully. Tn general. the frst few studies supported the importance of descriptive norms in eliciting norm-consis- teat behavior, regardless of whether the norm was either yro- or ani-itering: people tended to iter significantly neve ino a litered eqvironment than into a clean envizon- ‘ent This tendency was particulary strong when subjects! tention was directed to the descriptive norm in the set ting, When a confederate litored into an already hitered tavironment thereby focusing atenion on the trashed set- Ling, people were mos Tikely to lites, When the confeder- ate tittered into clea environment, however, thereby highlighting the lack of Titer, people litered Yess than they did when there was a clean environment with no confser~ te modeling litering. (See the section "Goal Confic: The Role of Norm Salieace" later in this chapter for a more compete discussion of the importance of focus in explain- ing the relationship between norms and behavior) "The role of esbiguity in secking social proof informs-ee ————————————————————— 156 Part Foe / Interpersonal Phenomena ton is clearly ilustrated in Latané and Darley’s research ‘on he circumstances that affect bystander intervention du Sng emergencies (Latané & Darley, 19682, 1968; Latané & Nida, 198i). They were intrigued by the popolarattribu- tions given for the lethal inaction of Kitty Genovese's neighbors, thity-eight of whom listened while she was brutally beaten and stabbed in three separate attacks over the course of thiny-five minutes in the dead of night, no fone calling the potice until after she had been murdered, "The popular press attributed her death to the widespread apathy and alienation that consumes the humanity of any= fone who lives in a city the size of New York. Latané and Darley hypothesized, however, Uist her mordes had Yess (0 do with New York zesidents’ apathy than with the fact that 50 many neighbors obviously heard her pleas for help. The residents were looking for evidence that other neighbors had defined the situation as an emergency: finding n0 evi- donce that anything was amiss, their “pluralistic igno- rance™ cost Gonevose her life. Subsequent research has 16~ peatedly shown that, when alone, bystenders to Emergencies almost always help: bat in the presence of ‘others who are not moving to help. most people withhold assistance (Batson, 1998, in this Handbook; Latané & ‘Nida, 1981), ‘Although not specifically manipulating norms as de- sexiptve per se, a varity of oshor social influence phenom tena are consistent with the “social proof 2s information to. ‘ward right living” interpretation. Several years ago, a small [New Jersey town was suddenly plagued with the deaths of several teenagers, all of whom had taken their own lives Parents and schoc! officials feared thatthe town's children Ihad entered into a scoret death pact that would eventually decimate their youth population. According to the research ‘on suicide imitation, however, a conspiracy theory was NOt heeded wo explain why the tocnagers were killing them= elves, Instead, all that was needed was an understanding Df the power of sacial proof to legitimize suicide as a method for dealing with he troubles of life. Phillips (1974) first dubbed the phenomenon the “Werther effect.” after the effect of Goethe's 1774 novel, The Sorrows of Young, Werther At the ond of the story, Werther commits suicide, and the poplar book's publication spurred arash of iit tive suicides across Europe. Not simply the products of their tine, similar social phenomena bave been noted after the suicide deaths of Marilya Monroe in 1962 and Yukiko ‘Okada, a popular Japanese singer, in 1986 (UPI, April 23, 1986). Phillips and his colleagues, among others. have Tooked at monthly and daily Quetuations inthe suicide rate hhoth before and after publicized deaths (Phillips, 1974; Philips & Carstensen, 1986). They have found increases in suicides following front-page suicide stories in the news; the copycat suicides were clustered inthe geographical re igion where the publicized suicide occurred, and the in- ‘crease was evident even after the Jata were corrected for seasonal effects and a linear increase in suicide frequency. “Although others have argued that the effect holds only for the publicized suicides of American entenainess and potiti- teal celebrities (Kessler ot al., 1988; Stack, 1987), Stack (1990) found significant increases after both eclebrity and roncelebrity suicides, but larger increases after celebrity suicides. Jonas (1992) recently found similar evidence fol Towing the suicides of prominent citizens over a twelve ‘year period ip a region of West Germany. The effect also hholds true for highly publicized media portrayals of fic- tional suicides in television movies and regular program ‘ming (Berman, 1988; Platt, 1987; Schmidtke & Hafner, 1988). Moreover, while the method of suicide chosen by the imitators may not always be obviously self-inflicted, it is noncthetess lethal. Phillips (1979) also found that, im- ‘mediately following front-page coverage of a suicide, the rutnber of people who died in commercial-sirtine crashes jumped by 1,000 percent. A corresponding jump was also found in the nummer of singke-passenger automobile fatali- ties (Philips 1980). Phillips (1989) argues that people imitate famous sui- ‘ides because the ensuing media coverage demonstrates that, rather than being punished, the deceased is accorded attention and status not conferred in life, Therofore, the so- cial stigm associated with suicide i lifted, and the result ing disinhibition allows those who have previously curbed their suicidal tendencies to follow through with their sup- ‘pressod plans. Additional evidence indiestes not only that the publicizing of suicides may make suicide appear to be fan effective solution to cusrent problems, but thatthe ue derlying causal mechanism may include the social proof of ‘similarity as well (Cialdini, 1993), People are most likely ‘to commit a copycat suicide when the precipitating suicide, 3s committed by someone who is similar in age oF sex. For instance, Schmidike and Hafner (1988), who examined suicides after & German TV series showed « male adoles- tent committing suicide by throwing himself in the path of 8 tain, found a reliable increase in suicides committed in that manner, primarily among adolescent males. Phill {(1980) analyzed the match between the precipitating soi ‘cide vietim and the car crash victim(s), and found chat newspaper stories that report suicide victims who died alone produce an increase inthe frequency of single-fotal- ity wrecks only, whereas stories reporting suicide-plus- ‘murder incidents produce an increase in multiple-fatality ‘wrecks only. Moreover, for those who died in singlo-car crashes, the ages of tho cupyeat victims were similar to the ages of the precipitating suicide victim. Apparently, the ‘principle of social proof is sufficiently powesful tha it can Jegitimize the suicidal behavior of @ similar person, allow ing troubled individuals to take not only their own Hives. ‘bat sometimes the lives of innocent others as wel ‘Another area in which descriptive norms present 2 per ticularly potent, and potentially damaging, form of socialChapter 21 / Soctal Influence: Socal Norms, Conformity, and Compliance uence is drug use, The current school-based approach eventing drug use among adolescents has emphasized ial skills training (how to resist) and prescriptive tain- ‘ovhy to resis), with a trong recommendation that peer 4ers be involyed in disseminating information and mod- 1g successful resistance behavior (Botvin, 1995; Don- son, 1995; Hansen etal, 1988). Recent field reports i ‘ale, however, that while the preseriptive component -mipts (0 instil appropriate values opposing drug use, ‘ial skills training can change students’ descriptive ‘ms concerning the prevalence of drug use o a more lib- estimate. The resistance practice carsies with it the _ssage that drug offers are commonplace, leading toa de- iptive norm of higher drag use than actually exists. Sev- 41 prevention researchers have actually reported a merang effect, with students reporting more drug use ter sotial skills training (Donaldson ct a, 1995; Moberg Piper, 1995), On the other hand, Alberts, Miller-Rassulo, 4 Heche (1991) found that, by reducing the perceived valence of drug nse in the school, reports of drog use eased, Tn other words, evidence indicates that drvg pre- ition progeams that do not simultaneously teach resis- ‘ce skills and lower the perccived prevalence of drug use ty notonly be ineffective, but may actually promote drug. among adolescents. Consistent with this conclusion, re- nit meta-analyses indicate that the most successful pre- rion programs For adolescents not only teach resistance ills, but also modify the social proof for using drugs: the Dpgrams change the descriptive norms about the preva- ace of use among students and are delivered and rein- recd by similar others, their peers (Tobler, 1986, 1995). ‘Our simple perceptions of what others in our social en- tonment are doing can affect how we perceive and inter- CCwith others in more benign ways as well. Buonk and akker (1995) found that people's perceptions of the fre- tency of their friends" extradyadic sexual experiences as all as their friends’ willingness to engage in such behav- + both had significant effects on their own willingness t0 3 80. Rutte, Wilke, and Messick (1987) manipulated con- tions of scarcity oF abundance ia a commons dilemma sk by varying the amount of money group members ould harvest from a common pool. They artificially ere ‘ed the appearance that thase who had harvested earlier in trial had either taken mote than their share (ie, setting norm of selfishness) or had taken Tess than their share €., setting a norm of generosity). Their results supported te notion that the participants Jooked to the behavior of se group members who had gone before 10 decide how auch money to take: those who sar others acting in a self th manner were selfish themselves, whercas those who sw others acting generously were more generous. “The purpose of the preceding discussion was to review Vidence that when the appropriate behavior ina situation 5 unclear, we sometimes look (0 the behavior of those 157 around us to find out what to do. Ths type of acquiescence is similar to informational influence that leads to confor~ amity, defined by Deutsch and Gerard (1955) as “influence te accept information gbtained form another as evidence about reality” (p. 629). As indicated, infonnational infio- ‘ence is based in the desire to make correct decisions, and ‘thers’ behaviors give us the teatity check we need to act clfectively. Deutsch and Gorard (1955) also identified a second type of conformity, normative influence, “influence to conform with the positive expectations of another" (p. 629). Consistent with that goal, we also avoid acting in ‘ways that will be met with social punishment or disap- proval, Accuracy becomes less important when the focal ‘goa! is building and maintaining satisfactory relationships ‘with others (Kelley, 1972). We now tum to research explor- ing the normative social influence that results from the seed to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) ‘The Goal of Building and Maintaining Social Relationships ‘As noted earlier, our ancestors may have started to wear clothing For protection against the elements of nature, but ‘choosing to clothe oneself in x colorful serape rather than fn equally colorful baseball jersey has more to do with fit- ting, in with the local customs than with the need for pro- tection, Similarly, some teenagers forgo their friends’ of- fers 10 use drugs because they know that, if caught, their parents would ground them untit emancipation. Other Teenagers, however, accept those same offers from friends because using drugs makes them accepted as “one of the crowd” (Alberts etal, 1991; Newcomb et al., 1988). Be- sides clarifying reality, thea, social norms have the power to influence because they clarify the behaviors that aze ex [pected of us by those in our social world. In this section we ‘vill examine types of norms that po beyond simply de- setibing appropriate bchavior to prescribing it, as well 95 proscribing inappropriate behavior. Injunctive Norms The “non” construct is most popo- {arly used to refer to behaviors that are accompanid by 50- cial acceptance or approval by others (Allison, 1992; Opp. 1982). According to Cialdini, Kallgreo, and Reno (1991), these injunctive norms “characterize the perception of ‘what most people approve or disapprove” (p. 203). They specify what “should” be done and are therefore the moral zhles of the group. Injunctive norms motivate behavior by promising social rewards or punishments fori. For exam ple, one reason we may fest obligated to help others is that a societal norm preseribes socially responsible behavior (Batson, 1998, inthis Handbook; Reskowitr, 1972; Staub. 1972), Likewise, the norm of reciproeity dictates that a ‘stranger or mere acquaintance who does us a favor expects 10 be able to “call jn” that favor when he of she has a simi-——————————— 158 Part Five { Interpersonal Phenomena tar need (Gouldner, 1960; for a fuller discussion of reci- ‘procty, see the section “Compliance” later in this chapter.) {injunctive norms can take the form of laws, but our discus- sion is limited to ilhustraive norms that are enforeed by 80- ial sanctions, not legal actions. ‘An early study im the social psychology of normative influence arose out of a naturally unfolding situation at Bennington College, where Theodore Newcomb was # fac- ‘ity member, Newcomb (1943) describes the power of in- jjunetive norms to confer popularity and social stats. Bon rington College was a newly established women’s college in New Hampshire when Newcomb was a member of the faculty in the fate 1930s. The women who artended the uni versity came from the privileged Fast Coast establishment and brought thei parents’ conservative political views with them. A north favoring left-wing politics emerged among, the young and liberal faculty members. The norm spread {nto the student population and was embraced by the more popular women on campus. Newcomb’s analysis indicates that, over time, the norm was not only associated with greater popblarity, bat the more advanced students begat to Sanction the newer students who did not express left-wing sentiments. “More recent rescarch indicates that injunctive pores need not be expressed im oncr to direct behavior, and that the reward of popularity is sufficiently powerful to elicit even health-threstening behavior. Crandall (1988) exam- {ned the prevalence of binge eating among sorority sisters to uy to determine whether the high rate of bulimia was ddue to individual predispositions or uo a more general so- Gal influence operating on a group level. ln both sororities ‘Studied, binge eating increased among members during their first year in the house. In one sorority, the level of binging was postively correlated with popularity; shat is, the most popular and well-connected women inthe soror- Sty alse hinged more. Consistent with the notion that we ‘develop local norms for behavior, the most popular mem ‘pers of the second sorority Dinged only @ moderate ‘amount; those a either extreme (100 much oF too Jitle ing) were less popular. In both cases, however, the amount that these wornen binged moved toward the aver fags of their friendship network overtime. Even though the Social approval ascribed to binging behavior was not ex plicitly tanght of eacouraged, the relationship between binging and popularity was clear ‘Since the beginaing of the environmental movement in the Tate 1960s, an antifitering norm has been an integral aspect of the American collective conscience (Cialdini, Kallgrcn, & Reno, 1991, Study 5). Cialdini, Reno, and Katlgren (1990, Study 5) investigated the effects of prim. ing either an antiitering norm or oder norms that varied in their conceptual closeness to littering (recycling. encray Conservation, voter awareness, and support for Focal muse~ tums). They activated the norm by placing a handbill with a corresponding message (eg “April is Keep Arizona ‘Beautiful Month. Please Do Not Litter.") under the wind shield wiper of library patrons’ cars while they were in the building, The parking lot was lightly littered, and wnobou- sive observers recorded patrons’ littering when they re~ fumed to their cars, When the antilittering norm was primed, only 10 percent of the handbilts were thrown on the ground. As the message's concepuial distance from lit tering increased, s0 did actual litering: in the nonnotma- tive (upport local musenms) condition, 25 percent of the hrandbills were thrown to the ground. An claborate follow up study strengthened the priming effect through percep- tual narrowing by manipulating physical aroosal and found a similar rend in the arousal condition (Kallgren, Cadi, & Reno, 1989). ‘Some researchers have subsumed the antilitering norm ‘under a larger injunctive norm, the norm of social respon sibility (Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). The socia} responsi- bility norm is an expectation that people should help those who need help, without expecting or requesting repayment (Berkowitz, 1972). This norm mandates not only that we help those who depend on others for their welfare, such 0s children and the eMerly, but that we have a sense of obliga- tion for the welfare of humanity in general (Staub, 19725 Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). Although wanting to show that people are socially responsible simply because 1 ‘makes them feel good, Berkowitz and his colleagues have hhad difficulty demonstrating that people help others with- fot thinking about the possible consequences (such as re- ‘yanis) (Batson, 1998, inthis Handbook; Berkowitz, 1972) For example, Berkowitz and Lutierman (1968) measored Sndividuals’ knowledge of the norm and found that those ‘who were high on social responsibility tended to do what- ever they perceived their social group thought was right, ‘thor than being motivated hy a sense of obligation to oth- crs in general, Given that approval by others is one of the underlying. goals of socially responsible behavior, he source of infla- fence should have a inarked effect on our felt obligation to follow the norma of social responsibility. Accordingly, @ similar soprce can trigger normative behavior more casily than a dissitniler source, at illustrated in research by Hor stein, Fisch, and Holmes (1968). They placed wallets on the ground in randomly distributed spots around midtown Manhattan, All of the wallets contained the same amount ‘of money, oviner identification, and a fetter. The content of the letter was the only variable in the stady. In all eases, the Teller indicated that the wallet had heen lost once before, Teading one to conchude that it must have been dropped this time by the person who was attempting to return i€ (0 it6 ‘original owner. The avtbor of the beter is what varied: the First good samaritan was either obviously American (and therefore similar to the new samaritan) or obviously 11> ceeat immigrant. The second samaritans clearly were a fe nee pererunee 1 ‘ 1Chapter 21 / Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance y the similarity of the leer writer: twice as many {the lead of the similar American in returning the 8 did those exposed to the socially responsible ex- rovided by the dissimilar foreigner. tctive norms are pervasive and powerful, Although ‘chosen to explain normative social influence using ‘w illustrations, we ean list other norms that ae i= «auch as the incest taboo, respect for elders, and 1 against unprovoked aggression. Knowing how tive others’ expectations for us is important in un- Jing how those perceptions influence our behavior, bein and Ajzen (1975) argued that in order t9 pre- tavior, we must also express our willingness to z0 “ith those expectations. five Norms. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; Ajren & 1, 1980) developed the theory of reasoned action as nse to assertions that the concept of attitudes was ticularly useful in predicting behavior (Festinges, Nicker, 1969: For a fuller discussion, see Peuty & tr, 1998, in this Handboo}). In addition to tackling reasurement issues, such as matching afitade and or specificity (see Ragly & Chaiken, 1998, in this volt), they argued that part of the difficulty in pre- ‘behavior from attitudes was that wn important de- tnt of behaviors and behavioral intentions had to be ted with attitude valencs: subjective norms. A sub- ‘non is “the person's perception that most people ‘© important fo him think he should or should not nh the behavior in question” (Fishbein & Ajzen, >, 302), We ean assess subjective noms disectly by people to describe their perceptions of the injume- ms held by the people whose opinions matter most 23, as well as thei willingness to follow these diree~ feasuring subjective norms, then, requires people 10 'y the referents whose opinions are important, de- the referents’ expectations for their behavior, and scribe the extent to which they are willing fo com: th those norms, For instance. in predicting the lkeli= that people will donate blood, itis necessary to mea- >t omy hove strongly they believe in the necessity of 1g blood (their cn attitudes), but also their petoep- af their fiicnds' and families? expectations regarding, stood donations (thei referents’ expectations about ‘onating blood), and the extent to which they want to ¥ with these expectations. These two components, _esand subjective norms, are then weighted and com= ‘to fora an individoal's Behaviors intention, which is © predict behavio itudes have traditionally beon weighted most heavily culating behavioral intentions (Sheppard, Hartwick, shaw, 1948), possibly because most of the research ‘cused on measuring individual beliaviors in relatively settings (Stiff, 1994). Some behaviors are more sus~ 159 ‘ceptible to social influence, however, and therefore more strongly determined by subjective norms (Fishbein & ‘Ajzen, 1975), For instance, Fishbein (1966) found that un- Search results. The. SIM also added perameters 10 the model, including type of task, source consistency, type OF troup, and individual differences in suscoptiility to nflu- ‘Campbell and Fairey (1989) argued that the difference ‘between the two models could be explained by examina tion of the underlying processes of informational and nor mative influence, In & computerized dot estimation task, they manipolated the availablity of normative and infer- ‘ational influence By regulating the group size, the mum- ber of exposures tothe stimulus materials, und the extem= ity of the error. They found support for the SFT title tifference between the effects of one or three sources) ‘when informational needs were high—tat is, when the ad- Vocated group position was close to reality or moderately iecrepant and when deprived of information (only one &% posure to the stimalvs). Support for the SIM was strongest ‘vhon normative influence should be most apparent; hati the second and third sources exerted more impact than the first only when the group position was obviously W7Ong and participants had repeated opportunities to serminize the stimu.(Chapter 21 / Social Influence: Saciel Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 165 Although there isa difference in the precision of the two models’ fit to the data, both the SIT and the SIM can predict the amount of influence that will be exercised by fone source up to many sources, capturing quantitative dif ferences in influence across a variety of influence settings. However, others have argued thst, 10 understand the effects ‘of faction size om influence, it is critical to explain the psy- chological processes underlying the observed influence in addition to describing the form of the function (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Levine & Russo, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Cial- ini, 1987), Ta particutar, Serge Moscovici (1976, 1980, 1985; Moscoviei & Pauchewx, 1972) has advocated the power of & minority to exercise influence, and argued that ‘minorities and majorities do so via diferent processes. Majority and Minority Social Influence To counter the “conformity bias" That had eharacterized social influence rescarch well ito the 1960s, Moscavici and his colleagues began a program of research to demonstrate that social in- floence is a rociprocal process in which both the minority target and the majority souree are agents and receivers of influence, Frota this perspective, « minerity is not simply passive target avcepting the influence of the more mumer- ‘ous majusity it also has the ability to challenge the stars ‘quo, creating cortfict god the possibility of innovation as ‘apposed to stagnation.” According to Moscovici (1976), a dissenting minority breaks the consensus of the majority, Challenging the validity of the majoety position and creat ing a dilemma between risking deviance by accepting the ‘minority’s informational advantage (conversion) or main- taining the social sopport provided by complying with the majority position (compliance). Arguing that and majorities elicit different outcomes, Moscovici (1980, 1985) predicted that they would also vigger distinct social iatuence processes. ‘Moscovie's (1980, 1985) dual-process model proposes that a contrary majority, such as the Force created in the ‘Asch paradigm, elicits a comparison process for the targot ‘of influence, who focuses on the discrepancy between his or her position and that advocated by the more numerous ‘majority. This focus outward on the majority message trig- ger the necd for consensus, producing coropliance with (but not internalization of) the majority position. On the ‘other hand, a contrary minonity elicits a validation process forthe target, whe is compelled to examine the accuracy of the minority position critically ifthe minority presents 2 re- alistc, consisientallemative viewpoint. Since the target is sorotinizing & reasonable message, this examination shond elicit internalized change. Resolving the confliet between minority and majority influence should take the path of Teast resistance (Moscoviei, 1980). That is, when con- ‘ronted witha disagrecable majority, itis easier to maintain ‘one’s public image by publicly complying with the major- ity, but not changing one’s internal attitude, Publicly agree~ ing with » deviant minority, however, can damage one’s reputation (Mugny, 1982); therefore, it may be easier to change one’s inteonl opinion without voicing itn publi ‘Moscoviei's dual-process model remains controversial (Gee Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Latané & Wolf, 1981; Wolf, 1987), Even so, an extensive body of literature hax developed in the past twenty-five years supporting “Moseoviei's contention that numerically inferior minorities ‘can exert influence (for reviews see Levine & Moreland, 1998, in this Handbook; Lovine & Russo, 1987; Maass & Clark, 1984; Maass, West, & Cialdini, 1987; Moscoviei, 1980, 1985; Moscovici, Muechi-Faina, & Maass, 1994; Nemeth, 1986; Wood et al., 1994). Wood et al’s (1994) ‘meta-analysis indicates that majorities tend to have more influence on public measures and private, direct measures, ‘while minorities have more influence on private, indirect measures (although minerity influence has also been found fon direct measures; see Maass & Clark, 1983; Trost, ‘Maass, & Kenrick, 1992). The persistence of minority-in- ‘duced change has received litle research attention. ‘Aithough minorities have exerted social influence on ‘opinion judgments (for example, soe Maass & Clask, 1983; ‘Mugny, 1975, 1982; Paicheler, 1976, 1977), the original re search employed 2 reversal of the Asch paradigm. “Moscoviei, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969) exposed groups of four naive participants to two confederates who consis: tently announced throughout repeated tials that an obvi ‘ously blue slide was green. Then the participants were ‘asked to identify the color of the slide themselves, a rola tively unambiguous task, Those who were not exposed to minority influence save one grecn slide one time (0-25 per ‘cont of the trials). One-third of those in the minority india. ‘ence condition said the sfide was green in approximately & percent of the tials, x significant increase, Subsequent re- search has shown that consistency is an essential criterion {for eliciting minority influence (Nemeth, Swediund, & ‘Kank, 1974); a consistent minority of two is more influen- tial than either a consistent individual or an inconsistent minority (Moscovici & Lage, 1976), and a minority that shifts to a less extreme position has litle influence (Kiesler & Palak, 1975: Paicheler, 1976, 1977). ‘Although the minority may instigate an informational conflict, when people are instructed to be accurate they tend to rely on the consensos heuristic and the majority pe- sition, Moscoviei and Lage (1978) directed their pantici= pants to foens on generating either au original response cr ‘an objective response to the side color labeling cask and found that, as the accuracy goal becaime more salient, the ‘majority's influence increased (and vice versa for the orig ality norm), They argued that the majority elicits conver- once on the group norm, whereas a dissenting minority clicits innovative responsos, Nemeth’s (1986) review of her problem-solving studies further illustrates that a minority———————E—EE——— 166 ‘Part Five / Interpersonal Phencment ‘voice frees the langet to respond to objective tasks in cre tive ways that diverge from the majority position. “The desire to be accurate in our choices and behaviors makes us susceptible to influence from sources that create conflict between their perceptions and ours. We have re- viewed a variety of perspectives and factors that address Wihen and bow thot clash will result in informational social Tafluence. Throughout the discussion, bowever, i has been ‘lew that the desise to conforin in order to receive accep tanve and approval can also be strong enough 10 case Us 10 deny ovr oven perceptions. We now tara to research rcle- vant to this second goal ‘The Goal of Buikding and Maintaining Social Relationships ‘The socia} rewards of conformity can be many, as evi enced by what happens to nonconformists: people Who deviate from the group consensus are disliked, rejected, sand unvamted (sce Levine, 1980, or a review). The dressy Tiree, or msnnerisms of our close friends and allies are hho mote effective than those of our enemies, but similarity ‘breeds Hiking. People shave their heads and pierce their eyebrows not 0 fit in with the “dominant” culture But eet tainly to be more accepted by their peer group. Resourch ‘on emotional contagion has shown that we oven snimie the facil expressions, vocal expressions, pstares, and instro- mental bchaviors of those we value in order to enhanes our connection with them (Hatfield, Cucioppo, & Rapson, {1993), From the perspective of adaptive group behavicr, conformity can be a “virtue,” because it provides 1 sense (of trust that allows interdependence among group members (Campbell, 1975). Therefore, conforming to the behaviors tnd practices of important reference groups can make Us tore likable und desirable. Not surprisingly, normative s- Thal influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) also pulls the in- dividual toward the group consensus. As we Wall S02, COO formity is stronger when responses are made in public and the proup is largo, interdependent, and attractive or valued. tn addition, individual and cultural differences can enhance: cur suscepibility o conformity pressures, ‘Sitoational Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Ap- proval. The ealy conformity researcher ll reperted tbat Pasticipants adopted the group position for two reasons: ei- Thor because they thought they were wrong or because it Seemed ensior to go along with the group than to disagree (ach, 1956; Crotchtild, 1955, Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) {ris stressful to stand up against a majority opinion {Migny, 198% Nemeth & Wachter, 1983) because minor- tty opinions ean be mot with laughter and derision (Asch, 1956, Schachter, 1951). Several contextual factors appear to enhance the salience of social approval, howeves. ‘Enhancing the feeling that one belongs to a group rather thon to an unconnected set of independent individuals ‘should enhance the power of normative influence. Interde~ pendence regoires that al group members work with exch ‘ther toward a common goat (Allen, 1965). Deutsch snd ‘Gerard (1955) tested the Simportance of perceived interde~ pendence by offering a reward (a pair of Broadway tickets for each group member) for the groups who made the fewest erzors. When interdependent, the level of confor. rity tothe group was twice that of the noninterdependent ‘Condition. Similar results were found in studies using ma- terial rewards Jones, Wells, & Torrey, 1958) and social re~ wards (Thibaut & Strickland, 1956). "The extent to which the responses are public also affects conformity. Unless a person koows that the group will tearm everyone's responses, there is file need to conform to obviously joaccurate responses. Many researchers have found loss Conformity on private responses than on public responses (for instance, Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955: Tnsko etal, 1985). Insko et al. (1985) specifically ‘manipulated the nature of the response (public verses psi- vate) 38 well as the size of the influence factor (one versos Four others) and the ebility to verify one’s responses ata fater ime. They presented a somewhat ambiguous task. asking participants to rete whether a blue-green slide was nore similar loa bive or toa green slide. They found evi- dence consistent with normative influence: participants ‘conformed more when making public judgments toa larze troup, On the other hand, they also found evidence of in- Formational influence: participants also conformed: more ‘when they knew they could check the correct answers Iater. ‘Once again, bth concems affeeted sovial influence. "Tho mature ofthe response affects not only respomae v= tence, but also the internalization of social influence. There js considerable evidence (see Nail, 1986) that people pub fiely confon to an inaccurate group jadement on objective tacks, bot do not continue to conform when responses he ‘come private. Hence, normative social influences may not te lasting, especially on objective tasks. On the other hand. ‘when the task is rlatively ambiguous or difficult (as in the ‘Sherif [1936] study), the individual ts moro likely to accept the informational influence provided by the group and ex ‘bit both public and private agsecrent "The group's attractiveness can affect its power to nfl: ‘ence behavior, although the effects are not consistent. We Tike people who are similar vo us (Byene, 1971), and we sometimes take on the behaviors and affecations of people te want 10 emulate (Kelman’s [1958] concept of identi Cation), Accordingly, couformity is greater when friends fare in the group (Festinger, Schachter. & Back, 1950: Lot & Lott, 1961; Thibaut & Strickland, 1956), whon the pet Son values the group oF feels valued by the group (Dittes & alley, 1956; Kelley & Shapiro, 1954), and when individa, als believe that group assignment has been based on shared Characteristics (Gerard, 1954), More contemporary stodiesChapter 21 1 Socal Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 167 ‘continue to find greater conformity 19 liked or similar oth ‘ers. A study conducted in Japan compared the conformity Tevels of intact groups to that of groups of unacquainted students and foond a significantly higher error rate for the intact groups (Williams & Sogon, 1984), Similarly. psy= chology students who believed their performance was ‘being evatuated by another psychology major conformed more than those who thought they were being evaluated by fn ancient-history major (Abrams et al., 1990). Several studies have not found attraction effects in perceptual judg- ments, such as the autokinetic phenomenon (Downing, 1058) and the Asch experiment (Harper, 1961), Similar thers may be more valuable sources for subjective judg ‘ments than they are for seemingly objective tasks (Goren- flo & Crano, 1989), Individual Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Ap- proval In addition to situational factors, individual char- ceristcs, including several personality traits and gender, am affect suscopkibility to conformity pressures, Crit field's (1955) malitary leaders not only unwitingly partici pated in a conformity study; they also ftled out several Personality scales. He divided them into “independents” tral “conformiss" based on thir conformity behavior and found thatthe Independent men were higher in intellectual effectiveness, maturity, and ego stength, while being lower than conformiats in rigidity, cxcessivese-control, and ae thortarionattudes. Conformity was also negatively corre- lated with tolerance. responsibilty, and social paricipa- tion, Although these are interesting anecdotal data, they still beg the question of whether particular ypes of people are more Bkey to confor than others. ‘Stein (1963) developed a Self-descripsion Typology based upon Murray's (1938) motivational aspects of per sonality. One type in panicular, the conformity-oriented, is ‘of most interest here. Those who report a high ned for con formity are fearful of criticism by others, cially anxious, deferent to authority, and situatonaly focused as opposed to internally focused (Neulinger & Stein, 971). They ae alsa very high in personal peed for structure Roman ta, 1995), or am organized and clearly strvctured life. Although not tated specifically within a conformity paradigm, con- formity-oriented types reported enjoying am unpleasant it~ sonance task more when fored to perform it than when given the chee (the opposite of the attr found in typ- al dissonance sties) (Nevlinger, 196). Another personality characteristic that specifically x amines attetion to one’s social surroundings is self-momi- toring, although again it has not beca tested specifically in 2 conformity setting (see Snyder, 1979), High self-moni- tors have been characterized as social chameleons: they ane highly responsive tothe demands of eny situation in which they find themselves. The soeial approval of peers should therefore have a stronger impact onthe behavior of high, 5 opposed to low, slf-monitrs, Supportive evidence indi- ates tht high selfmonitrs ate more likely than Fo stf- monitors o expres fale atitude (Zanna & Olson, 1982) ‘Similarly, peopic who have a high necd for affiliation are also mee conforming (MeGhee & Tesvan, 1967) Finally, those who tnd to eek social approval conform aor 60 a {group's unanimous judgment than those low ina desire for Sccal approval (Strickland & Crowne, 1962) ‘Considerable controversy as surrounded the existence of gender diferences in conformity. The common wisdom is that women conform more readily Wan men do, aid Some early revearch reports sported that notion (Asch, 1956; Crutchfield, 1985, ahough fining contradictory evidence, 100), a8 di several ltrature reviews (for exam ple, Coopec, 1979; Nord, 1969). Eagly and Cari 1981) Eondueted 4 meta-analysis of ai persuasion and confor- rity stages specfclly to examine gender effect in ss- epttility to social influence. Oveali, the gender effect sras small ta reliable, indicating that women fend to be Gly slighty more susceptible seca influence than men {an effect equal in size to a corcation of 05 to 08) ‘Among soca influence studies in general, then, there a pear fo be no appreciable gender differences. One tye of Eonformity study does, however, seem to foster more eon formity in women than im men (Eagy, 1978): the type in ‘ling face to face, pobic interactions, such asthe Asch paracipm. Athough one explanation for this effec x that fvomen are more concerned with maintaining group har mony than weith accuracy (Eaply, 1978), a subsequent ‘Mody found that rien were particle resistant to perso son in the group seting, nd women were equally con- forming on pubic and private responses (Eaely, Wood, & Fashbaugh, 1981). tn other words, men's tendency € ro Iain indepersieat in the face of socal pressure may have» Stronger pull onthe gender effect than women’s tendency to smocdh and facilitate interactions, athough the die cence is negligible. Cultural Factors Affecting Conformity for Social Ap- proval Conformity appears to be a universal phenome- ron, but the level of conformity varies by culture (Bond, 1988; Triandis eta, 1988), Milgram (1961) conducted » series of studice using a modified Asch paradigm in Nor. ‘way and France. He found that the Norwegian students ‘vere significantly more likely to conform than the French students, as errors ranged from 50 to 75 percent in Norway and from 34 to 59 pervent in Prance, Mitgram speculated thatthe differences were culturally based, since the Norwe- fins have 8 reputation for being more united and socially responsive, whereas the French have a long history of eri cal judgment, diverse opinions, and dissent. Whitaker and ‘Meade (1967) repeated Asch’s conformity experiment in several countries and found a siniar range of conformity: 31 percent in Lebanon, 32 in Hong Kong, 34 in Brazil, SLSe 168 art Five / Interpersonal Phenomena among the Bantu of Zimbabe (wo have strong sanctions gainet nonconformity), A recent meta-analysis (Bond & Shnith, 1996) of Aschetype studies across seventeen Comte ‘ties concluded that cultural values do affect conformity. In ‘parcular. people in countries that can be described as proce collectivist in orientation (such as China) are more responsive to other" influence than are people in more it~ ‘viduatistic countries (such as the United States and Britain), ‘Collectivist cultures stress interdependence over inde- pendence: they are more concerned with atsining $ToUP [Goals and maintaining harmvony than with individ s0¢- gs or achievement, and behavior is perceived to be more determined by cultural norms than by individual personal ity and atutudes (Triandis, 199). Tn other words, in 2 cle Teativist culture, conformity does noc have the samme neat tne implications as ia the more individvalistic United States, saer, it is considered to be a sign of tolerance, Seltcontrol, and maturity (Markus & Kitiyama, 1994) ‘Markus and Kitiyamva (1994) suggest that it may be time to {xpund our individualistic interpretation of confority (2 aarpnnce the mote positive atrbutes of a collective nate. They note, “Despite the powerful cultural sanctions agains allowing the collective o fluence one's thoughts seh actions, most people are sill much less self-reliant, eifcontained, or self sfficient than the ideology of indi “Gdvalisin soggests they should be” (p. 375). Conformity to group standards may be an adaptive behavior, promoting srciocultural evototion (Campbell, 1975; Lamsden, 1988), Iso the noed to consider the collective may be even more Ftmportan in igh of evidence that conformity in Asch-type stodies may be decreasing in the West (see Bond & Smith, 3006; Lalancette & Standing, 1990; Larsen, 1990). The {Wosteen focus on the s2lf as paramount in social life is re~ focted in the importance of the third goal for conformity. ‘managing one’s self-concept. ‘The Goal of Managing Self-concept ‘One of the reasons for engaging in social comparison is to Clarify who we are as individuals (Berkowitz, 1968; Fes: finger, 1954). When objective standards are not avail to validate our self-concept, we look to similar others to do vo Although Festinger (1954) specifically described con- Tormnity to others’ opinions, the process can also apply to Contormity more broadly. He proposed that pressures 10 ‘rad opinion uniformity occur in groups because we want bikers who are similar to us to share our opinions, When they do not share our opinions, we may be expecially S0s- ‘eptile to conformity inorder to avoid the social stigma of ‘Jevlance, As noted caricr, deviation from the grovp post tion ‘may be met with a variety of unpleasant conse- tqnences, including derision and rejection (Asch, 1956; ‘Schachter, 1951). Some people conform to an erroneous group choice simply because beiag different from the group makes them fee} bad about themselves and worthless (Asch, 1956). The acceptance by others that accompanies conformity can €- fame our own sense of self-worth and sclf-cstecm ‘Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszezynski, 1991), On the other nay feel equally uncomfortable upon finding out that they hhave couformed (0 an incorrect response (Asch, 1956), in- dicating that the implications of confority for one's self- troncept need to be considered in terms of the task, the re Grence group, and one's interdependence with other members of the Eroup. Summary: Conformity ‘Research into the asture of conformity arose out of Asch’ (1956) remarkable finding that people with normal vision ‘would ignore their oven eyes te agree publicly with an ob Yious)y inaceurate group judgment. Since that time, much iitional evidence has demonstrated the seemingly irra- tional exteat to which seemingly rational humans appear willing to go along with the crowd, We have argued that Such behavior, as well as its Jess dramatie forms, is fon dered more understandable when one considers three pow= ‘erful personal goals chat conformity can serve: a shift tov Gard 2 group consensus can allow an individual (1) to Felieve that he or she gow sees things more accurately, (2) to gain the approval and acceptance of desirable others, and (3) so avoid a sol-conception as different, deviant. oF invransigent, Although early researchers began with # focus ‘on the dark side of conformity, we concur withthe rela- tively more moder view that there are also social benefits fof group cohesion and cooperation and that these: bencti- ial soctal behaviors must be weighed against the negative {impact of conformity. COMPLIANCE Compliance refers wo a particular kind of response—acqui- fescence—to a particular kind of communication—2 Fe- quest The request may be explicit, as in the direct solicita” Ton of fonds in a door-to-door campaign for charitable (donations, or it may be implicit, as in a political advertise ‘ent that touts the qualities of a candidate without direetly inking fora vor. But in all cass, the target recognizes that hhc or she is being urged to respond in a desired. way. SYS tematic scientific study of the compliance process has bees dnder way for well over half a century, beginning in reamest with the United States government's public infor Faation and persuasion progroms of Workd War Il (8 Hovland, Lunsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949: Lewin, 1947s Stouffer ct al, 1949). As # consequence, the social science Titerature contains a substantial body of work on various(Chapter 21 / Social Influence: Socal Norms, Conformity, and Compliance factors that caose one navies to comply with another's request for action of some sor. In roviewing that work, we concentcate primarily on 2 set of si paychologcal princes that appear o nluence behavioral complience decisions most powerflly. nie call, we come to focus on these six principles not because thei prevalence in the investigations of social scents tat hoconse oftheir prevalence inthe practices of eommer- ial compliance professionsls—the rationale for whichis provided in the following nection, Brief, the principles in- tolve pressures to comply bocause of tendencies to: (> reciprocate a if favor of service, (2) be consistent with prior commitments, (3) follow the Isad of similar otbers. {@) accommodate the requests of those we know and like, {5) confoim to the directives of legitimate authority, and (6) seive opportunities that are scarce or dvindling in availability. We discus each of these tendencies in terms ‘Fits compatiblity with one or mother ofthe three major intone relevant gouls highlighted i this chapter: (0 en ance effectiveness, to build and maintain social relstion- ships, and to manage sef-conee Locating Powerful Phenomena Within academic social psychology, research into the behavioral compliance ‘process has emphasized two questions: Which principles fand techniques reliably affect compliance? and How do these principles and techniques work to affect compliance 15 thoy do? The frst ofthese questions is concerned with the identification of real Ge. relisble) effects, the second ‘with thei theoretical or conceptual mediation. Almost with: ‘ut exception, the vehicle that has heen employe to answer those two questions has been the controlled experiment. ‘This is understandable, since controled experimentation provides an excellent context for addressing such issues ‘Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1988, inthis Handbook) ‘A different approach is necessary when one’s concer ‘withthe compliance process is more than purely academic, sis the eae for most of us who find ourselves either inier- ‘sted investigators or interested observers of the interper- sonat influence interactions of daily life. We want to know more than whether a panticulsr influence exists and what cass it. We also want ta know how powerful itis im the ‘course of naturally occuring behavior, so that we can bet ter decide whether the effect is worthy of our attention and sty. In referring tothe power of an effect on naturally oc- curing compliance, we mean its ability to change eompli- ance decisions meaningfully over a wide range of everyday situations and cicumstances. ‘Regreitably, when the question of primary interest in- cludes a determination of the power of possible influences ‘on natural compliance behavior, the controlled experiment becomes less suited tothe job. The high levels of experi- ‘mental rigor and precision that allow us to know that un ef- fect is gemoine and theoretically interpretable simultane 169, ‘ously decrease our ability to assess the potency of that ef fect, That is, because the best-designed experiments (1) climinate oF control away ali sources of influence except the one ander study and (2) possess highly sonsitive mea- surements techniques, hey may register weak effects that may be so small as never to make a difference when other (extranecus) factors are allowed to vary naturally, a8 they typically do in the social environment. What's more, such ecologically trivial effects can be replicated repeatedly in the antiseptic enviroument of the controlled experiment, ving the mistaken impression of power, when in reality, all that has boon demonstrated is the reliability of the ef- fects. ‘Thus, rigorous experimentation is not best employed as the primary device for deciding which compliance-related influences are powerful enough to be submitted to rigorous experimentation for further stady. Some other starting point should be found to identify the most potent inslu- ‘ences on the compliance process. Otherwise, valuable time ‘could well be spent secking to investigate and to apply ef ‘ects that are merely epiphenomens of the contolled ex ‘perimental setting, That said, we should not be misonder- stood as believing that a controlled experimental approach is inappropriate to the study of compliance action, a that is hardly the case. We mean to suggest only that this ap- proach is more properly suited (0 answering questions ‘bout the reliability and conceptual mediation of cifects that have been idenlified by other means to be worthy of such inquiry ‘The Systematic Observation of Commercial Compli- ance Professionals A crucial question thus is, Haw does: ‘one determine which are the most powerful compliance ‘principles and tactics? One method is the systematic obser vation of the bohsviors of commercial compliznce profes sionals. ‘Who are the commercial compliance professiona's and why should thei actions be especially informative as to the identification of powerfdl influences on everyday compli- ‘ance decisions? ‘They can be defined as these individuals ‘whose business or Financial well-being depends ox their ability to induce compliance (¢.g., salespeople, fund-rais- cers, advertisers, political lobbyists, cuit recruiters, negotin- tors, con artists). With this definition in place, one can ‘begin to recognize why the regular and widespread prac ‘tices of these professionals would be noteworthy indicators cof the powerful infuences on the compliance process: be- ‘cause the livelihoods of commercial compliance profes- sionals depend on the effectiveness of their procedures, those professionals who use procedures that work well to clicit compliance responses will survive ané flourish. Fur. ther, they will pass these successful procedures om © suc~ ‘ceeding generations (trainees). However, those practition- ‘ers Who use unsuccessful compliance procedures eithera ———— 170. ‘Part Five / Interpersonal Phenomeia swt drop them of wil quickly go out of sine: i ei seis procedures themselves will not be passe on ‘newer generations. “Fhe upshot ofthis process is that, over tine and O¥et the rage of naturally occuring compliance Contents he spe peat and most adaptable procedres for generating SSaptance will se, persist, and accumulate, TOret “hens procedures should point a.carefl observer ward = naj principles tat poople we to desde oem 10 Com Tras however, that this analysis applies primarily t €or wow compliance professionals, whose economic We}. rer highly related to the success of the compliance Prac seeder employ. That is, we sbould not expect body of ateptive procedures to develop and proliferate co te some Prong noncommercial compliance organizations, wisible hand of the market” does aot vreep away ineiient practices overtime, For examples ‘ene compliance wath catain medial regimens (mee Tae det, exercise is notorious poor (Colon ct als 195% Jeioe Kirscht, & Becker, 1984), One reason sity be Peat walike the commercial compliance situation wherein = rat mpg target person departs from and impoveries the system, in a medical caro system, a noncomsliant PSP the Sdys and covichos i, Thus, in seeking evidence a (9 Xz post cegular and potent influences onthe compliance rocen, we woul be welhadvied 1 pay princiza 206%, arate the compliance repertoires of long-standing co™- ‘mercial compliance professions. Trnploying this logic and the methodology of partes pant eve aton, Cilini (1993) engaged in an extent ar Fgaron ofthe influence technigues chal are most fre- (quenily taught to and used By marketers, funder ‘Rifapeeptes andthe ike. What emerged was a Ut of Frineples on which compliance proessionals aPreared © Pane eet of their peychologica influence attempts: reek rity, consistency sci validation, findship oF AG Phony. and scarcity. Subsequent research has, focy, aetned the ability ofthese principles to mediate influence rach averse, matrally occuring, settings as Rome TP” enw pares (Frenzen & Davis, 1990), telephone chacty realtone (Howard, 1995), bill collector and deblor n= SGlations (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991), comporate boardroom tegotiatens (Belliveau, O’Reily & Wade, fo press MR. ‘O Roly, & Wade, 1995), and retal clothing store sales Chebas (Cody, Sater, & Montagne-Niler, 1995) Fore pte the Cody, Seite, ad Montagne Miller (1995) sunt Toad that each ofthese principles, when incorporate in trees techniques of department store clerks, produced & Significant increase io retail clothing purchases. ihe remainder of tis chapter offers an account of the ovigins ond workings of hese principles, as well as of Ie sae suienific thory and evidence regarding how cach ‘hip umcions to motivate compliance, Our Boson rou the principles in term ofthe goals hat compliance Ee ikely to serve forthe recipient of a request. ‘The Goal of Effective Action ‘a strong motivation for most of ws is to choase well 80 28 Be well The basic tendency toward material set inteest ‘Balin poople to want to expend or pay she Teast Co £65 he aoe Connptiance proessionals of every stripe frequently rary wo tap that tendency by offering “a good deal” The ‘SShiom for the rospient ofthis Kind of approach Ct problems in recognizing when the offered deal is 2 good seer hen can one tos that 2. decision in he direction of 2 ardcutar proposals likey tobe wise and eective? 52 Pe principles of inflvnce drive mach oftheir fore oA al Pinormativeness in answering this question, We will ‘consider them in tum. [Authority Legitimately constituted authorises ate aay influential persons (e.g, Aronson, Tues, & Cart eer 968, Blas. 1991; Milgram, 1974), Whether they rae aired Gee position daough knowledge leat of pass. cir positions bespeak superior information and eave ll had experince with such Bigures all ov power ery on, these people (©. parents, weachers) Knew des anus and we found shat ting their advice proved i case of their greater wisdom and aRty because dey controled our rewards 2nd punish rare be we becte adults, the abort Figures changed aptoyers judges, experts, and the Hike, but the Denes wechued wih doing as they say did nat ebange, For mest People then, conforming co the dictate of authority > reo daces genuine practical advantages. Conseqnetl ‘redtes grea sense ko comply with the wishes OF POPES ‘meted authorities, I. eaKes so much sense, jn Fact Shot people often do a when itemakes no sense a al Trerape nowhere i this last point driven home more ramtically than inthe Jile-and-death consequences of ¢ Shenomenon that azine industry officinks Hove tahsled ranitiy(Foushoe, 1984), Accident investigaors f° Ser ederal Aviation Administration have noted that in wren acl, an obvious eror by a light capi was ray sted by (he orice exew members and rested fn ee Te seers that, despite the clear and strong persons) STapotance ofthe decision, the crew members WeTE OBE immpotnorty hearst in Ceiling wo attend or respond io the Zipnin’s esaszoos nistake Harper, Kidere, Cullen Gay Indeod. evidence suggests tha when s0ch a hows Tar tay to come ino play—becauss the capi has a a ortaran leadership style—erews are Rip swscePt- ble to ents (Kank & Poushec, 19%). “Tre mvost dramatic research evidence forthe power of regina arity comes fom the famous Milgram TeStmnt i hich 65 percent of he abject were Wi NE Pernver continued, imfense, and dangerous bevels of cles easheck to an ianocent other subject simply Derause 2” wry Figoro—in tis case a scienit—-dzeeted dem 9 saner anova early everyone who hasten a psycho!Chapter 24 1 Social Influence: Socal Norms, Cor ‘ogy course has learned about this experiment, Milgram (1974) conducted a series of variations on his basic proce~ dare that are less well known but equally compelling in demonstrating the powerful role that authority played in ‘causing subjects to behave so cruelly. In one variation, Mil- gram bad the sciontst and the vietim switch septs; hati, the scientist told the subject to stop delivering shock tothe vvetim, while the victim insisted bravely that the subject continue for the good of the experiment. The results could not have been clearer: not a single subject gave even one additional shock when the demand came from a nonauthor- ity. Additional work has confirmed the basic finding that ‘when nonauthorities give the commands in the Milgram, paradigm, cbedience drops significantly (see Blass, 1991, for a eview), Finally, just as would be expected if such ‘obedience were based nn a decision co defer to authority, individvals possessing authoritarian betiefs are especially Fikely to comply with authority directives, ia the Milgram setting (Elms & Milgram, 1966) and in other settings (Ditto etal, 1995; Miller 1975). “Authorities may be scem as falling into two categories: those specific tothe particular situation, und more general authorities (Jordan, 1993). Compliance practitioners em- ploy techniques that seek to benefit from the power in- ‘vested in authority figures of both types. Inthe case of au thority relevant 10 a specific situation, we can note how ‘often advertisers inform their audiences of the level of ex- pertise of product inenufacturors (¢-g., "Fashionable Men's Clothiers since 1861." “Babies are our business, our only ‘pusiness.”). At times, the expertise associated with a prod uct has been snore symbolic than substantive—for in- stance, when an actor in a television commercial wears physiciun's white coat to recommend a product, in one fa ‘mous Sunka commercial, the actor involved, Robert Young. did not nocd a white-coat; his prior identity as TV doctor ‘Marcus Welby, M.D., provided the medical connection, Tis instructive that the mere symbols of a physician's expertise and authority are enough to wip the mechanism that governs authority influence. One of the most promi nent of these symbols, the bere title “Docter.” has been shown to be devastatingly effective as a compliance device among trained hospital personnel. In one stady, a group of Physicians and nurses conducted an experiment that docu- ‘mented the dangerous degree of blind obedience that hos- pital arses accorded to an individual whom they had never ‘met, but who had claimed in a phone call to be a doctor (Hofting et al., 1966). Ninety-five percent of those nurses ‘were willing 1 administer an unsafe level of a drug merely because the caller requested it. Subsequent research has found that, varying different aspects of the situation (e.g the nature of the requost or the nurses" familiarity with the drug) can affect the level of obedience: bot the amount of ‘compliance remains dangerously high (Krackow é Blass, 1995; Rank & Jacobson, 1977)- Jn the case of influence that gencratizes outside of rele- ity and Compliance 71 ‘vant expertise, the impact of authority (real and symbolic) appears equally impressive. For instance, researchers have found that, when wearing a security guard’s uniform, x re~ ‘quester could produce more complianee with requests (eg to pick up « paper bag on the street, to stand on the ‘other side of a bus stop sign) tat were imelevant to a secu- rity guard's domain of authority (Bickman, 1974; Bush- ‘man, 1988). Less blatant in its connocation than a uniform, Dut nonetheless effective, is another kind of aire tha: has traditionally bespoken authority status in our culture: the ‘well tailored business suit, This attire, too, can mediate in- fluence. Take as evidence the results of a study by Lefkowitz, Blake, and Mouton (1955). who found that three and a half Uimes as many people were willing te fol Tow imto traffic a jaywalker who was wearing a suit ard tie as opposed to a work shirt and trousers (but see Mullin, ‘Cooper, & Driskell, 1990). Con anists Frequently make wse of the influence inher- cent in authority attire. For example, a gambit celled the bank examiner scheme depends heavily on the automatic deference that most people afford authority figures, or those merely dressed as such. Using the two uniforms of authority we have already mentioned, a business suit and guard's outfit, the con begins when s man dressed in acon- Sservativethroe-piece business suit appears atthe home of a Tikely victim and identifies himself as an official of the vie- tim’s bank. The vietim is told of suspected isregularites in the transactions handled by a particular telier and is asked to help trap the teller by drawing out all of his or her sav- ings at the tller’s window. Jn this way, the examination ean “catch the teller red-handed” in any wrongdoing. Alter cooperating, the vietim is to give the money to a anifcrmed bank gvard waiting ootside, who will then retum it vo the ‘proper account, Otten, the appearance of the “bank exam- ‘and oniformed “guard” are so impressive that the im never thinks to check on their authenticity and pro- ceeds withthe requested action, never to see the morey or those «wo individuals again. Social Validation People frequently use the actions of ‘others, particularly similar others, as a standard of compar ison agaiast which to evaluate the correctness of their own actions, Thus, individuals corumouly decide on appropriate ‘behaviors for themselves in a given situation by employing, information as to how certain similar olhers have behaved cor are behaving there (c.., Darley & Latané. 1970; Fes- tinger, 3954, Schachter & Singer, 1962). This simple prin- ciple of behavior accounts for an amazingly varied aray of Juuman responses. For instance, research has shown that New Yorkers use it in deciding whether to return a Yost ‘wallet (Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968), that children ‘with a fear of dogs use it in deciding whether to risk ap- proacking a dog (Bandura & Menlove, 1968), that amuse- tment park visitors use it fo decide whether 10 Titer in a ‘public place (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), thet audi-172 Part Five / interpersonal Phenomena cence members use itn deciding whether a joke is funny (Cupehik & Leventhal, 1974), tat pedestrians use iin de- ciding whetber to stop and stare at an empty spot in the sky {Mijgrar, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969), and, on the Slarming side, that troobled individuals use i in deciding whether to commit suicide (Garland & Zigler, 199 Phillips & Carstensen, 1988) ‘Much of this evidence can be understood in terms of FFestinger's (1954) Social Comparisoa Theory, which states that (1) people have a constant drive to evaluate themselves (Ge. the appropriateness of their abilities, beliefs. feelings, fand behaviors), 2) if available, people prefer to use objec- tive eves to make these evaluations; (3) if objective evi- dance is aot available, people rely on social comparison tvidence instead; and (4) when secking soci comparison tvidence for these sel-cvaluations, people look to similar ‘thers asthe prefered basis for comparison. "When the goal is 1 evaluate the coreciness of an opin- jon or action, eseatch has generally supported Festinget’s theory, For example, social comparison is most likely t0 ‘occur in sitwations that are objectively unclear (Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983) and is most likely r0 be di- rected similar thers (Goethals & Dasley. 1977; Mie 1984). "Thus, whem people are unsure, they are most ikely to look to and accept the beliefs and behaviors of similar ‘thers as valid indicators of what thoy thernslves should believe and do. A bit of reflection suggests the reason for Us behavior: Whon unsure of how to decide, we are ill-ad- vised 10 look inside ourslves—where uncertainty reigns — Tor angwers; instead we must look outside. Where no ob- jective information exists, we tend 1 Iook at others. But bcause the purpose isto decide how we should act, we are Inlined to examine the actions ofa specific ind of oth- fre_—these who afc or who seem most ie ws. Thus, people fre more Hikely to comply with a request when the sequest i accompanied by information chat similar others have al- Teady done so (Melamed et a. 1978; Murray etal, 1984). “Our tendency to assume that en action is more conrect iF similar others are doing itis exploited in a variety of 9t- tings. Nevw-car dealers target the neat-door neighbors of re~ tet eustomers. Bartenders often “silt” their Up jars with a teow dollar ills atthe beginning ofthe evening to simulate ips left by prior customers and thereby co give the impres- ‘Non that tipping with folding money is proper barroom be- havior, Charch ushers sometimes prime collection baskets forthe sate reason and with the same positive effect om proveods Evangeical prosehers are known osood their a Fences with “ringers,” who are rehearsed to come forward at a xpecified time to give witness and donations. For exam fle, an Arizona State University research tear that infl- {rated the Billy Graham organization reported op such ad- ‘vance prepasstions prior to ane of his Crusade visits. “By the time Graham arrives i town and makes his altar call, an ‘army of 6,000 await with instructions on when to come ‘orth at varying intervals to create the impression of sponte~ ‘neous mass outpouring” (Altheide & Johnson, 1977) "That an “army” of others gave evidence of appropriate ‘conduct in this example is instructive. In addition to the ‘Similarity of compliant models, their mumber is also diag nostic of a corect choice; we are more swayed by tbe a€~ ons of multiple rather than single models (Bandura & ‘Menlove, 1968; Febrenbech, Miller, & Thelen, 1979; Mil- gram, Bickham, & Berkowite, 1969). Thus, advertisers {ove to inform us when a product isthe “fastest growing” cot “largest selling,” because they don't have to convince us directly thet the product is good: they need only say that ‘many others think so. The producers of charity telethons ‘dcvotu inordinate amounts of time to the incessant listing fof viewers who have already pledged contributions. The ‘message being communicated to the toldouts is clear: "Look at all the people who have decided to give; t must ‘be the correct thing to do.” ‘One tactic that compliance professionals use t0 engage the principle of social validation has becn put 10 scicmlitic test. Called the list technique, it involves asking for 8 re ‘quest only after the target person has been shown a list of lmifar others who have alrcady complied. Reingen (1982) ‘conducted several experiments in which college stunts oF hhome owners were asked to donate money or blood to a charitable cause, Individuals who were initially shown a tist of similar others who had already complied were sig nificantly more likely co comply themselves than were those who had not been shown such a list, Furthermore, the Tonger thelist, the grewter was the effect. Scarcity Opportunities seem more valuable to us when they are less avalable (Lyon, 1991) Hterestingly, this often tre even wien the epportunity holds ite attraction for us on its ovm metits, Take as evidence the experience of Floride Stete University students who, lke most under. radvcts, rated themaeives dssatisbed withthe quality of their cafeterias food, Nine days later they changed their minds, rating that food significantly better than they ha before, even though the food service had not actualy im proved since the fist rating, Instead, earlier on the day of The second rating, students had leared that, because of @ fire, they could ot eat at the cafeteria for two weeks (West, 1975). ‘Searcy is 4 powerfol motivator fortwo main reasons. Firs, because we Know tht things tat ae dificult to pos- es ae typically beter Man these that are easy to Possess {ynn, 1992), e can often use an item's availability 0 help us quickly and corectly decide on ts quality. As even “Aritotle conceded, “What is rane isa greater good (han ‘what is plentiful” Thus, one reason for the potency of Tareity i that, by assessing it, we can obtain a heute indication of a item's value (Cialdin, 1999; Dito & Sem mot, 1989),Chapter 21 Social tftunce: Socal Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 173 Second, scarcity derives motivational power from a unique source: a the things we can have become less snailable, we Jose the freedom to choose them and the at- tendant ability to act most effectively. A desive to preserve ‘our free choice is the centerpiece of Psychologies! Reac- tance Theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), de- veloped to explain the human response to diminishing per sonal control. According 10 the theory, whenever our freedoms are limited or threatened, the need retain them makes us want thern (as well as Ube goods and services as- sociated with them) significantly more than previously. 80, ‘when increasing searcity—or anything else—imerfeses ‘with our prior access to a particular item, we react against the interference by wanting and trying to possess the item ‘more than before. Heilman (1976) showed how reactance ccan be made to lead to compliance: supermarket shoppers ‘were most likely to agree to sign a petition favoring federal price controls when the requester incited reactance by in- forming them that a feleral official had oppassod the distr bution of the petition ‘One naturally occurring example of the consequences of increased scarcity can be seen in the outcome of a decision ‘by counly officials in Miami to ban the use and possession cof phosphate detergents, Spurred by the tendency to want what they could no longer have, the majority of Miami consumers came to see phosphate cleaners as beter prod ucts dian before. Compared to Tampa residents, who were ‘ot affected by the Miami ordinance, the citizens of Miami rated phosphate detergents ar gentler, more effective in ‘cold wate, beter whittners and fresheners, more powerful ‘om staing, and so on. After passage of the law, they had even ‘come to believe that phosphate detergents poured e: than did the Tampa consurners (Maris, 1975). ‘This sort of response is typical of individuals who have lost an established freedom, and itis crucial to an undor- standing of how psychological reactance and scarcity work ‘on as. When our freedom to have something is limited, the ‘tem becomes less available and we experience an in- ‘roused desire for it, However, we rarely recognize that psychological reactance has caused us to want the item ‘more; all we know is that we want it In the need to make sense of our Uesite forthe item, we begin to assign it posi= tive qualities to justify the desire. After al, it is natural to suppose that we are drawn to something because ofits ‘merit In the case of the Miami antiphosphate law—and i ther instances of newly restricted availabiity—athat is a faulty supposition. Phosphate detergents clean, whiten, nd pour no better after they are banned than before, We just assume they do because we find that we desire them more. Other research has suggested Ua like commodities, in- formation is more desirable—and more influential —when access to itis limited (Brock, 1968; Brock & Bannon, 1992), One lest of Brock's thinking found good suppor in ‘business seting. Wholesale beef buyers who were told of| fan impending imported-beef shortage purchased sigri ‘cantly more beef when they were informed that the short- age information came from certain “exclusive” contacts that the importer had (Knishinsiy, 1982). Apparently, the fact that the scarcity news was itself scarce made it more ‘valued and persuasive. Additional evidence—from the Hit crature on censorship—suggests that restricting informa- ton can empower that information in unintended ways. Im ‘dividuals typically respond to censorship by wanting 10 receive the banned information to a greater extent anc by perceiving it more favorably than they did before the ban (e.g. Worche, 1992; Worchel & Amald, 1973). Especially interesting is the finding that people will come to believe in banned information more, even though they have not ceived it (Worchel, Amold, & Baker, 1975). Even sel'im- posed bans on information can have powerful effects. Wegner, Lane, and Dimitri (1994) demonstrated that clan- destine romantic relationships are more memorable than the overt variey—and generate more attraction as wel ‘With scarcity operating powerfully on assigned won, it should not be surprising that compliance professionals have a variety of techniques designed to convert this power 10 compliance. Probably the most frequently used such technique isthe “Timited-numbee” tactic, in which the sus tomer is informed that membership opportunities, prod- ucts, oF services exist in a Timited supply that camnoa be uarantoed to last long. Related to the Hitited-nummber tac- lic is the “deadline” technique, in which an official ime limit is placed on the customer's epportonity 10 get shal is being offered. Newspaper ads shound with admonitions to the customer reganiing the folly of delay: “Last three days.” “Limited time offer.” “One weck only sale.” The purest form af a decision deadline —"right now" —oesurs in variant of the deadline technique in which customers are told that, unless they make an immediate purchase de- cision, they will have to buy the tem at a higher price oF they will not be able to purchase it at all. Cialdini (1993) reported use of this tactic in numerous compliance settings: A large child photography company urges parents to buy as many poses and copies as they can afford because “stock- ing Titations force us to bur the unsold pictures of your children within twenty-four hours.” A prospective health ‘lub member or automobile buyer might Fear thatthe deal ‘offered by the salesperson is good for that one time; should the customer lave the premises, the deal is off. One home vacuum cleaner sales company instructs trainees to claim to prospects that “Ihave 60 many other people to see tat T have the tine to visita family only once. Its company pol- icy that even if you decide later that you want this machine, can't come Back and sell it to you.” For anyone who: thinks about it carefully this is nonsense; the company and: its representatives ave in the business of making sales, and. any customer who called for another visit would be accom= ‘modated gladly. The real purpose of the can't-come-tack=174. again clam ist evoke ae possiblity of Tos hat is inber= product is hosed by ap individual, sally # woman, 6h atin the scarcity rule for compliance. pres coher home an array of friends, neighbors, and rs eon ear tows play arg oe Sa oman ee all of Romy TE their hostess receives per eee face people um tobe more moti cena fe PS piece sold by the Tapper deci Tne tought of losing something tan ty the vate ECS ‘vio is also there, In this way, the rane tor aainiag something of egal value (Kabnermsn & TVPPSNa “anpoaton arranges for its customers t© buy eet, 1984; Ketelaar, 1995). Fr instance, home owners Fareed fora iced rather than from an unknown sales Jhon told about how moch money they could lose from Fekto,One ty Frenzen & Davis, 199) found tat sh a saton are ore Daly to insulate thet Home Daryn srengih of social ties between th ive Inadegnte el spout how ich money ey coukd te and oes a for twice a8 much variance (67 tn a a rnson,& Conan, 1988), Sila = percn) in TN Tikelinood as did preference forthe save (Gores gnc heth eerchers Meyeritz, oduct Ge Pesan) favorable has beon the effect om sts have ee het gig youn women to proveats SES WANT) Sales por day) that the Tuppet~ & Chetan, TORT geo slexrinaions te sige wa COmprson D7) tandooed is early retal Ost check fo re nl i they stale hire tems ets and, tered COT Titeratore, Tupperware mcamtly mer els (epo"Yoo can lose sever poten ary Hep some wot the world every 2.7 second af wat an ee taltng wo spend ony five mits, Most ates 6 attempt to engage IME Sal ean ben cl cxamination”) rater thn_kag pn ‘Before making 3 fe- ch mon em gin several tetra ene guts IN Tike them. How do they do sain oy ve mints cach 90 i a ee tal ase to genarate iking chs Fs by spe aque roxas sugges nate aod ain Ce fiso have been showa by on unm apes iv enhances principally comolied recut o HES king. sees the concept of risk is prominent ori made prow Atractiveness Abdou itis generally acknowl: shor ee woge’s ind (Qeyoowlz, Wako, & Chaiken, Psat caged that good-looking people have an aslvantage in 50° 991; Rothman etal. 1992). Scat interaction, research findings indicate that we may Far orely underestimated the size and reach of that ad- “The Goal of Building and Maintaining Meataze. A positive reaction to good physical appearance Sppears to generale o such favorable rai perceptions 68 ‘Social Relationships aap kindaess, honesty and inteigence (se aly eta Compliance may be wsed tactically 10 forge mew iterpet- 1s “for a review). AS a consequence, attractive individ Comme ian ons orto protect, sly, and sengthenei- sls as OF POSS ‘both in terms of changing atitodes sae Goer After all eaming a requests typicalyrowarde (hae 1970) and in geting what they request (Benson, ing to the roquester, whereas denying the reaver, 8 Karabenio, & Lemer, 1976). Vorer perceptions and behaviors are influenced (0 2” ubishing: and much rescarch has documented the 03> Tonishig an rewardingness ofa elatonship ands a unseling BS Y "candidate attractiveness (sce Budesheim tion bee gers & Histon, 1979; Kelley, 1979; Rus, and Debi 3004, fora review). For instance, a study of sae eyeo). Coneequendy, ifthe goal of Bolding and che 1078 “Canadian federal elections found chat atractive tw ie social elaionshipsinfveaces compliance de cendidacs Teceived more than two and a half times the maintain Spt see more compliance withthe requests yes of aah fones (Efran & Patterson, 1976). cision ae idats, that iy hose with whoen 2 clatione Equally imprest ‘results appear in the judicial systema Ship would te more enjoyable; and, as is documented in (= eviews by Castellow, Wuensch, and Moore, 1990, 3nd a wing section on liking, we do. Morcover, we Downs aut Dis 1991), In-a Pennsylvania study, #6 ane ane more compliance when that compli searchets ra OF ‘physical aturactiveness of seventy-four site is likely to lead to and bolster desirable social tes: “ale defondaits a the start oftheir criminal tia ance Ae vedo, as documented in the subsequent When uch the researchers checked the results of section on reciprocation. thoes cases via court records, they Found tha the Better ooking men soceived significantly Tightcr sentences. 1s Liking People are more favorably inetined toward the fet MPS Ractive defendants wore twice as Hikcly to avoid TAKEO poe they Know ad Tike, This facts definiively incessant the unattractive defendants (Stewart, nea py he cemarkable success of the Tupperware Cor 1980). Jn and saising context, one stixdy found that at tration and ule "home party” demonstavon concept Fos i eitors for tbe American Heart Association gen rte W978). The dsmonseaion pany for Tupperware ea weary twice as much compliance (42 vetsus 29 PerChapter 24 / Social Influence: Socal Norms, Co cent) than did unattractive solicitors (Reingen & Keman, 1993), Similar results have been obtained in business set tings, where physical attractiveness has a favorable jmpact ‘on sales effectiveness (Kivisita, Honkaniemi, & Sundvik, 1994; Reingen & Kernan, 1993) and om income levels across a wide range of occupations (Hamermesh & Bile, 1994), In the light of such powerful effects it is not sur- prising that extremely attractive models aze employed 10 promote products and services, that sales trainers fre- ‘quently include appearance and grooming tips in their pre- sentalions, and that con men are commonly handsome and ‘eon wornen commonly pretty, Similarity We Wike people who are similar to us (Byme, 1971; Cari, Ganley, & Pierce-Otay, 1991; Hogg, Cooper- Shaw, & Holaworth, 1993), and we grant thei favorable (reatinent in charitable (Dovidio, 1984), negotiation (Kramer, Pormmerenke, & Newton, 1993), and legal set~ tings (Amato, 1979; Towson & Zanna, 1983). This fact seeins to hold true whether the similarity occurs inthe area Of opinions, personality traits, background, or lifestyle. Consequently, those who wish to be liked in order to in- cercase our compliance can accomplish that purpose by ap- ‘pearing simitar to usin any of a wide variety of ways. For that reason, it would be wise to be careful around salespeo- ple who only seem to be just like us. Many sales raining Drogratns now urge trainees to “mirror and match” the teustomer's body posture, mood, and verbal style, because Similarities along each of diese dimensions have been shown to lead to positive results (LaFrance, 1985: Lacke & Horowitz, 1990; Woodside & Davenpon, 1974), ‘Sumilarity in dress provides another example. Several stodies have demonstiated that we are more likely to help those who dress like us. In one study conducted in the early 1970s, when young people tended to dress either in “hip or in “straight” fashion, experimenters donned hippie alte and asked college students on a campus for a dime to make a phone call. When the experimenter was dressed in the same way as the student, the request was granted in more than two-thirds of the instances; but ‘when the seudent and requester were dissimilarly dressed, a dime was provided less than half of the time (Emswiller, Deaux, & Willits, 1971). Another experiment shows how automatic ur positive response to simifar others can be. archers in a politiest demonstration were Found net only to be more likely to sign the petition of «similarly dressed ‘equester, but to do so without bothering to-read it first (Suedfeld, Bochner, & Matas, 1971) Compliments Praise and other forms of positive estima tion also stimulate liking (e.g. Byme & Rhamey. 1965). “The simple information that someone fanies us ean be a highly effective device for producing return liking and y and Compliance 175 willing compliance (erscheSd & Walser, 1978). Although there are bats t our glibility—eepecialy when we can be sore thatthe ater’ intcat is manipulative Gomes & ‘Wertman, 1973)—we tend asa rule to betieve praise and to Tike those who provide it. Bvidence forthe power of praise fon Tiking comes from a study (Drachma, deCarufel, & Insko, 1978) in which men roceived persoaal zomments from someone who needed a favor from them, Some ofthe men got only positive comments, some only negative com rents and some a niixcure of good and bad, There were thee interesting findings. Fis, the evaluator who offered ‘only praive was liked the Best. Second, the first finding Ipeld even if the men full eaized dat the Mlatterer stood %0 gain from ther liking of them. Finally, unlike the other {ypes of comments, pie praise did not have tobe accurate to work. Compliments produced just as mach Hiking forthe fawterer when they were untrue as when they were true. For these reason, direct salespeople are educated in the at of praise A potential customer's home, clothes, ea, tte, fand so on, ae all Srequent targets for compliments (Cial- dini, 1993), Cooperation Cooperation is another factor that has been. shown to enhance positive feelings and behavior (Aronson, Bridgeman, & Geffner, 1978; Bettencourt et al., 1992; Cook, 1990), Those whe cooperate toward the achievement cof a common goal are more favorable and helpful to each other as a consequence. That is why compliance profes- Sonals often strive to be perveived as cooperating partners ‘with a trget person (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Automobile sales managers frequently set themselves as “villains” so thatthe salesperson can “do battc” in the customer's be: half, The cooperative, pulling-together kind of relations that is consequently produced between the salesperson and ‘customer naturally leads to a desirable form of liking that promotes sales. Reciprocation Ono of the most powerful norms in all truman cultures is that of reciprocity (Gouldner. 1960) “This norm obligates individuals to return the form of be- havior that they have received from another. Not only does ‘the norm apply (o all cultures; it applies to all behavior ‘within cultures. For instance, we report Tiking those who report Tiking us (Byme & Rhamey, 1965: Condon & ‘Crano, 1988); we cooperate with cooperators and compete sgainst competitors (Braver, 1975; Rosenbaurr, 1980): we self disclose to those who have self-disclosed to us (Cun- ningham, Strassberg, & Haan, 1986; Mcleshko & Alden, 1993); we yield to the porsuasive appeals of those who have previously yielded to one of our persuasive appeals (Cialdini, Green, & Rusch, 1992); we try to harm those ‘who have tried to harm us (Dengerink, Schnedker, &176 Part Five / Interpersonal Phenomena i covey, 1978); andin negotiations, we make concessions to th the actors would conapiete and return a Tong ques ; hoe who have offered concessions to us (Axelrod, 1984), Bonnaire they received in Ube mail. LE a eheck for $20 ac, te js gema ral, people fc obliged wo provide companied We “qoewtionnare, 78 of the physicians filled ; gutters, servers and ad to those who Bave given out De and sent it back as requested. Bat ifthe doc- | ite euch things first (DePaulo, Britingham, & Kaiser, can eamed thatthe S20 check was to be sent to them after : ther Nirenbenger, Cotterell, & Marvel, 1987; Tess, they rtumee Completed questionnaire, only 66 percent | 108: Sener gen), sometnes even retin did 0, By pvngte ese of a noncent i Jarger favors than ose they have received (Regan, 197). Beat tif rather tan of a reward for compliance, the re> i eae io silts the rls by fang co resproente the SECA Teahanced their sucess substantially. The second ' roocial actions of another risks damaging he relation SeSfrocetion elated finding concerned ony the pls Hl Pro with that ater (Coltercl, Enenberzer & Speicher, Gans 6 got the check up front, As indicated, most ofthe i etna & Alden, 1993), as well af Bis of er doctors complied the questionnaire request, but Some snenion ter such 88 "aches" didnot Although neath 910% percent) of the doctors apa are frequently applied te thse who who bad complied Cashed ther checks, only 26 pereent of era gran retary Several sales ai fondrasy hese who did na So ! ve ractice use his factor to advantage, The compliance Son eciprocate the $20 gift, they were not of a ind ! soe onal nial pres something fo te target person, 19 wee raking the accomspanying-gift technique & : re gting the angot wo be moe iksly to give some. _Wihly comatose or the rescarchers AR 2 eto Often, this “something eu” ste etn genet So esearehers have Found that inchoding sere mons compliance with & substantial quest monet) ner ‘omg with a mail survey question- ‘aire prodoces significant nereases in compliance, One (Howard, 1995). oar tired gift, accompanied by arequest fora do- — setwanalysis that such incentives generated 30 palo (ea common teciqie that employs the nonm for average 6% Pecos nerease in return rate (nineteen per~ emage points) over mail survey requests that Speke oe Teeiprcity. One familiar example isthe Hare Keisha 80 a ar ectby a book oraflower incentives; when comparably 25 incentives were offesed i | Ture ges cor wo es on eran sre CONGEST sy cad 2 mn einat an estbanlegtimate Anes Wal SOSH 1993) Tn fact, a sty sie aso em rns npninaons chen em Je and ets 1992 OT chock for $5 7 ar aueomapaied a sigle mailed survey request produce i soy tis highyelfectve device. These groups count ! Ploy i people will nor goto Ue trouble of returning signifiean'y ‘more compliance than an of 1 spe gt and wi feck uocorforable about Keping it with> Paid aero ‘completion (52 versus 23 percent), which ae aan prcating in some way. For instance, the Disabled produosd m9 mot ‘compliance than # no-incentive control ae vaca organization report tha is simple small condition (2 percen). Furthermore, a3 ithe Berry and URLaT Tr dovations produces a response rate of about 18 Rano ‘1987 study, dhe great majority of those whe re- oe Piling alse uncles an wnsotcted ceived the $5 chock Pt id 0 complete the accompany Te tgummed, individualized address labels, the success Ing survey equested also did not cash the check. Fate nearly doubles, © 35 percent (Smolowe, 1990), Fae nt sene of ciscomfort that aends an un~ Reciprocal Coneetsins ‘An extension of the general wid debt epiins ot only Why people often agree so pty Om of PTET fs that of reciprocation of eonces ail deb favor tats nrger than the one hey received, sions. A ocirocel com Sct procedure (er oor-in-the= iance has been docu- form gy people frequen refrain from asking fora face recone) ‘inducing comp q but ale why Erfhey ul) ot bein a positon to repay it mented repeatedly, 8 Cialdini et al, 1975; Harari, 1980; Reeves et beta, Nadir & Fisher, 1983: Greenberg & Shapiro, Mohs & Hoey, 1980, Mowen & Cini oe aay & Eckensode, 1986). The saddle of wamet so- sly 1991; Wane Brovmstein, & Kaizev, 1989). A requester 29 Sheen and we goo concrable lengths wes tis Proce ‘beginning with an extreme request cao oe avoid i. This may explain why individuals that is neatly aways ejected and then retreating to 4 Dore Sesforming acomputr task were more wing to seck help meee Miavor ihe one the requester bad in mind from repen the source of the aid was the computer rather than The outael, In doing so, te requester hopes thatthe retreat Srother person (Karabenick & Knapp, 1988). from exireme to moderate equest will spur the target Per ef te re fr rciprcaion account nicely son make eiFyed! “concession —moving from initial for Re Laan outcomes ofa study by Rand Corporation re- rejection of the Jager favor to acceptance of the smaller Corchere Berry end Kanouse (1987). They found that, By ones sein nbysctane fst, they could ineease the ikeinood THIS es {peace concessions strategy has been success‘Chapter 21 / Social Influence Soci] Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 17? fully used in fund-raising contexts in which, after refusing a lager request for donations, people become substantially more likely than before to give the average contribution (Reingen, 1978). Cialdini and Ascani (1976) used this technique in soliciting blood donors. They frst requested a person's involvement in a long-term donor program. When hat request was refused, the solicitor made a smaller re- quest for a one-time donation. This pattern of a large re- ‘quest (which i refused) followed by a smaller request sig- nificantly increased compliance with the smaller request, as compared to a control condition of people who were asked to perform only the smailer, one-time favor (50 per- cent versus 32 perceat compliance rate). OF special interest to university students and Faculty is evidence that the daor- insthe-face technique can greatly increase a professor's ‘willingness to spend time helping « student (Harari, Mohr, ‘& Hosey, 1980). In that stady, only 59 percent of faculty members were willing to spend “fifteen to twenty min~ tutes” to meet with a student on an issue of interest to the student—when that was the only roquest the student made However, significantly more faculty members (78 percent) ‘were willing to agree to the same request if they had first refused the student's request to spend “two hours a week for the rest othe semester” meeting with the student. ‘Telingly, procedures that undermine the target person's perception that the second request of the sequence repre- ents a legitimately offered concession from the first have eliminated the tactic’s effectiveness. For example, extend- {ng the lengli of time between the frst and second request (Cann, Sherman, & Elkes, 1975), changing requesters in midsequonce (Snyder & Cunningham, 1975), beginning ‘with en unreasonably large first request (Schwarzwald, Rar, & Zrvibel, 1979), and using a requester who has low credibility (Patch, 1986; Wiliams & Williams, 1989) have all been shown to neutralize the technique. Each of these ‘neutralizing circumstances can be seen to roduce the extent to which an obligation to reciprocate a concession would be expected to guide behavior. What emerges, then, is ovi- sence thatthe effectiveness ofthe techngue is mediated by the operation of the nom of reciprocity ‘Related to the door-i-the-face technique, but somewhat Gifferent, is the that's-not-all technique investigated by ‘Burger (1986) and frequently used by sales operators. An important procedural difference between the two tech- niques is that, in the that's-not-al tactic, the target person does not turn down the first offer before a better second offer is provided. After making the fist offer but before the target can sespond, the requester betters the deal with an additional item or a price reduction. Burger (1986) found this approach to be useful in selling more bakery goods ‘ducing a campus bake sale, One reason that this technique works appears to be the target person's desire 10 recipro= ‘ate the receipt of the better deal. ‘The Goal of Managing Self-concept In addition te helping ws to take effective action or to build ‘and raintuin social relationships, compliance may be used for the purpose of managing self-concept on desired di- mensions, Any meaningful behavior can affect how we think of ourselves (Schlenker & Trudean, 1990; Vallacher '& Wegner, 1985), and compliant behavior is no exception {(Gialdini etal. 1987), Because compliance can affect Bow ‘we think of ourselves, we can use it both to enhance and 10 verify our self-definitions (Swann, 1990). For example, someone in acute need of an ego boost might be expecially likely to acquiesce to a charity request so as 10 bolster self concept (a¢ an altruistic individual) inthe process (Brown & Smart, 1991). Or, if one’s sense of self already includes, ‘a strong altruistic component, one might be compliant with 1 charity request in order to confirm that view (Piliavin & Coflero, 1991). ‘One self-definitional dimension highly relevant to the ‘compliance process is that of personal consisteacy. Be ‘cause most people share to some degrec the desire to see ‘themselves as intrapersonally consistem (Cialdini, Trost, ‘Newsom, 1995), they are inclined to comply with requests that allow them to enhance or verity a view of themselves 8 consistent Consistency _Sacial psychologists have long understood de suength of the consistency principle in dirveting human fotion, Prominent early theorists like Leon estinger (1957), Fritz Heider (1958), and Theodore Newcomb (1953) viewed the desire for consistency 5 a prime moti- vator of our behavior. Subsequently, other theorists (e.g. Baurmeiste, 1982; Tedeschi, 1981) recognized thet the de- sire to appear consistent exerts considerable influence over four behavior at well. If we grant thatthe power af consis- tency is Formidable in directing human action, an jmpor- tant practical question immediately arises: How is that force engaged? Considerable research suggests that itis ‘engaged through the act of commitment. After making & ‘commitment, one tends to behave in ways that ar consis- tont with it (Devisch & Gerard, 1955; Greenwald et al, 1987; Howard, 1990; Sherman, 1980). Any of a variety of strategies may be used to generate the erecial instigating ‘commitment. ‘One such strategy is the foot-in-the-door technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Schwarzwald, Bizman, & Raz. 1983). A solicitor using this procedere first asks fora small favor that is almost certain 10 be granted. The initial com- pliance is then followed by a request for a larger, related favor. It has been found repeatedly that people who have ‘agreed to the initial, small favor are more willing to do the larger one (see Beaman et al., 1983, for a review), seem ingly to be consistent withthe implication of the initial ac-178 ‘ton. For instance, home owners who had agreed to accept and wear a small lapel pin promoting a local charity were, fe a consequence, more Tikely to contribute money to that charity when canvassed doring a subsequent donation drive (Pliner etal. 1974) ‘Freedman and Fraser (1966) argued that the foot-n-the- door technique is successful because performance of the initially requested action causes 2 self-perception changes ‘hat is, individuals come to see thems¢]ves as possessing ‘certain behavior relevant traits. For example, inthe Priner tal. (1974) stody, after taking and wearing the charity pin, subjects would be expected to see themselves as mare fa ‘orable toward charitable causes, especially the particular Cchavty involved, Later, when asked to perform the larger, related favor of contributing to that charity, subjects would ‘be more willing to do so to be consistent with (Le. 0 ver~ ify) the “charitable” tat they had assigned to themselves. ‘Support fortis interpretation comes froma study showing that children are not influenced by the foot-in-the-door {echnique until they are old enough to understand the idea ‘of a stable personality Wait (around six to seven years), ‘Once children are old enough to understand the meaning of ‘a sable tai, the Foot-in-the-door tactic becomes effective, tcspecially among children who prefer consistency in De- havior (Eisenberg et al. 1987). Cialdini, Trost. and New- som (1995) have replicated the latter finding with adults: ‘nly those with a strong preference for consistency showed 2 Toot-in-the-doot effect. Gorassini and Olsou (1995) pro- ‘Yided data indicating that changes in self-perception are hot sufficient to produce a foot-in-the-door effect. Ale though coropliance with a small request led to greater self perceptions of helpfulness, these shifts did not mediate Willingness to comply with a related. larger request. For the foot-in-the-door effect to appear reliably, then, indivi uals may have to experience a self-perception change in re- sponse (0 initial eompliance and have to be inched to be- fave consistently with that changed solf-view. The inclination toward consistent responding snay come about through dispositional factors, as in the Eisenberg ot al (4987) and Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom (1995) studies, oF Usrough situational factors that make consistency salient ‘Other, more unsavory technigues induce a comoritment to-an item and then remove the inducernents that generated the commitment. Remarkably, the comunitment frequently remains. For example, the bail-and-switch procedure is tused by some retailers, who may advertise certain mer- cchandise (¢., 8 700m of furniture) ata special low price. ‘When the customer arrives to take advantage ofthe special, the oF she finds the merchandise to be of low quality or sold cout. However, bocause customers have by now made en ac~ tive commitment to getting new furniture al dat particular store, they are ntore willing t0 agree to examine and, con- Sequenily, © buy other merchandise there (Joule, Govil- foun, & Weber, 1989). Part Five / Interpersonal Phenomena ‘Car dealers employ a similar strategy: the lowball tch- nique, in which the dealer obtains a commitment 10 an 3¢~ tion nd then increases the costs of performing the ection (Cialdini ct al., 1978). The automobile salesperson who throws the lowball” indoces the customer to decide £0 ‘uy a particular model of car by offering a ow price om the car of am inflated one on the custome’s trade-in, After the decision has been made—and sometimes after the commit: ‘ment is enhanced throngh intermediate commitments, such as allowing the customer to arrange financing, to take the car home overnight, and so on (Joule, 1987)—something, ‘happens (0 remove the reason the customer decided to buy. Perhaps a price caleulation error is found, or the used-car assessor disallows the inflated trade-in figure. By tis timc, ‘tough, many customers have experienced an intomsl cour mitment 19 that specific automobile and proceed with the porchase anyway, Experimental research has documented the effectiveness of this tctic in settings beyond automa- bile sales CBrownstein & Katzev, 1985; Soule, 1987). Addi onal research indicates thatthe tactic is effective primar- ‘ly when used by a single requester (Burger & Petty, 1981) and when the initial commitment is freely made (Cialdint otal, 1978. ‘One thing that these procediures (and others like them) have in common isthe establishment of an earlier commit mont that is consistent with a later action desired Dy the ‘Sompliance professional. The desire for consistency then takes over to compel performance of the desired behavior, However, not all types of these earlier commitments are ‘equally effective, Some research evidence suegests the types of commitments that lead to consistent future re~ sponding. A commitment is likely to be maximally ffee- tive in producing consistent future behavior to the extent that iis active (Bem, 1967; Cioffi & Gamer, 1996), effort ful (Aronson & Mills, 1959), public (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994) and viewed as internally motivated (ic., uneoerced) (Freed- ‘man, 1965; Lydon & Zanna, 1990). “Another approach to employing the consistency prineix ple also is popular amoag commercial compliance profes sionals, Rather thao inducing a new commitment to their ‘product or service, many practitioners point out existing ‘ComPritments within potential customers thal are consistent ‘withthe product or service being offered. In this way. desi- able existing commitiments are made more visible to the ‘customer and the strain for consistency is allowed to direct bchavior accordingly. For example, insurance agents are frequently taught to stress to new home owners thatthe Pur ‘chase of an expensive house reflects an enormous persons) ‘commitment 19 one’s hone and the well-being of one’s family, Consequently, they argue. it would be only consis- tent with such a commitinent to home and family to par ‘chase home and life insurance in‘amounts that fit the size of this commitment.Chapter 21 / Social Influence: Sociat Norms, Conformity, and Compliance 173 Reseach of varius kinds indicates tht this sor of son siiation to commitments and, in aditon, to consequent behavioral inconsistencies can be effective in producing changes in belie, atitude, and behavior. Ball" Rokeach Rokeach, and Grube (1984) demonstrated [on-term be. havioral effects from a television program that focused ‘viewers on their personal commitments to certain deep- seated values (¢.g., freedom, equality) on the one hand, and their curent beliefs and behaviors onthe other. Not only did uninterrupted viewers ofthis single program evidence cohanced commitment to these value: they were signifi aly more likely to donate money to sapport causes com. sistent with the values two o Unce mont after the pro- gram had aired. A similar effect was noted. among Australian consumers of high levels of energy who were shown the discrepancy between their current level of cow. sumption and ther previous pro-conservation sateen: they began fo conserve sgaificamly more energy than did contol subjects (Kaniola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984) The tactic of pointing out the discrepancy ("bypoctisy”) be- tween an cxsting commitment and inconsfotent current oduct has been employed succesfully by Aronson and his colleagues to generate compliance with request er see- ‘ommendations for water conservation (Dickerson eta 1992), roeycing action (Fred & Aronson, 1995) ad con: dom ase (Stone os. 1994) ‘A mote manipulative tactic is to put people in a situa tion i which esing& specific request would be incon tent with a value they wish to be known as posseesi {Grocnvald etal, 1987; Sherman, 1980). One such totic is the legiimization-of-paly-favors (or even-a-penny- ‘would-elp) technique (Cieliné& Schroeder, 1976). Most people preter o behave in ways that are consistent with a ‘View of themselves as hepfal, charitable indidnals. Cone sequently, 4 fond-raiser who makes a request that le izes paltry amount of ad ("Could you give a comtibs- tion? Even a penny would help.") makes ie dificult for a target co refs to give a al: odo so risks appearing tobe 8 very unhelpful person. Notice that his procedae does ot spoiically request a vial sim: that would probably Jead to a profusion of pennies and a smal otal fake, stead, the request simply makes @ minascoe form of aid acceptable, thereby reducing the targets ability to give nothing and still remain consistent with the desirable lame of «help indvidual. How could» peron remain Committed to a helpful image after refusing to comubute when “ven a penny would help"? Experimental research to validate the effectiveness of this technigue has shown it to be successful in increasing the percentage of charity contributors Brockner et aly 1984; Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976: Reeves, Macolini & Martin, 1987; Reingea, 1978; Weyant, 1988), Moreover. in ach of those studies the evenra penny procedure proved ofiable, because subjects eave nota penny, bot rathec the donation amount typically given to charities. Thus, the le- sgitimization-of-paltry-favors approach appears to work by _Zeting more people to agree to give (60 a8 to be consistent ‘with a helpful image); but the decision of ow much 10 «give is left unaffected by the mention of a paltry amount. ‘The consequence is increased proceeds. (One final commitment-based tactic deserves mention — ‘one im which the target person goes on recon! as fecling or doing well before being asked to contribute resources to a worthy-sounding cause. The theory behind this tactic is that people who have just assorted that they are doing or feeling fine—ever as 2 routine part of a sociable ex- change—will consequently find it awkward to appear stingy in the context of their own admittedly Favorable cit ‘cumstances. Am experiment by Daniel Howard (1990) put the theory to test. Dallas, Texas, residemts were called on the phone and asked if Uiey would agree to allow a repre- sentative of the Hunger Relief Committee to come to their hhomes (0 sell them cookies, the proceeds from which ‘would be used to supply meals for the needy. When tried alone. that request (labeled the standard solicitation ap- proach) produced only 18 percent agreement, However, if the caller initially asked, “How are you fecling this evening?” and waited for a reply before proceeding with the standard approach, several noteworthy things hap- pened. Firs, of the 120 individuals called, most (108) gave the customary favorable reply ('"Good,” “Fine,” “Real well,” etc), Second, 32 percent of the people who got the ‘how-are-you-feeling-tomight question agreed to receive the Cookie seller at their homes, nearly twive the success rate of the standard solicitation approach, Third, tras to the consistency principle, almost everyone who agreed to such visit did make a cookie purchase when contacted at home (89 perce), ‘Summary: Compliance At the outset of this section, we suggested that an impor tant question for anyone interested in understanding, resi {ng, or hamessing the compliance process is, Whick are the ‘most powerful principles that motivate individuals to com- ply with another person's request? We also suggested that ‘one way to assess such power is to examine the practices of| commercial compliance professionals for their pervasive= ness. The widespread use by compliance practitioners of | certain principles would be evidence for he natural power of these principles to affect cveryday compliance, Six psy- chological principles emerged as the most popula: in the repertoires of compliance professionals: reciprocity, com sistency, social validation, friendship or liking, authority, and scarcity. Close examination of the principles revealed broad professional usage that could he validated and ex- plained by controtted experimental research. As wilh most180 research perspectives, additional work needs to be done: However at this juncture considesable evidence indicates that these six principles engage central features of the hhutsan condition to motivate compliance. CONCLUSION ‘The social influence process is an undeniably central com ‘of social interaction, People seek to influence and row thernselves to be influenced in almost every interper- onal segment of Uiir lives. It is not surprising, then, that re infivence process sorves multiple goals. Our review of the relovant literatures inthe areas of social norms, confor~ try, and compliance id us to see thee sch goels: 10 Po- fave effectively, 1 build and maintain relationships, and to hanage self-concept tis our view that each ofthese goals vere an important rationale for influence and offers, ac~ Cordingly, a way to understand many of the effects (9 cally found in the Tteratures reviewed. "At the same time, i¢ should be reengnized that we as: signed these effects to 2 paicolar goal often for reasons of rzanizatinal eficiency, and such asignament should not betaken to imply that only a single goal is being served. Tadeed, the most powerful effects in our literatures are Iikely to be powerful precisely because they conteibute to ho atajauyent of more than one goal. For example, the ton~ ‘eney to coraply with a request that is consistent with at ertier commitment is Tikely due to a desire to be consis ont tserving the goal of managing seli-concept), a desire te Took consistent to others (serving the goal of building thd maintaining relationships), and a desie to act correctly Gerving the goal of behaving effectively). The sinvltanc~ (ne salsfaction of muliple goals should only enbance che tikelihood that an influence attempt will succeed. “sithough the goa? motivation framework ofthis chapter ‘may appear to focus on the social motives of the indvid- ual itis important te remember that most fesponses 10 $0 Gav influcace attempts are also affected by the situational vcontert of the influence effort. Moreover, goals can interact Ghih social situations in a variety of ways (Endler, 1993). Tins, differen situations can make different goals salient for tue same individual. For instance, seeing someone pick tip pie of liter in an otherwise lean environment can dtivate the motive for social approval (serving the goal of building and maintaining relationships), desreasing the Tikelihood of tering (Cialdini, Reno. & Kallgsen, 1990). ‘But even if an individual's personal norma is opposed to lit fering, aeing someone toss a candy wrapper into a heavily Tiered environment may tigger titering behavior, as it de ‘sribes what others do in that situation to rid themselves of ‘rash (serving the goal of behaving effoctively). Situations an also change people's motives. For instance, in a work Part Five / Interpersonal Phenomena setting, uncertain newcomers may conform to the group Deroeplion atthe outset Because they think chat the groop Pefer the most accurate view (serving the goal of behaving Gitectively), but after greater experience in the situation, their conformity may be based more on a desire to avoid rregitive sanctions from the group (serving the goal of Duilding and maintaining social relationships). Finally, sit warional constraints on behavior, including such Factors ts ‘eavironmental contingencies and source characteristics, n= terect with individual characteristics to affect the goals thst (he actnvated, Asking a person {0 contribute time to a can Ter onganization because til "make yoo fee! pood about Yourself" may be effective for someone who is Jow inst Neem, since such behavior can bolster self-pereeption feerving the goal of managing self-concepf), but it may backfire with a person who has high self-esteem and is snore raotivated by relational goals, such as interacting ‘a committed group (serving the goal of building apd Iaintaning relationships). Any fully informed explanation ‘social influence must coasider the characteristics of both the influence target and the seating, and the numerous 29S in which they may interact. alli i clear thatthe social influence process is both rich and complex. This fect accounts for the large body of ‘aisting work exploring the functioning of Une social inflae ‘Shon process and ensures that t wil inthe futore, 2s in the past, be the focus of much escarch. NOTES 1. Although Shatter and Latans's (1996) discussion of gulturally shared beliefs" focuses ox the evolution of stereotypes, the anaysi is applica to the evolution of porns ay well (M_Sehaller, personal communication, No- vember 21, 1995). 12 Note the cmphasis on social norms. Those who study Sruall-group behavior have extensively examined the or of taskclated norms; fr a review, sce Levine and Moreland, 1997, in his Handbook, 3, The effets of normative and informational influence will be considered more thoroughly in the ment section, 1A, For reviews of the factors affecting conformity and pom conformity, se Allen (1985, 1975) 45 though the minority was originally concepmatized as = Group that lacks power, satus, of strength ia numbers {(Moscovii, 1976), most of the researc has operational Fed the minority as numerically inferior 1 the majority. ‘6, However, when the purpose of social comparison is 02 take onestf feel beter or 1 motivate oneslf 10 yrealet Soeompishments, people sometimes compare themselves fo others who arent similar Pt who are below 0 ubove