CIVIL PROCEDURE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

balance of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges.
The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees,
plus the Costs. 2

EN BANC

This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was
done in a memorandum decision reading in full as follows:

G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM DECISION

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,

vs.
WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records
of this case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no
cogent reason to disturb the same.

CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which
started out as an ordinary complaint for a sum of money. The question
squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the memorandum
decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article
VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to
answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased premises except
when caused by reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private
respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund of
his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the
additional ten days of his occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The
petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee still owed him for other
charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00
for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original
condition. 1
1

The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.

After the submission of position papers by the parties, a summary
judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant
and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 3

When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review
was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for
reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of
the regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section
14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the
present charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of
1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973
Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the
Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal courts.
The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person

CIVIL PROCEDURE

reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by
the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the
applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure
them that the court rendering the decision actually studied the case
before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more substantial reasons.
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze
the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider
its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision, if wellpresented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and
persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full
exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially
those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of
case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in
the resolution of future controversies. As the Court said in Rosales v.
Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at
least substantially Identical with previous litigations. Argumentum a simili
valet in lege. Earlier decisions are guideposts that can lead us in the right
direction as we tread the highways and byways of the law in the search
for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the
past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except
where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint
or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden
path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the
regional trial court should be revoked for non-compliance with the abovequoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the case be remanded to the
regional trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by
a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. For his part, the private respondent demurs.
He justifies
2
the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P. Blg. 129 and invokes the
ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which sustained the
said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:

Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or final

resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state
the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is based which
may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or adopted by
reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution
appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a
similar rule embodied in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the Court
of Appeals shall remain in the Division to which they have been assigned,
and shall be decided within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this
Decree; Provided, however, That if the decision or order be an
affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed
from, then the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended
opinion, indicate clearly the trial court's findings of fact and
pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for the
affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous Court,
declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations
consisted of thirteen pages, single space. The above-quoted decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals consists of four pages, three of which
contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from.
The remaining page is devoted to an explanation of why "for judicial
convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of
reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread
in its decision, as integral part of this Our decision." The said decision
may be considered as substantial compliance with the above-quoted
provisions in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to express the
following reservation:
The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the findings
of fact and conclusions of law from those set forth in the appealed
decisions should be exercised with caution and prudence, because the

CIVIL PROCEDURE

tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting

the findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly
studying the appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic
validity of a decision is the perception by the parties-litigants that they
have been accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and
responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It is this perception,
coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the members of the
judiciary to discharge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on
their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the
memorandum decision is to expedite the termination of litigations for the
benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of
justice, the Constitution now contains a number of provisions aimed at
correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much disaffection among
the people. Thus, Section 16 of the Bill of Rights reiterates the original
provision in the 1973 Constitution guaranteeing to all persons "the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies." Section 14(2) of the same Article III retains the
rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be public
and impartial but also speedy. In Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme
Court is expressly permitted to temporarily assign a judge from one
station to another when the public interest so requires, as when there is a
necessity for less occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of
his cases. In paragraph 5 of the same section, it is stressed that the rules
of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court "shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." In Section 15, of the same article, maximum periods are
prescribed for the decision or resolution of cases, to wit,
3 twenty-four
months in the case of Supreme Court and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three
months for all other lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the tremendous
number of cases in their dockets which, to make matters worse,

continues to grow by the day despite the efforts being taken to reduce it.
In the Supreme Court alone, an average of 400 cases is received every
month as against the average of 300 cases disposed of during the same
month, leaving a difference of 100 cases monthly that is added to some
5,000 still unresolved cases that have accumulated during the last two
decades or so. At this rate, the backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every
year on top of the earlier balance, much of which, despite its age, is still
viable and have still to be resolved. Considering that the Court spends
four days of the week for studying and deliberating on these cases in
its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time
allowed its members for the actual writing of its decisions. (This particular
decision, while extended, happens fortunately to be less complicated than
many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time to write,
not to mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum
decision can be welcomed indeed as an acceptable method of dealing
expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice, But expediency
alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the
Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the
means. It is plain that if Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it
must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan
trial court in compliance with the rule on summary procedure. The
decision consisted of three typewritten pages, single space, and stated
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based. It was a
concise and well-written decision, and a correct one to boot, for which
Judge Paciano B. Balita is to be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this
judgment, the regional trial court of Makati rendered a mere
memorandum decision that simply adopted by reference the findings of
fact and law made by Judge Balita and then concluded, without saying
more, that "there was no cogent reason to disturb the same." It is claimed
that as Judge de la Rama did not make his own statement of the facts
and the law as required by the Constitution, his memorandum decision
was a total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent
court, what it reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional
trial court but the decision rendered by the metropolitan trial court which,
legally speaking, was not before the appellate court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court which was the subject of
the petition for review. A reading of its own decision will show that it dealt
extensively with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some
length in the light of the observations and reservations of this Court
in the Romero case. Moreover, in reviewing the decision of the
metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was actually reviewing the
decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated by reference
the earlier decision rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was
a valid act that effectively elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial
court for examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the
convenience offered by Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in
accordance with the ruling announced in Romero permitting the use of
the memorandum decision. It must also be observed that even if the
respondent court appeared to be partial to the reservation rather than the
rule in the said case, it nevertheless had the duty which it discharged
to abide by the doctrine announced therein by the highest tribunal of
the land. The respondent court could not have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine
our own rulings and modify or reverse them whenever warranted, we take
a second look at the memorandum decision and the Romero case and
test them on the touchstone of the Constitution.

It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually

reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court
below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the above
provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first,
it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by
reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the
decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm
the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings
of fact by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the
higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by
reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the
higher court. The Idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter
decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are
being approved or adopted anyway.
Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United
States, but its form (at least) differs from the one under consideration in
this case. Such a decision is rendered in that country upon a previous'
determination by the judge that there is no need for a published opinion
and that it will have no precedential effect. The judgment is usually limited
to the dispositive portion but a memorandum is attached containing a
brief statement of the facts and the law involved, mainly for the
information of the parties to the case.

The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests
that the court may adopt by reference the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or resolution on appeal
before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are
not indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term
"memorandum decision" in Section 40 or elsewhere in the rest of the
statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this
4 jurisdiction
not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines,
reading as follows:

When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption

in favor of its constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission of
Elections, "to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication." 7 Courts will bend over backward to sustain that presumption.
In case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary to exert every effort to
prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of the
legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm is
based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the
political departments of the government which, it must be assumed in
fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under challenge and assured
themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.

Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final resolution of a

court in appealed cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision or final order appealed from.

The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the
memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into account the
salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-

CIVIL PROCEDURE

discussed restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us,

we have come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we
shall interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the
appellate court to merely adopt by reference in its own decision the
judgment of the lower court on appeal. It is easy to understand that this
device may feed the suspicion feared by Justice Feria that the court has
not given the appeal the attention it deserved and thus deprived the
parties of due process. True or not, this impression is likely to undermine
popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears before it
decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the
applicable law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search
for the decision referred to, which, having been incorporated by reference
only, does not have to be attached to the memorandum decision. The
Court had occasion earlier to complain about this difficulty in the case
of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either
expressly or impliedly the findings and conclusions of the inferior court,
and as a rule, such adoption would amount to a substantial compliance
with the constitutional mandate discussed herein, but where, as in this
case, the specific arguments presented against the decision of the inferior
court are of such nature that a blanket affirmance of said decision does
not in fact adequately dispose of the strictures against it, it is but proper, if
only to facilitate the action to be taken by the appellate court on the
petition for review, that the concrete bases of the impugned decision
should appear on its face, instead of the appellate court having to dig into
the records to find out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the
case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it does
not exist in the case at bar because the decision of the Court
5 of Appeals
extensively quoted from the decision of the metropolitan trial court.
Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of
the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available
to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or even happenstance, if
you will, that has validated the memorandum decision challenged in this
case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the
following requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot
incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower
court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged
decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed,
it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In
other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of
B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions
of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an
indispensable part of the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study
was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was
merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the law on
which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement
should suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of
course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin
with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision
should be sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial
sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity that this kind of decision
may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted
by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no
doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion
of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in
simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the
appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time
needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still
desirable that the appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his own
words the findings of fact of the lower court and presenting his own
interpretation of the law instead of merely parroting the language of the
court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There must be less intellectual
indolence and more pride of authorship in the writing of a decision,
especially if it comes from an appellate court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors
and a pot of paste as if he were a mere researcher. He is an innovator,
not an echo. The case usually becomes progressively simpler as it
passes through the various levels of appeal and many issues become
unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The appellate judge should
prune the cluttered record to make the issues clearer. He cannot usually
do this by simply mimicking the lower court. He must use his own
perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in
discovering the law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in
laying down his judgment. And in doing so, he should also guard against
torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a
technical tract on the values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style
will help liven the opinion trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all
its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision does not have to be a
bore.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the
memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court in the case at
bar, or to the decision of the respondent court such decision on the
strength of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability
and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita incorporated by
reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la Rama. The
memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero decision
was a valid act at the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and
produced binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the respondent
court that the summary judgment without a formal trial was in accord with
the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is
not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the
requirements herein set forth both as to the form prescribed and the
occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the
strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike
down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
6

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

This decision is immediately executory. It is so ordered.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

In 1977, Civil Case No. B-398 (Gloria Naval vs. George Carlos) for
recovery of ownership of a parcel of coconut land was filed and
subsequently raffled to the sala of the petitioner, Judge Adriano Villamor.
While the civil case was pending there, respondent Carlos filed Criminal
Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft
against Gloria Naval and her helpers. The criminal cases were also
assigned to the sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-398, the criminal cases were
temporarily archived.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

After trial in Civil Case No. B-398, a decision was rendered in favor of
Naval who was declared the lawful owner and possessor of the disputed
land. Carlos was ordered to vacate the land.

FIRST DIVISION

Thereafter, respondent Carlos, through counsel, moved to activate the

archived criminal cases. Having declared Naval the lawful owner and
possessor of the contested land in Civil Case No. B-398, Judge Villamor
dismissed the criminal cases against her and her co-accused.

G.R. No. 101041 November 13, 1991

HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE
CARLOS, respondents.

Judge Villamor likewise granted execution pending appeal of his decision

in Civil Case No. B-398. This order was challenged by Carlos in the Court
of Appeals and in this Court, both without success.

G.R. No. 101296 November 13, 1991

HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO T. GUERRERO and HON. PEARY G. ALEONAR, Presiding
Judge of RTC, Branch 21, Region VII, Cebu City, respondents.
Ramon Ve Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio T. Guerrero for private respondent.
Henry R. Savellon for respondent.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p

Afterwards, Carlos filed an administrative case, A.M. No. RTJ-87-105,

against Judge Villamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and
an unjust decision in Civil Case No. B-398. On November 21, 1988, this
Court, in an En Banc resolution, summarily dismissed the administrative
case.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative case, respondent
Carlos filed a civil action for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-6478) against
Judge Villamor for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he
dismissed the five (5) criminal cases against Naval, et al.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served upon Judge
Villamor on December 10, 1987. The next day (December 11, 1987),
instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal
Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order of direct contempt against Carlos
and his lawyer. Attorney Antonio T. Guerrero, "for degrading the respect

CIVIL PROCEDURE

and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptous
language before the court," and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P500.
Carlos immediately filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Judge (G.R.
Nos. 82238-42). We promptly restrained Judge Villamor from enforcing
his Order of Contempt against Carlos and Attorney Guerrero. On
November 13, 1989, we annulled the contempt order. (See pp. 2634, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041.)
Back to Civil Case No. CEB-6478; Judge Villamor filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted the
motion. The order of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CAG.R. CV No. 20657, June 26, 1990). Carlos appealed to this Court which
also denied the petition. (p. 125, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296.)
Unfazed by these setbacks, Carlos and his counsel, Attorney Antonio
Guerrero, filed separate complaints for damages against Judge Villamor
for knowingly rendering an unjust order of contempt.
Attorney Guerrero's complaint for damages (Civil Case No. CEB-8802)
was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, presided over
by Judge Peary G. Aleonar. Carlos' complaint for damages was docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-8823 and raffled to Branch 8, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City presided over by Judge Bernardo LL. Salas.
On March 30, 1990, Judge Villamor filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. CEB-8802 but it was denied by Judge Aleonar (p. 33, Rollo of G.R.
No. 101296).
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order
docketed as G.R. No. 101296.
8

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order

against Judge Aleonar to stop him from proceeding in Civil Case No.
CEB-8802 (pp. 45-46, Rollo of G.R. No. 101296).
On May 20, 1991, a Manifestation was filed by Judge Villamor praying
Judge Salas to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8823 but the motion was

denied by respondent Judge on July 2, 1991 (pp. 13-16, Rollo of G.R. No.
101041).
Hence, this second petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining
order (G.R. No. 101041).
On August 21, 1991, a Resolution was issued by this Court: 1)
temporarily restraining Judge Salas from further proceeding in Civil Case
No. CEB-8823; and 2) granting the petitioner's prayer that this case be
consolidated with G.R. No. 101296 (pp. 37-39, Rollo of G.R. No. 101041).
The sole issue here is: whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may
take cognizance of the actions for damages against Judge Villamor for
allegedly having rendered an unjust order of direct contempt against
Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which this Court subsequently annulled.
The answer is no.
As very aptly held by this Court in a Resolution it issued in connection
with a previous case filed by respondent Carlos against Judge Villamor,
over a similar action for "Damages and Attorney's Fees Arising From
Rendering an Unjust Judgment," in dismissing the five (5) criminal cases
for qualified theft which he (respondent Carlos) had filed against Gloria P.
Naval and others
Indeed, no Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much
less declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and
sentence the judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul with
the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review and
correct errors of the trial courts. (George D. Carlos vs. CA, G.R. No.
95560, November 5, 1990; p. 125, Rollo of G.R No. 101296.)
To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of
the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a coequal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere with the
judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or
power of review. The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now
the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each

CIVIL PROCEDURE

other's cases, judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111
SCRA 262).
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final
judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust decision be levelled against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111
SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; Gahol vs. Riodique, 64
SCRA 494).
Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct
contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found
a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with
conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous
order of direct contempt issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former
counsel was sustained by this Court (Jaynes C. Abarrientos, et al. vs.
Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237, June 1, 1988).
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be
considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be
held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or
wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for certiorari are GRANTED,
Civil Cases Nos. CEB-8802 and CEB-8823, respectively, pending in the
salas of respondents Judge Peary G. Aleonar and Judge Bernardo LL.
Salas, are hereby dismissed. The temporary restraining orders issued by
this Court in these cases are hereby made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
9

CIVIL PROCEDURE

writ of preliminary attachment, the deputy sheriff of the CFI of Manila,

herein respondent Ferdinand J. Guerrero, proceeded to levy upon a
conjugal property6 belonging to petitioners, spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching.7
On July 26, 1982, petitioners filed a petition 8 with the CFI of
Rizal,9 seeking to declare illegal the levy on attachment upon their
conjugal property.10 Petitioners claimed that the branch sheriff had no
authority to levy upon a property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
The trial court, however, dismissed the case on August 8, 1983 for lack of
jurisdiction because the subject property was already under custodia legis
of the CFI of Manila.11

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 118830

February 24, 2003

SPOUSES ALFREDO AND ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, and FERDINAND J.
GUERRERO, SENIOR DEPUTY SHERIFF, MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 31795, dated October 27, 1994, as well as its resolution, 2 dated
January 27, 1995, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts, gathered from the records of the petition, involve three different
cases filed in separate jurisdictions.
10

On August 6, 1981, respondent Family Savings Bank (Bank) filed a

complaint3 with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, for the
collection of a sum of money against its debtor Cheng Ban Yek & Co., Inc.
and petitioner Alfredo Ching, who acted as a surety for Cheng Ban Yek &
Co., Inc.4 A day after the complaint was filed, the Bank was able to obtain
a writ of preliminary attachment against the defendants. 5 Armed with a

Meanwhile, summary judgment was rendered in the collection case in

favor of the Bank on August 12, 1982. 12The defendants therein, including
petitioner Alfredo Ching, appealed the summary judgment to the Court of
Appeals.13 While the case was on appeal, 14 the trial court granted the
Banks motion for execution pending appeal. 15 As a consequence, the
attached conjugal property was levied upon and sold through public
auction by the deputy sheriff to the Bank on October 10, 1983. 16
On September 5, 1984, in an effort to prevent the deputy sheriff from
consolidating the sale, petitioners filed a second annulment case 17 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. 18 Petitioners sought to declare
void the levy and sale on execution of their conjugal property by
reiterating the same argument raised in the first annulment case, i.e., that
the branch sheriff had no authority to levy upon a property belonging to
the conjugal partnership.19
On November 15, 1985, while the second annulment case was pending,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed in the collection case and
affirmed in toto the summary judgment rendered by the CFI of
Manila.20The matter was elevated to us on a petition for review, 21 but was
eventually dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of
merit.22 Hence, the decision in the collection case became final.
On November 13, 1990, the RTC of Makati rendered judgment in the
second annulment case in favor of petitioners and declared null and void
the levy and sale on execution upon the conjugal property. 23 Respondents
elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 31795.
On October 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed decision,

CIVIL PROCEDURE

reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC of Makati. 24 The Court
of Appeals declared that the Makati annulment case is barred by res
judicata because of the prior Rizal annulment case and Manila collection
case.Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
the following grounds:25

I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the decisions
rendered in the Manila collection case and Rizal
annulment case, taken together, constitute res judicata or
bar by prior judgment to the annulment case filed with the
RTC of Makati. Assuming there is res judicata or bar by
prior judgment, the Court of Appeals erred in not holding
that respondents have waived this defense.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner
Encarnacion Ching waived or abandoned her right or
claim on her conjugal property when she did not
intervene in the Manila collection case.
III
In any event, the Court of Appeals erred in not deciding
the Makati annulment case on its merits on equitable
considerations.
We deny the petition.

11

The Makati annulment case should have been dismissed from the start
for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC of Makati does not have the authority to
nullify the levy and sale on execution that was ordered by the CFI of
Manila, a co-equal court. The determination of whether or not the levy
and sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls

within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued
the writ of execution.26
Beginning with the case of Orais v. Escao, 27 down to the subsequent
cases of Nuez v. Low,28 Cabigao v. del Rosario,29 Hubahib v. Insular
Drug Co., Inc.,30 National Power Corp. v. De Veyra, 31 Luciano v. Provincial
Governor,321a\^/phi1.net De Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador,33 Cojuangco v.
Villegas,34 Darwin v. Tokonaga,35 we laid down the long standing doctrine
that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments
or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various
trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority,
should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of
justice.
There is no dispute that the subject conjugal property was under custodia
legis of the CFI of Manila. It was initially attached under a writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the CFI of Manila. Said property was
later on levied upon and sold under a writ of execution issued by the
same court. Since the attachment, levy and sale have been carried out
upon orders of the CFI of Manila, any and all questions concerning the
validity and regularity thereof necessarily had to be addressed to the CFI
of Manila.
Petitioners, however, contend that one of the owners of the property,
petitioner Encarnacion Ching, was not a party to the collection case. Not
being a party thereto, Encarnacion Ching should be allowed to file a
separate case as a third-party claimant and said filing cannot be
considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and
coordinate court.36
We do not agree.
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court authorizes a third person, who
is not the judgment debtor or his agent, to vindicate his claim to a
property levied through an entirely separate and distinct action. Said rule
reads as follows:37

CIVIL PROCEDURE

SECTION 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If

the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto
or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof
upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum
not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement
as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the
writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is
filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of
the bond.

the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was

adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The
husband then filed a complaint with the CFI of Quezon City for the
annulment of the writ of execution, alleging therein that the conjugal
properties cannot be made to answer for obligations exclusively
contracted by the wife. The executing party moved to dismiss the
annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals, in Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to
hear the annulment case, had not interfered with the executing court. We
reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and held that there was interference
by the CFI of Quezon City with the execution of the CFI of Caloocan City.
We ruled that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
"stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife, which
would allow the filing of a separate and independent action.

The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating
his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment
obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate action against a
third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.

The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was
inappropriate for petitioners to institute a separate case for annulment
when they could have easily questioned the execution of their conjugal
property in the collection case. We note in fact that the trial court in the
Rizal annulment case specifically informed petitioners that Encarnacion
Chings rights could be ventilated in the Manila collection case by the
mere expedient of intervening therein.40 Apparently, petitioners ignored
the trial courts advice, as Encarnacion Ching did not intervene therein
and petitioners instituted another annulment case after their conjugal
property was levied upon and sold on execution.

xxxxxxxxx
In Ong v. Tating,38 we elucidated on the applicability of Section 16 of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. We held therein that a separate and distinct
case from that in which the execution has issued is proper if instituted by
a "stranger" to the latter suit. Upon the other hand, if the claim of
impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution proceedings is made
by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may
only be applied with, and obtained from, the executing court. This is true
even if a new party has been impleaded in the suit.
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property
is being executed on account of the other spouse being 12
the judgment
obligor, considered a "stranger?" In Mariano v. Court of Appeals, 39 we
answered this question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan
City declared the wife to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ
of execution was issued against her. Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to
levy upon the conjugal properties of the wife and her husband. The wife
initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for

There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a
separate case against a wrongful execution. 41 However, in those cases,
we allowed the institution of a separate and independent action because
what were executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive property of a
spouse who was not a party to the case. In those instances, said spouse
can truly be deemed a "stranger." In the present case, the levy and sale
on execution was made upon the conjugal property.
In any case, even without the intervention of Encarnacion Ching in the
collection case, it appears that Alfredo Ching was able to raise the
conjugal nature of the property in both the trial court and appellate court.
A perusal of the records reveals that petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash Writ of Execution before the
CFI of Manila. In the motion, he specifically argued that the execution was
invalid for having been enforced upon their conjugal property.42 Alfredo

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Ching raised this argument again on appeal in CA G.R. CV No.

02421.43 Evidently, due process has been afforded to petitioners as
regards the execution on their conjugal property.

articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution 2 dated 15

September 2000 denying petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine
Daily Inquirer, Inc.s motion for reconsideration.

Considering that that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to hear
Civil Case No. 8389, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised by petitioners.

The antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998,
wherein they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action; (2) the defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were
general conclusions without factual premises; (3) the questioned news
report constituted fair and true report on the matters of public interest
concerning a public figure and therefore, was privileged in nature; and (4)
malice on their part was negated by the publication in the same article of
plaintiffs or PALs side of the dispute with the pilots union.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005
ARMAND NOCUM
INC., Petitioners,
vs.

and

THE

PHILIPPINE

On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter

Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 982288,seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious
and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.

DAILY

INQUIRER,

LUCIO TAN, Respondent.

DECISION

ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31,
1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of
action; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a
real party in interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first
published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February
10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of
improper venue.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
13of the 1997
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
1
Rules of Civil Procedure are the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
19 April 2000 that affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. 98-2288, dated 19 April 1999,
admitting respondent Lucio Tans Amended Complaint for Damages for
the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against him in two (2)

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed

an Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of
the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of
the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first
published in the City of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192),
and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first published in
the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue,
admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous
order of dismissal, supra, stating, inter alia, that:

In a Manifestation filed on 19 February 2001, respondent stated that the

petition6 filed by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already been denied
by the Court in a resolution dated 17 January 2001. 7

"The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have

been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly
admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final. Besides, there is no
substantial amendment in the Amended Complaint which would affect the
defendants defenses and their Answers. The Amendment is merely
formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is substantial."

On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within
thirty (30) days from notice.8 Both petitioners and respondent complied.9

Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali

and the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP),
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions
for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 55192, and the other by defendants Umali and ALPAP
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54894. The two petitions were
consolidated.
On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the court a
quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and by defendants
Umali and ALPAP were likewise denied in a resolution dated 15
September 2000.
Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this Court.
Under consideration is the petition for review filed by petitioners.
14

On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to comment

on the petition filed by petitioners.3
4

Respondent filed his comment on 22 January 2001 to which petitioners

filed a reply on 26 April 2001.5

Petitioners assigned the following as errors:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE
BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER
JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR ADMITTED BECAUSE
THE LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER DIVESTED" OF JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED
PURPOSELY TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE.10
Petitioners state that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code vests
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on the RTC of the
place: (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2)
where the complainant, if a private person, resides; or (3) where the
complainant, if a public official, holds office. They argue that since the
original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not
the latters actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending
news reports were printed and first published, the original complaint, by
reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on
the lower court.
The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction
over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
We rule in the affirmative.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged

in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. 11In the case at
bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the
allegations thereof, respondents cause of action is for damages arising
from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance 12 that
is specifically designated to try a libel case.13
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the
Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,14differentiated jurisdiction and venue as
follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case;
venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction
is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction
establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a
relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent;
and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the
parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint
that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in the
City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC
nor would respondents failure to include the same in the original
complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the
power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that venue was not properly laid.
In Laquian v. Baltazar,15 this Court construed the term "jurisdiction" in
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place where
actions for libel shall be filed or "venue."
In Escribano v. Avila,16 pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363,1715
we laid down
the following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions in written
defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published

or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time
the offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of
Manila, the venue is the province or the city where he held office at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of
residence at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended
party is a public officer or a private person, he has always the option to
file the action in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
the libelous article is printed or first published.
We further restated18 the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually
resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila,
the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
We fully agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled:

CIVIL PROCEDURE

We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was

not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it had
none. The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the
action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with
jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly
laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural,
not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in civil cases, venue may be
waived.
Consequently, by dismissing the case on the ground of improper
the lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the
petitioners recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers
complaint, albeit, questioning the propriety of venue, instead of a
to dismiss.

venue,
herein
to the
motion

...
We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper
considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither
the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article
was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the
dismissal, the same may still be amended as in fact the amended
complaint was admitted, in view of the court a quosjurisdiction, of which it
was never divested. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any
grave abuse of discretion.19
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from
libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction.
The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it
does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. 20 It is a procedural,
not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical
location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to
the jurisdiction of the court.21 It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it 16
relates to the
place of trial.22 In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue
is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction. 23
Petitioners argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
case because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous
articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the

case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to
contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the
issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This
is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is
not jurisdictional.
The cases24 cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases
involve amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on courts over
which they originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As
discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
upon the filing of the original complaint. It did not lose jurisdiction over the
same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The
amendment merely laid down the proper venue of the case.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 19 April 2000 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
PAUL PELAEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent.
May 22, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

SECOND DIVISION

and LOURDES FUA VILLACASTIN,

A conflict of jurisdiction between the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) and the regular trial courts is at the core of
the present case. Petitioners question the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dated February 7, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83873, which
upheld the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB in cases
involving the use or possession of lands covered by agrarian laws.

Petitioners, Present:

The facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:

SPS. TERESITO Y. VILLACASTIN G.R. No. 170478

17

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
TINGA,

On June 29, 1976, respondent Paul Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their
agricultural lands bearing Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-10343, 010344 and 0-10345, situated in Barrio Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Bogo Branch, Cebu. For
failure of the Pelaez spouses to pay their mortgage obligation, the
properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold at public auction.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

The purported tenants of the property, Anastacio Alob, Francisco Alob,

Jesus Cordova, Manuel Sanchez, Elia Giltendez, Flora dela Pea, Eliseo
Rayco, Benjamin Santillan, Pascual Gilbuena, Jesus Alob, Renaldo
Grande, and Julieto Manzueto, filed an action to annul the mortgage,
foreclosure and sale of the properties, claiming that they are the owners
thereof under Presidential Decree No. 27. the case was docketed as Reg.
Case No. VII-76-C-90.
In the meantime, on May 10, 1988, petitioners filed a Complaint for
Forcible Entry with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,
[2]
docketed as Civil Case No. 79, with the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of Bantayan, Cebu, against respondent and a certain
Elesio Monteseven. The complaint averred that plaintiffs (petitioners
herein) are the owners and actual possessors of the subject landholding
and that defendants, having entered the property through stealth and
strategy, unlawfully deprived plaintiffs of possession thereof.
Respondent countered that he is the owner of the subject property, which
was foreclosed by the DBP and later purchased by petitioners at an
auction sale. Petitioners, however, were allegedly never in possession of
the subject property as they failed to apply for a writ of possession
therefor. Respondent further claimed that he had redeemed the property
on March 3, 1988 and accordingly reacquired possession thereof.[3]

foreclosure and eventual sale thereof to Sps. Teresito

and Lourdes Villacastin as null and void ab initio as it is
contrary to law, public order and public policy;
3. Declaring complainants herein to properly account their
deposited shares/lease rentals before the DAR office of
Bantayan[,] Cebu and deliver the said deposited
[share/lease] rentals including the forthcoming harvest
thereon to respondent landowners Sps. Paul and Elnora
Pelaez with the assistance of the MARO of Bantayan,
Madridejos, Cebu.
4. No pronouncement as to cost.[4]
This decision was affirmed by the DARAB in a Decision [5] dated February
22, 2000.
On January 6, 2000, the MCTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 79 in
favor of petitioners and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE,
ordered:

premises

considered,

defendant

is

hereby

a) To return to plaintiffs possession of the parcel of land

above-described and vacate the premises;
Meanwhile, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu rendered
a decision in Reg. Case No. VII-76-C-90 dated February 15, 1993, in
favor of the tenants, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing view, DECISION is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring complainants herein with the exception of
Silbino Arranquez[,] Jr. and Claro Gilbuela who 18
earlier
withdraw from this case as bonafide tenant farmers of the
parcels in question covered by P.D. [No.] 27;
2. Declaring the mortgage executed by Sps. Paul and
Elnora Pelaez to respondent DBP and the subsequent

b) To pay the costs of litigation;

c) Moral and exemplary damages not recoverable in
ejectment suit is denied;
d) Expenses claimed not duly proven are disallowed;
e) To release in favor of the plaintiffs the cash bond the
sum of P5,000.00 deposited pursuant to the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.[6]
In a Decision[7] dated March 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dakit, Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, affirmed the MCTC decision.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that regular courts should

respect the primary jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB in cases
involving agricultural lands such as the property subject of this
case. Accordingly, it set aside the decision rendered by the RTC
and the MCTC, and dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed
by petitioners in this case.
The
appellate
court
denied
Resolution[8] dated November 11, 2005.

reconsideration

in

order directed the PARO of Cebu and the MARO of Bantayan, Cebu to
cease and desist from further activities affecting the subject property
under Operation Land Transfer, and to refer the matter to the DENR.

its

Petitioners contend that Civil Case No. 79 did not involve any agrarian
matter and thus, the MCTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the
case.
In his Comment[9] dated March 21, 2006, respondent underscores the
fact that the parcels of land subject of this case are tenanted agricultural
lands. Before judgment was rendered in the forcible entry case, the
tenants of the property already filed a suit with the DARAB for the
annulment of the real estate mortgage executed by respondent over the
same in favor of DBP and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale in
favor of petitioners. The DARABs decision declaring the mortgage,
foreclosure and auction sale null and void became final as regards
petitioners who did not appeal from the decision. Respondent asserts
that the complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioners had lost its legal
basis after the DARAB declared that the foreclosure and auction sale of
the subject property were null and void.
Petitioners filed a Reply[10] dated July 28, 2006, insisting that the tenantfarmers involved in the DARAB case were not parties to the forcible entry
case, the only defendant therein being respondent in this
case. Respondent, in turn, raised the defense of ownership, thereby
joining the issues regarding possession and ownership.
Petitioners further note their argument in their Motion for
19 that the
Reconsideration[11] of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
subject property had been declared as wilderness area and the same
had been classified as alienable and disposable on December 22,
1987. In support of this contention, they submitted a Department of
Agrarian Reform Order[12] dated September 12, 1997 to the effect that the
subject property falls within the administrative authority or competence of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of

the complaint.[13] In ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one
for forcible entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, the averments of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are to be examined.[14]
A review of the complaint reveals that the pertinent allegations thereof
sufficiently vest jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint
alleges as follows:
III
That the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual
possessors of a parcel of agricultural land more particularly
described as follows:
xxx
IV
That the defendant, sometime in the second week of March 1988,
by strategy and through stealth entered the above-described land
of the plaintiffs and took possession thereof; thus, depriving said
plaintiffs of the possession thereof;
V
That several demands were made the plaintiffs upon the
defendants to restore to them the possession of the abovedescribed parcel of land; but, defendants refused and still refuse to
restore possession of said property to the plaintiffs; [15]
It has not escaped our notice that no landowner-tenant vinculum juris or
juridical tie was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone
that which would characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute.
[16]
Rule II of the DARAB Rules[17] provides that the DARAB shall have

CIVIL PROCEDURE

primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and

adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No, 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
Petitioners action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material
possession of the subject property only, a question which both the MCTC
and the RTC ruled petitioners are entitled to. It does not involve the
adjudication of an agrarian reform matter, nor an agrarian dispute falling
within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or
private agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession
as this issue is independent of the question of disposition and alienation
of such lands which should be threshed out in the DAR. [18] Thus,
jurisdiction was rightfully exercised by the MCTC and the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83873 dated February 7, 2005, and its
Resolution dated November 11, 2005, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dakit, Bogo, Cebu,
Branch 61, dated March 10, 2004, affirming the decision of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bantayan, Cebu, dated June 6, 2000, is
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

20

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 92625 : December 26, 1990.]
192 SCRA 768
JOSE ORDA and IMELDA LOZADA, Petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and GIL GALANG Respondents.

DECISION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The question presented in this case is whether or not the Court of
Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it to the
Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to conflicting facts presented
by the parties.
Originally, private respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City to regain custody of his minor
daughter, Joyce, who continued staying with her maternal grandparents,
petitioners herein, her mother being already deceased at the initiation of
the action. The case was eventually dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
because petitioners, as defendants therein, had moved to Bataan and
any writ of habeas corpus to be issued by the trial court may not be
enforced against them.
Subsequently, private respondent, on the basis of his being the sole
surviving parent of his daughter, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
respondent Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13912-SP, an
original action to compel petitioners to produce the body of minor Joyce

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Orda Galang and explain the basis of their custody. Petitioners herein
filed their Opposition/Answer 1 alleging that private respondent
abandoned his wife and child, had no source of livelihood and therefore
could not support his daughter, they prayed that care and custody of the
child be awarded them.: rd
On 13 April 1988, respondent court issued its assailed decision, as
follows:
The conflicting thesis (sic), however, of petitioner [private
respondent herein] and respondents [petitioners herein] require a
full-blown trial of the facts alleged by the parties. This could be
shown by the initial discussions aforestated.
The records show that [private respondent] had already filed a
similar petition before the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 31, San Pablo City, on November 23, 1987, in
Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87). However, the writ was
returned unserved as [petitioners] ostensibly transferred their
domicile at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center at Barrio
Sabang, Morong, Bataan.
Inasmuch as [petitioners] have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Court by producing the body of the child, Joyce Orda Galang, and
submitted their comments to the petition, the trial on the merits
could now proceed to determine who of the parties are entitled to
the custody of the child.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides
to REMAND this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San
Pablo City, for trial on the merits as to which of the parties are
legally entitled to the custody of the child, Joyce Orda Galang.
SO ORDERED. 2

that only the order of dismissal of the same was in the expediente of the
case. They brought this matter to the attention of the trial court which then
issued an order dated 27 January 1989 directing the Chief, Archives
Section of the Court of Appeals "to transmit to this Court the original
record of case AC-G.R. No. SP-13912 (sic) immediately upon receipt of
this Order." 4
In reply, the respondent Court of Appeals advised the trial court that no
records can be remanded because no expediente from the lower court
was ever elevated. For this reason, petitioners filed with respondent court
on 21 April 1989 a Motion for Clarification of its earlier decision alleging
that CA-G.R. No. SP-13912 was an original action, not an appeal
emanating from, or a special civil action to assail, a case filed with the trial
court, hence no record of the case can be remanded because no
expediente from the lower court was ever elevated to the Court of
Appeals; that Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87) was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and the order of dismissal has long become final and,
moreover, herein petitioners were never brought to the jurisdiction of the
trial court in said special proceedings, so much so that they have not
even presented an answer or opposition in said special proceedings; and
that a reinstatement of Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87), over which
the trial court had lost jurisdiction, may not be justified by virtue of the
order of the Court of Appeals to remand CA-G.R. No. 13912 for trial on
the merits. 5
The Court of Appeals 6 resolved this motion on 6 June 1989 as follows:
At the outset, it is necessary to point out that this Court entertained this
petition for Habeas Corpus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over
such case. Said petition is in no way connected with the one dismissed by
the lower court in SP-719 (87).
In their Motion for Clarification, [petitioners] appear to be confused by this
Court's directive remanding the case to the lower court.

21

In conformity with the foregoing decision the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, the Hon. Napoleon R. Flojo presiding, before which private
respondent filed his first action, ordered the reinstatement of Special
Proceedings No. SP-719 (87) and scheduled the case for trial on the
merits. 3 Upon examination of the records of said case, petitioners noted

It should be noted that when this Court ordered the same, it did not mean
the remanding of the records, but (the) referring (of) the case to the court
a quo for appropriate action, it enjoying original and concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court over habeas corpus cases (B.P. 129).:-cralaw

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Judge Napoleon Flojo also appears to be mixed up as he issued an Order

dated January 27, 1989, which inter alia require the Chief, Archives
Section of this Court "to transmit" to the Regional Trial Court "the original
record of case AC-G.R. No. 13912 immediately upon receipt of this
order." (p. 106, Rollo) (sic) But no records can be transmitted back to the
lower court simply because no records were elevated in that, as
aforesaid, the case was filed here as an original action.
The [petitioners] have manifested in their motion that they were not given
an opportunity to answer or at least comment on the petition. Now the
same is in the lower court as directed in the decision sought to be
clarified. Indeed, issues cannot be joined if the lower court will deprive the
[petitioners] (of) their right to respond to the petition.
WHEREFORE, for the sake of clarity the dispositive portion of the
decision dated April 13, 1988 is hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby
decides to REFER this case to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on the merits as to
which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of
the child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR ISSUES TO BE
JOINED, THE LOWER COURT IS HEREBY ORDERED
TO REQUIRE THE [petitioners] TO ANSWER THE
PETITION."
SO ORDERED." 7
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of the foregoing
resolution. Petitioners contended that respondent Court of Appeals had
no authority to refer the case to the lower court for trial on the merits
because said court, in the original habeas corpus case filed by private
respondent, had never acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Further,
22 with the
that respondent court had no power to order a case docketed
lower court without private respondent having paid the docketing fee and
filing an appropriate pleading therein. Private respondent, on the other
hand, also set forth similar contentions and prayed that trial on the merits
be resumed by respondent Court.

The Court of Appeals 8 resolved both motions for reconsideration on 13

March 1990 as follows:
We entertain no doubt that [petitioners] had never been brought
to the jurisdiction of the lower court in SP: PROC. No. SP-719
(87)and agree with the claim that the Order of dismissal issued in
said case had already become final and executory. But then, it
must be pointed out again that with the filing of another petition
for habeas corpus before this Court (docketed as AC [sic] G.R.
SP No. 13912), an entirely new proceeding was commenced.
Unlike the lower court in the previous habeas corpus case, this
Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners] upon
their filing of an Opposition/Answer on April 4, 1988 (p. 14, Rollo).
Section 9[1] in relation to Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 confers
upon the Court of Appeals authority to try and decide habeas corpus
cases concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts. Concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction has been defined as that which is possessed by a court
together with another or others over the same subject matter. Clearly,
therefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides the basis for Us to refer AC
(sic) G.R. SP No. 13912 to the lower court for trial on the merits. With the
referral of AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912, the jurisdiction which this Court
acquired over the persons of [petitioners] was transferred to and
conferred upon the Regional Trial Court, which necessarily must treat
said case as a separate and distinct proceeding from the one it earlier
dismissed. This means that the Regional Trial Court must assign the
referred case a new number, but need not require the [private
respondent] to remit the prescribed docketing fee inasmuch as the same
had already been paid with this Court. What the parties need to do though
is to reproduce the pleadings they filed in AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912
before the Regional Trial Court in order for issues to be joined therein.nad
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the Decision dated April 13, 1988 is
hereby further clarified to read thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides
to REFER this case to the regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San
Pablo City, for trial on the merits as to which of the parties are
legally entitled to the custody of the child, Joyce Orda Galang.
FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO

CIVIL PROCEDURE

REPRODUCE ALL THE PLEADINGS THEY FILED IN AC (sic)

G.R. SP NO. 13912 BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
UPON THE RECEIPT OF WHICH, SHALL ASSIGN THE CASE A
NEW NUMBER WITHOUT REQUIRING [private respondent] TO
PAY THE DOCKETING FEE."

9(1) and 21 thereof merely provide that the Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Courts, respectively, exercise original jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus, among others. While recognizing the concurrent
original jurisdiction of both courts over habeas corpus cases as special
proceedings, these provisions are not authority for remanding or referring
to the latter original actions filed with the former.

SO ORDERED. 9
In this special civil action for Certiorari petitioners assign the following as
errors committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority
[to do so], in referring the original action for habeas corpus
filed before it to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San
Pablo City, for trial on the merits to determine the issue as to
which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of the
child, its reliance on Section 9[1] in relation to Section 21 of
B.P. Blg. 21 being specious.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ordering the parties to
the original action for habeas corpus filed before it to
reproduce before the Regional Trial Court all the pleadings
they filed in AC-G.R. SP No. 13912 (sic).
3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority
[to do so], in directing the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31,
San Pablo City, to assign the case a new case number
without requiring herein private respondent (as petitioner
therein) to pay the docket fee therefor. 10
There is merit in the contentions of petitioners.
Essentially, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals has no power to
issue the decision remanding the proceedings to the trial court and the
23
two subsequent resolutions clarifying the same.
The assailed decision and the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
not supported by law and the Rules of Court. The provisions of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act (B.P. Blg. 129) cited by the respondent Court
of Appeals in its resolution dated 13 March 1990 are not in point. Sections

On the contrary, the Court of Appeals is specifically given the power to

receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve
factual issues raised in cases falling within its original jurisdiction. 11
Furthermore, under the Supreme Court Resolution dated 11 February
1983 implementing B.P. Blg. 129 pending the corresponding thorough
revision of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals is authorized to
conduct a trial or hearing to receive evidence and for the purpose shall
observe the procedure prescribed for the trial courts. 12 Clearly, the Court
of Appeals should not have remanded or referred the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to the trial court.: nad
Finally, the questioned decision and resolutions go against the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. 13 Under Rule 6, Section 2(c) (5)
thereof, the proper procedure is as follows:
RULE 6
PROCEDURE IN SPECIAL CASES
xxx
SEC. 2. Special Civil Action. Original verified petitions
for Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo
warranto and other writs may be filed in the Court of Appeals . . .
xxx
c. Judicial Action. The Court may either deny due course or
dismiss the petition outright, or require the private respondent or
respondents to comment on the petition, or give due course
thereto.
xxx

CIVIL PROCEDURE

(5) If it appears that there is need for reception of evidence, the

Division to which the Justice to whom the case is assigned for
study and report belongs shall conduct the hearing. The Division
shall have the power to perform any acts to resolve the factual
issues raised in the case (Emphasis supplied.)
Attention is also directed to the fact that the foregoing provision is silent
as to whether or not the hearing may be delegated, unlike that of the
provision on annulment of judgments, Section 1(c)(3) of the same Rule,
where, on motion of the parties, referral of any of the issues to a
Commissioner is allowed in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court.
Under the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals was in error in
ordering the remand and later on the referral of the original petition for
habeas corpus filed with it to the Regional Trial Court. What respondent
court should have done was to conduct the reception of evidence and
pass upon the merits of the conflicting allegations of the parties insofar as
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is concerned.
While We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court that the
case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in
the context of the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule
99 of the Rules of Court, and not a remand or referral of the original
action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the respondent court.
Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place where the
petitioner therein resides. 14 Petitioners' third assigned error is disposed
of accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals are
SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition for
habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing by private respondent
of the appropriate special proceedings to gain custody of his minor child.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all Members of the
24respondent
Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129132 July 8, 1998
ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO DE LA
FUENTE, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a sequel to our decision 1 of 5 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428,
entitled Isabelita Vital-Gozon v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,
which held that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, in a special civil
action for mandamus against a public officer (docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 16438 and entitled Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente v. Dr.
Isabelita Vital-Gozon, et al.), to take cognizance of the claim for damages
against respondent public officer.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Specifically, the instant petition seeks to reverse the Resolution of 7 May

1997 2 of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438
awarding to petitioner below, now private respondent, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees after hearing the evidence
thereon sometime after this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101428 became
final.
The factual antecedents then, as found by us in G.R. No. 101428, must
be restated, thus:
In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119
issued on January 30, 1987 by president Corazon C. Aquino
reorganization of the various offices of the Ministry of Health commenced;
existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the
Chief of Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed
to that position on December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the
post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which he was promoted in 1977
after serving as Medical Specialist I of the same hospital for six (6) years
(since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the
Department of Health that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist
II." Considering this to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his
post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH
Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case
to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No.
4. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be
exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr."
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a
Resolution dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission
25
made the following conclusion and disposition, to wit:
. . . (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant dela
Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialist II as null and void:
hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National Children's
Hospital was not abolished and the positions therein remained intact

although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics was changed to "Chief
of Medical professional Staff" with substantially the same functions and
responsibilities, the Commission hereby orders that:
1. Appellant dela Fuente, Jr. be retained or considered as never having
relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical
Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and housing
allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from the date of his
illegal demotion/transfer.
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor
appeal therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day
period prescribed therefor by the Constitution. Consequently, the
resolution became final, on September 21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the
Medical Center Chief of the National Children's Hospital, demanding
implementation of the Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred
"de la Fuente's claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for
Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action . . . (She did this
allegedly because, according to the Solicitor General, she was) unaware
when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory, whether
such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the
DOH Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution."
But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him
of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to
await "legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department." On the other
hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la
Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with
the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In
fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened to stop
paying . . . (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet
no "approved" appointment even as "Medical Specialist II" . . .
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or
anyone in her behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution
of August 9, 1988 would be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to
cover the salaries and allowances otherwise due him would revert to the
General Fund, Dr. de la Fuente repaired to the Civil Service Commission

CIVIL PROCEDURE

and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however "told to file in court
a petition for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission
had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions."

bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through the
individual respondents . . . (However, no) answer was filed; neither was
there any show cause [sic] against a writ of preliminary injunction." It was
a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf.

So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action

of "mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel VitalGozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the
NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution of the Civil Service
Commission. He prayed for the following specific reliefs:

About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a

"Supplemental/Amended Petition" dated February 2, 1989. The second
petition described as one for "quo warranto" aside from "mandamus",
added three respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and
alleged inter aliathat he (de la Fuente) had "clear title" to the position in
question [by] virtue of the final and executory judgment of the Civil
Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment had
become final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the
latter allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as "OIC Professional Service" to further
usurp, intrude into and unlawfully hold and exercise the public
office/position of petitioner (under a duly approved permanent
appointment as "Chief of Clinics" since 1978). De la Fuente thus prayed,
additionally, for judgment:

(1) (That) . . . a temporary restraining order be issued immediately,

ordering the principal and other respondents to revert the funds of the
NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement the final
resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein petitioner, Dr.
Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums which have accrued
and due and payable as of the date of said order;
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the
restraining order be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction; and that
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering principal
respondent and the other respondents to implement in full the said final
resolution; and
(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment be
rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal
respondent be ordered and commanded to comply with and implement
the said final resolution without further delay; and, furthermore, that the
principal respondent be ordered to pay to the petitioner the sums of
P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It 26
also issued a
temporary restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondents
to show cause why it should not be converted to a writ of preliminary
injunction. The record shows that the respondents prayed for and were
granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their answer "through
counsel, who," as the Court of Appeals was later to point out, "did not

(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not
legally entitled to the office of "Chief of Clinics" (now retitled/known as
"Chief of Medical Professional Staff," NCH), ousting him therefrom and
ordering said respondent to immediately cease and desist from further
performing as "OIC Professional Service" any and all duties and
responsibilities of the said office; (and)
(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is the
lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as "Chief of the Medical
Professional Staff" and placing him in the possession of said
office/position, without the need of reappointment or new appointment as
held by the Civil Service Commission in its resolution of August 9, 1988,
in CSC Case No. 4.
xxx xxx xxx
Copy of the "Supplemental/Amended Petition" was sent to "Atty. Jose A.
Favia, Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc.,
National Children's Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty.
Fabia's address not being indicated or mentioned in his motion for
Extension of Time)."

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again,

none was filed. The petitions were consequently "resolved on the basis of
their allegations and the annexes." The Appellate Court promulgated its
judgment on June 9, 1989. It held that
The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position as
Chief of Clinics by the expedient of having him appointed to another,
lower position is no longer an issue. It ceased to be such when the
resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said resolution is explicit
in its mandate; petitioner was declared the lawful and de jure Chief of
Clinics (Chief of the Medical Professional Staff) of the National Children's
Hospital, and by this token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not
legally entitled to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita VitalGozon, had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be
complied with. It was ill-advised of principal respondent, and violative of
the rule of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed or implemented.
and accordingly ordered
. . . respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, . . . to forthwith
comply with, obey and implement the resolution in CSC Case No. 4
(and) . . . Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled to the office, . . .
to immediately cease and desist from further performing and acting as
OIC Professional Service.
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages founded essentially on the
refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the
Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a
different forum was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the "petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the
forum for . . . (said) claim of damages."
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate
Tribunal's Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. Respondent de La
Fuente acknowledged receipt of his own copy on June 15, 27
1989. Neither
Vital-Gozon nor her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for
reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal the decision.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by
motion filed through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. He insisted that

the Appellate Court had competence to award damages in

a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages
might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate
Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of
Appeals had authority to issue such writs only "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction," the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which
three levels of courts the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and
the Court of Appeals were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to
issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to conduct
hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to
separately litigate the matter of damages, he continued, would lead to
that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to
enforce the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 directing
his reinstatement pursuant to the Civil Service Commission's Resolution
of August 9,1988, supra. He filed on July 4, 1989 a "Motion for
Execution," alleging that the judgment of June 9, 1989 had become final
and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. served with notice thereof on
June 16, 1989 to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to
the Supreme Court. His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated July 7, 1989, reading as follows:
The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory, as
prayed for, let the writ of execution issue forthwith.
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, on the
invoked authority of Section 9, Rule 39. The writ quoted the dispositive
portion of the judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor
General's Office points out, the second paragraph to the effect that the
petitions "are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of
damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied."
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989
judgment was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20,
1989, an "Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents
for Contempt," complaining that although Gozon and her co-parties had
been served with the writ of execution on July 14, they had not complied
therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court required Gozon
and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the

CIVIL PROCEDURE

charge and show cause "why they should not be adjudged in contempt
for disobeying and/or resisting the judgment."
At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves,
accompanied by their individual private lawyers one for Gozon (Felipe
Hidalgo, Jr.), two for Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S.
Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in their behalf, from the Health
Department, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was there "in behalf of
Jose A. Fabia." They explained that they had no intention to defy the
Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith;
and they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking
to do so "even in the afternoon" of that same day. The Court consequently
ordered them "to comply with their undertaking . . . without any further
delay," and report the action taken towards this end, within five (3) days.
On August 9, 1989, Gozon, as "Medical Center Chief," sent a letter to
Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special
Order No. 31 dated August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to
assume the position of Chief of the Medical Professional Staff, and that a
voucher for the payment of his allowances had been prepared and was
being processed.
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the
Court of Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de
la Fuente's motion for reconsideration of June 29, 1989. It modified the
Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a) deleting its last paragraph (disallowing
the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it
as a "PARTIAL DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for
the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages)," since said question
"cannot be resolved by mere reference to the pleadings." This was done
in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la
Fuente, which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
28 specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be

done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustainend by petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his
appearance for Isabelita Gozon. At his instance, the Court gave him an
"opportunity to . . . file a motion for reconsideration" of the Resolution of
September 27, 1989. That motion he filed by registered mail on
November 10, 1989. His basic contentions were (a) that the decision of
June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become final and
executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129,
the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in
a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's
behalf at this juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on
November 14, 1989. It, too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of
September 27, 1989. It filed on November 16, 1989 an "Omnibus Motion:
I. For Reconsideration of Resolution dated September 27, 1989; and II.
To defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages."
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
January 11, 1991. In that Resolution, the Court
1) declared that the amended decision had already become final and
could no longer be re-opened because, although "a copy of the
amendatory resolution was received by counsel who was representing
Gozon on October 3, 1989," the first motion for reconsideration was not
mailed until November 10, 1989 and the Solicitor General's "Omnibus
Motion" was not filed until November 16, 1989; and
2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon in connection
with . . . (de la Fuente's) claim for damages," on the authority of this
Court's ruling promulgated on March 19, 1990 in G.R. No. 87977
(Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No. 88578 (Co v. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig).
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor
General's Office on January 18, 1991. Again the Solicitor General sought
reconsideration, by motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January

CIVIL PROCEDURE

30, 1991. Again it was rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7,

1991, served on the Solicitor General's Office on August 20, 1991, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion. It ruled that the "question of the
authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for respondent
Gozon . . . (had already) been extensively discussed," and that its
"jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine issues on damages proceeds from
Sec. 9, Batas Pambansa 129 as amended."
In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of Appeals
and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de
la Fuente's claim for damages" the Solicitor General's Office has
instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends that the
Court of Appeals is not legally competent to take cognizance of and
decide the question of damages in a mandamus suit. . . . 3
On 5 May 1993, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 4 which noted
that our decision in G.R. No. 101428 had become final and left the option
to reopen the case to de la Fuente.
In its resolution of 26 October 1995, 5 the Court of Appeals, inter alia, set
the hearing for reception of evidence on the matter of damages on 7
December 1995.
After de la Fuente presented his evidence, the Court of Appeals set
reception of Vital-Gozon's evidence on 16 and 17 January 1996. 6
At the scheduled hearing on 16 January 1996, Conrado M. Dela Fuente
sought to block the presentation of Vital-Gozon's evidence on the ground
that the former had not filed an answer, which the latter refuted. The
hearing was then reset to other dates for the parties to prove their
respective claims. Vital-Gozon submitted, on 18 January 1996, copies of
a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 10 September 1992 to which was
attached an Answer likewise dated 10 September 1992. It was claimed in
the Manifestation that the answer to the claim for damages could not
29
have been filed earlier as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over de
la Fuente's claim for damages had been questioned before the Supreme
Court. Vital-Gozon likewise claimed that copies of the Manifestation and
Motion were received by the Court of Appeals on 18 September 1992 at
3:40 p.m. and sent by registered mail to counsel for dela Fuente. 7 The
filing of the Manifestation and Motion with the Court of Appeals was
confirmed by Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Division Clerk of Court of the Fifth

Division of the Court of Appeals in an undated Report. 8 He further

disclosed that the pleading was transmitted to the Archives Section on 19
September 1992.
The Court of Appeals then ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda, 9 after which, the Court of Appeals promulgated, on 20
March 1997, a resolution denying petitioner's motion to admit her Answer
to the petition and supplemental/amended petition for mandamus with
damages, on the ground that the period to file the answer had long
prescribed, thus:
It was too late that the answer was filed in this Court on September 18,
1992, after promulgation on August 5, 1992, of the decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 101428. The prescribed period to file such
answer as well as the extended period had long expired on January 24,
1989 (pp. 35, 37, 55, rollo) by the time respondent's answer was filed in
this Court on September 18, 1992. She had another opportunity to
answer when petitioner filed a supplemental/amended petition. (pp. 57,
72, rollo). Still, she filed none. It is evident respondent just ignored the
case filed against her or gave no importance to the petitions and the
notices sent to her by this Court. The delay in filing her answer is
inexcusable.
After promulgation and upon finality of this Court's decision granting the
principal relief sought by the petitioner, the instant case for mandamus
was virtually disposed of with the exception of the incidental damages
that petitioner has claimed. It was uncontested in view of respondent's
failure to answer the petition setting up her defenses. Consequently, the
allegations in the petition and supplemental petition were deemed
admitted; unpleaded defenses were deemed waived and any
counterclaim not set up, barred (Sections 1, 2 and 4, Rule 9, Revised
Rules of Court). Such procedural rules would become meaningless
unless strictly complied with by litigants. As clearly indicated in the
proposed answer, respondent's purpose is to set up a counterclaim
already barred and to plead defenses already waived.
Besides, the parties as well as this Court are bound by the
comprehensive findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court in its final
decision in G.R. No. 101428, based on the uncontroverted allegations of
the verified petitions. So are they bound thereby in this proceeding which
deals with the lone issue of incidental damages claimed by petitioner.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

What remains to be done by this is but the determination of whether

respondent's wrongful act or refusal/failure to perform an official duty
caused injury to the claimant and the amount of the damages that may be
awarded in his favor. 10

5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file

answer, notice thereof having been sent directly to her and her corespondents since the attorney who sought the extension in their behalf
(Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his motion for extension;

Respondent court then set the hearing of the case on 22-23 April 1997
"for the presentation of [Vital-Gozon's] evidence to controvert or rebut that
of [de la Fuente] which he has adduced in support of his claim for
damages."

6) the "supplemental/amended petition" subsequently presented by de la

Fuente, copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and

In its resolution 11 of 21 April 1997, the Court of Appeals denied

petitioner's motion to reconsider 12 the 20 March 1997 resolution.
Petitioner then opted not to present her evidence, as she intended to file
a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the 20 March
1997 resolution and 21 April 1997 order of the Court of Appeals. 13
On 7 May 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution 14 finding
petitioner liable for damages and ordered her to pay private respondent
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. In support thereof, respondent court
quoted our finding in G.R. No. 101428, 15 to wit:
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following
acts and events:
1) the proceeding commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service
Commission in protest against his demotion;
2) the Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as
the direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back
salaries and other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being
couched in fairly simple language obviously understandable to persons of
ordinary or normal intelligence;
30

3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for

implementation of the CSC's aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for
enforcement of the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;

7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to he counsel on October

3, 1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of
Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least.
Neither she nor the Health officials concerned accorded said acts and
events any importance. She never bothered to find out what was being
done to contest or negate de la Fuente's petitions and actions,
notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente's efforts were being
met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits
relief from the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service
Commission. This Court will not disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that
no procedural or substantive errors taint that Resolution, or its becoming
final and executory.
The Court of Appeals then considered the evidence for private
respondent and the applicable law, thus:
Upon respondent's continued refusal without justifiable cause to
implement the final resolution of the Civil Service Commission upholding
petitioner's right to the position he has been claiming with back salaries,
transportation, representation and housing allowances and other benefits
withheld from him, petitioner is entitled to the damages he claims.
Testifying in his own behalf petitioner declared that he was greatly
disturbed, shocked and frustrated during the three months preceding the
filing of his petition; that he had sleepless nights and suffered from mental
anxiety, mental anguish, worry, tension and humiliation when respondent
ignored and disregarded the final resolution of the Civil Service
Commission; that he felt harassed by her refusal because he had to go to
court to obtain relief and had to incur additional expenses for litigation

CIVIL PROCEDURE

which he could hardly afford; and that he had to spend no less than
P5,000 for court fees and incidental expenses and to pay his counsel
P10,000 at the end of the litigation (pp. 6, 7, 12, 13, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1995).
All these respondent has not successfully rebutted by her evidence since
she adduced none in her behalf.
Petitioner therefore, is entitled to recover moral damages from
respondent for her refusal and neglect without just cause to perform her
official duty to reinstate petitioner to the position he was entitled, as
ordered by the Civil Service Commission in its decision. While he was
reinstated to his position, petitioner had to seek the aid of the courts for
that purpose. In point is the case of San Luis vs. Court of Appeals,
decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 1989 (174 SCRA 258, 276),
which involves the unlawful suspension and dismissal by a Provincial
Governor of a quarry superintendent and the Governor's obstinate refusal
to comply with the final decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the
Office of the President which declared said suspension and dismissal
unlawful or without just cause. The Supreme Court held that the Governor
(who was sued both in his official and private capacities) was personally
liable for the damages claimed and awarded in favor of the offended party
P50,000 as moral damages and P20,000 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses. Tan Kapoe vs. Masa, decided January 21, 1985 (134 SCRA
231), is also pertinent. There the Supreme Court upheld the award of
moral damages although it was "made on the basis of documentary
evidence . . . without supporting oral testimonies." And the award of
exemplary damages, in addition to moral damages, was also deemed
proper "even if not expressly pleaded in the complaint nor proved." Such
award of exemplary damages is by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral damages (Article 2229, Civil Code).
Inasmuch as petitioner is entitled to exemplary damages, he should be
awarded attorney's fees. The award in favor of petitioner of moral and
exemplary damages are attorney's fees in the amounts of P50,000
P20,000 and P10,000, respectively, is but fair and just and not
excessive. 16
Unsatisfied, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition31 for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She prays that we
reverse and set aside the challenged Resolution on the following
grounds:

1. There is absolutely no ground for the award of moral and exemplary

damages, as well as attorney's fees.
2. Petitioner's right to due process was violated.
Anent the first ground, petitioner asserts there is no factual basis for the
award of moral damages for, concretely, private respondent was unable
to show any causal connection between his supposed injury and
petitioner's alleged actionable wrong. Petitioner argues that while
testifying, private respondent simply made generalized statements that he
had sleepless nights and suffered mental anxiety, mental anguish, worry,
tension and humiliation. Petitioner next reiterates her stand that she had
nothing to do with the Civil Service case relative to respondent's original
position, as she was not yet connected with the NCH when said case was
filed. Moreover, the failure to immediately reinstate private respondent
was caused by the directive of the Legal Department of the Department of
Health, to which office she forwarded the decision of the Civil Service
Commission for guidance, pursuant to standard procedure. Petitioner,
therefore, acted in good faith. She likewise faults the Court of Appeals for
considering our observations in G.R. No. 101428 as factual findings
which bound respondent court.
As to exemplary damages, petitioner asserts that she did not act with
vindictiveness nor wantonness, hence the award of said damages was
unwarranted, 17 as such, there could likewise be no basis for the award of
attorney's fees. 18
Anent the second ground, petitioner contends that she was sued in her
official capacity, hence could not be held liable for damages, and to hold
otherwise would violate her right to due process as a private
individual, citingCario v. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration 19 and Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office. 20
Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals denied her due
process by refusing to admit her answer, considering that: (a) she
personally attended each and every hearing of the mandamus case; (b) in
its decision of 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals explicitly declared that it
was not the proper forum for the claim for damages, at which point then
the necessity of an answer had become moot; (c) it was only on 27
September 1989 that the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision of 9
June 1989 thereby upholding its jurisdiction to hear the claims for

CIVIL PROCEDURE

damages; (d) but then, consistent with her stand that the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction over the claims for damages, she assailed such ruling
before this Court, hence she could not have been expected to file an
answer; (e) nonetheless, upon receipt of the adverse decision of this
Court of 4 August 1992 in G.R. No. 101428, she immediately filed her
answer with a corresponding motion for its admission; and (f) while her
motion for admission of the answer had been pending since 18 October
1992, the Court of Appeals did not act on it until it was already her turn to
present her evidence on the claim for damages.
In his comment on the petition submitted in compliance with the
Resolution of 21 July 1997, private respondent contends that: (a)
petitioner's incomplete and slanted version of the facts of the case cannot
be relied upon; (b) the factual findings of this Court in G.R. No. 101428
are conclusive and binding, hence the Court of Appeals did not err nor
abuse its discretion in relying on said findings; (c) petitioner's invocation
of state immunity is untenable as she was sued not in her official capacity,
and assuming otherwise, petitioner could nevertheless be held liable for
damages under Articles 20, 27 and 2176 of the Civil Code and Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (d) the Court of Appeals did not err in
denying petitioner's motion to admit her answer; and (e) the Court of
Appeals' awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
were proper, fair, reasonable, justified and in accord with the law and
precedent.
Two principal issues thus confront us, viz: (a) whether petitioner was
denied due process when her answer to the petition was not admitted;
and (b) whether the awards of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees were proper. These will be resolved in seriatim.
I
We do not hesitate to rule that petitioner was not denied due process. The
record of CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 shows that in the resolution of 29
December 1998, the Court of Appeals gave due course
32 to private
respondent's petition and required herein petitioner and the other
respondents to answer the petition within 10 days from notice of the
resolution. 21 On 9 January 1988, petitioner and the other respondents,
represented by Atty. Jose Fabia, filed a motion for an extension of 15
days from said date within which to file their answer, which respondent
court granted in its resolution of 17 January 1989. 22 Likewise, on 17

January 1989, private respondent, as petitioner below, was granted leave

to file a supplemental/amended petition. 23
The Supplemental/Amended Petition was filed on 3 February 1989, 24 and
in the resolution of 9 February 1989, 25the Court of Appeals required
petitioner herein and her co-respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 16438 to file
their answer thereto within 10 days from notice. However, no such answer
was filed, and on 9 June 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision. 26 De
la
Fuente
seasonably
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, 27 principally as regards the holding that "the petitions are
not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for the claim of damages." A
copy of this motion was furnished counsel for respondents. Respondents
therein were then required, in the resolution of 5 July 1989, 28 to comment
within 10 days from notice. However, respondents below once more failed
to comply. Thus, on 27 September 1989, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a resolution 29 granting the motion for reconsideration by
deleting therefrom the challenged portion of its decision of 9 June 1989.
Respondent court then set reception of evidence on the claims for
damages on 9 and 11 of October 1989.
Respondents below, represented by new counsel, Atty. Pedro Martinez,
and the rest by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed motions to
reconsider the resolution of 27 September 1989, primarily on the ground
that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the claim for damages
in the petition for mandamus. The incidental issue of the authority of the
Solicitor General to appear for herein petitioner in respect of the claim for
damages against her in her personal capacity was also raised. These
matters became the subject of various pleadings.
Eventually, on 11 January 1991, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
resolution 30 which gave rise to G.R. No. 101428, after the Court of
Appeals denied herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner's failure to file the answer to the petition was
due to her fault or negligence. She was, by formal resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, required to file answers to both the original petition and the
Supplemental/Amended Petition; yet, she failed to heed both resolutions.
As regards the resolution to answer the Supplemental/Amended Petition,
herein petitioner totally disregarded the same. And if only to further evince
that herein petitioner had no one to blame but herself for her plight, as
regards the resolution to answer the original petition, this she spurned

CIVIL PROCEDURE

despite the fact that she asked for and was granted an extension of 15
days within which to do so. That she questioned the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals over the claims for damages is entirely irrelevant,
considering that she did so only after the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Resolution of 27 September 1989. Up to that time, petitioner had
absolutely no responsive pleading setting forth her defense.
It may likewise be stressed that under Section 2.c.(4) of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals then in force, after the expiration of
the period for filing the answer or the reply in special civil actions, a case
is deemed submitted for resolution. Thus, after the expiration of the 10day period granted to herein petitioner to file her Answer to the
Supplemental/Amended Petition, and in light of her failure to file her
answer to the original petition despite the grant of her motion for
extension of time to file it, then the case was automatically deemed
submitted for decision. After the decision was rendered, she could then
no longer be heard to raise a defense which, by her inaction, she
indubitably expressed no desire to raise.
It cannot then be successfully maintained that the Court of Appeals
committed reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion, when it
denied admission to an answer that was filed only after this Court's
decision in G.R. No. 101428 had long become final and immutable.
What further militates against petitioner's advocacy is that the Court of
Appeals, aside from affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard
through the filing of pleadings, likewise sustained petitioner's right to due
process at the hearing. What petitioner neglects to mention is that
respondent court did not deprive her the right to cross-examine private
respondent when the latter testified as to the matter of damages. Through
the exercise of the right, petitioner could have negated private
respondent's claims by showing the absence of legal or factual basis
therefor. Moreover, the Court of Appeals explicitly allowed petitioner to
present her evidence against the claim for damages. However, petitioner
again failed to take the opportunity to have herself heard. 33
It may be pointed out that in her Answer, 31 she interposed the following
defenses against the claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, namely: (1) the claim was effectively and exclusively a
suit against the State, but without its consent; (2) she had not committed
any actionable wrong as she acted in good faith and without malice or

negligence; and (3) whatever injury private respondent may have suffered
were mere consequences of his indiscretion, negligence and/or ignorance
of the law which, at best, constituted damnum absque injuria. From the
nature of these defenses, they could very well have been taken up, even
indirectly, on cross-examination of private respondent or in the course of
petitioner's testimony had she chosen to present her evidence. All told,
the above discussion should readily refute petitioner's claim of a denial of
due process.
II
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. They may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. 32 The
instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, "acts
and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of
the Civil Code," 33which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human
Relations of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code. Relevant to the instant
case,
which
involves
public
officers,
is
Article
27, 34 which provides:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform
his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.
Art. 27 must then be read in conjunction with Section I of Article XI
(Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution, 35 which provides:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and
2217 of the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be
liable for moral damages for as long as the moral damages suffered by
private respondent were the proximate result of petitioner's wrongful act

CIVIL PROCEDURE

or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in the

performance thereof. In fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of
public officials and employees to suits for damages to answer for any
form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court
has had occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the Civil Code, a
public official may be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly
legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the "abuse of right" doctrine
embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human
Relations. 36

That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably

refusing or neglecting to perform an official duty is undeniable. Private
respondent testified on the moral damages which he suffered by reason
of such misfeasance or malfeasance of petitioner, and the attorney's fees
and litigation expenses he incurred to vindicate his rights and protect his
interests. The Court of Appeals which heard him gave full faith and credit
to his testimony. Private respondent declared that by reason of the "unjust
action" or "refusal" of petitioner when she did not recognize, ignored and
disregarded the final and executory Civil Service Resolution, he:

Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for

the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. 37

[W]as actually greatly disturbed, shocked and frustrated during those

three . . . months. [He] had sleepless nights and . . . suffered from mental
anxiety, worry, tension and humiliation . . . 39

Attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation may be recovered as

actual or compensatory damages when, inter alia, exemplary damages
are awarded; when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim,
and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 38

Private respondent's anguish even continued during the 5-month period

while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, thus:

There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be

restored to his position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and
executory decision of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner, as head or
chief of the National Children's Hospital, then had the duty to see to it that
the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and
private respondent's two official demands for compliance with the Civil
Service Commission's decision were merely referred by petitioner to the
Legal Department of the Department of Health; and as further noted by
this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, "she did not answer [private
respondent's] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the
Assistant Secretary [for Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await 'legal
guidance from the DOH Legal Department.'" This Court further noted:
To all these, [petitioner's] reaction, and that of the officials
of the
34
Department of Health concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say
the least. Neither she nor the Health Department officials concerned
accorded said acts and events any importance. She never bothered to
find out what was being done to contest or negate [private respondent's]
petitions and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, [private
respondent's] efforts were being met with success.

During this period my sleepless nights and my moral sufferings continued.

As a matter of fact, even worsened. I just could not understand, actually I
could not understand the action here of Dr. Gozon for having not followed
the decision of the Court of Appeals. And that is why I felt very much
aggrieved during this period. I could not sleep at all and this has
weakened me. 40
Private respondent further testified that he "spent not less than P5,000.00
for court fees and as incidental expenses" and had committed himself to
pay "P10,000.00 to his counsel at the end of the case." 41
While private respondent did not quantify the extent of his moral
damages, the Court of Appeals fixed the same at P50,000.00. Since
moral damages are, in the language of Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
"incapable of pecuniary estimation," courts have the discretion to fix the
corresponding amount, not being bound by any self-serving assessment
by the claimants. On the other hand, a claimant's failure to state the
monetary value of moral damages suffered presents no legal obstacle to
a court's determination thereof, as long as there is factual basis for the
award such as the claimant's testimony as to his sufferings. As a matter of
fact, it is not unusual for claimants to leave the determination of the
amount of the award to the discretion of the court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Under Article 2233 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages cannot be

recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals awarded
exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00. Considering that a
public official is the culprit here, the propriety of such an award cannot be
questioned. It serve as an example or deterrent so that other public
officials be always reminded that they are public servants bound to
adhere faithfully to the constitutional injunction that a public office is a
public trust. That the aggrieved party happened to be another public
official will not serve to mitigate the effects of petitioner's having failed to
observe the required degree of accountability and responsibility.
As to attorney's fees as actual damages, the Court of Appeals'
determination of its propriety in this case and the extent thereof were well
within its discretion. The agreement between private respondent and his
counsel as to the amount does not control.
Petitioner's contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she
was sued in her official capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was
impleaded as respondent in an official capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity
as Chief of the National Children's Hospital, is best determined from the
Petition as well as the Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the
captions in both, she is named as one of the respondents without any
express mention that she was so sued in her "capacity, as Chief of the
National Children's Hospital." For another, the allegations in the body of
the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and private
capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege
petitioner's position as a public official, and specifically as "Head of the
Children's Hospital;" her duty to restore private respondent to his position
by virtue of the final decision of the Civil Service Commission; and her
refusal to allow private respondent to perform and discharge his duties
and responsibilities as Chief of Clinics. As to the latter, paragraph 16 of
the Petition explicitly speaks of petitioner's personal liability, thus:
42
16. For causing such mental suffering and anguish, etc.,
principal
35
respondent [herein petitioner] ought to and must be, in accordance with
the Civil Code, held personally answerable and liable to the petitioner in
the sum of not less than P100,000.00 as moral damages, and another
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, by way of example or
correction for the public good. 43 (emphasis supplied)

In maintaining then that she was sued merely in her official capacity,
petitioner has either overlooked paragraph 16 or sought to deliberately
mislead this Court.
WHEREFORE, for utter failure to show that respondent Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in the challenged resolutions, the instant
petition is denied.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the

management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2

EN BANC

Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case. 3

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working
as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on
February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was
intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner
St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who
was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the
NLRC contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to
the evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a
"volunteer" and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from
February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and
(3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee relationship between
him and petitioner. 4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the present petition alleging that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court
feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional
validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has
long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The
increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and
the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines
and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that
procedural aspect.

36

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then
took over the management of the business. She then discovered that
there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees,
although the records purported to show that the same were already paid.
Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first
established in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14,
1972, and its decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines,
the same to take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the
Department of Labor and Employment for program and policy
coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also
granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the
NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review
has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision
for appeals from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as
last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides
that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from
receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final
and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this
Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and
formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for
appellate review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It
held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts
of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right
of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep
the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of
this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Curiously,
37
although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may
already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it
has been held that this Court may still take cognizance of the petition
for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within
the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No.
129 originally provided as follows:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(1)
Original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts
necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its
original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders
issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals. 15
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by
R.A. No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1)
Original
jurisdiction
to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary
writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

CIVIL PROCEDURE

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments

of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission,
the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service
Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of
the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within, three (3) months, unless
extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the
lower appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No.
7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of
the Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was
deleted and replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals
limited powers to conduct trials and hearings in cases within its
jurisdiction.
38

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed
to paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause
therein now provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor
Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the
quasi-judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of
purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review
over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to
be by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is,
of course, a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional
issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that
have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129
now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all
final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial
agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among
others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily
contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie
from decisions of the NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally
construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring
that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and
those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These

CIVIL PROCEDURE

cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the
aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded
are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are
no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of
any other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902
persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used
therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there
was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been
drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report
on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its
jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but
also all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
39

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual
issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be
derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the "decisions and

interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and
by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate
the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the
coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to reduce
the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of
the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review
by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice
Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme
Court of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important
issues involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that
the Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest
in the discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution
and the guarantor of the people's basic rights and additional task
expressly vested on it now "to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President.
It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand
we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of
cases pending.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we
have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests
the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee
Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following
proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED." So that it
becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the Labor Code will
still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of
Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this
was also deleted, Mr. President.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing
40 none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No.

1495 was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its
unanimous approval on third reading followed. 21 The Conference
Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and House Bill No. 10452,
having theretofore been approved by the House of Representatives, the
same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme
Court earlier discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to
the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption
that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in
the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were
of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an
initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would
prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and
realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the
aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to
the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the
evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the
findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly
affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the
axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not
be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will

CIVIL PROCEDURE

reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be

dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24

circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the

exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the

matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further
observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being
elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been
constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally
equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its
component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for
expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional
protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition

for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof
ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set
forth, without pronouncement as to costs.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to

supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted
and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made
in accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be
said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in
the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated by law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not
only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded
41 or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as
better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of
facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima,
JJ., concur.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals
from decisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources
Board (petitioner).
A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application
for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate
and maintain a water service system in Alijis, Bacolod City.
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondents application
on the ground that it is the only government agency authorized to operate
a water service system within the city.1
By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondents CPC
application. BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered,
contending that its right to due process was violated when it was not
allowed to present evidence in support of its opposition. 2
Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present
evidence,3 drawing respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and
BACIWA. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper
recourse of respondent was to the Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186450

April 14, 2010

42
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD (NWRB), Petitioner,
vs.
A. L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005, 4 dismissed respondents petition for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . . except those within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC
explained:
Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended,
which has effectively and explicitly removed the Regional Trial Courts
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies such as [petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the
Court of Appeals, very clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this
instant petition.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a

petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of
January 25, 2008,5 annulled and set aside the RTC April 15, 2005,
holding that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from
petitioners decisions. Thus the appellate court discoursed.
In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court[,] the Supreme Court . . . categorically
pronounced the RTCs jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the
NWRB consistent with Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this
wise:
x x x x.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction over actions
for annulment of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts,
particularly, when we take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all
embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and
questions of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. No. 1067). This conclusion is also
in keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests
Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or
omissions of an inferior court (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
x x x x.
Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton, the Supreme Court
conformably ruled, viz:
"Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization
and control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the
dispute in the first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as
provided in PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The
43 appellate
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has only
jurisdiction over the case."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt that [petitioner]
NWRB is mistaken in its assertion. As no repeal is expressly made, Article
89 of P.D. No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an exception to the

jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals or petitions for certiorari

of the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds harmony with
Paragraph 2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is stated
that, "If it involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 involving the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies must be
filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule admits of some exceptions as
plainly provided by the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules" and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of these
exceptions. (italics and emphasis partly in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution of February 9, 2009, 6 petitioner filed the
present petition for review, contending that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI
JURISDICTION
OVER
THE
[PETITIONER]
SINCE SECTION 89, PD NO. 1067, REGARDING
APPEALS, HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED AND REPEALED
BY [BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG] 129 AND THE RULES
OF COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITSELF DOES
NOT CONTEMPLATE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT SHOULD HAVE CERTIORARI JURISDICTION
OVER THE [PETITIONER].7 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or
omissions as a quasi-judicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner contends that there is no law or rule which
requires the filing of a petition for certiorari over its acts or omissions in
any other court or tribunal other than the Court of Appeals. 8
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did
not expressly repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067)
otherwise known as the Water Code of the Philippines.9
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed
decision of the appellate court.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

The petition is impressed with merit.

Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.10
Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasijudicial agencies under Rule 4311 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of
quasi-judicial agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what
Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for procedural uniformity. The only
exception to this instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs
otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65.12 The appellate courts
construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads:
ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may
be appealed to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the
controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from the date the party
appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following
grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3)
questions of fact and law (emphasis and underscoring supplied), is such
an exception, is erroneous.
Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage
of BP 129. Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals
and the RTCs, Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:
x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as
amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of
instructions and general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
44

The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended

repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts."13

In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have

knowledge of the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have
intended to change it.14 The legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear
and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to
provide a homogeneous procedure for the review of adjudications of
quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.
More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was
the power of review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that
the appellate court gave significant consideration to the ground of "grave
abuse of discretion" to thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction
over petitioners decisions. A reading of said Article 89 shows, however,
that it only made "grave abuse of discretion" as another ground to invoke
in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique to the
Water Code at the time of its application in 1976.
The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the
subsequent formulation of the Rules, clarified and delineated the
appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals over
adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may be
invoked before the appellate court as a ground for an error of jurisdiction.
It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioners
order via certiorari before the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In
other words, it invoked such ground not for an error of judgment.
While Section 9 (3) of BP 129 15 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court16 does not list petitioner as "among" the quasi-judicial
agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are
appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court
of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over petitioners judgments,
orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial
agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be
exclusive.17 The employment of the word "among" clearly instructs
so.1avvphi1
BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,18 a 1987 case cited by the appellate court to support its ruling that
RTCs have jurisdiction over judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of

CIVIL PROCEDURE

petitioner, is no longer controlling in light of the definitive instruction of

Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton19 is not in point either as the issue raised
therein was which between the RTC and the then National Water
Resources Council had jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation,
utilization and control of water.
In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner
properly belongs to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City dismissing petitioners petition for
lack of jurisdiction is UPHELD.

11

SECTION 1. Scope.This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments

or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals* and from awards, judgments,
final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission,** Office of the President, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform Under
Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System,
Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
x x x x (underscoring supplied)

No costs.
12

SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments
of Regional Trial Courts; and

SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. x x x .

If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or

of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of
Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of
the courts appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts of a quasi-judicial
agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall
be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
x x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with
the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph
45 (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
x x x x.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

46