Chagla 2016 - Team OO - Memorial For Petitioner

TEAM CODE: OO
IN THE HIGH COURTOF JUDICATURE AT LYS

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.
OF 2016
(UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

BRAAVOS)
PETITIONER
ARCHANA STARK
Versus
THE FREE REPUBLIC OF
RESPONDENTS
BRAAVOS AND ORS.
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. OF 2016
VARYS CORPORATION v. STATE OF LYS AND ORS.
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
23rd M.C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE

NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
23RD M. C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SR. NO.
PARTICULARS
PAGE NO.
III-V
1.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
2.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
3.
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
4.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
6.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1-20
7.
PRAYERS
XIV
VI
VII-IX
X-XI
XII-XIII
II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CASES
SR. NO.
NAME OF THE CASE
CITATION
PAGE NO.
1.
State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar.
AIR 1952 SC 75
2.
Amita v. Union of India and Anr.
(2005) 13 SCC 721
2,3,11,13
3.
TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka.
(2002) 8 SCC 481
2,11
4.
M Nagraj v. Union of India.
(2006) 8 SCC 212
2,11
5.
State of Punjab v. Kalkaran Singh.
(2006) 12 SCC 709
2, 10
6.
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar.
AIR 1955 SC 191
2,5,13
(1994) 2 SCC 176
3,13
AIR 1987 SC 1690
3,13
7.
General
Manager,
Kerala
SRTC,
Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors.

Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation,
8.
Ahmedabad v. RamanbhaiPrabhatbhai and

Anr.
9.
Fizabai and Ors. v. Nemichand and Ors.
AIR 1993 MP 79
3,13
10.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India.
AIR 1951 SC 41
AIR 2013 SC 2582
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
State of Maharashtra and Anr.v. Indian

Hotel and Restaurants Association and Ors.
Maneka Gandhi v.Union of India.
AK Bindal and Anr. v. Union of India and
Ors.
Yogesh Shantilal Choksi v. Home Secretary,
Govt. of Kerala and Anr.
Shri DK Basu, Ashok K. Johri v. State Of
West Bengal, State Of UP.
Reliance Energy Limited v. Maharashtra
III
AIR 1978 SC 597.
5,6,14,15,1
6,19
AIR 2003 SC 2189
6, 14
1983 CriLJ 393
6,14
AIR 1997 SC 610
6,14
(2007) 8 SCC 1
6,14
State Road Development Corporation Ltd.

17.
Rylands v. Fletcher.
(1868) LR 3 HL 330
18.
MP Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar.
AIR 2002 SC 551
19.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab.
(1994) 3 SCC 569.
8,16
(2007) 4 SCC 669
11
Management of Coimbatore District Central

20.
Co-operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore

District
Central
Co-operative
Bank
Employees Association and Anr.

21.
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India.
(2004) 1 SCC 712
12
22.
RBI v. Peerless General Finance.
(1996) 1 SCC 642
12
23.
DTC v. Mazdoor Union DTC.
AIR 1991 SC 101
15
AIR 1999 Ker 385
15
AIR 2000 SC 2083
15
AIR 1950 SC 27
15
AIR 1980 SC 470
18
AIR 1969 SC 783
18,20
2010(2)ALLMR81
18,20
AIR 1994 Bom 323
20
24.
K Ramakrishnan and Anr v. State of Kerala

and Ors.
25.
State of AP v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy.
26.
Gopalan v. State of Madras.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Jolly George Varghese and Anr. v. The

Bank of Cochin.
Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel etc. v. Union of
India and Anr.
Karan Dileep Nevatia v. Union of India.
PB Samant and Ors. v. Union of Indiaand
Anr.
BOOKS REFERRED
D. D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, 14th Edition, 2009, Vol. 1 & 2.
D. D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 8th Edition, 2008, Vol. 2 & 3.
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 6thEdition, 2010, Vol. 1.

IV
STATUTES
THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAAVOS
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
BRAAVOSI MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT
PROTECTION OF MARITIME TRADE ACT
THE FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT, 1855
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
CONVENTION ON PREVENTION OF PIRACY IN THE BRAAVOSI ARCHIPELAGO
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONER HAS FILED THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION INVOKING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF LYS UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAAVOS. THE PETITIONER STATES THAT THE
PRESENT PETITION DEALS WITH SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
THAT THE PETITIONER HAS NO ALTERNATIVE EFFICACIOUS REMEDY EXCEPT
TO APPROACH THIS HONBLE COURT.
THE PRESENT PETITION SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND

ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENT CASE.
VI
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Archana Stark (Petitioner) is a citizen of the Free Republic of Braavos (Braavos).
Varys Corporation (Varys Corporation) is a company incorporated in the Republic of

Volantis (Volantis).
Braavos is an island country in the continent of Essos. Volantis is a neighbouring

island country. Lys is a constituent state in Braavos (Lys).
Before 2013: Export of Tullyfish (Fish) in large quantities was a valuable source of
earning foreign exchange for Braavos. The catch of the Fish eventually reduced due to
overfishing.
2013: The fishermen of Braavos were having problems in catching the Fish to sustain
a living. The banking system of Braavos collapsed. Some fishermen turned to piracy
to supplement their income. Braavos was located close to major shipping routes. The
problem of piracy in and around the waters of Braavos posed a problem in shipping
and trade in the region.
192 countries attended the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
to curb piracy and signed the Convention on Prevention of Piracy in the Braavosi
Archipelago (Dragon Treaty). The Dragon treaty inter alia provided that:
a) The preamble declared that the treaty was a measure in continuance of the
universal custom outlawing piracy and was now incorporated in the common
maritime law of all nations to counter the scourge of piracy;
b) Companies owning ships (who are incorporated in a signatory state) are entitled to
hire armed security guards and place them on their vessels (if the flag state of the
vessel is a signatory to the convention). (Article 15);
VII
c) The said armed guards shall be private personnel, and shall not be agents, or
members of the armed forces of any country. They shall also not be considered
seamen for any purposes whatsoever. (Article 18);
d) In case of any criminal acts committed by these personnel, they would serve any
sentence in the country of the flag state of the ship. (Article 25);
e) The employers civil liability in any of the wrongful acts committed by these
personnel would be 20,000 Braavosi ducats. The liability is to be a strict liability and
would be enforced by the ordinary Courts of the place of commission of the offence.
(Article 26)
All the said the signatory nations ratified the Dragon Treaty.
December, 2015: The said signatory nations reduced the employers liability for the
acts of Second Sons to 15,000 Braavosi Ducats (BD).
January, 2016: The Braavosi Merchant Shipping Act (Central Act) was amended to
give effect to the Dragon Treaty and the following provisions were added:
Section 2 (aa) Convention shall mean the Convention on Prevention of Piracy in
the Braavosi Archipelago as amended from time to time.
Section 235A Notwithstanding anything contained in any law in force, an employer
shall be liable for any act committed by any Second Sons in the course of his/her
duty/employment only upto the limits provided for under the Convention. For this
provision to apply the employees must be a party to the Convention.
February, 2016: The said signatory nations amended the Dragon Treaty to reduce the
liability to 10,000 BD.
March, 2016: On March 1, 2016, Braavos and Volantis entered into Treaty to amend
the Dragon Treaty incorporating complete exclusion of liability for wrongful acts of
the Second Sons(Bilateral Treaty). This move angered many people in Lys.
VIII
April, 2016: Government of Lys enacted the Protection of Maritime Trade Act (PMT
Act) which inter alia imposed a liability of 20,000 BDfor the acts of Second Sons on
all ships irrespective of their flag state in the territory of Lys. The PMT Act received
the assent of the President on April 24, 2016.
May 2, 2016: Andal, a ship owned by Varys Corporation, within 3 nautical miles of
the coast of Lys suspected a pirate attack from a boat speeding in the waters of
Braavos. The Second Sons on board opened fire on the boat, killing the sole person on
board (Deceased). The Deceased was a fisherman.
The Petitioner, wife of the Deceased, made a complaint acting upon which the said
ship of Varys Corporation was intercepted.
The Petitioner is inter alia challenging the relevant provisions of the PMT Act which
limit liability for acts of Second Sons to 20,000 BD (Challenged Provisions of the
PMT Act) and Section 235A of the Central Act before this Honble High Court.
Hence, this Petition (Present Writ Petition).
Varys Corporation was made a respondent in the Present Writ Petition. Varys
Corporation also filed Writ Petition No.
of 2016 (Tagged Writ Petition) challenging
the PMT Act. Both the writ petitions have been tagged.
IX
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
Whether Section 235A of the Central Act is violative of Articles 14 and 21?
1.1. Section 235A of the Central Act provides for a limit on compensation which is violative
of Article 14.
1.2. Section 235A of the Central Act is violative of Article 21.
1.3. Section 235A of the Central Act is not based on the principle of strictliability as
provided in the Dragon Treaty.
2.
Whether the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are unconstitutional being
violative of Articles 14 and 21?
2.1. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are ambiguous and vague.
2.2. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are unconstitutional, inasmuch as it
provides for a fixed sum of 20,000 BD for the wrongful acts of the Second Sons without
adjudication, being violative of Articles 14 and 21.
2.3. Without prejudice, the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are unconstitutional,
inasmuch as they put a limit upto 20,000 BD for the wrongful acts of the Second Sons,
being violative of Articles 14 and 21.
2.4. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are arbitrary.
3.
Whether the provisions of the Bilateral Treaty are against Articles 14 and 21, and
are not binding on the Petitioner?
3.1. The Bilateral Treaty does not have the force of law.
3.2. The provisions of the Bilateral Treaty are against Articles 14 and 21.
3.3. The Bilateral Treaty is not binding on the Petitioner.
XI
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.
WHETHER SECTION 235A OF THE CENTRAL ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLES 14 AND 21?
Section 235A of the Central Act provides for a limit to the compensation receivable by the
victims of wrongful acts of the Seconds Sons. Such limit is the amount mentioned in the
Dragon Treaty. Limit or a cap on compensation to the victims is arbitrary, unjust and
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of Braavos.
Furthermore, the amount of compensation under the Dragon Treaty has already reduced from
20,000 BD as it stood originally to 10,000 BD in February, 2016; which has reduced the limit
of compensation under the Central Act. However, there has been no change in the
circumstances existing in Braavos which warrant such reduction.
Section 235A of the Central Act is also ambiguous, absurd and violative of Article 14 as it
applies only when employees, that is, the Second Sons are a party to the Dragon Treaty.
2.
WHETHER THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE PMT ACT ARE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are ambiguous and vague as to whether the
compensation receivable by the victim from the owner is a fixed sum of 20,000 BD whatever
may be the consequence of the wrongful act of the Second Sons or is the limit of upto 20,000
BD. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are impermissibly vague and imprecise. It is
also ambiguous as to whether the compensation of 20,000 BD is the sum receivable by a
single victim of the wrongful act of the Second Sons or is the total sum receivable by
multiple victims for wrongful acts of the Second Sons.
XII
Further, providing a fixed amount of compensation to the Petitioner without consideration to

the facts and circumstances of the case results in an impermissible classification which is
violative of Articles 14 and 21. Without prejudice, providing a limit of 20,000 BD upto which
the liability of the owner extends is violative of Articles 14 and 21. Therefore, the Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act are arbitrary and should be struck down as unconstitutional.
3.
WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILATERAL TREATY ARE

AGAINST ARTICLES 14 AND 21, AND ARE NOT BINDING ON THE
PETITIONER?
The Bilateral Treaty in itself does not have the force of law in Braavos unless it is
incorporated into the laws of Braavos by the Parliament. The Bilateral Treaty is against
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution as it seeks to exclude all civil liability for wrongful acts
of the Second Sons when the ship is flagged in Volantis.The enactment of a law by
Parliament in respect of treaties/agreements/conventions is necessary when the treaty or
agreement restricts or affects the rights of citizens or others or modifies the law of
Braavos.Therefore, the Bilateral Treaty is not binding on the Petitioner.
XIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1.
WHETHER SECTION 235A OF THE CENTRAL ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF

ARTICLES 14 AND 21?
1.1. SECTION 235A OF THE CENTRAL ACT PROVIDES FOR A LIMIT ON

COMPENSATION WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14.
1.1.1.Limit on compensation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 inasmuch as it treats the
Petitioner differently from similarly placed victims in terms of adjudication of damages.
Section 235A of the Central Act reads thus:
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law in force, an employer shall be liable for
any act committed by any Second Sons in the course of his/her duty/employment only
upto the limits provided for under the Convention. For this provision to apply the
employees must be a party to the Convention.
It is submitted that the Central Act provides for a limit on the compensation receivable by the
victims of wrongful acts of the Seconds Sons. Such limit is the amount mentioned in the
Dragon Treaty. It is submitted that the imposed limit on compensation to the victims is
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Braavos.
Article 14 of the Constitution reads thus:
The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of
the laws within the territory of Braavos.
Article 14 has 2 facets; (i) Equality before the law, and (ii) Equal protection of the laws. The
first expression contained in Article 14, has been taken from English Common law, whilethe
second expression has been borrowed from American jurisprudence.1 Equality before the
law means that amongst equals, the law should be equal and should be equally
administered.2 Equal protection of the laws deals with the implicit concept of equality that
persons who are infact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on a par3 and equals cannot
be treated as unequals4. It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.In
order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group,
and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that
there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14
condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.5
It is submitted that Section 235A of the Central Act places the Petitioner in a separate
classthan similarly placed victims in other cases. The victims of wrongful acts committed by
Second Sons are treated differently than the said similarly placed victims of wrongful acts
committed by any employee/private security guard/any other person, when such an
employee/private security guard/any other person does not fall into the category of Second
Sons, even though the injury suffered and other circumstances are materially the same. The
said similarly placed victims who have suffered similar amount of damage as the Petitioner
State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75.

Amita v. UoI and Anr, (2005) 13 SCC 721.
3
TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481; M Nagraj v. UoI, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
4
State of Punjab v. Kalkaran Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 709.
5
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.
2
have a right to approach a Civil Court for compensation inter alia under Torts, and Fatal
Accidents Act, 1855. The compensation of the said similarly placed victims in a Civil Court
is ascertained in accordance with the circumstances and the actual damage or injury suffered
in each case without any limit on compensation. The said victims are entitled to receive a fair,
just and equitable compensation.6 Various factors are taken into consideration7 while
accessing compensationsuch as life expectancy of the deceased, income of the deceased,
better employment opportunity, number of dependants, loss of consortium etc. The said
similarly placed victims do not have a cap orlimit on the quantum of compensationreceivable
while the amount mentioned in the Dragon Treaty is the maximum amount of compensation
which can be received by the Petitioner as per Section 235A of the Central Act. It is
submitted that this results in differential treatment and such differential treatment results in
classification of victims into 2 categories, one which does not have a limit on compensation
and the other with a limit on compensation, and seeks to treat the Petitioner differently from
similarly placed victims without any plausible reason. It is submitted that Equality before the
law forbids discrimination between persons who are substantially in the same or similar
circumstances.8
It is submitted that the according to the test of permissible classification, a classification is
valid only if it is found on intelligible differentia and has nexus to the object of the act sought
to be achieved. It is submitted that there is no reasonable ground whatsoever to limit the
compensation of the Petitioner when similarly placed victims have a right to receive damages
in tune with the injury suffered. It is also submitted that there is no nexus whatsoever
between limiting the compensation of the victims of the wrongful acts of the Second Sons
General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrumv. Mrs Susamma Thomas and Ors,
(1994) 2 SCC 176, Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. RamanbhaiPrabhatbhai and Anr,
AIR 1987 SC 1690.
7
Fizabai and Ors v. Nemichand and Ors, AIR 1993 MP 79.
8
Supra, note 2.
and the object of curbing piracy. Therefore, such classification fails the dual test laid down
under Article 14. Further, it is unjust and arbitrary to put a limit on the compensation of
victims of wrongful acts of Second Sons without any reasonable grounds when the actual
damage may amount to much more. It is thus submitted that Section 235A of the Central Act
is violative of Article 14.
1.1.2.The Limit of compensation has reduced as a result of reduction of the amount provided
for in the Dragon Treaty.
It is submitted that the compensation amount under the Dragon Treaty has already been
reduced from 20,000 BD as was originally envisaged by 192 nations, to 15,000 BD in
December 2015 and to 10,000 BD in February, 2016. It is submitted that the limit of
compensation has accordingly reduced in Braavos. However, the circumstances prevailing in
Braavos have not changed which warrant a reduction in the limit of compensation. Moreover,
compensation receivable by the victims is to be in tune with the actual damage suffered,
therefore a reduction in liability merely because the Dragon Treaty lowers the compensation
is arbitrary.
1.1.3.Section 235A applies only in cases when the Second Sons are party to the Dragon
Treaty which is ambiguous, arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
Section 235A of the Central Act states that for this provision to apply the employees must be
a party to the Convention. It is submitted that Section 235A is ambiguous, absurd and
violative of Article 14 as it applies only when employees, that is, the Second Sons as
individuals are a party to the Dragon Treaty.
Without prejudice, even if it is assumed that the provision shall apply when the employees,
that is, Second Sons are from States which are a party to the Convention, i.e. the Dragon
Treaty, Section 235A of the Central Act is still violative of Article 14. It is submitted that
Section 235A seeks to limit the compensation of victims for the wrongful acts of the Second
Sons and if such provision is to apply only when the Second Sons are from States which are
parties to the Dragon Treaty, it results in a classification of victims. Victims of wrongful acts
of a Second Son who is from a State which is a party to the Dragon Treatyare treated
differently from victims of wrongful acts of a Second Son who is from a State which is not a
party to the Dragon Treaty. The former category of victims has a limit on the compensation
receivable from the employer whereas the latter category of victims has no limit on the
compensation receivable even though all other material circumstances are the same. Article
14 provides that there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as
regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is the same9. Therefore, Section
235A classifies thesimilarly placed victims of wrongful acts of Second Sons into 2 separate
categories, one with a limit on compensation receivable and the other with no limit on
compensation receivable. Such differential treatment is arbitrary and irrational and is not
based on any reasonable ground whatsoever. Further, such classification has no nexus to the
object of the Legislation which is to curb piracy and implement the Dragon Treaty. It is
therefore submitted that Section 235A fails the two-fold test of Article 14 as laid down
inBudhan Choudhry10.
1.2. SECTION 235A OF THE CENTRAL ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21.

Violation of Article 14 is a violation of Article 21.
1.2.1.Article 21 is an amplitude of rights.
Article 21 of the Constitution reads thus:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.
9
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. UoI, AIR 1951 SC 41.

Supra, note 5; State of Maharashtra and Anr v. Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association and Ors, AIR 2013
SC 2582.
10
It is submitted that in Maneka Gandhi11 case, it was held that the expression personal liberty
is of the widest amplitude. Right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights, and any
decision affecting human life must call for the most anxious scrutiny. Right to life has been
expanded to include a plethora of rights such as right to livelihood12, right to access courts13
of justice, right to compensation for being deprived of ones life and liberty14 etc.
1.2.2.Test propounded byArticle 14 pervades Article 21.
It is submitted that deprivation of ones life or liberty is not justified unless it is in accordance
with a procedure established by law. However, if the procedure prescribed does not satisfy
the requirements of Article 14, it would be no procedure at all within the meaning of Article
21.15 Article 14 and 21 are the heart of the Chapter on fundamental rights. They cover various
aspects of life.16For reasons more particularly submitted in issue no 1.1, Section 235A of the
Central Act is violative of Article 14. Therefore, Section 235A is also violative of 21.
1.3. SECTION 235A OF THE CENTRAL ACT IS NOT BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
STRICT LIABILITY AS PROVIDED IN THE DRAGON TREATY.
Article 26 of the Dragon Treaty reads thus:
The employers civil liability in any of the wrongful acts committed by these personnel
would be 20,000 Braavosi ducats. The liability is to be a strict liability and would be
enforced by the ordinary Courts of the place of commission of the offence.
It is submitted that Section 235A of the Central Act is an implementation of Article 26 of the
Dragon Treaty. Article 26 provides that the employers liability will be strict liability. Strict
11
Maneka Gandhi v.UoI, AIR 1978 SC 597.

AK Bindal and Anr v. UoI and Ors,AIR 2003 SC 2189.
13
Yogesh Shantilal Choksi v. Home Secretary, Govt of Kerala and Anr, 1983 CriLJ 393.
14
Shri DK Basu, Ashok K. Johri v. State of West Bengal, State of U.P, AIR 1997 SC 610.
15
Supra, note 11.
16
Reliance Energy Limited v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Limited, (2007) 8 SCC 1.
12
Liability is a principle laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher17which provides that if one brings
upon his land anything which would not naturally come on it, and which is in itself is
dangerous, and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control, though in so doing
he may act without personal wilfulness or negligence, he will be liable in damages for any
mischief thereby occasioned.
The Supreme Court of India observed a person undertaking an activity involving
hazardous or risky exposure of human life is liable under Law of Torts to compensate for the
injury suffered by any other person irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part
of the manager of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk
inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known in law
as strict liability.18 Theactivity of placing armed private security guards on vessels by
shipping companies is a hazardous activity which puts human lives on board that vessel, and
any other vessel, at risk. Wrongful acts of the said armed private security guards including
unlawful firing and discharge of firearms,lack of proper training etc. can be fatal and can
prejudice human lives. The risk involved is foreseeable in the very nature of the activity of
placing the said armed private security guards on board. The shipping companies place the
said armed private security guards on the vessels in furtherance of their own interests.
The Dragon Treaty specifies that the saidarmed private security guards shall not be members
or agents of armed forces of any State. The Dragon Treaty also provides that the employers
civil liability for the wrongful acts of the said armed private security guards will be a strict
liability. The rational being that the armed private security guards are placed on board vessels
by shipping companies, in furtherance of their own interests, thereby putting human lives at
risk. Thus, they are accountable for the wrongful acts of the saidarmed private security
17
18
Rylands v. Fletcher, House of Lords, (1868) LR 3 HL 330.

MP Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar, AIR 2002 SC 551.
guards. It is the duty of the shipping companies to be diligent and vigilant in hiring, training
and managing the said armed private security personnel. The nature of the risk involved is
such that a very high degree of care is expected from the employers and very few defences
are permissible. Accordingly, the nature of civil liability of the employers a strict one.
However, Article 235A of the Central Act does not recognise the employers civil liability as
strict liability. It is submitted that for the following reasons, the employers civil liability
ought to have been a strict liability (i) the nature of activity being inherently risky; (ii) the
armed private security guards are placed on vessels in furtherance of the shipping companys
interests; (iii) the employers degree of care ought to be very high; (iv) without strict liability,
the defence of reasonable care and precaution is available to the employer which lowers the
accountability of the employer; (v) if the liability of the employer were strict, the vigilance
and diligence of the employer to train and manage the armed private security guards will
increase and the occurrence of wrongful acts will reduce; (vi)the object of the Dragon Treaty
is to curb piracy and to make international waters safe and allowing the armed private
security guards to be placed on board without a strict liability on the employers is watering
down the safety of international waters, and is thereby against the object of the Dragon
Treaty.
2.
WHETHER THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE PMT ACT ARE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
2.1. THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE PMT ACT ARE AMBIGUOUS AND
VAGUE.
2.1.1.Inasmuch as it can be read that the liability of 20,000 BD for any wrongful acts of the
Second Sons is (i) a fixed sum of 20,000 BD for any act, or (ii) a limit of upto 20,000
BD.
In Kartar Singh19it was held,It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend
several important values. It is insisted or emphasised that laws should give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a law
judges for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act
impose a liability of 20,000 BD for the acts of the Second Sons on all ships. It is therefore
submitted that it is ambiguous as to whether the compensation receivable by the victim from
the owner is a fixed sum of 20,000 BD whatever may be the consequence of the wrongful act
of the Second Sons or is the limit of upto 20,000 BD. The Challenged Provisions of the PMT
Act are impermissibly vague and imprecise inasmuch as it is unclear whether the amount of
20,000 BD is an amount fixed as compensation or whether it is a cap on the amount of
compensation that could be awarded. This inherent defect in the Challenged Provisions of the
PMT Act can be read in the two aforementioned ways resulting in arbitrariness. There can be
arbitrary application of the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act for victims in a similar
19
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
situation resulting in discrimination, which consequently leads to a violation of Article 14.

Clear and specific provisions remove the ambiguity in the statute and avoid dual
interpretations, which safeguards the interest of individuals in similar circumstances. It is
therefore submitted that the PMT Act is violative of Article 14 and should be struck down as
void for vagueness.
2.1.2.Inasmuch as it reads that the liability of 20,000 BD for any wrongful acts of the Second
Sons is (i) the compensation receivable by single victim, or (ii) the total compensation
receivable by multiple victims?
The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act impose a liability of 20,000 BD for theactsof
theSecondSonson allships. It is therefore submitted that it is ambiguous as to whether the
compensation of 20,000 BD is the sum receivable by a single victim of the wrongful act of
the Second Sons or is the total sum receivable by multiple victims of thewrongful acts of the
Second Sons.The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are ambiguous and can lead to dual
interpretations, which is violative of Article 14 and should be struck down as void for
vagueness.
2.2. WHETHER THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE PMT ACT ARE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL, INASMUCH AS IT PROVIDES FOR A FIXED SUM OF
20,000 BD FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF THE SECOND SONS WITHOUT
ADJUDICATION, BEING VIOLATIVE OFARTICLES 14 AND 21?
2.2.1.Fixing the amount of 20,000 BD in all cases, irrespective of the facts, results in placing
the Petitioner on the same pedestal as differentially victims placed.
It is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act do not contemplate taking into
consideration the various consequencesof the wrongful acts or the injury suffered as a result
of the wrongful act. The injury suffered as a result of the wrongful act of the Second Sons
10
varies from one case to another, for instance it can vary from temporary disablement to
permanent disablement or death, etc. Similarly, theChallenged Provisions of the PMT Act do
not contemplate any difference between victims of intentional wrongful acts and victims of
negligent wrongful acts.In each of the abovementioned instances, the compensation
receivable by the victims from the owner would be the fixed sum of 20,000 BD. Therefore,
the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act result in placing the Petitioner on the same
pedestal as differentially placed victims which is arbitrary.
2.2.2.Equal treatment of differentially placedpersons results in inequality, and is violative of
Article 14.
Equal protection of the laws deals with the implicit concept of equality that persons who are
infact unequally circumstanced cannot be treated on a par20 and equals cannot be treated as
unequals21.
(a)
Equal protection of law means the right to equal treatment only in similar
circumstances.
It is submitted that Article 14 covers within its ambit equality of treatment only to equals and
not unequals.22 Therefore, the laws need to be equally administered only between those who
are placed in like or similar circumstances.23 Therefore, equal treatment of differentially
placed victims as provided by the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act amounts to a
violation of Article 14.
(b)
Equal treatment of differentially placed victims is arbitrary.
It is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act seek to treat differentially
placed victims at par as the compensation is a fixed sum of 20,000 BD. Such equal treatment
20
Supra, note 3.
Supra, note 4.
22
Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and Anr, (2007)4SCC669.
23
Supra, note 2.
21
11
of differentially placed victims is wholly arbitrary. There is no reasonable ground to give

equal treatment to victims who have suffered differentially. Therefore the Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act are arbitrary.
(c)
In the absence of nexusto the object to be achieved by the PMT Act, equal treatment of
unequals is discriminatory and violative of Article 14.
It is submitted that equal treatment of unequals is liable to be struck down as discriminatory

in the absence of a rational relation to the object intended to be achieved by the law.24 The
Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act, inasmuch as they seek to treat the Petitioner equal to
differentially placed persons has no nexus whatsoever with the object of the PMT Act and
have no rational relation to providing compensation to the victims. Therefore, Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act are violative of Article 14.
2.2.3.The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act put the Petitioner in a separate class than
similarly placed victims in other cases.
It is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act place the Petitioner in a
separate class than similarly placed victims in other cases. The victims of wrongful acts
committed by Second Sons are treated differentlythan the said similarly placed victims of
wrongful acts committed by any employee/private security guard/ any other person, when
such an employee/private security guard/any other person does not fall into the category of
Second Sons, even though the injury suffered and other circumstances are materially the
same. The said similarly placed victims who have suffered similar amount of damage as the
Petitioner have a right to approach a Civil Court for compensation inter alia under Torts, and
Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The compensation of the said similarly placed victims in a Civil
Court is ascertained in accordance with the circumstances and the actual damage or injury
suffered in each case and is not a fixed quantum of compensation. The said victims are
24
Dharam Dutt v. UoI, (2004) 1 SCC 712; RBI v. Peerless General Finance, (1996) 1 SCC 642.
12
entitled to receive a fair, just and equitable compensation25. Various factors are taken into
consideration26 while accessing compensation. Such victims do not have a fixed quantum of
compensationreceivable irrespective of the facts of the case. This differential treatment of the
Petitioner results in classification. It is submitted that Equality before the law forbids
discrimination between persons who are substantially in the same or similar circumstances.27
Therefore, the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are violativeof Article 14.
2.2.4.The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are arbitrary and create unreasonable and
unjust classification which is violative of Article 14.
It is submitted that the test of permissible classification is two-fold: (i) that the classification
must be founded on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together
from others who are left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational
connection to the object sought to be achieved by the law.28 A classification would not be
justified if it is patently arbitrary.
It is submitted that the classification made under the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act
is wholly unreasonable and unjust. There is no reasonable ground whatsoever to fix the
quantum of compensation of the Petitioner without adjudication of damages when similarly
placed victims have a right to have their claims adjudicated upon. Furthermore, giving a fixed
sum as compensation is wholly arbitrary and unreasonable.It is further submitted that there is
no nexus whatsoever between fixing the quantum of compensation of the Petitioner and the
object of the PMT Act. Therefore, it is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT
Act are violative of Article 14.
2.2.5.Violation of Article 14 is a violation of Article 21.
25
Supra, note 6.
Supra, note 7.
27
Supra, note 2.
28
Supra, note 5.
26
13
It is submitted that in Maneka Gandhi29 case, it was held that the expression personal liberty
under Article 21 is of the widest amplitude. Right to life is the most fundamental of all human
rights, and any decision affecting human life must call for the most anxious scrutiny. Right to
life has been expanded to include a plethora of rights such as right to livelihood30, right to
access courts31 of justice, right to compensation for being deprived of ones life and
liberty32etc.It is also submitted that if the procedure prescribed does not satisfy the
requirements of Article 14, it would be no procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21.33
Article 14 and 21 are the heart of the Chapter on fundamental rights. They cover various
aspects of life.34For reasons more particularly submitted in issue nos. 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, the
Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are violative of Article 14. Therefore, the Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act are also violative of 21.
2.2.6.Fixing the quantum of compensation to 20,000 BD is against the principles of Natural
Justice, inasmuch as it curtails the Petitioners right to approach the Court for
adjudication of damages.
It is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act, inasmuch as they provide for
the fixed sum of 20,000 BD to be given as compensation, are violative against the principles
of natural justice.Victims placed in similar position as the Petitioner, who have suffered a loss
to the same extent, have a right to approach a Civil Court for compensation inter alia under
Torts, and Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 where compensation is to be ascertained in accordance
with the circumstances and injury suffered in each case.However, it is submitted that the
Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act curtail such right of the Petitioner under which the
Petitioner is entitled to receive only the fixed sum of 20,000 BD as compensation awardable
29
Supra, note 11.

Supra, note 12.
31
Supra, note 13.
32
Supra, note 14.
33
Supra, note 11.
34
Supra, note 16.
30
14
by the Court. Petitioners right to a fair hearing, and to approach the Court for adjudication
and ascertainment of damages has been curtailed by the Challenged Provisions of the PMT
Act.
Audi alterampartemfacet of natural justice is a requirement of Article 14, for, natural justice
is the antithesis of arbitrariness.35 Violation of principles of natural justice is also violative of
Article 21.36 Hence, the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are wholly violative of
Articles 14 and 21.
2.2.7.The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are unreasonable, fanciful and oppressive;
and take away the Petitioners right to approach the Court and ask for adjudication of
claim, thus being violative of Article 21.
It is submitted that the Petitioner is entitled to have her claim for damages adjudicated upon.
The Petitioner also has a right to receive fair compensation as a result of such adjudication.
These rights are a part of the most basic and essential rights guaranteed to every person in
Braavos. These rights form a part of Right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution. The word life is very significant as it covers all facets of human existence.The
word life has not been defined in the Constitution but it does not mean nor can it be
restricted only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from conception to death.
Life includes all such amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country is entitled
to enjoy with dignity, legally and constitutionally. 37 Right to life is one of the basic human
rights and not even the State has the authority to violate that right.38
Article 21 provides that the Statecannot deprive a man of his life and personal liberty, unless
a procedure established by law which provides for such deprivation of life and liberty is
35
DTC v. Mazdoor Union DTC, AIR 1991 SC 101.

Supra, note 11.
37
K Ramakrishnan and Anr v. State of Kerala and Ors,AIR 1999 Ker 385.
38
State of AP v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 2083.
36
15
followed. Procedure means the manner and form of enforcing the law.39 Supreme Court of
India has further elaborated that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 is that the
procedure has to be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive.40 Further,
the Court held in Maneka Gandhi41 case, that the procedure should be right, just and fair and
not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the
requirement of Article 21 will not be satisfied.
It is submitted that the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act provide for a fixed sum of
20,000 BD which curtail the Petitioners right to life; to approach the Court for adjudication
of damages, to receive a fair compensation, to receive a fair hearing, to compel the owner to
pay for the wrongful act of the Second Sons etc. The procedure of such curtailment of
Petitioners right to life is not fair, just and reasonable. Such procedure is not a procedure that
can be upheld in law and is to be held as no procedure at all. Therefore, it is submitted that
the Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act are violative of Article 21 and ought to be held
unconstitutional.
2.3. WITHOUT PREJUDICE, WHETHER THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE

PMT ACT ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, INASMUCH AS THEY PUT A LIMIT
UPTO 20,000 BD FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF THE SECOND SONS, BEING
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14 AND 21?
Without prejudice, if 20,000 BD is considered as a limit upto which the liability of the owner
extends for the wrongful acts of the Second Sons, it is submitted that the Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act are still unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 14 and 21. In
addition to the submissions made in issue no.1, wherein it is submitted that a limit on
39
Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.

Supra, note 19.
41
Supra, note 11.
40
16
compensation is violative of Articles 14 and 21, it is further submitted that the Civil Courts in
Lys are bound by the four corners of laws prevailing in Lys. Civil Courts have no jurisdiction
to act beyond a statute. Therefore, unless declared unconstitutional, the Court is bound by the
Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act and Section 235A of the Central Act, and cannot
award damages beyond 20,000 BD in any case even if the assessment of damages is infact
more.
2.4. WHETHER THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE PMT ACT ARE

ARBITRARY?
The Challenged Provisions of the PMT Act provide that the liability of the owner is 20,000
BD for the wrongful acts of the Second Sons. However, the Challenged Provisions of the
PMT Act make no difference between negligent acts and malafide acts, therefore treating
victims of malafideacts of Second Sons the same asvictims of negligent acts of Second Sons
which is patently arbitrary. Arbitrariness is an antithesis to law. Therefore, the Challenged
Provisions of the PMT Act ought to be struck down as void.
17
3.
WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF TREATY TO AMEND THE DRAGON

TREATY ARE AGAINST ARTICLES 14 AND 21, AND ARE NOT BINDING
ON THE PETITIONER?
3.1. THE BILATERAL TREATY DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW.
It is submitted that Braavos, like India, recognises the difference between formation of a
treaty and incorporation of the treaty into the laws of the land. Braavos follows the dualist
school42 of law in respect of implementation of international law at a domestic level. It is
therefore submitted that international treaties do not automatically form part of the corpus
juris43 in Braavos. As held by the Supreme Court of India in Maganbhai Patel44case and by
the Bombay High Court in Karan Nevatia45 case, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified by
the Central Government, do not by virtue of the treaty alone have the force of law. Further,
Parliament alone has the power to legislate to implement international treaties, agreements or
conventions entered into by the Union of Braavos. The Bilateral Treaty has merely been
signed and has neither been ratified nor implemented into the laws of the land.There has been
no legislation passed by the Parliament under Article 253 to make the Bilateral Treaty
enforceable in Braavos. Thus, it is submitted that the Bilateral Treaty does not have the force
of law in Braavos.
3.2. THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILATERAL TREATY ARE AGAINST ARTICLES 14

AND 21.
3.2.1.The nullification of thecompensation for wrongful acts of the Second Sons is against
Article 14 of the Constitution.
42
Jolly George Varghese and Anr. v. The Bank of Cochin, AIR 1980 SC 470.
Ibid.
44
Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel etc. v. UOI and Anr, AIR 1969 SC 783.
45
Karan Dileep Nevatia v. UOI, 2010(2)ALLMR81.
43
18
Without prejudice, the victims of the wrongful acts of Second Sons where the owner of the
ship is from a country other than Volantis have a right to approach a Civil Court for
adjudication of compensation. The Bilateral Treaty seeks to treat the Petitioner and other
victims of wrongful acts of Second Sons differently as the Bilateral Treaty provides a
complete exclusion of liability for wrongful acts of Second Sons when the ship is flagged in
Volantis. The Petitioner and the other victims of wrongful acts of Second Sons from a ship
flagged in Volantis will become a part of a distinct class which is excluded from approaching
a Civil Court for compensation from the owners of the ship. Such classification is arbitrary,
unjust and unreasonable. It is submitted that Equality before the law forbids discrimination
between persons who are substantially in the same or similar circumstances. Such
classification is against Article 14.
3.2.2.The aforementioned provisions of the Bilateral Treaty are unreasonable, fanciful and
oppressive; and would take away the Petitioners right to approach the Court and ask
for adjudication of claim, thus being against Article 21.
It is submitted that a complete exclusion of all liability for the wrongful acts of Second Sons
of ships flagged in Volantis as provided for under the Bilateral Treatycurtails the Petitioners
right to approach the Court for adjudication of damages, to receive a fair compensation, to
receive a fair hearing and the right to access the courts for the redressal of just grievances.
These rights form a part of Right to Life under Article 21. Moreover, the procedure
prescribed to limit the Petitioners right to life is not one that is fair, just and reasonable. Such
procedure is not a procedure that can be upheld in law and is to be held as no procedure at
all.46 Therefore, it is submitted that the Bilateral Treaty is against Article 21.
3.3. THE BILATERAL TREATY IS NOT BINDING ON THE PETITIONER.

46
Supra, note 11.
19
The Bilateral Treaty has neither been ratified nor has it been incorporated in the municipal
laws of Braavos. International treaties/agreements/conventions are not by their own force
binding upon Indian nationals47. The enactment of a law by Parliament in respect of
treaties/agreements/conventions is necessary when the treaty or agreement restricts or affects
the rights of citizens or others or modifies the law of Braavos.48 Therefore, the Bilateral
Treaty is not binding on the Petitioner for it is wholly against Articles 14 and 21.
47
48
Supra, note 44, 45, PB Samant and Ors v. UoI and Anr, AIR 1994 Bom 323.
Supra, note 45.
20
PRAYERS
It is, therefore, respectfully prayed in the Present Writ Petition that this Honble Court be
pleased to:
a. Issue a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, or direction, or order
declaring that Section 235A of the Braavosi Merchant Shipping Act is
unconstitutional, void and ultra vires being violative of Articles 14 and 21;
b. Issue a writ of mandamus, or any other appropriate writ, or direction, or order
declaring that the Challenged Provisions of the Protection of Maritime Trade Act
areunconstitutional, void and ultra vires being violative of Articles 14 and 21;
c. Issue a direction, order or any appropriate writ holding that theprovisions of the
Treaty to amend the Dragon Treaty are not binding on the Petitioner;
d. Costs;
e. Pass any other direction or order which the Honble Court may deem fit and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the case.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS THE PETITIONER AS IN DUTY BOUND

PETITIONER SHALL EVER PRAY.
Sd/Advocate for the Petitioner
XIV
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE

AT LYS
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL
JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 2016
(UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF BRAAVOS)
Archana StarkPetitioner
v.
The Free Republic of Braavos and Ors.
Respondents
ALONG WITH
Writ Petition No.
of 2016
Varys Corporation v. State of Lys and Ors.
WRIT PETITION
TEAM OO
Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner

Chagla 2016 - Team OO - Memorial For Petitioner

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TEAM CODE: OO

IN THE HIGH COURTOF JUDICATURE AT LYS

(UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

BRAAVOS AND ORS.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

23rd M.C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE

NAME OF THE CASE

State of WB v. Anwar Ali Sarkar.

Amita v. Union of India and Anr.

(2005) 13 SCC 721

TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka.

(2002) 8 SCC 481

M Nagraj v. Union of India.

(2006) 8 SCC 212

State of Punjab v. Kalkaran Singh.

(2006) 12 SCC 709

Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar.

AIR 1955 SC 191

(1994) 2 SCC 176

AIR 1987 SC 1690

Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors.

Ahmedabad v. RamanbhaiPrabhatbhai and

Fizabai and Ors. v. Nemichand and Ors.

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India.

AIR 2013 SC 2582

State of Maharashtra and Anr.v. Indian

AIR 1978 SC 597.

AIR 2003 SC 2189

1983 CriLJ 393

AIR 1997 SC 610

State Road Development Corporation Ltd.

MP Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar.

AIR 2002 SC 551

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab.

(1994) 3 SCC 569.

(2007) 4 SCC 669

Management of Coimbatore District Central

Co-operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore

Employees Association and Anr.

Dharam Dutt v. Union of India.

(2004) 1 SCC 712

RBI v. Peerless General Finance.

(1996) 1 SCC 642

DTC v. Mazdoor Union DTC.

AIR 1991 SC 101

AIR 1999 Ker 385

AIR 2000 SC 2083

AIR 1980 SC 470

AIR 1969 SC 783

AIR 1994 Bom 323

K Ramakrishnan and Anr v. State of Kerala

State of AP v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy.

Gopalan v. State of Madras.

Jolly George Varghese and Anr. v. The

D. D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, 14th Edition, 2009, Vol. 1 & 2.

M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 6thEdition, 2010, Vol. 1.

THE CONSTITUTION OF BRAAVOS

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

BRAAVOSI MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT

PROTECTION OF MARITIME TRADE ACT

THE FATAL ACCIDENTS ACT, 1855

CONVENTION ON PREVENTION OF PIRACY IN THE BRAAVOSI ARCHIPELAGO

THE PRESENT PETITION SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND