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TEAM CODE - 09

IN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUS


PETITION DRAWN AND FILED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDUS

IN THE MATTER OF:

KINGBIRD PRIVATE LTD AND ANR...................................PETITIONERS


v.
UNION OF INDUS................................RESPONDENT

MATTER CONCERNING:

VALIDITY OF DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER, 2016

AND

VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT U/ART. 14, 19 R/W ART. 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION


OF INDUS.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS


DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

10th NALSAR - JUSTICE B.R. SAWHNY MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................................... VII
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................................... VIII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ..............................................................................................................X
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ..................................................................................................... XI
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................................... 1
I.

THAT THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE. .................................................. 1


A.

THAT THE COMPANY THROUGH THE MANAGING DIRECTOR CAN FILE A WRIT PETITION

UNDER ART. 32. ...................................................................................................................... 1

B.

THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF THE

COMPANY

AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS HAVE

BEEN VIOLATED BY THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE LT. GOVERNOR. ...................... 2

II. THAT LT. GOVERNOR DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH
PROHIBITION ORDER 2016. ..................................................................................................... 3
A.

THAT THE N.C.T. O F DILLI PRADESH IS NOT AMENABLE TO ART. 239. ................. 3

B.

THE LT. GOVERNOR IS BOUND

TO TAKE THE AID AND ADVICE OF THE

COUNCIL OF

MINISTERS OF N.C.T. OF DILLI PRADESH. ........................................................................... 4


i.

The Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters

enumerated in the State List. .............................................................................................. 4


ii.

The Executive Power of the Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advise of

the Council of Ministers. .................................................................................................... 5


C.

THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016 IS INVALID..................................... 7

III. THAT THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER

ART. 14 AND ART. 19(1)( G) OF THE I NDIAN

CONSTITUTION ......................................................................................................................... 9
A.

THAT

IT VIOLATES THE

RIGHT

TO

EQUALITY

UNDER

ART. 14

OF

CONSTITUTION

OF

INDUS.9
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(i) The classification is not reasonable. ........................................................................... 9


(ii) That there is no rational nexus between the classification and the object sought to be
achieved by the act. .......................................................................................................... 10
(iii) That the impugned order is arbitrary........................................................................ 12
B.

THAT

IT VIOLATES THE

RIGHT

TO

FREEDOM

TO PRACTICE ANY PROFESSION, OR

CARRYING ANY TRADE OR BUSINESS UNDER ART. 19(1)(G)................................................... 12

(i) That there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor. ................................................ 12


(ii) That the order imposes unreasonable restriction on the Fundamental Right to Trade.
13
(iii) That the order is arbitrary in nature. ........................................................................ 14
C.

THAT IT VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY UNDER ART. 21. ...................... 15

PRAYER FOR RELIEF .............................................................................................................. XII

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION

DEFINITION

&

And

Para

Section

U/

Under

i.e.

That is

AIR

All India Reporter

Anr.

Another

Approx.

Approximately

Art.

Article

Const.

Constitution

Hon'ble

Honourable

Lt.

Lieutenant

Ltd.

Limited

M.P.

Madhya Pradesh

N.C.T.

National Capital Territory

Ors.

Others

Pvt.

Private

SC

Supreme Court

SCC

Supreme Court Cases

SCR

Supreme Court Reporter

U.P.

Uttar Pradesh

v.

Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
-CASES1.

Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 51616

2.

Anil Kumar & Ors. v. State (GNCT of Delhi & Anr.), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3255 ..... 14

3.

B. Krishna Murthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (2) ALT 342. ................................ 17

4.

Bennett Coleman & Co .& Ors., v. Union of India & Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 788. .............. 11

5.

Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 ............................................. 17

6.

D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (2) 165 ........................................... 17

7.

Devji Vallabhai Tandel v. Admin. of Goa, Daman Diu & Anr., (1982) 2 SCC 222. ...... 14

8.

Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712. ........................................................ 18

9.

Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682. ..................................... 18

10. Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 578 11
11. F.N. Balsara v. State of Bombay & Anr., AIR 1951 SC 318 ........................................... 18
12. Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4308. .......................... 11
13. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. UoI & Ors, (1985) 1 SCC 641
.......................................................................................................................................... 16
14. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian, AIR 1975 SC 2299. ................................................ 15
15. Javed v. Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369. .............................................................................. 19
16. Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 AIR 723. ............................................... 18
17. Kerala Hotel Bars Association v State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385............... 21
18. Kerala Hotel Bars Association v. State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385.............. 20
19. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574 ... 18, 22
20. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1368. ....... 18
21. Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (1967) 3 SCR 50. ...................... 21
22. Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873; ..................................................... 19
23. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248..................................................... 23
24. N.D.M.C. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 2847. ........................................................... 12
25. Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. The CEPT 1955 SCR 952. ...................................... 21
26. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180. ................................. 24
27. Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State of Delhi & Ors.,75 (1998) DLT 3 (DB). ................. 14
28. Parvej Aktar v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 221. ......................................................... 18
29. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. ......................................................... 10
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30. Reliance Energy Ltd. & Anr. v. MSRDC & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 1. ................................ 22
31. S.K. Chakraborty v Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 575. .................................................. 17
32. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & Ors, (2001) 7 SCC 126 .......................................... 15
33. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842. ............................... 11
34. Shashikant Laxman Kale & Anr. v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 2114. ............................. 17
35. Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Giri, 1970 AIR 2097. ............................................................. 12
36. Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 3 SCC 193. ...................................... 10
37. Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 2 SCR 476. ........................................................ 17
38. State of Andhra Pradesh & others v McDowell & Co. & others, (1996) 3 SCC 709 ...... 18
39. State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114 ............................................................ 19
40. State of Kerala & Ors. v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573 .................................. 18
41. State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566 ............................... 18
42. State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Subanayagan & Anr. (1998)1 SCC 318. ................................ 16
43. Tej Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. State Through Data Din, 1954 CriLJ 1399. ...................... 17
44. U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139. ........................ 18
45. Welfare Asson, ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 ............................................ 19

-STATUTES REFERRED1. The Constitution of India, 1950


2. The Delhi Excise Act, 2009.
3. The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991.
4. The Industrial Act (Development and Regulation Act), 1951.
5. Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules,
1993.
-BOOKS REFERRED1. C.K. THAKKER, M.C. THAKKER & V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS, Vol. 1 & 2, (6th
ed., 2006).
2. DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Vol. 1 & 2. (14th ed., 2009).
3. H.M SEERVAI., Constitutional Law of India, Vol. 1 & 2 (4th ed., 2006).
4. L.M SINGHVI & JAGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Vol. 1, 2 & 3 (2nd ed., 2007).
5. JAIN M.P., Indian Constitutional Law (6th ed., Lexis Nexis Buttersworth, 2010).
6. BASUDr.DURGA DAS, The Indian Constituional Law (3rd Ed Kamal Law House, 2011).
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-LEXICONS & DICTIONARIES1. Bryan A. Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2001)
2. Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd Ed. 2009)
3. Websters New International Dictionary (1926)
-ARTICLES REFERRED1. Shubhomoy Sikdar, Drunk Driving Behind 70% Accidents In Delhi: Survey. The Hindu,
June 16, 2016.
2. Dara Lee Luca, Emily Owens & Gunjan Sharam, The Effect of Alcohol Regulation on
Violence Against Women: Evidence from India, Social Science Research Network.
3. Chapter 5, Crime in India 2015 Statistics, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of
Home Affairs.
4. Murthy Pratima, Culture and Alcohol Use In India. World Cultural Psychiatry Research
Review, 2015.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The writ petition has been filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indus under Art.
32seeking appropriate remedy for violation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed u/Art. 14,
19(1) g and 21 of The Constitution of Indus.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has suo motu transferred the petition pending before the High
Court of Dilli Pradesh under Art. 139A of The Constitution of Indus.

ART. 32, CONSTITUTION OF INDUS, 1950 READS:


___________________________________________________________________________
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
1) The right to move the Supreme Com by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of
the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto&certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
this Part.
3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1)&(2),
Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of
its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause
(2).
The right guaranteed by this Article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for
by this Constitution.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
~ Introduction to Indus and Dilli Pradesh ~
Indus is a Republic in the continent of Asia which is divided into various states and union
territories. Dilli Pradesh is situated in the central part of Indus. It has very rich cultural and
historical importance. It also enjoys special status under the Constitution of India under Art.
239AA. Dilli Pradesh has a legislative assembly and is empowered to enact laws under this
Art.. Dilli Pradesh is currently being run by Aap Ki Party.
~ Menace of Alcohol in Dilli Pradesh ~
There have been many incidents in Dilli Pradesh due to heavy consumption of alcohol, since
2015. The issue was raised by the citizens, NGOs and various international organizations. The
government took notice of the matter. The Health Minister of Dilli Pradesh, in his public
announcements declared that the government was in deliberations to address the grievances of
all in the best possible manner.
~ The General Election of 2016 ~
In the general elections held in March 2016, the Moody Janta Party secured all the eight seats
in Dilli Pradesh. It had promised in its manifesto to deal with the menace of alcohol in Dilli
Pradesh. It should be noted that there is no Central Act which restricts the production, sale or
consumption of alcohol. The Union Government collects excise duty on the manufacture of
alcohol beverages which contributes to the exchequer.
~ Issuance of The Prohibition Order~
The Central Government of Indus issued a notification, through the Lt. Governor of Dilli
Pradesh, in July, 2016. It was called the Dilli Prohibition Order, 2016. The order was notified
and came into effect from 1 August 2016. It ordered for complete prohibition on the sale,
distribution, marketing and consumption of whisky, wine, rum, vodka, gin, tequila or any other
alcohol within the territory of Dilli Pradesh. It did not prohibit beer and any other alcoholic
beverage where the alcohol content is less than 5%.

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~ Impact of the order on exchequer of Dilli Pradesh ~


The Prohibition Order was criticized by the State Government for being counter-productive to
the economy of the country. There was an adverse impact on the state exchequer due to loss of
indirect taxes. The Lt. Governor had acted beyond its powers in issuing the order. This claim
of State Government was supported by various legal scholars as the Dilli Pradesh Government
had the sole prerogative to enact law in this regard.
~ Impact on King Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd. ~
Due to the complete embargo on the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption of certain
types of alcohol like whisky, vodka, gin, tequila etc, King Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd that had its
manufacturing unit in Dilli Pradesh was seriously affected. The company was in the business
of manufacture of premium whiskies and vodkas.
~ Filing of the Present Petition ~
King Bird Pvt. Ltd. has filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Indus Constitution as the order
violates their Fundamental Rights under Art. 14 and 19. The State Government of Dilli Pradesh
had also filed a petition under the Art. 226, before the High Court of Dilli Pradesh challenging
the competency of the Lt. Governor to issue the order. The Supreme Court suo moto transferred
the petition pending before the High Court and tagged both the petitions.
Hence, the present petition.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

II.

WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION


THE HON BLE COURT UNDER
MAINTAINABLE ?

FILED BY KING BIRD INVOKING JURISDICTION OF


ART .

32

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

INDUS

IS

WHETHER THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSES BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF


THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 14 AND ART. 19(1)(G) OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

III. WHETHER THE LT. GOVERNOR WAS NOT LEGISLATIVELY COMPETENT TO ENACT THE
DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER, 2016?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

THAT THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY KING BIRD LIQUOR PVT. LTD. INVOKING
JURISDICTION OF THE HONBLE COURT UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDUS IS MAINTAINABLE.

It is submitted that the Writ Petition filed by King Bird under Art. 32 in the Honble
Supreme Court is maintainable. Firstly, the Managing Director of the Company can file a
Writ Petition under Art. 32. Secondly, the Fundamental Rights of the Company and its
shareholders guaranteed have been violated by the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt.
Governor.
II.

THAT THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSES BY THE LT. GOVERNOR IS VIOLATIVE OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 14, ART. 19(1)(G) AND ART. 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION.

The Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor violates the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed under Art. 14, 19(1)(g) & 21 of the Indus Constitution. Firstly, it violates Art.
14 as the classification done under the order is not reasonable, there is no rational nexus
between the classification and the objects sought to be achieved by the order and it is
arbitrary in nature. Secondly, the Order violates the Petitioners Fundamental Rights under
Art. 19(1)(g) as there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor which has been infringed
upon by the unreasonable and arbitrary nature of the Order. Thirdly, the order violates the
Petitioners Right to Life and Liberty as the order has caused a loss of livelihood to the
Petitioner and those dependent on the sale, distribution and marketing of alcohol in Dilli
Pradesh.
III. THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE LT. GOVERNOR DID NOT HAVE THE
CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH PROHIBITION ORDER 2016.

The Order passed by the Lt. Governor is ultra vires, as he was not capable of passing such order
under the Indus Constitution and other related provisions. Firstly, Dilli Pradesh is not amenable
to Article 239. Secondly, the Lt Governor is bound to take the aid and advise of the Council of
Ministers of N.C.T. Dilli Pradesh as the Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with
respect to matters enumerated in the State List and the Executive power is subject to the aid
and advise. Thirdly, the Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order 2016 is invalid.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I.

THAT THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE .

It is humbly submitted before the Honble court that the present petition is maintainable before
the Supreme Court as the aforesaid petition has been filed by the Managing Director of King
Bird Liquor Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the King Bird). It is submitted that [A]the
company through the Managing Director can file a writ petition under Art. 32 and [B]that the
Fundamental Rights of the Company and its shareholders have been violated by the Prohibition
Order passed by the Lt. Governor.
A.

That the company through the Managing Director can file a writ petition under
Art. 32.

A Company is a juristic person and has a personality of its own. It is a legal entity in the eyes
of law on equal footing as a natural person. Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indus states that, the
state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of law under the
territory of Indus. Therefore it is submitted that the Company is entitled to claim right u/Art.
14 of the Constitution.1
In addition to this, a legislative measure may impair the rights of the Company alone and not
of its shareholders, or it may impair the rights of the shareholder along with the Company and
in such scenario, the Court shall not refuse to grant relief merely upon the technical operation
of the action.2
In the present case, the Writ Petition has been filed by the Managing Director, for asserting his
fundamental rights because of unreasonable restrictions imposed by the aforesaid legislation.3
Reliance for the same is placed upon the landmark Judgement of R.C. Cooper v.Union of India4
where it was held that
the fundamental rights of share-holders as citizens are not lost when they
associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders
are impaired by State action their rights as shareholders are protected.

Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P. , (2011) 3 SCC 193.


R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248. [Hereinafter referred as R.C. Cooper]
3
Moot Proposition, 7.
4
R.C. Cooper, Supra at 4.
2

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The same has been reiterated by the Honble Court in the Bennett Coleman5 case.
It is respectfully submitted that it is the substance and the practical result of the act of the state
that should be considered rather than the pure legal form.6 Furthermore, in Express Newspapers
case, no plea was raised against the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground that one
of the petitioner happened to be a Company.7
Thus, it is humbly submitted that the Company and the Managing Director have the right to
file the Writ Petition.
B.

That the Fundamental Rights of the Company and its shareholders have been
violated by the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor.

It is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Rights of King Bird have been violated under Art.
14 of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights of the shareholders have been violated under
Art. 14 and 19(1) (g).

Bennett Coleman &Co.&Ors., v. Union of India&Ors., (1972) 2 SCC 788.


Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.&Ors. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842. [Hereinafter referred as Sakal]
7
Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd.&Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 578; Sakal, Supra at 5.
6

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II.

THAT LT. GOVERNOR DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO PASS THE DILLI PRADESH
PROHIBITION ORDER 2016.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the notification so provided by the Central
Government falls outside the vires of its competence. In the following submissions, it shall be
put forth [A] that the National Capital Territory Dilli Pradesh (Hereinafter referred as N.C.T of
Dilli Pradesh) is a Union Territory with a Special Status under the Constitution of Indus; [B]
the Lt. Governor is not bound by the aid and advice clause of the council of Ministers.
A.

That The N.C.T. Of Dilli Pradesh is not Amenable To Art. 239.

It is humbly submitted that the N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh is governed by a special provision
enumerated in order to ensure a Responsible Government in the Dilli Pradesh under the
Constitution of Indus in the form of Art. 239AA8. According to Art. 1 of the Constitution of
Indus, Indus is a Union of States and further Clause (2) and (3) classify the distinction between
the States and Union Territories specified in the first schedule. Though according to the
definition9Dilli Pradesh is not categorised as a State but on the similar hand it shall be governed
by Art. 239 AA of the Constitution of Indus.
As is evident from the title itself, Art. 239AA is a special provision with respect to Dilli Pradesh
which was inserted by the Constitution (69th Amendment) Act, 1991 with effect from
01.02.1992, in terms of which the Union Territory of Dilli Pradesh shall be called N.C.T. of
Dilli Pradesh and the administrator thereof shall be designated as the Lt. Governor. Further, as
per clause (2) of Art. 239AA, there shall be a Legislative Assembly for the National Capital
Territory and the seats in such Assembly shall be filled by members chosen by direct election
from territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory. Clause (2) further provides that
the functioning of the Legislative Assembly shall be regulated by law made by Parliament.
There are certain Union Territories for which there is no Legislature. The second category of
Union Territories, as under Art. 239A (i.e., Puducherry), which have their legislatures
conferred by the Parliament and finally the third category of Union territory, as under Art.
239AA (i.e. Dilli Pradesh)10. The difference is Art. 239 of the Constitution deals with the
administration of Union Territories whereas Art. 239AA talks about the special provisions with
respect to Dilli Pradesh i.e. they talk about the distinction between a body constituted by the

Govt. of N.C.T. Delhi v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4308.
INDIA CONST. art. 366, cl. 15.
10
N.D.M.C. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1997 SC 2847.
9

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Parliament and the Legislature created by the Constitution.11 In other words Art. 239AA
constitutes a full-fledged Legislature for Delhi which is different from the body constituted by
Parliament under Art. 239A to function as a Legislature for a Union Territory.
Moreover a reference to Art. 239B read with clause (8) of Art.239AA shows how the Union
Territory of Delhi is in a class by itself. This is also the reason why Art. 239 is also not
applicable to the Union Territories. As Art. 239 of the Constitution deals with the
administration of Union Territories whereas Art. 239AA talks about the special provisions with
respect to a different class of Union Territory.
Therefore Art. 239 of the Constitution is not applicable to the NCT of Dilli Pradesh. The powers
of the Lt. Governor under Art. 239AA are different from the powers of the Administrator under
Art. 239. Hence Art. 239AA is a self-contained code and not incorporated by reference under
Art. 239 of the Constitution of Indus.
B.

The Lt. Governor is bound to take the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers of N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the Lt. Governor is the Administrative
Head, directed by the President, of the N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh. The Lt. Governor is bound to
take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh. In the following
sub contentions, the same is sought to be put forth.
i.

The Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect to matters
enumerated in the State List.

It is humbly submitted that the Legislative Assembly has the power to make laws with respect
to matters enumerated in the State List. As according to Clause (3) of Art. 239AA the
Legislative Assembly of National Capital Territory has the power to make laws for the whole
or any part of the National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in
the State List or in the Concurrent List except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the
State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2
and 18. Furthermore, the powers so conferred on the Legislative Assembly of National Capital

11

Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V.V. Giri, 1970 AIR 2097.

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Territory to make laws are not in derogation of the powers of Parliament under the Constitution
to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof.12
In the present case, the Prohibition Order passed by the Lt. Governor, put a complete
prohibition on the sale, distribution, marketing and consumption of whiskey, wine, rum, vodka,
gin, tequila or any other alcohol.13 The action taken by Lt. Governor is ultra vires as the Lt.
Governor did not have the authority to issue an order concerning the entry 8 of List II in the
Seventh Schedule in which he is bound to take the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Moreover also the industries engaged in the manufacture of alcohol meant for potable purposes
had already brought under the total and exclusive control of States in all respects.14
ii.

The Executive Power of the Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers.

It is humbly submitted that the Executive Power of the Lt. Governor is to be exercised after the
aid and advice of the Council of Ministers has been carried out. According to Clause (4) of Art.
239AA provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head
to aid and advise the Lt. Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with
respect to which the Legislative Assembly has power to make laws except in so far as he is
required by law to act in his discretion. This proves that the Executive power is co-extensive
with the Legislative power. Hence It is humbly submitted that the Lt. Governor can act only
after the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers is exercised.
Since Delhi is Union Territory of a Special Category, the discretionary power of the Lt.
Governor is pari materia with the Governor of a State.15The Lt. Governor can act in his
discretion only with regards to those matters which fall outside the purview of the powers
conferred on the Legislative Assembly but in respect of which powers or functions are
entrusted or delegated to him by the President.16 The only difference between the powers of
the both the authorities is in case of discretionary powers to be exercised by them. The Lt.
Governor is just bound to take the aid and advise whereas the governor is bound by the aid and
advise of the Council of Ministers. As seen in the case of Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State

12

INDIA CONST. art. 239AA, Cl. 3(a).


Moot Proposition 7.
14
The Industrial Act (Development & Regulation), Amendment Act 2016.
15
DevjiVallabhaiTandel v. Administrator of Goa, Daman Diu&Anr., (1982) 2 SCC 222.
16
The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 41 (1991).
13

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of Delhi & Others17 that the phraseology employed by Clause (4) of Art. 239AA deserves to
be compared with that employed in Art. 163. The Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi would be
aided and advised by the Council of Ministers in the exercise of his functions in relation to the
matters with reference to which the legislative assembly has power to make laws.
This was reiterated in the case of Anil Kumar v. GNCT of Delhi18 and held that in respect of
matters which do not fall outside the purview of the powers conferred on the Legislative
Assembly in other words, which fall within the legislative competence of the Legislative
Assembly, or in which he is not required by or under any law to act in his discretion or exercise
his judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the Lt. Governor must act on the aid and advice of the
Council of Ministers.
Moreover it has been state that the Lt. Governor shall in respect of matters connected with
'public order', 'police' and 'land' exercise his executive functions to the extent delegated to him
by the President in consultation with the Chief Minister, if it is so provided under any order
issued by the President under Art. 239 of the Constitution.19
It is respectfully submitted before the Honble Court that even though the NCT of Dilli Pradesh
may have maintained the Parliamentary supremacy as to legislation, it is equally important to
consider that an arrangement of governance of the region through directly elected
representative has been provided for. It has been provided that the Council of Ministers would
ultimately be responsible for the governance. As the Supreme Court also held in S.R.
Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab& Ors.20 that the very concept of responsible Government and
representative democracy signifies Government by the people. In constitutional terms, it
denotes that the sovereign power which resides in the people is exercised on their behalf by
their chosen representatives and for exercise of those powers, the representatives are
necessarily accountable to the people for what they do. The Members of the Legislature, thus,
must owe their power directly or indirectly to the people.
Thus due to all of the above arguments it is humbly submitted that the Executive Power of the
Lt. Governor to be exercised after the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers.

17

Om Parkash Pahwa & Ors. v. State of Delhi & Ors.,75 (1998) DLT 3 (DB).
Anil Kumar & Ors. v. State (GNCT of Delhi & Anr.), 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3255.
19
Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, Rule 45, (1993).
20
S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab & Ors, (2001) 7 SCC 126.
18

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C.

The Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order 2016 is invalid.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble that Dilli Pradesh Prohibition order is invalid. As in
the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian21 it was held that the separation of powers is
the basic structure of the Constitution. Also though the Lt Governor enjoys some discretionary
powers. But, it is contended before the court that the Lt Governor can exercise those powers
only in certain circumstances as described under the Constitution of Indus, the GNCT of Dilli
Pradesh Act, 1991 and the Transactions of Business Rules of Delhi.
According to the Proviso to Art. 239AA (4), it was held that in the event of a difference of
opinion between him and the council of ministers, the Lt. governor of Delhi does have the
power to act on his own where the matter, in his opinion, is so urgent that it is necessary for
him to take immediate action. But then, Art. 239AA of the Constitution also makes it clear
that the Lt. Governor can invoke this urgency power only after he has referred the matter to
the President for decision and that it shall be competent for him to take immediate action
pending such decision. Since in the present case the Lt. Governor had not consulted the Chief
Minister and the Council of Ministers, there could not have been any conflict. Hence, he could
not have referred to the President before issuing the Prohibition order, which is a precondition
for taking immediate action.
Moreover it has been held in various cases that the executive power must always be exercised
in the four corners of the law. It has been relied upon to reinforce that a piece of 'subordinate
legislation' can be tested on the question of 'unreasonableness', namely, that it is manifestly
arbitrary.22
In Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd23, It was held that the
essential legislative function consisting determination of the legislative policy cannot be
abdicated by the Legislature in favor of another though power to make subsidiary legislation
can be entrusted to another body after enunciating the policy and the principles for the guidance
of the delegates. The delegate has to work within the scope of its authority and cannot widen
or constrict the scope of the Act or the policy laid down there under nor can it legislate on the

21

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narian, AIR 1975 SC 2299.


Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
23
Agricultural Market Committee vs. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd, (1997) 5 SCC 516
22

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field covered by the Act. Similar principles were re-stated in State of Tamil Nadu v. K.
Subannayagan & Anr.24
In Hamdard Dawakhanaand Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.,25 the Supreme Court said, that
the discretion should not be so wide that it is impossible to discern its limits. There must instead
be definite boundaries within which the powers of the administrative authority are exercisable.
Delegation should be not be so indefinite as to amount to an abdication of the legislative
function. As seen in our case as there has been a major loss of the public exchequer as the Govt.
of N.C.T. collects excise duty on manufacture of alcoholic beverages.26
Therefore finally it is submitted before the Court that the Lt. Governor could not have issued
an order without consulting the Chief Minister and the council of Ministers of Dilli Pradesh,
on matter given to Dilli Pradesh Government to legislate, by the Constitution.

24

State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Subanayagan&Anr. (1998)1 SCC 318.


HamdardDawakhana&Anr. v. Union of India&Ors., AIR 1960 SC 554.
26
Moot Proposition, 5.
25

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III. THAT

THE PROHIBITION ORDER PASSED BY THE

LT. GOVERNOR

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER


THE INDIAN

ART. 14

AND

IS VIOLATIVE OF

ART. 19(1)( G)

OF

CONSTITUTION

The Dilli Pradesh Prohibition Order, 2016 passed by the Lt. Governor that the Prohibition
Order is violative of the fundamental right as it,[A]violates the Right to Equality under Art.
1427; [B]violates the Right to Freedom to practice any profession, or carrying any trade or
business guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (g), [C] consequently leading to the violation of the Right
to Life and Liberty under Art. 21.
A. That it violates the Right to Equality under Art. 14 of Constitution of Indus.
It is humbly submitted that the principle underlying guarantee of Art. 14 is not that the same
rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian Territory or that the same
remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. 28 It
only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed.29 Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same
situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards
the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same.30
It is contended that Art.14 has been violated by the Prohibition Order on following three
grounds;
(i) The classification is not reasonable.
Art. 14 permits reasonable classification for the purpose of disposition.31 The classification
must be rational, that is to say, it must be based on some qualities or characteristics which are
to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out. The condition
that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those
that are grouped together must be fulfilled.32The subject matter of legislation should be a welldefined class founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes that subject matter from
27

India CONST. art. 14.


Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869; B. Krishna Murthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005
(2) ALT 342.
29
Shashikant Laxman Kale &Anr. v. Union of India, 1990 AIR 2114.
30
D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (2) 165; Tej Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. State through Data
Din, 1954 CriLJ 1399.
31
S.K. Chakraborty v Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 575.
32
Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 2 SCR 476.
28

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the others left out.

33

In other words, equals must be treated alike in like circumstances and

conditions34 and such classification is based in legal and relevant consideration.35


It is submitted that all the products with Alcoholic Content (except Beer) of over 5% have been
prohibited for sale, distribution, marketing and consumption under the prohibition order.36 It
has led to the creation of a separate class out of a homogeneous class. The process of giving
licences in case of the establishment of the industries manufacturing alcohol and beer is
governed by only one act.37 Thus, there is only one class which is related to manufacture of the
alcoholic beverages however the Prohibition Order has bifurcated and created a new class
on a non-intelligible premise. There is no difference between industries manufacturing alcohol
and alcoholic beverages with content of less than 5% in its composition.
In order to elucidate the aforesaid discrepancy, reliance is placed upon the case of Karimbil
Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala38, where the impugned Act gave certain benefits to those who
owned plantation of rubber, tea and coffee but left those who owned pepper and areca
plantation. Since there was no reasonable distinction between those two classes of plantation
owners, the Supreme Court held the act ultra-wires Art. 14.
Furthermore, the business in liquor as a beverage has been defined by the Honble Court in
respect of Potable Liquor39 and differentiation must be founded on pertinent and real
differences as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.40
It is humbly submitted that differentiation of any alcohol from beer is segregation without any
rational basis or an intelligible differentia. Hence, it is ultra vires, null and void.
(ii) That there is no rational nexus between the classification and the object sought
to be achieved by the act.
It is humbly submitted that in addition to reasonable classification, there should also be a clear

33

DharamDutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712.


ParvejAktar v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 221.
35
U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139.
36
Moot Proposition, 7.
37
Delhi Excise Act, 2010.
38
KarimbilKunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 AIR 723.
39
State of Kerala&Ors. v. Kandath Distilleries, (2013) 6 SCC 573; F.N. Balsara v. State of Bombay&Anr., AIR
1951 SC 318; Khoday Distilleries Ltd.&Ors. v. State of Karnataka&Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574; State of M.P.&Ors.
v. NandlalJaiswal&Ors., (1986) 4 SCC 566; State of Andhra Pradesh & others v McDowell&Co.&others, (1996)
3 SCC 709; Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu&Kashmir&Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1368.
40
Dr. SubramaniamSwamy v. Director, CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682.
34

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nexus between the classification and the objects sought to be achieved by the act. It is part of
the twin test of reasonable classification as propounded by the Honble Supreme Court in a
number of cases.41
In its public announcement after the notification of the Prohibition Order, the Lt. Governor
stated that the law has been passed keeping in mind the directive principles of state policy
which every Government should aim to achieve.42
It is humbly submitted that the Art. 47 states that the State shall endeavour to bring about
prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks which are injurious to health.43The
aforesaid order does not establish a rational nexus between the classification and the object
sought by the act. The continuation of a substitutive alcoholic beverage is only a special favour
done to the beer manufacturers. The object of prohibition can not to be achieved by the act as
first, the basis of classification is unreasonable and secondly, mere less content of alcohol in
the beverage does not solve the problem with relation to injury to the health of the person or
with regards to the menace.
It is humbly submitted that having regards to being injurious to people that beer is also an
intoxicating drink and is defined under the same head as Liquor44 and what differentiates beer
from other alcoholic beverages is only the quantity of alcoholic content. It is to be noted that a
drink is considered to be 0.5 ounces (oz) or 15 grams of alcohol, which is equivalent to 12 oz
(355 millilitres [ml]) of beer thus, the same amount intoxication can be achieved by an alcoholic
by drinking beer as he could have achieved by drinking any other alcoholic beverage thus, the
object to either control menace or to increase the level of public health both are likely to suffer
in achievement as same quantity can be drunk by people.45 Therefore, not only the
classification is based on unreasonable or arbitrary grounds but also there is also no rational
nexus between the object sought by the act.
There cannot be a caveat to the opinion that permitting the consumption of beer is a getaway
to the consumption of hard liquor, and indeed is a social malaise in itself.46

41

LaxmiKhandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, (2003) 9 SCC 114; Welfare
Asson, ARP v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Javed v. Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369.
42
Moot Proposition 8.
43
INDIA CONST. art. 47.
44
Delhi Excise Act, 2(46) 2010.
45
'What is a Standard Drink?', https://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/whatstandard-drink, last accessed on 24 September, 2016.
46
Kerala Hotel Bars Association v. State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385.

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(iii)

That the impugned order is arbitrary.

It is humbly submitted before the Court that as classification is unreasonable and it is not have
a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the act, it is arbitrary in nature.
Referring to the Prohibition Order, it is submitted that the law explicitly excludes the sale,
distribution, marketing and consumption all Beers (even exceeding 5% alcohol content).
It is humbly submitted that the prohibition order has created a privileged class in the
fermentation industry by establishing a monopoly of the manufacturers of Beer. Thus, it is
carving out a special category of a homogeneous class. The order has resulted in the monopoly
of beer manufacturers in potable liquor businessand a special favour has been done by the
Government to the beer manufacturers by excluding them from a class.
B. That it violates the Right to Freedom to practice any profession, or carrying any
trade or business under Art. 19(1)(g).
It is humbly submitted before the court the Petitioner had a fundamental right to trade under
Art. 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of Indus. Art. 19(1) (g) provides the citizens the freedom to
practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is humbly submitted
that Art.19 (1) (g) has been violated by the Prohibition Order which will be expounded on the
basis of three pronged contentions,
(i)

That there is a fundamental right to trade in liquor.

It is humbly submitted that Art. 19(1) (g) of the Indus Constitution provides that all citizens
shall have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
Reasonable restriction can be imposed by the State under 19(2) to 19(6). The State Government
has power to make laws relating to intoxicating liquors regarding the production, manufacture,
possession, transport, purchase and sale.47 Furthermore, the Union Government has enacted
IDR Act and the same act recognizes Fermentation Industries.48
Thus, it is humbly submitted that alcohol is fit for human consumption has been recognized by
the Constitution of Indus as well as the subsequent statutory provisions enacted by the
Parliament of Indus also approve the same.

47
48

INDIA CONST. Sch. 7, Ent. 8.


The Industries Act (Development & Regulation), Act 1951.

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The word business connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of
activity or conduct with a set purpose.49 It is contended that applying this test to the trade and
liquor proves that it is a business covered under Art. 19(1) (g) as liquor can be manufactured,
brought or sold like any other commodity. It is consumed throughout the world, though some
countries restrict or prohibit the same on economic or moral grounds. The morality or otherwise
of a deal does not affect the quality of the activity though it may be a ground for imposing a
restriction on the said activity. The illegality of an activity does not affect the character of the
activity but operates as a restriction on it.50
Hence, it is submitted that the Petitioner has a Fundamental Right to trade in alcohol.
(ii)

That the order imposes unreasonable restriction on the Fundamental Right to


Trade.

It is humbly submitted that Right to Freedom under Art. 19(1) can be restricted by the
provisions under Art. 19(2) to 19(6). In present case, the right conferred by the Art. 19(1)(g) is
subject to reasonable restrictions under Clause (6) of Art. 19 which reads as follows:
[6] Nothing in Sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the States from making any law imposing, in the interests of
the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing
law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to[i] the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession
or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
[ii] the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State,
of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,
of citizens or otherwise.51
In Kerala Hotel Bars Association v .State of Kerala52, it was held that, in the event of the state
permitting of trade or business in potable liquor with or without limitation, the citizen has the

49

NarainSwadeshi Weaving Mills v. The Commissioner of Excess profits Tax 1955 SCR 952.
Krishna Kumar Narula v. State of Jammu&Kashmir, (1967) 3 SCR 50.
51
INDIA CONST. art. 26, cl. 6.
52
Kerala Hotel Bars Association v State of Kerala, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1385.
50

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right not to be discriminated against. And any regulatory measure would have to satisfy the test
of Art.14.53
Thus, it is humbly submitted that the state cannot discriminate with the citizens who are equally
qualified to carry on trade when the state permits the business with or without limitation.
Furthermore, it can also adopt any method to sell licenses to maximise the revenue so long as
the method is not discriminatory.54 Thus, in regard of the law laid by the Honble Court, the
prohibition order is violative as it is discriminatory and treats people similarly placed
differently as the State has neither created a monopoly nor it has created totally prohibited trade
in potable liquor but rather a monopoly of private beer manufacturers has been created thereby
special and discriminatory treatment has been meted out by the state with regards to other
citizens engaged in business in potable liquor.
The State Government collects revenue under the Delhi Excise Act and the same governs both
the beer and other alcoholic beverages thus, the manner of obtaining license is the same with
same requirements and thus, both the manufacturers are equally qualified and hence,
discriminatory treatment is violative of the principle of reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6).
(iii)

That the order is arbitrary in nature.

The order also is arbitrary as it does not distinguish between the purpose for which the alcoholic
product is used and having regards to this precarious fiasco of the order, It is humbly submitted
that only trade in potable liquor is res extra commerciumhowever the position is entirely
different with regard to alcoholic beverage used for industrial, medicinal and toilet preparations
wherein the right to trade is recognised on the same footing as any other profession and the
state does not have the right to prohibit the same but impose only reasonable restriction having
regards to Art. 19 (6).
It is also contended that Beer is explicitly excluded from the prohibition order. Thereby, the
order violates 19(1)(g) by creating a privileged class in the form of Beer manufacturers.
In the case of Reliance Energy Limited & Anr. v.Maharashtra State Road Development
Corporation & Ors.,55 the Supreme Court of India held that Level playing field is an important

53

Khoday Distilleries Ltd.&Ors. v. State of Karnataka&Ors., (1995) 1 SCC 574.(Hereinafter referred


asKhoday)
54
Ibid.
55
Reliance Energy Ltd.& Anr. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 1.

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aspect to be considered while construing Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution. According to the
bench,
When Art. 19(1)(g) confers fundamental right to carry on business to a
company, it is entitled to invoke the said doctrine of level playing field. We
may clarify that this doctrine is, however, subject to public interest. In the world
of globalization, competition is an important factor to be kept in mind. The
doctrine of level playing field is an important doctrine which is embodied in
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. This is because the said doctrine provides space
within which equally-placed competitors are allowed to bid so as to subserve the
larger public interest. Decisions or acts which results in unequal and
discriminatory treatment, would violate the doctrine of level playing field
embodied in Art. 19(1)(g).
In the instant case, the order denies to Managing Director of the right to have a level playing
field in the market as its products have been arbitrarily prohibited which is a violation of his
fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g).
C. That it violates the Right to Life and Liberty under Art. 21.
It is humbly submitted that the Petitioners right to live and liberty has been violated by the
aforesaid Prohibition Order. As based on arbitrary order, the Fundamental Right to Trade has
been infringed upon by the Order.The loss of livelihood of the Petitioner and those dependent
upon the sale of alcohol within Dilli Pradesh have been left jobless without proper
rehabilitation.
Articles dealing with Fundamental Rights do not represent entirely separate streams of rights
which do not mingle at many points. They are all parts of an integrated scheme in the
constitution. Their waters must mix to constitute that grand flow unimpeded .and impartial
justice (social, economic and political), freedom (not only of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship, but also of association, movement vocation or occupation as well as of acquisition
and possession of reasonable property), or equality (of status and of opportunity, which imply
absence of unreasonable or unfair discrimination between individuals, groups and classes), and

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of fraternity (assuring dignity-of the individual and the unity of the nation) which our
Constitution visualises.56
It is humbly submitted that the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation57 has held,
The sweep of right to life conferred by Art.21 is wide and far reaching. It does not
mean, merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the
imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to procedure established
by law. That is but one aspect if the right to life. An equally important facet of the right
to life is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of
livelihood.
It is humbly submitted that the order infringes upon the Fundamental Right to Life and Liberty
guaranteed under the Art. 21 of the Indus Constitution.

56
57

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.


Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF


Wherefore in the light of arguments advanced, authorities cited and facts mentioned the
Honble Court may be pleased to adjudicate by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order
that:
a) The Writ Petition is maintainable
b) The Fundamental Rights of the King Bird have been violated U/Art. 14 and 19 1(g)
And any other relief that the Honble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is humbly submitted.
Sd/Counsels for the Petitioner Kingbird

Wherefore in the light of arguments advanced, authorities cited and facts mentioned the
Honble Court may be pleased to adjudicate by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order
that the Central Government did not have the capacity to pass the Dilli Pradesh Prohibition
Order.
And any other relief that the Honble Court may be pleased to grant in the interests of
justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is humbly submitted.

Sd/
Counsels for the Petitioner N.C.T. of Dilli Pradesh

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