Bhu' M M M C C 2016: Team Code-Od

TEAM CODE-OD
BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016
BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF RHODO
IN THE MATTER OF:

SLP NO. 8015/2015
REPUBLIC OF RHODO.....PETITIONER
V.
DASHANAN MOTORS LIMITEDDEFENDANT
SLP NO. 031/2016

MAYA MEHTA ...PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF NORTHERN PROVINCE ..DEFENDANT
Memorial for Respondents
-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................................... V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... VIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................................... IX
ISSUES RAISED...................................................................................................................... XIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS............................................................................................. XIV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED....................................................................................................... 1
I.
THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT AND PROXIMATE NEXUS BETWEEN THE
POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE

MOHANA REGION ................................................................................................................. 1
A.
DRASTIC CHANGES WERE OBSERVED .................................................................. 1
B.
NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. .................................................................................... 2
II. THAT DML CANNOT BE HELD TORTIOUSLY LIABLE ....................................... 5

A.
THAT THERE EXISTED A DUTY OF CARE .............................................................. 5
B.
THAT THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CARE...................................... 6
C.
THAT DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF DUTY........................... 7
III.
THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION ... 9
A.
RATIONALE BEHIND THE DIRECTIVE .................................................................... 9
B.
THE REASON BEHIND THE WRONG DECISION .................................................. 10

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[Memorial for Respondent]
IV.
THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE
DIRECTORS AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY ........................................ 12

A.
INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRADE OF THE
DIRECTORS OF DML. ......................................................................................................... 12

B.
INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD OF THE
EMPLOYEES OF DML ........................................................................................................ 14

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................... XVI
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION
EXPANSION
&
And
Section
Sections
Paragraph
Paragraphs
AIR
All India Reporter
Anr.
Another
Art.
Article
DML
Dashanan Motors Limited
DPSP
Directive Principle Of State Policy
ED.
Edition
EPA
Environment Protection Act
HC
High Court of Shivpuri
Honble
Honorable
IUCN
International Union for Conservation of

Nature
MBCF
Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum
MoEF
Ministry of Environment and Forest
NGT
National Green Tribunal
Ors.
Others
PCB
Pollution Control Board
PIL
Public Interest Litigation
Rhodo
Republic of Rhodo
SBCB
State Pollution Control Board
SC
Supreme Cases
SCC
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SLP
Special Leave Petition
UDHR
United Declaration of Human Rights

III | P a g e
UOI
Union of India
v.
Versus
Vol.
Volume
W.P.
Writ Petition
WWF
World Wildlife Fund
IV | P a g e
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abhilash Textiles v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, AIR 1988 Guj 57 ....................................... 16
Angarki Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 764............. 11
Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SCW 2257 ....................................................... 16
Base Corporation Ltd.v. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and Ors., 2012(1)
KarLJ372. .................................................................................................................................... 3
Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University, (1998) 8 SCC 194. .................................................. 11
Bennet Coleman & Co. and Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106 ....................................... 12
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781, 784 ..................................................... 5
Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar R. Nandkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109 ............ 14
D.D.H.E.U. v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1992 SC 789 ........................................................................... 14
D.T.C. v. Mazdoor Union D.T.C. AIR 1991 SC 101 ............................................................. 11, 14
Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 937 ............................................. 12
Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), AC 562, 618-19 ....................................................................... 5, 7
Faruk v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 SC 93(96) ................................................................................ 13
Francis v. Union Territory, AIR 1981 SC 746.............................................................................. 14
Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210 ................................................................................. 3
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 176 (201). ............................................................... 6
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1037 ...................................................................... 15
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M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770 ............................................................. 9, 11

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597............................................................ 14, 16
Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1988 SC 526........................................................... 14
Narendra v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 ............................................................................ 14
Nazir Abbas v. Raja Ajamshah, ILR 1947 Nag 955 ....................................................................... 8
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180........................................ 14, 17
Praveen Singh v State of Punjab and Others, AIR 2001 SC 152.................................................... 9
Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board Kairana, (1950) SCR 566..................................................... 13
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564................................................... 12
South Australia Asset Management Corpn. v. York Montague Ltd., (1996) 3 All ER 365 (HL) .. 8
Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902 ..................................... 13
Systopic Laboratories (P.) Ltd. v. Prem Gupta, AIR 1994 SC 205 .............................................. 13
Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 3887 ............................. 11
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178 .................................................. 16
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647 ...................................... 16
Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 129 ....................................... 13
Yasin v. Town Area Committee, (1952) SCR 572 ....................................................................... 13
BOOKS
A. DESAI, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (2ND ED. 2002).
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8TH ED. 2009).
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DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14TH ED. 2009).
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH ED. 2010).
P. LEELAKRISHNAN., ENVIRONMENTAL CASE LAW BOOK (2ND ED. 2006).
P. S. JASWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2006).
S. K. SARKAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2ND ED.2006).
S. SHANTHAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).
SHANTHAKUMAR, S., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).
SUMEET MALIK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2012).
V. N.SHUKLA , CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11TH ED. 2008).

STATUTES AND ACTS
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.
WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974

LEXICONS
BRIAM A. GARNER,BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014).
P RAMANATHAAIYAR, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON 3531 (4THED 2010).
SALLY WEHMEIER, OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNERS DICTIONARY (7TH ED. 2005).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The respondents humbly submit before the Hon'ble Supreme Court under the
jurisdiction invoked by the petitioner. The respondent reserves the right to
challenge the same.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
-THE BACKGROUNDDashanan Motors Limited (hereinafter referred as DML) was initially established as a public
sector enterprise after the independence of Republic of Rhodo (hereinafter referred to as Rhodo)
in the mid-twentieth century. Its flagship product was Pushpak, and buses named Garuda which
became the preferred means of mass transit. The sole and principal manufacturing unit of DML
is situated in the suburbs of the capital city of Northern Province, Shivpuri on the banks of the
River Asli and it remained profitably operational for the first few decades of its existence.
In the meantime, there was a growing concern in the international community regarding the
degradation of environment, which led to various international treaties and conferences on
environmental safety norms in which Rhodo was an active participant.
In 1991, Rhodo, faced with an impending foreign exchange and balances of payment crisis,
relaxed its import regime, which resulted in the entry of foreign automobile companies into
Rhodo and people started opting for their products over DMLs products. Thus, sales dipped for
DML and the government intervened by setting up ancillary units (tyre, lube & lubricant, paint &
coolant) to manufacture the spare parts onsite, and injected funds to create updated and efficient
components for the automobiles.
The condition of DML, however, did not improve and its disinvestment process started in 2005,
at the end of which DKS Enterprises held 30%, VS Motors held 21% and 49% was held by the
government. After the private acquisition of DML, there has been a consistent rise in the value of
the stock on the National Stock Exchange.
-THE CONTROVERSIESA. The factory of DML, ever since its inception, discharged all its trade effluents in the river Asli.
Fifty miles down the river from where the factory is situated, the river Asli created a delta the
Mohana which is an internationally recognised important biosphere reserve.
In 2015, certain drastic changes were observed in the flora and fauna, and the health of the
natives of this region
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i. The over-ground breathing roots of the deltaic mangroves were found plugged with
sludge resulting in withering and death of vast patches of mangrove forests.
ii.
Bloated bodies of dead riverine dolphins unique to the Mohana delta, which were
a special and endangered variety, floated up on the shores.

iii.
The natives started complaining of having developed black sores on various parts
of the body and shortness of breath.

The Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum (MBCF) conducted an exhaustive research to
elicit the reason for these detrimental changes, which revealed that the water of the river
contained various hazardous chemicals, some of the major pollutants being sulphur and heavy
metals which could have been the cause of death of the dolphins and the black-sore disease.
It averred that the major reason for presence of the hazardous chemicals beyond the tolerable
limits in the river was due to the emission of effluents by DML and opined that it was
responsible for such environmental deterioration. Their findings were independently confirmed
by ecological studies conducted by researchers of international eminence.
Maya Mehta, a prominent green crusader, took up the cause of the MBCF and demanded a
thorough inspection of the trade effluents and plant facilities of the DML or a complete closure
of the plant until such findings came out, but no action was taken.
B. The government of Republic of Rhodo had switched to the Euro IV norms in 2010, and had
declared to opt for Euro V norms by 2015 and Euro VI norms by 2020. At the end of 2014, the
government decided to skip directly to Euro VI norms by 2020.
By mid-2015, the air pollution levels in the country had risen dauntingly and the government,
after proper consideration and deliberation, and under the influence of various environmental
conservation pressure groups, opted to switch from Euro IV to Euro VI norms from 1 January
2016. It issued a directive to that effect in October 2015 strictly ordering all automobile
manufacturing companies to desist manufacture and sale of all vehicles which do not comply
with the new norms.
The DML manufactured only three vehicles namely Pushpak Hatchback and Pushpak Sedan
among cars and Garuda Premium bus which were non-compliant. The Board of Directors of
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DML held a meeting on 1 November 2015 at which it was found that necessary modifications of
the products would require at least eight months, and till then, they would have to lay off
workers and forced to stop both manufacturing and sale of their products, incurring huge losses.
-THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGSA. Ms. Mehta filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the HC on 16 November 2015. She cited
expert analyses on the effluent and emission figures and photographic and documentary evidence
of the morphological and physiological changes in the deltaic ecosystem. She alleged the reason
for the drastic shift in the ecological balance of the deltaic region to be the discharge of noxious
effluents by the DML plant. She sought to recover damages from the DML to the natives
suffering from black sores and a writ of mandamus to be issued to the State Pollution Control
Board (SPCB) to close the DML plant.
The HC directed the SPCB to conduct an examination of the trade effluents discharged by the
plant and report the same to the court within 3 weeks.
The HC, in its final judgment dated 21 December 2015, held that the report of the PCB revealed
that effluents discharged by the plant contained many chemicals beyond the prescribed limits.
After this examination, the Court ordered the company to pay damages worth Rs.10 crores to the
aggrieved natives. It also opined that if the plant was closed, it would render about 45000
employees unemployed, and that it would leave around 2 lac family members of these employees
in misery, hunger and squalor. Hence, it did not issue a directive to shut the plant.
Ms. Mehta and the aggrieved natives were dissatisfied with the damages awarded and in the
subsequent week, she filed a SLP before the SC seeking enhancement of the awarded damages
and closure of the plant, which was admitted under SLP 031/2016.
B. The directors of DML considered the government directive to be violative of their fundamental
rights and moved the High Court of Shivpuri (hereinafter referred to as HC) on 1 December 2015
seeking the issuance of writ of mandamus to get the impugned directive annulled. The writ
petition was admitted as WP(C) 9813R2015.
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The petitioner alleged that the directive was unconstitutional as it violated their freedom to trade
and profession and the right to livelihood of their employees and the HC ruled in their favour.
The aggrieved Central Government filed an SLP the Supreme Court of Rhodo (hereinafter
referred to as SC) on 22 December 2015 which was admitted as SLP 8015/2015.
C. After a couple of hearings, SC decided to club SLP 031/2016 and SLP 8015/2015 as they had the
same subject matter and the same parent company, and because Ms. Mehta was the council for
the central government in the latter. The SC has set both of these cases to be decided before a
division bench on 1st April 2016 for final hearing.
XII | P a g e
ISSUES RAISED
I.
WHETHER THERE IS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE NEXUS BETWEEN THE POLLUTION CAUSED BY
THE DML AND THE EFFECTS RESULTED IN THE MOHANA REGION?
II.
WHETHER THERE IS A TORT OF NEGLIGENCE?
III.
WHETHER THERE IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
IV.
WHETHER THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE DIRECTORS AND THE
EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT AND PROXIMATE NEXUS BETWEEN THE
EFFLUENT DISCHARGE BY THE DML PLANT AND THE EFFECTS
RESULTED IN THE MOHANA REGION
Firstly, the deleterious changes observed in the Mohana region were drastic and could not have
been suddenly caused by the consistent discharge of effluents by the DML plant for decades.
Secondly, neither the MBCF nor Maya Mehta nor the PCB report have been able to prove
conclusively that there is a nexus between the effluents discharged by the DML plant and the
deleterious effects in the Mohana region.
It is, therefore, humbly submitted that DML was wrongly held liable in the PIL filed by Ms.
Mehta.
II. THAT DML CANNOT BE HELD TORTIOUSLY LIABLE

It is humbly submitted that the mass tort action by Ms. Mehta for the natives who developed the
black-sore disease allegedly due to the effluent discharge by the DML does not hold because the
essentials of the tort of negligence have not been satisfied. So, there is no basis for demanding
more compensation from DML.
III. THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION

It is humbly submitted that the directive issued by the government is arbitrary based on the
procedural aspect of the policy statement relating to the inadequacy of the time period provided
by the government for making the necessary changes in the automobiles manufactured by the
company.
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IV. THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE

DIRECTORS AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY
It is humbly submitted that the Fundamental Rights of the Directors and the employees of DML,
ie. the right to trade and profession of the Directors and the right to livelihood of the employees
are being violated.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I.
THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT AND PROXIMATE NEXUS BETWEEN THE

POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE
MOHANA REGION
1. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that there is no direct and proximate
nexus between the pollution caused by DML and the changes that were observed in the flora and
fauna as well as the natives of the region around the river Asli and the Mohana region. The
timeline of the events is such that the changes would not have been caused but for some
intervening factor.
A. DRASTIC CHANGES WERE OBSERVED
2. It has been stated in the facts that DML had been set up by the Government after the
independence of Rhodo in the mid-twentieth century and had been profitably operational for the
first few decades of its existence1. However, it can be reasonably inferred from the statement of
facts that the company was established before the year 1991, the year in which the government
relaxed its import regime and the sales of DML fell due to international competition. Another
concrete year mentioned is 2005, in which the disinvestment process of DML started, at the end
of which the Government of Republic of Rhodo (hereinafter referred to as the Government)
owned 49% stake. Thus it can be concluded that DML had been in existence for a few decades
even before 1991. The facts then state that the factory of DML had been discharging its effluents
in the river Asli since its inception, that is, a few decades before 1991 but it was in 2015 that
certain drastic changes2 were observed, comprising withering of mangroves, death of
endangered riverine dolphins and the natives of the Mohana region suffering from black sores on
their body and shortness of breath.3
3. It is not reasonable to draw a nexus between the alleged pollution that had been happening for so
many decades and the drastic effects seen in the region because every change, happening due to
a consistent cause, has a gestation period and shows symptoms before actually developing into
1
Paragraph 4, Moot Proposition.

Paraghraph 11, Moot Proposition.
3
Paragraph 11, Moot Proposition.
2
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anything so deleterious. So, there should have been some gradual changes noticed over the years
due to the alleged pollution, but since the changes mentioned are drastic, it is humbly submitted
that these changes were due to some intervening change(s) that had taken place in 2015 and not
because of the effluent release of the factory that had been taking place for so many decades.
B. NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE.
4. It has been stated that the only findings that the research conducted by the MBCF has revealed
concretely is that the water of the river Asli is heavily polluted, that some of the chemicals it
contained are hazardous to the flora and fauna of the region, and that some of its major pollutants
are sulphur and heavy metals. The mention of the non-conformity of the reports to establish a
link between the acts is as followsi. From these findings, it was averred that the reason for the existence of sulphur and
heavy metals beyond the tolerable limits was the trade effluents discharged by the plant.
ii. It was opined that DML is responsible for the environmental deterioration.
iii. It is also stated that the MBCF thought that the high concentration of sulphur and heavy
metals could have been the cause of the death of the dolphins.
iv. In the PIL filed by Ms. Mehta in the High Court of Judicature of Northern Province at
Shivpuri, she too alleged, without any concrete evidence to confirm, that the drastic
shift in the ecological balance was due to the trade effluents being discharged by the
DML plant.
5. It is humbly submitted that although extensive research has been conducted on the conservation
of this endangered species, sulphur or heavy metals have not been mentioned as the cause of
death of riverine dolphins by any eminent national or international organisation. The only two
chemicals which have been widely associated with the death of this species are organochlorine
and butylin (WWF and IUCN)4.
https://www.worldwildlife.org/threats/pollution;
http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered_species/cetaceans/about/river_dolphins/ganges_river_dolphin/
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6. The PCB report submitted to the Honble High Court in the mentioned case stated that the plant
discharged such effluents in the river which contain many chemicals way beyond the prescribed
limits, but did not confirm Ms. Mehtas allegations, thus leaving the Honble High Court to aver
that the heavy discharge of pollutants in the river that caused the deleterious effects, thereby
holding DML liable for the same.
7. It is submitted that in the legal context, the meaning of the words used by the PCB, MBCF,
Maya Mehta or the findings confirmed by researchers of international eminence are as followsi. the meaning of the term aver is to allege5, of allege is to assert as true, esp. that
someone has done something wrong, though no occasion for definitive proof has yet
occurred6, and
ii. opine is In the law of evidence, opinion is an inference or conclusion drawn by a witness
from facts some of which are known to him and others assumed, or drawn from facts
which, though lending probability to the inference, do not evolve it by a process of
absolutely necessary reasoning7.
8. It is, therefore, humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that DML cannot be held
liable only on the ground that the PCB report alleged that the effluent discharge from its plant
was the reason for the drastic changes without any conclusive evidence to prove the same.
Moreover, a report prepared by the PCB cannot be relied on in all the cases, as a touchstone8.
9. It is also humbly submitted that Section 17 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 19749 states
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of a State Board shall be(f) to inspect sewage or trade effluents, works and plants for the treatment of sewage and
trade effluents and to review plans, specifications or other data relating to plants set up
for the treatment of water, works for the purification thereof and the system for the
Blacks Law Dictionary 5 (10th ed. 2010).

Blacks Law Dictionary 5 (10th ed. 2010).
7
Black's Law Dictionary 4th Ed. Rev. 6-1971. See also Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 So. 210.
8
Base Corporation Ltd.v. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and Ors., 2012(1) KarLJ372.
9
Section 17, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
6
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disposal of sewage or trade effluents or in connection with the grant of any consent as
required by this Act;
10. In this case, the DML plant either has never been inspected by the SPCB or it has been inspected
and no discrepancy in the effluent discharge has been discovered by the SPCB. In either case, the
SPCB has not properly performed the function that it has under the ambit of the Act and DML
was, thereby, unaware of the fact that they were flouting any rule. Thus, it is unreasonable to
suddenly hold DML liable for an act which had been in existence and had not been condemned
for many decades.
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II.
THAT DML CANNOT BE HELD TORTIOUSLY LIABLE
11. It is respectfully submitted before the court that the company DML is not liable under the mass
tort action filed by Ms. Maya Mehta since it does not fulfil all the essentials of the specified tort.
12. Negligence is the breach of duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable
man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs
would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.10 According to
Winfield, Negligence as a tort is the breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage,
undesired by the defendant to the plaintiff.11 This leads to the conclusion that there are three
basic essentials of negligence. They are listed as followsi.
That the defendant owed a duty of care towards the plaintiff
ii.
That such duty of care was breached through his conduct or action
iii. That
the plaintiff suffered damage or injury as a consequence

A. THAT THERE EXISTED A DUTY OF CARE
13. The first and foremost constituent which needs to be satisfied for the occurrence of the tort of
negligence is the existence of duty of care towards the victim. It is humbly submitted to the
Honble Court that, in the present case, the DML plant does owe a duty of care. It not only owes
a duty of care towards the environment but also towards the health of the natives of the Mohana
region.
14. Within the existence of duty the test of reasonable foreseeability and proximity also comes into
the folds of the instant case. As Lord Atkin said, You may take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.12
15. Applying this principle in the present case, it is evident that some drastic changes13 took place
in the year of 2015 which cannot be contended to be attributed to the continuous discharge of
effluents into the river Asli for so many decades by the DML plant. Thus, it cannot be concluded
10
Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781, 784.

WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ, Tort, 12th edition, p. 69.
12
Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), AC 562, 618-19.
13
Moot Proposition, 11.
11
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that this continuous discharge of the effluents in the river led to the sudden deleterious effects
observed there. It is therefore contended that there must have been some sudden changes
elsewhere in the environment which resulted in the drastic changes observed in the Mohana
region and these could not have been reasonably foreseen on the part of the DML. Since this
chain of events was not reasonably foreseeable, an act or omission on the part of the DML
cannot be contended.
16. Further, as has already been submitted, the reports furnished by the SPCB, the observing
scientists and activists of MBCF and the findings independently confirmed by the researchers
of international eminence could not conclusively prove that the major pollutants of the river
which could have been the cause behind the death of dolphins, the black-sore disease, drastic
changes in the flora and fauna were due to the DML plant. It is, therefore, contended that there
were intervening factors between both the acts and hence, it cannot be affirmed that the actions
of DML were responsible for the changes and that there exists a proximate and foreseeable link
between them.
B. THAT THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CARE
17. As it has been contended successfully that DML owed a duty of care to the natives, it is now
submitted that the next essential to be fulfilled for the tort of negligence to have taken place is
that there was a breach of this duty on the part of DML.
18. It is further submitted that it was observed by the Supreme Court in case of hazardous
industries14 that
We cannot possibly adopt a policy of not having any chemical or other hazardous industries
merely because they pose hazard or risk to the community. If such a policy were adopted, it
would mean the end of all progress and development. Such industries, even if hazardous have
to be set up since they are essential for economic development and advancement of well-being
of the people.
14
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1986) 2 SCC 176 (201).

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19. It is humbly submitted before the Court, that the even in the above case, the role of hazardous
industries is recognised and they are allowed to function so that the economic development as
well as advancement of the people as well as of the nation is not atrophied.
20. In the present case, though it is acknowledged that DML owes a duty of care, it is contended that
there is no breach that duty of care. This is further supported by the fact that the effluent
discharge by the plant of DML has not been conclusively tied to the far-reaching changes by any
of the reports mentioned in the facts.
21. It is submitted that for the DML to be held liable there needs to be a direct and proximate link
between the discharge by the plant and the effects which are taking place. Since there is no
certain report which can establish the connection between the two incidents and establish a cause
and effect relationship, it cannot be contended that DML was responsible for the effects on the
environment and the people. Hence it is contended that DML is not responsible for the harm
caused in the Mohana region.
22. According to the facts, Ms Mehta accepts that there was drastic shift in the ecological balance
of the deltaic region15, thereby accepting that there was a sudden change in the status quo. The
facts also confirm that it has been more than a few decades since the inception of the company
and it has, since its inception, discharged all the waste in the river Asli. This confirms that there
was no direct and proximate relation between the two events.
C. THAT DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF DUTY
23. It is submitted that the last essential to be fulfilled in case of the tort of negligence is the damage
resulted from the breach of duty of the negligent party. It is contended that since the second
essential fails to be fulfilled, there cannot be any damages resulting from such non-existent
breach of duty.
24. In the landmark judgement of Donoghue v. Stevenson16, Lord Macmillillan said that,
The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness
only where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has caused damage. In
15
16

Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), AC 562, 618-19.
7|P age
such circumstances carelessness assumes the legal quality of negligence and entails the
consequences in law of negligence.
25. It is further contended that although damages have been observed in the environment and the
natives of the Mohana region according to the facts, there is no conclusive proof to establish that
any act of the DML could have caused the same. It is, therefore, submitted that the demand for
extra compensation is should be dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court.
26. As has already been established, in a suit for damages on the ground that the tort of negligence
has been committed, it must be established first a duty to take care existed, secondly a breach of
duty had taken place and thirdly, that such breach was the proximate cause of the loss or injury
that occurred to the plaintiff17.
27. It had to be proved that the duty which the defendant has failed to comply was owed to him and
was in respect of the kind of loss which he has suffered.18 It is contended that in the present
case, the establishment of the connection between the acts of the plant of DML and the harm
caused has failed. Hence, it is humbly submitted before the court that the essentials which
constitute the tort of negligence are not satisfied, so the tort has not been committed.
17
18
Nazir Abbas v. Raja Ajamshah, ILR 1947 Nag 955.

South Australia Asset Management Corpn. v. York Montague Ltd., (1996) 3 All ER 365 (HL), p. 370.
8|P age
III.
THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
28. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that there is violation of the
fundamental right to equality of DML under Article 14 of the Constitution under the ambit of
arbitrariness of the directive issued by the government.
29. The ambit of this Article has been widened in scope in the recent times by the Honble Supreme
Court itself where the distinctions between the arbitrariness as under Article 14 and Article 19
have been made to overlap. Now, in order to evoke Article 14, it is no longer required that the
narrow definition of arbitrary classification. Article 14 can hence be evoked for protection
against any arbitrary or irrational act on the part of the State.
It is also humbly submitted that in Praveen Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.19, the Court held
that
Arbitrariness being opposed to reasonableness is an antithesis to law. There cannot, however,
be any exact definition of arbitrariness neither can there be any straight jacket formula evolved
therefore, since the same is dependent on all varying facts and circumstances of each case.
30. The Honble Supreme Court in M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka20 held that
It is settled law that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be
informed by reason. Actions uninformed by reason may amount to being arbitrary and liable
to be questioned under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The action must be just,
fair and reasonable.
A. RATIONALE BEHIND THE DIRECTIVE

31. In the SLP 8015/2015, it is contended that the government directive issued in October 2015 is an
arbitrary act of the government since there was no rationale behind the same. The reasons to
support the same are:
19
20
Praveen Singh v State of Punjab and Others, AIR 2001 SC 152.

M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770
9|P age
i. The government had originally decided in 2010, when they adopted the Euro IV norms,
that they would switch from the Euro IV to the Euro V norms in 2015 and subsequently
from the Euro V to the Euro VI norms in 2020.
ii. At the end of 2014, that it would decided to skip the Euro V norms altogether and switch
to the Euro VI norms in 2020.
iii. In mid 2015, with rising air pollution in the country and under the influence of pressure
groups for environment conservation, the government suddenly decided to switch to the
Euro VI norms by 1 January 2016, issuing a directive to that effect in October 2015.
iv. Thus, the government arbitrarily preponed the switch by five years.
B. THE REASON BEHIND THE WRONG DECISION
32. The time period of three months, as provided by the Government to make this transition, is not
just inadequate, but also arbitrary in so far as it does not taken into account the substantial
changes required to be made in the engines complying with Euro VI norms21. The facts also state
that only three of the vehicles of DML were non-compliant with the new norms, thereby
implying that the rest of its vehicles complied with the norms, and also that the company knew
how much time it could take to make the necessary changes in the engines of those three
vehicles, i.e. at least eight months, since they had already started the process of changing the
engines of the rest of the cars.
33. This shows that the government did not take into consideration all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the switch to the Euro VI norms and had not provided sufficient time for the
company to make the necessary changes, moreover imposing restrictions on their trade by
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of the non-compliant vehicles. It is, therefore, submitted
that the directive issued by the government was procedurally arbitrary.
34. Once it is acknowledged that non-arbitrariness is an ingredient of Article 14, pervading the entire
realm of State action, it has come to be established, as a further corollary, that the audi alteram
partem facet of natural justice is also a requirement of Article 14, for natural justice is an
21
https://www.theaa.com/motoring_advice/fuels-and-environment/euro-emissions-standards.html;
http://www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/hd.php
10 | P a g e
antithesis of arbitrariness22. This requirement of natural justice is applicable to administrative

orders affecting prejudicially the party in question and any action taken in contravention of
natural justice is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution23. It is submitted that DML is being denied natural justice because it is subject to the
arbitrary directive issued by the government.
35. Another aspect of this Article in dealing with the citizens in a non-arbitrary manner is the
doctrine of legitimate expectation which, although not a right in itself, can be relevant in
determining the arbitrariness of the action taken by the government authority. This principle is
based on the rule of fairness and states that where a persons legitimate expectation was not
fulfilled by taking a particular decision, then the decision-maker should justify the denial of such
justification. In the present case, the directors of DML legitimately expected that they would be
required to switch to the Euro VI norms by 2020 according to the declaration of the government
in 2014 and even began working on that expectation since only three of their vehicles were noncompliant with the norms. The state transgressed such legitimate expectation by suddenly
deciding to switch to the Euro VI norms by 1 January 2016, thereby cutting short the time
provided drastically by five years. This again proves that the directive issued is unconstitutional
and arbitrary. In fact, an arbitrary action need not be mala fide24. In the case of M.J. Sivani25 it
was held by the Honble Supreme Court thatIt is settled law that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State must be
informed by reason. Actions uninformed by reason may amount to being arbitrary and liable
to be questioned under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The action must be just,
fair and reasonable.
22
D.T.C. v. Mazdoor Union D.T.C. AIR 1991 SC 101; Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University, (1998) 8 SCC
194.
23
Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 3887.
24
Angarki Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 764.
25
M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770.
11 | P a g e
IV.
THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE

DIRECTORS AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY
36. It is humbly submitted to the Honble Supreme Court that there is violation of the fundamental
right to trade of the Directors of DML and the right to livelihood of the employees of the
enterprise provided under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution respectively.
A. INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRADE OF THE
DIRECTORS OF DML.
37. It is submitted to the Honble Supreme Court that Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution under its
ambit covers, the object of using four analogous and overlapping words is to make the
guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible to include all the avenues and modes through
which a man may earn his livelihood.
a. In this context, occupation would be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of
livelihood or a mission in life. This directly proves that the directorship of DML is an
occupation for the directors of the company.
b. Moreover, trade or business is considered synonymous to each other in the context of
this Article, meaning any substantial and systematic or organised course of purpose.
Since the Board of Directors has been organised for the purpose of governance of the
company, their right also falls under the ambit of trade or business. It has been firmly
established by the various orders passed by the Honble Supreme Court that the Directors
of a company can claim the rights enshrined in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution26.
38. With respect to the SLP 8015/2015, the government directive dated October 2015, ordering all
automobile manufacturing companies to desist the manufacture and sale of such automobiles
which do not comply with the newly introduced Euro VI norms, is causing DML to stop the
production of three of their products, thus restricting the trade carried on by the directors of the
company.
26
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564; Bennet Coleman & Co. and Ors. v. Union of
India, AIR 1973 SC 106; Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 937.
12 | P a g e
39. The government had deliberated and decided that it will adopt the Euro VI norms in 2020 and
this sudden change in decision to prepone this switch five years is unreasonable, as has been
contended above. Moreover, since the facts of the case mention that only three vehicles produced
by DML do not comply with the new norms, namely, Pushpak Hatchtback and Pushpak Sedan
among cars27, and Garuda Premium bus, it is implicit that the rest of the vehicles manufactured
by them comply with the Euro VI norms already, although it was only in 2014 that the
government had declared that they would skip the switch to Euro V norms that was to take place
in 2015 and would skip to the Euro VI norms in 2020. In the time period between 2014 and mid
2015, DML had already changed the configuration of the engines of the rest of the vehicles it
manufactures to the Euro IV norms, thereby showing its intention of following the directive,
given the adequate time.
40. Since the inadequacy of time has already been firmly contended, it is now humbly submitted that
the restriction imposed by the government directive is unreasonable not due to the substance but
due to the procedural aspect of the directive. As contended, DML is willing to switch to the Euro
VI norms, but the procedure undertaken by the government is unreasonable since it is prohibiting
the company from the manufacture and sale of three of its products, thereby restricting the right
to trade of its directors. Since natural justice is a condition of procedural reasonableness, it is
submitted that injustice is caused to the directors of the company in the form of restriction of
trade and loss of revenue. Moreover, the burden to prove that the restriction is reasonable and is
covered under 19(6) of the Constitution lies on the Government28.
41. With respect to the SLP 031/2016, Ms. Mehta is demanding the closure of the only plant of
DML, thereby asking for complete prohibition of the occupation of the directors29. Other than in
exceptional categories of inherently dangerous business30 or trade, like making and selling of
intoxicating liquor, explosives, etc. or illegal trade, like trafficking or women and children, etc. a
total prohibition on the right to trade would be considered as an unreasonable restriction. It has
also been held that greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the courts31.
27

Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902; Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 129.
29
Yasin v. Town Area Committee, (1952) SCR 572; Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board Kairana, (1950) SCR 566.
30
Faruk v. State of M.P., AIR 1970 SC 93(96); Systopic Laboratories (P.) Ltd. v. Prem Gupta, AIR 1994 SC 205.
31
Narendra v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430; Minerva Talkies v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1988 SC 526.
28
13 | P a g e
In this case, where the directors are not carrying on any such inherently dangerous or illegal
trade, it is submitted that Ms. Mehtas demand that the SPCB impose prohibition on the sole
factory of the company is unreasonable.
B. INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD OF THE
EMPLOYEES OF DML
42. It is humbly submitted before the Honble Supreme Court that Article 2132 of the Constitution
talks about the right to life and personal liberty which cannot be restricted except reasonably by
procedure established by law. Here, the definition of life has been extended to something more
than the survival or animal existence and now includes the right to live with human dignity as
well33. The right to dignity in turn means the right to a quality life, which can be ensured through
minimum subsistence, i.e. livelihood of the person34. If the person is deprived of his livelihood,
he is deprived of his minimum subsistence, thereby infringing upon his right to dignity.
43. Thus, Article 21 includes the right to livelihood by means which are not illegal, immoral or
opposed to public policy35. In the instant case, the employees are employed in an automobile
manufacturing company and since they only engage in the manufacture of automobiles, their
employment is in no way illegal, immoral or opposed to public policy. The ambit of the right to
livelihood also implies that public employment cannot be taken away by any procedure which is
not reasonable, fair and just36 and that after the appointment of an employee, whether under the
state, its agency, instrumentality, juristic person or private entrepreneur, the employee is to be
dealt with as per public element and public interest.
44. According to the facts of the case, the government directive issued in October 2015 ordered all
the automobile companies to stop the manufacture and sale of vehicles which are non-compliant
with the new Euro VI norms. DML had only three vehicles non-compliant with the new norms
and as contended above, the Board of Directors of DML, after exhaustive deliberation, came to
the conclusion that the time span provided by the government to make the necessary changes in
32
Article 21, Constitution, 1950.

Francis v. Union Territory, AIR 1981 SC 746; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
34
Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar R. Nandkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109.
35
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180; D.T.C. v. Mazdoor, AIR 1991 SC 101;
D.D.H.E.U. v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1992 SC 789.
36
Id.
33
14 | P a g e
the engines of the vehicles is inadequate and that to comply with the directive issued, they would
have to stop the manufacture and sale of the aforementioned products, which will force them to
lay off workers and incur huge losses. It is, therefore, humbly submitted before the Honble
Supreme Court that in the SLP 8015/2015, the right to livelihood of the employees of DML
under Article 21 of the Constitution is being infringed, as they will be deprived of their
employment as a tangible effect of this directive without any reasonable, fair or just procedure.
45. At the same time, when Ms Mehta is demanding the closure of the sole plant of DML, the
tangible harm of this demand is the deprivation of all the employees of the company of their
right to livelihood by rendering them unemployed. It is, therefore, also submitted that in the SLP
031R2016, the right to livelihood of the employees under Article 21 is being violated since
employment of the employees is being taken away unreasonably without considering them in
context of their public interest.
46. It is pertinent to note the judgement of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India37. In the above mentioned case, the tanneries conceded to the fact that they were
discharging effluents in the river and that such effluents were responsible for the adverse effects
on the environment and the river. Yet, the Supreme Court did not shut down the tanneries.
Instead, it ordered the tanneries to install effluent treatment plants and accordingly gave them a
time period of six months. In the instant case, it is humbly submitted that although the
Respondent has been discharging effluents in the River Asli, there is no direct and proximate
nexus between the pollution and its consequential effects. And, thus, shutting down the factory
would infringe upon the right to livelihood of the employees and would involve gross injustice.
47. In the case of Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India38, the Honble Supreme Court
passed a judgement suspending the closure order of tanneries in five districts, providing them
reasonable time to install treatment devices. Inter alia, it stated thatWe suspend the closure orders in respect of all the tanneries in the five districts of North
Arcot Ambedkar, Erode Periyar, Dindigul Anna, Trichi and Chengai M.G.R. We direct all
the tanneries in the above five districts to set up CETPs or Individual Pollution control
Devices on or before November 30, 1996. Those connected with CETPs shall have to
37
38
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1037.

Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.
15 | P a g e
install in addition the primary devices in the tanneries. All the tanneries in the above five
districts shall obtain the consent of the Board to function and operate with effect from
December 15, 1996.
48. From the perspective of personal liberty, the Supreme Court has, in Unni Krishnan v. State of
Andhra Pradesh39, stated that several unenumerated rights fall under the ambit of Article 21 and
recognised the right to social justice and economic empowerment as fundamental rights in Ashok
Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.40 Along the same lines, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India41, the
Supreme Court observed that the compliance with natural justice is implicit in Article 21. When
social and natural justice are considered to be fundamental rights, it is unreasonable on the part
of Ms. Mehta to demand the closure of the sole plant of DML, which will thereby render around
45,000 workers unemployed and leave 2,00,000 more dependents in misery and squalor, or on
the part of the government to issue a directive one of whose tangible harms is the loss of
livelihood of all the employees who will have to be laid off by DML if they are forced to stop the
manufacture and sale of some of their products.
49. In the case of Abhilash Textiles v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation42, the Gujarat High Court,
keeping in mind the loss of livelihood of the employees in case the factory is shut down, did not
pass any order shutting down the factory. It was held that In the facts and circumstances of the case it is hoped that before taking any coercive steps
the respondent-Municipal Commissioner will give some more time to the petitioners to
mend their ways and prevent the nuisance. This observation is made with a view to see that
several workmen employed by the numerous factories may not be rendered unemployed on
account of the fact that the petitioners are carrying on their business in unregulated manner.
Subject to the aforesaid observations, the petitions are rejected. Notice discharged. Ad
interim relief granted earlier stands vacated in each petition.
50. It is also imperative to view Article 21 in the light of Article 39(a) of the Constitution43 which
states
39
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178.

Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., AIR 1997 SCW 2257.
41
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
42
Abhilash Textiles v. Rajkot Municipal Corporation, AIR 1988 Guj 57.
43
Article 39(a), Constitution, 1950.
40
16 | P a g e
The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing

(a) That the citizens, man and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood.
51. This DPSP has been read as a fundamental right in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Corporation44.
52. Article 39(a) of the Constitution, which is a DPSP, provides that the State shall, in particular,
direct its policy towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an
adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another Directive Principle, provides, inter
alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make
effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment and of undeserved
want. Article 37 provides that the Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court, are
nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country. The Principles contained in
Articles 39(a) and 41 must be regarded as equally fundamental in the understanding and
interpretation of the meaning and content of fundamental rights. If there is an obligation upon the
State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be
sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State
may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work
to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just
and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life
conferred by Article 21.
44
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.

17 | P a g e
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it is most
humbly and respectfully requested that this Honble Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The SLPs be dismissed.

2. The directive issued by the government should be struck down.
3. Reverse the order of High Court and not give any extra compensation.
In the alternative, pass any other relief which the court may deem fit and proper.
All of which is humbly submitted by

Counsels on behalf of the Respondents
XVI | P a g e

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TEAM CODE-OD

BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016

BEFORE THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF RHODO

IN THE MATTER OF:

DASHANAN MOTORS LIMITEDDEFENDANT

SLP NO. 031/2016

STATE OF NORTHERN PROVINCE ..DEFENDANT

Memorial for Respondents

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

THAT THERE IS NO DIRECT AND PROXIMATE NEXUS BETWEEN THE

POLLUTION CAUSED BY DML AND THE CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS IN THE

DRASTIC CHANGES WERE OBSERVED .................................................................. 1

NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. .................................................................................... 2

II. THAT DML CANNOT BE HELD TORTIOUSLY LIABLE ....................................... 5

THAT THERE EXISTED A DUTY OF CARE .............................................................. 5

THAT THERE WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CARE...................................... 6

THAT DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF DUTY........................... 7

THAT THERE IS VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION ... 9

RATIONALE BEHIND THE DIRECTIVE .................................................................... 9

THE REASON BEHIND THE WRONG DECISION .................................................. 10

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

THAT THERE IS A VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE

DIRECTORS AND THE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY ........................................ 12

INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRADE OF THE

DIRECTORS OF DML. ......................................................................................................... 12

INFRINGEMENT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVELIHOOD OF THE

EMPLOYEES OF DML ........................................................................................................ 14

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

All India Reporter

Dashanan Motors Limited

Directive Principle Of State Policy

Environment Protection Act

High Court of Shivpuri

International Union for Conservation of

Mohana Biodiversity Conservation Forum

Ministry of Environment and Forest

National Green Tribunal

Pollution Control Board

Public Interest Litigation

State Pollution Control Board

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Special Leave Petition

United Declaration of Human Rights

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

World Wildlife Fund

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770 ............................................................. 9, 11

A. DESAI, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE (2ND ED. 2002).

-BHUS 4TH MAHAMANA MALVIYA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2016-

DURGA DAS BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (14TH ED. 2009).

M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6TH ED. 2010).

P. LEELAKRISHNAN., ENVIRONMENTAL CASE LAW BOOK (2ND ED. 2006).

P. S. JASWAL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2006).

S. K. SARKAR, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (2ND ED.2006).

S. SHANTHAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).

SHANTHAKUMAR, S., INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2008).

SUMEET MALIK, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2ND ED. 2012).

V. N.SHUKLA , CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (11TH ED. 2008).

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950.

WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974

BRIAM A. GARNER,BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (10TH ED. 2014).

P RAMANATHAAIYAR, THE MAJOR LAW LEXICON 3531 (4THED 2010).