G.R. No.

111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall

proceeding]
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections.
Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia.
They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings.
COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of
Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the
PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid
down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They
pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in
passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting
to 65 members of the assembly.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate
recall
proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local
public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the
law.
RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a
single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for
Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given
the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment
dictates.

What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall,

whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using
its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode
of initiation by direct action of the people.
The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was
adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct
action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and
sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities are made
members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to
the political affiliation of its members.
Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all
the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the
greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority.
Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally
elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members of the
PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence
cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation.
Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of
opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic
system.
Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for discriminating against
local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the
recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by
extraneous influences.
We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition
sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene
in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of
recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC (G.R. No.

125416) September 26, 1996
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA
7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner
commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of
the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the
American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its
absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and

2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing
for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national
law.
Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing
to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."
Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but

respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg.

10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to
join provided conditions are met.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the

word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not
mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the
documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in
said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of
1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the
metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former
naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and
to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly.
On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or
reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a
law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of

elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the

respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the
content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is
still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to
contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it
has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review
Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse
of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the
proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements
about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is
really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the
exercise of its review powers.

Lambino Vs. Comelec , G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and
sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. The proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameralparliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling
that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a peoples initiative; (2) Whether or Not this Court
should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; (3) Whether or Not
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to
the Lambino Groups petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People. The petitioners failed
to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading
which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives. The framers of the constitution
intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may
propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and
the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. Even assuming

that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735. Petition is dismissed.

Espiritu vs. Melgar (1992)

Llamas vs Orbos

Facts: Three similar complaints were filed with the DILG, Office of the
Provincial Governor, and Office of the President, accusing Mayor Melgar of
physically assaulting and arresting complainant without any reason.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, after evaluation, passed a resolution
recommending the Provincial Governor to preventively suspend him pending
the administrative case so Mayor Melgar was suspended by Governor
Espiritu. Melgar filed petition with RTC which enjoined the Governor from
implementing the order of suspension.

Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some
other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for
alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty.
He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas,
assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with
an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

Held: RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the governor from preventively

suspending the mayor. Clearly, under Sec63 of the (old) LGC, the provincial
governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to preventively suspend
the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the issues had been joined
and any of the following grounds were shown to exist: (1) When there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or
acts complained of; (2) When the evidence of culpability is strong; (3) When
the gravity of the offense so warrants; or (4) When the continuance in office
of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence. The rationale of preventive
suspension is so that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of
the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible
witnesses (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456).

ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

Also, Melgar failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Since respondent

mayor believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and politically
motivated, he should have sought relief first from the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government, not from the courts. However, once the 60-day
preventive suspension has been served, the official is deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation
of the charges against him.

HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The

SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President
cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered
view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can
she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.

Aguinaldo vs. Santos

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has

rendered the administration case moot and academic

Facts:
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After
the December 1989 coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a
telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he
should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the
Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several
municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the
coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to
the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice,
pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary
rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his
removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor.
Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the
decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued
that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no
longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of
disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it
is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for
disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been
removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground
that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still
pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in
the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
Issues:

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government
officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be
removed from office.
Held:
1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has
rendered the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears
that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of
votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is
that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have
committed during the failed coup.
2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is
anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative
branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of
the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general
supervision over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the
acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President
unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337
was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973
and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to
enact a local government code, which provides for the manner of removal of
local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al.,
this court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force
despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the
proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the
DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in
Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively
where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas

"Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of
Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building
(Makati Parking Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to
conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and
file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st
Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et
al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases 17 for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of
Public Documents (OMB Cases).
Binays First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 21 for Phase III, IV and V of the
Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract
without the required publication and the lack of architectural
design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor.
Binays Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building
project; and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the
design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the
Ombudsman, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay,
Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. 53 The Ombudsman
ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer
are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards
Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending
the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed
the release of funds; and

o
o
o

(b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service;
(2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public
service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS), and
(3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public
records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the
OMB Cases filed against them.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
Binay contends: that he could not be held administratively liable for
any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were
undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b)
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned
his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and academic. 61In any event,
Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against
him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the
purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief,
Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold
public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013
elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the
lack of evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension
from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of
the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution 65 (dated March 16,
2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, 66 notwithstanding Pena,
Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being
restrained and that since the preventive suspension order had already
been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC:
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April
6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The
Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by
Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at
any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine
Held:
1. YES. OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive
suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under
the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from
judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally
obtainable from the courts," 158 claiming that said writs may work "just as
effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would."
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
o Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which grappled
with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. the concept of
Ombudsman's
independence
covers
three
(3)
things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot
be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows,
or
an
amendment
thereto
is
made;cralawlawlibrary
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be
obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to
impair
said
functions;
and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which

means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by
an
internal
authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office
of the Ombudsman frompolitical harassment and pressure, so as to
free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence

cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from
judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals
and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it
can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
- clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office
from political harassment or pressure.

B. The
first
paragraph
of
Section
14,
RA
6770
in
light
of
the
powers
of
Congress
and
the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation
conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o
writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself
concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the

Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions
of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt
the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all
matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through
passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's
consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the
questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point,
these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of
BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

2. A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive

suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a
preventive measure. Its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him
The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the
issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation,
namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect
in
the
performance
of
duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however,
show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites provided in
Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs.
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have
considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense which
should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the
administrative disciplinary proceedings. 243 However, the Court agrees with
the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity
with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting
jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay,
Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, 244 the CA did not err in passing
upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the
evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453,245 it appears that the CA found that the application of the
condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of
the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this
since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was
established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed
committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation
doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with

condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative

defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the
evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing
the
subject
injunctive
writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs
herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA gravely
abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's

ratio

decidendi may

be

dissected

into

three

(3)

parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which
the public officer was elected for each term is separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally
held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the
constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not
extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x
x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous
misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have
known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their
right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office,
it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason
of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. 274

The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the
corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea
that an elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply
no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion
that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be
condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to
administrative offenses:
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for
discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against an elective
local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office.
In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first
place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could
not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification
from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as
an
accessory
to
the
penalty
of
dismissal
from
service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US
State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of administrative
liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating,
in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed
during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office
does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency
occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the reelection of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the
justification behind condonation. In another case, 297 it was deemed that
condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's
requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the
doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party
as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the
official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior
irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was

deemed to be incompetent. 299Hence, owing to either their variance or

inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued
adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws. At best,
Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior
term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a
local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in
any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience
that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds.
The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by
public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the
public.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and
is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes. 303 At a
conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation
of an act that is unknown.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the
condonation doctrine should beprospective in application for the reason that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 305 Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means,
and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. Hence, while the future
may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule,
recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion

and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the
issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating
the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the
issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima,
Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following
settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above.
Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was
correctly
issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to
resolve the main petition forcertiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the
merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had
already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the
penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative
charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been
mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an
ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office
of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of
investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of
the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of
this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly,
its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the
moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its
infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued
application of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public
office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the
people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that
has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative
liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been
brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional character which this
Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude
of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount
public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative
law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of
the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to
the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine
came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its
relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by
elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against them.
To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for
the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon
Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of
alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression,
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach
of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers." 315 Evidently,
this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must
therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative
of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation and may
therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution,

revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of

discussion moot.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accusedappellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for
his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge
mandate as member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The
privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him
a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.

GREGO vs. COMELEC

274 SCRA 481, 1997
Facts: On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government
Code of 1991, private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his
position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding
of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District
of the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and
assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the
ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under
said section, those removed from office as a result of an administrative case
are disqualified to run for any elective local position.
Issue: Does Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1,
1992?
Held: The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application
to the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That the provision of the
Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from
office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from
applying the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its
language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters
which transpired before its passage.

SALUMBIDES vs OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal
Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget Officer, respectively, of
Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002, herein respondentsRicardo Agon,
Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian,all
members of theSangguniang Bayanof Tagkawayan, filed withthe Office of the
Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda (hereafter
petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative aspect
of the case charged petitionerset al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local
Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the prayer to place
petitionerset al. under preventive suspension pending investigation. By Order
datedFebruary 1, 2005, approved onApril 11, 2005, it denied the motion for
reconsideration butdropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials, as
respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted
the case. The Office of the Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005
Memorandumabsolving Jason and Aquino, and finding petitioners guilty of
Simple Neglect of Duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of condonation is applicable in this case.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed. POLITICAL LAW: doctrine of
condonation
The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous
misconductto the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office.To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers.When the people elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any.It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people.Contrary to petitioners asseveration,
the non-application of the condonation doctrine toappointiveofficials does not
violate the right to equal protection of the law.The electorates condonation of
the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be
extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying
basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the
ballot.In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed

coterminous employees.It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one
person who happens to be the appointing authority, that could extinguish an
administrative liability.Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot
claim the mandate of the electorate.The people cannot be charged with the
presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every
probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.
Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy
cannot be appreciated in favor of petitioners who were found guilty of simple
neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their infraction
becomes intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence.
Petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing
to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining the legal requirements
and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and
giving their advice to their superior.
The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner
Salumbides failed to uphold the law and provide a sound legal assistance
and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and
provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with
the construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is
tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous or illegal advice,
when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to
upholding the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion
on a course of action without any legal basis becomes no different from a lay
person who may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use
of government funds upon the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the
municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly cooperating
rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside
from the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the
improper itemization of the expense, held that the funding for the projects
should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the
appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which
extend beyond the fiscal year and which add to the assets of the local
government unit.It added that current operating expenditures like
MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services
for the conduct of normal local government operations within the fiscal year.

Garcia v. Mojica

Facts:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a
contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract
covers the period 1998-2001, which was to commence on September 1998
upon F.E. Zuelligs first delivery. Sometime in March 1999, news reports
came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City,
through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as
INQ-VIS-99-0132. After investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry
be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the
other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation

Issues:
1.
Whether
Garcia
may
be
held
administratively
liable.
2. Whether the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the Local
Government Code.

Held:
1. No. As previously held, a reelected local official may not be held
administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term
of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it
is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects
him, then such is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered
into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just 4 days before the date of
the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the
electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of
this particular aspect of his life and character.

Petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for an act done during
his previous term. The agreement between petitioner and F.E. Zuellig was
perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term.
At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract,
including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government.
Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already
became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the
deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the
contract with F. E. Zuellig, this should not prejudice the filing of any case,
other than administrative, against petitioner. The ruling does not mean the
total exoneration of petitioners wrongdoing, if any, that might have been
committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling is now limited to the
question of his administrative liability therefore, and it is our considered view
that he may not.

2. No. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The
two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let
alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the
other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail
over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but
also to the Deputy Ombudsman.

GLORIA vs CA
Facts:
Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS
Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of
the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the
implementation of his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the
petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is violative of Icasianos right
to security of tenure.
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because
the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of
presidential immunity from suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from
suit.
2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his
security of tenure.
Held:
1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition
is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned
acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is
grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court
that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The
same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for
President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private
respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an expert in
vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject
reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been
described as fit for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides,
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of
private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an
intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no

definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is

definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held
in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature
of our civil service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to
employees removed without cause but also to cases of unconsented
transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even
without the employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is
a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from
his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or
force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision
which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service.
Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be
violative of his security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST
cannot be countenanced.

Lapid vs CA

Facts:
Gov.Manuel Lapid & 5 other government officials were charged with alleged
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service for allegedly having conspired among themselves in demanding
& collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee,
control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel or other
quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the
collection thereof and without issuing receipts for such collection.

The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty for misconduct,

which meted out the penalty of 1yr suspension without pay pursuant
to Sec.25(2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

The
DILG
implemented
the
said
Ombudsman
decision.
Proceeding from the premise that the Ombudsman decision had not yet
become final, petitioner argued that writs of prohibition & mandamus may be
issued against the DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.

Issue:
WON the Ombudsmans Decision finding petitioner administratively liable for
misconduct & imposing upon him a penalty of 1yr suspension without pay is
immediately executory pending appeal.

Held:
Sec.27 of RA 6770 provides that Any order, directive or decision imposing
the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
months salary shall be final and unappealable.

The Rules of Produce of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contains a

similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said Rules provides: where the
respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the

penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than

one month, or a fine where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent
to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of 10 days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section
27of R.A. 6770.

The punishment imposed upon petitioner is not among those listed as final
and unappealable. The legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterus
finds application. The express mention of the things included excludes those
that are not included. The clear import of these statements taken together is
that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose
penalties not enumerated in the said section are not final, unappealable and
immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the
instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law. The fact that
the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions
should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal.
Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable
would be rendered nugatory.

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become

executory only after it has become final and executory, execution pending
appeal being an exception to this general rule.

There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasijudicial agencies are immediately executory.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasijudicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law
expressly so provides.

Sec. 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the

appeal will not stay the award, judgment,final order or resolution unless the
law directs otherwise.finalorder or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and
accordingly the provisions of the Ombudsman Act should apply in his case.

It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that
apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said
case must prevail over the other. Considering however, that petitioner was
charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern
his
case.
It is suffice to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative
Order No. 07, mandate that decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman where
the penalty imposed is other than public censure or reprimand, suspension of
not more than one month salary or fine equivalent to one month salary are
still appealable and hence, not final and executory.

JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of
Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25
July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro
filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor Navarro
contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of
authority or official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed
office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on
the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he
immediately complied with the same. Notably, Mayor Mirandas counteraffidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the
Philippine National Police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not good faith may be invoked by the petitioner.
HELD:
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he
reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under
preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny.
Petitioners own affidavit states. Petitioners excuse for violating the order of
preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged
that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel
had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed the
validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their
own hands.

Esquivel vs. Ombudsman

Facts: Several police officers filed complaint-affidavits against petitioners
Antonio Esquivel, municipal mayor of Jaen, Nueva Ecija and his brother,
Mark Anthony Esquivel, barangay captain of Barangay Apo, Jaen, Nueva
Ecija. They were charged with illegal arrest, arbitrary detention,
maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats. After the preliminary
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a resolution
recommending that both petitioners be indicted for less serious physical
injuries and Mayor Esquivel alone for grave threats. The Ombudsman
approved the resolution. Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the persons
of petitioners.
Held: YES. Petitioners claim that positions of municipal mayor and barangay
captain are not mentioned in R.A. No. 7975, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction over their persons. However, the Supreme Court in
Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, Binay v. Sandiganbayan, and Layus v.
Sandiganbayan, held that municipal mayors fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor can Barangay Captain Mark
Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975, as amended by R.A. No.
8249, provides that it is only in cases where "none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher" that
"exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in B.P. Blg. 129, as amended." Under the 1991 Local Government
Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27. Since Barangay Captain
Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor Esquivel, whose position falls under
salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over the criminal cases.

Osea vs Malaya
G.R. No. 139821 January 30, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner filed a protest with the Civil Service Commission. She averred that
she was appointed as OIC, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur, by then DECS Sec.Ricardo T. Gloria, upon the endorsement
of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. Despite the
recommendation of Sec.Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed
respondent to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines
Sur. Petitioner averred that respondents appointment was made without
prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Sec.99 of
the LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that respondents appointment be
recalled and set aside for being null and void.

Sec. 99 of RA 7610 provides:

Sec. 99. Functions of Local School Boards. The provincial, city or

municipal school board shall:

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local
school boards on the appointment of division superintendents,
districtsupervisors, school principals, and other school officials.

The CSC dismissed petitioners protest complaint. The CSC found that
President Ramos appointed respondent without any specific division. Thus,
respondent performed the functions of Schools Division Superintendent in
Iriga City. On November 3, 1997, Sec.Gloria designated respondent as
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools
Division Superintendent of Iriga City.

In dismissing petitioners protest, the CSC held that Sec.99 of the LGC of
1991 contemplates a situation where the DECS issues the appointments,

whereas respondents appointment was made by the President, in the

exercise of his appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as
Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of
reassignments, in which case consultation with the local school board was
unnecessary.

Issue:
Whether Respondent was merely re-assigned and did not require the
mandatory consultation with the Local School Board under Sec.99 of RA
7160.

Held:
The afore-quoted portion of Sec.99 of the LGC of 1991 applies to
appointments made by the DECS. This is because at the time of the
enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by
the DECS to specific divisions or locations.

In 1994, the Career Executive Service Board issued Memorandum

Circular No.21, Series of 1994, placing the positions of schools division
superintendent and assistant schools division superintendent within the
career executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint persons to
career executive service positions was transferred from the DECS to the
President.
Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment. Her
designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where
she previously exercised her functions as OIC Schools Division
Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Sec.
99 of the LGC of 1991 of prior consultation with the local school board, does
not apply. It only refers to appointments made by the DECS. Such is the plain
meaning of the said law.

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment

may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed,

usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for
the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure.

On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee

from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency,
which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not
require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.

SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER COLLEGE OF

vs. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN CITY
[G.R. No. 146382. August 7, 2003]

CALOOCAN

CITY

Facts: Systems Plus Computer College is a non-stock and non-profit

educational institution. It enjoys property tax exemption from the local
government on its buildings but not on the parcels of land which petitioner is
renting for P5,000 monthly from its sister companies, Consolidated
Assembly, Inc. (Consolidated Assembly) and Pair Management and
Development Corporation (Pair Management).
Petitioner requested respondent city government of Caloocan to extend tax
exemption to the parcels of land claiming that the same were being used
actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes pursuant to Article
VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987 Constitution and other applicable provisions of
the Local Government Code. Such request was denied because the owner of
the parcel of land was not Systems Plus but Consolidated Assembly and Pair
Management. Thereafter, the sister companies entered into an agreement
where the land was donated to Systems Plus. Ptr then informed the City
Assessor of the donation and sought a reconsideration of the first decision.
The City Assessor again denied the request, reasoning that the donation
was a mere farce to evade the payment of taxes; that revenue officers, in
proper cases, may disregard the separate corporate entity where it serves as
a shield for tax evasion; the grant of exemption from taxation rests upon the
theory that an exemption will benefit the body of people, and not upon any
idea of lessening the burden of individual or corporate owners; there is no
showing that the parcels of land are actually, directly and exclusively used
either for religious, charitable, or educational purposes.
Ptr filed a Ptn for mandamus with the RTC.
Issue: Will mandamus lie to against public respondents?
Ruling: No. Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which
such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where administrative remedies are
available, a petition for mandamus does not lie.
Under Section 226 of RA 7160, the remedy of appeal to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals is available from an adverse ruling or action of the
provincial, city or municipal assessor in the assessment of property.
However, petitioner argues that it is not contesting any assessment made by

respondent City Assessor. Petitioners argument obviously proceeds from its

misunderstanding of the term assessment. Under Section 199(f), Title II,
Book II, of the Local Government Code of 1991, assessment is defined as
the act or process of determining the value of a property, or proportion
thereof subject to tax, including the discovery, listing, classification and
appraisal of properties. Viewed from this broader perspective, the
determination made by the respondent City Assessor with regard to the
taxability of the subject real properties squarely falls within its power to
assess properties for taxation purposes subject to appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals.
Petitioner also argues that it is seeking to enforce, through the petition for
mandamus, a clear legal right under the Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code granting tax exemption on
properties actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
But petitioner is taking an unwarranted shortcut. The argument gratuitously
presumes the existence of the fact which it must first prove by competent and
sufficient evidence before the City Assessor. It must be stressed that the
authority to receive evidence, as basis for classification of properties for
taxation, is legally vested on the respondent City Assessor whose action is
appealable to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board
of Assessment Appeals, if necessary.
The petitioner cannot bypass the authority of the concerned administrative
agencies and directly seek redress from the courts even on the pretext of
raising a supposedly pure question of law without violating the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, when the law provides for
remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, as in
the case at bar, relief to the courts can be made only after exhausting all
remedies provided therein. Otherwise stated, before seeking the intervention
of the courts, it is a precondition that petitioner should first avail of all the
means afforded by the administrative processes.
Besides, mandamus does not lie against the respondent City Assessor in the
exercise of his function of assessing properties for taxation purposes. While
its duty to conduct assessments is a ministerial function, the actual exercise
thereof is necessarily discretionary. Well-settled is the rule that mandamus
may not be availed of to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way, or to retract or reverse an action already taken in the exercise
of either.