Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BICHARA
G.R. No. 213729, September 2, 2015
Facts:
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) hired Alexander P. Bichara as a flight attendant.
Bichara was included in PAL's Purser Upgrading Program in which he graduated. As
flight purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides for his performance
evaluation and earn at least an 85% rating for each ride. However, Bichara failed in
the two (2) check rides with ratings of 83.46% and 80.63%. Consequently, Bichara was
demoted to the position of flight steward.
Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL, but no action was taken. Hence, he filed
a complaint for illegal demotion against PAL before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch. Labor Arbiter (LA) issued a Decision
(June 16, 1997 Decision) declaring Bichara's demotion as illegal, and accordingly,
ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position as flight purser. PAL filed an appeal
before the NLRC and later before the Court of Appeals (CA), both of which, however,
upheld LAs finding. PAL no longer appealed to the Court, thus, it rendered the June
16, 1997. Decision final and executory.
During the pendency of the illegal demotion case before the CA, PAL
implemented another retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of
Bichara's employment. This prompted him, along with more than 1,400 other
retrenched flight attendants, represented by the Flight Attendants and Stewards
Association of the Philippines (FASAP), to file a separate complaint for unfair labor
practice, illegal retrenchment with claims for reinstatement and payment of salaries,
allowances, backwages, and damages against PAL.
On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old compulsory retirement age
under the PAL-FASAP Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). On January 31, 2008,
Bichara filed a motion for execution of the LA's June 16, 1997 Decision, which PAL
the reinstatement of Bichara to the position of flight purser. Nonetheless, since the
Decision had already settled the illegality of Bichara's demotion with finality, this
Court finds that Bichara should, instead, be awarded the salary differential of a flight
purser from a flight steward from the time of his illegal demotion up until the time he
was retrenched. Notably, unlike LAs award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement,
the award of salary differential is not dependent on the validity of his termination, as
it is, in fact, intrinsically linked to the illegality of Bichara's demotion. Hence, with
this direct relation, there should be no obstacle in rendering this award.
This Court deems the award of salary differential to be the just and equitable
award under the circumstances herein prevailing. Jurisprudence holds that courts may
modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts when
after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, as in this
case.
Since Bichara's illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be entitled
(a) to backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of retrenchment
up until his compulsory retirement; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in
accordance with the existing CBA at the time of Bichara's retirement; and (c)
attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, but only if this Court, in the
FASAP case, finally rules that the subject retrenchment is invalid. Otherwise, he
should only be entitled to the above-stated salary differential, as well as the
corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Article 297
(formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The awards of
backwages, and retirement benefits, including attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary
damages, if any, cannot, however, be executed in these proceedings since they are
incidents which pertain to the illegal retrenchment case, hence, executable only
when the FASAP case is finally concluded.
No. The compromise agreement had been concluded to terminate the illegal
dismissal and unfair labor case then pending with the CA. While the parties agreed
that no further action shall be brought by the parties against each other, their
pointedly stated that they referred to actions on the same ground. The phrase same
ground can only refer to the grounds raise in the first complaint and not to any other
grounds. It likewise cannot be applied to all claims and damages or losses either
party may have against each other whether those damages are known or unknown,
foreseen or unforeseen. This coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any
claims by the respondent against petitioner, including those that by law and
jurisprudence cannot be waived without appropriate consideration such as
nonpayment/underpayment wages and overtime pay.
TOYOTA ALABANG v. GAMES
GR No. 206612, August 17, 2015
Facts:
Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner, allegedly stole its vehicle
lubricants. Subsequently, it charged him with qualified theft before the trial court.
Two years thereafter, or on 24 August 2007, Games filed a Complainant for illegal
dismissal, nonpayment of benefits, and damages against petitioner. The latter,
through counsel, failed to file its Position Paper on the date set on 15 November 2007.
The case was reset several times.
The LA ruled against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay Games
P535,553.07 for his separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave pay and
attorney's fees resulting from his illegal dismissal. Petitioner no longer filed a motion
for reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling became final and executory. Petitioner
prayed that the proceedings be reopened, explaining that it had failed to present
evidence because of its counsel's negligence in filing the appropriate pleadings. The
LA denied the claims of petitioner.
The NLRC dismissed the case on the basis of the rule that no appeal may be
taken from an order of execution of a final judgment
Issue:
Held:
No. LA's decision finding that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent was
already final and executory because of petitioner's failure to file a timely appeal.
Therefore, the labor dispute between the parties should have been considered a
closed case by then, and no longer subject to appeal. The reopening of a case is an
extraordinary remedy, which, if abused, can make a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Hence, there must be
good cause on the movant's part before it can be granted.
Jurisprudence dictates that a final and executory decision of the LA can no
longer be reversed or modified. After all, just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winning party have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. On this basis, the CA did not
grievously err when it concluded that the ruling of the NLRC denying petitioner's
appeal was not baseless, arbitrary, whimsical, or despotic.
The reopening of a case is, by default, not allowed merely on the ground that
the counsel has been negligent in taking the required steps to protect the interest of
the client, such as timely filing a pleading, appearing during hearings, and perfecting
appeals. An exception arises only when there is good cause and excusable negligence
on the client's part.
The Court cannot give special treatment to petitioner. In our past cases, this
Court already held that the failure of the counsel to file the required position papers
before the LA is not a ground to declare that petitioner had been deprived of due
process; and is not a cause to conclude that the proceedings a quo had been null and
void.
The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the
documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should
be conducted or was necessary. Here, petitioner, despite being given several chances
to pass its position paper, did not at all comply. Worse, petitioner also had other
instances of negligence. Consequently, this Court cannot redo the whole proceedings
of the Labor Arbiter who had already afforded due process to the former.
along with the motion to reduce bond. They also posted 60% of the award ordered or
P603, 627.52 as their appeal bond.
Issue: Whether the requirements for posting of bond was complied with
Held:
Yes. Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that the
motion to reduce bond shall be entertained upon the posting of the bond in a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. As to what the reasonable
amount is, the NLRC has wide discretion in determining the reasonableness of the
bond for purposes of perfecting an appeal.
In this case, the NLRC had reconsidered its original position and declared the
60% bond was reasonable given the merits of the jurisdiction provided by respondent
in their Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Additional Appeal Cash Bond.
This is in accordance with the guidelines established in McBurnie v. Ganzon, that the
posting of provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award
subject of the appeal is sufficient provided that there is meritorious ground.
The following guidelines shall be observed:
(a)
The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be
entertained by the NLRC subject to the following conditions:
(1) there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable
amount is posted;
(b)
(c)
(d)
The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion
to reduce bond and determine the final amount of bond that
shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the
standards of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond, or
requires a bond that exceeds the amount of the
provisional bond,
the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (10) days from
notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by
posting the required appeal bond.