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AUTHORTITY TO SANCTION MEMBERS OF THE BAR

1. AUGUST 14, 2013 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAG.R. CV NO. 94656, A.C. No.
10117 Present: - versusCARPIO, Chairperson BRION, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA,
and LEONEN,JJ. ATTY. GIDEON D.V. MORTEL,
RESOLUTION LEONEN,J.: This resolves an administrative complaint charging respondent Atty.
Gideon
D.V. Mortel (Atty. Mortel) with disobedience or defiance of lawful court orders, amounting to
gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. 1 The complaint arose from the
proceedings before the Court of Appeals in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Angelita De Jesus,
through her Attorney-in-Fact Jim Dulay,2 which Atty. Mortel handles.3 2 Rollo, p. 15, Statement
of Facts Re: Suspension of Atty. Gideon V. Mortel. This was signed by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid of the Sixth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila. The case was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 94656. Id.at 2, Court of Appeals Resolution. Resolution 2 A.C. No. 10117 On July 20,
2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Notice4 for Atty. Mortel to file an appellants brief on behalf
of his client, Angelita De Jesus,5 within the reglementary period of 45 days from notice.6 Atty.
Mortel recently moved out of his office at Herrera Tower, Makati City due to the high cost of
maintenance.7 Looking for a new office,8 he requested to use the address of his friends law
firm as his address on record for Bank of the Philippine Islands. 9 Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V.
Jose (Atty. Jose), Managing Partner of MFV Jose Law Office, granted this request sometime in
August 2010.10 Atty. Mortels address on record was then listed at Unit 2106, Philippine AXA
Life Center, 1286 Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City,11 the same address as MFV Jose Law
Office.12 All communication, court orders, resolutions, notices, or other court processes
addressed to MFV Jose Law Office were received by the law firms staff.13 The staff would pass
these to the desk of Atty. Jose for monitoring and checking. Atty. Jose would then forward these
to the handling lawyer in the office.14 The law firms messenger, Randy
G. Lucero (Lucero), was tasked with informing Atty. Mortel whenever there was a resolution or
order pertinent to Bank of Philippine Islands. 15 Bank of Philippine Islands was not included in
MFV Jose Law Offices list or inventory of cases.16 Thus, Atty. Jose simply attached a piece of
paper with notation and instructions on the same, advising [Lucero] . . . to forward it to Atty.
Mortel.17 Initially, Randy De Leon (De Leon), Atty. Mortels messenger, went to MFV Law
Office to inquire if it had received notices for Atty. Mortel.18 None came at that time.19 Thus,
De Leon left his number with Lucero, and the two messengers agreed that Lucero would text
De Leon should any court 4 CA. INT. RULES, Rule IV, sec. 4(a)(1.6) provides: SEC. 4. Processing
of Ordinary Appeals. (a) In Civil Cases. . . . . 1.6 Within ten (10) days from completion of the
records, issue a notice to file appellants brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof.
The notice shall require that a certified true copy of the appealed decision or order be
appended to the brief. 5 Rollo, p. 2. 6 Id. at 3. 7 Id. at 33, Omnibus Motion with Profuse
Apologies. 8 Id. at 39, Atty. Joses Affidavit. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 4. 12 Id. at 39. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15
Id. at 41, Luceros Affidavit. 16 Id. at 39. 17 Id. 18 Id. at 41. 19 Id. Resolution 3 A.C. No. 10117
notice or order for Atty. Mortel arrive.20 On August 16, 2010, instead of heeding the Court of
Appeals Notice to file the appellants brief, Atty. Mortel moved to withdraw Angelita De Jesus
appeal21 in light of an amicable settlement on the disputed property.22 After the Motion to
Withdraw Appeal was filed, he stopped communicating with MFV Law Office and instructed De
Leon to do the same.23 In the Resolution dated September 20, 2010, the Court of Appeals
directed Atty. Mortel to secure and submit Angelita De Jesus

written conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal within five (5) days from notice.24 Atty.
Mortel did not comply.25 In the Resolution dated November 11, 2010, the Court of Appeals
again directed Atty. Mortel to comply with the September 20, 2010 Resolution and warned him
of disciplinary action should he fail to secure and submit Angelita De Jesus written conformity
to the Motion within the reglementary period.26 Atty. Mortel did not comply.27 Thus, on
February 23, 2011, the Court of Appeals resolved to den[y] the motion to withdraw appeal; . . .
reiterat[e] the notice dated July 20, 2010, directing [Angelita De Jesus] to file appellants brief
within . . . [45] days from notice; and . . . direc[t] Atty. Mortel to show cause why he should not
be cited in contempt for non-compliance with [the Court of Appeals] order.28 The February 23,
2011 Resolution was sent to Angelita De Jesus address on record, but it was returned with the
notation moved out on the envelope.29 On March 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals resolved to
direct Atty. Mortel to furnish it with Angelita De Jesus present and complete address within 10
days from notice. Atty. Mortel did not comply.30 In the Resolution dated July 5, 2011, the Court
of Appeals again ordered Atty. Mortel to inform it of Angelita De Jesus address within 10 20 Id.
21 Id. at 44, Dulays Affidavit. 22 Id. at 34. 23 Id. at 24, Comment. 24 Id. at 2. 25 Id. 26 Id.
27 Id. 28 Id. at 23. 29 Id. at 3. 30 Id. Resolution 4 A.C. No. 10117 days from notice.31 Atty.
Mortel did not comply.32 In the Resolution dated October 13, 2011, the Court of Appeals
directed Atty. Mortel, for the last time, to inform it of Angelita De Jesus address within 10 days
from notice.33 Still, Atty. Mortel did not comply.34 In the Resolution dated January 10, 2012,
the Court of Appeals ordered Atty. Mortel to show cause, within 15 days, why he should not be
held in contempt for non-compliance with the Court of Appeals Resolutions.35 Atty. Mortel
ignored this.36 In the Resolution dated May 16, 2012, the Court of Appeals found Atty. Mortel
liable for indirect contempt.37 It ordered him to pay 10,000.00 as fine.38 Atty. Mortel did not
pay.39 On August 13, 2012, the Court of Appeals resolved to (1) again order Atty. Mortel to
pay, within 10 days from notice, the fine of 10,000.00 imposed upon him under the May 16,
2012 Resolution;40 (2) require Atty. Mortel to follow the July 5, 2011 and October 13, 2011
Resolutions that sought information from him as to his clients present address;41 and (3) warn
him that failure to comply with the Resolutions within the reglementary period will constrain
the Court of Appeals to impose a more severe sanction against him.42 Atty. Mortel snubbed
the directives.43 According to the Court of Appeals, the Cashier Division reported that Atty.
Mortel still did not pay the fine imposed despite his receipt of the May 16, 2012, August 13,
2012, and October 17, 2012 Resolutions.44 In the Resolution dated April 26, 2013, the Court of
Appeals directed Atty. Mortel to show cause why it should not suspend him from legal practice
for ignoring its May 16, 2012 Resolution (which fined him for 10,000.00).45 The April 26, 2013
Resolution was sent to his address on record at Unit 2106, Philippine AXA Life Center, 1286
Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37
Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. at 4. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id. Resolution 5 A.C. No. 10117 Makati
City,46 as shown in the registry return card.47 Despite having ignored 11 Court of Appeals
Resolutions,48 Atty.
Mortel did not show cause for him not to be suspended.49 The Court of Appeals found that his
failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with the [Court of
Appeals] directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of [the Court of
Appeals], amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect.50 In the
Resolution dated August 14, 2013, the Court of Appeals suspended Atty. Mortel from legal
practice for six (6) months and gave him a stern warning against repeating his actions.51 Atty.
Mortel was also directed to comply with the previous Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: WHEREFORE, Atty. Gideon D.V.

Mortel, counsel for respondent-oppositor-appellant, is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of


law for a period of six (6) months effective from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Further, Atty. Mortel is
DIRECTED to comply with the May 16, 2012 Resolution and other related Resolutions issued by
this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Supreme Court for its information and appropriate action. SO ORDERED. 52 (Emphasis in the
original) On October 2, 2013, pursuant to Rule 138, Section 2953 of the Rules of Court, the
Court of Appeals submitted before this Court a certified true copy of the August 14, 2013
Resolution, which suspended Atty. Mortel from legal practice, together with a statement of facts
from which the suspension order was based.54 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 25. The ignored
Resolutions are dated September 20, 2010, November 11, 2010, February 23, 2011, March 28,
2011, July
5, 2011, October 13, 2011, January 10, 2012, May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012, October 17,
2012, and
April 26, 2013. 49 Id. at 5. 50 Id. at 15, Statement of Facts Re: Suspension of Atty. Gideon V.
Mortel. 51
Id.at 5. 52 Id. at 56. 53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 29 provides: SEC. 29. Upon
suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme
Court. Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order or suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make
such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as
such, as the facts warrant. 54 Rollo, pp. 716. Resolution 6 A.C. No. 10117 On October 23,
2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Report stating that it docketed the Court of
Appeals August 14, 2013 Resolution as a regular administrative case against Atty.
Mortel.55 In the Resolution dated January 20, 2014, this Court noted and approved the
administrative case, furnished Atty. Mortel a copy of the August 14, 2013 Resolution, and
required him to comment within 10 days from notice.56 This Court forwarded it to his address
on record.57 On February 25, 2014, Atty. Jose read this Courts January 20, 201458 Resolution
meant for Atty. Mortel,59 and saw that Atty. Mortel had been suspended by the Court of
Appeals.60 He immediately tried looking for Atty. Mortels mobile number to inform him of
this development. 61 On the following day, he was able to reach Atty. Mortel through a mutual
friend.62 Four (4) years passed since the Court of Appeals first sent a Resolution63 to Atty.
Mortel, through MFV Jose Law Office, in 2010. Atty. Jose asked Lucero, his messenger, why
these Resolutions were not forwarded to Atty. Mortel.64 Lucero stated that he would usually
text De Leon, Atty. Mortels messenger, whenever there was an order or resolution pertinent to
the case.65 However, after a few messages, De Leon no longer texted back.66 Lucero added
that he had no other way of finding [De Leon] and knew nothing of De Leons
whereabouts.67 He hoped that either Atty. Mortel or De Leon would pick up the mails sent by
the Court of Appeals for Atty. Mortel.68 Not knowing how to contact Atty. Mortels messenger,
Lucero simply kept the copies in the office racks or on his table.69 On March 5, 2014, Atty.
Mortel filed before the Court of Appeals an 55 Id. at 18, Resolution dated January 20, 2014. 56
Id. 57 Id. at 39, Atty. Joses Affidavit. 58 Only the January 20, 2014 Resolution contained the
information that Atty. Mortel was suspended by the Court of Appeals (Id. at 19). The Resolution
dated February 9, 2015 did not contain this information (Id. at 48). 59 Rollo, p. 39.
60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 Id. at 2. 64 Id. at 39. 65 Id. 66 Id. at 41. 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. at 39.
Resolution 7 A.C. No. 10117 Omnibus Motion and Manifestation with Profuse Apologies.70 He
informed the Court of Appeals of his present address at No. 2806 Tower 2, Pioneer Highlands,
Mandaluyong City.71 He also

prayed for (1) the reinstatement of the Motion to Withdraw Appeal, (2) the acceptance of his
compliance with the September 20, 2010 and November 11, 2010 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals (which sought for his clients conformity to the Motion), (3) the grant of his Motion, and
(4) the recall of all previous orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals.72 In his Comment73
dated March 7, 2014, Atty. Mortel argues that he honestly believed that the case was already
closed and terminated in light of his Motion to Withdraw Appeal.74 Atty. Mortel avers that [h]e
did not expect that a requirement of conformity of the client would be needed in as much as
the act of counsel binds the client[.]75 According to him, the filing of a motion to withdraw
appeal is a matter of right, which did not need his clients conformity.76 Thus, he did not bother
to visit MFV Jose Law Office again or send his messenger to check with the law firm if there
were resolutions or orders for him.77 According to Atty. Mortel, the Court of Appeals
Resolutions never reached him.78 He interposes the defense of sheer lack of or absence of
knowledge . . . as all Resolutions of the Court [of Appeals] were received by the messenger of
MFV Jose Law Office but not forwarded to him.79 Finally, he claims that he had no reason to
refuse to comply, had he known of the orders or resolutions.80 In the Resolution81 dated
February 9, 2015, this Court noted Atty. Mortels Comment and required the Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals Manila to file a reply within 10 days from notice. In the Resolution82 dated
May 30, 2016, this Court dispensed with the filing of the reply. For resolution are the following
issues: 70 Id. at 3238. 71 Id. at 37. 72 Id. at 32. 73 Id. at 2027-A. 74 Id. at 20. 75 Id. 76 Id.at
21. 77 Id. at 3435. 78 Id. at 34. 79 Id. at 20. 80 Id. 81
Id. at 48. 82 Id. at 52. Resolution 8 A.C. No. 10117 First, whether there are grounds for this
Court to probe into Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Joses possible administrative liability; and
Second, whether respondent Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel should be imposed a disciplinary
sanction. I This Court has the authority to discipline an errant member of the bar.83 Rule 139B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that [p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension,
or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio[.]84 However, the
lawyer must have the full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against
him [or her,] among others.85 Thus: RULE 138 ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR . . . .
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension.
No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has
had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the
matter ex parte. Implicit in Atty. Jose and respondents arrangement is that Atty. Jose would
update respondent should there be any communication sent to respondent through his law
firm, and that respondent would regularly check with the law firm if any court-delivered mail
arrives for him.86 Yet, Atty. Jose failed to measure up to his part of the deal. He delegated
everything to his messenger without adequately supervising him. All communication, court
orders, resolutions, notices, or other court processes addressed to MFV Jose Law Office go
through Atty. Joses desk for monitoring and checking.87 Having monitored and checked at
least 12 envelopes88 from the Court 83 RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B 84 RULES OF COURT,
Rule 139-B, sec. 1. 85 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 30. 86 Id. at 33. 87 Id. at 39. 88 Id. at
25. It is common practice for Philippine courts to issue orders or resolutions in sealed
envelopes. These 12 envelopes contain the Resolutions dated September 20, 2010, November
11, Resolution 9 A.C. No. 10117 of Appeals meant for respondent, Atty. Jose could have
followed up with Lucero if respondent was actually receiving the Court of Appeals orders or
resolutions. This is a fairly simple task requiring a quick yes or

no, accomplishable in a few seconds. As Managing Partner of his firm, Atty. Jose can be
expected to have supervisory duties over his firms associates and support staff, among
others. Alternatively, Atty. Jose could have contacted respondent himself. That he did not know
respondents number89 does not suffice. It bears stressing that Atty. Jose and respondent are
acquaintances and have common connections.90 In the first place, Atty. Jose showed that he
could easily get respondents new number through a mutual friend. Yet, he only did so four (4)
years later.91 In todays age of email, social media, web messaging applications, and a whole
gamut of digital technology easing peoples connectivity whenever and wherever they are, it is
fairly easy to get connected with someone without even leaving ones location. Atty. Jose is
fully aware of the importance of following court orders and processes. It is reasonable to
expect him to extend assistance to the lawyer to whom he lent his office addressand in doing
so, to the Court of Appealsin the speedy and efficient administration of justice in Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Atty. Joses reading of this Courts January 20, 2014 Resolution92 is also
highly questionable. While the Resolution was sent to his law firm,93 it was addressed to
respondent, a lawyer not under his employ.94 Canon 21, Rule 21.0495 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility generally allows disclosure of a clients affairs only to partners or
associates of the law firm, unless the client prohibits it. Respondent is not a partner or
associate of MFV Jose Law Office.96 2010, February 23, 2011, March 28, 2011, July 5, 2011,
October 13, 2011, January 10, 2012, May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012,
October 17, 2012, April 26, 2013, and August 14, 2013. 89 Id. at 39. 90 Id. at 33. 91 A total of
four (4) years passed between 2010 and 2014. Atty. Mortel made the address request in 2010
(Id. at 40, Atty. Jose Affidavit). He stopped communicating with MFV Jose Law Office after
August 16, 2010 (Id. at 24, Comment). Meanwhile, Atty. Jose began to look for Atty. Mortels
number on February 25, 2014 (Id. at 41, Atty. Jose Affidavit). 92 Rollo, p. 39. 93 Id. 94 Id. at 41.
95 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 21, rule 21.04 provides: Rule 21.04 - A lawyer
may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless
prohibited by the client. 96 Rollo, p. 41. Resolution 10 A.C. No. 10117 Even assuming that this
Courts January 20, 2014 Resolution is independent of Bank of Philippine Islands, the present
case being administrative in nature, Atty. Joses action still invites suspicion. Article III, Section
3(1) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that: ARTICLE III Bill of Rights . . . . SECTION 3. (1) The
privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Under Article
32 of the Civil Code: ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: . . .
. (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence[.] Atty. Jose took hold of this Courts
correspondence meant for respondent and read it.97 On February 25, 2014, he look[ed] into
the said case [and] noticed that the Resolution . . . was already in the pink form issued by the
Supreme Court. [He] saw the word suspended and, upon perusal, saw that [respondent] was
now subjected to an administrative case[.]98 Atty. Jose may claim that he did so out of
concern. However, if he were truly concerned, his proper recourse would have been to inform
respondent about receiving mail from this Court, not to read it. Moreover, he would have
informed respondent, as early as 2010, that his law firm received several Court of Appeals
correspondences, and that these letters kept arriving for respondent until 2013.99 Therefore,
under Rule 138, Section 30100 of the Rules of Court, this 97 Id. at 39. 98 Id. Emphasis supplied.
99 Id. at 24.
100 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 30 provides: SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before
removal or

suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession,
until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself Resolution 11 A.C. No. 10117
Court directs Atty. Jose to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution,
why he should not be administratively sanctioned for failing to ensure respondents prompt
receipt of the Court of Appeals Resolutions, and for reading this Courts Resolution addressed
to respondent. II Atty. Jose stated under oath that respondent requested to use MFV Jose Law
Offices address as his mailing address only in August 2010,101 after respondent had already
filed his appeal.102 The exact day in August is unknown. Assuming respondents request was
granted as early as August 1, 2010, this does not help him in any way. The Court of Appeals
Notice for respondent to file an appellants brief was issued one (1) month earlier, on July 20,
2010, when respondent still presumably used his old address on record at Herrera Tower,
Rufino St., corner Valero St., Makati City.103 Thus, respondents sending De Leon, his
messenger, to the new forwarding address at MFV Jose Law Office to get updates anytime
between August 1, 2010104 and August 16, 2010 (when he filed the Motion) would certainly
have yielded no result. In this hypothetical scenario, the Court of Appeals would have sent the
Notice to his old address on record.
That he allegedly did not receive the July 20, 2010 Notice from the Court of Appeals was,
therefore, his own lookout. Assuming MFV Law Office accommodated respondents request
after August 16, 2010, there could have been no instance where respondent sent De Leon to
MFV Law Office, if this Court were to believe his statement that he stopped contacting MFV Law
Office after he filed the Motion.105 In either case, respondent had been remiss in his duty to
keep himself informed on the status of the case. Respondent presents a different version of the
facts. According to or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. 101 Rollo, p. 39. 102
Although the records do not show when Atty. Mortel filed the appeal, it certainly happened
before July 20, 2010, the date when the Court of Appeals issued the Notice for Atty. Mortel to
file an appellants brief. Under Section 4(a)(1)(1.6) of the Court of Appeals Internal Rules,
issuing a notice to file appellants brief means that the appellate court has already received the
appeal. 103 Rollo, p. 34. 104 In this hypothetical scenario, this would be the date when Atty.
Mortels request was granted by MFV Law Office. 105 Rollo, p. 24. Resolution 12 A.C. No. 10117
him, he requested to use MFV Law Offices address as his mailing address for the [purpose of]
filing of the appeal[.]106 This hints that he made his request before he even elevated Bank of
the Philippine Islands to the Court of Appeals, and precisely for that purpose. While the records
do not show when respondent filed the appeal, it certainly happened before July 20, 2010, the
date when the Court of Appeals issued the Notice107 for respondent to file an appellants brief.
Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, issuing a notice to file appellants brief means
that it has already received the appeal.108 Thus, insofar as respondent is concerned, the July
20, 2010 Notice reached MFV Law Office,109 not his old address on record. Respondent further
claims: [O]n the account of the Honorable Court [of Appeals] in its Resolution dated 14 August
2013 the Court [of Appeals] issued already a Notice to file appellants brief on July 20, 2010
signifying that there was already a notice received by the staff of M V F [sic] Jose Law Office
but was not forwarded to the undersigned counsel. This demonstrated that the very first Order
issued by the Court [of Appeals] was received by the aforesaid law office but was not
forwarded to the undersigned counsel and the same was true to all subsequent Orders or
Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals[.]110 (Emphasis supplied) Respondent dates back
his request to use MFV Law Offices

address before July 20 2010, while Atty. Jose avows that it happened in August 2010.111 The
inconsistent narration of facts shows that one of them did not give a truthful account on the
matter. In any of the scenarios presented, respondents gross negligence and lack of foresight
is apparent.
Respondent did not make it easy for MFV Law Office to reach him personally or through his
messenger. First, respondent personally stopped visiting and communicating with the law firm
after August 16, 2010.112 A total of 12 Court of Appeals Resolutions arrived at MFV Law Office
after that date. 106 Id. at
34. 107 Id. at 3. 108 Section 4(a)(1)(1.6) of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals states
that as soon as the Court of Appeals receives appellants appeal, the Civil Cases Section of the
Judicial Records Division shall, within ten (10) days from completion of the records, issue a
notice to file appellants brief within fortyfive (45) days from receipt thereof. 109 Rollo, pp. 27
28. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 39. 112 Id. at 24. Resolution 13 A.C. No. 10117 Second, respondent asked
De Leon to stop going to the law firm after August 16, 2010.113 This may explain why De Leon
no longer replied to Lucero, Atty. Joses messenger, after a few text exchanges.114 Lucero
states that he had no idea how to find De Leon, and had not seen respondent for years.115
Third, Atty. Mortel did not update MFV Law Office of his or De Leons present work or phone
number(s).116 Atty. Jose had to look for respondents mobile number four (4) years later117
just so he could inform respondent about this Courts Resolution.118 Meanwhile, Lucero
assumed that De Leon changed his number as De Leon could no longer be reached.119 Fourth,
there is no allegation that respondent left other contact details to MFV Law Office, such as his
home address, as a safety net. What follows from all these is that respondent failed to adopt an
efficient and orderly system of receiving and attending promptly to all judicial notices.120
The fault was his to bear. In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals: 121 We hold that an attorney owes it
to himself and to his clients to adopt an efficient and orderly system of receiving and attending
promptly to all judicial notices. He and his client must suffer the consequences of his failure to
do so particularly where such negligence is not excusable as in the case at bar. . . . Aside from
his failure to adopt an organized and efficient system of managing his files and court notices,
we also note that petitioners counsel, Atty. Almadro, allowed one year to lapse before he again
acted on the appeal of his client. . . . Subsequently, the notice to file the appellants brief was
received by the househelp of Atty. Almadro, petitioners counsel, on February 21, 1996. It was
only on July 11, 1996 that Atty. Almadro claims to have discovered the notice. . . . Atty. Almadro
apparently never bothered to check why he had not received any notice for the filing of his
clients (appellants) brief.122 113 Id. at 24. 114 Id. at 41. 115 Id. 116 Id. at 42. According to
Lucero, after not receiving any reply from De Leon, he assumed that the latter changed his
number. 117 Four (4) years have passed from 2010 to 2014. Atty. Mortel made the address
request in 2010 (Id. at 40, Atty. Joses Affidavit). He stopped communicating with MFV Jose Law
Office after August 16, 2010 (Id. at 24, Comment). Meanwhile, Atty. Jose began to look for Atty.
Mortels number on February 25, 2014 (Id. at 41, Atty. Joses Affidavit). 118 Rollo, p. 39. 119 Id.
at 41. 120 450 Phil. 296 (2003) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]. 121 Id. at 302. 122 Id. at 302
303. Resolution 14 A.C. No. 10117 Similarly, in this case, respondent did not adequately inquire
why he had not received any notice for the filing of Angelita De Jesus appellants brief.123 He
should have assumed that the Court of Appeals would send him a notice regarding his appeal.
Yet, he instructed De Leon to go to MFV Law Office only initially,124 and cut contact with the
law firm after August 16, 2010.125 According to respondent, he was completely unaware of
the existence of the Court [of Appeals] Orders or Resolutions.126 He claims that his failure to
comply was made in good faith and was not done intentionally.127 We are not convinced.

Respondents disobedience of court orders, while it may not have been malicious, was certainly
willful. He knew of the consequences of disregarding court orders, yet he did not take steps to
prevent it from happening. He used Atty. Joses office address for Bank of the Philippine Islands,
but did not ensure that he could actually receive the Court of Appeals Notices and Resolutions.
That respondent was able to receive this Courts Resolution through MFV Law Office in 2014
shows that it was also possible for him to have received the Court of Appeals Notice and
Resolutions from 2010 to 2013, had he only cared to do so. III Respondent attempts to escape
liability by invoking Rule 50, Section 3128 of the Rules of Court, which states that withdrawal of
appeal is a matter of right before the filing of the appellees brief. He claims to have honestly
believed that the filing of the motion had the effect of withdrawal of appeal.129 Thinking that
the case had been closed and terminated, he forgot all about it.130 Respondent prides himself
in wanting to become a judge, joining the 123 Id. at 303. 124 Id. at 24. 125 Id. 126 Id. at 23.
127 Id. at 27A. 128 RULES OF COURT, Rule 50, sec. 3 provides: SEC. 3. Withdrawal of appeal.
An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of the appellees brief.
Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the court. 129 Rollo, p. 24. 130
Id. Resolution 15 A.C. No. 10117 30th Prejudicature program, and taking the masterate [sic]
and doctoral degree[s] in law[.]131 In terms of legal knowledge and conduct, more is
expected of him. Filing a motion to withdraw appeal does not result in automatic withdrawal of
the appeal. The next-level court, before which a motion to withdraw appeal is filed, still needs
to resolve this motion. A motion prays for a relief other than by a pleading.132 As the court
may either grant or deny a motion, or otherwise defer action on it until certain conditions are
met, lawyers have the obligation to apprise themselves of the courts resolution, and not to
simply second-guess it. In this case, before the Court of Appeals acted on respondents Motion,
it first required proof133 of the clients conformity.134 It is not unlikely that the Court of
Appeals wanted to ensure that Angelita De Jesus voluntarily agreed to the withdrawal of the
appealthat is, without force, intimidation, or coercionand that, despite losing the case
before the lower court, she was fully informed of the legal consequences of the contemplated
action. Thus, respondent cannot excuse himself from complying with the Court of Appeals July
20, 2010 Notice simply because he belie[ved] that the case has long been closed and
terminated when he filed the Motion to Withdraw Appeal.135 Ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance.136 Respondent could not safely assume that the case had already been
closed and terminated until he received the Court of Appeals resolution on the matter. IV Both
respondent137 and Atty. Jose138 point a finger at Lucero, Atty. Joses messenger, while Lucero
points a finger at De Leon, respondents messenger.139 131 Id. at 26. 132 RULES OF COURT,
Rule 15, sec. 1 provides: SECTION 1. Motion defined. A motion is an application for relief
other than by a pleading. 133 Id., Rule 138, sec. 21 provides: SECTION 21. Authority of attorney
to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in
court for his client, but the presiding judge may. . . on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name
of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. 134
Rollo, p. 2. 135 Id. at 24. 136 CIVIL CODE, art. 3. 137 Rollo, p. 23. 138 Id. at 39. 139 Id. 41.
Resolution 16 A.C. No. 10117 According to respondent, Lucero simply left the Resolutions in
MFV Law Offices racks or in Luceros table[.]140 Lucero states that he did not know the
relevance of the Court of Appeals Resolutions or the importance of these to respondent.141 For
a law

firm messenger to have no clue about the importance of a court issuance is doubtful. What is
more plausible is that the messenger, being outside this Courts disciplinary arm, is serving as
a convenient scapegoat. Even assuming that only the messengers are at fault, neither counsel
can blame anyone but themselves for assigning an important matter to incompetent or
irresponsible person[s].142 In Gonzales, [i]f petitioners counsel was not informed by his
house-help of the notice which eventually got misplaced in his office files, said counsel has
only himself to blame for entrusting the matter to an incompetent or irresponsible
person[.]143 Respondent gave the MFV Law Offices address to the Court of Appeals. Thus,
this is presumably where he wanted the orders of the Court of Appeals sent. He cannot later
excuse himself from complying with the court orders by stating that he did not actually receive
these orders for three (3) years. Respondent is estopped from raising it as a defense. As far as
courts are concerned, orders and resolutions are received by counsel through the address on
record they have given. It is well-noted that respondent informed the Court of Appeals of his
present address (No. 2806 Tower 2, Pioneer Highlands, Mandaluyong City) only on March 3,
2014.144 V Respondents defiance of the Court of Appeals Notice and Resolutions shows a
blatant disregard of the system he has vowed to support.145 When he took his oath as
attorney, he has sworn to do as follows: I, do solemnly swear that . . . I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein . . . and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. 140 Id. at 21. 141 Id. at 41. 142 Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 450 Phil. 296, 302
(2003) [Per J.
Corona, Third Division]. 143 Id. 144 Rollo, p. 38. 145 Bantolo v. Castillon Jr., 514 Phil. 628, 633
(2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. Resolution 17 A.C. No. 10117 (Emphasis supplied) An
oath is not an empty promise, but a solemn duty. Owing good fidelity to the court, lawyers
must afford due respect to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities[.]146 Under
the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. . . . . . . . CANON 10 - A LAWYER
OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY
EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. In Bantolo v. Atty. Castillon Jr.: 147 Lawyers are
particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored
by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. Such is the situation in the instant case. We
need not delve into the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
contempt case against respondents. Suffice it to say that respondent lawyers commission of
the contumacious acts have been shown and proven, and eventually punished by the lower
courts.148 (Emphasis supplied) In its May 16, 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals found
respondent guilty for indirect contempt of court.149 On top of respondents punishment for
contempt, his willful disobedience of a lawful order of the Court of Appeals is a ground for
respondents removal or suspension. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27.
Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from 146 Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, 528 Phil. 814, 821 (2006)
[Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. 147 514 Phil. 628 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division]. 148 Id. at
632633. 149 Id. at 3.

Resolution 18 A.C. No. 10117 his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. In Sebastian v. Atty.
Bajar, 150 this Court ordered the lawyer to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice, but she
was able to file only after one (1) year.151 The lawyer was also ordered to comment on the
complainants manifestation, but instead of filing a comment, she submitted a manifestation
about four (4) months after.152 Suspending the lawyer for three (3) years, this Court stated
that the lawyers cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.153 In this case, respondent utterly
disrespected the lawful orders of the court by ignoring 12 Court of Appeals Resolutions.154 In
Ong v.
Atty. Grijaldo: 155 [Respondents] conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A
resolution of this Court is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply therewith not
only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of our lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof. Any departure from the path which a lawyer must
follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority. This is especially so, as in the instant case, where respondent even
deliberately defied the lawful orders of the Court for him to file his comment on the complaint,
thereby transgressing Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a
lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due the courts.156 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted) In Richards v. Asoy, 157 the lawyer failed to comply with this Courts Resolution
requiring him to file a comment and show cause why he should not be administratively
sanctioned or cited in contempt.158 He was also 150 559 Phil. 211 (2007) [Per J. Carpio, En
Banc]. 151 Id. at 223. 152
Id. 153 Id. at 224. 154 Rollo, pp. 15. 155 450 Phil. 1 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 156 Id. at
1213. 157
647 Phil. 113 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 158 Id. at 116. Resolution 19 A.C. No. 10117 asked
to comply with this Courts other Resolution requiring him to reimburse the complainant within
10 days from notice.159 This Court found that respondent had gone into hiding and was
evading service of pleadings/orders/processes of this Court.160 For the lawyers grave
misconduct, this Court indefinitely suspended him from legal practice.161 When the lawyer
later sought to be readmitted to the bar, this Court denied his Petition to be reinstated.162 The
lawyer was found to have failed to justify the long delay of nine (9) years in complying with this
Courts Resolutions to reimburse complainant: Respondents justification for his 9-year belated
compliance with the order for him to reimburse complainant glaringly speaks of his lack of
candor, of his dishonesty, if not defiance of Court orders, qualities that do not endear him to
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers. The solemn oath which all lawyers take upon admission
to the bar to dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice is neither a mere formality nor hollow
words meant to be taken lightly, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep
inviolable at all times. The lack of any sufficient justification or explanation for the nine-year
delay in complying with the Courts July 9, 1987 and March 15, 1988 Resolutions to reimburse
complainant betrays a clear and contumacious disregard for the lawful orders of this Court.
Such disrespect on the part of respondent constitutes a clear violation of the lawyers Code of
Professional Responsibility[.] . . . .

10

Respondent denigrates the dignity of his calling by displaying a lack of candor towards this
Court. By taking his sweet time to effect reimbursement . . . he sent out a strong message that
the legal processes and orders of this Court could be treated with disdain or impunity.163
(Citations omitted) Here, respondent failed to justify the long delay of at least three (3)
years164 in complying with the Court of Appeals Resolutions requiring his clients written
conformity to the Motion (2010)165 and information on his clients current address (2011).166
Respondent also failed to justify the long delay in complying with other Court of Appeals
Resolutions (a) requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and to
comply with the Court of Appeals earlier Resolutions;167 (b) citing him in indirect contempt
and ordering him 159 Id. 160 Id. 161 Id. 162 Id. at 122. 163 Id. at 120121. 164 Rollo, p. 33.
Atty. Mortel belatedly presented Dulays Affidavit of Conformity and Compliance (Id. at 44) on
March 5, 2014. 165 Id. at 13. 166 Id. at 3. 167 Id., citing Court of Appeals January 10, 2012
Resolution.
Resolution 20 A.C. No. 10117 to pay a fine of 10,00000;168 (c) reiterating the Resolutions that
directed him to pay the fine and inform the Court of Appeals of his clients address, and
warning him of a more severe sanction should he fail to do so;169 (d) requiring him to show
cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for his refusal to pay the fine;
and (e) ordering him to again to comply with the Resolution that directed him to pay the fine.
170 Moreover, even after he found out about the developments of the case,171 respondent
still did not take immediate actions to observe all of the Court of Appeals Resolutions. Nowhere
in the records does it show that he complied with the May 16, 2012, August 13, 2012, and
October 17, 2012 Resolutions directing him to pay 10,000.00 as fine for his non-compliance
with the earlier Court of Appeals Resolutions. Thus, despite respondents profuse apologies172
to the Court of Appeals, the evidence of atonement for [his] misdeeds is sorely wanting.173
In Cuizon v. Atty. Macalino, 174 this Court disbarred a lawyer for his obstinate failure to comply
with this Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his comment and for issuing a bouncing
check.175 Found liable for contempt of court, the lawyer was ordered imprisoned until he
complied with this Courts Resolution to pay a fine and submit his comment: By his repeated
cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of
the Court. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to
court orders and processes.176 (Citations omitted) Respondents actions shatter the dignity of
his profession. He exhibited disdain for court orders and processes, as well as a lack of fidelity
to the court. In taking his sweet time to effect177 compliance with the Court of Appeals
Resolutions, he sends the message that he is above the duly constituted judicial authorities of
this land, and he looks down on them with condescension. This Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that his acts constitute gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect of court.
168 Id., citing Court of Appeals May 16, 2012 Resolution. 169 Id., citing Court of Appeals
October 17, 2012 Resolution. 170 Id. at 56. 171 Id. at 39. 172 Id. at 3238. 173 Richards v.
Asoy, 647 Phil. 113, 121 (2010) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 174 477 Phil. 569 (2004) [Per Curiam,
En Banc].
175 Id. at 572. 176 Id.at 575. 177 Richards v. Asoy, 647 Phil. 113, 121 (2010) [Per Curiam, En
Banc]. Resolution 21 A.C. No. 10117 Gross misconduct is defined as an inexcusable, shameful
or flagrant unlawful conduct178 in administering justice, which prejudices the parties rights
or forecloses a just determination of the case.179 As officers of the court, lawyers themselves
should be at the forefront in obeying court orders and processes. Respondent failed in this
regard. His actions resulted in his clients prejudice. VI Respondent states that [t]he ironical
truth on this legal controversy is that the client-

11

appellant represented by undersigned counsel was satisfied, contented and has fully benefited
from the legal services rendered by him.180 Presenting the affidavit181 of Jim Dulay (Dulay),
Angelita De Jesus Attorney-in-Fact, respondent brandishes his clients pleasure with his legal
services.182 According to respondent, [t]he client-appellant in the same affidavit expressed
that [Dulay] was not prejudiced in any manner.183 This is not true. Angelita De Jesus was
prejudiced by respondents willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the Court of Appeals.
Respondents failure to comply with the September 20, 2010 Resolution (requiring his clients
conformity to the Motion to Withdraw Appeal) and November 11, 2010 Resolution (reiterating
the requirement of his clients conformity to the Motion) resulted in the denial of the Motion on
February 23, 2011.184 The period within which to appeal the February 23, 2011 denial185 had
clearly lapsed when respondent filed the Omnibus Motion before the Court of Appeals on March
5, 2014.186 Dulay wanted to withdraw the appeal,187 but respondents negligence and lack of
prudence resulted in an outcome opposite of what Angelita De Jesus, through Dulay, sought his
services for. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: 178 Flores v. Atty. Mayor Jr., A.C. No.
7314, August 25, 2015 4 [Per Curiam, En Banc]. 179 Id. at 5. 180 Rollo, p. 25. 181 Id. at 44.
182 Id. at 25. 183 Id. at 26.
184 Id. at 23, citing Court of Appeals February 13, 2011 Resolution. 185 Id. 186 Id. at 32. 187
Id. at 43. Resolution 22 A.C. No. 10117 CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. . . . . Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the
clients request for information. In Ong, this Court found that the lawyer violated his duty to his
client in failing to update the client on the status of the case.188 The lawyers incompetence,
neglect, and failure to update his client, in addition to his misappropriation of his clients
money, led to his disbarment from the practice of law.189 Here, respondent blindsided his
client on the real status of Bank of Philippine Islands. He failed to diligently attend to the legal
matter entrusted to him. The case, instead of being closed and terminated, came back to life
on appeal due to his neglect and lack of diligence. As the Court of Appeals correctly found:
Failure of Atty. Mortel to comply with the Resolutions of [the Court of Appeals] has prejudiced
the right of his client, herein respondentoppositor-appellant, to a just determination of her
cause. His failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid reason to comply with [the
Court of Appeals] directives constitutes disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of [the
Court of Appeals], amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or disrespect. The
foregoing acts committed by Atty. Mortel are sufficient cause for his suspension pursuant to
Sec. 28, in relation to Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.190 Respondents
negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and diligence required of every
lawyer.191 For his gross misconduct, insubordination, and disrespect of the Court of Appeals
directives, and for his negligence of his clients case, respondent must be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, Atty. Marcelino Ferdinand V. Jose is DIRECTED
to 188 Id. at 56. 189 Id. at 3. 190 Rollo, p. 5. 191 Ong v. Grijaldo, 450 Phil. 1, 9 (2003) [Per
Curiam, En Banc]. . , .
Resolution 23 A.C. No. 10117 show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why he should not be disciplined by this Court. Respondent Atty. Gideon D.V. Mortel
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ( 1) year for violating Canons 7, 10, 11, 12, and 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is STERNLY WARNED that
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this
Resolution be attached to respondent's personal

12

records as attorney, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in the country through the Office of the Court Administrator. SO ORDERED.
2.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila SECOND
DIVISION
A.C. No. 10583
February 18, 2015
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent. x x
A.C. No. 10584 [Formerly
CBD 10-2827]
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N LEONEN,
J.:
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon
10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against
Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty.
Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty.
Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.6
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by
Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by
Atty. Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said
deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the
original underscoring supplied)
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a
Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining
order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which
allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.15
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination: CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she
was about four years old.
A : Yes, sir.

13

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff,
isnt it?
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her cousins.
....
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla? THE
WITNESS
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s]. THE
COURT
: Whats the name of the mother? ATTY.
CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isnt it? THE
WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isnt it?
A : Of course.
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested
to be marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement
of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just
testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial. A :
Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication. ATTY. REY
SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because it
is not the issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly notarized on
or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book

14

number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I
read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed
to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other
heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have drafted into this
document . . . true or false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn the
legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife
Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the
subject of my continuing objection from the very beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened
the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your
Honor. That is why thats only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question? ATTY. REY
SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation. ATTY.
CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?] ATTY.
REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and impertinency
and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with the
ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true. ATTY.
CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted a
document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL

15

Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five
years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for
himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This
was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardinos Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla,
Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Mans
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the death of
his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during
his

16

professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turlas estate.26 In
other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that
Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos wife,
Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turlas niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had
other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully
aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was
then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity
in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife
who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the government;
14.5Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any
other heir entitled to her estate [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turlas affidavit that
Rufina Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turlas properties that were supposed to be
distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged
that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that the death
certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not
aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he [was]
representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her fathers estate."40 Mariano Turlas
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla
was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum shopping
because the various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his client as
the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of
attorneys fees out of the estates funds could be considered as "expenses of administration."44 Also,
payment of Atty. Santos legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the
Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turlas birth certificate was registered.46

17

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that Atty.
Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47

18

It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate
was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty.
Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turlas estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different parties and prayed
for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission
on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes
members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that "the
proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests
arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition
inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted
that he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir
of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turlas daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turlas daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on
the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of
Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina
Turla is Marilu Turlas mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rufina Turlas
inheritance and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for
Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wifes sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a
position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir
of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors
in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15,
2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

19

....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is
proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors Resolution. However,
this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3)
months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his client.
....
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers
must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage
clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court
explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument
will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily refute
Mariano Turlas claim that he is Rufina Turlas sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse,
he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar
Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil
Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the
attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of

20

properties and he . . . told me, Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan. So he asked me
to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself."
This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu Turlas standing as a legal and
rightful heir to Rufina Turlas estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla
that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65
It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turlas consent. Still, respondent did
not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano
Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of
interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent violated Canon 10,
Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

21

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:


Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondents act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication
despite
. . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the
respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not
only was he in contravention of the Lawyers Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With
full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turlas request to prepare the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and
March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to
impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this courts "plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys"70
and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems
from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as
well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to
the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Courts
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of
the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)
This courts authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

22

....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73 Under
the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the
constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines .
.
. upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the
investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the penalty that
may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the Statethe
administration of justiceas an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76
(Citations omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1wphi1 This disciplinary authority is
granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of the
Integrated
Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be
equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED
with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is
imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their

23

information and guidance.


ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

SO

24

3. EN BANC BARMATTERN0.1645 RE: AMENDMENT OF RULE 139-B Whereas, Article VIII,


Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.
Whereas, the Supreme Court's power relating to the admission to the practice of law inherently
includes the power to discipline and remove from the rolls, lawyers who have transgressed
their oath and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whereas, dismissal of
complaints filed against lawyers is a power of the Supreme Court that cannot be delegated to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Whereas, the motive of the complainant and his or her action/inaction after the filing of a
verified complaint against a lawyer are not essential to the proceedings. Now therefore,
Sections 1, 5, 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are amended to read as
follows: RULE 139-B Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint of any person before the
Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.

25

QUANTUM OF EVIDNECE

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and


BENJAMIN DANDA, Complainants
- versus
ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO
PEEWEE TRINIDAD,
and ANDRESITO FORNIER, Respondents.
Present:
CARPIO,
J.,
Chairperson,
SERENO, and REYES, JJ.
PEREZ,

BRION,

Promulgated:
December 14, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban and Benjamin
Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr., Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad, and
Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated
criminal complaints against them before the Iligan City Prosecutors Office for Large Scale and Syndicated
Illegal Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.1 Complainants pray for the
imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon respondents.2 Attached to complainants lettercomplaint is the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint3 allegedly submitted by complainants
in the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.
The Facts
Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador
P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal
recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against
certain persons, in exchange for money.5 De Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his
group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty. Andresito Fornier
(Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers),
were untouchable.6
In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint
Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file.7 The Joint
Complaint-Affidavit and supporting documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De
Guzman.8

26

During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office, complainants
allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of
them continuously telling complainants to pursue the case.9 When complainants asked De Guzman what
would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, Ipa tubus natin sa
kanila, perahan natin sila.10
Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they told De Guzman and
his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.11 Complainants
were allegedly offered by respondents 200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused.12
Complainants were once again allegedly offered by respondents One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00) to
pursue the case until the end, but they refused again.13 For this reason, respondents allegedly
orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 061676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City.14 On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to
have received a text message from De Guzman, saying, Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan
Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck kayo.15
In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly
fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,17 letter of De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor
Orlando Badoy,18 De Guzmans Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,19 and other
relevant documents. Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty.
Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,20 and prayed that the complaint be pursued against De Guzman.
Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court21 and Position Paper filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline,22 denied all the allegations in the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared
that he has never communicated with any of the complainants and has never been to Cotabato.23 He
further claimed that the subscribed letter-complaint does not contain ultimate facts because it does not
specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings and conversations with him.24
Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a
certain Joseph Montesclaros (Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidads reputation as a lawyer and city
mayor.25 Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly
believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City.26 Trinidad also claims that he,
his family members and close friends have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the
syndicate headed by Montesclaros.27
Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court processes by filing
fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of
defendants.28 Since the defendants addresses are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the
criminal complaint, and thus the information is filed with the court.29 Consequently, a warrant of arrest
is issued by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the defendant will the latter
know of the criminal complaint.30 At this point, Montesclaros intervenes by extorting money from the
defendant in order for the complainants to drop the criminal complaint.31 To prove the existence of this
syndicate, Trinidad presented the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to
the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these institutions to
investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a Canadian citizen who was at that time
jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket.32 Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco,
which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by complainants
themselves.33

27

Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included some of their
members as respondents to divert suspicion.34 Trinidad pointed out that his wife was a victim of this
fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment filed in Marawi City.35 Fortunately, when the warrant of
arrest was being served in Pasay City Hall, Trinidads wife was not there.36 Lastly, Trinidad declared that
Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and dangerous places to
harass his victims.37
Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court38 and Position Paper filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline,39 claimed that in his 35 years as a member of the bar, he has conducted
himself professionally in accordance with the exacting standards of the legal profession.40 Fornier
denied knowing any of the complainants, and also denied having any dealings or communication with
any of them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on behalf of a client, any
case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against complainants.41 Fornier claimed that he was included in this
case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal
recruitment.42 Fornier claimed that the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by
Montesclaros.43 For coming to the legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the
plan of the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients.44 Fornier claimed that the
filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the syndicate to get even at those who may have
exposed and thwarted their criminal designs at extortion.45 Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey
to the scheme and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery of
the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutors Offices, the Philippine National Police and the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in carrying out their criminal activities.46 Lastly, Fornier
claimed that complainants failed to establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof, as complainants affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures
and sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence.47
De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a Motion to Dismiss
Complaint48 on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the
Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of this administrative complaint, are spurious.49 According
to the Certification issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants
Lauban, Lumabao and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
Act), which charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered by the Prosecutor,
did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of
Complaint against any person.50

In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,51 De Guzman stated he is an 81-year
old retired Regional Trial Court judge.52 He pointed out that there are no details regarding the
allegations of grave and serious misconduct, dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents,
violation of lawyers oath and other administrative infractions.53 De Guzman invited the attention of the
Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to
deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint and to narrate in detail how he
became involved in this case which was masterminded by Montesclaros.54 In his Affidavit of
Clarification,55 De Guzman claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal
complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter-affidavit of
Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr.,

28

implicating him in the preparation of the complaint.56 De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find
his and his clients names in the counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the
Affidavit of Clarification.57 Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has no familiarity with the complainants
or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other respondents in the complaint, but he
believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L.
Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.58

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 200859 and 13 March 2009,60 none of the
complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint despite due notice.61
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline
The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline reads:
In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier are deemed to be
without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends DISMISSAL of the charges against them.
As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough basis to hold him
administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for two (2) months is hereby
recommended.62

29

The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint as well
as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against respondents
Trinidad and Fornier.63 Other than bare allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and
Forniers supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the
complaint.64 In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the non-participation and noninvolvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against
Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.65 For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that the charges against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to deny the allegations
in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.66 Moreover, De Guzman failed to
controvert the truly vicious evidence against him:
But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he sent to Orlando D.
Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006. This letter was alleged in and attached to
the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel
to Cotabato City to file charges against persons he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name
Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was one of those who
executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis
Lauban which was filed before the Supreme Court.67
The Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against
Fornier and Trinidad.68 In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a
suspension of two (2) months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to
file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with modification, and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case against
Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED. However, Atty.
Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years for his attempt
to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort money.69
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be administratively disciplined
based on the allegations in the complaint.
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier.

30

We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzmans liability, and likewise dismiss the charges
against De Guzman.
Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence
Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or
wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is
presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.70

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.71

Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not determined
mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon
its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.72

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by preponderance of evidence, and lastly by
substantial evidence, in that order.73 Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.74
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.75 It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.76 Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in
determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following:
(a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
(d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the
equipoise doctrine.77
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or

31

disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.
De Guzmans Liability
The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzmans liability for the following reasons: (a) the documents
submitted by complainants in support of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not
appear in any of the mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their
complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman
communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of
extortion.

The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First, complainants submitted a Joint
Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct against
De Guzman, Trinidad and Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint CounterAffidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut
the illegal recruitment charges against them. The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint
purportedly appears to be subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman,
however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the submission of this
document by complainants:

This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN, MIKO LUMABAO and
SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042
under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI, and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints
were dismissed thru a Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.
This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in
connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did they file any Affidavit of Complaint
against any person.78 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and
Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to
before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants
submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants
submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this
Court.

Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a syndicate headed by
Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges. Given this claim that
complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated criminal charges supported by fabricated documents,
this Court is more cautious in appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants.
Complainants bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in support of
their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. Unfortunately, complainants did not

32

even attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the
documents and substantiate or narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by
respondents. To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint complainants
attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all their allegations of misconduct
against respondents, is spurious, not having been submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan,
despite purportedly having the signature and seal of the prosecutor.

Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their communication with De
Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a warrant of arrest would be issued, what
mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of the voluminous documents that complainants submitted,
where is the warrant for their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these
complainants? These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to attend
any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite due notice. For this reason,
the allegations of De Guzmans misconduct are really doubtful.
Lastly, the supposedly vicious evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he allegedly sent to
Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter states:
Dear Orly,
Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about the South and the way
of life there.

It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a-gun filed charges
against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint directly to your man, Ben Danda,
with instructions for him and the other two complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor
and file with City Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from the
prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest.
Thank you and best regards.79
The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported letter have material
discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even explain how they were able to get a copy of
the purported letter. Complainants did not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V.
Gustilo, to authenticate the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the
Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents.
The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and credibility into this purported
letter:
Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer denial of the letter or
explain the import of the same differently from what is understood by the Complainants. But even with
that effort, the letter is so plain to understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the
message it conveys.80
Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that complainants, whom
respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are consistently involved in the fabrication of
evidence in support of their criminal complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioners

33

observation, De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants criminal
complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman stated:
5.

Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his surprise, he recently
received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c)
Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does
not have any Daryll);
6.
Undersigned counsels name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit of Atty. Nicanor
G. Alcarez (Montesclaros lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as
against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the
Monica Condominium, and Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation
to make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;
xxx
4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment Agency nor with the
complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City), nor with the other respondents, but he
believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L.
Montesclaros in the illegal recruitment business.81
For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in support of their
complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the charges against De
Guzman.
De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or wrongdoing. Complainants
have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants
were not able to discharge this burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated
and were apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory conference
proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In disbarment proceedings, what is
required to merit the administrative penalty is preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher
than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and persuaded them to file
fabricated charges against other people for the purpose of extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence
of the parties are evenly balanced, the Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise
doctrine. For these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly dismisses the charges against
De Guzman.
Trinidads and Forniers Liabilities
The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to Trinidads and Forniers liabilities:
A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Counter Affidavit with
Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed miserably to substantiate their charges against
Respondents. Other than their bare allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondents
supposed involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For instance, they
failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato City to personally induce and
persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen

34

(16) others or that they have prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of
communication. The supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made
during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutors Office to the Complainants is unbelievable
and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during
a serious proceeding such as the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the
City Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates against the
reliabiity of Complainants charges against Respondents
xxx
But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made unmistakable Respondents
non-participation or non-involvement in the charges they have filed when they wittingly filed their
Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only
too well that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such
pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same reveals that the
Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously included Respondents Trinidad and
Fornier as parties to the case. In particular, they explained that they had no communication or dealings
whatsoever with the said lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their
charges. The undersigned finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to ignore the
import of the same as a piece of evidence.82
At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under Section 12(c) of Rule
139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the penalty imposed by the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand,
admonition or fine), unless the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:
c.
If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is
less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision
exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon
petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the Boards resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing the charges
against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a Motion to Dismiss Complaint
Against Trinidad and Fornier.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges
against Attys. Wenceslao Peewee Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the
Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and increasing the
penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS
the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]
DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO
DIVISION

SECOND

35

Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 3 2005.
A.C. No. 6580 (CBD 03-1175) (Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz vs. Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.)
A complaint dated December 16, 2003 was filed by Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent of violating the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility by filing disbarment, criminal and administrative cases against complainant without legal
and factual bases, for submitting false affidavits, for refusing his invitation to have a "brotherly" talk as
fellow lawyer to clarify the matters between complainant and respondent's clients and for filing a
prohibited pleading.
Specifically, complainant accuses respondent of: filing, through Adoracion Losloso, a baseless
disbarment case against him supported by two false affidavits; sending complainant a letter charging
him of estafa and ignoring complainant's reply thereto; refusing complainant's invitation to a "brotherly"
talk; filing an estafa case through falsification of public document and four other criminal complaints
against herein complainant, through Losloso, which were eventually dismissed for being groundless;
filing an HLURB case in behalf of Losloso and Nestor Aguirre without verifying the truth of their claims;
filing a motion to dismiss the ejectment case filed by complainant against Losloso before the barangay
knowing that such is a prohibited pleading; and helping Losloso to file motions to inhibit a prosecutor in
Pasig for alleged bias.[1]cralaw
Respondent filed an answer contending that: he merely acted as counsel of the parties who filed cases
against complainant and out of the 17 cases filed by Adoracion Losloso against complainant, respondent
only handles four which are still pending resolution; it would be premature to say that said cases were
filed only to harass complainant; there is no showing that respondent is moved by malice or bad faith in
agreeing to act as counsel of Losloso; Losloso also alleged that it was a public attorney who was
assisting her in all her cases by preparing the various pleadings in court; and it is only because said
public attorney could not appear in court that she asked the assistance of respondent and eventually
engaged the legal services of respondent when the public attorney died.[2]cralaw
On February 17, 2004, complainant filed a Reply to the answer reiterating his earlier claims which
respondent countered with a Rejoinder asserting the same denials.[3]cralaw
A mandatory conference was held on April 16, 2004 and on said date, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.[4]cralaw On June 7,
2004, she submitted her report dated June 7, 2004, finding that:
...In the case at hand, complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to
prove that respondent has been moved by malice and bad faith in accepting to serve as legal counsel of
Mrs. Adoracion Losloso. Moreover, records show that the cases, where respondent acted as counsel for
Mrs. Losloso have not been resolved, and therefore, it could not be determined yet whether or not they
are meritorious.[5]cralaw
She then recommended that the instant case of disbarment filed against respondent be dismissed for
lack of merit.[6]cralaw
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-349
CBD Case No. 03-1175

36

Atty. Miniano B. dela Cruz vs. Atty.


Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks merit, the case is hereby
DISMISSED.[7]cralaw
On October 19, 2004, complainant filed before this Court a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds
that: the report and recommendation of IBP Commissioner Maala is not based on correct records of the
case; Maala's report and recommendation did not consider the violations of respondent under Sec. 20 of
Rule 138[8]cralaw of the Rules of Court, Canons 1,[9]cralaw 8[10]cralaw and 12,[11]cralaw and Rules
1.02, 1.03, and 1.04 of the Code of Professional Conduct;[12]cralaw the report and recommendation did
not discuss the failure of respondent to conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of the
complaint for Estafa, disbarment and complaint before the HLURB, among others; and the Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors erred in approving the incomplete and defective report of Maala and should
therefore be set aside.[13]cralaw
On December 28, 2004, complainant filed a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration emphasizing
the issue that respondent filed groundless cases against him.[14]cralaw
On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a Comment stating that: complainant, instead of filing a petition from
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c), erroneously filed a
motion for reconsideration; contrary to the allegations of complainant, respondent acted in good faith
and studied the supporting documents of Losloso first before sending complainant the demand letter;
respondent was not the one who filed the cases before the HLURB, the Prosecutors' Office and the IBP;
respondent came into the picture long after these cases have been filed; respondent agreed to handle
the said cases based on his honest assessment that there is a valid cause of action against complainant;
[15]cralaw the investigating IBP commissioner was not biased in requiring respondent to submit his
position paper despite his failure to attend the mandatory hearing on time; respondent agreed to the
order of Maala requiring both parties to submit position papers and it was only when the commissioner
dismissed his complaint that complainant raised the issue of bias; respondent enjoys the presumption
that he is innocent of the charges against him and complainant has failed to convincingly prove that
respondent has acted in bad faith in the manner by which he has handled the cases pending between
complainant and Losloso, et al.; complainant himself has filed several cases against Losloso (cancellation
of contract, estafa and perjury) which have been dismissed; since these cases were also found to be
without merit, complainant, following his line of reasoning, should also be considered as having harassed
Losloso in violation of his oath as a lawyer.[16]cralaw
First of all, we are treating herein motion for reconsideration as a petition referred to in Rule 139-B, Sec.
12(c).
After reviewing the records of this case, we find the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, to be well-founded.
Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the complainant, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
[17]cralaw

37

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.[18]cralaw But his guilt cannot be presumed.
[19]cralaw A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing will not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be sufficient
evidence to support the charge.[21]cralaw
In this case, complainant accuses respondent of filing baseless charges against him. Apart from his bare
allegations, however, complainant failed to show that respondent did in fact file baseless cases against
him. As borne by the records, the complaint, as well as the motions for reconsideration of the denial
thereof, for estafa through falsification of public document, was filed by Adoracion Losloso;[22]cralaw the
disbarment case before the IBP were filed by Losloso, Sheila Bones-Lei and Nestor Aguirre;[23]cralaw
while the HLURB case was filed by Losloso and Aguirre.[24]cralaw Aside from complainant's allegations,
there is no proof that respondent prodded said individuals to file cases against herein complainant.
Adoracion Losloso even executed a sworn statement expressing that it was Atty. Ramon Vera of the
Public Attorney's Office in Pasig who helped her in filing the cases before the fiscal, the HLURB and the
IBP. She also categorically stated that herein respondent only entered the picture after the said cases
had already been filed and that he did not have any participation in the drafting of said complaints. She
also explained that out of the 20 cases filed between her and herein complainant, respondent only
participated in four cases which are still pending resolution.[25]cralaw
Apart from complainant's naked assertions, there is also no proof anywhere in the records that
respondent filed false affidavits to support the disbarment case against complainant in the IBP. Neither is
there any showing that respondent filed a prohibited pleading, In any case, we cannot see how such
pleading, if ever one was filed, could be a basis for disbarment. Neither could respondent's refusal to
have a "brotherly talk over a cup of coffee" with complainant or respondent's act of helping Losloso file a
motion to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for alleged bias could be a basis for disciplinary action.
What is only clear is that herein respondent sent complainant a letter dated May 17, 2001 demanding
that complainant give Losloso, et al. their commission for the sale of a property in Antipolo based on a
Memorandum of Agreement, otherwise Losloso, et al. would be constrained to file appropriate criminal,
civil and administrative complaints against herein complainant.[26]cralaw We cannot, based on this
letter alone, say that respondent was moved by malice or bad faith.
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, such as the case at bar, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. This Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if the complainant establishes his case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant
evidence, the complaint for disbarment against respondent is correctly dismissed[27]cralaw by the IBP
Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz, is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
Clerk of Court
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND
DIVISION
A.C. No. 7687
December 3, 2014

38

RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants, vs.


ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------x
A.C. No. 7688
RAUL C. LANUZA and REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants, vs.
ATTYS. FRANKIE O. MAGSALIN III, PETER ANDREWS GO and PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents. D E C I S I
ON
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for disbarment filed by complainants Raul C.
Lanuza (Lanuza) and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), docketed as A.C. No. 7687, against lawyers Frankie
O. Magsalin III (Atty. Magsalin) and Pablo R. Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty. Magsalin,
Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go) for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross
misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both involve the same parties, revolve around
the sameset of facts, and raise exactly the same issues.
The Facts
These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant Lanuza against Philippine
Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI), which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit Hotel), a client of respondents Atty.
Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from the law firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law Office). Both the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza
appealed the NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals (CA).
A.C. No. 7688
On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642, favoring Lanuza and directing
PHI to reinstate him with full backwages.
According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), received the Notice of
Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his law office located in Quezon City.
Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance1 and Motion for
Reconsideration,2 both dated April 12, 2007, filed by PHI and signed by Atty. Magsalin. In the said
pleadings, PHI stated that it received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision on April 10,
2007. This information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver the said
Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was also located in Quezon City,
thirteen (13) days after he received his own copies. Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City
Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of
Judgment with the CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007 Certification,3 issued by
Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that the Registered
Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman
Pecante)and duly received by Teresita Calucag on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of
Postman Pecante.
With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the disbarment complaint
against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as A.C. No. 7688.
A.C. No. 7688

39

In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita "Tess" Calucag (Calucag), secretary of PRC Law
Office, altered the true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment withthe CA decision when she signed
and stamped on the registry return receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the opposing
party that they received their copy of the CA decision on a later date and not March 29, 2007. The
complainants added that the alteration was very evident on the registry return receipt which bore two
(2) stamped dates of receipt, with one stamped date "snowpaked" or covered with a liquid correction
fluid to conceal the true date written on the registry return receipt. They inferred that Calucag concealed
whatcould probably be the true date of receipt, and that the respondents must have induced Calucag to
alter the true date of receipt because they stood to benefit from the additional thirteen (13) days to
prepare their motion for reconsideration.
In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants allegations and countered that they actually
received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on April 10, 2007 based on the
Registry Return Receipt4 (1st return receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return receipt
was "RECEIVED APRIL 10 2007" and signed by Calucag in front and within the full view of Postman
Pecante. The respondents claimed that examining and finding that the return receipt had been faithfully
accomplished and the date indicated therein to be true and accurate, Postman Pecante accepted the
said return receipt. As borne out by the records, the 1st return receipt pertaining to the CA decision was
duly returned to the CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty. Magsalin filed the required Compliance.
Considering that Atty. Cruz was out of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6, 2007, based on a Bureau
of Immigration certification,5 Atty. Magsalin requested Atty. Go, a senior associate in their law office, to
review PHIs motion for reconsideration of the decision. Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for
reconsideration and had it filed with the CA.
Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt, respondents stated the date, April 10, 2007, in the
filed compliance and motion for reconsideration.
To oppose complainants assertion of Calucags application of "snowpake" in the 1st return receipt
allegedly to conceal the true date of receipt of the CA decision, the respondents secured a Certification6
from the CA, which stated the following:
This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March 23, 2007, attached to the dorsal portion of
page 209 of the rollo of the above-captioned case, asper careful observation, reveals no "snowpaked"
portion and that the white mark that appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry Return
Receipt bearing the stamp mark of receipt ofP.R. Cruz Law Offices is a part of the white envelope that
contained the decisionof this Court which stuck to the said Return Receipt.
A.C. No. 7687
As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution.
On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of Resolution from the CA.
Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance,7 dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI,
through the PRC Law Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was
received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA.
Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the respondents, Atty.
Garciarequested the QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the said Notice
of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. Inthe October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO, Chief of
the Records Section Fallarme, stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin
was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July 16, 2007, based on the logbook
of Postman Pecante.

40

docketed as A.C. No. 7687.


In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have induced Calucag to
alter the true date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof when she
signed and stamped on the 2nd return receipt the date- July 23, 2007. They contended that Attys.
Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the additional seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered
date asthey, in fact, used the altered date in their subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin and Cruz falsely
alleged such in the compliance filed before the CA; the motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari;10 and the petition for review on certiorari11 filed before this Court. The
complainants insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and this Court by
filing the above- mentioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were already time barred.
In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the allegations in the complaint and retorted that they
actually received the subject Notice of Resolution on the date - July 23, 2007 as indicated in the 2nd
return receipt which was also duly accepted by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned to the CA as
sender. Relying on the date, July 23, 2007, as indicated in 2nd return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of
PHI, filed the compliance and the other pleadings before the CA and this Court concerning CA-G.R. SP No.
92642. The respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd return receipt deserved full faith and credence
as it was clearly indicated by Calucag, witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately processed by the
QCCPO to be duly returnedto the CA.
Referral to the IBP
In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the Court referred the said administrative cases
tothe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report and recommendation.
The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the scheduled mandatory conference held before
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, the parties filed their respective position papers.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
A.C. No. 7687
In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation,14 Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner
Hababag) recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave more
credence to the date indicated in the 2nd return receipt which bore no alteration and was duly accepted
by Postman Pecante than the October 25, 2007 Certification issued by the QCCPO. He stated that the
2nd return receipt did not contain any alteration as to the stamping of the date - July 23, 2007, and that
Postman Pecante would not have allowed and accepted the 2nd return receipt from Calucag if it
contained an inaccurate date other than the true date of receipt. Finally, the CBD ruled that the
complainants failed to demonstrate the specific acts constituting deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct by evidence that was clear and free from doubt as to the act charged and as to the
respondents motive.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report
and recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-176.15 The complainants moved for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
A.C. No. 7688
In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009, the CBD recommended that the complaint
be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave credence to the date indicated in the 1st return receipt as the

41

actual and true date of receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the
respondents. It did not subscribe to the complainants theory that Calucag was induced by the
respondents to conceal
the true date of receipt by applying a liquid correction fluid in the 1st return receipt. It found the the
Certification issued by Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to explain the presence of the white
substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.
On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and recommendation
through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was denied.
With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases denied, the complainants filed their respective
petitions for review before this Court.
ISSUE
The vital issue for the Courts resolution is whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held
administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaints.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688 jointly as they essentially revolve
around the same circumstances and parties.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the complainant.1wphi1
The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly
preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.18
In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive, thus, insufficient to
hold the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.
Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts as to the
dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it appear that
they received the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO
Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the only logical explanation as
to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was
that the respondents must have induced Calucag toalter the true date of receipt by the CA for the
purpose of extending the period to file, the otherwise time barred, motion for reconsideration. Verily, this
leap of inference proffered by the complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and
not in any way supported by clear substantial evidence required to justify the imposition of an
administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
Even
legal
mail.
been

if the postmaster's certifications were to merit serious consideration, the Court cannot avoid the
reality that the registry return card is considered as the official CA record evidencing service by
This card carries the presumption that it was prepared in the course of official duties which have
regularly performed. Jn this sense, it is presumed to be accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise.

The Court finds merit in the respondents' argument that had Calucag stamped an inaccurate date on the
registry return receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and had full view of the receiving and

42

stamping of the said registry return receipts, would have called her attention to correct the same or
would have refused to receive them altogether for being erroneous. Here, Postman Pecante having
accepted two registry return receipts with the dates, April 10, 200719 and .July 23, 2007,20 respectively,
can only mean that the said postman considered the dates indicated therein to be correct and accurate.
While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out the proper disciplinary punishment upon
lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, the Court will not wield its axe against those the
accusations against whom are not indubitably proven.
Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint for disbarment should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, in
A.C. No. 7687; and the administrative complaint against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S.
Go and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7688, are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

43

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015

NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, Respondent.


RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S. Sorreda (Sorreda) against Atty. David L. Kho
(Kho) for malpractice and/or gross misconduct.
The Facts
The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L. Macarilay (Macarilay), through her then counsel
Sorreda,1 filed an administrative complaint2 against Kho before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1866 (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as counsel for
Macarilay on 10 March 2007.3 On 5 December 2007, Sorreda filed with the IBP the present complaint4
against Kho, which contained exactly the same allegations in Macarilay's complaint. Sorreda alleged
that:
(1) Macarilay, through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case against Candelaria Kholoma (Candelaria)
and Imelda Kholoma (Imelda), Kho's clients, before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC); (2) Kho notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being
disqualified under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since Candelaria and Imelda are Kho's sister-inlaw and niece, respectively; (3) Kho did not furnish Macarilay and Sorreda a copy of his comment on
their motion for substitution of arbitrator; (4) Kho did not countervail the manifestation alleging the
mendacity of Kho and his clients; (5) Kho intentionally delayed the receipt of Macarilay's motion for time
extension; (6) Kho advised Robert Kholoma (Robert), the husband of Candelaria, to forcibly eject
Macarilay's watchman in the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed by the Kholomas in
the case for forcible entry;
(8) Kho also notarized the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the Kholomas, which amounted
to "self-notarization," because "the one being given power is the law firm of Kho Antonio Velasco & Payos
Law Offices, of which [Kho] is the premier partner"; (9) Kho notarized the SPA with only one of the three
signatories exhibiting her cedula; (10) Kho also notarized the petition for review filed by Candelaria and
Imelda before the Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho and his clients deliberately failed to furnish the CIAC
with a copy their appeal.
In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit, answer in the case for
forcible entry, SPA, and petition for review. Kho, however, alleged that he acted in good faith for he
believed that the decision in Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those convicted
of the crime involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents," was still the prevailing
rule. Kho pleaded for liberality in the application of the then recently enacted 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, since there was no damage caused by the notarization. He admitted that he was not yet fully
conversant with the new rules. As to the other allegations, Kho claimed that those were unsubstantiated
conclusions, conjectures and speculations. Kho admitted his failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy of the
comment on the motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish the CIAC with a copy of his
clients' appeal. However, he alleged that no damage was caused and he immediately furnished the
copies of the pleadings upon discovery of his inadvertence.

44

Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate forum shopping and splitting a cause of
action, albeit baseless and unfounded, must be sanctioned."7 In an Order8 dated 29 January 2009, IBP
Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (IBP Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to consolidate the
present complaint with Macarilay's complaint, because there was already a report and recommendation
by a different commissioner in Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009, Kho filed an urgent
manifestation,9 pleading for the dismissal of the present case. Kho attached a copy of this Court's
Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third Division of this Court resolved to close and
terminate CBD Case No. 06-1866 (docketed as A.C. No. 8161), considering that no motion for
reconsideration was filed against the IBP Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit, and no
petition for review was filed before the Court.
The Ruling of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the present complaint against Kho because Sorreda failed to establish his allegations by
clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did not
establish how Kho's alleged violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, if proven, would damage
Macarilay. In Resolution No. XX-2013-10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, dismissing the complaint
for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. XXI-2014-22114 issued on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Sorreda, since the Board found no cogent reason
to reverse its initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of those which had already been
taken into consideration.
The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment,
the Court finds that the present administrative case becomes dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It provides that a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies, and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same
claim, demand, or cause of action.16 A.C. No. 8161 and the present case have substantially identical
parties, refer to the same subject matter, raise the same issue, and claim the same relief. The present
complaint is a mere duplication of Macarilay's complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this
Court in A.C. No. 8161 is conclusive in the present case. Furthermore, Sorreda failed to discharge the
burden of proving Kho's administrative liability by clear preponderance of evidence.
The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved.17 The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
complainant,18 and the burden is not satisfied when complainant relies on mere assumptions and
suspicions as evidence.19 Considering the serious consequences of disbarment and suspension, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
administrative penalty.20 In the present case, Sorreda did not substantiate his allegations, and he relied
on his own assumptions and suspicions. Sorreda did not show how Kho's alleged actions amount to
malpractice or gross misconduct, which will subject Kho to administrative sanction. Sorreda cannot shift
the burden of proof to Kho by asking him to rebut his allegations. It is The October 25, 2007 Certification
became the basis of the other disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz
axiomatic that one w ho alleges an act has the onus of proving it.21 If the burden of proof is not
overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.22
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. David L. Kho. Costs against
complainant. SO ORDERED. Del Castillo, Mendoza Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

45

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 9831, March 09, 2016
CHAN SHUN KUEN, Complainant, v. COMMISSIONERS LOURDES B. COLOMA-JAVIER, GREGORIO
O. BILOG III, RAUL TAGLE AQUINO AND ATTY. JOYRICH M. GOLANGCO, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N REYES, J.:
The instant disbarment case filed by Chan Shun Kuen (complainant), the General Manager and Chief
Executive Officer of Compromise Enterprises Corporation (CEC), against Commissioners Lourdes B.
Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III and Raul Tagle Aquino, and Deputy Executive Clerk Atty. Joyrich M.
Golangco (respondents), all from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), is an offshoot of the
labor case entitled Felisa B. Toribio, et ah, v. Compromise Enterprises Corporation and/or Margaret So
Chan.
The said labor case for illegal dismissal, unpaid service incentive leave and 13th month pay was decided
against CEC; hence, it was ordered to pay separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the sum of
P5,543,807.57.1 CEC, however, failed to appeal the said decision, thus it became final and executory.
The complainants in the labor case moved for the execution of the said decision, hence, a Writ of
Execution was issued and was duly served. Accordingly, the sheriff levied the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19784 belonging to CEC.

46

By a Decision2 dated October 16, 2007, the labor case was resolved by the NLRC Third Division in favor
of the complainants therein. CEC filed several motions and appeal before the NLRC but all were ruled
against it.
Instead of filing an appeal with the appellate court, the complainant opted to file a series of complaints,
administrative and criminal, against one or several of the respondents of the NLRC before different
bodies.3
Undaunted with the dismissal of all the cases he filed against the respondents, the complainant once
again came to this Court with a Verified Complaint4 for disbarment claiming that the respondents
connived with each other in writing its Decision dated October 16, 2007 for the said labor case and
alleging that Commissioner Tito F. Genilo's (Commissioner Genilo) signature was forged by a personnel of
the Third Division, as well as the December 10, 2007 Letter of Commissioner Genilo regarding his
inhibition in the said case.
In compliance with the Court's directive,5 the respondents filed their Comment6 asserting in the main
that the complainant committed forum shopping for having filed identical complaints in various forms,
against the same respondents before different bodies. The respondents branded the complaint as
motivated by malice and retorted that the complainant has been using the Court and several quasijudicial bodies as a means to overturn the decision of the Labor Arbiter in his desperate attempt to stop
the execution proceedings on his property by maliciously and repeatedly filing baseless, unfounded and
frivolous harassment suits against them.
After examining the instant complaint, the Court resolves to dismiss it outright.
To begin with, the main issue in disbarment cases is whether or not a lawyer has committed serious
professional misconduct sufficient to cause disbarment. The test is whether the lawyer's conduct shows
him or her to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor; or whether it renders
him or her unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant; and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint with clearly preponderant evidence.7
Guided by the foregoing tenets, the disbarment complaint against the respondents has no leg to stand
on. The particular acts alleged by the complainant against the respondents, which to his mind, were
grounds for disbarment, have no merit and seem too far-fetched. The respondents cannot be disbarred
merely on complainant's bare allegation that the respondents connived with each other in writing its
decisions, resolutions and orders against his company, and that Commissioner Genilo's signature was
forged by a personnel of the NLRC Third Division. These acts particularized by the complainant are mere
allegations and he has nothing but hollow suppositions to bolster his complaint.
Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of the respondents, there was no evidence to show
that the respondents committed the acts complained of. No specific incidents and sufficient evidence
can be gathered to show that the respondents had committed misconduct, dishonesty, falsehood, or had
misused the rules of procedure. There was no indication whatsoever of any connivance or manifest
partiality to prejudice the complainant. Neither was there proof that the decisions, resolution, or orders
of the respondents were attended by bad faith, malice or gross negligence. As it turned out, the charges
levelled against the respondents were imaginary and unworthy of serious consideration because it was
clear from the start that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to the respondents' capacity as
NLRC commissioners. Besides, the sincerity of the charge against the respondents is cynical.
Upon scrutiny of the records of this case, it would reveal that the complaint was an ill-motivated bid to
disbar the respondents, who were merely exercising their judicial function as NLRC Commissioners.

47

Hence, there is a veneer of truth in the allegation of the respondents that the complaint is a vindictive
charge of the complainant meant to vex, harass, humiliate and punish them in performing their duty, as
well as to get even with them for deciding the labor case against the complainant. The Court had already
held that "[t]o allow complainant to trifle with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an
instrument of retaliation, would be a reflection on the rule of law."8
The Court also noted that the instant complaint is a virtual duplicate of previous administrative
complaints which this Court had already dismissed in A.C. No. 80409 and A.C. No. 8621,10 there being
no prima facie case. Clearly, all the cases filed by the complainant before the different bodies essentially
revolve around the same circumstances and parties involving the decisions, resolutions, and orders
relative to the abovementioned labor case.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the case should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Nonetheless, the
complainant's propensity in incessantly filing baseless complaints against the respondents should be
curtailed. To allow every party who lost in a case to file multiple suits against those who did not decide in
his favor would unreasonably clog the dockets of the court with unscrupulous cases. Considering that
this has already been complainant's third attempt to file a baseless suit against the respondents before
this Court, it is deemed proper to admonish him and sternly warn him that he shall be dealt with more
severely should he commit a similar act against a member of the Bar.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Commissioners Lourdes
B. Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III, Raul Tagle Aquino, and Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco for lack of merit.
Complainant Chan Shun Kuen is hereby ADMONISHED for filing the malicious complaint, WITH STERN
WARNING that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely as indirect contempt of the Court.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO,
JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR., AND
ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N BERSAMIN,
J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek the
disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G.
Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that
became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of
lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they
brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the Registry of

48

Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City
(Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546 their
affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of
defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres,
they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No. RT64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they
immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the
proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim
would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to
the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants'
lack of objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16,
2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to
his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new
annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request
appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and
the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the arinotation of the decision dated
May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the
complainants' Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30, 2008
addressed.
to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who
had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of their
notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9,
respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or before such scheduled
hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already resolved, or
remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his
professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They submitted
that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order
specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty.
Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions as officials in the
Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting
Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced.

49

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint.11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres had
been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation
process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit any
abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the complainants
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for
every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy, stressing
that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during
the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter-request dated June
30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-request
had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint was the second
disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to harass and
intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another
Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the
cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise
of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed in the
cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-0759598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty. Caluya,
Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn
disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of
Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on
consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala's Comment.19

50

Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly
required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and
immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility
exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general
duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and that the same
are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof
and inform the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and advising
him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or
duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely ministerial
act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala, Atty.
Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008

51

or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to
determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was limited only to
what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC
order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it
became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants were not bereft of
any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way of
consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated
in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document registered by the
Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each other to
guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement, and then
to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No.
N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause since the
issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is nonetheless
essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in
this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired
with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the records
indicated their own active pjarticipation in arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that
they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the settlement of
the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as lawyers to do so,
pursuant
to
Rule
1.04,
Canon
1
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility,
viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Civil
Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the
complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the

52

property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The
complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio,
Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to
the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at
any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal
representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law Profession
did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence, the
rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. Atty.
Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his
whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil
Case No. Q-07- 59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he continued to
come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case No. Q-0759598.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N PER
CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law
for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt
of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint.
On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before
the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set
of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed
if there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution

53

based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent
arrived at 11:10 oclock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondents Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant
therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10
Complainants Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name
a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda
Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainants case.
Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that:
1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to
buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the
method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she
complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency.16 Complainant obliged the
request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by
a receipt,17 stating that it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after

54

favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the
remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of
P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to
prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include
additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these
were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the
same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion,
the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondents directive for the reimbursement of the value of a
bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on the
case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her


counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty
since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the
amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent
never replied.
Respondents Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of
law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted
the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainants case, but he qualified that
he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for
which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees.
Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her
husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his
services. The transaction was declared as no loan and he was told not to worry about its payment. As
regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount
was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in the
handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their
hotel accommodations. Complainants husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent
denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from complainant. He also
denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in their favor at
the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other
party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the
judge.

55

Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel
was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of
action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of
contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he
had rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondents defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the
complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she
met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company
owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount
of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as no loan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated
June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against
respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondents motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three
(3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Courts Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers conduct is not confined to the performance
of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral

56

character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the
amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense
that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the
actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the
legal profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.28
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately
returned. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged
filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a
lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if
the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
representation expenses allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his
client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of
his clients trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession
and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost
fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act
that would damage the image of judges, lest the publics perception of the dispensation of justice be
overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was

57

indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondents actuations would seriously erode the
publics trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that [a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. In his private
capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first
time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next
time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or
emergency but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These
acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were
indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as a
lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00
were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondents assertion
that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as
no loan, does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as
loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and
sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

58

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to
ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also
covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to
be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondents lawyering for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would
trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the
rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainants case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil
Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the
parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the
complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission
of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was
the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainants case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor
the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent
that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there
is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.

59

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.36 The appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance
as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative
cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondents administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are
filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different
from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of
evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than

60

that which is offered in opposition thereto.40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the
Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00 representing
the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyerclient relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received
from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the
complainant. While respondents deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the
judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of
their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for
the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession.43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and
ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave. Peralta, J.,
no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115
September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy YupangcoNakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts

61

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At
the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria
La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the
court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacitas properties, as well
as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming
from Pacitas stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged
a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9
executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as
President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds
therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or
after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to
transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several
cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the
same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension
of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to withdraw did
notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,

62

restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately,
the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are
sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good
moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of
Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty
was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited
by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil
Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject
trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the
Courts determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the
aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had
previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even
adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x
toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has
no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of
the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of
"serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1wphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a
property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,

63

honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not
only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although
to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds
respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115
September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and
unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy YupangcoNakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At
the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria
La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the
court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacitas properties, as well
as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming
from Pacitas stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged

64

a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of
Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9
executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as
President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10
Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding
deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds
therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or
after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to
transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several
cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the
same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorneys fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension
of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion to withdraw did
notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately,
the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are
sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good
moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands of
Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty
was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court

65

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited
by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil
Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject
trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the
Courts determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the
aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had
previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even
adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x
toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has
no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of
the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of
"serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1wphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a
property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not
only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although
to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent
guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P15,000.00 within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court

66

Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

3Republic of tbe tlbilippineg ~upreme ~ourt ;illllanila FIRST DIVISION PLUTARCO E. VAZQUEZ,
Complainants, A.C. No. 9492 Present
- versus - SERENO, CJ, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE, and CAGUIOA, JJ.
ATTY. DAVID LIM QUECO KHO, Promulgated: JUL 11/2n Respondent.
-;::--,1
x
x------------------------------------ DECISION SERENO, CJ: This case for
disbarment was filed by complainant Plutarco E. Vazquez (Vazquez) against respondent Atty.
David Lim Queco Kho (Atty. Kho). In his verified Complaint1 filed with this Court on 11 July
2012, Vazquez alleges that Atty. Kho violated the lawyer's oath that he "will do no falsehood. 2
" He further claims that respondent transgressed Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 3 FACTS Vazquez and Atty. Kho were both members of the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (Coalition), an accredited ' Rollo, pp. 8-11. 2 Id.
at 8. 3 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (
Decision 2 A.C. No. 9492 party-list group that participated in the national elections of 10 May
2010. The Complaint arose from an allegedly false statement made in respondent's Certificate
of Acceptance of Nomination for the Coalition. Complainant contested the truth of the
statement made under oath that Atty. Kho was a natural-born Filipino citizen.4 In his Complaint,
Vazquez asserted that respondent was a Chinese national. He reasoned that when Atty. Kho
was born on 29 April 194 7 to a Chinese father (William Kho) and a Filipina mother (Juana Lim
Queco ), respondent's citizenship followed that of his Chinese father pursuant to the 193 5
Constitution. Moreover, Vazquez argued that since respondent has elected Filipino citizenship,
the act presupposed that the person electing was either an alien, of doubtful status, or a
national of two countries. 5 Upon receipt of the Complaint, the Court through its First Division
issued a Resolution6 dated 26 November 2012 requiring Atty. Kho to file his comment on the
Complaint within 10 days from receipt of the Notice. Alleging he received the Court's
Resolution on 18 February 2013, he filed his Comment7 on 27 February 2013. As to the alleged
falsity of his statement, Atty. Kho countered that when he was born on 29 April 1947, his
Filipina mother was not yet married to his Chinese father, and that his parents only got married
on 8 February 1977 or some 30 years after his birth. He then averred that according to the
1935 Constitution, his citizenship followed that of his Filipina mother, and thus he was a
natural-born Filipino . 8 c1t1zen. . On the matter of his electing Filipino citizenship,
respondent il explained that since he was already a natural-born Filipino, his subsequent
election of Philippine citizenship on 25 February 1970 was superfluous and had no effect on his
citizenship. Having established his natural-born status, he concluded that he had not
committed any falsehood in his Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination, and that complainant
had no cause of action to have him disbarred.9 Apart from defending his natural-born status,
Atty. Kho also moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. He claimed
that Vazquez had filed three (3) cases in which the latter raised the issue of respondent's
citizenship: (1) the present disbannent case; (2) a quo warranto proceeding with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and (3) a criminal complaint for perjury lodged with
the City Prosecutor of 4 Rollo, pp. 8-9. 5 Id. at 9-10. 6 Id. at 16. 7 Id. at 18-24. 8 Id. at 20. 9 Id.
at 21-22. f Decision 3 A.C. No. 9492 Quezon City. Atty. Kho alleged that both the quo warranto
and the perjury cases had already been dismissed by the HRET10 and the City Prosecutor
respectively. 11 Finally, he raised jurisdictional questions, arguing that the proper remedy to
attack his citizenship was not a disbarment case, but rather I" quo warrant a. - In answer to
respondent's Comment, Vazquez filed with the Court a Reply to Comment13 on 11 March 2013.
He claimed therein that at the time of election of Philippine citizenship by respondent on 25
67

February 1970, the latter's mother was already a Chinese national by virtue of her marriage to
respondent's father who was Chinese. Complainant also opposed respondent's assertion that
the latter's parents were not yet married when he was born on 29 April 1947. 14 Complainant
further cited respondent's Certificate of Live Birth, which stated that the latter's parents were
married at the time he was born. 15 That being so, complainant averred that at the time Atty.
Kho was born, his mother was already a Chinese national. Thus, complainant concluded that
respondent's election of Filipino citizenship was fatally defective, since the latter's parents
were both Chinese at the time of his election. 16 Furthermore, complainant alleged that the
marriage of respondent's parents on 8 February 1977 was just a ploy to put a semblance of
legitimacy to his prior election of Filipino citizenship. Lastly, complainant denied the forum
shopping charge, saying the three cases he had filed against respondent had different causes
of action and were based on different grounds. 17 On 8 April 2013, the Court issued a
Resolution referring the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 18 At the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), the case was docketed as CBD Case No. 13-3885. Commissioner Victor
Pablo C. Trinidad (Commissioner Trinidad) was designated as investigating commissioner. In a
Notice dated 14 August 2013, he set the case for mandatory conference/hearing oh 19
September 2013 and ordered the parties to submit their mandatory conference briefs. 19 10
Id. at 34. 11 Id. at 35-37. 12 Id. at 22. 13 Id. at 38-43. 14 Id. at 38. 15
Id. at 44. 16 Id. at 39-40. 17 Id. at 41. 18 Id. at 47. 19 Records of the IBP-CBD, p. I. ( Decision 4
A.C. No. 9492 With both parties present at the scheduled mandatory conference/hearing,
Commissioner Trinidad ordered them to submit their respective position papers within ten
( 10) days, after which the case would be deemed submitted for report and recommendation.
20 Only the respondent b . d .c b . r21 d . . 22 su m1tte a con1erence ner an pos1t10n paper.
IBP's REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION On 3 November 2013, Commissioner Trinidad
promulgated his Report and Recommendation (Report)23 finding Atty. Kho "innocent of the
charges" and recommended that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Upon weighing
the evidence presented by both parties, Commissioner Trinidad found no merit to the allegation
that respondent had committed dishonesty and deceitfulness when he indicated in his verified
Certificate of Acceptance of Nomination that he was a natural-born citizen.24 Commissioner
Trinidad said that respondent Atty. Kho, as a naturalborn Filipino citizen, fell under the category
of someone who was born of a Filipino mother before 17 January 1973, and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. 25 On the matter of jurisdiction, the
IBP-CBD said that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter, since the issue was whether
respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the relevant provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Although it acknowledged that citizenship cannot be attacked collaterally, it
ruled that it had to make a finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty hinged on that very
matter. The IBP-CBD clarified though, that its ruling was limited and "cannot strip or sustain the
respondent of his citizenship."26 Lastly, the IBP-CBD found Vazquez guilty of forum shopping
since in all the three cases he had filed, he was questioning whether or not lespondent was a
natural-born citizen. It said that the actions filed by complainant involved the same
transactions, the same essential facts and circumstances, as well as identical subject matter
and issues.27 On 10 August 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014519, which adopted and approved the Report and 20 Id. at 8. 21 Id. at 10-1 I. 22 Id. at 22-31.
23 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, I 0 pages; penned by Commissioner Victor
Pablo C. Trinidad 24 Id. at
2. 25 Id. at 6-7. 26 Id. at 5. 27 Id. at 8-9. ~ Decision 5 A.C. No. 9492 Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case against Atty. Kho. THE RULING OF THE COURT
We adopt and approve the IBP Report and Recommendation and dismiss the instant
administrative case against respondent for lack of merit. This disbarment case centers on
whether Atty. Kho violated his lawyer's oath that he shall do no falsehood and that he shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. According to complainant, a
violation occurred when respondent declared in his verified Certificate of Acceptance of
68

Nomination that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Although the question of one's
citizenship is not open to collateral attack,28 the Court acknowledges the IBP-CBD's
pronouncement that it had to make a limited finding thereon, since the alleged dishonesty
hinged on this issue. We have constantly ruled that an attack on a person's citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity. 29 A disbarment case is definitely not the
proper venue to attack someone's
citizenship. For the lack of any ruling from a competent court on respondent's citizenship, this
disbarment case loses its only leg to stand on and, hence, must be dismissed. WHEREFORE,
the instant Administrative Complaint for violation of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility filed against Atty. David Lim Queco Kho is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Chief Justice, Chairperson 28 Gov. Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 191810. 22 June 2015. 29 Co v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 276 Phil. 758 (1991 ); Go v. Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, G.R. No. 1918 I 0. 22 June 2015. Decision WE CONCUR: ,q. 6 j~ ~ it (ltuk TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice A.C. No. 9492 JA(,{1 ~ ESTELA M:TPERLASBERNABE
Associate Justice

3Republtc of tbe llbiltpptneg ~upreme QCourt jflf[nniln FIRST DIVISION ._


BUDENCIO DUMANLAG, Complainant, A.C. No.
8825 - versus - ATTY. JAIME M. BLANCO, Jr., Respondent. Present: SERENO, CJ, Chairperson,
LEONARDO- DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE, and CAGUIOA, JJ. Promulgated: AUG 0 3
2016 x---------------------------------------- DECISION SERENO, CJ: Before this Court is an administrative Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent Atty. Jaime M. Blanco for rejecting complainant's claim over a
parcel of land based on a Spanish Title. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS Under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. (TCT) 79146, 1 El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc. (EMIDCI) appears to be
the registered owner of the land it occupies at the corner of Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard and
C. de Dios Street in Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property). Complainant Budencio Dumanlag
sent a letter dated 9 August 2010 to EMIDCI' s President, Victoriano Chung, claiming to be an
agent of the Heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro (the Heirs of San Pedro) based on a Special 1
Rollo, pp. 41-45. ( Decision 2 A.C. No. 8825 Power of Attorney dated 14 October 1999.2
Complainant asserted that the Heirs of San Pedro, and not EMlDCI, owned the Sampaloc
property, predicating such claim on a Spanish Title, Titulo de Propriedad No. (T.P.) 4136. 3 He
further stated in the letter that the Heirs of San Pedro were selling the Sampaloc property, and
that he had given EMIDCI the option to buy it. Victoriano Chung referred the matter to EMIDCI's
counsel, respondent 4 Atty. Jaime M. Blanco, Jr. (Atty. Blanco), who rejected the claim. In a
letter5 dated 16 August 2010, the latter explained that the Supreme Court had declared T.P.
4136 null and void in Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of
Appeals.6 Demand was made on Dumanlag and his principals to cease and desist from further
harassing EMIDCI. 'it Complainant sent another letter to Mr. Chung dated 1 September 2010. 7
While acknowledging the Court's decision, the former alleged that Intestate Estate excluded
the Heirs of San Pedro from the enumeration of persons prohibited from selling lands covered
by T.P. 4136, including the Sampaloc property. Atty. Blanco rejected complainant's claim once
more through another letter 8 dated 13 September 2010. He reasoned that the Supreme Court
Decision held that the heirs were specifically prohibited from exercising any act of ownership
over the lands covered by T.P. 4136. On 22 October 2010, complainant filed this administrative
case for disbarment against Atty. Blanco, alleging that Mr. Chung was a squatter on the
Sampaloc Property and Atty. Blanco had unjustly prevented the exercise of complainant's rights
over the same. 9 In his Verified Comment, 10 Atty. Blanco alleged that the Complaint was
frivolous, unfounded and retaliatory. He averred, among others, that complainant, in his second
demand letter to Mr. Chung, had attached two draft pleadings. The first was a draft petition for
69

certiorari against the latter; 11 the second, a draft complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Blanco. 12 According to respondent, these drafts were meant to intimidate him and Mr. Chung.
True enough, after Atty. Blanco sent his second letter to complainant, the latter filed with the
Court of Appeals the draft petition, 2 Id, pp. 50-52. 3 Id. at 50. 4 Rollo, p. 21. 5 Id. at 11-13. 6
333 Phil. 597 ( 1996). 7 Annex "10." 8 Id. at 116-118. 9 Rollo, p.
6. to Id. at 20-40. 11 Annex "10-A", id at 89-94. 12 Annex "10-8", id at I 08-1 12. ( Decision 3
A.C. No. 8825 which was later dismissed. Complainant subsequently filed the Complaint for
Disbarment. Atty. Blanco also moved that the Court direct complainant to show cause why the
latter should not be cited for indirect contempt. Respondent stated that Intestate Estate
declared in its fallo that agents of the Heirs of San Pedro were disallowed from exercising any
act of ownership over lands covered by T.P. 4136. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING
COMMISSIONER Investigating Commissioner Michael G. Fabunan of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) rendered a Report and Recommendation 13 for the dismissal of the Complaint
for lack of merit, based on the following grounds: 1) the complaint was patently frivolous, and
2) it was intended to harass respondent. He recommended that the Court issue an order
directing complainant Dumanlag to show cause why he should not be cited for . m d" 14 irect
contempt. The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XXI-2014-418 adopting and
approving the Report and Recommendation of the 15 mvestlgatmg commissioner. No
petition for review has been filed with this Court. RULING OF THE COURT The Complaint must
be dismissed for utter lack of merit. A lawyer is charged with the duty to defend "the cause of
his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion." 16 Nevertheless, the Code of
Professional Responsibility circumscribes this duty with the limitation that lawyers shall perfonn
their duty to the client within the bounds of law. 17 In this case, Atty. Blanco performed this
duty to his client without exceeding the scope of his authority. As early as 1996, this Court
declared in Intestate Estate that T.P. 4136 was null and void. 18 In said case, the Heirs of San
Pedro claimed ownership of a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares on the basis of
a Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated 25 April 1894. The 13 ld. at 256-261.
14 Id. at 261. 15 Id. at 256. 16 Trinidad v. Villarin, A.C. No. 9310, 27 February 2013, 692 SCRA
1,6 citing Pangasinan Electric Cooperative v. Montemayor, 559 Phil. 438 {?007) citing Natino v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 247 Phil. 602 (1991). 17 CPR, Canon 19. 18 Supra note 5. R

lRepublic of tbe flbilippines $->upreme @:ourt r:


2016 THIRD DIVISION TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant, -versusATTYS. JOHN G. REYES,
ROQUE BELLO and CARMENCITA A. ROUS-GONZAGA, Respondents. A.C. No. 9090
Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, PEREZ, REYES, and JARDELEZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August
31,
2016
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x ~~ RESOLUTION PEREZ,
J.: This is a Motion for Reconsideration 1 of the Resolution2 of the Court dated 22 August 2012
finding respondent Atty. John G. Reyes guilty of "negligence of contumacious proportions" and
suspending him from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year. The Facts The present
case arose out of a petition for disbarment filed by Atty. Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant)
charging respondent Atty. John G. Reyes (respondent) with intentional misrepresentation,
knowingly handling a case Rollo, pp. 284-288. Id. at 282-283. ~ Resolution 2 A.C. No. 9090
involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly alleging untruths in pleadings and
unethical conduct, based on the following incidents: The First Incident (Intentional
Misrepresentation and Knowingly Handling a Case Involving Conflict of Interest) Complainant
alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel for Mayor Rosi to Velarde (Mayor
Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an election protest case that was on appeal before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman,
Protestant, versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated from the Regional Trial Comi (R
TC) of Calabanga, Branch 63, Camarines Sur. According to the petition for disbarment, "an
incident occurred" in the course of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up
70

to the COMELEC on certiorari. 3 While the case was being tried at the RTC level, protestant
Raquel Reyes De Guzman (De Guzman) was represented by the Sales Law Office ofNaga City,
although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated in the pleadings that his address is in
Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel. Mayor Velarde, on the other hand, was represented by
Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit (Atty. Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit
prepared the pleadings in connection with the appeal to the COMELEC but, according to
complainant, unknown to Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the COMELEC,
which pleading was apparently prepared in Cainta, Rizal but was signed by respondent whose
given address is in Quezon City. 4 Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied
with former Speaker Arnulfo Fuentebella (Speaker Fuentebella) under the Nationalist People's
Coalition (NPC) party, whereas Mayor Velarde was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) party, led by Camarines Sur Governor Luis R. Villafue1ie (Gov. Villafuerte). The
Fuentebellas and the Villafue1ies are known to be politically at odds with each other. However,
De Guzman subsequently changed her political allegiance and became affiliated with the
Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor Velarde, on the other hand, became an ally
of the Fuentebellas under the NPC. 5 Id. at 3. Id. at 3-4. Id. at 4. ~ Resolution 3 A.C. No. 9090
According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to represent De Guzman in the election protest
case because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella. Complainant emphasized that
Atty. Bello has always represented the political interests of the Fuentebellas. There is,
therefore, no doubt that Atty. Bello is the lawyer of the Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the
sudden shifting of the political loyalty of De Guzman and Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello suddenly
stopped appearing for De Guzman in the protest case without formally withdrawing as her
counsel. 7 Mayor Velarde now had to be defended by Atty. Bello because he is already an ally
of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty. Bello cannot actively defend Mayor Velarde because he
appeared for De Guzman before the RTC. 8 Thus, complainant concluded, Atty. Bello found the
expedient of passing the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty. Reyes, making the
latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,9 in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Second Incident (Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in
Pleadings and Unethical Conduct) On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella
filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur.
Complainant also filed a COC for the same position. Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz
(Ebeta) and a certain Marita Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective
COCs for the aforementioned position. The former is an indigent laundry woman from San Jose,
Camarines Sur, while the latter was a former casual laborer of the municipal government of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur. 1 Clearly, both Ebeta and Marita had no real intention of running for
the position for which they filed their COC, but were merely instigated to do so in order to
confuse the electorate of the district, to the disadvantage of complainant. Consequently,
complainant filed a petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance d.d 11 can 1 ates. In
connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates, complainant
filed a Memorandum with the COMELEC 6 10 II Id. Id. at 5. Id. at 6. Id. at 8. Id. at 9. Id. at IO.
~ Resolution 4
A.C. No. 9090 through the Office of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election Supervisor (PES).
Pertinent portions of the Memorandum were quoted by the complainant in his petition for
disbarment, 12 to wit:
1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified Answer of Marita signed by respondent as
counsel, whose given address is in Quezon City; 2. From the Answer, it was made to appear
that Marita caused the preparation thereof, read the allegations therein contained, and
understood them. It was also made to appear that Marita signed the verification; 3. During the
hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili, Camarines Sur, on 23 January 2004, respondent appeared
and: a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing on the Verified Answer is his; b.)
officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as her counsel to prepare the Verified Answer;
71

c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the Verified Answer were supplied by Marita; and
d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City when she "signed" the Verified Answer. 4.
Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal withdrawal of her COC. She was immediately put
on the witness stand wherein she testified that: 12 a.) she did not know respondent; b.) she
never solicited his legal services, particularly, to file the Verified Answer; c.) she never supplied
the allegations contained in the Answer; Id.at IO-II. ~ Resolution 5 A.C. No. 9090 d.) the
signature appearing in the Answer is not her signature; and e.) she could not have signed the
verification in the Answer in Quezon City on 15 January 2004 because she was in Bicol on that
date. 13 The petition for disbarment
also alleged that respondent admitted to Attys. Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty. Manlagnit complainant's counsels in the petition for disqualification before the PES-COMELEC - that Atty.
Bello merely gave the Verified Answer to him already signed and . d 14 notarize . For his part,
respondent narrated the following version of the events: Anent the first incident, respondent
alleged that he first met Atty. Bello sometime in May, 2003 when the latter was introduced to
him by a friend. A few months after their meeting, Atty. Bello called him up to ask if he could
handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC since Atty. Bello had so many cases to handle. The
case would be to secure a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction from the COMELEC. 15 According to respondent, he informed Atty. Bello
that he has never before handled an election case, much less one with an application for a TRO
with Preliminary Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be difficult at first, but he
would assist respondent and things will tum out easier. Due to the assurance given and his
desire for a more comprehensive experience in law practice, respondent agreed to accept the
case. Since he made it clear from the start that he has no knowledge or experience in election
cases, he was never part of the preparations in connection with the case. Atty. Bello simply
called him up for a meeting when the pleading was ready so that he could sign the same. They
agreed to meet somewhere in Timog, Quezon City and after he read the pleading and sensing
that there was no problem, he signed the same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter, he attended
the initial hearing of the case, during which, the parties were required to submit their
respective Memoranda. 16 13 14 15 16 I Id. at 14 and 17-19. Id. at 20. Id. at 60. Id. at 60-61. ~
Resolution 6 A.C. No. 9090 Respondent claimed that up to that point, there were no indications
about the true nature of the case. However, when he was preparing the required
Memorandum, he found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the COMELEC and the
submission of the Memorandum, respondent declared that he never knew what happened to
the case as he formally withdrew therefrom immediately upon knowing the circumstances of
the case. He maintained that he cannot be held guilty of representing conflicting interests
because he never handled any previous case involving either of the parties in the COMELEC
case. Moreover, he was not properly apprised of the facts and circumstances relative to the
case that would render him capable of intelligently deciding whether or not to accept the case.
He likewise did not receive a single centavo as attorney's, acceptance or appearance fees in
connection with the case. He agreed to handle the same simply to accommodate Atty. Bello
and to improve his skills as a lawyer and .c. 'd . 17 never ior monetary cons1 erat10ns. With
respect to the second incident, respondent related that he was at home in Pangasinan on 17
January 2004 when he received a call from Atty. Bello asking him to attend a hearing in
Camarines Sur. He declined the request three times due to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello
pleaded, saying that even on Saturdays, hearings could be scheduled. Thus, even if he did not
want to attend the hearing due to its distance and because of his full calendar, he could not
refuse because he really did not schedule appointments and/or hearings on Saturdays. All that
was told him regarding the case was that a congressional candidate was being disqualified and
a lawyer is needed to defend him and his candidacy. Respondent alleged that according to Atty.
Bello, the candidate was qualified and financially capable of funding his campaign.
Nevertheless, he clarified from Atty. Bello if the candidate is not a nuisance candidate and Atty.
Bello allegedly replied: "Qualified na qualified naman talaga eh." Respondent added that it was
not disclosed to him that the disqualification case involved a candidate for the third
72

congressional district of Camarines Sur. He was simply informed that the scheduled hearing of
the disqualification case would be on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. 18 Since respondent was in
Pangasinan and due to the fact that the deadline for the filing of the necessary pleading was
nearing, Atty. Bello advised respondent that he would just prepare the Answer and sign for
respondent's name in the pleading. Respondent maintained that he would not 17 18 Id. at 62.
Id. at 63. Resolution 7 A.C. No. 9090 have agreed to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it not been for
the pressed urgency, trusting that he would not get into any trouble. 19 While waiting for the
scheduled date of the hearing to arrive, he wondered why he has not been furnished a copy of
the pleading or given additional instructions relative
to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime, has ceased to communicate with him and suddenly
became inaccessible. He thus toyed with the impression that he was being left out of the case
for reasons he could not then understand. 20 According to respondent, he was able to get a
copy of the Answer only when he was already in Naga City and it was only then and there,
while reading it, that he realized that the case was, in reality, about a nuisance candidate and
that the client he was to appear for was, indeed, a nuisance candidate. What was even more
surprising to him was that the copy of the Answer that was given to him was unsigned: neither
by him nor by his supposed client. It was likewise not notarized. Finding the indefensibility of
his client and in order not to make matters worse, he opted to appear and just submit the case
for resolution. To prove this point, respondent alleged that all he had with him for the hearing
were only the unsigned and unnotarized Answer, the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as
nuisance candidates, his case calendar and nothing else. He had not in his person any
evidence whatsoever in support of the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at
this point, he had no knowledge that his supposed client "had already jumped ship." More
importantly, he did not know that her signature on the Answer was forged, precisely because
the copy of the Answer that was . h" . d 21 given to nn was uns1gne . Before the start of the
hearing, respondent started looking for his client but she could not be found. He, nevertheless,
proceeded to the hearing for it was immaterial to him whether she was present or not as he
had already planned to simply submit the case for resolution. Unfortunately, respondent
claimed, the proceedings before the PES started as a casual conversation with the lawyers for
herein complainant and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or unwittingly."22 Respondent
admitted that, during the hearing, he acknowledged that the signature appearing on the
Answer was his. He alleged that despite his personal aversion and objection to certain
allegations in the Answer, he~ 19 Id. 20 Id. at 64. 21 Id. at 65. 22 Id. at 66. Resolution 8 A.C.
No. 9090 could not anymore deny the signature above his printed name, even if it was only
signed for and in his behalf, because he had previously agreed, although unwillingly, that his
name be signed in the pleading. It, therefore, came as a surprise to him that of all the
questions that can be asked of him during the trial, he was questioned about his signature.
Belatedly he realized that he should have objected to the line of questioning as he was being
presented as an unwilling witness for therein petitioner. However, without sufficient exposure
in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a scheming lawyer, he failed to seasonably
object to the line of questioning. 23 Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied
complainant's allegation that he admitted having seen Marita sign the document in his
presence. According to him, he vividly recalls his response to the then query whether or not
Marita signed the document in his presence as: "I suppose that is her signature." Likewise,
when queried fmiher on the ideal that the pleading should be signed by Marita in his presence
as her counsel, he allegedly responded: "While it is the ideal, sometimes we lawyers, like you
and I, sign documents even if the client is not around due to our busy schedules." He pointed
out to the two lawyers of herein complainant that whether Marita signed the Answer in his
presence or not is inconsequential since he was not the notary public who notarized the
Answer. He argued that his signature pertains to the allegations in the Answer, while the
signature of his client forms part of the verification and certification and that it is the duty of
the notary public to see to it that the person signing the pleading as a party is really the person
referred to in the verification/certification. 24 Finally, respondent declared that except for the
73

modest appearance cum transportation fees that he received, there was no monetary
consideration for handling the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates. He
explained that when the case was offered to him, it was in haste and under a tenor of urgency
that the only impression he got was that the client was well- to-do and could wage a decent
campaign and was really a qualified candidate. He repeated the words of Atty. Bello: "qualified
na qualifed sya." He emphasized that all he wanted was to expand l . . d . 1 25 11s expenence
an practice as a awyer. In his report and recommendation dated 1 7 April 2007, Investigating
Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found respondent guilty of the charges against him and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for one ( 1) month. The report, in
part, reads: % Id. 24 Id. at
67. 25 Id. at 68. Resolution 9 A.C. No. 9090 It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's
imagination, however, that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the above incidents and
that he was just a "willing victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow lawyer, who,
surprisingly he did not even thought (sic) of running after and holding liable, even after all
these charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that respondent himself
had knowledge of and allowed himself to be used by whoever should be properly held liable for
these fraud and misrepresentation. As regards the second incident, respondent argues that he
could not be held guilty of forgery, misrepresentation, and other related offenses. x x x If at all,
respondent was forced to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of
accommodation. Undersigned Commissioner disagrees. Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent should have evaluated the
situation first before agreeing to be counsel for an unknown client. x x x Undersigned
Commissioner finds sufficient legal basis for disciplinary action against respondent for the
various misrepresentations and later, admissions before the COMELEC when confronted with
his "supposed client", claiming that it was Atty. Roque [sic] who merely gave him instructions
and whose requests he merely accommodated. x x x His shortcomings when he accepted to be
a counsel for an unknown client in the COMELEC protest (first incident) is in itself, already
deplorable but to repeat the same infraction in the petition for disqualification (in the second
incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious proportions. It is even worse that respondent
has attempted to mitigate his liability by professing ignorance or innocence of the whole thing,
a matter that, too, is inexcusable. Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his
own confession, he was woefully negligent. 26 On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII2007- 99 was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
resolving to adopt and approve the above report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. It thereafter forwarded the report to the Supreme Court as required under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.27 26 27 Id. at 223-225. SEC. 12. Review and
decision by the Board of Governors. - xx xx (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines N. that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law
or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for final action. Resolution 10 A.C. No. 9090 On 22 August 2012, the Court issued the
questioned Resolution adopting the above-quoted findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner. The Court, however, increased the period of suspension from the recommended
one (1) month to one (1) year. The same Resolution also resolved to: xx xx 2. IMPLEAD Aitys.
Roque Bello and Carmencita A. RousGonzaga in this administrative proceedings; and 3.
REMAND the whole records of this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further
investigation, report and recommendation with respect to the charges against A TTY. ROQUE
BELLO and A TTY. CARMEN CIT A A. ROUS-GONZAGA. Respondent is now before us seeking a
reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution insofar as the penalty imposed against him is
concerned. Respondent points out that from the very start, he had been very candid as to the
factual backdrop of the present case. He never denied that he should have evaluated the
situation first before agreeing to be a counsel for an unknown client. He does not refute, nor
does he argue against, the finding of the Commission on Bar Discipline that he was remiss in
74

his duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the requests of a fellow lawyer to represent an
unknown client. However, respondent argues, such negligence is not the negligence "of
contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition of the penalty of suspension. Likewise,
such negligence is not tantamount to having knowledge of the alleged fraud and
misrepresentation, for the simple reason that he did not know the details of the election case
until its hearing on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. He maintains that if such fraud and
misrepresentation really exists, his "only fault was that he allowed himself to be duped to
unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the name of accommodation." Our Ruling We
find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious. Considering the serious
consequences of the disbarment or the '(/} suspension of a member of the Bar,
clear
preponderant evidence is necessary fb Resolution 11 A.C. No. 9090 to justify the imposition of
the said administrative penalties28 and the burden of proof rests upon the complaint. 29
"Preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as wmihy of belief compared to the presented contrary evidence."30 In
the case at bar, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
his claim that respondent "knowingly" handled a case involving conflict of interest, "knowingly"
alleged untruths in pleadings, and that he "intentionally" committed misrepresentation and
falsification. In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged that respondent
perpetrated acts constituting intentional misrepresentation and knowingly handling a case
involving conflict of interest when he appeared as counsel for Mayor Velarde in the COMELEC
case. Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining
whether a violation of this rule is present in a given case, to wit: One test is whether a lawyer is
duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one client has to be
opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. 31 (Emphasis omitted) Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous
lawyer-client relationship in order for the liability to attach. Clearly, respondent cannot be held
liable under any of the three aforementioned tests because he was never 28 29 30 JI LimSantiago v. Atty. Saf.,71/Cio, 520 Phil. 538, 548 (2006) citing Berbano v. Barcelona, 457
Phil. 331, 341 (2003). Rudecon Management Corp. v.
Camacho, 480 Phil. 652, 660 (2004) citing Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarcido, 449 Phil.
619
(2003). Ylaya v. Gacott, 702 Phil. 390, 407-408 (2013). Anifion v. Sahitsana, Jr., 685 Phil. 322,
327 (2012)
citing Quiambao v. Bamba, 505 Phil. 126, 134 (2005). Resolution 12 A.C. No. 9090 a counsel for
either party in the COMELEC case prior to the filing of the said action. Complainant, however,
would have us believe that respondent is the "furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so
as to justify his accusation that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Complainant, however, failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his allegation. The
mere fact that respondent agreed to handle a case for Atty. Bello does not - alone - prove that
they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined to give more weight and credence to the
explanation proffered by respondent: that is, he accepted the case without being fully aware of
the real facts and circumstances surrounding it. His narration is straightforward enough to be
worthy of belief, especially considering that he withdrew from the case after he realized its true
75

nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal as Counsel"32 he filed before the COMELEC. With
respect to the charge of intentional misrepresentation, complainant failed to specify which act
of respondent constituted the alleged offense. If the alleged misrepresentation pertains to the
act of respondent of signing the pleading prepared by Atty. Bello, we do not agree with
complainant and the same cannot be considered as misrepresentation since respondent
specified in his Comment that he read the pleading before he affixed his signature thereto. He
was, therefore, aware of the statements contained in the pleading and his act of signing the
same signifies that he agreed to the allegations therein contained. On the other hand, if the
misrepresentation alleged by complainant refers to the allegations in the pleading filed by
respondent before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be said that there was "intentional"
misrepresentation on the part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent and as
complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein contained were supplied by Atty. Bello,
which allegations, at that time the pleading was signed, respondent did not know were
inaccurate. As pointed
Professional Responsibility (CPR). The Court's Ruling Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the court,
lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."23 In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR
states: CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xx xx Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Good moral character is a trait that every practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be
defined as "what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which c01Tesponds to
objective reality." 24 Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely: (a) to protect
the public; ( b) to protect the public image of lawyers; ( c) to out above, as soon as the true
nature of the situation revealed itself, respondent withdrew from the case. Regarding the
second incident, complainant claimed that, in connection with the petition to declare Marita as
a nuisance candidate, respondent committed falsification and knowingly alleged untruths, not
only in Marita's Verified Answer to the disqualification case against her, but during the hearing
of the case, as well. As with the first incident, respondent maintained that he accepted the
case without being fully aware of the circumstances relative thereto, this time because of the
insistence and urgency with which Atty. Bello made the request. 32 Rollo, p. 72. ~ Resolution
13 A.C. No. 9090 We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his cause. His candidness
about the events leading to this administrative complaint against him is demonstrated by the
following declarations he made: ( 1) having agreed to have his name signed in the pleading on
his behalf, he cannot now deny the signature above his printed name; 33 (2) he believed the
assurances of his fellow lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever may have
been said in confidence between them will not be revealed to anybody for whatever reason; 34
and (3) he failed to seasonably object to the line of questioning relative to his signature on
Marita's Answer, thereby incriminating himself and making him an unwilling witness for the
opposing party, because of his insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a result of his
lack of the traits of a scheming lawyer. 35 These straightforward statements, coupled with the
legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proven,
36 keep us from treating respondent's proffered explanation as an indication of mendacity. 37
This Court is, therefore, compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply in his favor
the presumption that he acted in good faith, especially considering the failure of complainant
to present clear and convincing evidence in support of his allegations. Thus, with respect to the
charge that respondent "knowingly" alleged untruths in the supposed Verified Answer of
76

Marita, he admitted that Marita's Answer was prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent
likewise authorized to sign his name on the pleading on his behalf. This statement was
corroborated by complainant himself when he alleged in his petition for disbarment that "Atty.
John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr.xx x that the
Answer was merely passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed and notarized." Consequently,
respondent cannot be held liable for "knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple reason that
the allegations in the Answer were not supplied by him. Neither can respondent be held guilty
of falsification in connection with the forged signature of Marita. "The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence."38 Complainant merely alleged that Marita's
signature in the Answer "was forged either by Attorney Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and
that 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 Id. at 66. Id.
at 67. Id. at 66. Ylaya v. Gacott, supra note 30 at 408. Maligaya v. Doronil/a, Jr., 533 Phil. 303,
310
(2006). De Jesus v. Guerrero Ill, 614 Phil. 520, 614 (2009) citing Manalabe v. Cabie, 553 Phil.
544, 551 (2007). Rollo, p. 20. ~ Resolution 14 A.C. No. 9090 respondent falsified or caused the
falsification of the signature because "he is the one who presented the same to the COMELEC,
hence, presumed to be the one who falsified the same."40 Other than this presumption and
bare allegation, complainant has not adduced any proof in support thereof. As a result, this
Court cannot give any merit to his accusation. The same is true in connection with
complainant's allegation that respondent falsely testified and made misrepresentations during
the nuisance candidate case hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the lawyer of
Marita, that the allegations in the Answer were supplied by Marita and that Marita was in his
office when she signed the Answer's verification. Apart from his allegations, complainant has
not presented any evidence, as for instance, the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the
proceedings, to prove that respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him and to
enable this Court to properly evaluate the transgressions ascribed to respondent. It is well to
note that respondent vehemently denied having admitted seeing Marita sign the Verification
before his presence in his office in Quezon City. He insisted that his response, when queried
about Marita's signature, was that: "I suppose that is her signature." This Court finds it
unreasonable - illogical, even - that after having
admitted the blunders he committed in this case, he would now deny this particular
circumstance, unless he was in fact telling the truth. In any case, as explained by respondent,
it is of no moment whether or not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not the
notary public who notarized the Answer. Respondent's signature in the Answer refers to the
allegations therein, whereas the signature of Marita forms part of the Verification which states
that "she has caused the preparation of the foregoing Answer and has read the contents
thereof which are true and correct of her own personal knowledge." Respondent is, therefore,
correct when he pointed out that it is the responsibility of the notary public administering the
oath to make sure that the signature in the Verification really belongs to the person who
executed the same. It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its disciplinary power only
if the complainant establishes [his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. x x x
When the pieces of evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the
preponderance of evidence, the 40 Id. at 120.
Resolution 15 A.C. No. 9090 equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party
carrying the burden of proof."41 The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that
respondent has no liability at all under the circumstances. His folly, though, consists in his
negligence in accepting the subject cases without first being fully apprised of and evaluating
the circumstances surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree with respondent that such
negligence is not of contumacious proportions as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of
suspension. This Court finds the penalty of suspension for one ( 1) year earlier imposed on
respondent too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed. "The power to disbar or
suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
77

seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty."42 The penalty to
be meted out on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion taking
into consideration the facts surrounding each case. 43 In this connection, the following
circumstances should be taken into consideration in order to mitigate respondent's
responsibility: first respondent exhibited enough candor to admit that he was negligent and
remiss in his duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the request of another lawyer to
handle a case without being first apprised of the details and acquainted with the circumstances
relative thereto; and second, since this is his first offense, respondent "is entitled to some
measure of forbearance. " 44 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court dated 22 August 2012 is
hereby modified in that respondent Atty. John G. Reyes is REPRIMANDED for his failure to
exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice of the legal profession. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 41 42
41 44 SO ORDERED
. Ylaya v. Gacott, supra note 30 at 413. Ramos v. Ngaseo, 487 Phil. 40, 49 (2004). LimSantiago
v. Sagucio, supra note 28 at 552. Maligaya v. Doronil/a, Jr., supra note 37 at 311. Resolution WE
CONCUR: ~ 16 PRESBITERO VELASCO, JR. Assoc}_ate Justice ~irperson ~ A.C. No. 9090
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice Associate Justice c:::::.:,rzF!ED TRUE COPY Divi:i'on
Clerk )~ of Court Third Division SEP Z O 2011
l\,epublic of tbe !lbilippines ~upreme ([ourt ;ffflanila EN BANC CARRIE-ANNE SHALE EN CARLYLE
S. REYES, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. RAMON F. NIEVA, Respondent. A.C. No. 8560 Present:
SERENO, C.J, CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,* PERALTA, BERSAMIN,**
DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ, MENDOZA, REYES,*** PERLAS-BERNABE, LEONEN, JARDELEZA, and
CAGUIOA,JJ Promulgated: September 6, 2016
O....,...-~. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: For the Court's resolution is the Complaint1 dated
March 3, 2010 filed by complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S. Reyes (complainant) against
On leave. On official leave. On official leave. 1 Rollo, pp. 1-7. ~ Decision 2 A.C. No. 8560
respondent Atty. Ramon
F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her. The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP)
as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order basis since October 2004. Sometime in January 2009,
she was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary under the supervision of
respondent, who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board Secretary. During complainant's stint
under respondent, she would notice that during office hours, respondent would often watch
''pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop, all of which turned out to be pornographic
films. Complainant also averred that whenever respondent got close to her, he would hold her
hand and would sometimes give it a kiss. During these instances, complainant would remove
her hands and tell him to desist. According to complainant, respondent even offered her a
cellular phone together with the necessary load to serve as means for their private
communication, but she refused the said offer, insisting that she already has her own cellular
phone and does not need another one. 2 Complainant also narrated that at about 5 o'clock in
the afternoon of April 1, 2009, respondent texted her to wait for him at the office. Fearing that
respondent might take advantage of her, complainant convinced two (2) of her officemates to
accompany her until respondent arrived. Upon respondent's arrival and seeing that
complainant had companions, he just told complainant and the other two (2) office staff to lock
the door when they leave. 3 Complainant further recounted that on the following day, April 2,
2009, respondent called her on her cellular phone, asked if she received his text message, and
78

told her he would tell her something upon his arrival at the office. At about 9:30 in the morning
of even date, respondent asked complainant to encode a memorandum he was about to
dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on complainant's waist area near her breast and
started caressing the latter's torso. Complainant immediately moved away from respondent
and told him "sumosobra na ho kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology, respondent told
complainant he was willing to give her P2,000.00 a month from his own pocket and even gave
her a note stating ''just bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy," referring to
complainant's mother who was also working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the morning
of the same day, while complainant and respondent were left alone in the office, respondent
suddenly closed the door, grabbed complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a kiss,"
then attempted to 2 Id. at 2-3. Id. at 3-4. ~ Decision 3 A.C. No. 8560 kiss complainant. This
prompted complainant to thwart respondent's advances with her left arm, raised her voice in
order to invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit,
sir may asawa ako." After respondent let her go, complainant immediately left the office to ask
assistance from her former supervisor who advised her to file an administrative case 4 against
respondent before the CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI). 5 Finally,
complainant alleged that after her ordeal with respondent, she was traumatized and was even
diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent
major depression. 6 Eventually, complainant filed the instant complaint. In his defense,7
respondent denied all of complainant's allegations. He maintained that as a 79-year old retiree
who only took a position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it was very unlikely for him to do
the acts imputed against him, especially in a very small office space allotted for him and his
staff. In this regard, he referred to his Counter-Affidavit8 submitted before the CODI, wherein
he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he indeed watches "interesting shows" in his office
laptop, he never invited anyone, including complainant, to watch with him and that he would
even close his laptop whenever someone comes near him; 9 ( b) he never held and kissed
complainant's hand because if he had done so, he would have been easily noticed by
complainant's co-staffers; 10 (c) he did offer her a cellular phone, but this was supposed to be
an office phone which should not be used for personal purposes, and thus, could not be given
any sexual meaning; 11 (d) he did tell complainant to wait for him in the afternoon of April 1,
2009, but only for the purpose of having an available encoder should he need one for any
urgent matter that would arise; 12 and ( e) he would not do the acts he allegedly committed on
April 2, 2009 as there were other people in the office and that those people can attest in his
favor. 13 Respondent then pointed out that the administrative case filed against him before the
CODI was already dismissed for lack of basis and that complainant was only being used by
other
CAAP employees who were agitated by the reforms he helped implement upon his assumption
as CAAP consultant and eventually as Acting Corporate Board Secretary. 14 4 See AffidavitComplaint dated April 2, 2009; id. at 8. Id. at 4-5. See also id. at 60. 6 See Certificate of
Psychiatric Evaluation dated April 13, 2009. Signed by Juan V. Arellano, M.D., D.P.B.P., F.P.P.A.;
id. at 9. 7 See Comment filed on June 16, 2010; id. at 21-27. Id. at 42-55. 9 Id. at 48. 10 Id. at
48-49. 11 Id. at 49. 12 Id. at 49-50. 13 Id. at 50. 14 Id. at 2223. See also id. at 54. y Decision 4 A.C. No. 8560 The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a
Report and Recommendation 15 dated August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint against respondent. 16 He found that complainant failed to substantiate her
allegations against respondent, as opposed to respondent's defenses which are ably supported
by evidence. Citing respondent's evidence, the Investigating Commissioner opined that since
the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary was very small, it is implausible that a startling
occurrence such as an attempted sexual molestation would not be noticed by not only the
other occupants of said office area, but also by those occupying the office adjacent to it, i.e., the
CAAP Operations Center, which is separated only by glass panels. Further, the Investigating
Commissioner drew attention to the investigation conducted by the CODI showing that the
79

collective sworn statements of the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion that none of the
alleged acts of misconduct attributed to respondent really occurred. 17 In a Resolution18 dated
May 10, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously reversed the aforesaid
Report and Recommendation. As such, respondent was found guilty of committing sexual
advances, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
three (3) months. In view of respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, 19 the IBP Board referred
the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for study, evaluation, and
submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP Board.20 In the Director's Report21 dated July
8, 2014, the IBP-CBD National Director recommended that the current IBP Board adhere to the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner as it is supported by the
evidence on record; on the other hand, the reversal made by the previous IBP Board is bereft of
any factual and legal bases, and should therefore, be set aside. In this light, the current IBP
Board issued a Resolution22 dated August 10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP Board's
Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent. 15 Id.
at 179-187. Signed by Commissioner Pablo S. Castillo. 16 Id. at 187. 17 Id. at 183-187. 18 See
Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XX-2013- 555 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A.
Marohomsalic; id. at 178, including dorsal portion. 19 Id. at 188-190. 20 See id. at 208. 21 Id. at
208-211. Signed by IBP-CBD National Director Dominic C. M. Solis. 22 See Notice of Resolution in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-531 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A. Marohomsalic; id. at
206. ~ Decision 5 A.C. No. 8560 The Issue Before the Court The essential issue in this case is
whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the Code of
protect prospective clients; and ( d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 25 23 See
Spouses Lopez
v. Limos, A.C. No. 7618, February 2, 2016, citing Tabang v. Gacott, 713 Phil. 578, 593 (2013).
24 Advincula v. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431, 440 (2007), citation omitted. 25 Id., citing Dantes v.
Dantes, 482 Phil. 64, 71 (2004). v Decision 6 A.C. No. 8560 In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court
emphasized that a lawyer's continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition to remain a member of the Bar, viz.: Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the
Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.
This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in
order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds
and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality. The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as
officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also behave
himself so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting
those moral standards." Consequently, any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or
private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment. 27 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good
standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of
law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 28 After due
consideration, the Court reverses the findings and recommendations of the IBP, and finds
respondent administratively liable for violations of the CPR, as will be explained hereunder. To
recapitulate, the IBP found that as compared to complainant's purposedly bare and
uncorroborated allegations, respondent's evidence point to the conclusion that none of the
alleged sexual advances made by respondent against complainant actually occurred. As such,
80

it absolved respondent from any administrative liability. In support of such finding, the 26 A.C.
No. 7353, November 16, 2015. 27 See id. 28 Advincula v. Macabata, supra note 24, at 440,
citing Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001). ~ Decision 7 A.C. No. 8560 IBP
largely relied on the following: (a) the five (5) photographs29 respondent submitted to the
CODI to show that respondent's office space was so small that any commotion caused by a
sexual harassment attempt would have been easily noticed by the other occupants thereof; 30
and (b) the investigation conducted by the CODI per the Transcript31 submitted by respondent
where the witnesses said that they did not notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2, 2009,
the date when respondent's alleged sexual advances against complainant were committed. 32
However, the foregoing evidence, taken as a whole, did not actually refute complainant's
allegation that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, respondent closed the
door, grabbed complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's seal it with a kiss" and
attempted to kiss complainant despite the latter's resistance. A careful perusal of the aforesaid
Transcript shows that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, there was a
time that complainant and respondent were indeed left alone in the office: Mr. Mendoza:
Ngayon, puwede mo bang idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to 11 :00 sinu-sino kayo doon? Witness
1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun. Si Ma'am Carrie Anne [complainant], si sir Nieva [respondent]
tsaka aka po. Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw fang ang witness, ang taong naroon 9:30 to 11? Witness 1:
Yes sir. xx xx Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch? Witness 1: Sa loob po kami nagf uf
unch. Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain minsan may natitira pa bang iba? Witness 1: !
tong po yung dafawa yung natira nung umalis po aka. Um ... pagbalik ko po wafa na po si
Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am Amy nafang po ang nandoon. Mr. Mendoza: So siya
[complainant] nafang at tsaka si Atty. Nieva [respondent] ang naiwan doon sa room? Eh nasaan
na yung ibang OJT pa? Witness 1: Tatlo fang po kasi kami nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung
dafawa. 29 See ro/lo, pp. 56-58. 30 See id. at 184-185. 31 Id.at75-123. 32 See id. at 186-187.
v Decision 8 A.C. No. 8560 Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila. So totoong may nangyari na
naiwan silang dalawa [complainant and respondent] na time na silang dalawa fang ang naiwan
sa kuwarto? Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro po nun. Mr. Mendoza: Jiang beses
na may nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa kuwarto? Witness 1: Yun fang po kasi
yung natatandaan ko po sir na time na naiwan sila eh. xx xx Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room
para bumili ng pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva [respondent]? Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang
dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero tapos na po silang magtype nun fas nag decide na
maglunch na eh. Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan? Witness 1: Dalawa pa fang sila sir
pagbalik ko tatlo na sila pero wala naman po si Ma'am Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po
aka si sir Nieva [respondent] tsaka si Ma'am Caan yung nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na si
Ma'am

81

Caan, si sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po yung nandoon. Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na
silang kasamang iba? Witness 1: Opo. 33 The same Transcript also reveals that the CODI
interviewed the occupants of the adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which,
according to the IBP Investigating Commissioner, was only separated from complainant and
respondent's office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary, by glass panels. Pertinent parts
of the interview read: Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11)
hanggang alas dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]? Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP
Operations Center]. Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness 5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito
noong bandang ganung oras past eleven (11) parang nag-advance yata si Atty. Nieva
[respondent] kay Ms. Reyes (Caan) [complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan siya parang
ganun ang dating eh "I raised up my voice also, so that the OPCEN personnel will hear of the
alann" may narinig ba kayo na sumigaw siya? Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun yung
time na ano yung RPCC 764 so nag-cocoordinate kami ... 33 Id. at 83-84 and
89. y Decision 9 A.C. No. 8560 Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764? Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung
nawawala siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa so intransi po kami ... opo ... Mr. Borja: So busingbusy ka sa telepono? Witness 4: Opo lahat kami. Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw? Witness 5: Opo. Mr. Borja:
Sinong walang ginagawa nun? Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami ng coordination lahat
kami nasa telepono. Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo
maririnig? Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya
kaming may kausap sa telepono eh. Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap ngayon wala
kayong ginagawa, narinig niyo ang usapan doon sa kabila. Witness 5: Yes sir. Atty. Gloria: Lalo
na pag malakas. Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein normal voice fang level. Witness 4: Kasi
minsan malakas din yung radio nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may mga music sila. Eto sir yung
time na kinuha ... Dami nila eh ... Lumabas nakita naming mga ano mga 10:45 na yan nabasa
sir. Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas dose
(12) ang pinaka latest message mo dito 02103106, 11 :06. So between 11 :06 to 12 wala
kayong ... Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga kami kahit ... kami fang nandoon sa
telepono. Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo sa telepono kayo? Witness 4: Tsaka
naka log-in sa log book. xx xx Mr. Abesamis: Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo kanina naririnig
niyo si sir [respondent] sa kabila kung wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na kapag malakas yung
salita? Witness 4: Opo. ~ Decision 10 A.C. No. 8560 Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi
malakas may possibility na maririnig niyo yung usapan kung walang radio? Siguro if intelligible
or knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila? Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung usapan?
Mr. Abesamis: Normal na usapan, conversation. Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila. Mr.
Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw? Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag nagdidictate si
Attorney [respondent] minsan naririnig namin. Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto? Witness
4: Ah opo. Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig? Witness 4: Kung malakas. Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
Witness 4: Opo. Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man Zang kahit isang word na malakas
doon sa kanila during the time na nangyari ito? Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi
kaming maalala ... Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig niyo pero mas busy kayo sa
telephone operation. Witness 4: Busy kami. Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano ...
Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na babae nga pero kala fang namin ah ... Mr. Abesamis:
Nung date na iyon o hindi? Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi ... Mr. Abesamis: Hindi
yung date bang iyon ang sinasabi mo? Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami sa coordination
nung ano eh nung time na iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon hinahanap pa namin yung
requirement. Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April 2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na nagaanuhan ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty. Nieva [respondent], wala? May narinig
kayong movie na parang sounding na porno ganun? ~ Decision 11 A.C. No. 8560 Witness 4:
Wala music Zang talaga sir. Mr. Mendoza: So music. Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan
nila yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto nila. Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon? Witness
4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano cartolina na white. Mr. Borja: Makakatestify Zang kayo sa
audio eh, kasi wala kayong k"k" 34 na 1 1ta. The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript show
that at around past 11 o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009, complainant and respondent
82

were left alone in the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary as complainant's officemates were all
out on errands. In this regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to hastily conclude from the
testimonies of complainant's officemates who were interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of
the ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a position to confirm or refute complainant's
allegations as they were not physically in the office so as to make a credible testimony as to
the events that transpired therein during that time. Neither can the testimonies of those in the
CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude that respondent did not do anything to
complainant, considering that they themselves admitted that they were all on the telephone,
busy with their coordinating duties. They likewise clarified that while their office is indeed
separated from the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary only by glass panels, they could not see
what was happening there as they covered the glass panels with white cartolina. In light of
their preoccupation from their official duties as well as the fact that the glass panels were
covered, it is very unlikely for them to have noticed any commotion happening in the adjacent
CAAP Office of the Board Secretary. Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the testimonies of
the witnesses in the CODI proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting that all those
interviewed in the CODI proceedings were job order and regular employees of the CAAP.
Naturally, they would be cautious in giving any unfavorable statements against a high-ranking
official of the CAAP - such as respondent who was the Acting Board Secretary at that time - lest
they earn the ire of such official and put their career in jeopardy. Thus, the IBP erred in
concluding that such Transcript shows that respondent did not perform the acts complained of.
On the contrary, said Transcript proves that there was indeed a period of time where
complainant 34 Id. at 119-122. I Decision 12 A.C. No. 8560 and respondent were left alone in
the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary which gave respondent a window of opportunity to
carry out his acts constituting sexual harassment against complainant. More importantly,
records reveal that complainant's allegations are adequately supported by a Certificate of
Psychiatric Evaluation35 dated April 13, 2009 stating that the onset of her psychiatric problems
- diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major depression - started after
suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the hands of respondent. Moreover, complainant's
plight was ably supported by other CAAP employees36 as well as a retired Brigadier General of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines 37 through various letters to authorities seeking justice for
complainant. Perceptibly, complainant would not seek help from such supporters, and risk their
integrity in the process, if none of her allegations were true. Besides, there is no evidence to
establish that complainant was impelled by any improper motive against respondent or that
she had reasons to fabricate her allegations against him. Therefore, absent any competent
proof to the contrary, the Court finds that complainant's story of the April 2, 2009 incident was
not moved by any ill-will and was untainted by bias; and hence, worthy of belief and credence.
38 In this regard, it should be mentioned that respondent's averment that complainant was
only being used by other CAAP employees to get back at him for implementing reforms within
the CAAP was plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere self-serving assertion that deserves
no weight in law. 39 In addition, the Court notes that respondent never refuted complainant's
allegation that he would regularly watch ''pampagana" movies in his office-issued laptop. In
fact, respondent readily admitted that he indeed watches "interesting shows" while in the
office, albeit insisting that he only does so by himself, and that he would immediately close his
laptop whenever anyone would pass by or go near his table. As confirmed in the Transcript 40
of the investigation conducted by the CODI, these "pampagana" movies and "interesting
shows" turned out to be pornographic materials, which respondent even asks his male staff to
regularly play for him as he is not well-versed in using computers.41 Without a doubt, it has
been established that respondent habitually watches pornographic materials in his officeissued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours, and with the knowledge and
full view of his staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such audacious display 35 Id. at
9. 36 See undated Letter written by CAAP employees addressed to then-Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno; id. at 12. 37 See Letters written by Retired Brigadier General Miguel M. Villamor of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines addressed to: (a) respondent, id. at 17-18 (undated); and (b)
83

CAAP Director General Ruben F. Ciron (dated April 7, 2009); id. at 164. 38 See People v.
Jalbonian, 713 Phil. 93, 104 (2013), citing People v. Manulit, 649 Phil. 715, 726 (2010). 39 See
People v. Mangune, 698
Phil. 759, 771 (2012), citing People v. Espinosa, 476 Phil. 42, 62 (2004). 40 Rollo, pp. 75-123.
41 See id. at 91-93, 100, and 106-107. ~ Decision 13 A.C. No. 8560 of depravity on
respondent's part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for - the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary - but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a
lawyer in the government service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties
with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost
devotion and dedication to duty. 42 However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase
these standards, and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the
government position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by
himself and that he would immediately close his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or
come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness of his actions, within the setting of
this case, remains. The legal profession - much more an engagement in the public service should always be held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should be
unwavering exemplars of integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers,
such as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must
handle their personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken the oath to
assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will
to overcome the weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this case. 43 In the Investigating
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the
quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance
of evidence. Preponderance of evidence "means evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it."44 Generally, under Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold applies to civil cases: SECTION 1.
Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil ~' the party having the burden of proof
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Emphasis supplied) 42
See Section 4 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "CODE OF CONDUCT AND
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES." 43 See Valdez v. Dabon, A.C.
No. 7353, November 16, 2015, supra note 26, citing Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 706
(2000). 44 Montanez v. Mendoza, 441 Phil. 47, 56
(2002). j Decision 14 A.C. No. 8560 Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De Zuzuarregui, Jr.
v. Soguilon 45 cited by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the Court had pronounced that the
burden of proof by preponderance of evidence in disbarment proceedings is upon the
complainant. 46 These rulings appear to conflict with other jurisprudence on the matter which
contrarily hold that substantial evidence is the quantum of proof to be applied in administrative
cases against lawyers. 47 The latter standard was applied in administrative cases such as
Foster v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in fact, illumined that: rTlhe quantum of evidence
required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative
cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is "a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto." In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more
84

than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.49
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Similarly, in Pena v. Paterno,50 it was held: Section 5, in
[comparison with] Sections 1 [(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)] and 2 [(Proof beyond
reasonable doubt)], Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only
substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. 51
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling on the
matter is Cabas v. Sususco,52 which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case,
it was pronounced that: In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges 45 589 Phil. 64
(2008). 46 See Spouses Rafols v. Barrios, Jr., 629 Phil. 213, 224 (2010);
Arma v. Montevilla, 581 Phil. 1, 7 (2008); Asa v. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9, 21 (2006). 47 See Sison v.
Camacho,
A.C. No. 10910, January 12, 2016; Brennisen v. Contawi, 686 Phil. 342, 350 (2012). 48 A.C. No.
10579,
December IO, 2014, 744 SCRA 242. 49 Id. at 263. so A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 1.
51 Id. at
592-593. 52 See A.C. No. 8677, June 15, 2016. j
Decision 15 A.C. No. 8560 based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given
credence. "53 (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to
control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold to be
applied in administrative cases against lawyers. Besides, the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence - as opposed to preponderance of evidence - is more in keeping with the
primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law
elucidates, "[ d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor."54 With the proper application of the substantial evidence
threshold having been clarified, the Court finds that the present charges against respondent
have been adequately proven by this standard. Complainant has established her claims
through relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion - that is, that respondent had harassed her and committed despicable acts which
are clear ethical violations of the CPR. In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable
and therefore, penalized. Jurisprudence provides that in similar administrative cases where the
lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging from reprimand to
disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 55 the lawyer was reprimanded for his distasteful act of
suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and kissing her on the lips. In De
85

Leon v. Pedrena, 56 the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years for rubbing the female complainant's right leg with his hand, trying to insert 53 Id., citing
Dr. De Jesus v. Guerrero III, 614 Phil. 520, 529 (2009). 54 Pena v. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512, 521
(2007). 55 Supra
note 24. 56 720 Phil. 12 (2013). ( Decision 16 A.C. No. 8560 his finger into her firmly closed
hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area, and pressing his finger
against her private part. While in Guevarra v. Eala57 and Valdez v. Dahan, 58 the Court meted
the extreme penalty of disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs.
Here, respondent exhibited his immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic
materials while in the office and his acts of sexual harassment against complainant.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court deems it proper to impose upon
respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F. Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1,
and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of
this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely. Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance and be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney. SO ORDERED. WE
CONCUR: ESTELA A~s-BERNABE Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice
/ ANTONIO ~ T. CAR Associate Justice TERESITA
~~~Ju~ J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice 57 555 Phil. 713 (2007). 58 A.C. No. 7353,
November 16, 2015, supra note 26. PRESBITE~O J. VELASCO, JR. sociate Justice On leave
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice Decision 17 ; ~~;:; Associate Justice JOSEC ENDOZA I\ /
A.C. No. 8560 On official leave LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice On official leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES Associate Justice I~ - FRANCISH .. Associate Justice S. CAGUIOA Cfari sfttD Xt:h;:.OX COPY: ~~~--~ '\:euPA B. ~NAMA CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC SUPREME COURT

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