Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to
foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted
over a third party mortgagors property situated
in the Philippines by filing an action for the
collection of the principal loan before foreign
courts?
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the decision[1]of public respondent
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51094,
promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its
resolution,[2] dated 22 May 1998, denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is
an international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines, organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of California,
United States of America while private
respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC)
is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on
the other hand, is a limited liability company
organized and existing under the laws of
England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on
several occasions granted three major multimillion United States (US) Dollar loans to the
following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian
Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A.
and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as
borrowers), all of which are existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama
and are foreign affiliates of private respondent.
[3]
Due to the default in the payment of the loan
amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
assailed decision of the lower court prompting
petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration
which the appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for
review[14] on certiorari where herein petitioner
BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the
following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded
the doctrines laid down by this Hon. Supreme
Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as G.R.
No. 74730 promulgated on August 25, 1989
andPhilippine Commercial International Bank vs.
IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said
cases were duly cited, extensively discussed
and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues
in the assignment of errors found on page 5 of
the decision dated September 30, 1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it awarded the private
respondent actual and exemplary damages
totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998
although such huge amount was not asked nor
prayed for in private respondents complaint, is
contrary to law and is totally unsupported by
evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two
main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners act of filing a
collection suit against the principal debtors for
the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court
of actual and exemplary damages in favor of
private respondent ARC, as third-party
mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies,
petitioner submits that a waiver of the remedy
of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two
requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection
should be filed and subsequently a final
judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998]
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside
the Resolution[1] dated September 27, 1995
and the Decision[2] dated April 10, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,
[4] and the Orders[5] dated August 29,
1994[6] and February 2, 1995[7] that were
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-9318394.[8]
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise
to the instant petition, as stated in the
questioned Decision[9], are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired
plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its airlines
based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta,
Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco dance with
fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because
it was almost morning when they returned to
their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of Thamer. When they
were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some
pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted
to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and
several security personnel heard her cries for
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian
police came and arrested Thamer and Allah AlGazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days
later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her
about the Jakarta incident. They then requested
her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the
release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager
Baharini negotiated with the police for the
immediate release of the detained crew
members but did not succeed because plaintiff
refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she
might be tricked into something she did not
want because of her inability to understand the
local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank
paper and a document written in the local
dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to
return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta
flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession
of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try
Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21
of the New Civil Code since the proper law
applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is
known in private international law as a conflicts
problem. Otherwise, the Republic of the
Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done
by another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental
pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to absence
of leave of court is now moot and academic
when this Honorable Court required the
respondents to comment on petitioners April
30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For Review With
Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within
Ten (10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further, the
Revised Rules of Court should be construed with
liberality pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
SO ORDERED.
III.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this
Honorable Court the instant Petition[29] for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant
Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
the Decision[30] dated April 10, 1996, now also
assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is an
appropriate forum considering that the
Amended Complaints basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of
respondent Court. It further held
that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a
denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the
petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in
case of an adverse ruling, find recourse in an
appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental
Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order[31] dated April 30, 1996,
given due course by this Court. After both
parties submitted their Memoranda,[32] the
instant case is now deemed submitted for
decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THE CASE PHILIPPINE
LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a
conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset. It maintains that private respondents
claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the
existence of a foreign element qualifies the
instant case for the application of the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex
loci delicti commissirule.[34]
On the other hand, private respondent contends
that since her Amended Complaint is based on
Articles 19[35] and 21[36] of the Civil Code,
then the instant case is properly a matter of
domestic law.[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this
case, there is no dispute that the interplay of
events occurred in two states, the Philippines
and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her
Amended Complaint[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or
SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation doing
business in the Philippines. It may be served
with summons and other court processes at
Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc.,
3rd Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian government,
the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention. Eventually, they were again put in
service by defendant SAUDIA. In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was already
behind her, her superiors requested her to see
MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA,
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where the
police took her passport and questioned her
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
xxxxxxxxx
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the July
16, 2002 Decision[2] and the January 29, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR SP No. 68403. The assailed Decision
dismissed the CA Petition (filed by herein
petitioner), which had sought to reverse the
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC is
specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as
follows:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence
of stenographic notes, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for
reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work
and other terms and conditions of employment
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264
of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,
Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employeremployee relations, including those of persons
in domestic or household service, involving an
amount of exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The commission shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
Labor Arbiters.
x x x x x x x x x.
More specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads
in part:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing provisions, labor
arbiters clearly have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from
employer-employee relations,
including termination
disputes involving all workers, among whom are
overseas Filipino workers (OFW).[15]
We are not unmindful of the fact that
respondent was directly hired, while on a tourist
status in Singapore, by the PNB branch in that
city state. Prior to employing respondent,
petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for
her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower.
Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement
pursuant to the immigration regulations of that
country.[16]
Similarly, the Philippine government requires
non-Filipinos working in the country to first
obtain a local work permit in order to be legally
employed here. That permit, however, does not
automatically mean that the non-citizen is
thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by
petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of
ones national laws on labor. Absent any clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, such
permit simply means that its holder has a legal
status as a worker in the issuing country.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondent likewise
applied for and secured an Overseas
Employment Certificate from the POEA through
the Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The
Certificate, issued on March 8, 1999, declared
her a bona fide contract worker for Singapore.
Under Philippine law, this document authorized
Second Issue:
Third Issue:
Proper Venue
Illegal Dismissal
No Valid Cause
for Dismissal
Moreover, Articles 282,[26] 283[27] and
284[28] of the Labor Code provide the valid
grounds or causes for an employees dismissal.
The employer has the burden of proving that it
was done for any of those just or authorized
causes. The failure to discharge this burden
means that the dismissal was not justified, and
that the employee is entitled to reinstatement
and back wages.[29]
Notably, petitioner has not asserted any of the
grounds provided by law as a valid reason for
terminating the employment of respondent. It
merely insists that her dismissal was validly
effected pursuant to the provisions of her
employment Contract, which she had
voluntarily agreed to be bound to.
Truly, the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they want, and their agreement would have
the force of law between them. However,
petitioner overlooks the qualification that those
terms and conditions agreed upon must not be
contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy
or public order.[30] As explained earlier, the
employment Contract between petitioner and
respondent is governed by Philippine labor laws.
Hence, the stipulations, clauses, and terms and
conditions of the Contract must not contravene
our labor law provisions.
Moreover, a contract of employment is imbued
with public interest. The Court has time and
time again reminded parties that they are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contractingwith each
other.[31] Also, while a contract is the law
between the parties, the provisions of positive
law that regulate such contracts are deemed
included and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties.[32]
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,
xxxxxxxxx
[Petitioners] likewise acted in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating
[respondents] employment and are therefore
liable for exemplary damages. This should
served [sic] as protection to other employees of
[petitioner] company, and by way of example or
correction for the public good so that persons
similarly minded as [petitioners] would be
deterred from committing the same acts.[36]
versus -
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571 Present:
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
Manila
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
THIRD DIVISION
*ABAD, and
Promulgated:
August 11, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
THE PETITION
(a)
In case of a judgment or final order
upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and
(b)
In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
(a)
births;
(b) deaths;
(c)
marriages;
(e)
divorces;
(f)
legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i)
naturalization; and
(j)
changes of name.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
July 4, 1991
petitioner,
vs.
respondent.
J.:Before this Court is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the
dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent
against petitioner with the trial court.
As culled from the records of the case, the
following antecedents appear:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc.
(BMSI), a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of
Connecticut, United States of America, and
respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American
citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI
hired respondent as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an
agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross
receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent
secured a service contract with the Republic of
the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the
dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and mudflows.3
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against
BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST),
Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment
contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering
BMSI and RUST to pay respondents money
claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondents complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.6 Respondent
elevated the case to this Court but was
dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November
1997. The Resolution became final and
executory on 09 November 1998.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident
of La Union, instituted an action for damages
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil
Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein
petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as
BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded
in the earlier labor case. The complaint
MINORU KITAMURA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 149177
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Petitioners,
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CAG.R. SP No. 60205 on account of the petition's
defective certification of non-forum shopping, it
was a dismissal without prejudice.[27] The
same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said
case due to defects in the formal requirement of
verification[28] and in the other requirement in
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the statement
of the material dates.[29] The dismissal being
without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the
petition, or file a second petition attaching
thereto the appropriate verification and
certificationas they, in fact didand stating
therein the material dates, within the prescribed
period[30] in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said
Rules.[31]
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 154380
- versus -
Present:
Davide, Jr., C
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino
citizens, where one party is later naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce
decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that
behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
this apparently novel question, presented as a
pure question of law.
Petitioner,
Present:
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
- versus Promulgated:
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
x
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
xxxx
Petitioner,
vs.
Respondent.
DECISION
J.:We resolve the petition for review on,
certiorari1 filed by petitioner Tung Ho Steel
Enterprises Corp. (Tung Ho) to challenge the July
5, 2006 decision2 and the March 12, 2008
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 92828.
The Factual Antecedents
Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Taiwan, Republic of
China.4 On the other hand, respondent Ting
Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a domestic
corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.5
On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself
under a contract of sale to deliver heavy metal
scrap iron and steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently,
Tung Ho filed a request for arbitration before the
ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) in
Singapore after Ting Guan failed to deliver the
full quantity of the promised heavy metal scrap
iron and steel.6
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18,
2004 and ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho the
following: (1) actual damages in the amount of
US$ 659,646.15 with interest of 6% per annum
from December 4, 2002 until final payment; (2)
cost of arbitration in the amount of US $
47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and expenses in
the amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $
34,552.83.7
The Issues
This case presents to us the following issues:
1) Whether the present petition is barred by res
judicata; and
2) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Ting Guan, specifically:
a) Whether Tejero was the proper person to
receive the summons; and
b) Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary
appearance before the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
I. The Court is not precluded from ruling on the
jurisdictional issue raised in the petition
A. The petition is not barred by res judicata
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive on the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on all points and matters determined in
the former suit.19 For res judicata to apply, the
final judgment must be on the merits of the
case which means that the court has
unequivocally determined the parties rights
February 9, 1995
petitioner,
vs.
respondents
J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's
complaint to enforce the judgment of a
Japanese court. The principal issue here is
whether a Japanese court can acquire
jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing
business in Japan by serving summons through
diplomatic channels on the Philippine
corporation at its principal office in Manila after
prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had
failed.
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc.
(hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of
Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil
Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 54, Manila, a judgment rendered
in its favor by a Japanese court against private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc.,
(hereinafter SHARP), a corporation incorporated
under Philippine laws.
As found by the Court of Appeals in the
challenged decision of 10 November
1993, 1 the following are the factual and
procedural antecedents of this controversy:
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and
defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its
Japan branch, entered into an International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby
the former authorized the latter to sell its air
transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant
on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued
defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with
claim for damages.
xxx
xxx
Manila
JUDGMENT
THIRD DIVISION
petitioner,
vs.
respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for petitioner.
Castelo Law Office for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
Challenged in this petition for certiorari which is
anchored on grave abuse of discretion, are two
orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLII
of Makati, Metro Manila dismissing the
complaint for collection of a sum of money and
denying the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal order on the ground that petitioner, a
Hongkong-based bank, is barred by the General
Banking Act from maintaining a suit in this
jurisdiction.
The records show that on July 18, 1979,
petitioner Hang Lung Bank, Ltd., which was not
(1)
the 1st Defendant (Ko Ching Chong
Trading otherwise known as the Worlder
Enterprises) do pay the Plaintiff the sum of
HK$1,117,968.36 together with interest on the
respective principal sums of HK$196,591.38,
HK$200,216.29, HK$526,557.63, HK$49,350.00
and HK$3,965.50 at the rates of 1.7% per
month (or HK$111.40 per day), 18.5% per
annum (or HK$101.48 per day), 1.85% per
month (or HK$324.71 per day), 1.55% per
month (or HK$25.50 per day) and 1.7% per
month (or HK$2.25 per day) respectively from
4th May 1984 up to the date of payment; and
(2)
the 2nd Defendant (Cordova Chin San)
do pay the Plaintiff the sum of
HK$279,325.00 together with interest on the
principal sum of HK$250,000.00 at the rate
of 1.7% per month (or HK$141.67 per
day) from 4th May 1984 up to the date of
payment.
AND IT IS ADJUDGED that the 1st and 2nd
Defendants do pay the Plaintiff the sum of
HK$970.00 fixed costs.
N.J. BARNETT
Registrar
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
heirs-appellees.
Manila
EN BANC
petitioner-appellee,
vs.
opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for
oppositor-appellant.
J.:This is an appeal from a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of
said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among things the final accounts of
the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount
of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and
in case of death without issue, one-half of said
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY
IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONEHALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen
was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But
there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as
witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to
probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan"
with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to
the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which
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