G.R. No.

L-14078

March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6
Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the
status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present
opinion This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative
power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence
of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts
and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "nonChristians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is
alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi
and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and
one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent
settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place
most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject
to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of
section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the
governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce
civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao
and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro
but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the
paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an
approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read
as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand
one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall
upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this
section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916;
section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to
the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is
also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category,
and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized
elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities
towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title
III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on
February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568.
Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order
that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in
harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to
use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success,
our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain
assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred and
forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At these
meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and
separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and
temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise
to those human necessities which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of
this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys,
presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the concentration of
the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without
causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good
treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves,
and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has
been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with
in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
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xxx

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LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands,
and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indioscan
have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall
not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order
that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them
previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
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xxx

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LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
thepueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the
viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that en. And, because
these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this
law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently obtained. The penalty of
one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion;
if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if
the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be
less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman,
who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by
Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on
January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December
17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in
the reduccionesand towns and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who
deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living;
robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would
leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and
utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders
and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts
above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors,
and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation
of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds
(zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to inherit their houses
and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from
their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less
advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral
part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to
conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the
nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the
moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the
non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the
commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important
question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary
fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the
principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to

complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and
in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the
prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing
respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I
have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves
important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After
hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of
Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of
Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held
for the object so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding
in a practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and
the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the
following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of
instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its
territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into
three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor
a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life;
and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and
the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the
work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the
first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means
which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or
settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing
up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative organization of the said towns or
settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the fiscal year
they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the
only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than
those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the
inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute
necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for
them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to
establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed
precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations
based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties
affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the
products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same
price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as
the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of
which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall
be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally
wherever convenient.

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all
by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their
families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way
them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their
habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own
accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and families of
recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the purchase or
facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities
as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in
return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and
country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the
location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not have the good
conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by
them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the
peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April,
committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the
Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in
conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the
expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements, and confiscate their
products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the
military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities,
shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the
scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of
the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or
permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the
foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and
missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about
due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their
respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for
dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was
President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by
section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained
undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted,
namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed
by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and
government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be

subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in
view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature,
composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian
portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into
twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint
senators and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not
represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be
known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the
inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by
Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory
which is inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO.
82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila;
Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization
of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao
and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an
d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning
with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having
reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855,
1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela.
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and
Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS
FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial
governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of office, and to
prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in
excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven entitled
"An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of Nueva
Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized,
when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and

control over them shall be exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom
shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced
sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to
sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the
geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in
the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last
named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice
with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in
section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine
Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau.
Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550,
1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite
nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These
terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145,
2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as
well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and
pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408,
sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be
those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section
2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas
Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin
of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; CraigBenitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true
meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many
laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory"
of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition
in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly."
The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of
the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The
specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These
are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local selfgovernment. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular
representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and
some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of
1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The
reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular
province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of
the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The
so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these
people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward
Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose
of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more
autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906,
circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections
2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian
tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to
determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban
[Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with
article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the
point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called nonChristians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the
requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to
be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be
taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and
enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating
to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior.
Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the
Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was
circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally nonChristian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized
are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced
far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes
is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to
adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission
was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient
advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act
and the Municipal Code.

The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person
baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will
give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may
recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of
regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the
degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above
expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized
under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say
on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the
term carries the same meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30,
1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the
hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional
guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the
Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular
letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue
Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The
Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess
some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he
has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes
are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists,
etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In
other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious worship or profession that decides
whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized
manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and
living with a non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a
prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he
was not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are
paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely
scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in most of
the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these
Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people
preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the
Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due
from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and
becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws
governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published for the information of all
concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not
profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All

inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three
classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of
the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other
members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches himself to the community the
same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members thereof. If he comes in after the
expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving from foreign
countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a regular class A,
D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to
pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is
subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor
even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his
mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized
community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as
members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned,
since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and
so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1,
promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by
Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript
of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion
of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The
precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay
himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the
same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question
remains a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these
should be the constructions place upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning
which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or
uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who,
living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which
live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and
civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but,
without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression
which the Spanish legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657
(articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the
Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning
would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of
the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or
Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census,
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and
Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in
the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and
Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not
to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join
in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area,
and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided
them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de
Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that
the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to
certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that
island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all
these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from
which we can deduce that the name was applied to men considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that
these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were called
the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately
15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547,
have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal
government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States
for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the socalled non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States
Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation
of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage."
The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The
Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress
passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the
Act, the opinion goes on "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object
sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into
agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S.,
375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then

proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of
which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the
Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex
character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who
were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have
recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established
occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were
forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority.
When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United States wished to
purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise.
With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been,
regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not
as nation not a possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the
State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of
the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arise the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and
by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these
remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United
States, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the
status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating
liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of
the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon
the fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said
"that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection,
where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians
tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule
the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not
subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488;
U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers
[1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218;
Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907],
204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286;
U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever,
therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such
laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their
persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas
corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ

of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who
have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time
previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the
general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without
aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of
violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of,
and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some
place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission from the Government;
and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the Army had issued an order which required the
respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order,
he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The
second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators
for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In
discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly
tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for
the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government
almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an
extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned.
It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld."
The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the
right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he
may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of
liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte,
has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the
respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and
have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do
not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof,
the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the
Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of
the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse
[1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians
have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous
consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the
reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian
policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of
the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial
authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its
full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected,
we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed
in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion,
as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
(U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of
the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this
"necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the
Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to
the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes
provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and
agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all
matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view
of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to
warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of
Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was
necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the
Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204
U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S.,
598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule.
sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local
authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged
with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select
sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says
that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as
language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result,
them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their
religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood to
mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the
Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore
stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of
legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of

civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an
account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission,
the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
[1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the
Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty
by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on
right. That authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of
high civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion
to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that
man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought
not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is
only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others.
(Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly
freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society
based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy.
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury
that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may asserts the
supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any
free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is
equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members,
the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable
conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community,
consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace
the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epochmaking decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract,
the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free
men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627;
Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902],
114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for
the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No
man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the
natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and
equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope
of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz
[1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of
the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic
literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice
are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a
stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law
prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this
law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
(U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due
process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is
applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution
particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said
Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has,
by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code,
prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.)
The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary,
no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must
come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching
scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to
legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity.
(See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to
restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill
Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam
the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great
principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the
exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited
only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any
constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should
be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the
Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the
following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of
the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good
one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that
there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which
they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying
period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the
impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the beginning of the
institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the
press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and
evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political
communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this
country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on
account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be
subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has
adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to
equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the
following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave
their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions
inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and
the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social
and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of
Mindanao and Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may
fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being
persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They are being made to
understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid them to live and work, protect
them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the advantages of
leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and
objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with
the more highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians,
and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in
civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes,
defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in
favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a
systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of
those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and
complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago.
(Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino
people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of
civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently
working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have
on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate
neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands.
What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for
educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this
method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation,
has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in
some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really
constitutes protection for the manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not
precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the
equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which
citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low
degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the
law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and
persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are
punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before.
If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet,
unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and
thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the
laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are
engaged in the works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins
thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will
ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now
fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance

they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by
those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a
rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another
in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are
being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx

xxx

xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of
law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty
in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what
liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the
welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let
along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was
adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under
the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not
far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which
has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply
because a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by such a measure has
come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization?
Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of
ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor
that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To
allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a
permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge,
the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and
guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the
government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to
live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established for them. In short,
everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in civilization and material prosperity
may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them in a
condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of
imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and
wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the
conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is the property of the nation,
the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why
can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands,
instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the
interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment
of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will
always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you
can not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will
come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not,
however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute
freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt,
this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian?
The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have
little or not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor
to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus
confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open
for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular
case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily
hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the
individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the
very existence of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to
be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the
Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual
to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular
degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a
along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political
theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and
equal protection of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of
the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200
Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes
before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is
wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as
sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in
vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days
to the present. The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of
nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to
be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole.

The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their
own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate
branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the
courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he
is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances."
(Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents,
the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the
general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but
with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.
We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This
is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!"
It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626
particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent
the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to

charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they
were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of
the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now
come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid
because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this
Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review
by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others,
all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive
and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them
so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated
otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another
distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear
of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially
this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new
rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking
care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It
was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment
required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that
were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that
extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order.
Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his
judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of

this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental
question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable
language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the
due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept
ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934,
but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully
argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the
guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation,
enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it
were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases
as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing
sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would
thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his
peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness
that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since
then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when
confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side"
before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half
of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the
bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective
only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary
or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the
insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing

13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because

they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced
by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth
College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of
every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and
empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of
admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as
such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the
fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and
lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a
person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the
womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule
in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original
measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the

carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs."
We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased
dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if
it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own
carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to
prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of
their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the
animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding
of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute
under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human
consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a
"reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the
services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the
productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.
In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor,
so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The
method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female
upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We
note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it
should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the
Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed
by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is
prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out
forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that
summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily
judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a
previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment.
The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no
reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with
the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held
in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the
prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed
in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in
the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said
officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless.
Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own
exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in
his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at
that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and,
on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did
not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would
never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become
a fait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would
have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would
have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is
embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered
restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.

G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, HON. JESUS B.
GARCIA, in his capacity as Acting Secretary, Department of Transportation and Communications, and
ROGELIO A. DAYAN, in his capacity as General Manager of Philippine Ports Authority, petitioners,
vs.
UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANILA PILOTS
ASSOCIATION,respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to
one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right
to exercise their profession and their right to due process of law?
The PPA was created on July 11, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. On December 23, 1975,
Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA's charter. Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and
supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, 1 the PPA promulgated PPA-AO-03-85 2 on March 21, 1985, which
embodied the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports." These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses 3 and must train as
probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four months. It is only after they have
achieved satisfactory performance 4 that they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself 5 to exercise
harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the
PPA General Manager. 6Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for effective pilotage services.
In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office equipment. In fact, every new
pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot association and is required to pay a proportionate
equivalent equity or capital before being allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of
the amount it paid to his predecessor.
Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 7 on July 15, 1992, whose
avowed policy was to "instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users through the
improvement of pilotage services." This was implemented by providing therein that "all existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December
1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term
of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance."
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt.
Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and Communication,
but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling
PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board of Directors as its governing body."
Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-92 8 which laid down the criteria or
factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors: 9 safety record and
physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation: 10 promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with
PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.
Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92, but Secretary
Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of the PPA.
Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPAAO No. 04-92. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of its
administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV of P.D. No. 857, as
amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to restore order in the ports and to improve
the quality of port services.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona,
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. 11 He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92
applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely
implementing Section 6 of P.D. No. 857, mandating it "to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in
any port district."
On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memoranda and
circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or
interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context of this case. PPA-AO 04-92
does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of
those affected thereby. As may be noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by
limiting the appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid
evaluation of the appointee's performance.
PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in
PPA's jurisdictional area. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, as regards the alleged "absence of ample prior consultation" before the issuance of the administrative order,
Secretary Corona cited Section 26 of P.D. No. 857, which merely requires the PPA to consult with "relevant
Government agencies." Since the PPA Board of Directors is composed of the Secretaries of the DOTC, the
Department of Public Works and Highways, the Department of Finance, and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic Development Agency, the
Administrator of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), and the private sector representative who, due to his
knowledge and expertise, was appointed by the President to the Board, he concluded that the law has been
sufficiently complied with by the PPA in issuing the assailed administrative order.
Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65673. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment: 12
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:

1. Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in
a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all
its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;
2. PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;
3. The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its
implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The court a quo pointed out that the Bureau of Customs, the precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a
profession and, therefore, a property right under Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 13 Thus, abbreviating the term
within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the harbor pilots.
Consequently, any "withdrawal or alteration" of such property right must be strictly made in accordance with the
constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the PPA when it did not conduct public
hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92; respondents allegedly learned about it only after its publication in the
newspapers. From this decision, petitioners elevated their case to this Court on certiorari.
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced that
PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property without due
process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, . . .
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and
that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process of law,

however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence,
procedural due process "refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due
process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair,
reasonable, and just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no
hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the pilots themselves could ventilate their
views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained
a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it
declared that "(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times 16 before the matter was finally
elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the
Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not
consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was
duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no matters of
naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted. 18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity of the administrative
order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive
or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage by pilots
is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by
observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to
one of substance. It is here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. Even petitioner Corona
recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within
the constitutional guarantee against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due
process." 20 He merely expressed the opinion the "(i)n the limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a
wrongful interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby, and that "PPAAO 04-95 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession." As will be presently
demonstrated, such supposition is gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an administrative order which is not only
unreasonable but also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the granting of
license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in
accordance with establishment standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to
carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal. 22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass through the proverbial
eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed by actual training and practice. Thus, the
court a quo observed:
Petitioners (herein respondents) contend, and the respondents (herein petitioners) do not deny, the here
(sic) in this jurisdiction, before a person can be a harbor pilot, he must pass five (5) government professional
examinations, namely, (1) For Third Mate and after which he must work, train and practice on board a vessel
for at least a year; (2) For Second Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year;
(3) For Chief Mate and after which he must work, train and practice for at least a year; (4) For a Master
Mariner and after which he must work as Captain of vessel for at least two (2) years to qualify for an
examination to be a pilot; and finally, of course, that given for pilots.
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the
age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular appointments
which have been previously issued by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December
1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance."

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before
their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after passing five
examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have a license which they could use until their
retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have
to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent depending on the
outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid
evaluation of performance" which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of
the term "renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which
is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" 23 and, therefore,
an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing
Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO
No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be
struck down.
Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the
questioned administrative order may have some factual basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his office
to propose rules and regulations. The trial court's finding of animosity between him and private respondents might
likewise have a grain of truth. Yet the number of cases filed in court between private respondents and Dayan,
including cases which have reached this Court, cannot certainly be considered the primordial reason for the
issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92. In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should be presumed to have acted in
accordance with law and the best of professional motives. In any event, his actions are certainly always subject to
scrutiny by higher administrative authorities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the court a quo dated
September 6, 1993, in Civil Case No. 93-65673 is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL.,respondents.
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be
made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2
of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary,
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three
justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under
Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the
instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was
"otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is
that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with
but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes
that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to
remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may

question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to
one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case
studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the
assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances
are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and
in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official
Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it
impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and
apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as
required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is
untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the
acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our
country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating
from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates
and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This
they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from
their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-50581-50617 January 30, 1982

RUFINO V. NUEZ petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court,
the Sandiganbayan with "jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law." 1 It came into existence with the issuance in 1978
of a Presidential Decree. 2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft statute was passed, 3 to
be supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the validity of which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968 decision. As
set forth in the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier
statute was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard
of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must
indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The
conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device." 6 It should
occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971 Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the continuity need to
combat the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the Presidential Decree creating the
Sandiganbayan, He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several
cases. 7 The informations were filed respectively on February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year,
upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. 8 A week later. respondent
Court denied such motion. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. 10 Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating
the respondent Court is violative of the due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the
Constitution. 14
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more effectively with dishonesty and abuse
of trust in the public service whether committed by government officials or not, with the essential cooperation of the
private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from or disregard of constitutional rights.
That is beyond question. With due recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in his
pleadings butressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally aided in the study of the issues raised by the

exhaustive memorandum of the Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No, 1486 as
amended, creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated.

The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree cannot be adjudged.
1. It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create
the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973
Constitution contemplated that such an act should come from the National Assembly, the 1976 Amendments made
clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been
lifted. " 17 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 18 decided in
1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making
authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . 19 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of
authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the
period of Martial Law. " 20
2. Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to nullify Presidential Decree
No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J. M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: 21"The Ideal
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus
could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity which is of
the very essence of the Idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot
approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the
situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist
.To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if
they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was
prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. " 23 Classification is
thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly
on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which,
if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 24
3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum thus: " 1.
The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because - appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of
law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafaindictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals
and thereafter to the Supreme Court." 25 ,that is hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test
announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera 26 requiring that it "must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. 27 To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes
mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan 4 precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court
ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive
to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner, moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co
Chiong v. Cuaderno 28 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among which are the
due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, " in that decision, one reserving
to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities." 29The scope of such a principle is not to be constricted. It
is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the
Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy
wise ... ." 30 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of permisiveness of such an argument.
The Kay Villegas Kami 31 decision promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding
pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1)
makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidences, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony . than the law required at the time of the commission to regulate civil
rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful,
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty." 32 Even the most careful scrutiny of the above
definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is
qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to
appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People

v. Vilo 33 a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine
Justices then composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion
that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.

5. It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative exposition of what is prohibited by the ex
post facto clause is found in Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided in 1903. Thus: "An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes
such action; or (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. " 35 There is relevance to the next paragraph of the opinion of
Justice Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what way the act in question
alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal,
and is intended
First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the
claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility. 36
6. Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United States Supreme Court. Even the very
language as to what falls with the category of this provision is well-nigh Identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I
consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. Ist. Every law that makes an action done
before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th Every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense,
in order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive." 38 The opinion of Justice
Chase who spoke for the United States Supreme Court went on to state: "The expressions 'ex post facto laws,' are
technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators,
lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers an ex post
facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson and by the
author of the Federalist, who I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principle of
government. " 39
7. Petitioner relies on Thompson v. Utaha. 40 As it was decided by the American Supreme Court in April of 1898 - the
very same year when the Treaty of Paris, by virtue of which, American sovereignty over the Philippines was acquired - it is
understandable why he did so. Certainly, the exhaustive opinion of the first Justice Harlan, as was mentioned by an
author, has a cutting edge, but it cuts both ways. It also renders clear why the obstacles to declaring unconstitutional the
challenged Presidential Decree are well-nigh insuperable. After a review of the previous pronouncements of the American
Supreme Court on this subject, Justice Harlan made this realistic appraisal: "The difficulty is not so much as to the
soundness of the general rule that an accused has no vested right in particular modes of procedure as in determining
whether particular statutes by their operation take from an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution, as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him." 41 An 1894 decision of the American Supreme Court, Duncan v.
Missouri 42 was also cited by petitioner, The opinion of the then Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the Court, is to the same
effect. It was categorically stated that "the prescribing of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the
creation of new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the existing laws surrounds the person
accused of crime, are not considered within the constitutional inhibition." 43
8. Even from the standpoint then of the American decisions relied upon, it cannot be successfully argued that there
is a dilution of the right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no recourse to the Court
of Appeals, the review coming from this Court. The test as to whether the ex post factoclause is disregarded, in the
language of Justice Harlan in the just-cited Thompson v. Utah decision taking "from an accused any right that was
regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he
enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him." The crucial words are "vital for the
protection of life and liberty" of a defendant in a criminal case. Would the omission of the Court of Appeals as an
intermediate tribunal deprive petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty? The answer must be in the
negative. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent
Court. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices
from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the
concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. " 44 Then if convicted, this Court
has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.
Petitioner makes much, perhaps excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of the facts.
What Cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in determining whether or not to give due course to the petition
for review must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence 45 has been overcome. In that sense, it
cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a
finding of guilt has been satisfied. The standard as to when there is proof of such weight to justify a conviction is set forth

in People v. Dramayo. 46 Thus: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer
evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been
committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting
test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted
to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty." 47 This Court has repeatedly reversed convictions on a showing that this fundamental and basic right to De
presumed innocent has been disregarded. 48 It does seem farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission
of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss "vital protection" of liberty.

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page
memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack
of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court
decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words,
Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a
defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men
will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due
to the accused, is due to the accuser also, The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We
are to keep the balance true." 50What is required for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In
Arnault v. Pecson, 51this Court with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with "a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense." 52 In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the
accused is "informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made
to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in
accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent
jurisdiction." 53 The above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of
Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 54 decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise.
Thus: "This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal
procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice
to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has
had due process of law." 55
10. This Court holds that petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for a declaration of unconstitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1606. The decision does not go as far as
passing on any question not affecting the right of petitioner to a trial with all the safeguards of the Constitution. It is
true that other Sections of the Decree could have been worded to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now,
however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice
Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of invalidity, they must be construed in such a
way as preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition
too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval. Nor should there be any doubt either that a review by
certiorari of a decision of conviction by the Sandiganbayan calls for strict observance of the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr. and Ericta, JJ., took no part.
Fernandez, J., concurs and dissent

G.R. No. L-46496

February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la
sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba
a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of
the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed
in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court
of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected
to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,

in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to
the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R.
No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S.
Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d
985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct.
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.)
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to
the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in
any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate
to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment
of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to
appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme

adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition.
By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be
better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the
same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations,
with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 93891

March 11, 1991

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.
Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.
Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals
reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing
private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into
a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as
Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of
about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections
conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged
in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on
06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and
the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the
wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by
means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment
Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is
highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of
respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
Effluent Regulations.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installation
and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the
requirements and until further orders from this Board.
SO ORDERED.

We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ; and
2

b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").
The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that
its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled
through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents
showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its
Implementing Regulations.
A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board
was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.
Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22
September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.
On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.
On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that
the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.
Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order
of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of
Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
portion of its Decision that:
. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative
to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities.
3

The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may
result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:
1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with
law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and
2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by
the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges
of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the
1982 Effluent Code.

Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue
only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and
plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to
issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:
P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an exparte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation
of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public
hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied)
We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order
may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facieevidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been
the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when
it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the
general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains
necessary.
Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission
or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life.''
Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed
"when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC
Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under
Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations which in part provides that:
4

Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe
and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified
according to the following beneficial usages:
(a) Fresh Surface Water
Classification
xxx

xxx

Best usage
xxx

Class D
For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering
and industrial cooling and processing.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(Emphases supplied)
The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:

a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the
Effluent Regulations of 1982.
6

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings
of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:

"Inland
Waters
(Class C & D
a) Color in
platinum
cobalt
units
b) pH
c) Temperature in C
d) Phenols in
mg.1
e) Suspended
solids in
mg./1.
f) BOD in
mg./1.
g) oil/Grease
in mg./1.
h) Detergents
mg./1."

November
1986
Report
Station 1
100

a)

Color units
(Apparent
Color)

250

September
1988
Report
Station 1
125

6-8.5
40

b)
c)

9.3

8.7

0.1

d)

75

e)

340

80

80

f)

1,100

152

10

g)

h)

pH
Temperature
(C)
Phenols in
mg./1.
Suspended
solids in
mg./1.
BOD (5-day)
mg./1
Oil/Grease
mg./1.
Detergents
mg./1. MBAS
Dissolved
oxygen, mg./1.
Settleable
Matter, mg./1.
Total Dis
solved Solids
mg./1.
Total Solids
Turbidity

i)
j)
k)
l)
m)

2.93
0
0.4

1.5

800

610

1,400
NTU / ppm, SiO

690
70

The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:

Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation,
was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting
dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new
owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
1986 (sic).
The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during
the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a
re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence,
this inspection.
Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our
water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted
immediately against the firm. . . .
10

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined
wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of
the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river
by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment
plant (WTP).

2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed. Only the sump pit
and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent
discharge [from such collection tank].
1wphi1

3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show
that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others.
(Please see attached laboratory resul .)
11

From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain
from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a
hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986.
Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and
September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other
words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable
standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated,
pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its
Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al., the Court very recently
upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing
establishment, after finding that the records showed that:
12

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the
business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted
by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health
of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it
was required to bring the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2,
petition)
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina
who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9,
petition)
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition).
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."
In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar
has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily
to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother
and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to
reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats
and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution
statutes and their implementing regulations.
It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of
Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by
an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process
clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing
may then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984
and Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar
should have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and
instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority
temporarily to continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another
analysis of effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.
Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution
were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's
petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order
of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court
dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of
the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 89317 May 20, 1990

ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES,
BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON,
LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet,
Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the
chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
Antonio A. Ayo Jr. and Soliman M. Santos, Jr., for petitioners
Pedro A. Venida Agustin A. Ferrer and Gil F. Echaro for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School
of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student,
once admitted by the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be refused readmission
after the semester is over, as the contract between the student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to reenroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the
school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial
court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988; the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly
on the point at issue in this case but the authority of the school regarding admission of students,
save as a matter of compassionate equity when any of the petitioners would, at the least, qualify
for re-enrollment, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 12-A.]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on February 24, 1989 in this wise:
Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas S.J., and that really there
must be a better way of treating students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the
Supreme Court, the Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.
But applicable rule in the case is that enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sophia
Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al.,
G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the termination at the end of the semester, reason for the
critical comments of Joaquin G. Bernas and Doods Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling.
Petitioners' claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny
respondent's affirmative defenses that "they were given all the chances to air their grievances on
February 9, 10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were
represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak" and that on February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of
classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present in their
classes.
Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for
re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for
the first semester of school year 1988-89. Said form specifically states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose
scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students
whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or
interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required
to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.
In addition, for the same semester, petitioners duly signed pledges which among others uniformly
reads:
In consideration of my admission to the Mabini College and of my privileges as
student of this institution, I hereby pledge/ promise under oath to abide and comply
with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College
Department or School in which I am enrolled. Specifically:
xxx xxx xxx
3. I will respect my Alma Matter the Mabini College, which I represent and see to it
that I conduct myself in such a manner that the college wig not be put to a bad light;
xxx xxx xxx
9. I will not release false or unauthorized announcement which tend to cause
confusion or disrupt the normal appreciation of the college.
Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus to prosper (Sec. 3,
Rule 65). It being a mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or reenrolled,
respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of

the academic freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings in the
cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November 28, 1975)
and Tangonon vs.Pano, et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).
WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo pp. 15-16.]
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the Court, which resolved on April 10, 1989 to refer the
case to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition. The Court of Appeals ordered respondents to
comment on the petition and set the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for
hearing. After considering the comment and hearing the injunction application, the Court of Appeals resolved on
May 22, 1989 to certify the case back to the Supreme Court considering that only pure questions of law were raised.
The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which then transferred it to the Court en banc on August
21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional. On September 14, 1989, the Court en bancaccepted
the case and required respondents to comment.
Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. Petitioners were required to reply. As reply, they filed a
pleading entitled "Counter-Comment," to which respondents filed a rejoinder entitled "Reply to Counter-Comment To
this petitioners filed a "Rejoinder to Reply."
The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.
At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester.
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are
for "one semester." It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being
the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19, 1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99
SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated,
there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract
with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court,
have no power to make contracts for the parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., supra). [At 161 SCRA 17-18; Emphasis supplied.]
In Alcuaz, the Second Division of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who were barred from reenrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added that "in the light of compassionate
equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the
school year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time." [At 161 SCRA
22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento dissented from the majority opinion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers in Alcuaz. The students did not move for
reconsideration. The Court en banc, to which the case had been transferred, denied the motion for reconsideration
in a Resolution dated September 29, 1989, but added as an obiter dictum:
In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right of students to complete their
education in the school or university of their choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to
rallies and demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom of speech
and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always be
conducted peacefully, and without resort to intimidation, coercion, or violence. Academic freedom in
all its forms, demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise would be to subvert freedom
into degenerate license.
The majority's failure to expressly repudiate the "termination of contract" doctrine enunciated in the decision
provoked several dissents on that issue. Although seven (7) members of the Court * disagreed with the Second
Division's dismissal of the students petition, a definitive ruling on the issue could not have been made because no

timely motion for reconsideration was filed by the students. (As stated above, the motion for reconsideration was
filed by the dismissed teachers.)
Be that as it may, the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, insofar as it allowed schools to bar the
readmission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract, shall be made in this case where
the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5].
Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper perspective. This is not a simple case of a school refusing
readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll
petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed
against the school. Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after leading and participating in student
protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to
speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them.
Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988; Rollo,
pp. 1212-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students' rights and the school's power to discipline
them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory right to education, and there is such
denial when students are expelled or barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free
speech and peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with the
requirements of due process. Also, it is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely
critical and, at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.
But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . . [Order of February 24, 1989; Rollo, p.
13.]
1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the recognition and protection of the rights of free speech
and assembly. Thus, our Constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
[Art. III.]
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar provision was found in the 1973 Constitution, as
amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended [Art. III, sec. 81, the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones
Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13]. Thus, as early as 1907, the Court
in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right to speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition. It
said:
Section 5 of the Act No. 292 is as follows:
All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of
legal methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or
any public official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any
judicial or administrative order.
But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge "the freedom of speech" or "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances" guaranteed
by the express provisions of section 5 of "the Philippine Bill."
xxx xxx xxx
It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always
wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as

a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition
for redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it on the
most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took part
therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain
did not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur
on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor, but the utmost
discretion must be exercise in drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct and
between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising. [At pp. 424, 426.]
That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly
available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No.
62270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en
bancdecision, declared:
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4. Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are entitled to do so.
They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to
borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." While
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. [At pp. 367-368.]
The facts in Malabanan are only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass actions:
. . . Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent [Gregorio Araneta]
University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they
held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) the place indicated
in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the respond floor lobby. At such
gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same
day, they marched toward the Life Science building and continued their rally. It was outside the area
covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to language severely
critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result,
disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance,
stopped their work because of the noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why
they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were
informed through a memorandum that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition
for mandamuswith damages against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education,
Culture, and Sports. On October 20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director of the National Capital
Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private
Schools more specifically their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the
violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The
penalty was suspension for one academic year. . . . [At pp. 363-364.]
The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe and reduced it to a one-week suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of the Court.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the Court
reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. It
enjoined the school and its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But
the Court allowed the non-enrollment of students who clearly incurred marked academic deficiency, with the
following caveat:
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4. The academic freedom enjoyed by ''institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion
of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot
be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to

peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the
students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. [At p. 711.]
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case arising
from almost the same facts as those in Malabanan, the Court rejected "the infliction of the highly- disproportionate
penalty of denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of the
cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to them. [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to
allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to
any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests that led to
the stoppage of classes.
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be
taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students. This was made clear by the
Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 US 503, 514: "But
conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
Thus, in Malabanan, the Court said:
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8. It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than
that specified, in the second floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the (VMAS) building of
the University. Moreover, it was continued longer than the period allowed. According to the decision
of respondent Ramento, the "concerted activity [referring to such assembly went on until 5:30 p.m."
Private respondents could thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [ At pp. 370-371].
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
Thus:
. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. As stated in Malabanan, "[i]f the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed is not followed, an element of
arbitrariness intrudes." [At p. 371].
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated not only because of
political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversy over increases in tuition fees. But
the over-eager hands of some school authorities were not effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan. Instead
of suspending or expelling student leaders who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same
stratagem was adopted by the latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to,
their alleged misconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass actions directed against the
school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must be repeatedly
emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory
and regulatory powers over all educational institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, which provides that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling . . . for the
entire semester for collegiate courses," which the Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse
enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.
The "termination of contract" theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely clarifies that a
college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and
paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance
before examinations. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has
stayed on for more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is
given his credentials for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and
Other Fees, which in its totality provides:
137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school
year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A
student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of
classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length
of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he
withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes,
regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the
school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer
or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to
and including the last month of attendance.
Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for only one
semester, and that after that semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion of the
school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire
period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:
Every student has the right to enrol in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency
and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the
entire period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.
This "presumption" has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the "Education Act of 1982."
Section 9 of this act provides:
Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.
Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that "respondent Mabini College is free to admit or
not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school" [Rollo, p. 16]. To
support this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June
27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized the institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment
of students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning.
These cases involve different facts and issues. In Garcia, the issue was whether a female lay student has a clear
legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological studies leading to a degree.
In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing student, who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her
nursing subjects, may compel her school to readmit her for enrollment.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that the right of an institution
of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their

constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win be a violation of their right to equal protection
[At p. 711]
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.
In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private respondents cite the recent cases of Capitol Medical
Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499, October 13, 1989, and Licup v. University of San Carlos, G.R. No.
85839, October 19, 1989, both decided by the First Division of the Court.
We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions dissimilar from the issues in the present case.
In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld the decision of the school authorities to close down the school because
of problems emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty. The Court ruled that the students
had no clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school.
On the other hand, in Licup the issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded procedural due
process before disciplinary action was taken against them. Thus, the Court stated:
The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of petitioners that they were deprived of due
process of law and that the investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair. On the contrary,
what appear from the record is that the charges against petitioners were adequately established in
an appropriate investigation. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. . . .
Moreover, Licup, far from adopting the "termination of contract" theory in Alcuaz, impliedly rejected it, to wit:
While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an
educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the
concommitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.
True, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to
complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and
the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. (Emphasis supplied.)
7. The Instant Case.
To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting from their answer
filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have incurred failing grades, to wit:
a) Ariel Non has not only failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause the submission of Form
137 which is a pre-requisite to his re- enrollment and to his continuing as a student of Mabini;
b) Rex Magana not only has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete grades in four (4)
subjects as well as no grades in two (2) subjects;
c) Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3) incomplete grades;
d) Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take CMT 1 1 to 22. He is already
enrolled at Ago Foundation;
e) Joselito Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;
f) Luis Santos has failed in one (1) subject;
g) George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove the incomplete grade in one (1)
subject;
h) Daniel Torres has failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades in five (5) more
objects and has no grade in one (1) subject. [Rollo, p. 79.]
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

(11) Petitioners were and are prepared to show, among others, that:
a) Three of the 13 of them were graduating. (Admitted in the Answer.)
b) Their academic deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non- readmission. (The Answer indicates only
8 of the 13 as with deficiencies.)
c) Their breach of discipline, if any, was not serious.
d) The improper conduct attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly, particularly a February 1988 student rally. (The crux of the matter,
as shown even in the Answer.)
e) There was no due investigation that could serve as basis for disciplinary action. (In effect,
admitted in the Answer; even Alcuaz required due process.)
f) Respondents admit students with worse deficiencies a clear case of discrimination against
petitioners for their role in the student rally. (An equal protection question.)
g) Respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence which they can afford
to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half school-years in itself
punishment enough. [Rollo, p. 86].
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes Banares,
Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment without just cause and, hence,
should be allowed to re-enroll.
On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were afforded due process, in the manner expressed
in Guzman, before they were refused re-enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to
refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the
ire of the school authorities was the student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or
participated in by petitioners. Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action
taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play.
Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some have only one or two failures, namely, Rex Magana,
Elvin Agura, Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos. Certainly, their failures cannot be considered marked academic
deficiency within the context of the Court's decision in Villar.
Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades, namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge)
Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not clear from respondents' enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only
one semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the school. Neither are the academic
standards of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not these students are academically deficient,
alleged by respondents. Thus, while the prerogative of schools to set academic standards is recognized, we cannot
affirm respondent school's action as to petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon and Torres because of insufficient
information.
With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone,
if true, will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners
for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could
have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty
that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must
be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed
upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules and regulations duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and
academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively
excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for any
breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that, according
to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no
useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of

respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24,
1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re- enrollment
of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel
Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they
have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.