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To cite this article: Joseph Nevins (2009) Embedded Empire: Structural Violence and the Pursuit of Justice in East Timor,
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 99:5, 914-921, DOI: 10.1080/00045600903245904
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00045600903245904
East Timor faces severe limitations in its efforts to realize legal and material justice and to overcome the horrific
violence associated with Indonesias invasion and almost twenty-four-year occupation. Since the Indonesian
militarys withdrawal in October 1999, the now-independent country has struggled to realize legal and material
justice for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed from 1975 to 1999 and to overcome the
deprivation and dispossession associated with Indonesias invasion and occupation. In relation to these efforts,
this article examines two case studies. The first is East Timors effort to secure legal and financial restitution for
damages associated with Indonesias actions. The second involves a disagreement with Australia over oil and
natural gas deposits in a shared seabed and the effort to ensure an international-law-informed resolution of the
conflict. In both cases, East Timor has fallen far short of its goals. Key Words: East Timor, empire, imperialism,
justice, violence.
Timor Oriental enfrenta severas limitaciones en su esfuerzo por aplicar justicia legal y material y dejar atras la
horrenda violencia asociada con la invasion de Indonesia y los cerca de veinticuatro anos
de ocupacion. Desde la
retirada militar indonesia en octubre de 1999, el ahora pas independiente ha bregado duro para ejercer justicia
legal y material en relacion con los crmenes de guerra y crmenes de lesa humanidad que se cometieron entre
1975 y 1999, y superar la deprivacion y desposeimiento derivados de la invasion y ocupacion por Indonesia. Al
respecto, en este artculo se examinan dos situaciones concretas. La primera es el esfuerzo de Timor Oriental por
hacer la reparacion jurdica y financiera por danos
asociados con las acciones indonesas; la segunda, se relaciona
con un desacuerdo con Australia sobre depositos de petroleo y gas en un lecho marino compartido, y el esfuerzo
por lograr una resolucion del conflicto con base en normas internacionales. Muy poco es lo que Timor Oriental ha
conseguido en sus pretensiones con respecto a los dos casos. Palabras clave: Timor Oriental, imperio, imperialismo,
justicia, violencia.
ndonesias 1975 invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timorendeavors strongly backed
by various Western allies (Gorjao 2002; Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation [CAVR]
2005; Dowson 2005; Fernandes 2005; Nevins 2005;
Simpson 2005)would seem to be a case of classic
imperialism, the domination of a country by a superior power via territorial control. Now that the occupation has ended, one might conclude that so, too, has
the associated imperialism. Yet East Timors failure to
realize justice for crimes and dispossession associated
with overtly imperialist acts suggests that imperialism
Embedded Empire: Structural Violence and the Pursuit of Justice in East Timor
governance. These practices do not necessarily (and,
indeed, rarely) involve state control over territory but
rather the maintenance and enhancement of a global
economy structured to privilege certain spaces over others (e.g., Harvey 2003; Smith 2003; Flint and Taylor
2007).
Although these analyses illuminate much, they tend
to privilege the global economy, mechanisms of exploitation and uneven exchange, and an associated set
of economic actors as imperialisms embodiment to a
degree that they provide insufficient scrutiny of how
the imperial orderin terms of its structural manifestations and their associated socioeconomic inequalities
plays out beyond the economic realm. As a result,
various types of imperial embeddedness and diverse
forms of imperial privilege and disadvantage are underexplored. As part of an effort to fill in somewhat the gaps
and to facilitate a more expansive interrogation of how
imperialism functions and shapes the global political
economy, this article emphasizes structural violence
or institutionalized injusticerather than uneven exchange as the key mechanism for furthering unjust relations between nation-states and their peoples.
By drawing on literature in critical theory as it relates
to social difference and power, this article presents an
enlarged analysis of imperialism. It shows how violenceinfused power structures nation-states and the relations
between them so as to maintain and produce unjust
outcomes across global space. Like racism, patriarchy,
and other forms of violence that enable and inhibit by
(re)producing privilege and disadvantage, imperialism
has no fixed essence of the form it takes (see Acker 1989;
Knopp 1992). It involves a varied set of practices and
relations over spacetime. What all imperialisms share,
however, regardless of their particular spatiality, is that
their associated practices and relations unevenly shape
places and peoples and affect their ability to access resources such as peace, justice, and human rights. As the
case of East Timor illustrates, contemporary imperialism is, among other things, an embedded phenomenon,
with a definite geography, yet it does not correspond to
the model of Western empires of old, and it exhibits
both overt and structural forms of violence.
915
916
Nevins
As Smith (2003) asserts, contemporary U.S. imperialism is fundamentally different from that exercised
by Western European countries during the era of formal colonialism. As opposed to the old imperialist view
of space as absolute or as the endowment of natural
resources of a particular territory, U.S imperialists
or at least a significant slice of the imperialist class
(see Glassman 2005)perceive and treat space as malleable, the outcome (as well as constituent and constitutive) of particular politicaleconomic processes, rather
than primordial and unchanging. European colonialism facilitated the realization of this vision by helping to unite the world, integrating the Third World
into a West-dominated world economy over which the
United States would soon reign. World War II provided
the opening for the United States to take advantage
of the largely European-created world market. Smith
(2003) characterizes this approach as one of global economic access without colonies, paired with a geostrategic vision of necessary military bases around the globe
both to protect global economic interests and to restrain
any further military belligerence (349). How imperial
power is deployed depends on perceived needs, as well
as on the faction of the ruling class in power at the time
(Glassman 2005).
That said, to speak of American imperialism risks
falling into the territorial trap (the conflation of social relations with national territory) that Agnew and
Corbridge (1995) warn us about. States do not simply
project power onto the international stage from within
their territories. They also do so through international
institutions and mechanisms and allied actors abroad.
At the same time, transnational forces and coalitions of
states deploy such power (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; also
Agnew 2005), the Indonesian invasion and occupation
of East Timor, decisively enabled as it was by a number
of Western states, being an obvious example.
As a result of their collective political, economic,
and military strength, powerful states are generally far
more active and influential internationally than relatively weak states. Their state power is internationalized (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Glassman 1999). The
most important manifestation of this power is a Western bloc centered on the states of Western Europe,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States,
and Japan as well (see Shaw 1997). These states
many of them largely due to their bloc membership
dominate international affairs in numerous ways and in
a manner highly disproportionate to their population
sizes. In other words, how they are situated in what
we might consider an imperial order, an inherently
Embedded Empire: Structural Violence and the Pursuit of Justice in East Timor
hierarchical arrangement, reflects and shapes who (and
where) gets what and who (and where) does not. Such
an arrangement is not overtly violent or coercive and it
need not be as the very constellation of social relations
facilitates outcomes that are favorable for those at the
top and detrimental as one moves down the imperial
chain. To the extent that the order needs to be remade,
a variety of toolsovertly coercive, indirectly or structurally violent, and persuasiveare available. In this
regard, the spatiality of empire reflects and reproduces
deeply unequal relations and unjust outcomes between
nation-states (and groups within and between them). It
allows for international double standards such as those
that reign vis-`a-vis East Timor, which both reflects and
helps further the contemporary imperial order.
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It is because of such atrocities, destruction, and dispossession that the commissions report calls on the international community to provide unqualified support
for strong institutions of justiceif necessary through
an international tribunalfor trying war crimes and
crimes against humanity. The recommendation echoes
similar calls by international nongovernmental organizations and a broad cross-section of East Timorese civil
society, as well as by various investigatory United Nations (UN) commissions (Nevins 2005). Despite such
calls, there has been almost no accountability. To the
extent that there have been judicial proceedings for
war crimes and crimes against humanity, they have
been extremely limited. A hybrid internationalEast
Timorese court (which closed in May 2005) tried lowlevel offenders. Established by the UN during its postoccupation administration of the territory, the court
convicted eighty-four individuals, all East Timorese,
typically members of militia groups created and directed
by the Indonesian military, for crimes committed in
1999 (and that year only). Despite an agreement of
cooperation with the UN, Indonesia did not extradite
any indicted individuals under its jurisdiction. No serious pressure was forthcoming from the international
community to compel Indonesias government to do so,
either. As all the key players involved in the terror (from
1999 and before) were (and are) in Indonesia, this shortcoming effectively reduced the process to irrelevance.
Meanwhile, within Indonesia, a court prosecuted eighteen Indonesian citizens for crimesagain, only those
from 1999. Six were convicted, but all of them were
eventually cleared on appeal to a higher court.
As for an international tribunal, there has been no
movement in the UN by the Secretariat or the Security Council to bring one about. This is hardly surprising
given that three permanent member statesFrance, the
United Kingdom, and the United States(along with
other Western countries such as Australia, Canada,
and Japan) together provided Jakarta with billions of
dollars worth of weapons, military training, and economic aid, as well as invaluable diplomatic cover during the period between 1975 and 1999. Collectively,
this assistancethe CAVR characterizes U.S. support
as fundamentalwas decisive in permitting the invasion to take place and for allowing the occupation
to persist (Nevins 2005). These member-states remain
steadfast allies of Indonesia.
Finally, neither apologies nor monetary reparations have been forthcoming.3 The CAVR recommended both, not only from Indonesia but also from
governments that provided military assistance during
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Nevins
the occupation. Reparations also applied to business corporations who benefited from weapon sales
to Jakarta. Indonesia has by and large dismissed the
CAVRs recommendations, and Western countries
have ignored them.4
In addition to enduring such impunity, East Timor
also remains occupied in a sense: The Australian government continues to hold and exploit deposits of oil
and natural gas contained in seabed areas in the Timor
Sea, areas that, on the basis of international law, appear
to belong to East Timor. Australia gained initial control
of these areas through a combination of what appears
to be an incorrect drawing of East Timors eastwest
sea boundaries during the Portuguese colonial period
and a subsequent agreement signed with Indonesia in
1989during the occupation. Given the illegality of
Indonesias very presence in East Timor at the time, the
agreement was effectively one involving stolen goods.5
Interest in these goods was a significant factor (albeit only one factor among others; Dunn 1996; Way,
Browne, and Johnson 2000) in informing an Australian
policy of acquiescence toward and support for Indonesias actions vis-`a-vis East Timor dating back to 1975
(King 2002).
Following Indonesias withdrawal in 1999, the
embryonic East Timorese state disputed Australian control of the seabed. Although there are international legal mechanisms to adjudicate such disputes, Canberra,
fearing that it would lose, changed the terms on which
it accepts international dispute resolution mechanisms
related to maritime boundaries. Previously, Australia
had declared its acceptance of the International Court
of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea as venues for the compulsory settlement of
disputes under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In March 2002, however,
Canberra announced that it was taking advantage of an
UNCLOS clause that allows treaty parties to exclude
certain areas from compulsory dispute resolution.
The East Timorese government could have filed
a case against Canberra at the International Court
of Justice following the Australian governments
revocation of its commitment to compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS, which asserts that this
commitment remains in force for a three-month period after formal notification of withdrawal is communicated to the UN. Nevertheless, Dili failed to do so
within the prescribed time period. This is likely due to
one of the same factors that has prevented East Timors
government from strongly advocating for some sort of
international judicial process for the crimes against hu-
Conclusion: Independence in an
Imperialized World
East Timors experience of injustice regarding lawbased accountability and restitution is neither surprising nor accidental. As Mexicos delegate to the UNs
founding convention in 1945 opined, the UN Charter
Embedded Empire: Structural Violence and the Pursuit of Justice in East Timor
ensured that the mice would be disciplined, but the
lions would be free (Eban 1995, 46). One could make
a similar observation about the contemporary world order: It allows for countries of relative privilege (due
to their own power or that which they have through
alliances)a privilege borne of and reproduced by various forms of violence and institutionalized injusticea
large degree of freedom (and impunity for their transgressions) on the global stage, while limiting that of the
disadvantaged.
Similar factors explain Australias ability effectively
to steal much of what appears to belong to East
Timor and the latters limited capacity to remedy
this dispossession. Australias exercise of imperial
privilege draws on, takes advantage of, and reinforces
East Timors politicaleconomic marginality, which is
produced in part by a war and occupation supported by
Australia among others. It reproduces East Timor as an
imperialized and disadvantaged place near the bottom
of the global socio-spatial hierarchy, and it sustains
markedly unequal power relations that profoundly
inform conditions of life and death. Meanwhile, the
powerful have not suffered at all for their crimes related
to East Timors suffering and dispossession. Instead, as
in the case of Australias ill-gotten oil and gas revenues,
they still enjoy the benefits.
East Timors predicament thus demonstrates how imperialism both limits and enables depending on where a
particular nation-state finds itself on the international
power hierarchy. Relatively privileged national actors
are comparatively well positioned to ensure that their
extranationalterritorial interactions minimize damage
to the power of their particular nation-states and the
overall global order that embodies and reproduces interstate inequalities, and that is generally beneficial to
them. Thus, whereas East Timors government must
restrain itself from publicly advocating for an international tribunal lest it incur the wrath of the powerful,
Indonesia and its Western allies have the sociopolitical
space to publicly denounce any such advocacy.
Contemporary empire functions in myriad ways.
The U.S. occupation of Iraq is one variety, Australias
occupation of East Timor oil and gas deposits is
another. At the same time, imperialism draws on and
produces various spatialities, ranging from direct territoriality to the manipulation of internationstate
relations predicated on inequality. Although having
overtly violent aspects, the power of emperors is often deployed through politicaleconomic relations and
structures born, in significant part, of direct forms of
violence, and associated inequalities, from a previous
919
era. The weakness and unfairness of international legal mechanisms, and East Timors inability to realize an
international tribunal or to see its seabed resource case
properly adjudicated, are manifestations of imperialism,
as are the benefits and impunity enjoyed by those countries involved in the invasion and occupation of East
Timor.
To contend that the outcomes of Indonesian and
Australian imperialism examined here are demonstrations of imperialism is not to suggest that the imperially privileged always get their way. Nor is it to ignore
the mosaic-like aspects of the global political economy, in which the geography of wealth and poverty
is much messier than aggregate averages of individual
countries (Agnew 2005).7 Similarly, it would be incorrect to state that, in a system of racial privilege, the
relatively advantaged always win and that the structurally disadvantaged are always on the receiving end
of detrimental outcomes, one factor being the importance of other social categories (e.g., class and gender)
in informing results. Social relationslike spaceare
always under construction, subject to challenge, and are
thus inherently unstable (Massey 2005). The relatively
weak are able at times to challenge the strong and gain
concessions. In the case of contemporary imperialism,
this instability is significantly due to the demise and
discrediting of formal imperialism. To the extent these
challenges do not alter the imperialism-informed fundamentals of the larger order, however, the inequalities
in terms of conditions of life and death, wealth and
poverty, political voice and other forms of powerdo
not disappear. The structural violence that underlies
relations between territorial states endures, as does the
imperialism that it reflects and reproduces, East Timor
being one of the more unfortunate examples.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Steve Herbert, Michael
Velarde, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Notes
1. Regarding the concept of embeddedness, see Granovetter (1985) and Ruggie (1982).
2. For the precise citations relating to information or quotes
from the CAVR report contained herein, see Nevins
(20072008).
3. There are precedents for such reparations. In 1991,
the UN Security Council imposed a $52 billion reparations bill on Iraq for its invasion and occupation of
920
4.
5.
6.
7.
Nevins
Kuwait. As of September 2008, Iraq had paid more than
$24 billionthe majority to the Kuwaiti government
and various corporationsdespite the end of Saddam
Husseins regime.
East Timors elected leaders have felt compelled to reject
the reports recommendations for reparations, as well as
its calls for an international tribunal for fear of offending
Indonesia and its Western backers (see Kingston 2006).
Regarding the legality of the agreement itself, see Clark
(1992) and Cleary (2007).
For additional background, analysis, and maps of the
dispute and the various agreements, see the Web site of
Lao Hamutuk (http://www.laohamutuk.org/).
Yet, nation-statesand the relations between them
matter profoundly in terms of livelihood-related outcomes for individuals and countries. See Flint and Taylor
(2007) regarding the ongoing importance of uneven exchange. See also Agnew (2005, 181) about the importance of country of residence in accounting for individual
incomes.
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Correspondence: Department of Earth Science and Geography, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 126040735, e-mail: jonevins@vassar.edu.