Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who
acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus
me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is
not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, VS NELIDA DEQUINA
Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC Y JAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y
CRUZ,Accused-Appellants.
Facts:On 6:00 a.m., of September 29, 1999, Dequina with her co-accused
were caught by police officers in possession of 32,995 grams of marijuana.
For the defense, only Dequina made her testimony.
Sometime she joined the Kilosang Mayo Uno. On September 27, 1999, one
Sally told her that the movement had decided to send her to a mission which
would determine if she was really qualified to join the group. As agreed upon,
they met Sally at the designated place and time. Sally secretly told her that
the three of them would be going to Manila for a still undisclosed
mission. She was briefed that the three of them will temporarily stay in the
house of her [Dequina] relative in Manila. She was further instructed that
they will go to the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in Avenida where they will be
met by members of their group who will also monitor their
movements. Afterwards, they will proceed to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga
where they will pick-up some bags. Thereat, somebody will meet and give
them instructions.
From Dau, they will return to Manila. They will alight at the first ShoeMart
Department Store which they will see along the way. A waiting tricycle would
bring them to a store where they could buy carton boxes for their
bags. Finally, a taxicab will fetch and bring them all the way to the pier.
[Dequina] received P3,000.00 from Sally for their expenses and plane tickets
for the three of them from Sally. However, she noticed that instead of their
true names, the tickets were in the names of other persons. Her plane ticket
was in the name of Sarah Ganje. That of [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] were in the
names of Rowenal Palma and Mary Grace Papa, respectively.Nervous, she
thought of backing out at the last minute but Sally assured her that she had
purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense story is riddled with
holes.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JUAN
SALVATIERRA, ENRIQUE CONSTANTINO, AGUSTIN TRINIDAD, WILLIE
TRINIDAD, and ALVIN SANTOS, accused, ENRIQUE CONSTANTINO,
accused-appellant
Facts:That on or about the 15th day of May 1988, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, while armed with handguns and
knives, with intent to gain, entered the house of HICHIRO KUBOTA and
ELIZABETH HAMMOND and once inside, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the belonging to said Hichiro
Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in
the aforementioned amount(s) of P800,000.00; 26,000.00 yen; US$2,4000.00
and P7,000.00; that on the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another by means of force, threats and intimidation and one after the other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
carnal knowledge of Hazel Arjona, Hichiro Kubota's maid, against her will and
consent.
By
his
own
account,
as
herein
summarized,
ENRIQUE
CONSTANTINOadmits having been with the group of Salvatierra which robbed
the house of spouses Hichiro Kubota and Elizabeth Hammond in the evening
of May 15, 1988. At the time of the incident, he was working as a driver for a
Japanese friend of Kubota and it was in fact the latter who recommended him
to that Japanese employer, a certain Kinawa. He recalls that he was invited
by the group of Salvatierra for a drinking spree in Cubao in the afternoon of
that day. Juan Salvatierra, Agustin Trinidad, Wilfredo Trinidad and Alvin
Santos were in his acquaintances whom he had met a few months earlier at
an auto repair shop. After consuming some bottles of liquor, Salvatierra
approached appellant and asked whether the latter could help him find
employment under Kubota. When appellant declined, Salvatierra lost his
temper and drew a knife which he pointed at appellant, saying, "Tarantado
ka, Eric. Marunong ka pa sa boss mo, basta samahan mo kami ngayon."
Fearing for his life, appellant acceded. They hailed a taxicab and all of
them proceeded to the residence of Kubota, with Salvatierra all the while
poking his knife at appellant who was then at the backseat along with
Salvatierra, Agustin Trinidad and Alvin Santos. When they reached the place,
it was appellant who rang the doorbell at the prodding of Salvatierra who
apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this
prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Thus, applying the principle of DURA LEX SED LEX in the case at bar,
the accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too
cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. The duty of courts is to
apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity of the accused.
The ruling of the Trial Court that the petitioner failed to present and
attest to the fact that they sought prior DENR permission before cutting the
trees and sawing them into lumber.
The trial court further stated that the Forestry Code is a special law where
criminal intent is not necessary.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and ruled
that moyive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of
the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.
The petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary
documents when the police officers accosted him. Mere possession of forest
products without the proper documentation consummates the crime.
Applying DURA LEX SED LEX, the law may be harsh but that is the law.
because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the
minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4)
governmental projects.
Wherefore, the petition is granted.
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
In this case Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous
employee, a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees.The Court believes, and so holds, that
the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners application for
early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified,
and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of
said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the
minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four
(4) successive governmental projects. The necessity of law is needed in order
to prove that Lydia Chua is entitled for the retirement benefits which was
stated in section 2 of the said act. Sec. 2.Coverage This Act shall cover all
appointive officials and employees of
the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corpora
tions withoriginal charters, as well as the personnel of all local government
units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular,
temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service
as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of
this Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation
Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee
of 4 successive NIA projects.
Ernesto Maceda vs. energy regulatory board (ERB) G.R. No. 96266
(July 18, 1991)
Facts: Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August
1990.Petroleum companies Caltex, Shell and Petron filed separate
applications with the Energy Regulatory Board for permission to increase the
whole sale prices of petroleum products, and meanwhile, for provisional
authority to increase temporarily such prices pending further proceedings.
The Energy Regulatory Board, in a joint order granted provisional relief and
the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
and rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a
real departure from the laws fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because the evil purpose need not to break the
law, and if suffices if it is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids.
In the case at bar, the intruder had been a robber as the defendant
believed him to have acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent,
and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that he
cannot contend to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness.
MANUEL vs. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 165842 Nov. 29, 2005
The Court ruled that there was no error of law committed. The
petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage, by his and his parents assurance that he is single were wilful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the complainant. Also the
petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution and against good morals and interest and
general welfare of society.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the privet complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or
good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by
dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the
special statute. ... At any rate, in the event harmony between provisions of
this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision
controls unless the statute, considered in its entirety, indicates a contrary
intention upon the part of the legislature. ... A general law is one which
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or
place naturally belonging to such class while a special act is one which
relates to particular persons or things of a class.
Justice Gancayco said in Commissioner of customsvs Hon. Court of Tax
Appeals:
A special and specific provision prevails over a general provision irrespective
of their relative position in the statute. Generaliaspecialibus non
derogant. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also
a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and
the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its
general language as are not within the provisions of the particular
enactment. 2 It is a principle in statutory construction that where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed for said case must prevail over the other.
In the case of Rosario Valera vs Mariano Tuason Jr., Justice Tuason
reasoned:
A special law is not regarded as having been amended or repealed by a
general law unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest. Generaliaspecialibus non derogant.And if this is true although the
terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter in the
special statute. At any rate, in the event the harmony between provisions of
this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible, the specific provision
controls unless the statute, considered in its entirely, indicates a contrary
intention upon the part of the legislature. granting then that the two laws
can not be reconciled, in so far as they are inconsistent with each other,
section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being a specific law, should prevail
over, or considered as an exemption to, section 211 of the Administrative
Code, which is a provision of general character. a general law is one which
embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or
place naturally belonging to such class, while a special act is one which
PariMateria
[Latin, Of the same matter; on the same subject.] The phrase used in connec
tion with two laws relating to the same subject matter that mustbe analyzed
with each other.
Judge Callejo Sr. explained in Tan Co vs The Civil Register of Manila
that:
Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because
enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to
form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts
the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the
subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto.
Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the
purpose of an expressed national policy, thus:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that
in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those
prior statutes, and they all should be construed together. Provisions in an act
which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will be
applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its
purpose. Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable
construction, both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision
of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in apparent conflict, are so far as
reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other.
Justice Angeles reasoned in the case of C & C Commercial vs
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority that:
On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in
mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, it is held that
against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that
putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun
and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule
and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded
Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has
already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no
longer in effect.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by
the Civil Service Commissioner.
HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not
on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in
this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he
appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work
outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino
tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of
law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.
Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power,
not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will
of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise
agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such
there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a
valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental
zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.
Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive
then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.
Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid.
3,620 kilos, but based on the bill of lading and customs appraisal, the actual
and correct weight thereof was 36,197 kilos. Consequently, to correct the
weight declared in the manifest, petitioner, in its capacity as ship agent, filed
an amendment on July 27, 1966, which amendment was approved by the
Bureau of Customs without prejudice to any administrative action which
might be taken against the vessel
In 1969, the SS "NORMAN," represented by herein petitioner, was charged for
violation of Section 1005, in relation to Section 2523, of the Tariff and
Customs Code. However, on March 16, 1971, counsel for the Bureau of
Customs sought the amendment of the charge to one for violation of Section
1005, in relation to Section 2521 of the Code.
On June 11, 1971, after hearing, the Collector of Customs rendered a
decision imposing upon the vessel and/or petitioner herein a fine of
P7,000.00 for violation of Section 1005, in relation to Section 2521, of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
The legal provisions involved in this case are Sections 1005, 2521, and 2523
of the Tariff and Customs Code. Section 1005 lays down the indispensable
requirement that every vessel coming from a foreign part must have on
board a complete manifest of all her cargo, further stating therein the
required contents of each manifest intended to be submitted to the customs
authorities.Both Secs. 2521 and 2523 provide for the corresponding penalties
in case Sec. 1005 is violated.
ISSUE: WON private respondent be held responsible under Section 2523
HELD: No.This must be answered in the negative.
In order to be liable under Section 2523, two requisites must be satisfied, to
wit:
1) the actual gross weight of any article or package described in
the manifest exceeds by more than twenty per centum the gross
weight as declared in the manifest or of lading thereof, and
2) The Collector shall be of opinion that such discrepancy was
due to the carelessness or incompetency of the master or pilot in
command, owner or employee of the vessel or aircraft.
Noscitur a sociis
The maxim states that where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
FACTS: AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few
months old.BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6)
years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was
working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6)
days a week.
In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping
inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The
following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work,
appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to
resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB.
Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly
woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs
neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly
parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA
struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her
twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again
raped her by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that
appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time
until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years old.
On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape.
On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was
raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts.
Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made
"the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but
foreign court refused to admit the private respondents objections
for failure to pay the required fi ling fees. Despite notice sent to the
private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by
the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent
refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the
petitioner.
The petitioner fi led a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action.
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which
affi rmed the dismissal of the complaint.
In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the
arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties,
thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award.,
ISSUES: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent under clause 16 of the
contract
RULING: The court explained that the origin of the dispute is the failure of
private respondent to deliver the agreed 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement
to the specific places settled. This the court reasoned was not covered by the
provisions of clause 16 of the contract which the petitioner shrewdly edited
with the insertion of a comma (,) between the words supply order/contract
and design which should have properly read supply order/contract design
instead of supply contract/order, design. The reason for this important
distinction is that without the comma it is clear that what is being referred to
byClause 16 are disputes and ambiguities with regards to the SUPPLY
CONTRACT/ORDER taking its design, drawings and instructions as other
descriptions that could have ambiguities. Notwithstanding this however,
petitioner argued that although it be assumed that such failure to carry out
the contract was not under the provisions of clause 16, the attempt of
private respondent to replace the undelivered goods with a certain class G
cement which did not meet the specifications of petitioner was clearly
covered by the said clause. This argument was affirmed by the court. Public
Synthesis
In the case of MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC.
& PAGCOR
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are
authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes
games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of
the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a
word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that
since the word "gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of
chance," the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which,
like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
In People vs Flores
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of
a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with
which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of
the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim
which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the
perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral
relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be
noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all
denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that
the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with
a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the wards
biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian).
Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father.
Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.
In OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC.
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of
statutes, is equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and
scope of vague contractual stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase.
According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase
is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of the words in which it is found or with which it is associated, or
stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to
associated words. 13 A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers
three matters which may be submitted to arbitration namely,
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification
designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality
of workmanship of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising
out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification,
instruction or these conditions; or
(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute
the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof.
The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes
relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply/order contract. In the third category, the clause,
"execution or failure to execute the same", may be read as "execution or
failure to execute the supply order/contract". But in accordance with the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference to the supply order/contract must
be construed in the light of the preceding words with which it is associated,
meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing, instructions,
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The
non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute
arising from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials. That Clause 16 should
pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the contract is but
a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to
arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person
possessed with the required skill and expertise which may be otherwise
absent in the regular courts.
transactions, which they made with the Complainant and the public in
general to the effect that they were in a legitimate business of foreign
exchange trading successively or simultaneously operating under the
following name and style of Asia Profits Philippines, Incorporation, Winggold
Management Philippines Incorporated, Belkin Management Consultancy, Inc.
and/or Belkin Profits Limited or other unregistered foreign entities induced
and succeeded in inducing complainant and several other persons to give
and deliver and in fact, the latter and said persons gave and delivered to
said accused the amount of at least US$ 123,461.14 or its equivalent in
Philippine Pesos on the strength of said manifestations and representations,
the accused knowing fully well that the above-named corporations registered
with the SEC and/or those unregistered foreign entities are not licensed nor
authorized to engage in foreign exchange trading corporations and that such
manifestations and representations to transact in foreign exchange were
false and fraudulent that resulted to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant and other persons and that the defraudation pertains to funds
solicited from the public in general by such corporations/associations.
On November 7, 2001, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin issued an Order finding
probable cause against all the accused and approved the recommendation of
the City Prosecutor that the charge be non-bailable. The corresponding
warrants of arrest were issued.
A return on the warrant of arrest was made by PO3 Joselito M. Coronel, PNP
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Camp Crame, Quezon City, with
the information that except for Margielyn Tafalla, who remained at large, all
other accused were already detained at the Makati City Jail.
On November 12, 2001, a notice of hearing was issued by Judge Bersamin
setting the case for arraignment on November 20, 2001. Private respondents
on the same day filed an urgent motion to fix bail.
On November 20, 2001, private respondents, when arraigned, entered pleas
of not guilty. The Prosecution was required to file their comment/opposition
on private respondents motion to fix bail which they did through the Private
Prosecutor with the conformity of Assistant City Prosecutor Arthur O.
Malabaguio.
On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued an Order reconsidering his
earlier Order of November 7, 2001 by declaring that the offense charged is
bailable. In finding that the accused are entitled to bail.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime charged is
bailable despite that the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua?
HELD:
The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a
syndicate as defined under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death
cannot be imposed on private respondents. Judge Bersamin is correct when
he ruled that private respondents could only be punished with reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount of the
fraud exceeds P100,000.00.
The Court further held that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
Clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or
information. Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in their
judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial.
A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any
aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found
that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of
conviction.
Hence, Petitioners interpretation that the term "any person" in the first
paragraph of section 1 could mean that even one person can be indicted for
syndicated estafa is contrary to the provision of the law. It bears stressing
that the law must be considered as a whole, just as it is necessary to
consider a sentence in its entirety in order to grasp its true meaning.16 It is a
dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since
one portion may be qualified by the other portion.17 In fact, there is no need
for any construction or interpretation of P. D. No. 1689 since the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 has defined
what constitutes a syndicate and such definition is controlling. Where a
Argumentum a contrario
What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.
Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied.
In logic, an argumentum a contrario (Latin: "appeal from the contrary" or
"argument based on the contrary") denotes any proposition that is argued to
be correct because it is not disproven by a certain case. It is the opposite of
the analogy. Arguments a contrario are often used in the legal system as a
way to solve problems not currently covered by a certain system of laws.
Although it might be used as a logical fallacy, arguments a contrario are not
by definition fallacies.
Examples
" 123 of the X-Law says that green cars need to have blue tires. As
such, red cars don't have to have blue tires."
Here the argument is based on the fact that red cars are not green cars and
as such 123 of the X-Law cannot be applied to them. This requires the law
to be interpreted to determine which solution would have been desired if the
lawmaker had considered red cars. In this case it's probably safe to assume
that they only wanted to regulate green cars and not regulate cars of other
colors.
On the other hand, this example:
" 456 of the Y-Law says that it's irrelevant whether a message is sent
by letter or by telegraph. As such, messages cannot be sent by fax
machines."
As with the example above, the argument is based on the fact that the law
does not mention fax machines and they must therefore not be used. Here
the interpretation that the lawmaker consciously did not mention fax
machines is less valid than the assumption that fax machines did not exist at
this time and that, were the law passed today, they would have been
mentioned. Here the argument a contrario is used fallaciously since it places
the letter of the law above its intent
Escribano v. Avila
G.R. No. L-30375, Sep. 12, 1978
FACTS:
On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governorelect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that
province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong,
Cotabato. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a
speech, which was broadcasted on a radio station, that "Mr. Pendatun is the
worst animal that ever live in this province. Escribano questioned Judge
Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense.
Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the
power to conduct the preliminary investigation. On April 1, 1969 Escribano
filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge
Avila be set aside. On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to
annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In that order he found that
Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to believe that" libel
by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the
same". The city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano.
Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the
Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written
defamations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel
committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is
lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.
HELD:
Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never
intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely
sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary
investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance
is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the
preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot
conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or
the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not
mentioned.)
However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in
this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is
not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a
preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do
with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing
a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and
mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it
should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect
its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of article 360 on
the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct an investigation
of criminal actions for written defamations does not preclude a judge of that
court from holding such investigation.
STATUTE: for libel, preliminary investigations of criminal actions for written
defamation xxx shall be conducted by the city fiscal of province or city or by
municipal court of city or capital of the province where such actions may be
instituted precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such
preliminary investigations
G.R. No. 2122, Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18
It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st
day of December, 1903, in the town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, the
plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the office of municipal
president of the said town; that as a result of the said election the plaintiff
was elected to the said office by a majority of 100 votes, and that
notwithstanding this fact the defendant has usurped said office and
unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the
exercise of said office. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to
illegalities alleged to have been committed during the election. The prayer of
the complaint is to the effect that judgment be entered against the
defendant, excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the
plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be given
possession thereof, and for such other and further relief as the facts in the
case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.
The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various
witnesses, all and each of whom testified to facts which, if true, would more
or less gravely affect the legality of the election. Not a single witness,
however, confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to the effect
that the plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election,
nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he,
as a result of the said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the
office of municipal president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.
In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before the
defendant had presented his, the court, on the latter's motion, acquitted the
defendant, imposing the costs upon the plaintiff. The court based its action
upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not maintain the
action brought by him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to
the exercise of the office in question; and (2) that there was no necessity to
inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the said office for the reason
that this question had already been determined by the provincial board after
a consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to
irregularities committed during the last election held at Laoag for the office
of municipal president and other municipal officials, and for the further
reason that the presumption is that a person holding a public office was duly
appointed or elected thereto.
The plaintiff excepted to his ruling of the court, moved for a new trial, and
thereafter brought the case to this court for review. An examination of the
evidence of record supports the finding of the court below to the effect that
the plaintiff has failed to prove in any way, shape, or form that he was
entitled to the office in question, as alleged by him in his complaint. There is
no dispute upon this question. The appellant, himself, when the motion of
the defendant to dismiss was argued, and from the decision of which he
appealed to this court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his
right to the exercise of the office in question. (Page 17 of the bill of
exceptions.) And on page 52 of his brief, he also assumes that he had been
unable to establish his alleged right to the office in question.
fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held
and exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the
individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for
usurpation of public office.
This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that
when the action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint
shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with
an averment of his right to the same. Why should this be required as an
essential requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the
action should claim the right to exercise the office in question?
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the
provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring such action, an in
but one case does the law authorize an individual to bring such an action, to
wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual
can not maintain such action. The law, in our opinion, does not allow of any
other construction. If an individual, whether or not he has the right to the
office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to
maintain such an action, it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be
evidently superfluous. It would be a useless and redundant provision of the
code.
As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action
relating to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has a
right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that
such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because there
is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of
such action is destroyed as is the case here. This is what actually happened
in this case. After all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff had been
introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that he had failed to
establish in any way, shape, or form that he had any right to the office of
municipal president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint
without foundation for such allegation. Consequently the judge very properly
acquitted the defendant of the complaint.
The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into
the right of the defendant to the office in question and that no other question
can be raised or investigated until this point has been determined, and
alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does
not arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to
the exercise of such office. In support of his contention he relies upon the
provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for
usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who
claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same; and
that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment
may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of
the person so averred to be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant,
as justice requires."
From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below
should have first passed upon the right of the defendant and afterwards
upon the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion this should be done at the same
time and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the court may
follow in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of
his judgment because even though the court may pass upon the right of the
plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant afterwards, or vice versa, this
procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not fail to
state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But
all of this, of course, presupposes that the action has been properly brought
and duly prosecuted to a judgment. This, at the same time, presupposes that
the plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence submitted
by him at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause of
action. Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that
the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential
conditions required by law in order to bring and maintain such action, his
complaint should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the
right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession
of his office, unless action is brought by a person having a right to maintain
the same under the law.
It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right
of the defendant when the justice of the case so demands. This is true, but
this only refers to cases where the action is brought by the Attorney-General
or by the provincial fiscal, as the case may be. In such cases it is not
necessary that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged
to have been usurped, because although there be no such person, as in the
case of a vacant office, for instance, the fiscal could and even should bring
such action against the person usurping the office in accordance with the
provisions of sections 200 and 199, respectively, as the case may be. The
manner in which judgment should be rendered according to section 202
perfectly meets the various cases provided for in the three preceding
sections; and it becomes the duty of the court to pass upon the rights of the
defendants only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the due
prosecution of the action that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the
office thus usurped, something which only happens where the AttorneyGeneral or the fiscal of any province brings the action against the usurper.
As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity
of the election of the defendant, for the reason, among others which it is not
necessary to state here, that the defendant has no right to maintain such an
action as this.
The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After the
expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith
and let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for further
proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Willard, J., did not sit in this case.
________________
Acosta v. Flor
STATUTE: specifically designates the persons who may bring actions
for quo warranto, excludes others from bringing such actions.
VERA v. FERNANDEZ
GR No. L-31364 March 30, 1979
89 SCRA 199
FACTS: The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for allowance of claim and for
payment of taxes representing the estate's tax deficiencies in 1963 to 1964
in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. The administrator opposed
arguing that the claim was already barred by the statute of limitation,
Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which provides that
all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for
funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever.
ISSUE: Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar the claim of
the government for unpaid taxes?
HELD: No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes
against a decedent's estate in the form of exception from the application of
the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the
Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious need.
(CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the Government
ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard
such interest, neglect or omission of government officials entrusted with the