MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG vs. ALFREDO L.

BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002, Carpio, J.
FACTS: On Feb 2, 1999, COMELEC en banc appointed Angelina
Matibag as Acting Director IV of the Education and
Information Department (EID). On Feb 15, 2000, Chairperson
Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of Matibag as
Director IV of EID in a Temporary capacity. On February 15, 2001,
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of
petitioner to the same position in a Temporary capacity. On March
22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim,
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners each for a term of 7 years. They took
their oath and assumed office. The Office of the President
submitted to the Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001,
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmation, but the COA did not act on them. On June 1, 2001,
President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of the three
for the same term. They again took oath, and the Office again
transmitted the appointments to COA, but the Congress adjourned
before COA could act on them. Again on June 8, 2001, President
Macapagal Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions.
Benipayo issued a memorandum addressed to Matibag as Director
IV of EID and to Cinco as Director III, designating Cinco as OIC of
the EID and resigning Matibag to the Law Department. Comelec EID
Commissioner Mehol Sadain objected to the reassignment, because
of Benipayo's failure to consult her. Matibag requested Benipayo to
reconsider, in view of the prohibition on the transfer of employees
during election period, but the latter denied the same. Matibag filed
an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Dept,
alleging violation of the OEC, Comelec Resolution etc. She filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment of Benipayo.
Meanwhile, Arroyo again renewed the appointment of the three.
ISSUE: WON Benipayo's ad interim appointment was a temporary
appointment prohibited by Art. IX-C Section 1(2), and consequently,
was the reassignment of petitioner valid
HELD: NO. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim

appointment permanent in character by making it effective until

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. See Section 16, Article VII.
Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting
appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued (such appointee does not enjoy
security of tenure). The Constitution imposes no condition on
the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad
interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee
can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the
powers pertaining to the office.
The kind of appointment that is prohibited by the Constitution, to
the three independent constitutional commissions, is an
appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It is due to the need
to avoid disruptions in essential government services which would
result in prolonged vacancies in government offices, that ad interim
appointment is allowed.
As to the Constitutionality of the Renewal

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by

the Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a
new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission on Appointments in the exercise of its checking
power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the
Commission on Appointments to give its consent after
deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee
as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the
President can no longer renew the appointment not because of
the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of
a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold
its consent to the appointment.
But a by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on
Appointments. There is no final decision by the Commission
on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is recognized in
Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments.

The phrase "without reappointment" in Art IX-C Section 1(2)

applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or
not such person completes his term of office. There must be a
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the
previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment
can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate
the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments.
An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of
the COA does not constitute a term of office. The period from
the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold
otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action
could start and complete the running of a term of office in the
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming
power of the Commission on Appointments.

than her. But this was denied on the ground that the OMB is given
the discretion, that Roque possesses the minimun qualifications,
and that Rimonte failed to show that Roque is not qualified. He
appealed to CSC, but the same was denied.

THUS, The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of

appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the
prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous
appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed
appointment. -> Benipayo has authority to reassign Matibag. It is
also valid because Matibags assignment was only in an
ACTING/TEMPORARY CAPACITY.

The head of an agency is the one who is the most

knowledgeable to decide who can best perform the functions of
the office. It is a discretionary power, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others who are better qualified. The choice is
a POLITICAL and ADMINISTRATIVE decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of
the service, which is best made by the head of the office
concerned.

DANILO F.C. RIMONTE vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not

the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate
civil service eligibility, nothing else.

G.R. No. 112045, May 29, 1995, Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez issued an order directing
the implementation of the "performance appraisal system" as basis
for evaluation of all incumbents, and another order proving the
guidelines in the placement of personnel. Danilo Rimonte,
incumbent Planning Officer III in the Office of the Ombudsman
applied for any of the positions of Records Officer V of the Central
Records Division, Chief of Monitoring and EDP Division, or
Administrative Officer V of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Armed Forces. He was appointed as Associate Graft
Investigation Officer III, while respondent Henrietta Roque was
appointed as Records Officer V (or Chief of the Central Records
Division). Rimonte protested in a letter to Ombudsman the
appointment of Roque claiming that he has better qualifications

ISSUE: WON the CSC

appointment of ROQUE

committed

GAD

in

upholding

the

HELD: NO. Respondent Civil Service Commission found from the

records that respondent Roque possessed the minimum
qualifications required for the position of Records Officer V to which
she was appointed. She graduated with a degree of Bachelor of
Business Administration. She has the General Clerical,
Stenographer and Career Service Professional eligibilities. Her work
experience also shows she is qualified for the position. The fact that
Rimonte's performance rating was 100% while Roque's was 80% is
not material.

ALEX A. ABILA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 92573, June 3, 1991, Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Amado Villafuerte retired from his position as
Administrative Officer IV in the Health Department of Quezon City.
The OIC Simon appointed Alex Abila, who has been Acting
Assistant Civil Security Officer, as Villafuerte's successor.
Administrative Offiver III Florentina Eleria filed a protest with the
Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) in respect of Abila's
appointment, but this was dismissed. On appeal, MPSB revoked
Abila's appointed and ordered the OIC to appoint Eleria instead.

MPSB found that both Abila and Eleria possess the minimum
eligibility and requirements, but ruled that Eleria has the edge in
terms of rank and experience as Administrative Officer, and that
Eleria was holding a position next in rank to the vacancy thus she
was "promotional priority" over Abila. Abila appealed to CSC, but
the latter affirmed MPSB's decision. Hence he appealed, claiming
that the CSC having found that they were qualified should not have
proceeded to comparing the parties' qualifications, as the
appointing power is vested in the City Mayor. The QC government
also filed a similar petition.
ISSUE: WON the CSC has the authority to substitute its own
judgment for that of the official authorized by law to make the
appointment.
HELD: NO. CSC has no such authority, the power of appointment,
which is essentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head
of the office concerned. The head of the office is the person on the
spot. He occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify
and designate the individual who can best fill the post and
discharge its functions in the government agency he heads. The
choice of an appointee from among those who possess the required
qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for
considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of
service which can best be made by the head of the office
concerned, the person most familiar with the organizational
structure and environmental circumstances within which the
appointee must function.
CSC is NOT a co-manager or surrogate administrator of
government offices and agencies.
Here, the CSC, having already determined that both are legally
qualified for the position, may not act any further except to
affirm the validity of petitioner's appointment. CSC's act was an
encroachment on the discretionary authority vested by law in the
CITY Mayor.
The NEXT-IN-RANK rule invoked by CSC to justify its choice of
ELERIA applies only where a vacancy is filled by PROMOTION (a
process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to another
position higher either in rank or salary). And even in cases of
promotion, the rule is not absolute, as it may be disregarded for
sound reasons (not mandatory/not a VESTED RIGHT, but may be
considered). Here, what was involved was NOT promotion, but a
LATERAL TRANSFER from a position of one department to another.

ROBERTO A. FLORES vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON

G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993, Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioners (taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association) questions the validity of Sec. 13, par. (d), of
R.A. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992). Said
provision appoints Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City as
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA). They claim that this provision is unconstitutional
for violating:
(1) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during
his tenure;
(2) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that the
President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; and
(3) Sec. 261 of OEC, prohibiting appointment within 45 days
before a regular election xxx.
ISSUE: WON said provision and the appointment is invalid
HELD: YES. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA). This clearly contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of
the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective
official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body
politic is of no moment.
The distinction between elective and appointive officials, as
provided in Section 7 Article IX-B, was purposely made, such that
the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the 2nd paragraph
cannot be extended to elective officials.
The argument that SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position
of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, is
UNTENABLE because if the Congress has so intended then it would
have used the word "ex officio" rather than "appointed."

Furthermore, the said provision indeed encroaches on the

appointing authority of the President. Appointment involves
an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial
act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. Thus, the
Congress cannot limit the choice of the President to only
one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on
the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of
whom to appoint. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed
by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of
appointment.
Finally, the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment
remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency,
although he may however resign first from his elective post to cast
off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. But as long as he is an incumbent,
an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another
public office. Such an appointment does not however
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary,
since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in
view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
(NOTE: This must not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ."
The difference between the two provisions is significant in the
sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts
only after they have been appointed to another government office,
while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts
before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the
elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post.)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. RAFAEL M. SALAS

G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997, Reglado, J.
FACTS: Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal
Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel. He was dismissed by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR due to loss of confidence, after an investigation conducted

by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR finding that he was allegedly

engaged in proxy betting. Salas appealed to the chairman of the
Board requesting reinvestigation but it was denied. He appealed to
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal
because his term merely expired. On appeal, CSC affirmed MSPB's
decision. Hence he filed a petition for certiorari, which was referred
to CA, which found that Salas was not a confidential employee
hence he cannot be dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence,
applying the proximity rule. Hence this appeal by Pagcor, on the
ground that under PD No. 1869 which created PAGCOR, its
employees are classified as confidential appointees, and that CA
erred in applying the PROXIMITY RULE, because even if Salas
occupied one of the lowest position in PAGCOR, he performed the
functions of one of the most sensitive positions in the corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas was a confidential employee, and
consequently was his dismissal valid
HELD: NO. It is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policydetermining or highly technical. The executive pronouncement
(such as PD 1869) can be no more than initial determinations that
are not conclusive in case of conflict. This must be so, otherwise,
the literal application would compromise the employee's security of
tenure. Consequently, notwithstanding any statutory classification
to the contrary, it is still the nature of the position, as may be
ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policydetermining or highly technical.
With respect to the application of the proximity rule, the occupant
of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee
if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing
authority was the latter's belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of
discussion, without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible
betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Thus,
where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing
authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant. Here, while integrity and honesty are primary
considerations for Salas' appointment in ISS, his position does NOT
involve "SUCH CLOSE INTIMACY" between him and the appointing
authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would ensure
"freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust."
Considering his organizational ranking and his compensation level,
he cannot be considered a confidential employee (ordinary/routine

character of his duty, modest rank, meager salary of P2,200 per

month).

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY

G.R. No. 135805. April 29, 1999, Pardo, J.
FACTS: George Suan (Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen
Chapter, Northern Samar) filed with the CSC a complaint against
Pedro Dacoycoy for habitual drunkenness, misconduct, and
nepotism. After fact-finding investigation, the CS Regional Office
found prima facie case and issued a charge against him. After CSC
conducted a formal investigation, CSC dismissed the other charges,
but found him guilty of two counts of nepotism because of the
appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and
utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under his
immediate supervision and control. CSC imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service. On MR< CSC denied the same.
On appeal to CA, it set aside the decision ruling that respondent did
not appoint or recommend his two sons, and ruled that it is the
person who recommends or appoints who should be sanctioned, as
it is he who performs the prohibited act.
ISSUE: WON Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
HELD: YES.
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of
the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising
immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
(RELATIVE refers to those withing 3rd degree of consanguinity
or affinity.)
EXCEPTIONS: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity,
(b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines
In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation
of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or issued in
favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or

affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising

immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, while Dacoycoy
did NOT appoint or recommend his two sons, it is he who certified
that funds are available for the proposed appointment of Rito and
even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On the other hand,
his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father
was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban here
is clear - he is still the one behind the appointing/recommending of
his sons.
AS TO THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
As an aggrieved party, the CSC may appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court expressly
abandons and overrules extant jurisprudence that the phrase party
"adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government
employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action.

RICARDO T. GLORIA (Sec. of DECS) vs. CA

G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999, Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Private respondents (Abad et al.) are public school
teachers. On various dates, during teachers strikes, they did not
report to work. They were administratively charged with grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations,
refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without
leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. After
investigation councluded before tha lapse of 90-day suspension,
they were found guilty. They appealed to MSPB but they were still
found guilty for the charge. On appeal to CA the court maintained
that they were guilty of the charges. They moved for
reconsideration seeking to be exonerated, and to be paid the
salaries during the suspension. The CA amended its decision, still
finding them guilty, but ordering the payment of their salaries,
allowances
and
other
benefits
during
the
period
of
suspension/dismissal beyond the 90-day preventive suspension.
Hence this appeal bby DECS Sec. Gloria, claiming that the
government should not be held answerable for payment of their
salaries because the continued suspension was due to their appeal.

ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the payment of their

salaries during the period of suspension beyond the 90-day period

leave, they were held liable for violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations for which the penalty is a reprimand.

HELD: There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service

employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or
suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and
(2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed
by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES vs. CA, JEJOMAR ERWIN

BINAY, JR.

Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation - NO RIGHT TO

COMPENSATION even if employee is exonerated. The clear purpose
of the law after amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries
for the period of suspension. To be entitled to such compensation,
the employee must not only be found innocent of the charges but
his suspension must likewise be unjustified. Justice Panganiban
stated in a separate opinion that this such preventive suspension is
not considered unjustified, even if later the charges are dismissed
so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.
It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for
the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days
unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the
employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is
not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be
automatically reinstated.
Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal - There is a RIGHT TO
COMPENSATION IF EMPLOYEE IS EXONERATED. This is because this
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually PUNITIVE
although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent
is exonerated. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states that respondent shall
be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his
conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his
suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or
dismissal.
In effect, he is penalized before his sentence is confirmed thus he
should be paid his salaries in the event he is exonerated. It would
be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate
execution of the decision against him.
Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although
Found Guilty of Violation of Office Rules and Regulations
and Reprimanded -- In this case, although they were absent from
work, it was not because of the strike. For being absent without

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas Ching Enciso VI filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint acussing Binay Jr.
of PLUNDER and violation of RA 3019 (The AntiGraft and Corrupt
Practices Act) in connection with the five (5) phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building. Before Binay, Jr., et al.s filing of their counter-affidavits,
the Ombudsman issued the subject preventive suspension order,
placing them under preventive suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. She
ruled that the requisites for preventive suspension are present - (a)
that the evidence of guilt was strong (that the losing bidders
attested to the irregularities, that the documents on record negated
publication of bids, the disbursement of release of funds); (b) that
they charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service which would
warrant removal from public service; and (c) that their positions
give them access to public records and allow them to influence
possible witnesses which would prejudice investigation. DILG Sec.
Roxas was ordered to immediately implement the same.
Binay et al filed petition with CA seeking nullification of the
preventive suspension order, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
WPI. He argues that he could not be held administratively
liable because the anomalous activities transpired during
his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of
Makati for a second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor.
Roxas caused the implementation of OMB's order so points of entry
to the Makati City Hall were closed, and Vice Mayor Pena assumed
office as Acting Mayor. At noon on the same day, CA issued a TRO
stating that it is more prudent to do so. But Ombudsman Morales
manifested that the TRO did not state exactly what was being
restrained and there was no longer any act to restrain because the
order was already implemented. Binay filed petition for contempt
against Roxas, Brion.

Ombudsman answers that CA has no jursidiction to grant Binay's

prayer for TRO because of Section 14 of The Ombudsman Act (RA
6770), stating that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the
Ombudsmans investigation unless there is prima facie evidence
that the subject matter thereof is outside the latters jurisdiction;
and that the ombudsman cannot be held in contempt being an
impeachable officer.
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction to issue a TRO/WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by
ombudsman; WON BINAY cannot be held liable based on the
condonation doctrine
HELD:
As to WON CA may issue WPI/TRO to enjoin the preventive
suspension
The Court concludes taht the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 14 of RA
6770 (that no court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law) is UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
and that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the
main petition.
The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. The Ombudsmans notion
that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order
- clearly strays from the concepts rationale of insulating the office
from political harassment or pressure.
As to the first paragraph of Section 14*, the Court rules that the
Congress in enacting said provision, took away from the courts
their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Courts
constitutional rule-making authority. These are provisional reliefs

and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of

Court, and are matters of procedure which belong exclusively
within the province of this Court.
As to WON CA abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and WPI
In issuing the TRO/WPI the CA hinged/based the issuance on
Binay's claim in relation to the condonation doctrine. This doctrine
is a jurisprudential creation originating from the 1959 case
of Pascual vs Provincial Board, decided under the 1935
Constitution. But reading the 1987 Constitution together with the
above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion
that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases. The concept that public office is a public trust under 1987
Constitution is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective
local officials administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected
to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is
not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
Condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge
of what is to be condoned. There can be no condonation of an
act that is unknown. Misconduct committed by an elective
official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes
(NOTE: The abandonment of this doctrine is PROSPECTIVE. It is
still "good law" prior to abandonment.)
CONSEQUENTLY, CA did not commit GAD in issuing the writs
because it merely followed the then settled precedent on the
condonation doctrine.
*Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.