Arctic Aff Wave 2 - Michigan7 2016

DONT CALL IT A COMEBACK
This file contains a new South China Sea 1ac that still offers full Arctic Council
membership but asks China to arbitrate its maritime claims in the South
China Sea through the UN Convention on the Law of the SEA (UNCLOS).
An UNCLOS arbitration panel just ruled in favor of the Phillipines and against
China on July 12th. Things are not looking pretty on the South China Sea, but
along comes the aff
More extensive strategy notes coming at a later date.
Big thanks to these hard-working students on crushing it on a *very tricky
part of the topic in a *very short period of time:
The Wayzata Council (Anant Jindani, Aditya Sitaraman and Aman Sharma),
The Iowa City West Council (Lauren Ernst, Chirag Jain and Mason Wang), Lucy
McDermott (Walter Payton) and Daniel Joseph (Glenbrook North HS)
1ACs
1acWarming QPQ
1acPlan
The United States federal government should offer to fully
support and pursue full member status in the Arctic
Council for China if China agrees to participate in bilateral
cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific
research and environmental policy issues.
1acWarming
Advantage One is Warming
China wont back Arctic warming initiatives, decking USChina warming cooperation and unraveling the entire
partnership supporting Beijings Arctic status is key
Tiezzi, 15Shannon, Editor at The Diplomat, previously served as a
research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, MA @ Harvard, also
studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Why Did China Opt Out of the
Arctic Climate Change Statement? The Diplomat, Sept 1,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/why-did-china-opt-out-of-the-arctic-climatechange-statement/ --br
On Sunday and Monday, foreign ministers and other international leaders met
in Anchorage, Alaska to attend the Conference on Global Leadership in the
Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement, and Resilience (GLACIER). The
State Department described the meeting as focused on changes in the
Arctic and global implications of those changes, climate resilience and
adaptation planning, and strengthening coordination on Arctic issues. The
United States is currently the chair of the Arctic Council, a grouping of the
eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden, and the United States) plus a dozen states with permanent
observers status, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
The U.S. made it clear that the GLACIER conference was not an official Arctic
Council event, but said the meetings would focus attention on the
challenges and opportunities that the Arctic Council intends to address. As a
sign of the importance the United States placed on the Alaska forum,
President Barack Obama attended. He used the conference as a platform for
urging swifter action to combat climate change. Climate change is no longer
some far-off problem; it is happening here, it is happening now, Obama said.
Were not acting fast enough. He also used his speech to focus attention on
the need for a global agreement to be reached at this years UN climate
meeting in Paris: This year, in Paris has to be the year that the world finally
reaches an agreement to protect the one planet that weve got while we still
can. After the conference, the representatives of the Arctic Council members
signed a joint statement affirming our commitment to take urgent action to
slow the pace of warming in the Arctic. The Arctic states were joined by 10
of the 12 Arctic Council permanent observers with China and India as the
holdouts. Most of the joint statement contained a litany of climate changerelated issues already seen in the Arctic, including statistics on melting
glaciers and ice sheets and warming temperatures, as well as the impact on
Arctic communities. In terms of state commitments, however, there wasnt
much to see. The signatories affirmed a strong determination to achieve a
successful, ambitious outcome at the international climate negotiations in

December in Paris this year; acknowledged the importance of reducing black
carbon (soot) and methane emissions; and called for additional research on
how climate change is impacting the Arctic. According to CCTV America,
China said that it needed more time to review the document before signing.
But RT had a different take, saying that China and India opted not to sign the
document because reducing emissions entails huge expenditure and loss of
economic effectiveness. (RT also said that Russia had decided not to sign,
contradicting other reports). China is not a member of the Arctic Council, but
was added as a permanent observer in 2013. In the two years since then,
Beijing has moved rapidly to stake out its interests in the Arctic, particularly
when it comes to developing mostly-untapped energy reserves in the region.
It is especially interested in being acknowledged as a key actor in the
Arctic though not an Arctic state, China believes the fate of the region is
crucial to its national interests. China has begun defining itself as a nearArctic state in the hopes of gaining a larger say in Arctic affairs. Beijings
decision to abstain from the joint statement on climate change in the Arctic
suggests that it viewed the statement as being in conflict with its Arctic
interests, potentially setting the stage for later arguments in the Arctic
Council itself about how to balance environmental protection with resource
extraction and other development activities. Chinas reaction to the GLACIER
conference also sends a worrisome signal about U.S.-China cooperation on
climate change. In addition to refusing to sign the statement, China sent a
relatively low-level representative. Former Chinese Ambassador to Norway
Tang Guoqiang, billed as a special representative to Chinas foreign
minister, headed the delegation from Beijing; most other countries sent
either minister-level or deputy-minister-level officials (Russia was another
exception, sending only its ambassador to the United States to the event).
Last year, China and the United States surprised the world by unveiling a
climate change deal wherein both sides agreed to take concrete steps to
move toward clean energy. That, in turn, raised hopes that the December
2015 climate change conference in Paris could successfully unveil a new
global roadmap for emissions reductions. Both China and the U.S. have been
slow to adopt binding commitments to cut emissions, despite the fact that
they are the worlds two largest carbon emitters; their joint cooperation will
be crucial to getting a deal done in Paris. China, in particular, has long held
that its status as a still-developing country should make it immune to
mandatory cuts (a stance also adopted by India, the other hold-out at the
GLACIER conference). 2014 marked a remarkable change in Chinas
willingness to commit to reducing global emissions, a side effect of Chinas
war on pollution domestically. Conversely, the failure to come to an
agreement at the GLACIER conference sends a troubling signal for the
Paris summit, and for U.S.-China cooperation in general.
US-China warming cooperation is try or die for human

extinction and global instability
Kuo, 7-10Mercy Kuo interviewing Kaiser Kuo founder of Sinica Podcast,
director of international communications @ Baidu (Chinese Google) and
columnist at The Beijinger. Part of a series where M. Kuo engages with
subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the
globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. New Potus
Brief: Getting US-China Relations Right, The Diplomat, -us-china-relationsright/ --br
The simple answer is that these are two frightfully well-armed nuclear
powers, and the cost of actual conflagration is absolutely staggering, just
unthinkable. Likely trouble spots are few right now really, only the South
and East China Seas but in the next four or eight years that number may
well grow. The possibility of a severe economic dislocation in China raises the
specter of political instability, which might have disastrous consequences
that would be felt globally. The next U.S. president will need to make
U.S.China relations a real priority and get it right so that we have some
hope of tackling, together, the very biggest issues facing this planet,
not least of which is anthropogenic global warming. Without the worlds two
largest greenhouse gas emitters working together, I truly fear the worst .
Two internal links

**A Arctic**
Try or die the Arctic will be ice free by 2100, driving 2/3
of all global trade through the Arctic without regulation
Saul and Chestney, 16Jonathan and Nina, Reuters reporters citing
Whit Sheard of the Circumpolar Conservation Union, Julie Gourley, senior
Arctic official at the U.S. State Department and multiple studies. Arctic thaw
opens shipping waterways, risks to environment, Feb 25,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-shipping-arctic-idUSKCN0VY1N9
--br
The Arctic is thawing even faster than lawmakers can formulate new
rules to prevent the environmental threat of heavy fuel oil pollution from
ships plying an increasingly popular trade route. Average Arctic temperatures
are rising twice as fast as elsewhere in the world and the polar ice cap's
permanent cover is shrinking at a rate of around 10 percent per decade.
By the end of this century, summers in the Arctic could be free of
ice. As the ice melts, traffic of ships carrying cargoes of gas, coal and diesel
through the region has increased. Russia, in particular, is keen to expand

shipping through the Arctic given its rich natural resources and efforts to cut
costs. It aims to cut journey times between Europe and Asia by 30 to 40
percent. "It is time for regulators to wake up and realize that the Arctic is
melting away right in front of us," said Whit Sheard of the Circumpolar
Conservation Union (CCU) green group. "Common sense regulations,
integrated ocean planning, and explicit protections are all needed before the
resources of the region are targeted for exploitation or before it becomes a
major shipping route." While there is a non-binding agreement in place
between Arctic states aimed at Arctic environmental protection, campaigners
say there has been no progress on regulating the use of heavy fuel oil (HFO),
which is banned in the Antarctic region owing to its toxicity and the polluting
emissions it generates. Regulations for the Antarctic came into effect in 2011
after being adopted by the United Nations' shipping agency the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). It was arguably an easier sell as less
commercial cargo ships such as oil tankers operate in the Antarctic, where
fishing boats, cruise ships and yachts predominate. Any effort to tackle the
issue is likely to take some time even after last year's climate deal in Paris,
which commits nations to curb emissions. The Paris deal did not set specific
targets for commercial shipping, leaving the IMO to take up the charge. HFO
was not the top focus of an Arctic Council meeting on environmental
protection earlier this month, leading campaigners to seek more action. They
plan to raise the issue at the IMO's next marine environmental protection
committee session in April. Julie Gourley, senior Arctic official at the U.S.
State Department, said Washington, which has the rotating chair of the
Council, was "presently studying" the risks associated with HFO and
continued to engage with Council partners to find solutions for Arctic issues.
"SIGNIFICANT THREAT" According to a 2009 study by the intergovernmental
Arctic Council, the release of oil into the Arctic's marine environment "either
through accidental release, or illegal discharge, is the most significant threat
from shipping activity". Last year, the U.S., Russia and other Arctic nations
signed an agreement to bar their fishing fleets from seas around the North
Pole. Under the Polar Code, which was adopted by the IMO, ships trading in
polar regions will have to comply with environmental provisions from January
2017. The code imposed prohibitions on the carriage of oil or oily mixtures
from any ship into the sea and prevented pollution from garbage and noxious
liquid substances. But it only "encouraged" ships not to use or carry HFO in
the Arctic. A 2015 study by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis estimated that two thirds of the volume of world trade that
goes through the Suez Canal could be re-routed via the Arctic route in
future. It gave no time frames. Other analysts are more conservative on how
much trade could be re-routed given the recent economic slowdown in China
and oil price uncertainty. The Suez Canal, which allows ships to travel
between Europe and South Asia, accounts for an estimated 8 percent of world
seaborne trade. The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP),
representing the global upstream industry, said it had gained extensive
experience "in the safest and most environmentally sensitive ways of
operating in such conditions". "While some parties have called for codes of
best practices in the Arctic, as far as the industry is concerned, wherever we
do business the same high standards apply," the IOGP said. Looser ice means
icebergs and there is the risk of vessels being holed. Insurers are also looking
for more clarity. "The level of regulation applying to these new waterways
has, perhaps inevitably, not had time to catch up with the physical changes
to the Arctic environment," said Joe Hughes, chairman and chief executive of
ship insurer American Club. "From an insurance perspective, marine
underwriters will have concerns in regard to hull and other damage caused by
physical hazards encountered in the Arctic, and navigating restrictions."
Arctic cooperation is vital its the epicenter of glacier

research and shipping emission regulation
Slayton and Brigham, 15David Slayton is research fellow, co-chair
and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universitys
Hoover Institution. Lawson W. Brigham is distinguished professor of
geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, a fellow at
the U.S. Coast Guard Academys Center for Arctic Study & Policy, and a
member of Hoovers Arctic Security Initiative. Strengthen Arctic cooperation
between the US and China, Aug 27, Alaska Dispatch News (ADN),
http://www.adn.com/article/20150827/strengthen-arctic-cooperationbetween-us-and-china --br
Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the
U.S. and China: First, since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change,
Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation
between our two countries. We are already addressing global climate change
issues in our formal dialogue, so inserting Arctic issues such as black
carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should
resonate with our ongoing discussions. Working together on WMO Arctic
initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another
fruitful course ahead
**B US-China Cooperation**

Cooperation is on the brink Chinas carefully assessing
US signals of commitment
Davenport, 16Coral, covers energy and climate change policy at The
New York Times, previously a fellow with the Metcalf Institute for Marine and
Environmental Reporting and covered energy and the environment for
National Journal, Politico, and Congressional Quarterly. Supreme Courts Blow
to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris Climate Accord, New York Times (NYT),
Feb 10, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/carbon-emissionsparis-climate-accord.html --br
The Supreme Courts surprise decision Tuesday to halt the carrying out of
President Obamas climate change regulation could weaken or even imperil
the international global warming accord reached with great ceremony in Paris
less than two months ago, climate diplomats say. The Paris Agreement, the
first accord to commit every country to combat climate change, had as a
cornerstone Mr. Obamas assurance that the United States would enact
strong, legally sound policies to significantly cut carbon emissions. The United
States is the largest historical greenhouse gas polluter, although its annual
emissions have been overtaken by Chinas. But in the capitals of India and
China, the other two largest polluters, climate change policy experts said the
courts decision threw the United States commitment into question, and
possibly New Delhis and Beijings. If the U.S. Supreme Court actually
declares the coal power plant rules stillborn, the chances of nurturing trust
between countries would all but vanish, said Navroz K. Dubash, a senior
fellow at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. This could be the
proverbial string which causes Paris to unravel. The issue can be
overwhelming. The science is complicated. We get it. This is your cheat
sheet. The court did not block the rule permanently, but halted it from being
carried out in the states until legal challenges against it have been decided, a
process that could take a year or more. Legal experts said the justices
decision to stop work on the rule before any court had decided against it was
unprecedented and signaled that the regulation might ultimately be
overturned. That could set back the United States climate efforts for years,
although there would still be a chance for Washington to meet its
commitments by 2025. If the American clean energy plan is overturned,
well need to reassess whether the United States can meet its
commitments, said Zou Ji, the deputy director general of Chinas National
Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, a
government think tank in Beijing. Mr. Zou, who was an adviser to the Chinese
delegation at the Paris negotiations, said by telephone: It had seemed that
with the American commitments, it was possible to get on the right emissions
path globally. But without those commitments, that could be a blow to
confidence in low-carbon development. In China domestically, there is also
resistance to low-carbon policies, and they would be able to say: Look, the
United States doesnt keep its word. Why make so many demands on us?
Inaction by the United States has long been the chief obstacle to
meaningful global climate change agreements.
The plan revives US-China cooperation by spurring highlyvisible, lasting changes

Fifth, joint Arctic marine research is an arena with much promise. Joint
oceanographic research between the U.S. and China would attain global
attention and herald an era of close collaboration in Arctic Ocean
research highly relevant to global climate change. Joint icebreaking
research ship operations in Arctic ice-covered waters could provide unique
and lasting cooperative experiences for the Chinese and American
operating agencies, as well as key links between our research funding
organizations. China and the U.S. have an obligation and opportunity to work
together on a range of cooperative issues to maintain the Arctics future as a
peaceful, safe and secure region, as that new frontier opens. Both nations
must be proactive in Arctic matters within their already existing dialogue and
in international organizations including the Arctic Council.
US-China cooperation is key theyre the two largest

emitters and drive multilateral action
Hongzhou, 15Zhang, Associate Research Fellow with the China
Programme @ S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at
Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). China-US Climate Change
Cooperation: Beyond Energy, The Diplomat, Oct 13,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-us-climate-change-cooperationbeyond-energy/ --br
The Paris Summit in December 2015 is being seen as the last chance to
save the world from the worst ravages of climate change, yet whether the
international community can reach a new climate change agreement remains
to be seen. The United States and China, the two biggest economies and
largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, hold the key to the
success of not only the Paris Summit but also long-term global efforts to
combat climate change. Thankfully, unlike most aspects of Sino-U.S.
relations where tensions are rising, bilateral cooperation on climate
change has made remarkable progress, highlighted by the historic climate
change agreement signed by the two countries in November 2014. During Xi
Jinpings first state visit to the United States last month, the two sides
announced a new set of policies to combat climate change, including a
national cap-and-trade program in China and a $3 billion fund from China to
help developing countries curb global warming. Energy Cooperation: The Key
Success Factor The remarkable success in Sino-U.S. climate change
cooperation can be attributed to a wide arrange of factors, including growing
domestic pressures, stable and flourishing non-official exchanges, and a
change of attitude towards some of the key climate issues, to name but a
few. Nonetheless, the solid foundation which has been laid on bilateral
energy cooperation, clean energy in particular, is the key driving factor.
However, relying on the energy sector alone is risky, and efforts in the
energy sector might not be sufficient to sustain Sino-US climate change

cooperation and curb global warming. The two countries commitment on
clean energy should not be taken for granted. In the U.S., the Obama
administration certainly has put curbing fossil fuels top of its policy agenda
and has made very real efforts to enact policies and regulations to achieve
these goals. However, whether those measures can survive political
opposition remains uncertain. The 2016 presidential election could be a
critical moment in the trajectory of U.S. climate policy. Moreover, the shale
gas revolution not only enables the U.S. to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it
may also make America the worlds top exporter of fossil energies. This
means energy security concerns might no longer be the top policy issue for
the United States, which could then weaken the governments commitment
towards developing clean energies. In the case of China, the current
economic slowdown, if it persists, could force the country to rethink its
ambitious plans for carbon emission reduction. For years, the bottom line for
China on climate change mitigation has been to strike a balance between
economic development and climate concerns. While in recent years, amid
rapidly worsening pollution, China has been more willing to take decisive
action such as breaking away from cheap coal and closing down energy
intensive factories to curb domestic greenhouse gas emission at the expense
of economic growth. However, it does not mean that climate change
concerns will prevail over economic development. With hundreds of millions
of people still living in poverty and per-capita incomes lagging far behind
those of the developed countries, Chinas development needs are immense
and the governments top priority is to maintain stable growth. Therefore, if
the economic situation in China worsens, it will be no surprise if the Chinese
government retreats from efforts to curb emissions in favor of stabilizing
economic growth.
Acting now is key to reviving US-China Arctic cooperation

its try or die
The China-U.S. relationship is a daily and recurring , sometimes dominant,
news story. Select news has been positive and indicates close collaboration,
such as the November 2014 joint announcement on climate and energy
initiatives. Other news is more worrisome and ominous. Recent concerns for
Chinas actions in the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and devaluation of the
yuan are serious matters of domestic and international security. With Chinas
presence more visible on every continent including Antarctica, is there room

for Sino-U.S. areas of cooperation at the top of the world? The Nordic states
and Canada have already established Arctic policy and research ties to China.
With the U.S. chairing the Arctic Council through May 2017, now is the
opportune occasion for the U.S. to develop a collaborative strategy, on a
range of Arctic research and policy issues. There are three approaches for
engagement. One, add focused, strategic Arctic issues to the established
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, a longer-term approach. Second,
and potentially effective in the near-term, leverage the opportunity to
strengthen our relationship with China on Arctic affairs while the U.S. is Arctic
Council chair. Third, hold enhanced dialogue on Arctic issues between the two
national delegations at meetings of the International Maritime Organization,
World Meteorological Organization, and International Hydrographic
Organization, among other institutions.
US-China climate cooperation facilitates mitigation and

adaptation strategies globally solves extinction
Li 14 MA in Global Studies @ U Denver, Intl Affairs Coordinator @ UN
(Xiaoyu, China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, China Institute of
International Studies, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/201401/13/content_6606656.htm)
Cooperation on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and consequence
management. China-US cooperation will be increasingly critical to the
global response to climate change. New scientific studies warn that the
worst-case scenarios for climate change impacts are the most likely
outcomes. Scientific assessments also maintain that anthropomorphic
climate change is partly responsible for extreme weather events that the
world is already experiencing at an increasing rate, from the floods in
Pakistan and the heat wave in Russia to the melting glaciers and ice sheets
and the superstorm Sandy that inflicted unprecedented destruction on New
York and New Jersey. It is highly likely that global climate change will be a key
issue in the coming two decades as the world faces increasing climateinduced humanitarian disasters and infrastructure destruction requiring
immediate and expensive relief as well as costly, long-term adaptation.
Climate change likely will increase social and political instability in many
areas of the world, including emerging economies and developed countries. It
also will likely renew political pressure for emissions reductions, especially by
China and the United States, the worlds two biggest emitters. China-US
cooperation in all these areas will be critical to whether the world
cooperates and how effective any cooperation is in responding to the
potentially existential threat posed by global climate change. The two
countries also can build on decades of bilateral cooperation on energy and
environment to seize opportunities for lucrative joint energy technology
development that would substantially benefit Chinese and US businesses as
well as lower costs and widely disseminate clean energy technologies.
Expert consensus that warming is real and existential

melting glaciers ignite a cascade that exceeds costbenefit analysis
Treich and Rheinberger, 15Christoph Rheinberger (Professor of
Health Policy and Management @ Harvard) and Nicolas Treich (Professor at
the Toulouse School of Economics). Citing Weitzman (economist @ Harvard)
and Bostrom (prof @ Oxford). On the economics of the end of the world as
we know it, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/climate-change -- br
CLIMATE change puts humanity at risk. The Popes celebrated encyclical
letter on the subject released last month emphasised this risk for our
common home, arguing that doomsday predictions can no longer be met
with irony or disdain. But apocalyptic predictions are often made by religious
groups. So, how serious is this claim? Perhaps for the first time in history,
there seems to be a broad consensus among scientists. They claim that our
planet might face a frightening future if we cannot agree to take decisive
actions here and now. Changes to how seawater circulates in the Atlantic,
the melting of glaciers on Greenland and in the Antarctic, and rising sea
levels might all result from inaction. Accounting for these catastrophic
scenarios is a huge challenge for scientists and economists alike. So, what
should we do in the face of existential risks? One, perhaps extreme, view is
that the mere possibility of massive human extinction should inspire us to do
everything we can to avoid it. The counterargument goes that we face
several other existential risks and focusing on one may be shortsighted. In his
fascinating book Catastrophe: Risk and Response, published in 2004,
Richard Posner argues that we do not do enough to hedge against
catastrophic risks such as climate change, asteroid impacts or bioterrorism. In
light of the competition of existential risks, how much should humanity
invest in the mitigation of climate change? Conventional wisdom holds that
we should limit global warming to 2C. To justify this target, economists seek
to compare the cost of reducing current emissions with its benefits. Indeed,
there is a trade-off: investing more resources today in climate-change
prevention leaves less to combat other immediate risks. Interestingly, the
Popes letter recognises that decisions must be made based on a
comparison of the risks and benefits foreseen for the various possible
alternatives. However, estimating these benefits means that we need to
determine the value of a reduction in preventing a possible future
catastrophic risk. This is a thorny task. Martin Weitzman, an economist at
Harvard University, argues that the expected loss to society because of
catastrophic climate change is so large that it cannot be reliably
estimated. A cost-benefit analysiseconomists standard tool for assessing
policiescannot be applied here as reducing an infinite loss is infinitely
profitable. Other economists, including Kenneth Arrow of Stanford University
and William Nordhaus of Yale University, have examined the technical limits
of Mr Weitzmans argument. As the interpretation of infinity in economic
climate models is essentially a debate about how to deal with the threat of
extinction, Mr Weitzmans argument depends heavily on a judgement about
the value of life. Economists estimate this value based on peoples personal
choices: we purchase bicycle helmets, pay more for a safer car, and receive
compensation for risky occupations. The observed trade-offs between safety
and money tell us about societys willingness to pay for a reduction in
mortality risk. Hundreds of studies indicate that people in developed
countries are collectively willing to pay a few million dollars to avoid an
additional statistical death. For example, Americas Environmental Protection
Agency recommends using a value of around $8m per fatality avoided.
Similar values are used to evaluate vaccination programmes and prevention
of traffic accidents or airborne diseases. Mr Posner multiplies the value of life
by an estimate of Earths future population and obtains an illustrative figure
of $336m billion as the cost of human extinction. Nick Bostrom, a philosopher
at Oxford University, argues that this approach ignores the value of life of
unborn generations and that the tentative figure should be much larger
perhaps infinitely so. The value of life as a concept is a natural candidate
for a tentative estimation of the benefit of reducing extinction risk. Yet the
approach seems somewhat awkward in this context. The extinction risk here
is completely different from the individual risk we face in our everyday lives.
Human extinction is a risk we all shareand it would be an unprecedented
event that can happen only once. A lack of reliable data exacerbates the
profound methodological and philosophical difficulties faced by climate
change economists. Extinction is a threat to future generations, while
evaluating and designing prevention policies is an urgent challenge today.
The United Nations conference in Paris this December offers a chance to take
appropriate steps to protect future generations from this risk. Many
economists do not believe in the current pledge-and-review mechanism, and
favour the implementation of a generalised carbon-trading system instead.
While the Pope dismisses that solution out of hand, his attacks on
technological innovation and capitalism, however, may not be very effective
in overcoming the current inertia that climate negotiations suffer from.
1acMultilateralism
Advantage Two is Multilateralism
Brexit was just the tip of the iceberg multilateralism is
collapsing, but demonstrated political will can revive it
Wurf, 16Hannah, Research Associate working in the G20 Studies Centre
at the Lowy Institute. Her research interests are global governance and
multilateralism, June 9, Online:
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/06/09/What-the-UK-needs-now-ismore-multilateralism-not-less.aspx, Article: What the UK needs now is more
multilateralism, not less Accessed on: 06-24-16//AWW
Britain leaving the EU could signal a new shift away from
multilateralism as leaders around the world increasingly talk about pulling
up the drawbridge against globalisation and retreating into isolationism. This
would be a mistake. The EU is enfeebled because its members cannot reach
consensus on critical issues, for example, processing refugees. The EU
remains a project of states despite its attempts at designing supranational
institutions. If Britain votes to leave the EU on 23 June, it will turn its back on
the most ambitious attempt at multilateralism in the 20th century. It will
also abandon the opportunity to make the EU function better. Martin Wolf has
observed that multilateral institutions are underperforming across the
board. His frustration is not so much with the current international
architecture as with the lack of political will to make existing
institutions work. In his words, 'systems of cooperation among states are
ultimately dependent on what states are willing to give them, both the
legitimacy and the power'. International pressure has been building against
Brexit, and not just from other EU countries. The G7 and G20 have made
statements about the potential ramifications of Brexit. The G7 concluded last
month that 'a UK exit from the EU would reverse the trend towards greater
global trade and investment, and the jobs they create, and is a further
serious risk to growth'. This follows the G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bankers' communiqu in February listing 'the shock of a potential UK exit
from the European Union' as one of the downside risks and vulnerabilities for
the global economy. Those campaigning for Brexit believe the UK will have a
menu of other multilateral options outside of the EU. Stewart Patrick from the
Council on Foreign Relations has written about the emergence of
'multilateralism la carte' whereby states choose coalitions and approach
issues case by case, rather than using the international organisations
themselves to hammer out collective agreements. However, for Britain, there
is a lot of evidence that its multilateral menu is more extensive inside the EU.
David Skilling has pointed out that the EU is 'a valuable asset for European
countries, enabling them to negotiate FTAs that they would not get
bilaterally'. Robin Niblett has also made a compelling case for why 'working
through EU institutions, despite their flaws, and with the UK's European
neighbours offers the best prospects of managing the changing global
context'. The UK will not be able to fall back on its bilateral relations as a
substitute for multilateralism either with its post-war ally, the US, or its new
favourite economic partner, China. Both the US and China have made clear
that they would prefer the UK to stay in the EU. President Obama has been
unequivocal about US opposition to Brexit, saying 'the UK is at its best when
it's helping to lead a strong European Union. It leverages UK power to be part
of the EU'. Hillary Clinton agrees. As usual, it is difficult to say what Donald
Trump's position would be. Even China does not like the possibility of Britain
leaving the EU. President Xi said in his state visit to the UK last year, 'Britain,
as an important member of the EU, can play an even more positive and
constructive role in promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties'.
The challenges that the UK faces in the 21st century are global. Like
everyone else, Britons will need to manage unprecedented flows of capital,
goods, services and people. The UK will have to rely on international
cooperation. It will lose out if it does not play a constructive role in
multilateral institutions, including the EU.
Arctic environmental cooperation spills over to boost

multilateral cooperation globally, but its on the brink
our impact is reverse causal cooperation creates a
paradigmatic governance shift that halts warfare and
several other immediate existential risks
Heinenen, 16Lassi, Professor of Arctic Politics @ University of Lapland,
Finland. author of more than 200 scientific publications and is the editor of
The Arctic Yearbook. High Arctic Stability as an Asset for Storms of
International Politics, Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy,
Economic Security and Climate, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-8
http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137468246 --br
More importantly, the international community is facing bigger and
unpredicted challenges and serious irrational violence than the exploding
Middle East, including the ISISs, other extreme groups and Israels state
terrorism, or the Ukrainian war including the warfare in Eastern Ukraine and
the annexation of Crimea by Russia: first, worldwide nonmilitary human
catastrophes, such as the Ebola virus as a zoonotic disease (Walsh and
Sifferlin, 2014); second, global environmental challenges, such as
unavoidable rapid climate change and global warming, such as loss of sea ice
and that of glaciers, and the consequent climate vs. capitalism conflict;
third, holistic environmental degradation accelerated by the Anthropocene
(see Finger in this volume), such as the Arctic Paradox (e.g., Palosaari,
2012); fourth, structural societal problems and challenges of the global
system, such as the faith of constant growth, poverty, growing greed, the
unsolved cumulative from fiscal, economic and political to moral crises of
the Western system, and the consequent inequality between the elites and
the masses with a possible irreversible collapse (Ahmed, 2014); and final,
according to rough calculations by the middle of August (2014) the
inhabitants of the globe had already used all the annual natural resources,
which should belong to us according to the criteria of sustainable
development. Going back to the current situation of regional conflicts and the
fight against international terror there is no direct connection between them
and the current situation in the Arctic region, at least not so far, but
reflections and indirect impacts. The Ukrainian crisis, and the war there, has
wrought tension between Russia and its Arctic neighbors casting a shadow
over Arctic affairs, particularly the Arctic intergovernmental cooperation, if
not outright putting them into danger. The first ever boycotting of Arctic
Council meetings is an example of this, though it was also influenced by the
disagreement of Canada and Russia over the North Pole (e.g., Heininen,
Exner-Pirot and Plouffe, 2014) Following this, there is a growing and
legitimate concern that due to this situation the current era of high political
stability of the Arctic may be lost (Heininen, 2014a). Also, the United
States, supported by other NATO member states, and the Russian Federation
have obviously become rivals, and there is a potential conflict of interests
between them: Russia is economically and (geo)politically, as well as partly
militarily, involved in the conflict. The United States is also (geo)politically
and economically involved in it, as are the other NATO member states
following (solidarity) Article V of the NATO. As a result, six of the eight Arctic
states Canada, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and the United States
(as NATO member states) and Russia are involved in the conflict in some
way or the other. Actually even the rest of the Arctic states Finland and
Sweden (the two non-NATO member states) are involved in the crisis
economically and politically due to the sanctions by the European Union.2
Interestingly, some years ago it was predicted by some journalists, politicians
and even scholars that in the Arctic a new Cold War is emerging, and that a
scramble for the Arctic has been started, for example, Cold War in the
Arctic in Times Online, in September 2009 and The Battle for the North Pole
by Der Spiegel, in September 2008. Furthermore, there were some cynical
comments that although the Arctic states may be talking on cooperation,
they are actually preparing for conflict (Huebert, 2010).3 The slogans of
emerging conflicts and a race on resources were media sexy, and much due
to the Russian expedition to the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 regulated
by the rules of UN Convention on a Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the
competition (between Canada and Russia) to control the North Pole because
of globalization and its flows in the Arctic region (e.g., Globalization and the
Circumpolar North, 2010), the geostrategic importance of the Arctic in world
politics and the global economy is increasing (Heininen, 2005). Not
surprisingly there were different opinions on Arctic geopolitics: the first
discourse (e.g., Heininen, 2010) emphasized, and still emphasizes, the
achieved stability that there is no rearmament in the Arctic, and the Arctic
states have done only limited modernization (Wezeman, 2012); the second
discourse challenged this by predicting a scramble for the Arctic emerging
conflicts and a race of natural resources, as mentioned earlier. It was much

supported by international media as well as the hypothesis of a research
project, Geopolitics in the High North (2008), that security in a militarystrategic sense is about to experience a renaissance in the Arctic. All this
sounds like an academic dialogue or political debate, and thus is normal in
academia and politics, but can also be much misleading. We, who did not
admit something that was neither really happening nor we could see any
signs of, were however right (e.g., see Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy,
2014).4 Also, among the Arctic states, as well as among the Arctic Council
observer states, there was, and is partly still, a consensus that there are no
military conflicts in the Arctic region, not even emerging ones, but a high
stability based on multilateral both intergovernmental and interregional
cooperation. The Arctic states even started ad hoc military cooperation
in the context of climate change with a plan of annual meetings of the
commanders of the armies. Owing to the fact that the high stability and
intensive cooperation is human-made and an achievement by the eight Arctic
states, Northern indigenous peoples and several nonstate actors, the
situation can be changed. Therefore, a timely and relevant question is
whether high stability is in danger, or at least in a real test, first time
since the end of the Cold War due to the conflictual situation of international
politics. Theoretically, the answer is yes: all this could mean that instead of
the current low-military tension we might have growing political tension in
the Arctic, as Luszczuk speculates in his chapter. However, more relevant,
and definitely more interesting, question is why those prognoses and slogans
of a new Cold War and emerging conflicts in the Arctic were not, yet,
materialized. Furthermore, how the achieved high stability is so resilient. The
answer lies on the fact that the stable and friendly Arctic has been, and is, so
valuable for the Arctic region and its peoples, as well as for all the Arctic
states, including the two major powers of the region, and for the entire
Europe and Asia. The same attitude was, and despite some doubts is still,
seen in the postWorld War II Europe with the European Union as an outcome
and guarantor of hard-won peace after the two devastating World Wars. This
might sound pouring and is not media sexy, but this clearly shows the power
of immaterial values and human capital, such as peace. Furthermore, this
shows the power of soft methods, such as devolution and self-determination,
in politics and governance, as well as the increasing geostrategic importance
of the Arctic in world politics and the global economy. The broader and more
dark picture of the current state of the world gives one more reason to value
the high stability of the Arctic region, that the Arctic is not isolated but keenly
a part of the globe and is heavily impacted by globalization and its
multifunctional effects; furthermore, that the globalized Arctic has its global
implications and drivers that affect both the region and the rest of the
globe, as it is described in the GlobalArctic project (www.globalarctic.org).
Recent industrial developments, such as aggressively expanding exploitation
of minerals and (off-shore) hydrocarbon resources due to increasing resource
demand, on the one hand, bring new and more dangerous environmental
and societal risks to the Arctic and its people(s) they have already created
the Arctic Paradox and on the other hand, have feedbacks related to global
energy and natural resource systems. From this we can conclude that on the
other hand, the Antropocene is already at play in the Arctic, as Finger
discusses in his chapter, and on the other hand, what happens in the Arctic
matters on a global scale. To conclude, the Arctic region with its high political
stability, as well as military structures based on the nuclear weapon systems
of Russia and the United States, and with a keen international (mostly
multilateral) cooperation, much initiated and supported by nonstate actors,
could be interpreted to be positively exceptional and left out of regional
crises and wars and political and military tension. Here the Arctic and
international Arctic cooperation would be and become a joint valuable,
human-made asset between the eight Arctic states, as the International
Space Station (ISS) acts for Russia and the United States and their space
cooperation. Furthermore, here the Arctic / international Arctic cooperation
would be a reserve for the future, the moment, when it is, again, needed
to calm down and to press reset. The situation might come sooner than later,
when the world, including Russia and the United States, is facing even more
serious regional and irrational warfare than the threat by ISIS and the
exposing middle East, that is, real big worldwide challenges and threats,
such as immediate impacts of rapid climate change and the Anthropocene.
In this kind of situation, the Arctic would act as a test ground and a
workshop to examine and test soft ways of governance and brainstorm an
alternative way to definite security by causing a paradigm shift (see
Heininen in this volume). Here the two discourses are far too much statecentric. A more interesting feature of Arctic security is the coexistence of
several concepts of security and its transformation from traditional and statecontrolled security to human security with an emphasis on the environment,
or economic development/security, and that they are closely related to each
other making Arctic security a special kind of phenomenon to influence the
region and its geopolitics. With regard to the future securities of the global
Arctic there are challenges, which go beyond state sovereignty and
nationalistic security thinking.
The plans signal drives cooperation the US has a narrow

window as Arctic Council leaders to lock in cooperation it
spills over to solve South China Sea conflict
Dwyer, 15 Commander William G. Dwyer III, United States Coast Guard,
Chinas Strategic Interests in the Arctic, NDU Press 3rd Place Paper, United
States Army War College, Joint Force Quarterly, NDU Press,
http://uscga.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=65722, p. 18-20
The Arctic will continue to be a strategically important region into the future
as nations position themselves to take advantage of the untapped resources
and expeditious maritime routes. Although Chinas interests in the Arctic
started with scientific research, they have evolved into a desire to exert
influence over the control and distribution of the bountiful natural resources
(oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish stocks) required to sustain Chinas
population and fuel the worlds largest economy. According to Stephen Blank,
China is clearly after more than simply investment and trade opportunities
as it continues to display its obsession with securing energy and other
supplies where the U.S. Navy cannot or will not go.77 Additionally, China has
signaled its intent to step up its use of the three Arctic maritime transit
routes. The Arctic Council is the internationally agreed model of governance
and has established a strong reputation for cooperation and mutual respect
among Arctic nations, as evidenced by the Arctic SAR and oil spill
agreements. Some argue China will not be satisfied with its limited role of
observer in Arctic affairs and will continue to lobby for full membership on
the Council. However, the Arctic Council can capitalize on Chinas leadership
position in the global economy to boost the strategic importance of the
group. The rise of China in the Arctic may also be seen as a balance to
Russia, which is the most active and provocative state in this region. The selflabeling of the United States as an Arctic nation by national policy makers is
not borne out by the intensity of American policy and activity in the region.78
Unlike Russia and Canada, the United States is perceived by China as neither
an Arctic power nor a threat to Chinas rising influence in the region. This
perception offers the advantage of muting any aggressive notes in the tone
of American calls for China to exhibit responsible behavior befitting a major
international power. The United States can take concrete actions in three
arenas unilateral, bilateral and multilateral to reduce the risk to its
national security interests in the Arctic. First, the U.S. Senate should ratify the
UNCLOS and fund additional Coast Guard aircraft, icebreakers and other
patrol vessels to give the United States both increased international
legitimacy and Arctic maritime capability. Second, the United States should
capitalize on the success of the bilateral Coast Guard ship-rider program to
build confidence with China in related maritime areas. A candidate venue
could be the joint maritime patrols between littoral nations in the South China
Sea proposed last month in Malaysia by the commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet.
Scott Cheney-Peters of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
suggests that the U.S. component of such patrols could be vessels from the
Coast Guard (rather than the U.S. Navy) to reduce the appearance of a direct
military challenge to China.79 The law-enforcement character of the Coast
Guard and its established capacity-building programs with its Chinese
counterpart should result in a less provocative presence that could spawn
additional areas of cooperation. Third, the chair of the Arctic Council
affords the United States a powerful legitimacy granted by a
multilateral body that China desperately wants to join. The U.S.
government must leverage this unique opportunity to build a solid
coalition within the Council to induce China to assume the mantle of
responsible global partner in several venues. The prize of full membership
in the Arctic Council could be used to prod China into cooperation on
maritime issues not only in the Arctic Ocean but further afield in the
contentious theater of the South China Sea. The United States and the
other Council members must be vigilant to Chinese attempts to subvert
Council proceedings through economic coercion of vulnerable Arctic nations.
The evolving Arctic offers great potential for multi-lateral cooperation rather
than the pursuit of self-interest and competition. The United States and China
have an opportunity to reinforce strong maritime governance in the Arctic for
their mutual benefit.
Pursuing Chinese full member status in exchange for

environmental cooperation locks in multilateral peace
thats key to defuse inevitable proxy conflicts that wreck
stability
China and America share a common interest of freedom of navigation in the
Arctic. However, while China views Canada and Russia as an Arctic power, it
does not view the United States as an Arctic power. Perhaps Chinas attitude
stems from the lack of any serious U.S. Arctic strategy, its refusal to ratify
UNCLOS, and diminished U.S. operations in comparison to other Arctic
states.67 One option the new Arctic Council leadership should consider is
offering China full member status in return for China submitting its
controversial maritime claims in the South China Sea to UNCLOS arbitration.
This alternative would take close coordination not only between Arctic
member states but also littoral nations of the South China Sea. To date,
Chinas official messages concerning its interests in the Arctic have followed
twin themes of scientific research and environmental monitoring, with
undertones of natural resource allocation and the development of new trade
routes. China has shown support of the Arctic Council, as evidenced in its
pursuit of full membership status, and the underlying framework of UNCLOS
as it applies in the Arctic. At the same time, China has been unwilling to
consider UNCLOS as a forum for arbitration of maritime boundary disputes in
the South China Sea. Chinas signing of UNCLOS in 1996 was qualified by its
rejection of certain provisions in dispute resolution clauses.68 Offering full
member status on the Arctic Council in return for Chinas submission to
UNCLOS arbitration elsewhere on the planet may reveal Chinas true
ambitions. Both the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean offer similar
potential natural resources (hydrocarbons and fisheries). The United States
may have an opportunity to collaborate with China on the Arctic Council
while working to shape its expanding influence in the Arctic. Chinas Twelfth
Five Year Plan calls for increased coordination and cooperation to include
forging bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation agreements as well as
active participation in international maritime forums.69 Acknowledging
Chinas great power status may encourage China to embrace a more
cooperative tone and transparent efforts in the Arctic . Even if not
offered full member status, China will likely continue to expand economic
partnerships with smaller Arctic countries such as Denmark and Iceland to
meet Chinas future natural resource demands. The Arctic Council, under U.S.
leadership, needs to monitor these relationships and prevent China from
becoming a quasi-Arctic state through its economic leverage over
Council member states. For example, China has forged a strong bilateral
relationship with Iceland, as evidenced by Chinas construction of the largest
embassy in Reykjavik. Iceland has permitted the Chinese National Offshore
Oil Corporation to develop projects on its continental shelf.70 Additionally,
Chinas only free trade agreement in Europe exists with Iceland.71 Iceland
has experienced significant problems with its economy since the 2008
banking collapse, and the opportunity to collaborate with a rising China is
seen as a financial lifeline.72 The chair and the members of the Arctic Council
must be alert to the character of votes cast by Iceland on Council issues. Do
they truly reflect Icelandic positions and are they in the best interest of the
Council? Or is China seeking to influence Council actions through its de facto
Arctic proxy? From 1951 through 2006, Iceland hosted U.S. forces at Keflavik
Naval Air Station until a U.S. military drawdown program closed the facility
and withdrew 1,300 American personnel from Iceland. 73 With no organic
military, the Icelandic government was upset since closing the base left the
island nation with no defense presence. 74 Iceland likely still resents this
abrupt move by fellow NATO member the United States. As their bilateral
relations with China strengthen, Iceland may offer China aircraft and naval
basing rights to support their regional interests. Chinas burgeoning influence
may potentially be a threat to this framework of Arctic cooperation and
the broader security of the region. China, therefore, should not be allowed to
create implicit proxy states through financial leverage or to exert undue
diplomatic influence on smaller, politically and economically weaker Arctic
states such as Iceland. The risk of an unchecked China in the Arctic
may lead to regional instability and a lack of trust and cooperation
among Arctic nations. It may cause a shift from the current state of liberalism
fostered through the Arctic Council to a realist view.
Independently, successful management of proxy conflicts

through regional multilateral institutions prevents
existential threats
Graeme P. Herd 10, Head of the International Security Programme, CoDirector of the International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre
for Security Policy, 2010, Great Powers: Towards a cooperative competitive
future world order paradigm?, in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the
21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a
global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and
the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real
question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers?
Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world
system, in which shared strategic threats create interest-based incentives
and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This
pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda

based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas. In addition.
Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral
partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants),
regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms,
including international law. Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on
institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their orderproducing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their
near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division of the world into
a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World
order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power and
zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow
a return to multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur
gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment
in the post-Cold War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of nonpolarity, where power is diffuse "a world dominated not by one or two or
even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising
various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise, characterized by a
combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and
talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of
global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as
groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and
immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then
legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble:
Global cooperation is the only way to master the new, asymmetric global
challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on
its own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of
non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate
security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20
Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined
as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" Grevi suggests that
managing existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is
the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in
cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and
accommodation between Great Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system
is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging
powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a
complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in
April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial
architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more
participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have
contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
Institutionalized cooperative norms check conflict

escalation and its reverse causal
Pouliot 11Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot,
Multilateralism as an End in Itself, International Studies Perspectives (2011)
12, 1826]
Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine
exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key
advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and
tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint,
according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to
multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism
that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is
that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what
they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday
multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the
joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of
action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices
structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they
are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a
degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations
over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of
deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and
linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to getting
the right signal across. The same goes with the practice of multilateralism,
which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the
boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring
effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for
appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint
solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the
definition of the issue at handa particularly important step on the global
stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads
everybody to agree on everythingthat would be as impossible as
counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that
multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level
(see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven
playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can
lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism
fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interactionfor
example, a common linguistic repertoirethat allows global actors to make
sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may
not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on
an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at
handsometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In todays
pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that
sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009)
calls political friendship among peoples. The axiomatic practice of

principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this
social structure: While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods
and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political
friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global
background context of norms and institutions based on mutual
recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global
cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance
rather than domination by any group (2009:5455). In a world where
multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the
structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance,
which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly
strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will
never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to
emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly
made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable
frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a
remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick
historical tour dhorizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend
to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very
process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to
produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice
inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it
entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken,
the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially
share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted
seem inherently, and seemingly naturally, moderate. This is because the
debate about what a given policy means takes place before its
implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit
the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of
multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently
reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach
(1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the
conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an
already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time
people define their interests in the very process of participation. The
argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in
any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political
practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping
participants preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the
multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is
also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot
forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the
policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily
entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes
that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are
generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run,
the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because

actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even
episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan
genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally
think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is
no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of
multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the
normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it
yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism
as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than
Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences
tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also
creates self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic
interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define
problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with
wide-ranging ownershipthree processual benefits that further strengthen
the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23
1acSCS QPQ
1acPlan
Plan the United States federal government should offer
to fully support and pursue full membership in the Arctic
Council for China if China agrees to submit its maritime
claims in the South China Sea to United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitration.
1acCredibiltiy
Advantage One is Credibility
Agreeing to lobby for full Council membership sends a
powerful signal that locks in multilateral cooperation and
defuses instability in both the Arctic and the South China
Sea
The Arctic will continue to be a strategically important region into the future
as nations position themselves to take advantage of the untapped resources
and expeditious maritime routes. Although Chinas interests in the Arctic
started with scientific research, they have evolved into a desire to exert
influence over the control and distribution of the bountiful natural resources
(oil, natural gas, minerals, and fish stocks) required to sustain Chinas
population and fuel the worlds largest economy. According to Stephen Blank,
China is clearly after more than simply investment and trade opportunities
as it continues to display its obsession with securing energy and other
supplies where the U.S. Navy cannot or will not go.77 Additionally, China has
signaled its intent to step up its use of the three Arctic maritime transit
routes. The Arctic Council is the internationally agreed model of governance
and has established a strong reputation for cooperation and mutual respect
among Arctic nations, as evidenced by the Arctic SAR and oil spill
agreements. Some argue China will not be satisfied with its limited role of
observer in Arctic affairs and will continue to lobby for full membership on
the Council. However, the Arctic Council can capitalize on Chinas leadership
position in the global economy to boost the strategic importance of the
group. The rise of China in the Arctic may also be seen as a balance to
Russia, which is the most active and provocative state in this region. The selflabeling of the United States as an Arctic nation by national policy makers is
not borne out by the intensity of American policy and activity in the region.78
Unlike Russia and Canada, the United States is perceived by China as neither
an Arctic power nor a threat to Chinas rising influence in the region. This
perception offers the advantage of muting any aggressive notes in the tone
of American calls for China to exhibit responsible behavior befitting a major
international power. The United States can take concrete actions in three
arenas unilateral, bilateral and multilateral to reduce the risk to its
national security interests in the Arctic. First, the U.S. Senate should ratify the
UNCLOS and fund additional Coast Guard aircraft, icebreakers and other
patrol vessels to give the United States both increased international
legitimacy and Arctic maritime capability. Second, the United States should
capitalize on the success of the bilateral Coast Guard ship-rider program to
build confidence with China in related maritime areas. A candidate venue
could be the joint maritime patrols between littoral nations in the South China
Sea proposed last month in Malaysia by the commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet.
Scott Cheney-Peters of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
suggests that the U.S. component of such patrols could be vessels from the
Coast Guard (rather than the U.S. Navy) to reduce the appearance of a direct
military challenge to China.79 The law-enforcement character of the Coast
Guard and its established capacity-building programs with its Chinese
counterpart should result in a less provocative presence that could spawn
additional areas of cooperation. Third, the chair of the Arctic Council
affords the United States a powerful legitimacy granted by a
multilateral body that China desperately wants to join. The U.S.
government must leverage this unique opportunity to build a solid
coalition within the Council to induce China to assume the mantle of
responsible global partner in several venues. The prize of full membership
in the Arctic Council could be used to prod China into cooperation on
maritime issues not only in the Arctic Ocean but further afield in the
contentious theater of the South China Sea. The United States and the
other Council members must be vigilant to Chinese attempts to subvert
Council proceedings through economic coercion of vulnerable Arctic nations.
The evolving Arctic offers great potential for multi-lateral cooperation rather
than the pursuit of self-interest and competition. The United States and China
have an opportunity to reinforce strong maritime governance in the Arctic for
their mutual benefit.
This summer is the trial of the century American pushes

to recalibrate Chinas position are key
Heydarian, 6-27Richard Javad, Prof of political science @ De La Salle
University, and formerly served a policy adviser at the Philippine House of
Representatives. The South China Sea moment of truth is almost here, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2016/06/the-south-china-sea-moment-of-truth-isalmost-here/ --br
The Trial of the Century
For the UNCLOS systemas a body of rules and binding dispute settlement
mechanismsprominence and credibility are at stake, Waxman
explains. The arbitration body faces the risk of being ignored, derided and
marginalized by the biggest player in the region. Last October, the
arbitral tribunal (formed under Article 287, Annex VII of UNCLOS) decided that
it would indeed exercise jurisdiction on almost half of the items in the
Philippines memorial (official complaint), with the remaining items subject to
simultaneous examination in terms of both jurisdiction and merit. In a tenpage summary, the judges argued that the Philippine-initiated arbitration
case was properly constituted and that the act of initiating this arbitration
did not constitute an abuse of process [as asserted by China]. The judges
reiterated that Chinas non-appearance in these proceedings does not
deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction, and international law does not require a
State to continue negotiations when it concludes that the possibility of a

negotiated solution has been exhausted. The Tribunal, which has no
mandate to decide on questions of sovereignty, decided that it can
nonetheless exercise jurisdiction on determination of the nature of disputed
features (see Art. 121 on regime of islands), particularly the Mischief,
Gaven, McKennan, Hughes, Johnson, Cuarteron and Fiery Cross Reefs, as well
as Scarborough Shoal. It can also exercise jurisdiction on allegedly aggressive
maneuvers by China against Philippine vessels operating close to
Scarborough Shoal, as well as the ecological impact of Chinas reclamation
activities near Scarborough and Second Thomas shoals. But key items such
as the validity of Chinas sweeping nine-dashed-line claims and dubious
doctrine of historical rights were left for further deliberation. Meanwhile,
China continuously ignored opportunities, in accordance to Article 5, Annex
VII, to formally participate in the proceedings. Thus, the arbitration body
effectively demolished Chinas longstanding claim that (1) UNCLOS and
arbitration bodies under its aegis have no mandate to arbitrate disputes
concerning the South China Sea disputes; (2) the Philippines has yet to
exhaust bilateral negotiations before resorting to compulsory arbitration; and
(3) China, under Article 298, has exempted itself from such arbitration
procedures. This isnt just some legal hairsplitting. There are huge
strategic implications. First of all, it means that not only the Philippines,
but also other claimant countries could resort to a similar lawfare strategy to
pressure and extract concessions from China. In effect, the Philippines
arbitration case could create a lawfare multiplier. So far, Indonesia,
which is inching closer to dropping its neutrality status in the South China Sea
disputes, and Vietnam, which has ramped up defense ties with America, have
threatened to go along the same path if China continues to press its
advantage in adjacent waters. Secondly, and more importantly, the
arbitration verdict could provide a perfection legal justification for not only
America, but also other key naval powers such as Japan, to launch sustained,
multilateral Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea.
Coordinated and multinational FONOPs by America and its key allies hold the
promise of creating just enough pressure to force China to recalibrate
its posturing in disputed areas.
Giving China a diplomatic off-ramp to settle Law of the

Sea disputes over maritime claims preserves international
law failure crushes it
Cronin and Krejsa, 6-26 Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Director and
Harry Krejsa is Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security
(CNAS). How Will China React to the Gavel Coming Down in the South China
Sea? War on the Rocks diplomats, officers, NCOs, intelligence
professionals, and some of the most established scholars in the world
studying war, conflict, and international politics,
http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-will-china-react-to-the-gavel-comingdown-in-the-south-china-sea/ --br
Rising tensions in the South China Sea have cast a pall over many actors and
issues, but not international law. Indeed, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its mandatory dispute settlement
mechanisms are arguably at the zenith of their popularity. Some believe
that the U.S. Senate may soon finally ratify a treaty that has been adhered to
by both Democratic and Republican administrations. Perversely, the Obama
administrations focus on international law with the arbitration ruling likely
to be handed down shortly may be badly undercut depending on how
China reacts and behaves. Ideally, China would find in the ruling a
diplomatic off ramp to avoid a clash at sea and promote new joint
development of maritime resources. However, such a diplomatic tack
should not be assumed to be that probable. One hint is Chinas longadamant position that the panels ruling will be a legal nullity because of
Beijings alleged indisputable sovereignty over South China Sea land features.
Another less obvious clue is Chinas systematic attempt to use diplomacy and
economic inducements to enhance the malleability of each Southeast Asian
claimant state.
The plan is the perfect bargain to persuade China to

arbitrate maritime claims through LOST that locks in
multilateral cooperation and Arctic peace failing to push
full member status ensures inevitable proxy conflicts that
wreck stability
China and America share a common interest of freedom of navigation in the
Arctic. However, while China views Canada and Russia as an Arctic power, it
does not view the United States as an Arctic power. Perhaps Chinas attitude
stems from the lack of any serious U.S. Arctic strategy, its refusal to ratify
UNCLOS, and diminished U.S. operations in comparison to other Arctic
states.67 One option the new Arctic Council leadership should consider is
offering China full member status in return for China submitting its
controversial maritime claims in the South China Sea to UNCLOS arbitration.
This alternative would take close coordination not only between Arctic
member states but also littoral nations of the South China Sea. To date,
Chinas official messages concerning its interests in the Arctic have followed
twin themes of scientific research and environmental monitoring, with
undertones of natural resource allocation and the development of new trade
routes. China has shown support of the Arctic Council , as evidenced in its
pursuit of full membership status, and the underlying framework of UNCLOS
as it applies in the Arctic. At the same time, China has been unwilling to
consider UNCLOS as a forum for arbitration of maritime boundary disputes in
the South China Sea. Chinas signing of UNCLOS in 1996 was qualified by its
rejection of certain provisions in dispute resolution clauses.68 Offering full

member status on the Arctic Council in return for Chinas submission to
UNCLOS arbitration elsewhere on the planet may reveal Chinas true
ambitions. Both the South China Sea and the Arctic Ocean offer similar
potential natural resources (hydrocarbons and fisheries). The United States
may have an opportunity to collaborate with China on the Arctic Council
while working to shape its expanding influence in the Arctic. Chinas Twelfth
Five Year Plan calls for increased coordination and cooperation to include
forging bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation agreements as well as
active participation in international maritime forums.69 Acknowledging
Chinas great power status may encourage China to embrace a more
cooperative tone and transparent efforts in the Arctic . Even if not
offered full member status, China will likely continue to expand economic
partnerships with smaller Arctic countries such as Denmark and Iceland to
meet Chinas future natural resource demands. The Arctic Council, under U.S.
leadership, needs to monitor these relationships and prevent China from
becoming a quasi-Arctic state through its economic leverage over
Council member states. For example, China has forged a strong bilateral
relationship with Iceland, as evidenced by Chinas construction of the largest
embassy in Reykjavik. Iceland has permitted the Chinese National Offshore
Oil Corporation to develop projects on its continental shelf.70 Additionally,
Chinas only free trade agreement in Europe exists with Iceland.71 Iceland
has experienced significant problems with its economy since the 2008
banking collapse, and the opportunity to collaborate with a rising China is
seen as a financial lifeline.72 The chair and the members of the Arctic Council
must be alert to the character of votes cast by Iceland on Council issues. Do
they truly reflect Icelandic positions and are they in the best interest of the
Council? Or is China seeking to influence Council actions through its de facto
Arctic proxy? From 1951 through 2006, Iceland hosted U.S. forces at Keflavik
Naval Air Station until a U.S. military drawdown program closed the facility
and withdrew 1,300 American personnel from Iceland. 73 With no organic
military, the Icelandic government was upset since closing the base left the
island nation with no defense presence. 74 Iceland likely still resents this
abrupt move by fellow NATO member the United States. As their bilateral
relations with China strengthen, Iceland may offer China aircraft and naval
basing rights to support their regional interests. Chinas burgeoning influence
may potentially be a threat to this framework of Arctic cooperation and
the broader security of the region. China, therefore, should not be allowed to
create implicit proxy states through financial leverage or to exert undue
diplomatic influence on smaller, politically and economically weaker Arctic
states such as Iceland. The risk of an unchecked China in the Arctic
may lead to regional instability and a lack of trust and cooperation
among Arctic nations. It may cause a shift from the current state of liberalism
fostered through the Arctic Council to a realist view
High Arctic Stability is on the brink our impact is reverse

causal cooperation creates a paradigmatic governance
shift thats vital to preventing US-Russia war, warming
and disease
Heinenen, 16Lassi, Professor of Arctic Politics @ University of Lapland,
Finland. author of more than 200 scientific publications and is the editor of
The Arctic Yearbook. High Arctic Stability as an Asset for Storms of
International Politics, Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy,
Economic Security and Climate, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 4-8
http://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137468246 --br
More importantly, the international community is facing bigger and
unpredicted challenges and serious irrational violence than the exploding
Middle East, including the ISISs, other extreme groups and Israels state
terrorism, or the Ukrainian war including the warfare in Eastern Ukraine and
the annexation of Crimea by Russia: first, worldwide nonmilitary human
catastrophes, such as the Ebola virus as a zoonotic disease (Walsh and
Sifferlin, 2014); second, global environmental challenges, such as
unavoidable rapid climate change and global warming, such as loss of sea ice
and that of glaciers, and the consequent climate vs. capitalism conflict;
third, holistic environmental degradation accelerated by the Anthropocene
(see Finger in this volume), such as the Arctic Paradox (e.g., Palosaari,
2012); fourth, structural societal problems and challenges of the global
system, such as the faith of constant growth, poverty, growing greed, the
unsolved cumulative from fiscal, economic and political to moral crises of
the Western system, and the consequent inequality between the elites and
the masses with a possible irreversible collapse (Ahmed, 2014); and final,
according to rough calculations by the middle of August (2014) the
inhabitants of the globe had already used all the annual natural resources,
which should belong to us according to the criteria of sustainable
development. Going back to the current situation of regional conflicts and the
fight against international terror there is no direct connection between them
and the current situation in the Arctic region, at least not so far, but
reflections and indirect impacts. The Ukrainian crisis, and the war there, has
wrought tension between Russia and its Arctic neighbors casting a shadow
over Arctic affairs, particularly the Arctic intergovernmental cooperation, if
not outright putting them into danger. The first ever boycotting of Arctic
Council meetings is an example of this, though it was also influenced by the
disagreement of Canada and Russia over the North Pole (e.g., Heininen,
Exner-Pirot and Plouffe, 2014) Following this, there is a growing and
legitimate concern that due to this situation the current era of high political
stability of the Arctic may be lost (Heininen, 2014a). Also, the United
States, supported by other NATO member states, and the Russian Federation
have obviously become rivals, and there is a potential conflict of interests
between them: Russia is economically and (geo)politically, as well as partly
militarily, involved in the conflict. The United States is also (geo)politically
and economically involved in it, as are the other NATO member states
following (solidarity) Article V of the NATO. As a result, six of the eight Arctic
states Canada, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and the United States
(as NATO member states) and Russia are involved in the conflict in some
way or the other. Actually even the rest of the Arctic states Finland and
Sweden (the two non-NATO member states) are involved in the crisis
economically and politically due to the sanctions by the European Union.2
Interestingly, some years ago it was predicted by some journalists, politicians
and even scholars that in the Arctic a new Cold War is emerging, and that a
scramble for the Arctic has been started, for example, Cold War in the
Arctic in Times Online, in September 2009 and The Battle for the North Pole
by Der Spiegel, in September 2008. Furthermore, there were some cynical
comments that although the Arctic states may be talking on cooperation,
they are actually preparing for conflict (Huebert, 2010).3 The slogans of
emerging conflicts and a race on resources were media sexy, and much due
to the Russian expedition to the bottom of the North Pole in 2007 regulated
by the rules of UN Convention on a Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as the
competition (between Canada and Russia) to control the North Pole because
of globalization and its flows in the Arctic region (e.g., Globalization and the
Circumpolar North, 2010), the geostrategic importance of the Arctic in world
politics and the global economy is increasing (Heininen, 2005). Not
surprisingly there were different opinions on Arctic geopolitics: the first
discourse (e.g., Heininen, 2010) emphasized, and still emphasizes, the
achieved stability that there is no rearmament in the Arctic, and the Arctic
states have done only limited modernization (Wezeman, 2012); the second
discourse challenged this by predicting a scramble for the Arctic emerging
conflicts and a race of natural resources, as mentioned earlier. It was much
supported by international media as well as the hypothesis of a research
project, Geopolitics in the High North (2008), that security in a militarystrategic sense is about to experience a renaissance in the Arctic. All this
sounds like an academic dialogue or political debate, and thus is normal in
academia and politics, but can also be much misleading. We, who did not
admit something that was neither really happening nor we could see any
signs of, were however right (e.g., see Heininen, Sergunin and Yarovoy,
2014).4 Also, among the Arctic states, as well as among the Arctic Council
observer states, there was, and is partly still, a consensus that there are no
military conflicts in the Arctic region, not even emerging ones, but a high
stability based on multilateral both intergovernmental and interregional
cooperation. The Arctic states even started ad hoc military cooperation in the
context of climate change with a plan of annual meetings of the commanders
of the armies. Owing to the fact that the high stability and intensive
cooperation is human-made and an achievement by the eight Arctic states,
Northern indigenous peoples and several nonstate actors, the situation can
be changed. Therefore, a timely and relevant question is whether high
stability is in danger, or at least in a real test, first time since the end of the
Cold War due to the conflictual situation of international politics.
Theoretically, the answer is yes: all this could mean that instead of the
current low-military tension we might have growing political tension in the

Arctic, as Luszczuk speculates in his chapter. However, more relevant, and
definitely more interesting, question is why those prognoses and slogans of a
new Cold War and emerging conflicts in the Arctic were not, yet,
materialized. Furthermore, how the achieved high stability is so resilient. The
answer lies on the fact that the stable and friendly Arctic has been, and is, so
valuable for the Arctic region and its peoples, as well as for all the Arctic
states, including the two major powers of the region, and for the entire
Europe and Asia. The same attitude was, and despite some doubts is still,
seen in the postWorld War II Europe with the European Union as an outcome
and guarantor of hard-won peace after the two devastating World Wars. This
might sound pouring and is not media sexy, but this clearly shows the power
of immaterial values and human capital, such as peace. Furthermore, this
shows the power of soft methods, such as devolution and self-determination,
in politics and governance, as well as the increasing geostrategic importance
of the Arctic in world politics and the global economy. The broader and more
dark picture of the current state of the world gives one more reason to value
the high stability of the Arctic region, that the Arctic is not isolated but keenly
a part of the globe and is heavily impacted by globalization and its
multifunctional effects; furthermore, that the globalized Arctic has its global
implications and drivers that affect both the region and the rest of the
globe, as it is described in the GlobalArctic project (www.globalarctic.org).
Recent industrial developments, such as aggressively expanding exploitation
of minerals and (off-shore) hydrocarbon resources due to increasing resource
demand, on the one hand, bring new and more dangerous environmental
and societal risks to the Arctic and its people(s) they have already created
the Arctic Paradox and on the other hand, have feedbacks related to global
energy and natural resource systems. From this we can conclude that on the
other hand, the Antropocene is already at play in the Arctic, as Finger
discusses in his chapter, and on the other hand, what happens in the Arctic
matters on a global scale. To conclude, the Arctic region with its high political
stability, as well as military structures based on the nuclear weapon systems
of Russia and the United States, and with a keen international (mostly
multilateral) cooperation, much initiated and supported by nonstate actors,
could be interpreted to be positively exceptional and left out of regional
crises and wars and political and military tension. Here the Arctic and
international Arctic cooperation would be and become a joint valuable,
human-made asset between the eight Arctic states, as the International
Space Station (ISS) acts for Russia and the United States and their space
cooperation. Furthermore, here the Arctic / international Arctic cooperation
would be a reserve for the future, the moment, when it is, again, needed
to calm down and to press reset. The situation might come sooner than
later, when the world, including Russia and the United States, is facing
even more serious regional and irrational warfare than the threat by ISIS
and the exposing middle East, that is, real big worldwide challenges and
threats, such as immediate impacts of rapid climate change and the
Anthropocene. In this kind of situation, the Arctic would act as a test
ground and a workshop to examine and test soft ways of governance

and brainstorm an alternative way to definite security by causing a
paradigm shift (see Heininen in this volume). Here the two discourses are
far too much state-centric. A more interesting feature of Arctic security is the
coexistence of several concepts of security and its transformation from
traditional and state-controlled security to human security with an emphasis
on the environment, or economic development/security, and that they are
closely related to each other making Arctic security a special kind of
phenomenon to influence the region and its geopolitics. With regard to the
future securities of the global Arctic there are challenges, which go beyond
state sovereignty and nationalistic security thinking.
Expert consensus that warming is real and existential

Treich and Rheinberger, 15Christoph Rheinberger (Professor of
Health Policy and Management @ Harvard) and Nicolas Treich (Professor at
the Toulouse School of Economics). Citing Weitzman (economist @ Harvard)
and Bostrom (prof @ Oxford). On the economics of the end of the world as
we know it, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/07/climate-change -- br
CLIMATE change puts humanity at risk. The Popes celebrated encyclical
letter on the subject released last month emphasised this risk for our
common home, arguing that doomsday predictions can no longer be met
with irony or disdain. But apocalyptic predictions are often made by religious
groups. So, how serious is this claim? Perhaps for the first time in history,
there seems to be a broad consensus among scientists. They claim that our
planet might face a frightening future if we cannot agree to take decisive
actions here and now. Changes to how seawater circulates in the Atlantic,
the melting of glaciers on Greenland and in the Antarctic, and rising sea
levels might all result from inaction. Accounting for these catastrophic
scenarios is a huge challenge for scientists and economists alike. So, what
should we do in the face of existential risks? One, perhaps extreme, view is
that the mere possibility of massive human extinction should inspire us to do
everything we can to avoid it. The counterargument goes that we face
several other existential risks and focusing on one may be shortsighted. In his
fascinating book Catastrophe: Risk and Response, published in 2004,
Richard Posner argues that we do not do enough to hedge against
catastrophic risks such as climate change, asteroid impacts or bioterrorism. In
light of the competition of existential risks, how much should humanity
invest in the mitigation of climate change? Conventional wisdom holds that
we should limit global warming to 2C. To justify this target, economists seek
to compare the cost of reducing current emissions with its benefits. Indeed,
there is a trade-off: investing more resources today in climate-change
prevention leaves less to combat other immediate risks. Interestingly, the
Popes letter recognises that decisions must be made based on a
comparison of the risks and benefits foreseen for the various possible
alternatives. However, estimating these benefits means that we need to
determine the value of a reduction in preventing a possible future

catastrophic risk. This is a thorny task. Martin Weitzman, an economist at
Harvard University, argues that the expected loss to society because of
catastrophic climate change is so large that it cannot be reliably
estimated. A cost-benefit analysiseconomists standard tool for assessing
policiescannot be applied here as reducing an infinite loss is infinitely
profitable. Other economists, including Kenneth Arrow of Stanford University
and William Nordhaus of Yale University, have examined the technical limits
of Mr Weitzmans argument. As the interpretation of infinity in economic
climate models is essentially a debate about how to deal with the threat of
extinction, Mr Weitzmans argument depends heavily on a judgement about
the value of life. Economists estimate this value based on peoples personal
choices: we purchase bicycle helmets, pay more for a safer car, and receive
compensation for risky occupations. The observed trade-offs between safety
and money tell us about societys willingness to pay for a reduction in
mortality risk. Hundreds of studies indicate that people in developed
countries are collectively willing to pay a few million dollars to avoid an
additional statistical death. For example, Americas Environmental Protection
Agency recommends using a value of around $8m per fatality avoided.
Similar values are used to evaluate vaccination programmes and prevention
of traffic accidents or airborne diseases. Mr Posner multiplies the value of life
by an estimate of Earths future population and obtains an illustrative figure
of $336m billion as the cost of human extinction. Nick Bostrom, a philosopher
at Oxford University, argues that this approach ignores the value of life of
unborn generations and that the tentative figure should be much larger
perhaps infinitely so. The value of life as a concept is a natural candidate
for a tentative estimation of the benefit of reducing extinction risk. Yet the
approach seems somewhat awkward in this context. The extinction risk here
is completely different from the individual risk we face in our everyday lives.
Human extinction is a risk we all shareand it would be an unprecedented
event that can happen only once. A lack of reliable data exacerbates the
profound methodological and philosophical difficulties faced by climate
change economists. Extinction is a threat to future generations, while
evaluating and designing prevention policies is an urgent challenge today.
The United Nations conference in Paris this December offers a chance to take
appropriate steps to protect future generations from this risk. Many
economists do not believe in the current pledge-and-review mechanism, and
favour the implementation of a generalised carbon-trading system instead.
While the Pope dismisses that solution out of hand, his attacks on
technological innovation and capitalism, however, may not be very effective
in overcoming the current inertia that climate negotiations suffer from.
US-Russia nuclear war would end all life on Earth in half

an hour
Postol 16 (Theodore, former advisor to the U.S. Chief of Naval operations,
professor of technology and international security at MIT, nuclear expert,
interview with Sophie Shevardnadze, RT.com, 3/14/16,

https://www.rt.com/shows/sophieco/324941-nuclear-cold-war-us/)//ml
Sophie Shevardnadze: Dr. Theodore Postol, former advisor to the U.S. Chief of
Naval Operations, a professor at MIT, nuclear technology expert, welcome to
the show, its great to have you with us so, Ted, President Obama came into
the White House calling for Global Zero now, there are plans to spend a
trillion dollars on an overall of entire nuclear arsenal. Why is this happening?
Dr. Theodore Postol: I think this is a consequence of the domestic politics. You
can never understand the foreign policy of a country without understanding
its domestic situation, and in this case, the domestic politics has caused Mr.
Obama to decide frankly, I think, incorrectly that he has to modernize the
U.S. arsenal in order to avoid being criticized for not being concerned about
the defence of the country. SS: Now, do you believe the U.S. is readying its
nuclear forces for direct confrontation with Russia? Do you think nuclear war
is possible now? At any scenario, do you see that? Dr.TP: I do think that an
accidental nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia is possible. I dont know
how likely it is anyone who says they know how likely it is, has no idea what
theyre talking about, so But, I think any possibility is too high, and in
that sense, I do think we are in danger. I think the current political
confrontation between Russia and the West and, particularly, the U.S. is
potentially dangerous too. Both sides are very aware of the catastrophic
consequence of nuclear weapons being used by one or the other, so I think
both will be very cautious but I think the danger does exist, yes. SS: But,
nuclear weapons have worked as a deterrent against war with the risks, like
you say, way too high for all sides involved. Has the mutually assured
destruction doctrine being forgotten? Has the defenition been changed,
maybe? Dr.TP: No, I dont think the definition has changed, and certainly, the
reality has not changed, and I think, an understanding of the reality is very
important if youre not going to make a mistake that leads to nuclear use on
either side. I believe, from what Ive seen on both sides, that the concern
about the potential for the complete destruction of each country and the
world is still very high. The problem is that as long as forces are on alert, at a
high level, theres always the possibility of a series of unexpected accidents
that could lead to nuclear exchange, and I think, thats the real danger. SS:
What happens, hypothetically, if there is a nuclear war? Will a doctrine like a
mutual destruction doctrine ever work again? Dr.TP: I think, anybody who is
rational and understands pretty much, in a dim way, the consequences of
nuclear weapons, would not rationally use nuclear weapons. The problem is
that if you have a crisis situation when one or both sides have no
understanding of what is actually happening on the other side, and people
are exhausted because it was going on over time, and somebody makes a
bad decision with incomplete information, which is almost certainly what
happens in the real world information is never complete you could have a
massive use of nuclear weapons, and that, of course, would end civilization
as we know it and might, although we cant be sure, but might actually end
human life on the planet. SS: You know, youve mentioned earlier that the
nuclear war as it is, is unlikely, but theres always a threat of an accident. And
Ive spoken to many political leaders, newsmakers like Noam Chomsky,
Mikhail Gorbachev, and they also agree that nuclear war is something
nobodys willing to risk right now, but there is a danger of an accident
involving nuclear weapons. What kind of accident can occur? Dr.TP: I can give
you a concrete example, and then expand on it. In 1955 there was, whats
called a sounding rocket launched off an island that is on off the NW coast
of Norway. Now, this sounding rocket was different from other sounding
rockets that had been launched at that time. It went to much higher
altitudes than had previously occurred, and it passed through the radar
search-fan of an early warning radar at Olenegorsk in Russia, and set off an
alarm that led to Yeltsin at that time being brought into the command loop.
Now, I do not believe that Russia or the Russian military forces were put on
high alert or would have done anything that could have led to an accident at
that time, but if you had an accident like this which occurred for example,
during the crisis between Russia and the U.S., where both sides had been at
loggerheads for quite a while and both sides were exhausted, very concerned
about military action happening it could have led to an alert and possibly
even a launch of Russian or U.S. forces. So, theres a concrete situation where
an accident that really, must be looked at as benign, given the circumstance
under which it occurred, could have been fatal under different circumstances.
Now, the likelihood of something like that happening is low, because you
need this accident to occur at the time of extreme crisis and you need the
overlap, but the consequences, of course, would be horrendous. SS: Now,
Ted, tell me something. Explain to an amateur, to me, how does one launch a
nuclear weapon? Is it as easy as pressing a button? How long does it take for
a nuclear missile to reach its target? Dr.TP: Well, typically what the U.S. and
Russia have are several kinds of what are called ballistic missiles they, in
the case of both Russia and the U.S. we have land-based ballistic missiles
which are in fortified underground missile silos, so they are protected to some
extent from nuclear attack, or on submarines, in the holds of submarines. The
ballistic missile could be fired, basically, within 50 or 60 seconds, more or
less, after alert being given to the operators. The warning could take
minutes to occur - that is, the Russian government or the American
government, could believe that an attack is underway, they could access the
situation, and then, collect information and then make a decision whether or
not to launch. That could take 10 or 15 minutes. In the case of actually
launching a rocket, that would take 40-60 seconds, more or less, depending
on procedures which are easily changed. The rocket will then ignite, it would
fly out of its silo or its launch hall in the submarine, it would typically undergo
powered flight for about between 150 and 300 seconds, depending on
whether or not the rocket is whats called a solid-propellant or liquid
propellant, so in one case 5 minutes, in other cause, maybe, 2.5 minutes
and then it would release warheads. The warheads would float in the near
vacuum of space under the influence of gravity and momentum, and in about
20-28 minutes would arrive at their targets, re-enter the atmosphere and
explode. So the world could be, basically, finished off in anywhere
from half hour to an hour upon the arrival of these warheads. People
who think about these things generally expect nobody really knows what to
expect but if you have a massive exchange, most nuclear warheads would
be delivered in a very short time, probably within half hour or an hour
interval. SS: Now, the bombs that Russia and the U.S. have in their arsenal
right now they are 100 times more powerful than the ones that were used in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How devastating would be the aftermath of the
nuclear explosion be today? Dr.TP: They are more than 100 times more
powerful. Typical warhead from a Russian missile like what we call the SS-18,
the one of these warheads this rocket can carry up to 10 warheads one of
these warheads, detonated over New York city, for example one! would
essentially destroy all of Manhattan, most of Staten Island, probably all of it,
basically. Large parts of New Jersey to the west. basically, the borough of
Brooklyn and most of Queens and the Bronx out to a range range of, maybe,
anywhere from, Id say, 10 kilometers range from the central area where it
exploded. If you had a similar warhead from the U.S. over Moscow, it would
destroy, again, most of the city. It would, again, destroy a 150 square
kilometers of the city easily and thats only one warhead. There would be
many warheads targeted on each of these great cities by the other side.
Diseases can cause extinction without killing the host

Arturo Casadevall 12, M.D., Ph.D. in Biochemistry from New York
University, Leo and Julia Forchheimer Professor and Chair of the Department
of Microbiology and Immunology at Albert Einstein College of Medicine,
former editor of the ASM journal Infection and Immunity, The future of
biological warfare, Microbial Biotechnology Volume 5, Issue 5, pages 584
587, September 2012, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.17517915.2012.00340.x/full
In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it
is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer
can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale
thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid
impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate
change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the
first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the
second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts
with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from
microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability
of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although
infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this
view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was
responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et
al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious
diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that
many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the
host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not
apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and
have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For
those types of hostmicrobe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill
off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would
return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the
viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially
pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic
microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al.,
2001; Taylor et al., 2001), especially if some of these species acquired the
capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or
bioengineering.
Independently, successful management of proxy conflicts

through regional multilateral institutions prevents
existential threats
Herd 10 Graeme P., Head of the International Security Programme, CoDirector of the International Training Course in Security Policy, Geneva Centre
for Security Policy, 2010, Great Powers: Towards a cooperative competitive
future world order paradigm?, in Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the
21st Century, p. 197-198
Given the absence of immediate hegemonic challengers to the US (or a
global strategic catastrophe that could trigger US precipitous decline), and
the need to cooperate to address pressing strategic threats - the real
question is what will be the nature of relations between these Great Powers?
Will global order be characterized as a predictable interdependent one-world
system, in which shared strategic threats create interest-based incentives
and functional benefits which drive cooperation between Great Powers? This
pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda
based on nascent similarity across national policy agendas. In addition.
Great Powers would seek to cooperate by strengthening multilateral
partnerships in institutions (such as the UN, G20 and regional variants),
regimes (e.g., arms control, climate and trade), and shared global norms,
including international law. Alternatively, Great Powers may rely less on
institutions, regimes and shared norms, and more on increasing their orderproducing managerial role through geopolitical-bloc formation within their
near neighborhoods. Under such circumstances, a re-division of the world into
a competing mercantilist nineteenth-century regional order emerges 17 World
order would be characterized more by hierarchy and balance of power and
zero-sum principles than by interdependence. Relative power shifts that allow
a return to multipolarity - with three or more evenly matched powers - occur
gradually. The transition from a bipolar in the Cold War to a unipolar moment
in the post-Cold War has been crowned, according to Haass, by an era of nonpolarity, where power is diffuse "a world dominated not by one or two or
even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising
various kinds of power"18 Multilateralism is on the rise, characterized by a
combination of stales and international organizations, both influential and
talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of

global governance has evolved. An embryonic division of labor emerges, as
groups with no formal rules or permanent structures coordinate policies and
immediate reactions to crises, while formal treaty-based institutions then
legitimize the results.'9 As powerfully advocated by Wolfgang Schauble:
Global cooperation is the only way to master the new, asymmetric global
challenges of the twenty-first century. No nation can manage these tasks on
its own, nor can the entire international community do so without the help of
non-state, civil society actors. We must work together to find appropriate
security policy responses to the realities of the twenty-first century.20
Highlighting the emergence of what he terms an "interpolar" world - defined
as "multipolarity in an age of interdependence" Grevi suggests that
managing existential interdependence in an unstable multipolar world is
the key.21 Such complex interdependence generates shared interest in
cooperative solutions, meanwhile driving convergence, consensus and
accommodation between Great Powers.22 As a result, the multilateral system
is being adjusted to reflect the realities of a global age - the rise of emerging
powers and relative decline of the West: "The new priority is to maintain a
complex balance between multiple states."23 The G20 meeting in London in
April 2009 suggested that great and rising powers will reform global financial
architecture so that it regulates and supervises global markets in a more
participative, transparent and responsive manner: all countries have
contributed to the crisis; all will be involved in the solution.24
1acSouth China Sea

Advantage Two is South China Sea
South China Sea tensions are rising and will escalate the
affs QPQ to abide by the Law of the Sea is try or die
Welch, 6-24David, Chair of global security and professor of political
science @ University of Waterloo and Senior Fellow @ Centre for International
Governance Innovation. China's Curious South China Sea Negotiation Policy;
What would China expect to achieve with bilateral negotiations on maritime
disputes? The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/chinas-curioussouth-china-sea-negotiation-policy/ --br
There has been a great deal of commentary recently on Beijings strident
refusal to participate in the Philippines arbitration case and the almost
desperate vehemence with which it is preparing to greet the tribunals final
judgment. This is not terribly surprising, as most analysts agree that the
Philippines will win on a number of crucial points, undercutting some, if not
all, of Chinas maritime claims. However, there has been surprisingly little
analysis of Beijings preferred alternative to adjudicated dispute resolution:
namely, bilateral negotiations. How might we understand this? What does it
tell us about Chinas wants, needs, or fears? What does it say about Chinese
leaders view of the world? The bilateral negotiation option is particularly
puzzling in view of Chinas profession that it has had indisputable
sovereignty in the South China Sea since ancient times. One doesnt make
arguments about history at a negotiating table: one makes offers.
Negotiation is the art of finding a quid pro quo , not winning a debate.
And if Chinese sovereignty is indisputable, what is there to negotiate about?
Is Beijing willing to give some up? If, as most analysts believe, the regime is
as petrified of rising nationalist sentiment as it appears to be (this seems,
after all, to be one of the main reasons that Beijing has been trying to
undermine the Philippines arbitration case), then how could it possibly cede
ground at a negotiating table without triggering a domestic backlash? The
cynical interpretation is that China wants to negotiate bilaterally so that it
can bully others into submission. But it would be strange indeed if Beijing
really thought that Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, or Brunei would be
willing to sit down at a negotiating table merely to accept surrender terms.
Presumably, Beijing thinks there must be a contract zone of some kind. What
might that be? One possibility is that Beijing is willing to resolve the
lingering ambiguity of its South China Sea claims in order to settle
disputes. The concession here, presumably, would be clarity. Beijing might
say, for instanceas Taiwan has saidthat the so-called nine-dash line is
only meant to encompass the islands over which China claims sovereignty,
not the body of water over which it claims maritime jurisdiction. That, China
might say, would be governed by UNCLOS rules. The upside of this
concession for rival claimants would be that it would pave the way for an
orderly demarcation of territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and
continental shelf rights. The downside for rival claimants would be that unless
China were actually willing to concede sovereignty over some of the Spratly,
Paracel, or Pratas islands to others, the gain in clarity would largely be
meaningless. China would still be asserting maritime jurisdiction over most of
the South China Sea. Moreover, a great irony of this scenario is that the
Philippines arbitration tribunal, whose legitimacy China has so hotly rejected,
will certainly clarify a number of the provisions of UNCLOS, on the basis of
which those maritime entitlements would be determined. If this is Chinas
default bargaining position, it would appear to be dead on arrival. More likely,
Beijing may think that rival claimants may be willing to yield on symbols in
return for material gains. A strong indication that this may be so is that
Beijing has regularly held out the prospect of joint development of natural
resources in the South China Sea. Conceivably, Beijing may think that rival
claimants would be willing to acknowledge Chinas sovereignty over disputed
islands in return for access to fishing grounds and the prospect of oil and gas
riches. Certainly this would be an attractive outcome for Chinas leaders, as
they would be able to represent it domestically as standing ground on the
core interest of sovereignty while at the same time demonstrating paternal
benevolence toward Chinas smaller and weaker neighbors. If this is the hand
Beijing is prepared to play, it would tell us at least three interesting and
important things: first, that for China the South China Sea dispute is
fundamentally about symbols, respect, and prestige; second, that Chinese
leaders do not believe that rival claimants similarly care about symbols,
respect, and prestige; and third, that Chinese leaders believe that rival
claimants think they can trust China to share in the South China Seas
resource bounty equitably and reliably. The first of these is eminently
plausible. But the latter two are not. People in general tend to care about
symbols, respect, and prestige, and it would betray a nave view of human
psychology to think that Chinese do and others do not. Quite apart from the
fact that Chinas neighbors have feared, resented, and often resisted its
paternal benevolence for thousands of years, Chinas recent behavior has
gravely damaged its reputation for trustworthinessnot only in the South
China Sea, but also, for example, in Hong Kong. If Chinese leaders think there
is a contract zone here, they lack the empathy required to see that this is
wishful thinking. At the end of the day, Beijing faces a stark choice if it truly
wishes to settle disputes in the South China Sea: it can either put its
confidence in its claims to the test in appropriate judicial fora, or it can offer
rival claimants genuinely attractive terms, which would almost certainly
require territorial concessions. At present, both seem highly unlikely.
Meanwhile, tensions continue to rise. Fasten your seatbelts.
War is increasingly likely quick diplomatic dialogue is

key
Coonan, 7-9-16Chris, citing Jerome A Cohen, director of the US-Asia Law
Institute at New York University, Armed conflict threat as regional rivals await
South China Sea ruling, http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-
pacific/armed-conflict-threat-as-regional-rivals-await-south-china-sea-ruling1.2715377 --br
Days before an international arbitration court rules on the disputed territory
in the South China Sea, the threat of armed conflict hangs over the Asia
Pacific. Beijing has stepped up sovereignty claims and is accusing the US of
trying to isolate China. Although US president Barack Obamas plan to build
an Asian Pivot is on the back burner, the US has been steadily expanding its
influence, publicly voicing its disapproval of what it sees as Chinas
militarisation of the South China Sea. It has sent aircraft carriers to the area
and is staging military exercises with allies. Annoyed major players China
believes Washington is trying to become more powerful in the Asia Pacific
region at Chinas expense, but Beijing is finding it difficult to find sympathy
locally, as it has annoyed nearly all the main regional players including the
Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, with its claims and
aggressive activities in the maritime region. One of these is a land
reclamation programme in the Spratly archipelago. Chinas sovereignty
claims are based on the nine-dash line which encompasses nearly all of the
South China Sea, including the Spratlys, the Paracels and remote sandbars.
The Philippines has asked the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to
affirm its right to areas within 200 nautical miles of its coastline, under the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
While the nine-dash claim will most likely be ruled inconsistent with the UN
convention, China is expected to ignore the ruling. Foreign ministry
spokesman Hong Lei said China exerted indisputable sovereignty over the
South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters. The Chinese government
holds a consistent and clear position of not accepting nor recognising any
ruling made by the arbitral tribunal set up at the unilateral request of the
Philippines, said Hong. An article in the Communist Partys organ Qiushi
described the arbitration as a political farce under legal pretexts aiming to
fake a new reality which provokes both principles of international law and
order. Control of the region is strategically important, because 4.5 trillion in
maritime trade passes through it every year, and the South China Sea
contains rich oil and gas reserves. Satellite footage shows China has installed
runways that can carry military aircraft and placed surface-to-air missiles on
Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. Yu Lingli, a commentator on US-China
relations, said. With its strong economic growth and greater economic
prowess, China is better able to protect its boundaries, so the US now
accuses China of changing its position and challenging the world order. But
lets not forget, this all started with the US decision to expand its strategic
position in the Asia Pacific region. The US shouldnt be involved, said Yu.
Beijing is staging military manoeuvres in the region ahead of the ruling and
state media are full of editorials attacking the US and denying accusations it
is trying to bully its smaller neighbours. In one show, Beyond the Waves, the
state broadcaster CCTV accused the US of trying to isolate China. The US
has spared no effort to drive a wedge between China and its neighbours,
said one commentator, while another said: Would you accept a traffic court
giving a verdict on the status of your property? Another presenter said:

When you claim your every right to the South China Sea, you go too far.
The state newspaper Global Times even urged the military to prepare for
confrontation. I personally dont think there will be an armed conflict. So
far, the US and surrounding countries in the South China Sea are putting on a
lot of pressure and competing for public opinion and support, said Yu.
Historical claim Chinas claim has no formal basis outside the countrys own
maritime laws, but the government claims a historical foundation, saying
China was the first country to discover and name the island group, and has a
history of continuous use and authority over 2,000 years. After the ruling, the
big question will be how China proceeds. If China ignores the ruling, and
flouts international law, it could further aggravate nerves in the region and
eventually armed conflict could result. Some believe there can still be
dialogue that will not involve Beijing giving ground on an issue it has made
central to its ambition to boost its standing in the area by matching its
economic strength with strategic influence. China and the Philippines, after
the arbitration decision, can renew their negotiations and settle the issues by
taking account of the decision without formally mentioning it. Face is crucial,
of course. But with every Beijing propaganda blast, it will become
harder to save, wrote Jerome A Cohen, director of the US-Asia Law Institute
at New York University.
The SCS is the worlds most dangerous hotspot regional

multilateral norms are try or die
Gewirtz, 16 Paul, Director @ Yale Law Schools China Center. Law
Professor with a speciality in Chinese law, and American foreign policy,
Online: Limits of Law in the South China Sea, The Brookings Institution:
Center For East Asia Policy Studies, May 8,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/05/09-limits-oflaw-south-china-sea/limits-of-law-in-the-south-china-sea.pdf --AWW
The vast South China Sea has become one of the worlds most dangerous
hotspots. Through words and deeds, six claimants including China contend
for control over numerous small land features and resource-rich waters, with
the United States also heavily involved because of alliances and our own
security and economic interests. The great geo-political question of our
age, whether the United States as the established dominant superpower can
co-exist with a re-emerging powerful China, sits on the seas horizon like a
huge and taunting Cheshire Cat. Most of the contending countries have been
aggressive in recent years, but China has been especially bold in staking out
very broad claims to sovereignty and related rights to land features and
waters in the South China Sea. It has also been bold in undertaking land
reclamations that build on land features, turning claims into physical
structures and threatening further militarization. Its rapidly developing
naval presence and capability have raised added concerns among Chinas
weaker neighbors as well as the United States, whose military presence has
greatly contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific for decades. The
risk of accidents or small conflicts leading to dangerous escalations

is constant. There is not yet a path ahead for resolving the many
disputes and controlling the serious risks they pose, but the United States
has articulated an approach. We have stated that we do not take a position
on the competing sovereignty claims but we have called for a law-based and
rules-based resolution of the competing claims. As President Obama has
recently said, the United States is committed to a regional order where
international rules and normsand the rights of all nations, large and
smallare upheld.
All hell will break loose several scenarios for escalation

A.D.I.Z., miscalc, nationalism and security traps
Harrison, 7-8-16interviewing Dr. Peter Navarro, Professor of Economics
and Public Policy @ UC-Irvine, PhD @ Harvard University. Also speaking with
James Bradley, author of the The China Mirage and Flags of Our Fathers.
Harrison is Host of Level Talk with John Harrison, How Likely is War Between
China and the US?
http://sputniknews.com/radio_level_talk/20160708/1042653245/us-china-warpossibility.html --br
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague will deliver its decision on
the standoff between China and the Philippines on July 12. If China is found to
be at fault, all hell might break loose according to one of our guests
Peter Navarro, an American Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the
Paul Merage School of Business. Our second guest, James Bradley, author of
an important book about American involvement in Asia called the China
Mirage, argues that Chinas expansionism is nothing compared to American
militarisation and catastrophic past adventures into S.E. Asia, such as the
Vietnamese war which killed 3-4 million people. James Bradley starts the
programme with a brief historical sketch. It is a highly emotional issue
between the two countries that share the Pacific sea lanes. China is saying
that this is their sovereign territory. Thats very emotional for the Chinese
after centuries of humiliation by the West which encroached on Chinese
territory. For the United States, the highly emotional word is freedom in this
case freedom of navigation. Fear of China is a traditional fear going back to
George Washington. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump dont agree about
much, but they agree about Big Bad China. Fear of China was the beginning
of McCarthyism. When I was a kid, fear of China was expressed in terms of
the domino theory. Vietnam was about China taking Vietnam and then all of
Asia. Professor Navarro countered James Bradleys point by asserting that
China has actually been Big Bad China. After the Korean War, we had tens
of thousands of Americans killed there, Then in Vietnam, I think it is
important to note that it was the Chinese gunners in Hanoi that shot down
over 2000 planes. I think it is incorrect to say that there is potential war
between the United States and China coming up. Vietnam is afraid of China,
and is being bullied by China. China has become very aggressive against the
Philippines and Singapore, and has very few allies in the region. China is
seizing islands by force, and building military garrisons on them, which is

provocative not only to the United States but to its neighbours. The 1980s
Law of the Sea Treaty dictates that even a small rock in the sea can have a
200 miles economic zones around them, which includes all of the oil and fish
within those area. What China has been trying to do is take as many of those
rocks as possible. But Chinas trade depends on sea routes which can be
easily blocked by Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, so China
surely needs to protect its sea lanes? James agreed and commented: just
imagine waking up tomorrow and China is shaking hands with the leaders of
Mexico, and said we are just going to construct a billion dollar air base here
so we can easily bomb LA and other cities. Next, the Chinese put in a base in
Nova Scotia, and weve got Chinese ships off the coast of New York and
Washington, we would go absolutely ballistic. We almost had a Third World
War when the Russians put some assets in Cuba. Were getting involved in
something 6,000 miles away from our shores . Gallup recently did an
international poll and asked 64,000 people which country is the greatest
threat to world peace. China was at 4%, the United States at 24%. Professor
Navarro replied to this by saying that China is not just protecting its trade
routes, it is using its muscle to expand its territory. To the question what will
happen next, Navarro said that ASEAN countries want to settle this dispute
within a multilateral framework, but China wants to work on a bilateral level.
I hope that China will not react in an aggressive manner to the ruling which
will be made on July 12th. For example, if China imposes an air identification
zone over the South China Sea, that will inflate the conflict. If it doesnt,
and China accepts the ruling of the International Court, then life is good. If it
doesnt, then the United States might well send warships, and for whatever
reason, ships bump in the night, unfortunately this has happened about 5
times since 1991. Shots are fired and then we are in a crisis. Scenario 2
would include a Philippine coastal vehicle which is attacked by a flotilla of
Chinese vessels, and the US is called in to help out. Professor Navarro thinks
that there will be conflict but is not sure whether it will become a hot war.
James Bradley did not predict whether there will be war or not, but hopes that
there will not, and restated that it is the American concept of freedom,
freedom of navigation, which really resonates strongly in the United States,
whereas for China this is about their sovereign territory. James made the
point that it is strange to talk about international law when we are droning
people in 8 different countries illegally right now. Was the United States
following international law when it invaded Iraq?
South China Sea conflict goes nuclear and is existential

it also crushes cooperation on other existential threats
Kuo, 7-10Mercy Kuo interviewing Kaiser Kuo founder of Sinica Podcast,
director of international communications @ Baidu (Chinese Google) and
columnist at The Beijinger. Part of a series where M. Kuo engages with
subject-matter experts, policy practitioners and strategic thinkers across the
globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. rebalance to Asia. New Potus
Brief: Getting US-China Relations Right, The Diplomat, -us-china-relationsright/ --br

The simple answer is that these are two frightfully well-armed nuclear
powers, and the cost of actual conflagration is absolutely staggering, just
unthinkable. Likely trouble spots are few right now really, only the South
and East China Seas but in the next four or eight years that number may
well grow. The possibility of a severe economic dislocation in China raises the
specter of political instability, which might have disastrous consequences
that would be felt globally. The next U.S. president will need to make
U.S.China relations a real priority and get it right so that we have some
hope of tackling, together, the very biggest issues facing this planet,
not least of which is anthropogenic global warming. Without the worlds two
largest greenhouse gas emitters working together, I truly fear the worst .
China says yeseven thought they wont abide now they

have every incentive to make a deal
Rosen, 6-21Mark, Prof @ George Washington University School of Law,
After the South China Sea Arbitration; Where do we go after the panel has
spoken? The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/after-the-southchina-sea-arbitration/ --br
What Next? James Kraska and other Western trained international lawyers are
confident that that the Philippines will prevail on most questions. But, the
question of what next from a legal perspective is much more elusive: Now
that you have a judgment, what do you do to enforce the judgment? Theres
no car or house to repossess. The political answer to this question seems
straightforward in the short term: China has no choice but to claim that an
adverse decision has no legal effect on them. They staked-out a legal and
political position that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction and they are unlikely to
publicly change that position. Other states in the region and those committed
to UNCLOS, will rightfully sound alarm bells that Chinas actions are
destabilizing both in terms of Chinas relations with its smaller neighbors and
in terms of the continuing viability of UNCLOS. For states that have tied their
future to UNCLOS, it makes sense for them to increase the costs to China for
engaging in legal revisionism since this particular case goes to the heart of
what UNCLOS all about. Put another way, many maritime states outside of
the region will not be comfortable with China being able to cherry pick the
benefits of UNCLOS while evading its responsibilities as a member of the
UNCLOS community. Being a member of UNCLOS entitles members to have
memberships in: (1) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS);
(2) the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and (3) to lodge petitions for the
Commissions on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). China has availed
itself of those benefits and it would make sense for the tribunal, as a method
of enforcing its decision, or a state party, to institute an action to deprive the
PRC of the benefits of belonging to these entities. Specifically, there might be
an action to recall Chinas judge on ITLOS. The tribunal, or a state party could
seek to block the CLCS from any further proceedings involving the rights of
China in the current matter which are they deliberating vis--vis Japan and
South Korea concerning seabed areas in the vicinity of the Okinawa Trough in
the East China Sea. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, China has at least
two deep seabed mining applications which are pending with the ISA for
prospecting sites in the Indian Ocean. It would be appropriate for a state (or
the Tribunal) to argue to the ISBA that China should not be able to continue to
pursue those claims (or serve on bodies that are writing the regulations for
deep seabed mining) given their refusal to honor the decision of the arbitral
tribunal in the Philippine matter. The precise path to hold China accountable
with UNCLOS institutions or compel China to cease reclamation or occupation
via a court order is not clear. But most courts will declare that they possess
ancillary jurisdiction to issue the orders necessary to give effect to their
decisions and are binding upon states under UNCLOS 296. UNCLOS Article
290 has a provision entitled provisional measures, which is vaguely similar
to the contempt power of U.S. courts. In any event, the creative Philippine
legal team could seek provisional injunctive actions against China in the
above areas. Or, if the path of enforcement using the tribunal is unclear, the
Philippines could petition the International Court of Justice for an order
enforcing the tribunals decision since China cannot veto such a petition and
the order would be legally binding upon China. The 1976 ASEAN Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation has mandatory dispute provisions that possibly could
be used to enforce the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal. (This is an interesting
idea since China cited the ASEAN Treaty, among others, as a reason why the
arbitral panel should not enter the case. ) Lastly, the Philippines, as a
member of ITLOS, ISBA, and CLCS, could, as suggested above, simply petition
that Chinas access to these bodies be suspended so long as they are in
contempt of the arbitration decision. Students in the field of lawfare (in
which China is quite expert and heavily invested) argue that quiet retaliation
in the commercial law and trade field might be more effective than public
legal action since it would create friction within China between its political
leaders and its business leaders. Lawfare tactics used in the past include the
threatened cancellation of a Russian cargo ships insurance, which resulted in
that ship not transporting a cargo of arms to Syria in 2012. There were also
lawsuits targeting banks in the Middle East to exact large financial awards (in
court) against institutions that had previously held the deposits of
international terrorists. Variations on these tactics might include increased
inspections (and delays) associated with the entry of Chinese flag merchant
vessels in the ports of certain countries, the non-recognition of its merchant
ships insurance or inspection certificates, or the non-renewal of Chinese
licenses to fish in the EEZs of other countries. Obviously, pursuit of these
legal harassment measures could backfire and rob the Philippines of the
moral high ground it has occupied by pursuing its grievances against China
using legal means. Before the Philippines pursues any of the listed
provocative actions versus the PRC, it would be wise for it to press for the
commencement of bilateral negotiations with China on access to the waters
around Scarborough Shoals, Second Thomas Shoals, Reed Bank and, perhaps,
some sort of joint use arrangement for the Spratlys. As regards the Spratlys,
a joint development concept is something that both sides have endorsed and
is a way to move the process forward. The Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920 (for
Svalbard Island) is a good model: It involves all countries shelving their
sovereignty claims but agree to share the oil and gas and fisheries resources
on an equal basis. Figure 1 below depicts such a notional multilateral joint
development zone agreement between the China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the
Philippines for the central Spratlys. The diameter of this zone could be
increased to encompass more disputed territories. Figure 1 Suggested Joint
Development Zone A non-claimant state would be designated as the
administrator (or trustee) over the zone. Indonesia, given its stature in
ASEAN, may be suited to do this. All countries that have occupied high-tide
features in the zone would be allowed to remain, although they would be
required to replace all military occupiers with civilians. Military equipment
would be removed. All structures built on fully submerged and low-tide
elevations would be dismantled or converted to use by ASEAN researchers for
biological diversity research purposes. The four parties would mutually agree
to not assert territorial claims around any feature except that each occupier
would have the right to establish 500 meter safety zones around each
island/feature for safety of navigation purposes. The trustee would allow each
of the four claimant states to fish anywhere in the disputed area and be the
sole licensee of any fishing. Licensing would be based on current FAO
standards to ensure sustainment of regional fishing stocks. Each one of the
claimants would be entitled to 25 percent of the catch. Mining in the area
would also follow the 25 percent formula. Oil and gas prospecting would be
licensed by the Administrator on a strictly competitive basis. The 25 percent
formula would be applied to any royalties received. The administrator would
be the only state permitted to have permanently based military forces in the
area to enforce the terms of the agreement. The United States, the EU and
Russia would provide security guarantees to Indonesia in the event that any
of its forces came under attack. The agreement would enter into force by
agreement among three of the four countries and any outliers share would
be held in escrow by the administrator. For China to continue on its current
trajectory as an economic and political power in Asia, it must realize that its
power is inextricably linked to increased access to oceans near and far for
resources and transit and that UNCLOS contains the rules for exploitation of
that space and its resources. China seems to now be expressing some
buyers remorse for not being more proactive when UNCLOS was being
negotiated in the 1970s or in properly assessing the impacts when it joined
UNCLOS in 1996. If China feels that UNCLOS does not protect their interests,
then China would do well to pursue its long- term interests at the United
Nations to seek amendments to UNCLOS and negotiate a short-term joint use
arrangements like that suggested above as a holding action. However,
intentionally choosing a path that takes China outside of the UNCLOS
framework and casts it in the role of Asias bully is neither in China nor
ASEANs long-term political and economic interests. A naked win by the
Philippines in the arbitration is a loss for everyone because turning China into
a hardened legal foe does nothing to advance the cause of cooperation and
diplomacy in the South China Sea. One can only hope that leaders in Manila,
Beijing and other ASEAN capitals will come to this realization and take the
next step to put the arbitration on hold so that negotiations in good faith can
proceed, or else use its findings as the basis for a deal.
The Arctic is the best venue to solve SCS conflict but

Chinese ascension is a pre-requisite
Chua, 16Grace, citing several qualified scholars, To Ease the South
China Sea Dispute, Look to the Arctic, Hakai Magazine Coastal Sciences
and Societies, Mar 3, https://www.hakaimagazine.com/article-short/easesouth-china-sea-dispute-look-arctic --br
In climate, history, and culture, the South China Sea could not be more
different from the North and South Poles. Geopolitically, though? There may
be some similarities. Thats the idea being put forth by a group of political
scientists who are arguing that the political arrangements used to govern the
Arctic, in particular, could be a good model to ending the disputes in the
fractious South China Sea. Much like in the Arctic, border states in the South
China Sea stake claims to all or part of the region. China, the Philippines,
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan, among others, are gunning for control
of the regions islands, reefs, atolls, and waters, in hopes of tapping the seas
rich commercial fisheries and oil and gas potential. These disputes have
culminated in rising tensions, increasing militarization, and a veritable
lockdown on scientific research in this ecosystem hot spot. Three scholars,
Ray Tsung-Han Tai, Nathaniel Pearre, and Shih-Ming Kao, from China, Canada,
and Taiwan, respectively, think that the situation in the South China Sea
mirrors that of the Arctic. They say that if the history of the Arctic is anything
to go by, then it should be possible to smooth things over in the South China
Seaat least to a degree. They foresee a future where South China Sea
border states cooperate on issues surrounding marine environmental
protection and scientific research, even if sovereignty disputes and military
concerns remain unresolved. As both the Arctic and South China Sea are open
seas surrounded by terrestrial states, they say, the Arctic regime is a good
model for South China Sea governance. As in the Arctic, they argue that only
border states should get a say in voting and decision-making, though other
states could be added as observers. The researchers are not the first to
suggest that South China Sea border states look to the poles for inspiration.
Marine biologist John McManus and colleagues first proposed it in the 1990s
though they focused on the Antarctic rather than the Arctic. In the 1950s,
amid the Cold War, 12 countries from New Zealand to Norway had staked
territorial claims to parts of the Antarctic. At the same time, the United States
and the Soviet Union were not recognizing others claims, and were reserving
the right to assert their own. Some claimant and non-claimant nations, like
Germany, were exploring and conducting scientific research in the Antarctic.
In 1959, the 12 nations active in the region signed the Antarctic Treaty into
effect, putting the territorial disputes on ice. The legally binding treaty froze
claims as they were, and stipulated that Antarctica be used for peaceful
purposes only. McManus suggests that the key to ensuring peace in the South
China Sea is to freeze territorial claims and activities in support of those
claims, as was done in Antarctica. Tai, Pearre, and Kao agree claims ought to
be frozen, and military activitiescurrently escalating in the hotly disputed
Spratly Islandsdisavowed. However, they think that the less rigid political
model in the Arctic is a better fit. Advantages and disadvantages exist in
both forms, they write. The soft-law format of the Arctic offers a more
flexible and expedient way to address urgent issues, whereas the Antarctic
hard-law regime is a stronger commitment, but reaching agreement among
parties is difficult and slow. Whichever model is used, they say, more
cooperative activities among bordering States should be encouraged,
particularly when no cooperative mechanisms have yet been established.
Back in 2013, Ian Storey, a senior fellow at Singapores Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, wrote that China and Southeast Asian countries have plenty to
learn from Arctic management. But first, he says, China must be willing to
bring its territorial claims in line with existing international conventions,
particularly those laid out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
Were at a turning point even if China says no, initiating

dialogue is vital to avoiding all-our war
Thompson 7/12 (Mark, American investigative reporter who won the
1985 Pulitzer Prize for public service journalism. Showdown Now Looming
Over the South China Sea TIME http://time.com/4402562/south-china-seahague-ruling/ 9:25 a.m. 2016)//masonw
The showdown over the South China Sea began Tuesday when an international court in The
Hague declared that Chinas claims to 90% of the worlds critical trade route are bogus. Just like an oldtime Western, the lesser-armed folks in townin this case including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnamhave scurried off into the buildings lining Main Street. Theyve closed the shutters, leaving them
open just enough to peek nervously as China and the United States prepare for a confrontation. Chinas
sweeping, yet undefined, South China Sea claims dont hold water, U.S. Naval War College
Chinese expert Andrew Erickson said shortly after the ruling. Looking forward, all parties concerned must
prevent China from grabbing with coercion or force what it could notand now clearly cannotobtain
legally. The five-member panel unanimously ruled that Beijings claim to nearly all of the South China Sea
because of its historic presence in the region has no merit. As expected, China quickly rejected the ruling.
The South China Sea has instantly become uncharted waters

for the globes two most-powerful nations. The ruling from the Netherlands, while legally
So what happens now?
binding, has no mechanism for enforcement. That means negotiations will be required to ease the growing
territorial tensions in and around the South China Sea.
If talks dont happen, or go nowhere
and China continues to refuse to back downa military clash could occur. U.S. optimists
hope that after an initial outburst, the Chinese will realize the international community has taken a firm
stance against its claims in the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in trade passes annually.
Starting bilateral talks on fishing and oil rights between China and the Philippines, which brought the case
to The Hague, could ease tensions. The ruling may compel Beijing to curb its dredging in the South China
China is more
likely to increase its island-building, and perhaps impose a blockade on
Philippine sailors on a desolate shoal who are based there seeking to declare it as part of the
Philippines. The Chinese blockaded the shoal in 2014 . Eventually, Manila ran
Sea to create new islets claimed as Chinese territory. But U.S. pessimists suggest
that blockade by taking a civilian ship, stuffing it full of supplies, stuffing it full of foreign journalists
and forcing a difficult decision on the Chinese: `Shoot us out of the water or let
us go!and the Chinese backed off, Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies said last month at a CSIS session. We could very well see a repeat of
that episode with a stronger Chinese response. That, in turn, could lead to a
stronger U.S. response, given the 1951 mutual defense pact between Manila
and Washington. A renewed Chinese blockade of the Second Thomas Shoal would
carry with it the highest risk of kinetic interactionguns being fired,
missiles being launched and/or bombs being droppedwith the U.S. Air Force
or Navy, Asian expert Michael Green said at the CSIS gathering. China may also respond by
declaring an air-defense identification zone over the S outh China Sea, as it did over
the East China Sea in 2013. That would require foreign flights to identify themselves to China before
China has been building

airstrips on islets in the South China Sea, and could deploy fighter aircraft to them
shortly before declaring the sea a second air-defense identification zone. At the end of the day
entering. While civilian airlines have complied, the U.S. military has not.
thats an elegant target set for the U.S., CSISs Andrew Shearer said. A pair of U.S. aircraft carriers is now
steaming in the western Pacific. We dont get to do two-carrier operations very often, Admiral John
Richardson, the U.S. chief of naval operations, said last month. Its a terrific opportunity for us to do some
But U.S. warships sailing in or near the South China

Sea also represent a fat target for China. Beijing has spent years
developing and deploying the DF-21D missile, informally known inside the
Pentagon as the carrier killer. The decision also is likely to embolden the U.S. to continue
[training for] high-end war-fighting.
and perhaps step upits naval patrols in the South China Sea. The U.S. has refused to acknowledge
Chinas claim of sovereignty to much of it, and repeated freedom of navigation exercises through the
disputed waters will serve to emphasize the American position, which is widely shared by the non-Chinese
both China and the

U.S. are wondering if the other is going to reach for its gun. We have
reached a critical turning point, says Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain now at the
nations bordering the sea. Eyeing one another down that deserted Main Street,
Center for a New American Security. The U.S. and its Navy, in particular, must now consider plans on how
it can best support the international community and uphold the rule of law. All options must be on the
table.
SAY YES
AT: Say No (Arctic Council)
AC Says Yes2ac
Council says yes Iceland has been proven to be a powerful lobby and China
is increasing influence with key members
Guschin 15 (Arthur. non-resident senior analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS). China, Iceland and the Arctic The Diplomat
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-iceland-and-the-arctic/
5/20/16)//masonw
Chinas efforts in recent
years to increase its presence in the Arctic can now be considered to have been a
success. Until 2014, observers were surprised by the activities of Chinese
diplomats, executives, and scientists in the region, and even debated Chinas threat in the Arctic. These days, though, China
is seen as an essential actor that provides strong links for the region
and drives economic development. Chinas achievement of observer status in the Arctic Council (AC) in 2013
symbolized an unspoken acceptance of Beijings Arctic expansion. At the same time, bilateral relationship
building with each AC member has enabled China to begin its work solving
economic issues in regional policy. Of strategic importance for Chinas plan is Iceland. Political
Interest The development and strengthening of Beijings ties with Reykjavik should be
understood in the context of Icelands role as a player with influence in the
regions institutional transformation. This is demonstrated by the recent
successes of Ice landic authorities. In 2007, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Mller came up with the idea to
Arthur Guschin is a non-resident senior analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).
solve Arctic problems via the small Arctic Five, which included the U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Iceland, which had not been
invited to join, complained about the meetings and claimed that any decisions made without Reykjavik, Helsinki and Stockholm would not
have validity. The protests paid off: The Arctic Five held only two meetings, in 2008 and 2010. After that, the decision-making process
returned to the AC. Conscious of the need for more trenchant policy, in 2011 Iceland initiated discussions on cooperation agreements in
It also lobbied to create a permanent AC

secretariat in Troms, where the experienced state official Magns Jhannesson, from the Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and
Natural Resources, was appointed as a director. In 2013, Iceland raised its status in Arctic policy debates by hosting the Arctic
Circle international conference, during which special attention was given to Asia-Pacific actors:
China, India, South Korea and Singapore. The success of the conference helped Reykjavik establish
itself as a center for opinion exchange regarding essential questions about economic, social and ecological
Arctic development. Moreover, Iceland increased its authority in the region by winning
the right to hold the Arctic Circle conference up to 2017 . Finally, Iceland
participated in a working group (Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum) together with Russia, Canada and Finland
in planning and establishing the Arctic Economic Council (AEC ). The AEC, incidentally, could become a
platform for Chinese investment in the region, changing Beijings status
from an outside actor to a leading non-regional investor. Since China is not represented in the AEC as an
equitable member, partner relations with Reykjavik could serve to facilitate the
PRCs foreign ambitions. Apart from Icelands merits as an effective facilitator, rapprochement between Beijing and Reykjavik
aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic.
is determined by the complicated relationship between Iceland and the EU. The negotiations for Icelands accession to the EU were not exactly
crowned with success as the parties could not agree on a fish catch quota. Despite some comprises from Reykjavik, Brussels took a hard line.
The fishing industry accounts for more than 10 percent of Icelands GDP, and a decrease in catches would be devastating. As a result, Iceland
halted the talks (and temporally withdraw its application). It then began to search for an alternative source of investment to kick-start an
economy that had been hard hit by the 2008-2009. Beijing took advantage of the tensions between Reykjavik and Brussels and offered a
currency swap amounting to 406 million dollars, symbolizing the beginning of active collaborations with the Arctic state. China subsequently
expanded its local embassy staff to eight people. The growing contact between the countries was capped by a visit from Wen Jiabao, then
premier of the State Council, in April 2012 and the signing of a document pack defining bilateral cooperation. A free trade agreement in 2013
The foundation of the

China-Nordic Arctic Cooperation Symposium, which became the second
international scientific conference in which China has full membership, sealed the
made Iceland a guide for Chinese interests in the Arctic and put the EU on the backburner.
China-Iceland cooperation
has enabled Beijings officials and Arctic scientists to effortlessly attend and organize international symposiums to
demonstrate their awareness of future regional development , while Reykjavik now has an
economic partnership with the worlds second-largest economy. Economy and Ecology Icelands economic prosperity
is based on three main sectors: fish catching and processing, aluminum and
ferrosilicium production, and the use of geothermal energy for heating and
electricity. Beijing evaluated the economic utility of these segments and proceeded to try and establish
cooperation with an eye to the financial and technological benefits.
relationship. It is worth noting that the Chinese side is represented by five academic centers.
Arctic Council says yes studies prove

Willis and Depledge, 15 Matthew Willis and Duncan Depledge, Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI), UK. Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic,
Edited by Leif Christian Jensen, Senior Research Fellow and Geir Hnneland,
Research Professor and Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway. p. 402-404
br
individual applications for observerships, including Chinas, were never
formally discussed within the Council surprised us. However, to learn that the so-called observer issue
That
ultimately had less to do with observers themselves than with the Arctic Council, its character and its evolution was the
bigger surprise. The Arctic states difficulty in reaching a decision was widely reported in 2011, but the context of that
the full-fledged process of institutional maturation that the Council had

not sought but also could not avoid has to our knowledge never been unpacked
until now. Vis--vis China, the starting point of our investigation, our findings corroborate the
claims of virtually all the SAOs we spoke to as to the Councils fundamental
openness to permanent Chinese observership. That is not to say that all member states were
difficulty
keen for more observers to be admitted, simply that they had nothing against China per se and that some were
If there is a degree of polar Orientalism in popular narratives of

Arctic geopolitics, we failed to find evidence of it in the Arctic Council . Nor, on aggregate,
is it visible in the academic and semi-academic literature which has generally reflected
the high-level national views of China and other extraregional actors. In particular, we found that the
literatures no threat and no exception narratives sufficed to convey the range of
official attitudes towards Chinas growing engagement in the Arctic Council .
No diplomat or foreign ministry official gave any time to the threat narrative . Indeed, at least
unequivocally favourable to it.
half of those we interviewed went out of their way to quash it.37 Instead, we found the delay in approving Chinas
application was mainly related to the decision that no applications at all would be discussed until the Council had tended
to its own institutional development. That process was held up as much by the requirement that ministerial approval be
obtained (but that ministerials occurred just once every two years) as by the debate over whether the Arctic Council
should be expanded to include more observers. This outright rejection of the threat narrative in the Arctic context does
not, in itself, prove it is unfounded. However, the overwhelming weight of evidence goes counter to it, whatever its
speculative appeal. First, the privileges of a permanent observer are very limited, so the power or leverage gained from
admission to the rank is unthreatening. Second, the old distinction between ad hoc and permanent observers had not
prevented China from attending previous Arctic Council meetings. That
regarded as ordinary observers is therefore more
China and others are now

a symbolic change-up than anything
substantive (though symbolism should not be underrated).38 In other words, one would not have expected the Arctic
states to feel threatened by China in the context of the observer issue. It could be that in other Arctic policy domains,
some states do feel threatened, but that possibility requires further testing. SAOs from several countries, including
The
United States SAO expressed perfect equanimity. Russias said China was a
valuable market. When debate over the merits of individual applicants did arise, the focus was not China but the
Denmark, Iceland and Norway, were unequivocal in saying they supported Chinas growing Arctic presence.
EU. The value of this study may therefore lie less in what it concludes about Chinas admission per se and more in what it
says about the things that mattered to the states and PPs. In the first instance, it demonstrates the absolute centrality of
meaningful indigenous participation to the Councils identity (Shadian 2009). The PPs were influential enough to ensure
their rights within the Council were not only discussed, but also, through the 2013 Observer Manual, re-enshrined within
the organizations architecture. SAOs themselves, unprompted, told us that the need to ensure the PPs position was
protected and strengthened had been just as much a concern as avoiding the bogging-down of Council procedure through
the organizations UN-ification. When the states found themselves deadlocked over how to proceed, the SAOs requested
it
demonstrates the commitment of the majority of member states to openness
that the PPs take the floor and share their views on the matter to help refocus the discussion. In the second instance,
and transparency in the Arctic, and thus the principles of accountability and responsibility the Kiruna Vision, so to
The evident tension surrounding the need, or not, to admit and reject observership
applicants on the basis of clear, impartially-applied rules points to something important: most member states
acceptance of the Arctics inherent connection to the rest of the world , and thus
their own obligation to acknowledge the legitimacy of extra-regional
input into its management. The conviction, as expressed by several countries, that China needed to be
admitted for the Council to fulfil one of its fundamental purposes (promoting
climate change research and encouraging the development of sound
climate policies) was striking for two reasons. Not only was it concrete evidence of the Arctic
states sense of responsibility towards the world at large, but it also demonstrated that some
states equated the vitality of the Arctic Council with their own national interest. Suggestions that the
Council is an exclusive club through which the region can be controlled and
certain actors excluded ought thus to be carefully nuanced. Lastly, this study shows
speak.39
that portrayals of the Arctic Council as riven along NATO-Russia or Arctic Five-Arctic Eight lines are merely crude
caricatures.40 Arctic politics are far more complicated than such sloppy categorizations imply. They cannot be expressed
through pre-existing (e.g. Cold War) geopolitical templates, nor can a single new template capture the character of the
Councils internal dynamics. If anything, we have learned that intra-Council alliances form and dissolve on an issue-byissue basis, and that the foundation of the issues is at least as likely to be philosophical or pragmatic as geopolitical. On a
final note, we warn the reader against extrapolating too far. This study presents the Council at a precise moment in time
a moment lasting a mere decade and in the light of just one of several major issues. Compared to the negotiations
surrounding the Search-and-Rescue Agreement or the Protocol on Oil Spill Prevention and Response, the debate over
permanent observers was a minor issue. The divisions described here between the Arctic states on observers should not
automatically be assumed to colour other facets of the Councils work. That is not to say that they will not at least two
SAOs told us they hoped to see observers far more involved in the Councils activities in future but there is no reason
they must. The sense of optimism among our interview subjects, looking ahead to the challenges before them, was
universal.
AT: Say NoTrust

China isnt revisionist and gets accepted into the arctic
council improving image
Wegge 14 (Njord Wegge, Associate Professor II, UiT The Arctic University
of Norway, China in the Arctic Interests, Actions, and Challenges
http://septentrio.uit.no/index.php/nordlit/article/viewFile/3072/2964 2014 p.
88-92)//masonw
As a world power China has a natural role to
play in the Arctic, as this northern region is being increasingly interwoven into
the global economy and politics. However, the increased interest of China in the North has
- How should Chinas actions be interpreted?
caused enthusiasm as well as suspicion and uneasiness among several of the traditional Arctic states (Solli
On the Greenlandic and Icelandic side, the expressed

Chinese willingness to invest and develop infrastructure has been warmly
welcomed. The strengthened political ties with China have given these two
actors valuable access to a key state in international politics (Nielsson 2013).
et. al. 2013: 261, Stokke 2013).
Nevertheless, Chinas reputation for large scale economic investments and huge appetite for mineral and
energy resources has also led to questions concerning Chinas long term political intentions in the Arctic,
the
one side realist inclined analysts have been concerned about whether China would
seek revisionist policies, e.g. trying to re-shape the rules governing the Arctic. In this perspective
Chinas growth and enhanced political clout might be viewed in the context of
rivalry with the USA, and in its most pointed version, as a threat to a liberal Western-dominated
global order (Chan 2008, Blunden 2012: 127, Lasserre 2010). Based on my investigation of
Chinas move towards the Arctic, this perspective does not find much
evidence supporting its warning of potential greatpower rivalry in the
north. Nevertheless, through the strengthened Chinese position in the Arctic, including the new
given the PRCs status as a rising great power (Chen 2012: 361, Solli et. al 2013, Dodds 2013: 32). On
development of strong economic and political ties with important Arctic actors such as Greenland and
Iceland, the PRC certainly demonstrates a stronger influence in the region, likely to come at the cost of
Liberal interpretations of the development, focusing on Chinese

economic interests and Chinas relevance as a key actor in the environmental
challenges facing the region, probably fits the empirical development
best. Political observers should also show caution when interpreting marginal
Chinese statements apparently challenging the Arctic states traditional view on
their rights in the Arctic. In this respect Rear Admiral Yin Zhuos statements from 2010; The
others.
Arctic belongs to no one and the Arctic belongs to all humankind and not to any one country or group of
countries, certainly have become the statements making the biggest headlines (Sun 2013, Jakobsen and
Peng 2012:15, Solli et.al. 2013, Blunden 2012: 126). As Chinese leaders experienced that such offensive
statements were striking back, e.g. with respect to the difficulties in acquiring a seat as a permanent
observer to the AC, the Chinese government from around 2011 on started displaying much more
conciliatory and accommodating behavior, where economic and scientific cooperation with the Arctic
states were emphasized. The Chinese support for the sovereign rights of the Arctic states was also
stressed, as was the view that the UNCLOS served as a sufficient legal framework for the Arctic Ocean
(Jakobsen and Peng 2012, Sun 2013, Blank 2013). In moving its focus away from issues of Chinese rights
focusing more on softer dimensions

such as cooperating in scientific research and environmental monitoring ,
China has improved its image in the face of some of the more skeptic Arctic
states (Blunden 2012: 126). Chinas pragmatic acceptance of the Nuuk criteria also
and toning down its role in Arctic governance, instead
demonstrated a rather liberal and cooperative behavior, contrary to what one

would expect from a revisionist state. This indicates also a shift in the Western mindset
regarding Chinas role in the Arctic; China is now seen as less of a competitor and threat to Western values
such as democracy, human rights and individual freedoms, and more of a partner and value added in
China has
in the last few years increasingly been accepted as a legitimate stakeholder in
terms of Arctic science and governance. Concluding remarks and future issues to be solved
the Arctic. With important economic stakes related to shipping, investments in resource utilization as well
China is an increasingly important economic

actor in the Arctic. Moreover, as it has become clear that climate change in the Arctic is
directly related to environmental and climatic conditions in China, the PRC is
also perceived as an even more relevant scientific partner in the region . With
new infrastructure, such as icebreakers and the Yellow River Station at Svalbard, China has also
invested in capabilities making it able to contribute to scientific research in
the north.
as in the consumption of the same resources,
AT: Say No (SCS)
AT: Say NoHistoric Rights

Historic rights apply to terra firma sovereignty, not
waterspaces sovereignty
Rosen, 6-21Mark, Prof @ George Washington University School of Law,
After the South China Sea Arbitration; Where do we go after the panel has
spoken? The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/after-the-southchina-sea-arbitration/ --br
At the end of the day, the arbitral panel is likely to rule that the five features
listed above are low tide elevations and that Reed Bank and Second Thomas
Reef are part of the Philippine Continental Shelf. The other listed features
including Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes
Reef) will also likely be classified as low-tide elevations by the panel, but it
will defer judgment on whether they are part of the Philippine Continental
shelf because they could be within the EEZ of Itu Abu. They may, for
example, in the case of McKennan Reef which has been the site of a
massive PRC reclamation project declare that the PRC is without legal
authority to occupy those features. The panel will also likely rule that
Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled to the 12 nautical-mile territorial sea and
that the PRC has no authority to exclude Philippine fisherman from waters
beyond the 12 nautical-mile territorial sea (but within the larger Philippine
EEZ). The panel will probably not tackle the nine-dashed line matter since the
PRC has never published the precise coordinates of that claim in its domestic
law. However, the panel will probably issue an admonition that there is no
legal basis for a state to claim a large swath of ocean based on a theory of
historic rights. Put another way, historic rights might apply in general
international law disputes over sovereignty over terra firma, but when it
comes to rights over waterspace, UNCLOS is the single international law on
this topic. Vague assertions of historic rights is not part of UNCLOS.
AT: Say NoNationalism

Chinese leaders can control nationalism over the SCS
three warrants
Lim 16 Kheng Swe, research analyst with the China Programme at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological
University. " China's Nationalist Narrative of the South China Sea: A
Preliminary Analysis." Power Politics in Asias Contested Waters. Edited by
Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu. Springer, pg 171, LM.
China has some leeway with regards to its ability to handle these nationalist
feelings over the South China Sea, especially when compared with the East China Sea
dispute. This is especially because China has some advantages in controlling the discourse on the South
China Sea conflict. Firstly and most importantly,
unlike in the case of Japan, the lack of

history issues means that there is little deep- seated public resentment
against the Southeast Asian countries as compared to Japan. It is highly telling that
there have been no large-scale public demonstrations over the South China
Sea in China, as opposed to those that broke out over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands. Secondly, the Chinese government does not need to worry about
elections. This means that, short of large-scale public disorder that threaten massive
domestic upheaval, public opinion cannot exert direct influence over the government
s decisions, giving the government some leeway to pursue policies that it
deems to be in the national interests that may not necessarily be popular. Thirdly, the
government exerts a strong degree of control over the media . Although China
may not be able to completely control public opinion, it is still able to use the
media to shape public discourse to a large degree.
SCS conflict is motivated by Chinas need to secure its

shipping, not prestige
Kuo 7/2 Frederick,
writer. His writing focuses on current events and economic analyses within a social
and historical framework. "Why China Wont Stop Island Building in the South China Sea." The Diplomat.
7/2/16. thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-china-wont-stop-island-building-in-the-south-china-sea/
Chinas One Belt, One Road project is composed of two primary routes. One is a land
route that winds through the great Eurasian hinterland linking China with its ancient trading partners in
the maritime route,

runs through the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits, and onward through the Indian
Ocean to Africa and to the Middle East and Europe. Chinas rapidly growing commercial empire
presents it with immense security challenges. While China has traditionally been a
continental power, it has not fielded a great navy since the 15th century when
Central Asia and the Middle East and then on to Europe. The other route is
which
Zheng Hes gargantuan fleet sailed to Africa. In the modern era, China went from defeat at the hands of
China is a
latecomer to the modern arena of great power politics, it has found its maritime
borders to be dominated by foreign powers, from the United States to regional Asian
states. This fact leaves Chinas colossal investments and trade vulnerable to the
whims of foreign navies, a situation which is the cause of anxiety in Beijing. This insecurity
has driven Chinas substantial focus in modernizing and upgrading its navy,
which now boasts of one aircraft carrier, with another currently being built and
two more planned in the next decade. In the South China Sea, Chinas claims have existed
Western gunboats to imperial collapse and then the chaos of the Maoist era. Since
since at least the Republican era. However, beset by domestic problems, China has been slow to enforce
Chinas recent actions reflect a significant increase in investment on the contested

are all part and parcel of Chinas attempts to establish
a beachhead of control in order to monitor and protect the trade routes that it
increasingly depends on. To put it simply, Chinas obsession with building up fortifications
in the South China Sea is driven by its fear of losing control over its vital trade
routes and thus having its national interests effectively denied by use of naval
force. As China moves forward with its ambitious Silk Road project, its sense
of urgency has kept pace to make sure it will have the naval infrastructure to
protect its commercial interests from the South China Sea to Djibouti, where China has
its claims.
islands within its control. These
established its first overseas military base.
AT: Say NoNo US Influence

The US has leverage after the ruling to encourage China
to abide by arbitration but it has to push
Waxman, 14 Matthew, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, as well
as Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law & Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations and Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National
Security & Law. He previously served in senior positions in the U.S. State
Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. INTENSE
MANEUVERS AT THE HAGUE, Asia Maritime Tranportation Initiative (AMTI),
part of the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). Dec 23,
http://amti.csis.org/intense-maneuvers-at-the-hague/ --br
In 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitration proceedings in the Hague
against China over disputed South China Sea maritime claims and in doing
so it challenged legally of Chinas nine-dash line claims over much of that
area. Both states are parties to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which allows for binding dispute resolution through the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. China has boycotted the proceedings, arguing that in
ratifying UNCLOS it had opted out of mandatory dispute settlement of
matters relating to sea boundaries. Some expect the Permanent Court of
Arbitration to reach a decision on jurisdiction a preliminary ruling on
whether it has authority to reach the ultimate merits in 2015. More likely,
though, it will schedule a hearing on the issue next year, which China will
probably boycott, and even that preliminary decision on jurisdiction will not
occur until 2016 because the jurisdictional arguments are so intertwined with
complex issues that go to the ultimate merits. The legal maneuvering in 2015
will be intense, though, because the stakes are high. For the parties
themselves, even an ultimate decision on the merits of these issues may not
settle the disputes, because China may ignore an arbitral ruling that it
regards as illegitimate. But in the meantime, a decision on jurisdiction will
shift diplomatic leverage one direction or the other. For the United States,
which is a treaty ally of the Philippines, a decision in the Hague that accepts
jurisdiction could exacerbate tension between two policy tenets: that the
United States does not take a position on competing sovereignty claims in the
South China Sea and that it promotes settlement of disputes according to
international law. Perhaps the United States can push harder for all parties,
including China, to abide by arbitral decisions, but doing so is awkward
because the United States has not itself ratified UNCLOS and thereby
subjected itself to binding dispute resolution. For the UNCLOS system as a
body of rules and binding dispute settlement mechanisms prominence and
credibility are at stake. A decision that the arbitral panel has jurisdiction
would push UNCLOS and its international adjudicators further to the fore
of disputes in this regional hotspot. In doing so, however, the arbitral panel
would risk being ignored, derided and marginalized by the biggest player in
the region.
AT: Say No (QPQ)
Say Yes2ac
China desparately wants in thats a direct quote from
Dwyer they have billions of dollars worth of incentives to
join more evidence with a boatload of say yes warrants
Economy 14 --- US-Chinese relations analyst for Forbes (Elizabeth, 4/4/14, The Four
Drivers Of Beijing's Emerging Arctic Play And What The World Needs To Do,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabetheconomy/2014/04/04/the-four-drivers-of-beijingsemerging-arctic-play-and-what-the-world-needs-to-do/#16cf3e8270d8)//ernst
If you pay attention, Chinese foreign policy rarely surprises. Of course there is the odd moment when
Beijing catches the world unaware: for example, its declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the
East China Sea in late 2013. Generally speaking, however, the Chinese telegraph their long-term strategic
intentions through their smaller tactical maneuvers. It is just that the rest of the world sometimes misses
the signals or doesnt know what to do with the information. Such is the case with Chinas emerging play in
the Arctic. Over the past several years,
China has begun to stake out its claim to the
Arctic. No part of China actually touches the Arctic, but as a recent International Institute for Strategic
Studies commentary points out, Chinese scholars routinely describe their country as a
near-Arctic state, and Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo has argued that the Arctic
belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over
it China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have
one-fifth of the worlds population. This is a signal of Chinese intent . There are a
number of reasons for Chinas interest in the region, but four stand out in particular. First, of course,
the region is rich in resources: oil and gas, fish and minerals among
them. According to one estimate, the region holds one-third of the worlds natural gas reserves, and
resource-hungry China has recognized the regions potential. China is in talks with Denmark to take stakes
in a copper mine in Greenland; China National Offshore Oil Corporation has partnered with Icelands Eykon
Energy for oil exploration; and Chinas Sichuan Xinye Mining Investment Company will be working with
London Mining to exploit the countrys iron ore reserves. Uranium and rare earths are additional potential
targets for Chinese investment: Greenland has enormous reserves of both, including the capacity to meet
the
climate changes and the Arctic ice melts, three new trade routes may
open up that will dramatically reduce cargo transport time and help
avoid the security challenges of traditional routes such as the Strait of
25% of world demand for rare earths. China is also interested in the Arctic for trade reasons. As
Malacca. Already, Denmark and China are discussing cooperation to explore these new routes.
Chinese scholars have made clear

their desire to play a significant role in mapping out the climatic
changes in the Arcticas well as understanding the resources the region
possesses. Climate change is having a profound impact on China, and Beijing has
ADVERTISING inRead invented by Teads In addition,
established a polar research center and has plans to launch three research expeditions to the Arctic in
Smaller Arctic countries such as Iceland are excited to partner with China
given Beijings significant financial and research capacity. At the same time,
Chinas arctic play is part of its broader global diplomacy and desire
to engage in a wide range of regional organizations to advance its
strategic and trade interests. That means that China wants a seat at
the table. In 2013, China and India both attained permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, the
2015.
regions governing body that consists of those states that actually border the arctic: Russia, the United
States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, as well as six international organizations
It is doubtful that China will remain a quiet

observer, however. As Chinese scholar Tang Guoqiang hints, China could serve as the
voice of the non-Arctic states, representing their views and interests in discussions with the
representing indigenous peoples.
Arctic Council. Recommended by Forbes MOST POPULAR Photos: The Global Celebrity 100 2016 TRENDING
ON FACEBOOK Chatri Sityodtong: ONE Championship's Temasek Investment 'Biggest Moment In... While no
one of these policies is of overwhelming consequence, together they
suggest a more significant

drive to assert Chinese interests in the region. As the United States assumes
the two-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015, it needs to begin its
tenure prepared with its own strategy for the region; and at least in part, this
means determining what matters and what doesnt in terms of Chinese
engagement in the Arctic. First, the United States should work to ensure that
the observer states, such as China, do not politicize the Arctic Council: allowing
China to become the spokesperson for most of the rest of the world that does not have a direct stake in
the Arctic, for example, would be a mistake. Reinforcing the position of observer status as necessarily
recognizing the Arctic states sovereignty and jurisdiction in the Arctic, as well as the law of the sea, is a
China has already refused to recognize the jurisdiction of a

United Nations tribunal on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in a
dispute with the Philippines in the South China Sea. Second, the United States
should help ensure that Chinese investment in the region is encouraged but
also managed in a sustainable manner. The Chinese are already aware that their investment
good place to start.
will be viewed with some suspicion: as Chinese scholar Jia Xiudong has noted, Chinas interest and
involvement in the Arctic are more for having options in case of emergency rather than resource
plundering. Moreover, while Greenland is resource rich but population poor, the countrys deputy foreign
minister has taken great pains to reassure the world of its political capacity: We are, in mining terms, a
frontier country. But we are not a frontier country like frontier countries in Africa or South America. We
have evolved over 300 years a solid legal framework, a well-educated population, rules, democratic
institutions and a strong society. If useful to Greenland, the United Statesas an Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative candidate countrycould use its leadership of the Arctic Council to offer assistance
to ensure that Greenland has the tools necessary to protect its environment as multinationals from around
Third, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry has

legitimate credentials as an international voice on climate change.
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council offers a unique opportunity to link the
changing Arctic to the need for the United States and China to do more to
address the challenge of climate chang e. Research in the Arctic should be a cooperative and
the world seek to exploit its resources.
collaborative effort among the interested parties and should not become yet another arena for competition
between the two countries. China has begun the process of engaging in the Arctic through research,
For now it has only dipped its toe in the Arctic waters, but
it is ready to plunge in. The rest of the world needs to be prepared.
investment and diplomacy.
Say YesResources
China really wants more involvement in the Arctic and
have already persuaded a whole list of countries to let
them in
Dingman and Costigan 14 June 10th 2014, Sean S. Costigan is Senior
Adviser to the Emerging Security Challenges Working Group at the
Partnership for Peace Consortium and lecturer in Global Studies at The New
School. Erica Dingman is an Associate Fellow at the World Policy Institute
where she directs the Arctic program. Fringe Benefits: Asia is Hot on the
Arctic, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/fringe-benefits-asia-is-hot-on-thearctic/ //Deej
Did you know that non-Arctic states have a keen interest in the Arctic? While
many observers express grave concern that the changing Arctic environment
portends greater rapid climate changethe Arctic is warming at twice the
rate of any other location around the globethis is not the only reason for
interest. Melting Arctic sea ice creates commercial opportunities barely
imaginable just a few scant years ago. The Northern Sea Route, bordering the
coast of northern Russia is often already navigable during warmer summer
months. And history was made when the Nordic Orion, carrying coal from
Vancouver to Finland, made the first ever passage of a bulk carrier through
the Northwest Passage in September 2013. In addition, the Arctic is widely
seen as a massive and untapped source of hydrocarbons and minerals.
Getting at those resources means running considerable environmental risks
at great cost, but as we live in a carbon economy, our dependence on
extracting oil and gas is not likely to change anytime soon. It may surprise
some even more to learn that both China and South Korea have developed
Arctic strategies that encompass both scientific Arctic research and support
for Arctic-related industries, even though neither have Arctic borders nor
territorial claims. China is the worlds largest energy consumer, and is
expected to surpass the United States in 2014 to become the worlds largest
consumer of oil. In 2011, South Korea was the second largest importer of
liquefied natural gas, reliant solely on tanker shipments to fulfill their energy
needs. Both countries continue to negotiate with energy rich Arctic nations to
improve their domestic energy security. A bit of background on the world
energy picture may help us at this point. The envy of many, the United States
alone sits on 29.0 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 349 trillion cubic
feet of proven wet natural gas reserves. Resource-rich Canada holds 173.6
billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves, 98 percent of which is from oil
sands. As the worlds third-largest producer of crude oil after Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela, Canada is already in the purview of Chinas state-owed
CNOCC. However, laws and logistics make moving that natural wealth
cumbersome. Beyond the supply and demand of energy resources, China and
South Korea differ in their Arctic-related efforts. Where China is courting
Arctic nations (Canada, Denmark, the semi-autonomous country of

Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and the United States)
primarily to establish liaisons for future commercial partnership, South
Koreas highly developed shipping industry is producing vessels specifically
designed for Arctic conditions. Chinas Arctic intentions could be portrayed as
a national quest that offers investment in return for access to natural
resources and unfettered passage through Arctic waters at a reasonable cost.
Although Beijing has not yet produced an official Arctic policy, it promotes its
interests through deepening diplomatic ties, increased bilateral agreements,
and by giving support to private investment. Beijing is developing close ties
with Nordic countries, resulting in considerable debate most notably in
Iceland and Greenland where sizable foreign investment and the presence of
large contingents of foreign workers are already creating challenges.
SOUTH CHINA SEA ADV
Add-Ons
ADIZ A-O2ac
China will declare an ADIZ absent the plan
Deutsch and Blanchard 7/12 -- (Anthony Deutsch and Ben Blanchard,
7-12-2016, "Tribunal overwhelmingly rejects Beijing's South China Sea
claims," Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-rulingstakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U)//A-Sharma
An arbitration court ruled on Tuesday that China has no historic title over the
waters of the South China Sea and has breached the Philippines' sovereign
rights with its actions, infuriating Beijing which dismissed the case as a farce.
A defiant China, which boycotted the hearings at the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague, vowed again to ignore the ruling and said its armed
forces would defend its sovereignty and maritime interests. China's state-run
Xinhua news agency said shortly before the ruling was announced that a
Chinese civilian aircraft had successfully tested two new airports in
the disputed Spratly Islands. And China's Defence Ministry said a new
guided missile destroyer was formally commissioned at a naval base
on the southern island province of Hainan, which has responsibility for the
South China Sea. "This award represents a devastating legal blow to China's
jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea," Ian Storey, of Singapore's ISEAS
Yusof Ishak Institute, told Reuters. "China will respond with fury,
certainly in terms of rhetoric and possibly through more aggressive
actions at sea." The United States, which China has accused of
fuelling tensions and militarizing the region with patrols and
exercises, said the ruling should be treated as final and binding. "We
certainly would urge all parties not to use this as an opportunity to engage in
escalatory or provocative action," White House spokesman Josh Earnest told
reporters in a briefing. U.S. officials have previously said they feared
China may respond to the ruling by declaring an air defense
identification zone in the South China Sea, as it did in the East China
Sea in 2013, or by stepping up its building and fortification of
artificial islands. China claims most of the energy-rich waters through
which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims. Finding for
the Philippines on a number of issues, the panel said there was no legal basis
for China to claim historic rights to resources within its so-called nine-dash
line, which covers almost 90 percent of the South China Sea. It said China
had interfered with traditional Philippine fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal
and had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by exploring for oil and
gas near the Reed Bank. None of China's reefs and holdings in the Spratly
Islands entitled it to a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, it added.
Independently, moves like ADIZ to secure Beijings air

zone guarantee full nuclear exchange
Billings, 15 Lee Billings is an editor at Scientific American covering space
and physics, Citing Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of
the Stimson Center, and James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, The
Scientific American, August 10, 2015, War in Space May Be Closer Than
Ever, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closerthan-ever/
The worlds most worrisome military flashpoint is arguably not in the Strait of
Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Iran, Israel, Kashmir or Ukraine. In fact, it
cannot be located on any map of Earth, even though it is very easy to find. To
see it, just look up into a clear sky, to the no-mans-land of Earth orbit, where
a conflict is unfolding that is an arms race in all but name. The emptiness of
outer space might be the last place youd expect militaries to vie over
contested territory, except that outer space isnt so empty anymore. About
1,300 active satellites wreathe the globe in a crowded nest of orbits,
providing worldwide communications, GPS navigation, weather forecasting
and planetary surveillance. For militaries that rely on some of those satellites
for modern warfare, space has become the ultimate high ground, with the
U.S. as the undisputed king of the hill. Now, as China and Russia aggressively
seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space
programs of their own, the power struggle risks sparking a conflict that
could cripple [destroy] the entire planets space-based infrastructure.
And though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite fullblown war on Earth. The long-simmering tensions are now approaching
a boiling point due to several events, including recent and ongoing tests of
possible anti-satellite weapons by China and Russia, as well as last months
failure of tension-easing talks at the United Nations. Testifying before
Congress earlier this year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
echoed the concerns held by many senior government officials about the
growing threat to U.S. satellites, saying that China and Russia are both
developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict, such as those that
might erupt over Chinas military activities in the South China Sea or
Russias in Ukraine. China in particular, Clapper said, has demonstrated the
need to interfere with, damage and destroy U.S. satellites, referring to a
series of Chinese anti-satellite missile tests that began in 2007. There are
many ways to disable or destroy satellites beyond provocatively blowing
them up with missiles. A spacecraft could simply approach a satellite and
spray paint over its optics, or manually snap off its communications
antennas, or destabilize its orbit. Lasers can be used to temporarily disable or
permanently damage a satellites components, particularly its delicate
sensors, and radio or microwaves can jam or hijack transmissions to or from
ground controllers. In response to these possible threats, the Obama
administration has budgeted at least $5 billion to be spent over the next five
years to enhance both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the U.S.
military space program. The U.S. is also attempting to tackle the problem
through diplomacy, although with minimal success; in late July at the United
Nations, long-awaited discussions stalled on a European Union-drafted code
of conduct for spacefaring nations due to opposition from Russia, China and
several other countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Iran. The
failure has placed diplomatic solutions for the growing threat in limbo, likely
leading to years of further debate within the UNs General Assembly. The
bottom line is the United States does not want conflict in outer space, says
Frank Rose, assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and
compliance, who has led American diplomatic efforts to prevent a space arms
race. The U.S., he says, is willing to work with Russia and China to keep space
secure. But let me make it very clear: we will defend our space assets if
attacked. Offensive space weapons tested The prospect of war in space is
not new. Fearing Soviet nuclear weapons launched from orbit, the U.S. began
testing anti-satellite weaponry in the late 1950s. It even tested nuclear
bombs in space before orbital weapons of mass destruction were banned
through the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of 1967. After the ban, spacebased surveillance became a crucial component of the Cold War, with
satellites serving as one part of elaborate early-warning systems on alert for
the deployment or launch of ground-based nuclear weapons. Throughout
most of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. developed and tested space mines, selfdetonating spacecraft that could seek and destroy U.S. spy satellites by
peppering them with shrapnel. In the 1980s, the militarization of space
peaked with the Reagan administrations multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense
Initiative, dubbed Star Wars, to develop orbital countermeasures against
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. And in 1985, the U.S. Air Force
staged a clear demonstration of its formidable capabilities, when an F-15
fighter jet launched a missile that took out a failing U.S. satellite in low-Earth
orbit. Through it all, no full-blown arms race or direct conflicts erupted.
According to Michael Krepon, an arms-control expert and co-founder of the
Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., that was because both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. realized how vulnerable their satellites wereparticularly
the ones in geosynchronous orbits of about 35,000 kilometers or more.
Such satellites effectively hover over one spot on the planet, making them
sitting ducks. But because any hostile action against those satellites could
easily escalate to a full nuclear exchange on Earth, both superpowers
backed down. Neither one of us signed a treaty about this, Krepon says.
We just independently came to the conclusion that our security would be
worse off if we went after those satellites, because if one of us did it, then the
other guy would, too. Today, the situation is much more complicated. Lowand high-Earth orbits have become hotbeds of scientific and commercial
activity, filled with hundreds upon hundreds of satellites from about 60
different nations. Despite their largely peaceful purposes, each and every
satellite is at risk, in part because not all members of the growing club of
military space powers are willing to play by the same rulesand they dont
have to, because the rules remain as yet unwritten.
AT: No ADIZ
China established an ADIZ in 2013 theyll do it again
ABC news 6/5/16 (ABC news online, China should prepare for military
confrontation in South China Sea, Newspaper declares,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-05/china-should-prepare-forconfrontation-in-south-china-sea/7571128) //AS
About $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year though the energyrich, strategic waters of the South China Sea, where China's territorial claims
overlap in parts with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
In joint editorials in its Chinese and English editions, the state-run Global
Times said the dispute, having already been complicated by US intervention,
now faces further escalation due to the threat posed by the tribunal to
China's sovereignty. "Washington has deployed two carrier battle groups
around the South China Sea, and it wants to send a signal by flexing its
muscles: As the biggest powerhouse in the region, it awaits China's
obedience," it said. China should speed up developing its military
deterrence abilities, the paper added. "Even though China cannot keep up
with the US militarily in the short-term, it should be able to let the US pay a
cost it cannot stand if it intervenes in the South China Sea dispute by force,"
it said. "China hopes disputes can be resolved by talks, but it must be
prepared for any military confrontation. This is common sense in
international relations." The newspaper is published by the ruling Communist
Party's official People's Daily, and while it is widely read in policy-making
circles, it does not have the same mouthpiece function as its parent and its
editorials cannot be viewed as representing government policy. It is also wellknown for its extreme nationalist views. China, which has been angered by
US patrols in the South China Sea, will be holding military drills in the waters
starting from Wednesday. China's Defence Ministry said the drills were
routine, the official China Daily reported. Manila has sought to dial down
tensions with its powerful neighbour ahead of the decision, but resisted
pressure to ignore the ruling. "The reality is that nobody wants a conflict,
nobody wants to resolve our conflict in a violent manner, nobody wants war,"
Philippines Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay told ANC television. "It is my
understanding that the President would like to maintain stronger, better
relationships with everybody, including China, including the United States,
including Japan and all," Mr Yasay said, adding that a "special envoy" was
needed to help resolve the dispute. US officials have expressed concern that
The Hague court ruling could prompt Beijing to declare an air defence
identification zone, or ADIZ, as it did over the East China Sea in 2013, or step
up the pace of reclamation and construction on its holdings in the disputed
region.
AT: No Escalation
Miscalc from an Air defense identification zone is likely
and triggers U.S. China war prefer Chinese officials
Hunt and Hume 7/13
(Katie and Tim Katie is the senior digital producer for CNN International,
editor of China section. Tim works for CNNs Hong Kong bureau. Has South
China Sea ruling set scene for next global conflict? CNN
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-china-sea-global-conflict-risks/
7/13/2016)//masonw
Hong Kong (CNN) Could an old map bring Asia to the brink of war ? An international
tribunal ruled Tuesday that China's nine-dash line -- drawn on a map dating from the 1940s that claims
large stretches of the South China Sea -- has no legal basis. It was an eviscerating verdict for Beijing, which
has long claimed it has unique, historical rights to the disputed waters which are rich in resources and a
busy thoroughfare for international shipping. "It
will certainly intensify conflict and even

confrontation," said Cui Tankui, China's ambassador to the United States, in a
speech in Washington. Analysts say the ruling, which went overwhelmingly in favor of the
Philippines, narrows China's wiggle room for negotiation in the dispute. " It will further escalate
nationalist sentiment in a big nation like China," said Wang Jiangyu, law professor
with the National University of Singapore. "In fact, it has immediately forced many
of China's moderates to become hawks." Risk of miscalculation Ashley Townshend,
research fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, said that if the ruling had been a
less emphatic victory for the U.S.-allied Philippines, then it may have proved a "bit of a firebreak" for
the international
tribunal delivered a resounding verdict against Beijing , and in response, China
might be less concerned with managing its reputation in the eyes of the world, and
less troubled about being seen as an international lawbreaker. Why it's so tense in the
South China Sea 01:17 Anton Alifandi, principal Asia analyst for IHS, said the big worry was that
there would be an interstate war involving the major powers -- the U.S.,
China and the countries of southeast Asia. But, he said, the stakes were so high that it
regional tensions, opening up space for negotiation over the issue. Instead,
was highly unlikely in the medium term that China would deliberately escalate tensions to a point where
the U.S. would retaliate -- as to do so would lead to a defeat for China, and a loss of legitimacy. However,
he said, "there
is always a risk of miscalculation , that is the danger." "If one side plays
brinkmanship and thinks the other side will back down and you miscalculate, things can get
out of hand quite quickly." 'First act' Townshend said that it was in no-one's interest that the
region -- which has $5 trillion worth of trade pass through its waters annually -- become the setting of a
next global conflict between China and United States. "But it would be a mistake to argue that the risks are
The risks are high," he said. He said that China would be "acutely aware of the
risks of unintended escalation," but it would now be under domestic pressure to register its
low.
defiance of the verdict and demonstrate that it had no intention of changing its position. Shen Dingli,
professor and associate dean at the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, said
China's behavior in the South China Sea, where it's turned sandbars into islands equipped with military
airstrips, was unlikely to change. However, he saw hope in the Philippines' surprisingly muted reaction to
the verdict. The country's foreign secretary spoke for only two minutes Tuesday at a press conference,
calling it a milestone decision that experts were now analyzing. "The Philippines has exercised restraint
and didn't issue an aggressive statement," said Shen. "The verdict is the first act. The second act could be
more promising if it involves negotiation." It's a view that was raised Wednesday by Liu Zhenmin, China's
vice foreign minister. He hoped the Philippines would view the ruling as a "scrap of paper" so bilateral
negotiations could resume. Chinese FM: China has noted the positive statements by President Rodrigo
Duterte, and stands ready to work with the new Philippine govt Bitter pill Nonetheless, to be told by the
court that Beijing was at fault and the U.S.-allied Philippines was the aggrieved party, would be "a
massively bitter pill for China to swallow," said Townshend. "We're talking about a country that genuinely
believes in the historical narrative that it has presented and that has very strong nationalist overtones," he
said. "It's
a country that is more than anything sensitive to being humiliated, especially

at the hands of what it sees as European imperialists . That's a very strong
motivator for their actions in the South China Sea." China published a map in 1948 outlining its claims
in the South China Sea. The map becomes the basis of the "nine-dash line" -- the foundation of
China's current territorial claims. China published a map in 1948 outlining its claims in the South
China Sea. The map becomes the basis of the "nine-dash line" -- the foundation of China's current
territorial claims. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, an initiative at the Center for Strategic and
acts of
retaliation could include increased island-building activities, a blockade of
Philippines marines, such as had been carried out in 2014, or the declaration of an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea. As when China
declared an ADIZ over the East China Sea in 2013, other powers could quickly move to defy the
zone, but civilian air traffic would likely comply. Such a move would increase the risk of
incidents between air forces, it said. Asserting what China sees as historical rights in the South
China Sea has been a massive priority for President Xi Jinping, said Shen. " China used to be
brutalized by other powers. The British sold us opium, Japanese raped
Nanjing. These bad memories still affect us. As China rises, we ought to restore these rights," said Shen.
"We were the first to discover the place in the entirety. We have maps, books and records.
International Studies that monitors developments in the region, said in a briefing paper that
For three decades our claims met no challenge or confrontation."
Chinese officials threaten to build an Air defense

identification zone escalates
Wong and Gomez 7/13
(Gillian Wong and Jim Gomez, Gillian is The Greater China News Director at
Associated Press, Jim Gomez is The Associated Press Chief Correspondent in
Manila, Philippines. China Says It Could Declare Air Zone Over South China
Sea ABC News http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-blamesphilippines-stirring-trouble-dispute-40536519 2016)//masonw
China warned other countries Wednesday against threatening its security in the South China Sea after an international
Vice
Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said Beijing could declare an air defense
identification zone over the waters if it felt threatened, a move that would sharply
escalate tensions. But Beijing also extended an olive branch to the new Philippine government, saying the
tribunal handed the Philippines a victory by saying Beijing had no legal basis for its expansive claims there.
Southeast Asian nation would benefit from cooperating with China. The Philippines, under a U.N. treaty governing the
seas, had sought arbitration in 2013 on several issues related to its long-running territorial disputes with China. In its
ruling Tuesday, the tribunal found China's far-reaching claims to the South China Sea had no legal basis and that Beijing
had violated the Philippines' maritime rights by building up artificial islands and disrupting fishing and oil exploration.
Liu said the islands in the South China

Sea were China's "inherent territory" and blamed the Philippines for stirring
up trouble. "If our security is being threatened, of course we have the right to demarcate a
zone. This would depend on our overall assessment," Liu said in a briefing . "We
While introducing a policy paper in response to the ruling,
hope that other countries will not take this opportunity to threaten China and work with China to protect the peace and
2013, China set up an air

defense identification zone over disputed islands in the E ast China Sea, requiring
all aircraft entering the area to notify Chinese authorities or be subjected to
stability of the South China Sea, and not let it become the origin of a war." In
"emergency military measures" if they disobey orders from Beijing. The U.S. and
others refuse to recognize the zone.
ADIZ causes all hell to break loose

Saludo 7/13 (Ricardo, Master of Science (MS) degree, major in public
policy and management, from the University of London. After the UN case,
Duterte calls the US-China match Manila Times
http://www.manilatimes.net/after-the-un-case-duterte-calls-the-us-chinamatch/273591/ 2016)//masonw
[Second of three parts] WITH the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling for the Philippines in its case
challenging Chinas nine-dash line claim over most of the South China Sea, the geopolitical ball is now in
Rodrigo Dutertes court. How the Philippines new President plays would impact the next round of highstakes rivalry between America and China for preeminence in East Asia. Why Duterte? How can the leader
of a nation with the weakest military in the region call the shots in the match between Chinawith the
largest armed forces on the planetand the United States, which has the most powerful? Ask
Washingtons former ambassador to Manila Kristie Kenney. Now a high-ranking State Department
counselor, the veteran diplomat is in town to meet with top officials. Her likely mission: to keep the
US-Philippines alliance intact, and to ensure that the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) boosting American forces in the archipelago and giving
them access to Philippine bases stays on track. Thats the big if in Sino-American
rivalry that President Duterte now holds in his raised fist: Will he implement the EDCA in full,
prompting China to escalate even more its South China Sea forces as a
counterweight to US deployment in the Philippines? The confrontation scenario So
whats looming in Round 2 of the US-China bout? Lets look at three scenarios: confrontation, conciliation,
and collective security.
The confrontation scenario assumes the continued

adversarial stance of the Philippines and its allies toward China , and vice-versa.
With the PCA giving international legal teeth to our nations claims under the UN Convention on the Law of
there will be even greater political, public, media and international

impetus for the Duterte administration to push hard against Beijing in the
South China Sea, despite our Presidents avowed wish to mend fences with the Chinese. Kenneys visit
and US Defense Secretary Ashton Carters call to his new Philippine counterpart will likely be
followed by similar exhortations from Japan and other allies for Duterte to maintain the
assertive course. If he bites, then the coming years, if not decades, would see even more
tension and military buildup in the South China Seapossibly even a shooting war. With
US forces rotating in the Philippines and establishing facilities in five bases, the Peoples
Liberation Army cannot but further escalate its naval and air deployment on
the high seas. The PLA must protect the mainland and its vital sea lanes in the South China Sea,
the Sea,
where four-fifths of Chinese oil imports passboth within range of nuclear-capable cruise missiles on
American vessels and aircraft in the archipelago. As China expands military-capable facilities in the
Spratlys, the US would likely send more ships and planes to monitor and challenge
Chinese actions, especially those asserting territorial rights voided by the PCA ruling, or imposing
The latter includes the feared declaration of an air

defense identification zone like the ADIZ imposed in the East China Sea in 2013. In this cauldron
of geopolitical and military rivalry, accidents and miscalculations would be more and
more likely, triggering violent incidents. These conflicts would then provoke even
more animosity, one-upmanship, arms escalation, and confrontationespecially if the peoples of
rival powers get more agitated and pressed for aggressive actions. Amid this
intensifying rivalry, the Philippines would be a frontline state , whose territory would
necessarily be targeted by Chinese ballistic missiles ready to neutralize US forces
restrictions on vessels and aircraft.
in the archipelago, plus the Cebu, Cagayan de Oro, Nueva Ecija, Palawan, and Pampanga bases
used by them. China would treat the Philippines as America did Cuba , which nearly
hosted Russian nukes, just as we now harbor nuclear-capable US naval and air
assets. One possible target of Beijings reprisal: 170,000 Filipino domestic helpers in Hong Kong.
AT: US Abides ADIZ

The US would ignore ADIZ empirics
Money Morning 7/13 (News publisher with ten market experts with
more than 250 years of combined investing experience, cites reporter with ill
spent 22 years as a journalist, most of it covering financial news as a
reporter, columnist, and editor that included stints with Gannett Co. Inc., and
The Baltimore Sun. Will the U.S. Go to War with China Over the South China
Sea? http://moneymorning.com/2016/07/13/will-the-u-s-go-to-war-withchina-over-the-south-china-sea/ 2016)//masonw
The U.S.-China War Could Happen in the Sky War with China U.S. aircraft carriers on patrol
in the South China Sea China may also respond by soon declaring an air-defense
identification zone over the South China Sea, as it did over the East China Sea in 2013. By
implementing this zone, China would require any aircraft entering its airspace to identify itself. Image
This may not seem like a

particularly stark or subversive move, but the United States, you see, has a history
of ignoring China's air-defense ID zones. Since China has been (illegally)
building airstrips on shoals and reefs in the South China Sea , it could deploy
fighter aircraft to these regions shortly before declaring the entire sea an airdefense identification zone. This would provoke another one of Patalon's "triggers" only
caption: U.S. aircraft carriers on patrol in the South China Sea.
from the U.S this time. as American aircraft carriers are already traversing the disputed area. One takeoff and we'd be invading China's declared air space. Is War With China Imminent? There
are some optimists out there who think we won't go to war with China. For example, Dr. Taylor Fravel, an
international security expert at MIT, told the Christian Science Monitor yesterday that the next outcome
could be all about "quiet diplomacy behind the scenes." You see,
China could simply choose to
ignore the ruling and proceed with its activities in violation of the tribunal's decision. China could
realize that the $5 trillion in trade that passes through the region annually is of more importance to
everyone involved. This would keep the U.S. Navy present in the South China Sea to instate its "freedom of
navigation" front. Basically, things could proceed just as they were pre-ruling, for now. Also, bilateral talks
whatever
happens next in the global dispute, the United States will most certainly
remain a key player. "The bottom line," writes Patalon, "no matter who ends up in the White
between China and the Philippines might help. But it's important to remember that,
House, the North Korea/South China Sea standoff will rank high on their 'trouble spots' list. And that means
defense spending especially on new technologies will be a good long-term bet for investors" What
Investors Need to Know About the South China Sea Showdown As one of the first market analysts to warn
about Beijing's desire to cordon off the South China Sea (he even beat The New York Times to the media
punch), Patalon wants everyone to understand the delicate balance at stake in the situation. No matter
what the outcome, there are profits to be made. And Patalon knows just where those opportunities lie
take a look
Cyber A-O2ac
South China Sea arbitration risks U.S. China cyber and
space war
Seidel 7/13 (Jamie, Network Digital News Producer at News Corporation,
Australia. South China Sea escalations leave analysts wondering who would
win if war broke out New Zealand Herald
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?
c_id=2&objectid=11673827 )//masonw
large-scale war will likely be fought over
cyberspace. In particular, the data-hungry combat computers aboard US-built
warplanes, tanks and warships are reliant on a constant, steady stream of
networked information. Halt the flow, and the "brain" becomes starved. It's largely a network of
space-based sensor and relay satellites that keeps this stream flowing. While space itself is an arena
barred from conflict under the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 , the treaty is
looking increasingly shaky. China is believed to have tested a satellite-killer
missile in 2007. The resulting cloud of high-speed debris still poses a threat to delicate orbital
Space / Cyberspace For the first time,
equipment. But choking the flow of data does not need projectiles: a few well-placed pieces of malware
Defending such vital, but vulnerable,

links in a data network poses a serious - and as-yet largely untested - challenge. At stake
can collapse whole networks at a strategically sensitive time.
is a huge array of "force multiplying" technologies, from global positioning systems for pinpoint accuracy
Militaries have become highly reliant on the

ability to instantly transmit massive amounts of data - such as high-resolution video through to high-definition spy devices.
from one side of the world of the other. And it's all the intelligence amassed by such means that must to be
Pull
the plug and many believe these advanced aircraft - and tanks and warships - are at risk
of becoming helpless.
processed into meaningful icons transmitted into the heads-up displays of F-35 strike fighter pilots.
Solves/Aff Key
SolvesCode of Conduct
The US has leverage China will change its conduct in the
SCS in exchange for Arctic status
Jones 14 Bruce Jones is vice president and director of the Foreign Policy
program at Brookings and a senior fellow in the Institution's Project on
International Order, Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the
Tension between Rivalry and Restraint, https://books.google.com/books?
id=B70WAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA207&lpg=PA207&dq=china+seeking+
%22full+membership
%22+arctic+council&source=bl&ots=e_ie9afx5B&sig=IvjZPk_OW9UE5UFglq
H_sUAs4zw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwicgN62883NAhXMJx4KHRuoBSQQ6A
EILjAD#v=onepage&q=china%20seeking%20%22full%20membership
%22%20arctic%20council&f=false //Deej
The United States could also lead efforts to expand the kind of informal,
deconfliction, and conflict-avoidance arrangements that have been forged in
the Arctic. It missed a major opportunity in 2013 when China and India
applied for observer status in the Arctic Council. I believe that the councils
response to China should have been to say, Yes, you can have observer
seats in the Arctic Council where you have strong interests in both energy
and trade the day after you sign a code of conduct to regulate behavior and
to limit crises in the South China Sea. Instead, the Arctic Council allowed
China to become an observer with the hope that such participation would
change Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. Still, China will one day
want full membership in the council, so some leverage still exists. A global
maritime regime, built around some of the lessons of the Arctic, would
increase the possibilities for more stable arrangements in the South and East
China Seas.
SolvesSignal
The ruling is causing Beijing to prepare for war in the SCS
to spur nationalism the affs signal of cooperation is key
Coonan 7/9 2016 (Clifford, A Trinity graduate and long-time Reuters
correspondent, reporter for the Irish Times in Beijing Armed conflict threat as
regional rivals await South China Sea ruling
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/armed-conflict-threat-asregional-rivals-await-south-china-sea-ruling-1.2715377)//masonw
Days before an international arbitration court rules on the disputed
territory in the South China Sea, the threat of armed conflict hangs over the
Asia Pacific. Beijing has stepped up sovereignty claims and is accusing the US
of trying to isolate China. Although US president Barack Obamas plan to build an Asian Pivot is
on the back burner, the US has been steadily expanding its influence , publicly voicing its
disapproval of what it sees as Chinas militarisation of the South China Sea. It has sent aircraft
carriers to the area and is staging military exercises with allies. Annoyed major players
Asdf
China believes Washington is trying to become more powerful in the Asia Pacific region at Chinas expense,
but Beijing is finding it difficult to find sympathy locally, as it has annoyed nearly all the main regional
players including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, with its claims and aggressive
activities in the maritime region. One of these is a land reclamation programme in the Spratly archipelago.
Chinas sovereignty claims are based on the nine-dash line which encompasses
nearly all of the South China Sea, including the Spratlys, the Paracels and remote sandbars. The
Philippines has asked the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to affirm
its right to areas within 200 nautical miles of its coastline , under the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While the nine-dash claim will most likely be
ruled inconsistent with the UN convention, China is expected to ignore the ruling. Foreign ministry
spokesman Hong Lei said China exerted indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and
clear position of not

accepting nor recognising any ruling made by the arbitral tribunal set up at the
the adjacent waters. The Chinese government holds a consistent and
unilateral request of the Philippines, said Hong. An article in the Communist Partys organ Qiushi
described the arbitration as a political farce under legal pretexts aiming to fake a new reality which
provokes both principles of international law and order. Control of the region is strategically important,
because 4.5 trillion in maritime trade passes through it every year, and the South China Sea contains rich
oil and gas reserves. Satellite footage shows China has installed runways that can carry military aircraft
and placed surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. Yu Lingli, a commentator on USChina relations, said. With
its strong economic growth and greater economic prowess, China

is better able to protect its boundaries, so the US now accuses China of
changing its position and challenging the world order. But lets not forget, this all
started with the US decision to expand its strategic position in the Asia Pacific region. The US shouldnt be
involved, said Yu. Beijing is staging military manoeuvres in the region ahead of the
ruling and state media are full of editorials attacking the US and denying accusations it is trying to bully its
smaller neighbours. In one show, Beyond the Waves, the state broadcaster CCTV accused the US of trying
to isolate China. The
US has spared no effort to drive a wedge between China and
its neighbours, said one commentator, while another said: Would you accept a traffic court giving a
verdict on the status of your property? Another presenter said: When you claim your every right to the
The state newspaper Global Times even urged

the military to prepare for confrontation. I personally dont think there will be an
South China Sea, you go too far.
armed conflict. So far, the US and surrounding countries in the South China Sea are putting on a lot of
pressure and competing for public opinion and support, said Yu. Historical claim Chinas claim has no
formal basis outside the countrys own maritime laws, but the government claims a historical foundation,
saying China was the first country to discover and name the island group, and has a history of continuous
After the ruling, the big question will be how China

proceeds. If it ignores the ruling, and flouts international law, it could further
aggravate nerves in the region and eventually armed conflict could
use and authority over 2,000 years.
result. Some believe there can still be dialogue that will not involve Beijing giving ground on an issue it has
made central to its ambition to boost its standing in the area by matching its economic strength with
strategic influence. China and the Philippines, after the arbitration decision, can renew their negotiations
and settle the issues by taking account of the decision without formally mentioning it. Face
is
crucial, of course. But with every Beijing propaganda blast, it will become harder to save, wrote Jerome
A Cohen, director of the US-Asia Law Institute at New York University.
ILArctic Council Key

The Arctic Council is key to resolving misunderstandings
Koivura and Graczyk 14 Timo, Research Professor, Director of the Northern Institute for
Environmental and Minority Law, Arctic Centre/University of Lapland, Finland; and Piotr, Research Fellow at
the Department of Sociology, Political Science and Community Planning, University of Troms, Norway.
"The future of the Arctic Council: Navigating between Sovereignty and Security." International Relations
and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance. Edited by Robert W. Murray, Vice President of
Research at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy and an adjunct professor of political science at the
University of Alberta; and Anita Dey Nuttall, associate director of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute at the
University of Alberta. Pg. 453-455. Print, LM.
the Arctic Council is the only intergovernmental body covering the

whole area of the Arctic. Together with the initial stage of the AEPS, the AC contributed
significantly to the deepening of interaction and confidence building in the
post-Cold War Arctic, becoming an example of a successful project to
enhance regional stability and creating an innovative and sustainable model of
cooperation.57 A practically open mandate (albeit limited in individual cases to the lack of
consent to engage in certain areas, or a consensus to postpone them); allows for the initiating of
projects relevant to current developments on the most pertinent issues
emerging in the region. Unconstrained exchange of views between representatives of
governments and indigenous peoples' organizations contributes to faster and more
appropriate actions to solve common problems. Although lacking the ability
to make legally binding decisions, the Arctic Council has proved to be quite
successful in resolving certain issues by promoting them in the relevant
institutions that have such powers. Most countries in the Arctic seem to believe that the
Nevertheless,
essential and unique mission of the AC is basically to deal with problems of the Arctic at a high political
level.58 According to the most-shared view between the member countries, it should act as a decision-
the importance of this institution

is revealed primarily through its ability to generate knowledge and encourage
innovation in approaches to the issues arising from the predictions about the
consequences of climate change in the Arctic. This is done primarily by providing
guidance, best practices and expertise to other international fora where
decisions can be made. Here the question emerges whether these developments and
the work of AC projects have indirectly contributed to stability and thus security in
the region. If yes, in what manner has it happened? Although one may argue that it is inadequate to
perceive the Arctic Council as a secu-rity-relevant institution, there are certain insights that can be
derived from the AC's role in enhancing regional stabili ty. First and foremost, the
projects and assessments create a common understanding of issues and thus
limit the possibility of different views on the fundamentals and facts. Interaction and
joint ventures mitigate the potential for conflicts and disputes on new and unexpected
questions that may emerge. This in turn results in an increased predictability,
which is essential for maintaining peaceful and effective cooperation. Second, the
council enhances stability by its very existence and by providing the "first choice"
channel for discussions on the Arctic issues within its mandate. This is further
strengthened by a rather rigid calendar of meetings and activities as well as
continued dialogue. Third, the council plays a crucial role in alleviating
misunderstandings both among Arctic countries and between them and nonshaping rather than decision-making body.59 Nevertheless,
Arctic actors by providing the forum and services for discussion, information
exchange and jointly generated knowledge. It proved to be particularly
important, though not always successful, in communicating to the world, especially
after the heated and media-driven debate following the flag planting by a
Russian expedition, that there is peaceful and well-established cooperation going on
in the region. Hence, it contributes to mitigating the perception of the Arctic as
a place for potential conflict and disputes over access to natural resources.
ILQPQ Key
China will say yes using the ruling as a bargaining chip
to apply gradual solutions solves
Rosenfeld 5/12 Everett, Staff Writer, CNBC; cites Peter Dutton, Peter Dutton, professor and
director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College and Greg Poling, irector of the
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Sweeping
ruling against China will have lasting impact globally." CNBC. www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/south-china-seabreathtaking-ruling-against-china-to-have-lasting-impact.html
Most experts who spoke with CNBC said they expected the tribunal to rule against China although others
said that the ruling may have been more limited. But no matter what happened, China repeatedly said it
experts said a big legal victory for the Philippines

could serve as a bargaining chip against Beijing in any future disputes. "Big
picture: The ruling is going to be critical in the long term, but it doesn't change
anything on July 13," Poling said. "China's not going to suddenly roll over and say, 'You got me. '
But if you're looking for how to pressure Beijing in the long term, (China will)
have it hanging over its head." While the immediate response from Beijing has
been defiance, there could be compromises down the road. "I see no chance
at all that Beijing will soften its stance in the near term, but the power of a
decision such as this is in its long-term impact," Dutton said. "Over time, this
decision will inevitably be the basis for resolution of the disputes in the South
China Sea. Equally inevitable is that a final resolution will be through negotiation
would not abide by the decision. Still,
between the parties. But I believe there will still be a long road ahead."
ILUS Key**
The US has leverage after the ruling to encourage China
to abide by arbitration but it has to push
Waxman, 14 Matthew, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, as well
as Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law & Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations and Member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National
Security & Law. He previously served in senior positions in the U.S. State
Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council. INTENSE
MANEUVERS AT THE HAGUE, Asia Maritime Tranportation Initiative (AMTI),
part of the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). Dec 23,
http://amti.csis.org/intense-maneuvers-at-the-hague/ --br
In 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitration proceedings in the Hague
against China over disputed South China Sea maritime claims and in doing
so it challenged legally of Chinas nine-dash line claims over much of that
area. Both states are parties to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which allows for binding dispute resolution through the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. China has boycotted the proceedings, arguing that in
ratifying UNCLOS it had opted out of mandatory dispute settlement of
matters relating to sea boundaries. Some expect the Permanent Court of
Arbitration to reach a decision on jurisdiction a preliminary ruling on
whether it has authority to reach the ultimate merits in 2015. More likely,
though, it will schedule a hearing on the issue next year, which China will
probably boycott, and even that preliminary decision on jurisdiction will not
occur until 2016 because the jurisdictional arguments are so intertwined with
complex issues that go to the ultimate merits. The legal maneuvering in 2015
will be intense, though, because the stakes are high. For the parties
themselves, even an ultimate decision on the merits of these issues may not
settle the disputes, because China may ignore an arbitral ruling that it
regards as illegitimate. But in the meantime, a decision on jurisdiction will
shift diplomatic leverage one direction or the other. For the United States,
which is a treaty ally of the Philippines, a decision in the Hague that accepts
jurisdiction could exacerbate tension between two policy tenets: that the
United States does not take a position on competing sovereignty claims in the
South China Sea and that it promotes settlement of disputes according to
international law. Perhaps the United States can push harder for all parties,
including China, to abide by arbitral decisions, but doing so is awkward
because the United States has not itself ratified UNCLOS and thereby
subjected itself to binding dispute resolution. For the UNCLOS system as a
body of rules and binding dispute settlement mechanisms prominence and
credibility are at stake. A decision that the arbitral panel has jurisdiction
would push UNCLOS and its international adjudicators further to the fore
of disputes in this regional hotspot. In doing so, however, the arbitral panel
would risk being ignored, derided and marginalized by the biggest player in
the region.
AT: Diplomacy Fails

Diplomacy is necessary even if it isnt sufficient their arg just
proves a whole-of-government approach is key
Garamone 16 --- DoD News Defense Media Activity (International Court to Rule on
Maritime Dispute in the South China Sea, Jim Garamone, U.S. Department of Defense, July 8,
2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/831560/international-court-to-rule-onmaritime-dispute-in-the-south-china-sea)//chiragjain
WASHINGTON, July 08, 2016 An international arbitral tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands will soon rule on the
interpretation of international law governing maritime claims in the South China Sea, and American
officials urged
China to accept the courts ruling, a senior Defense Department official told Congress yesterday. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration will decide a case brought by the Philippines in 2013 over the Scarborough Shoals. Both
United
States is interested in maintaining the sea lines of communication through
international waterways and airways, Abraham M. Denmark, the deputy assistant secretary of
the Philippines and China claim sovereignty over the area. Maintaining Sea Lines of Communication The
defense for East Asia, said at a joint hearing of two subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee here. The
courts ruling will mark an important crossroads for the region , Denmark said. It will
present an opportunity for those in the region to determine whether the AsiaPacifics future will be defined by adherence to international laws and norms
that have enabled it to prosper or that the regions future will be determined
by raw calculations of power, he added. China and the Philippines are two of claimants of areas in the
South China Sea, said Denmark, noting other nations with claims in the area include Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia
South China Sea is

a critical world crossroads, with trillions of dollars worth of goods transiting
through the region. The U.S. Navy has patrolled the sea since World War II ,
and Taiwan. China, he told the joint panel, has said it will not accept the courts ruling. The
creating the stability that has allowed the nations of the region to prosper, Denmark said. It is central to our strategy of
strengthening a principled, rules-based order that enables regional stability and prosperity, he said. China is seeking to
assert its claims through occupation -- literally building islands in the Spratly Islands and placing airfields, harbors and
logistics hubs that could support military aircraft and ships, Denmark said. Working to Ensure Peace, Stability in Region
United States is pursuing a whole-of-government approach to resolving the

problems in the region, he said, noting that the Defense Department is working with the State Department
and others to ensure peace and stability. Denmark said DoD is working along four lines of effort in
the South China Sea. The first is presence. The United States has a credible, powerful capability in the region,
The
he said, that creates stability and provides the space for diplomacy. Weve increased our military presence and were
presence is geographically distributed, operationally resilient and

politically sustainable, he added. The second line of effort is an increase in the tempo of military
ensuring our
operations in the region, he told the panel. Exercises, freedom of navigation exercises and presence operations mean DoD
continues to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows so that others can do the same, Denmark said.
DoD is also working with partner nations to enhance their capabilities and
capacity, particularly through work with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, Denmark said. Finally, we are engaging China directly to reduce
risk. We seek to keep lines of communication with Beijing open and
improve our cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to speak candidly
and constructively when we disagree, he said.
SCS Impact/Yes War
Yes Escalation2ac**
This ev answers every major no escalation claim
Thompson 7/12 -- (Mark Thompson, 7/12/16, "Showdown Now Looming
Over the South China Sea," TIME, http://time.com/4402562/south-china-seahague-ruling/)//A-Sharma
The showdown over the South China Sea began Tuesday when an
international court in The Hague declared that Chinas claims to 90% of the
worlds critical trade route are bogus. Just like an old-time Western, the
lesser-armed folks in townin this case including Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnamhave scurried off into the buildings lining Main
Street. Theyve closed the shutters, leaving them open just enough to
peek nervously as China and the United States prepare for a
confrontation. Chinas sweeping, yet undefined, South China Sea
claims dont hold water, U.S. Naval War College Chinese expert Andrew
Erickson said shortly after the ruling. Looking forward, all parties concerned
must prevent China from grabbing with coercion or force what it could not
and now clearly cannotobtain legally. The five-member panel unanimously
ruled that Beijings claim to nearly all of the South China Sea because of its
historic presence in the region has no merit. As expected, China quickly
rejected the ruling. So what happens now? The South China Sea has instantly
become uncharted waters for the globes two most-powerful nations. The
ruling from the Netherlands, while legally binding, has no mechanism for
enforcement. That means negotiations will be required to ease the growing
territorial tensions in and around the South China Sea. If talks dont happen,
or go nowhereand China continues to refuse to back downa military
clash could occur. U.S. optimists hope that after an initial outburst, the
Chinese will realize the international community has taken a firm stance
against its claims in the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in trade
passes annually. Starting bilateral talks on fishing and oil rights between
China and the Philippines, which brought the case to The Hague, could ease
tensions. The ruling may compel Beijing to curb its dredging in the South
China Sea to create new islets claimed as Chinese territory. But U.S.
pessimists suggest China is more likely to increase its island-building,
and perhaps impose a blockade on Philippine sailors on a desolate
shoal who are based there seeking to declare it as part of the
Philippines. The Chinese blockaded the shoal in 2014. Eventually, Manila
ran that blockade by taking a civilian ship, stuffing it full of supplies, stuffing
it full of foreign journalists and forcing a difficult decision on the Chinese:
`Shoot us out of the water or let us go!and the Chinese backed off,
Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said last
month at a CSIS session. We could very well see a repeat of that
episode with a stronger Chinese response. That, in turn, could lead to a
stronger U.S. response, given the 1951 mutual defense pact between Manila
and Washington. A renewed Chinese blockade of the Second Thomas Shoal

would carry with it the highest risk of kinetic interactionguns being
fired, missiles being launched and/or bombs being droppedwith
the U.S. Air Force or Navy, Asian expert Michael Green said at the
CSIS gathering. China may also respond by declaring an air-defense
identification zone over the South China Sea, as it did over the East China
Sea in 2013. That would require foreign flights to identify themselves to China
before entering. While civilian airlines have complied, the U.S. military has
not. China has been building airstrips on islets in the South China Sea, and
could deploy fighter aircraft to them shortly before declaring the sea a
second air-defense identification zone. At the end of the day thats an
elegant target set for the U.S., CSISs Andrew Shearer said. A pair of
U.S. aircraft carriers is now steaming in the western Pacific. We dont get to
do two-carrier operations very often, Admiral John Richardson, the U.S. chief
of naval operations, said last month. Its a terrific opportunity for us to do
some [training for] high-end war-fighting. But U.S. warships sailing in or
near the South China Sea also represent a fat target for China.
Beijing has spent years developing and deploying the DF-21D
missile, informally known inside the Pentagon as the carrier killer.
The decision also is likely to embolden the U.S. to continueand perhaps
step upits naval patrols in the South China Sea. The U.S. has refused to
acknowledge Chinas claim of sovereignty to much of it, and repeated
freedom of navigation exercises through the disputed waters will serve to
emphasize the American position, which is widely shared by the non-Chinese
nations bordering the sea. Eyeing one another down that deserted Main
Street, both China and the U.S. are wondering if the other is going to reach
for its gun. We have reached a critical turning point, says Jerry Hendrix, a
retired Navy captain now at the Center for a New American Security. The
U.S. and its Navy, in particular, must now consider plans on how it can best
support the international community and uphold the rule of law. All options
must be on the table.
Yes War2ac**
War is coming historic trends and multiple scenarios for
escalation
Seidel 7/13 (Jamie, Network Digital News Producer at News Corporation,
Australia. South China Sea escalations leave analysts wondering who would
win if war broke out New Zealand Herald
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?
c_id=2&objectid=11673827 )//masonw
Analysts are pointing out fundamental similarities between current
events and historical war-generating scenarios. Sparta's fear of the rise
of Athens made war inevitable. Global discomfort with Germany's growing
economic and military influence produced two World Wars. There is little doubt that
Ties that bind
China's rapid growth in economic and military might, and its willingness to flex it, has unsettled the
the US-Soviet Cold

War - avoided a shooting conflict. But that was due to the prospect of nuclear war. Does
such a fear still hold sway? The presences of potential flashpoints are not in
doubt. The United States is bound to come to the assistance of its former
protectorate the Philippines under a 1951 mutual defence treaty . So any
aggressive action by Beijing to claim Scarborough Shoal , just 220km off the
mainland, could become a trigger. It's a similar story with Japan . Washington
signed a mutual defence pact in 1951 to shore up Tokyo's post-World War II pacifist
constitution. And Beijing believes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, claimed by Japan, are rightfully its.
Similar US promises are in place to protec t the interests of South Korea and Taiwan,
and many other nations on the edges of this dispute. The Court of Arbitration ruling
prevailing order of things. But there is hope: One notable clash of empires -
that backs up national claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea will place
The game of diplomatic

brinkmanship is a dangerous one. Especially when played out at sea or in the air. In 2001 a
Chinese fighter jet collided with a US surveillance aircraft over the South China
Sea. The fighter crashed, killing its pilot, while the US aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing
on China's Hainan Island. Its 24-man crew were held prisoner for 11 days. Such an incident now
would likely spark an intense diplomatic crisis. The Rand Corporation recently ran just such a
pressure on the United States to uphold its word. Point of no return
scenario with the Foreign Policy Group. It looked at the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East
China Sea. It traced the fallout from a fictional chain of events sparked when Japanese ultranationalists
plant a flag on one of the rocky outcrops. The scenario rapidly degenerated into a series of escalations,
Neither side backs down.

Accidents happen. Shots are fired. Every move made by Tokyo is met by a
counter-escalation by Beijing. And vice-versa. Japan eventually invokes its 1951
mutual defence treaty with the United States. But it's not a scenario limited to Japan. It
including China's deployment of warships to arrest the activists.
could easily be applied to Scarborough Shoal. Beijing's artificial islands have built up its ability to project
power across the nine-dash line in a way that was not possible from the mainland or Hainan Island. But
Scarborough Shoal, currently held by the Philippines, remains strategically significant

as a stepping stone to an area otherwise outside of China's missile or combat aircraft range. Then
there is the contested ownership of the Spratley Islands, or one of any number of other contested reefs. At
sea The Rand Corporation projected a fatal clash between a Chinese coast guard vessel and protesting
Japanese trawlers near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as being the flashpoint for its war game. Ultimately
the inability of Beijing, Tokyo and Washington to back down
in the face of public and
makes conflict inevitable. Eventually, in this scenario, Japanese

submarines sink the Chinese coast guard ships in retaliation. Beijing's projected response: an
enormous cyber-attack on US, Japanese and Asian electrical and essential
services networks, followed up by wave after wave of conventionally armed
missile strikes against key Japanese military facilities. The scenario predicts early heavy
international pressure
losses for the Japanese navy. This would likely also apply to any other Asian nation drawn into conflict with
missile-armed submarines remain in the

conflict zone. According to the Rand Corporation: "US missiles rain down on the Chinese
homeland; Japanese commercial freighters explode on the high seas ; China's
shiny new navy is quickly shrinking under relentless undersea attacks . In
reprisal, Chinese forces obliterate Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and take a
potshot with a carrier-killer missile at the USS George Washington , damaging it
their few older and less capable vessels. Soon only
and forcing it out of the area. The casualty toll is appalling on all sides, with thousands dead." The sobering
prospect of a massed missile strike was the subject of a study by the US-China Economic and Security
US
military hub on the Pacific island of Guam to defend itself against what could
become a second Pearl Harbour-style surprise attack. "Such attacks could hold
Review Commission earlier this year. In particular, it expressed concern at the ability of a major
key US assets stationed on Guam at risk and also disrupt their region-wide response effort, slowing
deployment timetables and reducing the effectiveness of US forces in the theatre," the report reads.
Essentially,
without Guam the US military's ability to project power in and around the
would be greatly reduced.
East and South China Seas
Yes WarArms Race

South China Sea tensions are leading to an arms race to
challenge the U.S.
Money Morning 7/13 (News publisher with ten market experts with
more than 250 years of combined investing experience, cites reporter with ill
spent 22 years as a journalist, most of it covering financial news as a
reporter, columnist, and editor that included stints with Gannett Co. Inc., and
The Baltimore Sun. Will the U.S. Go to War with China Over the South China
Sea? http://moneymorning.com/2016/07/13/will-the-u-s-go-to-war-withchina-over-the-south-china-sea/ 2016)//masonw
China suffered a major defeat yesterday (Tuesday) as an international court The Hague Tribunal
rebuked the country's claims on waters home to the busiest shipping routes in the world. The judges ruled that the portion
of the South China Sea claimed by both China and the Philippines belongs solely to the Philippines. Furthermore, the court
concluded that Chinese efforts to create man-made islands expansionary tactics it's imposed for the sake of regional
dominance on top of atolls and reefs in the region were illegal. If China rejects The Hague's ruling
with further attempts to alter the South China Sea by dredging additional islands, or if the country continues to claim
it will likely be seen by much of the world as an

"outlaw on the wrong side of justice," reported Time Tuesday. Here's why that could mean war with
China Will the U.S. Go to War with China in the South China Sea? The U nited States
has long backed the Philippines' claim in the S outh China Sea dispute and has
positioned itself in the territory to maintain "freedom of navigation" for the sake of
global trade. But China sees the U.S.' position as nothing but self-interested . Before
more territories in the disputed region,
yesterday's ruling, China made numerous threats to the U.S. about its involvement. It also vowed to completely ignore
Beijing indeed says it will defend its interests in

the South China Sea, no matter the cost. Here's a look at the possible near-term outcomes in the dispute We
Could Be Seeing the First Stages of an All-Out Arms Race Money Morning Executive Editor
The Hague's decision. And now, after the ruling,
William Patalon III has been following the international clash since 2012 (way before the mainstream media picked up on
China will follow through with its vow to defend its dominance in the
region in two specific ways "The bigger picture here is one that's both
economic and military," Patalon writes. "And it's a big, big deal" You see, in keeping with its disregarding
nature, China could continue to increase its island- building and even impose a
blockade on Philippine fishermen that would cut off their access to resource-laden waters. China did
it). He thinks
this on a Philippine shoal in 2014, which forced Manila to take a Chinese civilian ship, load it full of foreign journalists and
supplies, and threaten to breach the blockade with it. By doing so, China would have to make one of two choices Shoot
the ship out of the water Let the ship pass China chose the latter, not wanting to cause the deaths of journalists from all
over the globe. However, Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned on June 30 via CNBC
that "we could very well see a repeat of that episode with a stronger Chinese response" meaning this time China would
Patalon, however, expects even more to arise from this

maritime conflict He believes we're witnessing the first stages of an all-out arms race.
"These 'triggers' are combining to fuel an Asian-focused arms race that's
staggering in magnitude," he writes. "IHS Jane's says arms spending in the AsiaPacific will climb 23% a year to reach $533 billion by 2020 . That will put it on
par with North America, which currently accounts for half of all global defense spending and which,
go ahead and "shoot the ship out of the water."
according to recent statistics I've seen will fall to a third of global spending by decade's end." And this Asian arms race
there's
also a technological race, where stealth aircraft, aerial and seagoing drones,
missiles, sensor systems, and missile-interceptor know-how will just keep
advancing. Which brings us to another likely near-term outcome in the immediate wake of the tribunal's decision: a
isn't just a spending sprint. As Patalon told his Private Briefing subscribers in a two-part series back in March,
U.S.-China air war
Yes WarCabbot Strategy

Conflict coming now cabbage strategy
Chao 6/28 -- Brian C. Chao is an international relations doctoral student
(Mellon Ethnopolitics Fellow) in the Political Science Graduate Group at the
University of Pennsylvania and a contributing analyst on the Asia-Pacific Desk
at Wikistrat Inc. His research interests include U.S. defense and foreign policy
in the Asia-Pacific, the role of naval power and crossTaiwan Strait relations.
(Brian C., 6-28-2016, "Coast Guards Could Accidentally Spark War in the
South China Sea," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/coastguards-could-accidentally-spark-war-the-south-china-16766?page=2)//ASharma
But what if all the above risks could be avoided? Could not the Chinese and
other coast guards somehow be able to operate in disputed waters peacefully
without seeming to acknowledge others territorial claims? In the case of the
South China Sea, this is harder than it appears, for while it is the China Coast
Guard that currently grabs the headlines, it is simply the inner core of what
analysts call the cabbage strategy. The PLA Navy sits over the horizon;
indeed, one may speculate that Chinese constabulary forces have been able
to be as assertive as they have been precisely because they know that their
larger, deadlier cousins are not too far away. If the United States or other
countries think that their constabulary forces can assert freedom of
navigation and respective territorial claims without their own naval forces
over the horizon, they are mistaken. A growing number of Chinese coast
guard vessels are more capable than their Southeast Asian naval
counterparts. Any de-escalatory signal a fellow claimant hopes to send to
China by sending out a constabulary force will be disregarded, as it was at
Scarborough Shoal.
Before a combination of continued Chinese construction and at-sea clashes,

the Philippines appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and U.S.
freedom-of-navigation patrols ushered in a new stage to this saga, I warned
that the United States and others needed to respond earlier and more
consistently to Chinese actions, lest feeble reactions lead to overconfidence
and misperception on Beijings part. Alas, Washington and its regional
partners find themselves in a more difficult situation today. The power
imbalance between Beijing and its neighbors may help to explain why China
is content for the moment to deploy its constabulary forces in the South
China Seaand why we see relatively fewer dangerous confrontations with
Japans formidable maritime forces in the East China Sea. China has gotten
away with so much already and is growing accustomed to exploiting its power
imbalance.
This pattern of China does something, the rest complain may prime Beijing
to react particularly harshly if and when the United States and regional
partners finally mount a unified, consistent, and potent response to Chinas
activities and questionable interpretation of the law of the sea. Whatever the
U.S. responsebe it a constabulary presence, stepped-up naval activities or
joint naval patrols with regional partnersone must not underestimate the
continued risk of conflict in the South China Sea, regardless of whether the
hulls are battleship grey or coast-guard white.
Yes WarMaritime
Intensification of maritime disputes and rising nationalism
lead to SCS escalation
Kim 16 Jihyun, assistant prof at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University. "Possible
Future of the Contest in the SouthChina Sea." The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Jan 29, 2016.
www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7239/20160307/15181457338698537.pdf
there are a number of important factors that could trigger a future

conflict. They include intensification of maritime disputes due to Chinas growing
popular nationalism, combined with the governments effort to treat the issue
as a matter of national security and pride. For example, Chinas grand strategy
would evolve in a more comprehensive way to strengthen its national power
and establish the country as more than just an economic giant in the 21st century. In this light, the
expansion of Chinas South China Sea claims, as well as its growing fleet of nuclear
submarines armed with ballistic missiles, can be interpreted as part of its
strategic efforts to create whats known in military parlance as a bastion, or a deep-water
sanctuary where Chinese submarines could avoid detection. 34
Notwithstanding Chinas no first use policy on nuclear weapons, its neighbours and the
United States might see this rapid development of ballistic submarines and
nuclear deterrence capability as a threat. This is because China might possibly
adopt a bastion strategy in the South China Sea and unilaterally declare an
air defence identification zone, which would restrict other countries military
overflights and abilities to track Chinas submarines, so inevitably intensifying the security
dilemma. 35 Additionally, the weak crisis-management structure of the Chinese
system and the lack of unity among Chinas large and complicated political, foreign affairs,
and military bureaucracies could heighten the danger of escalation from an
operational miscalculation at sea to a political and diplomatic crisis. 36 For
example, rising nationalism in China is not only real but also being utilized by a diverse set of
actors, including the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), local governments, law enforcement agencies,
Still,
resource companies, and fishermen, who are promoting different agendas to advance their own particular
parochial interests by seeking increased government funding or enhanced prestige. This means that
despite
the image of Xi as a strong leader, it is inevitable that Xi and the

central government will be influenced by Chinas fractured authority and
systemic problems, even in the course of formulating a grand national strategy for maritime
security in the South China Sea. 37 The problem is that not every action taken by the
government agency or other related actors would properly reflect the will of
Chinas leaders while it could increase the chances of division among
Chinese policymakers at a tactical level. 38 In the current nationalist political
atmosphere, where Chinese leaders rely heavily on these actors to maintain
the legitimacy and unity of the party, almost anything could be justified in the
name of safeguarding Chinas security and maritime consciousness, even at the risk
of deteriorating regional stability and causing foreign policy consequences that might go
against Chinas long-term national interests. This is what could potentially, though not
deliberately, shift the security order in the South China Sea from minor tensions
to major confrontations rather than peaceful cooperation, notwithstanding
Beijings smile diplomacy, buttressed by its charming rhetoric and economic

leverage.
Yes WarNationalism
SCS conflicts escalates in the long term nationalist
pressures on Beijing
Carlson 7/12/16 Allen,
Associate Professor in Cornell Universitys Department of Government.

"Chinas Claims in the South China Sea Rejected." ChinaFile.www.chinafile.com/conversation/chinas-claimssouth-china-sea-rejected
It is then safe to say that those in Beijing must not have been too surprised by the substance of the July 12
it is difficult to understate the extent to which the P.C.A.s

ruling challenges practically every core component of Beijings international
legal position regarding the sovereign status of the South China Sea. Such a
development is unprecedented within the history of this contested ocean territory. It then
decision. Nonetheless,
constitutes a pivotal moment within the conflict there, and may have caught Beijing somewhat off guard in
this
does not necessarily entail an immediate escalation of hostilities there
between the territorys various claimants. Rather, the ball is now in Chinas
hands, and much will depend on what Beijing does with it. Will it play by the
new rules laid out by the P.C.A.? Or will it move to re-write the game in the South China
Sea according to how it sees fit? To begin with, Beijing is likely to want to call
something of a time out, or, at least, protest that the call the P.C.A. made was
wrong. Thus it will attempt to both downplay the rulings significance (in terms
of being non-binding), and undermine its legitimacy (in regards to which it is
not consistent with international law). Beijing will undertake this balancing act in no small
part, as Chinas leaders are well aware of the extent to which the decision will
aggravate popular nationalist sentiment within the country. To continue with the
sports analogy, grass roots nationalists within China are then akin to vocal fans at
a sporting event, but in this case such a group not only has a rooting interest in
how things unfold, but also can influence the outcome by storming the field
(via social protests, online and in the streets). In this regard, Chinas leaders likely have real
apprehensions about the extent to which emotions might run amuck at the
popular level within China, should they either be too bluntly repressed, or
overly fanned, by the words and actions taken by the Chinese state . As a result,
Beijing is unlikely to pursue policies at home or abroad regarding the ruling
that will cause an immediate crisis over the South China Sea. This being said,
assuming that the region makes it through the next few weeks without major
incident, Beijing is now also in the position where it surely will feel it is
necessary to develop a new game plan for re-inscribing its claims to the South
China Sea in the face of this ruling. On this front, it is fair to expect greater Chinese
assertiveness in these waters. In other words, Beijing is simply not going to forfeit
the region and go home. This is where the real danger of escalation lies , as
whatever moves China takes are likely to force the hand of each of the other
claimants to the ocean waters, and inexorably drag the U.S. more deeply into
the conflict there.
terms of the scope of the ruling. The world is then in new waters in the South China Sea. However,
AT: Asian Stabiltiy

The Hague Ruling Tips the Scale Asian instability is now more
likely than ever
Apps 7/12/16 Peter Apps is a founder and executive director of the Project
for Study of the 21st Century; PS21, a non-national, non-partisan, nonideological think tank, Commentary: Can Washington prevent war in
Southeast Asia?, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-south-china-seacommentary-idUSKCN0ZS21N //Deej
I wrote last week that the risk of war in Europe was back. This week,
unfortunately, the likelihood of confrontation in Asia seems to be spiking
higher as well. Two events in particular have driven this development,
separate but subtly interlinked. On the Korean peninsula, the deployment of a
new South Korean missile defense system and imposition of new U.S.
sanctions on the north has nudged tensions higher. Now, an international
court decision on Chinas claims in the South China Sea could further amplify
already growing posturing over disputed maritime boundaries. For the United
States, particularly in an election year, this is a pretty toxic brew. Washington
might be the preeminent global military superpower, but it is now being
pulled in multiple directions on a scale not seen in recent history. Nor is it
truly in control of its own destiny in Asia even more than Europe, its foes
and allies are often calling the shots while the United States is inevitably left
playing catch-up. As with its dealings with Vladimir Putins Russia, it faces a
balance that is awkward and impossible to determine. If Washington looks too
conciliatory, it risks being charged with weakness and may end up
encouraging all other parties to take matters into their own hands. Try too
hard to dominate the situation and deter potential adversaries, however, and
the United States risks simply inflaming matters and ushering in the type of
conflict it is desperate to avoid. Take the North Korean example. Particularly
since the accession of Kim Jong Un, the United States has faced a deadly
quandary. Under the young Kims rule, Pyongyang has become more
unpredictable, the human rights situation on the ground reportedly
significantly worse. Most seriously from the perspective of outsiders, North
Korea has been aggressively arming and moving firmly if somewhat
unsteadily towards refining its nuclear weapons and missile systems until
they pose a major threat in the region and beyond. Just because it is working
on such weapons does not mean Pyongyang necessarily has direct ambitions
to use them. Most outside analysts believe its true aim in wanting such
weapons is to deter outside powers from considering any Iraq-style regime
change. Still, making solid predictions about the highly secretive country is
far from exact science and its hardly surprising its neighbors want to take
precautions. That makes the decision to deploy the U.S.-made Terminal High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea entirely reasonable.
Missile defense systems like that, however, can themselves raise tensions
even though they are defensive systems. In Europe, the deployment of a
missile shield in eastern and southern Europe primarily to counter any threat
from the Middle East clearly antagonized Russia, suddenly wary of losing its
own long-held ability to strike European targets with nuclear and conventional
weapons. In that sense, it might not have been the best time to apply a new
round of sanctions to North Korean officials and institutions. In response,
Pyongyang has said it will close the one remaining diplomatic channel two
U.S. officials via its UN mission. In the short term, the most likely
consequence will be to make matters worse for the two U.S. nationals
currently held by North Korea. It will also make handling any future crisis that
much harder and that cannot be a good thing. The key to handling North
Korea, however, has always been China. Beijing is Pyongyangs only real ally
and supporter, and while its ability to control North Koreas activities has
always been limited and imperfect, it does have multiple economic and other
levers. The problem, of course, is that relations between China, its regional
neighbors and Washington are currently also seriously deteriorating. Outright
conflict on that front probably remains less likely than a more limited war
involving North Korea, although it would also be cataclysmic. As perhaps the
worlds preeminent trading and exporting nation, Beijing has little appetite for
international isolation on the scale of North Korea. But it also has very real
ambitions, growing military capability and a government that has placed the
quest for ever-growing geopolitical power at the heart of its domestic
legitimacy. In that sense, this weeks decision by the International Court of
Arbitration in the Hague over Chinas maritime boundaries may be something
of a turning point, and not in a good way. China largely boycotted the
process, which it said had little legitimacy. The problem for Beijing, however,
is that most of the countries do take it seriously and the court roundly
rejected Beijings assertions to rights to most of the South China Sea. Chinese
regular and auxiliary maritime and other forces have already taken up a
relatively assertive position on some of the disputed islands and shoals, and
there seems little prospect of them are withdrawing anytime soon. The court
judgment, however, may ramp up the confidence of nations like the
Philippines to take a much more aggressive approach themselves, with
potentially seriously destabilizing consequences. Its not necessarily all bad
news. While the tribunal did conclude that Beijing had trampled on the
territorial rights of the Philippines, it also suggested that some disputed areas
such as Scarborough Shoal could be shared, for example when it came to
fishing rights. That might offer a path to cooperation or it could just make
confrontation more likely. Last year, a poll of leading national security experts
put the risk of a conventional or nuclear war between the United States and
China as marginally lower than the risk of a similar clash between NATO and
Russia. That probably remains the case but the risk of states like the
Philippines, Japan and Vietnam -- many U.S. Treaty allies -- finding themselves
in a fight may well be higher. If peace is based around consensus, the
direction of travel in Asia this year seems to be entirely the wrong way.
AT: Chinese Restraint

China will take all necessary measures in the SCS
Blanchard and Petty 7/13/16 (Ben [Reporter for Reuters] and Martin
[Reporter for Reuters]; China vows to protest South China Sea sovereignty,
Manila upbeat; July 13, 2016; http://www.reuters.com/article/ussouthchinasea-ruling-stakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U)//AJ
China vowed to take all necessary measures to protect its
sovereignty over the South China Sea and said it had the right to set up an
air defense zone, after rejecting an international tribunal's ruling denying its
claims to the energy-rich waters. Chinese state media called the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in the Hague a "puppet" of external forces after it ruled
that China had breached the Philippines' sovereign rights by endangering its
ships and fishing and oil projects. Beijing has repeatedly blamed the United
States for stirring up trouble in the South China Sea, where its territorial
claims overlap in parts with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and
Taiwan. "China will take all necessary measures to protect its territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests," the ruling Communist Party's
official People's Daily said in a front page commentary on Wednesday. The
case, covering a region that is home to one of the world's busiest trade
routes, has been seen as a test of China's rising power and its economic and
strategic rivalry with the United States. Underscoring China's rebuffing of the
ruling, state media said that two new airports in the Spratlys, on Mischief
Reef and Subi Reef, both received test flights from civilian aircraft on
Wednesday. Beijing called the Philippines' claims of sovereignty in the South
China Sea "baseless" and an "act of bad faith". In a government white paper
published on Wednesday, China also said its fishing boats had been harassed
and attacked by the Philippines around the disputed Spratly Islands. "On
whether China will set up an air defense zone over the South China Sea, what
we have to make clear first is that China has the right to... But whether we
need one in the South China Sea depends on the level of threats we face,"
Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin told reporters in Beijing, adding that China
hoped to return to bilateral talks with Manila. "We hope that other countries
don't use this opportunity to threaten China, and hope that other countries
can work hard with China, meet us halfway, and maintain the South China
Sea's peace and stability and not turn the South China Sea into a source of
war." U.S. officials have previously said they feared China may respond to the
ruling by declaring an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea,
as it did in the East China Sea in 2013, or by stepping up its building and
fortification of artificial islands. China's Liu also took aim at the judges on the
tribunal, saying that as not one of them was Asian they could not possibly
understand the issue and it was unfair of them to try.
AT: Cooling Down

Tensions are rising in the SCS
Mody 7/13/16 (Seema [CNBC reporter]; South China Sea: Beijing
considers next moves after Hague ruling; July 13, 2016;
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/13/south-china-sea-beijing-considers-nextmoves-after-hague-ruling.html)//AJ
Military confrontation in the South China Sea, in particular in the vicinity of
man-made islands that China is building, continues to be an ongoing threat.
The U.S. Navy and warships from China both patrol the region, and political
strategists stress that the chances of an unintended conflict are rising. As
tensions have worsened, Washington has steadily expanded its presence in
Asia-Pacific waters. Other countries with South China Sea claims, especially
the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia, have taken an increasingly vigilant
naval stance. Assistant Secretary Russel stressed the importance of
diplomatic engagement and respect for the rule of law. "I do believe China is
faced with some important questions regarding its future and its intentions.
The United States, China's neighbors, the world, wants to see a responsible
neighbor who abides by the rule of law, who honors its commitments under a
treaty, and who will work with its neighbors big and small to promote
regional stability and regional prosperity," he said. "No good will come for
anyone let alone China particularly, as it struggles with a slowing economy
from any kind of military clash. I truly do not believe that China seeks that
kind of military confrontation," Russel said.
AT: Duterte Caves

The Phillipines wont back down they dont have a
choice
Representatives. The South China Sea moment of truth is almost here, Asia
Times, http://atimes.com/2016/06/the-south-china-sea-moment-of-truth-isalmost-here/ --br
What is clear is that the Duterte administration will not drop the arbitration
case, which is in its final phase. This is just politically impossible, given
the amount of domestic and international support the Philippines lawfare has
generated. In fact, incoming foreign affairs secretary Perfecto Yasay made it
clear that the Duterte administration will not pursue any bilateral talks [with
China] at this time until we hear, or wait for, the outcome of the decision of
the arbitral tribunal to come out.
AT: No EscalGeneric
China on the verge of escalation-already lining up troops
and supplies
Mizokami 7/7/16 (Kyle Mizokami, writes on defense and security issues in
Asia, Why China Is About to Lash Out In the South China Sea, The Week,
http://theweek.com/articles/634094/why-china-about-lash-south-chinasea) //AS
An international panel of judges is expected to rule against China in a longrunning territorial dispute with neighboring country the Philippines. The
ruling, which is likely to undermine China's unilateral claim of virtually the
entire South China Sea, could cause the country to angrily lash out. In 2009,
China submitted a curious map to the United Nations. Using nine simple
dashes, the map carved out an estimated 90 percent of the South China Sea
as Chinese territory to the detriment of China's neighbors and their own
territorial claims. China has since claimed the South China Sea on historical
grounds, claiming they were traditionally part of China going back centuries.
The situation is analogous to the United States claiming virtually the entire
Gulf of Mexico. Alternately, it's similar to your neighbor deciding that part of
your driveway is now his property, or that any of your property is suddenly
his. Under the United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
all countries are granted territorial borders of 12 nautical miles extending
from their shoreline to the open ocean. Less well known is the fact that
countries are also granted Exclusive Economic Zones. EEZs extend from the
sea border another 200 miles, and grant exclusive economic use. For
example, only the United States can place oil rigs within 200 miles of its sea
borders. The problem with China's so-called "Nine Dash Line" is that it
tramples the EEZ rights of other countries, placing their exclusive zones
within China's territorial borders. This is despite the fact that China is a
signatory to the very convention that grants EEZs. One of those other
countries, the Philippines, decided to fight back in the court of international
law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, an international agency established
by the Hague Peace Conference, has been deliberating over the case for the
past year. It is expected to announce its decision on July 12, and all
indications are that it will rule for the Philippines. China has already
announced it will not abide by the decision, claiming that there is nothing to
arbitrate. From China's perspective there is no dispute, because the territory
is China's. End of discussion. Beijing has painted itself into a corner. The
evidence backing up its territorial claims in the South China Sea is weak, and
with the backing of the International Court of Arbitration there will be no
reason other than the threat of military force by China for any country to
abide by them. As a signatory to UNCLOS, it has endorsed the very border
laws it is now violating. China now faces a choice between a humiliating
retreat from its claims or becoming a hypocrite that selectively abides by its
international treaties and agreements. It will be a spectacular fall and China
knows it, as evidenced by its announcement ahead of time it will ignore the
decision. Some experts worry that China, having lost face in the international
arena, could lash out after the decision is announced. One option? Military
force. China has announced an entire week's worth of military exercises in
the South China Sea starting July 5 and ending July 11. The Chinese military
has announced a 38,000-mile no-go zone, almost the size of the state of
Kentucky, it is warning outsiders to stay out of. The country will reportedly
conduct anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and maritime interception
exercises. That the war games end the day before the arbitration results are
announced is no accident. The exercises will put a large Chinese air and naval
force on the doorstep of many of those countries affected by the Nine Dash
Line. That force will be armed, fueled, and trained for action. The temptation
could be to sail into the Nine Dash Line and enforce it as Chinese territory,
particularly those territories claimed by the Philippines. Most of those
territories are uninhabited, insignificant islets so tiny they disappear at high
tide. Military resistance would be non-existent, except for a small detachment
of Philippine marines based on a rusty landing ship at the disputed Second
Thomas Shoal. If China does lash out it may not kill anyone, but it will kill its
credibility in the eyes of the international community. It would put all of
China's international agreements in doubt, and trust in China as a global
entity will be severely undermined. Next week will be a landmark in the
history of modern China. Beijing can choose to live up to its agreements and
gracefully retreat from its grandiose claims. Alternately it can stomp its feet
and insist that Chinese claims trump all others, that China is not subject to
international law, and undertake dramatic action to prove it. A major power
vying for global leadership can only make one choice.
Several scenarios could easily trigger miscalculation or

escalation in a crisis
Chase 13 [July 2013, Michael S. Chase is an Associate Professor in the
Warfare Analysis and Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College,
China's Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and
Challenges for the United States, Asia Policy, Number 16]
China's transition to a more secure second-strike capability is likely to contribute to greater strategic
stability in the U.S.-China relationship, a goal that is emphasized in the most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture
China's larger and more sophisticated nuclear force will

also create challenges for U.S. policymakers. One possibility is that this force could
give China greater confidence in using its conventional capabilities to coerce
its neighbors. However, even if leaders in Beijing conclude that a more powerful and survivable
Review.104 Nonetheless,
nuclear force does not allow them to exert their conventional leverage, China's growing nuclear
capabilities could still become a complicating factor in future arms-control negotiations. Furthermore,
aspects of Chinese doctrine could undermine crisis stability and heighten the
risk of escalation in the event of a confrontation with another nuclear power . A
Bolder Beijing? Some U.S. scholars have argued that a more powerful nuclear force could
embolden China to behave more aggressively if it becomes embroiled in a
regional crisis. Most prominently, this case has been set forth by Thomas Christensen: In the minds of
China's top leaders, China may be acquiring a secure second strike capability for the first time or
recovering one it lost after the United States developed new strike capabilities since the 1980s. If true,
Chinese leaders might be more bold in conventional crises with the United
States than they otherwise would be, knowing that China is at least capable
of countering any American threat of nuclear escalation if a strong response
is made to China's conventional military actions .105 [End Page 95] Furthermore,
Christensen argues, the relationship between a secure second-strike
capability and conventional military operations is growing in importance as
China develops "new conventional military capabilities designed to assert or
protect the PRC's interests in its maritime periphery in ways that greatly
increase the chance of conventional engagement with U.S. forces , something
China was previously largely incapable of doing in an effective manner." This may be especially
important because of disagreements between China and other countries in
the region about what constitutes the legitimate status quo, which in turn
increase the volatility of potential flashpoints such as Taiwan or the Paracel
and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in
the East China Sea. Christensen concludes that this could be problematic if
the firebreaks between conventional and nuclear conflict are less than fully
robust, and there are plausible scenarios for nuclear escalation that China
could exploit to gain greater leverage in an otherwise conventional crisis or
conflict.106 Arms-Control Challenges China's growing nuclear arsenal will make the PRC a more
important consideration in discussions about future U.S.-Russia arms-control agreements, perhaps
eventually paving the way for multilateral agreements on nuclear arms control. On the other hand, China's
larger and more credible nuclear deterrent could constitute an obstacle to future arms-control agreements
if Beijing is unwilling to participate in such discussions. The integration of China into the global nuclear
reduction process that President Obama outlined in his 2009 speech in Prague will eventually be required
to move toward the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.107 The 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review reflects this challenge, stating that "over time" the United States "will also engage with other
nuclear weapon states, including China, on ways to expand the nuclear reduction process in the
future."108 Some Russian observers are also expressing concerns about the modernization of China's
nuclear force. Even though their analysis is [End Page 96] at times seriously flawed, it still raises potential
implications for Russian participation in future arms-control negotiations.109 Chinese scholars are well
aware of the possibility that China will face greater pressure as the United States and Russia downsize
their nuclear forces. Teng Jianqun of the China Institute of International Studies, for example, sees
Washington's approach as still focused mainly on Russia but notes that "as bilateral disarmament
progresses, the U.S. will certainly pay increasing attention to China's arms control policies."110 But China
is clearly far from eager to be drawn into the process, especially given the asymmetry in the size of its
nuclear arsenal compared with those of the United States and Russia. Teng explains: American and Russian
stockpiles make up more than 90 per cent of the world's total nuclear weapons. Though both have nearly
halved their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their total number of nuclear weapons is still
many times greater than that of states with small nuclear forces. Only when the two great nuclear powers
have reduced their arsenals to an appropriate level will China follow suit.111 It should be noted, however,
that Chinese scholars have not specified what number would constitute an "appropriate level." This
suggests that Beijing will remain reluctant to participate in such negotiations, at least until U.S. and
Russian numbers decline to a level that makes it more difficult for China to resist entering into serious
multilateral discussions. Moreover, Beijing may also resist pressure to take part in arms-control discussions
until it has achieved its own nuclear force modernization goals. According to Wang Zhongchun, "as China's
participation in multi-lateral nuclear disarmament negotiations will unavoidably lead to a reduction and
weakening of its strategic deterrent force, we should improve the base number of our nuclear [End Page
97] force before participating in any nuclear disarmament negotiations."112 Wang suggests that "the
development of a necessary quantity and quality of nuclear weapons" will be required to ensure that any
concessions made in future negotiations will not leave China in a position where its strategic forces "fail to
challenges
for escalation management that arise from Chinese capabilities and doctrine
also merit consideration. In particular, U.S. strategists should pay careful
attention to some of China's thinking with respect to deterrence operations .
fulfill the promise of a retaliatory strike." Second, beyond the implications for arms control,
The potential use of China's missile force to send signals aimed at influencing
an adversary raises the possibility of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation
in a crisis or conflict scenario. Miscalculation during a crisis is a particularly
troubling possibility, the risk of which could be heightened by uncertainty
over the message that one side is trying to convey to the other or by
overconfidence in the ability to control escalation. The most serious concern
is that the signaling activities described in Chinese publications could easily be
interpreted not as a demonstration of resolve or as a warning but as
preparation to conduct actual nuclear missile strikes, possibly decreasing
crisis stability or even triggering escalation rather than strengthening
deterrence. Indeed, some Chinese sources contain references that raise
troubling questions about miscalculations that could result from attempts to
increase the intensity of deterrence during a crisis or conventional conflict .113
While such signals are intended to put the enemy under the severe
psychological strain of realizing that China's missile forces have entered the
"pre-mobilization state" in hopes of causing the adversary to "abandon
certain activities," the authors apparently fail to fully consider the potential
for catastrophic miscalculation. Given the risks of unintended escalation,
some of these actions could be destabilizing, especially during a conflict with
a nuclear-armed adversary. Although Chinese authors appear to demonstrate
at least some awareness that actions intended to deter an adversary could
instead escalate tension, discussion of this risk in the relevant publications is
highly limited. For instance, Zhao Xijun notes that deterrence must be carefully calibrated to
maximize the chances of achieving the desired results. If the threat level is [End Page 98] too low, it will
fail to influence the enemy; but if it is too high, there is an equally serious risk that deterrence will fail
because the enemy may lash out in desperation.114 Similarly, in another passage, Zhao offers a
deterrence operations could accidentally trigger escalation if

they are poorly timed: Whether the timing for conducting the military deterrence of the missile
cautionary note that
forces is correctly chosen will directly affect the progress of deterrence and its outcome. If the appropriate
timing is chosen, then deterrence will deter the enemy, contain the eruption of war, and obtain the
objective of peace with the small price of deterrence. If inappropriate timing is chosen, then deterrence
may cause the situation to deteriorate, even leading to the eruption and escalation of war.115
the available sources suggest that Chinese thinking about the risks
of specific actions may be rather underdeveloped, which in turn could make
attempts to manage escalation in a U.S.-China crisis or conflict extremely
challenging and potentially very dangerous for both parties. U.S.
Nonetheless,
policymakers will face difficult choices in responding to these developments. In some cases, restraint will
be required to maintain stability.116 Trying to trump Chinese nuclear modernization through a large-scale
buildup of U.S. missile-defense capabilities would be costly and counterproductive. Chinese sources
indicate that a principal driver of Chinese nuclear calculations is the concern that a larger and more
complex U.S. missile-defense system could undermine the viability of China's strategic deterrent, thus
leaving China vulnerable to nuclear coercion in a crisis. Consequently, limiting missile defenses intended to
protect the U.S. homeland to a level appropriate for dealing with the much smaller threat posed by North
Korea could help avoid precipitating a larger increase in Chinese nuclear capabilities.117
AT: No EscalNuclear
Nuclear warheads are already loaded onto submarines in
the South China Sea - Pacific scouting means theyre
targeting the U.S.
Neill 7/11 (Alexander, Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow at IISS-Asia
International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia. The submarines and
rivalries underneath the South China Sea BBC News
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36574590 2016)//masonw
A tribunal is about to rule on China's territorial claims in the disputed S outh China
Sea. But Beijing's desire for control is about much more than rocks above the water, argues analyst
Alexander Neill. It is also central to China's plans for a submarine nuclear force
able to break out into the Pacific Ocean. Historically, China's national infrastructure projects
have tended to be of grandiose scale - the Great Wall of China and the Three Gorges Dam are ancient and
China has now proved such a capability at sea with the imminent
opening of a string of advanced military bases across the South China Sea, where
modern examples.
just two years ago little more than rocky outcrops, sandbars and reefs dotted the region. International
attention has focused on why Beijing's constructed these artificial islands so speedily. There is speculation
with the imminent announcement of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Beijing fast-tracked the project
to create a fait accompli or a "great wall of sand". For China, national sovereignty and
the credibility of the Communist Party is at stake. But so too is its new sea-based nuclear
that
in The Hague on the Philippines' territorial dispute with China,
deterrent. The island construction serves a dual purpose, both reinforcing China's claims of sovereignty
and creating a sustained Chinese presence, both military and civilian, in the South China Sea.
China
has argued that in addition to necessary defence measures for its islands they will
also serve the public good. China has built lighthouses and a hospital on Fiery Cross Island and it is likely
a critical
element to China's motivations for island-building lies beneath the surface of
the sea. Mounting concern within the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) over the
vulnerability of its land-based nuclear deterrent and the ability to deliver a
retaliatory second strike has prompted China to place some of its nuclear
warheads on board submarines. Two years ago, China deployed the Jin-class
ballistic missile submarine for the first time, each armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear
missiles. Operating from a state-of-the-art base near Sanya, on Hainan island's southernmost tip, Jin
class submarines are now patrolling the depths of the South China Sea. But in order to be within
range of the US, they must be able to break out into the Pacific Ocean. Before
that Chinese government administrative departments will be created on the islands too. But
the submarines achieve this, they must leave their base in Hainan and cross the South China Sea to reach
The Pentagon believes that the first such Pacific

patrol will occur this year. A large southern area of the South China Sea is rather shallow the Pacific Ocean undetected.
under 100m (328 feet) in depth. However, roughly contiguous to China's "nine-dash line" territorial claim in
the South China Sea, the continental shelf drops to a deep basin of around 4,000m, offering better cover
for submarines. That is why some experts believe the deeper waters of the South China Sea, and China's
enhanced anti-submarine efforts there, may offer a bastion for Chinese submarines in the future. In recent
years, the depths of the South China Sea have become a theatre for intensified rivalry between China and
the US. In early 2009, Chinese fishing vessels attempted to cut the cables attached to a sonar array towed
by the US surveillance vessel USNS Impeccable in waters off Hainan Island. Later that year, a Chinese
submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by the destroyer USS John McCain near Subic Bay off
the coast of the Philippines. Recently,
China has launched new submarine-hunting
capabilities. On 8 June, The PLA Navy commissioned a new Type 056A frigate, the Qujing, which boasts
an array of anti-submarine warfare capabilities and will be based in the South China Sea. The US Secretary
of Defence Ashton Carter has also announced that the Pentagon will invest $8bn (5.45bn) to ensure the
lethality of its submarine force - the "silent service" - including the deployment of new undersea drones in
the region. In the same way as the US and its allies created a network of listening devices on the sea floor
across Asia to listen out for Russian submarines during the cold war, China is now in position to deploy a
similar network from its bases across the South China Sea. Satellite
imagery suggests that

China's new islands are bristling with advanced sensors including radar arrays and
satellite communications stations, all of which bolster its navy's situational awareness
above and below the South China Sea. Such technologies may also provide command and control
infrastructure for communications with China's ballistic missile submarine force,
to evade detection but also to target any adversary.
not only helping it
AT: No FONOPs
Ruling gives the US justification for harsher FONOPS
Ku 7/13/16 Julian, Professor of Constitutional Law at Hofstra University.
"Possible U.S. Responses to the

South China Sea Arbitration Award: The Aggressive FONOPs Option." Lawfare.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/possible-us-responses-south-china-sea-arbitration-award-aggressive-fonopsoption
I think each of these policy commitments makes sense individually, but they
sometimes come into tension with each other. For instance, the longstanding
U.S. commitment to avoid taking sides in sovereignty disputes has led the
U.S. to treat all countries as if their sovereignty claims are equally strong,
even if a country like China has a much weaker claim than most others. Thus,
the U.S. Navy has been careful to limit its recent freedom of navigation
operations in the region to the rules of innocent passage, thus tacitly
signaling that China might have a valid sovereign claim to an underwater
land feature. Such caution is driven by the U.S. commitment to its not taking
sides policy. Todays sweeping arbitral award changes this situation rather
significantly. First, the arbitral tribunal has dramatically widened the scope of
where international law allows the U.S. to sail, fly and operate. The arbitral
tribunal found that none of the land features in the Spratlys satisfy the
definition of an island under the definitions set out in UNCLOS. This means
that none of the land features can generate a 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zone where China claims the right to limit U.S. military surveillance.
More importantly, the tribunal found that only a few of the land features even
satisfy UNCLOS definition of a rock. This means that most of the land
features, including several upon which China has built artificial islands, do not
even entitle China to claim a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Moreover, since
such non-island/non-rock land features cannot generate any maritime rights,
the tribunals award gives most of those rights to the nearest coastal state:
the Philippines. All of this brings us to the third, and newest, component of
U.S. policy. The U.S. considers the award legally binding and has called upon
China to comply with it. Since the U.S. considers the award legally binding on
China, it would be odd for the U.S. to continue to tacitly recognize those
Chinese sovereignty claims in the Spratlys that the arbitral award has found
legally insupportable. For example, the U.S. no longer has any obligation to
assume a 12 nautical mile territorial sea around the Chinese artificial island
at Mischief Reef. That reef lies, according to the tribunal, squarely within the
Philippines exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf. In legal
terms, there is no justification for Chinas land building activities or continued
presence there. Thus, if the U.S. Navy approaches Mischief Reef, it has no
obligation to invoke innocent passage and it can legally approach within 500
meters of the Chinese artificial island. Indeed, to maintain its policy of
sailing, flying and operating wherever international law allows, the U.S.
Navy would be required to not invoke innocent passage when operating near
Mischief Reef .U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has already signaled that
the U.S. may adopt such an approach. In his remarks at the recent Shangri-la
conference, he noted: After all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield
simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on
international air or maritime transit.This means that the U.S. is prepared to
treat Chinas artificial islands as underwater rocks without any maritime
rights at all. As I have argued in prior posts, FONOPs are not a long-term
answer. But I think they have served as a useful signal to other regional
powers that the U.S. remains committed to staying involved and active in the
region. With the arbitral award behind them, the U.S. should also have an
easier time convincing its partners and allies such as Australia or Japan to
conduct joint FONOPs since such operations would no longer simply
constitute U.S. interpretations of what international law allows. Such
operations would now reflect international law as interpreted by a neutral
arbitral tribunal formed under the authority of UNCLOS.
(FONOPs) will skyrocket

Representatives. The South China Sea moment of truth is almost here,
http://atimes.com/2016/06/the-south-china-sea-moment-of-truth-is-almosthere/ --br
This isnt just some legal hairsplitting. There are huge strategic implications.
First of all, it means that not only the Philippines, but also other claimant
countries could resort to a similar lawfare strategy to pressure and extract
concessions from China. In effect, the Philippines arbitration case could
create a lawfare multiplier. So far, Indonesia, which is inching closer to
dropping its neutrality status in the South China Sea disputes, and Vietnam,
which has ramped up defense ties with America, have threatened to go along
the same path if China continues to press its advantage in adjacent waters.
Secondly, and more importantly, the arbitration verdict could provide a
perfection legal justification for not only America, but also other key naval
powers such as Japan, to launch sustained, multilateral Freedom of
Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. Coordinated and multinational
FONOPs by America and its key allies hold the promise of creating just
enough pressure to force China to recalibrate its posturing in disputed areas.
AT: No GPW
Great powers will get drawn in they underestimate the
risk
Hunt 7/13/16 Katie Hunt is a senior digital producer for CNN International,
Has South China Sea ruling set scene for next global conflict?,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-china-sea-global-conflict-risks/
//Deej
Ashley Townshend, research fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre at the
University of Sydney, said that if the ruling had been a less emphatic victory
for the U.S.-allied Philippines, then it may have proved a "bit of a firebreak"
for regional tensions, opening up space for negotiation over the issue.
Instead, the international tribunal delivered a resounding verdict against
Beijing, and in response, China might be less concerned with managing its
reputation in the eyes of the world, and less troubled about being seen as an
international lawbreaker. Anton Alifandi, principal Asia analyst for IHS, said
the big worry was that there would be an interstate war involving the major
powers -- the U.S., China and the countries of southeast Asia. But, he said,
the stakes were so high that it was highly unlikely in the medium term that
China would deliberately escalate tensions to a point where the U.S. would
retaliate -- as to do so would lead to a defeat for China, and a loss of
legitimacy. However, he said, "there is always a risk of miscalculation, that is
the danger." "If one side plays brinkmanship and thinks the other side will
back down and you miscalculate, things can get out of hand quite quickly."
AT: No Miscalc
High risk of miscalc over UNCLOS ruling
Hunt and Hume 7/13/16 Katie, senior digital producer for CNN International; and Tim, CNN
Reporter. Cites Ashley Townshend, research fellow at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney;
Anton Alifandi, principal Asia analyst for IHS; Shen Dingli, professor and associate dean at the Institute of
International Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai; and a report from The Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, an initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Has South China Sea ruling set
scene for next global conflict?" CNN.www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-china-sea-global-conflict-risks/
But, he said, the stakes were so high that it was highly unlikely in the medium term that China would
deliberately escalate tensions to a point where the U.S. would retaliate -- as to do so would lead to a defeat
"there is always a risk of

miscalculation, that is the danger.""If one side plays brinkmanship and thinks
the other side will back down and you miscalculate, things can get out of
hand quite quickly. "'First act' Townshend said that it was in no-one's interest that the region -for China, and a loss of legitimacy. However, he said,
which has $5 trillion worth of trade pass through its waters annually -- become the setting of a next global
The
risks are high," he said. He said that China would be "acutely aware of the risks of
unintended escalation," but it would now be under domestic pressure to
register its defiance of the verdict and demonstrate that it had no intention of
changing its position. Shen Dingli, professor and associate dean at the Institute of International
conflict between China and United States. "But it would be a mistake to argue that the risks are low.
Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, said China's behavior in the South China Sea, where it's turned
sandbars into islands equipped with military airstrips, was unlikely to change. However, he saw hope in the
Philippines' surprisingly muted reaction to the verdict. The country's foreign secretary spoke for only two
minutes Tuesday at a press conference, calling it a milestone decision that experts were now
analyzing."The Philippines has exercised restraint and didn't issue an aggressive statement," said
Shen."The verdict is the first act. The second act could be more promising if it involves negotiation." It's a
view that was raised Wednesday by Liu Zhenmin, China's vice foreign minister. He hoped the Philippines
would view the ruling as a "scrap of paper" so bilateral negotiations could resume. Chinese FM: China has
noted the positive statements by President Rodrigo Duterte, and stands ready to work with the new
to be told by the court

that Beijing was at fault and the U.S.-allied Philippines was the aggrieved party, would be "a
massively bitter pill for China to swallow," said Townshend. "We're talking about a country
Philippine gov't CCTVNEWS (@cctvnews) July 13, 2016Nonetheless,
that genuinely believes in the historical narrative that it has presented and that has very strong nationalist
overtones," he said. "It's
a country that is more than anything sensitive to being

humiliated, especially at the hands of what it sees as European imperialists. That's a very
strong motivator for their actions in the South China Sea." The Asia Maritime Transparency
Initiative, an initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that monitors developments in
acts of retaliation could include increased islandbuilding activities, a blockade of Philippines marines, such as had been
carried out in 2014, or the declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the
South China Sea. As when China declared an ADIZ over the East China Sea in
2013, other powers could quickly move to defy the zone, but civilian air traffic
would likely comply. Such a move would increase the risk of incidents between
the region, said in a briefing paper that
air forces, it said.
AT: No Retaliation
The ruling is a bitter pill for China to swallow will
retaliate
Hunt and Hume 7/13/16 (Katie [Senior digital producer for CNN
International] and Tim [News desk editor]; Has South China Sea ruling set
scene for next global conflict?; July 13, 2016;
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/asia/south-china-sea-global-conflict-risks/)//AJ
Nonetheless, to be told by the court that Beijing was at fault and the U.S.allied Philippines was the aggrieved party, would be "a massively bitter pill
for China to swallow," said Townshend. "We're talking about a country that
genuinely believes in the historical narrative that it has presented and that
has very strong nationalist overtones," he said. "It's a country that is more
than anything sensitive to being humiliated, especially at the hands of what it
sees as European imperialists. That's a very strong motivator for their actions
in the South China Sea." The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, an
initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies that monitors
developments in the region, said in a briefing paper that acts of retaliation
could include increased island-building activities, a blockade of
Philippines marines, such as had been carried out in 2014, or the
declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the
South China Sea. As when China declared an ADIZ over the East China Sea
in 2013, other powers could quickly move to defy the zone, but civilian air
traffic would likely comply. Such a move would increase the risk of incidents
between air forces, it said. Asserting what China sees as historical rights in
the South China Sea has been a massive priority for President Xi Jinping, said
Shen. "China used to be brutalized by other powers. The British sold us
opium, Japanese raped Nanjing. These bad memories still affect us. As China
rises, we ought to restore these rights," said Shen. "We were the first to
discover the place in the entirety. We have maps, books and records. For
three decades our claims met no challenge or confrontation." Vietnam
fishermen on the front lines of South China Sea fray.
AT: No US Draw-In
U.S. China war is likely over the tribunal China has anticarrier missiles and the Philippines defense treaty draws
us in
Thompson 7/12 (Mark, American investigative reporter who won the
1985 Pulitzer Prize for public service journalism. Showdown Now Looming
Over the South China Sea TIME http://time.com/4402562/south-china-seahague-ruling/ 9:25 a.m. 2016)//masonw
The showdown over the South China Sea began Tuesday when an international court in The
Hague declared that Chinas claims to 90% of the worlds critical trade route are bogus. Just like an oldtime Western, the lesser-armed folks in townin this case including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and
Vietnamhave scurried off into the buildings lining Main Street. Theyve closed the shutters, leaving them
open just enough to peek nervously as China and the United States prepare for a confrontation. Chinas
sweeping, yet undefined, South China Sea claims dont hold water, U.S. Naval War College
Chinese expert Andrew Erickson said shortly after the ruling. Looking forward, all parties concerned must
prevent China from grabbing with coercion or force what it could notand now clearly cannotobtain
legally. The five-member panel unanimously ruled that Beijings claim to nearly all of the South China Sea
because of its historic presence in the region has no merit. As expected, China quickly rejected the ruling.
The South China Sea has instantly become uncharted waters

for the globes two most-powerful nations. The ruling from the Netherlands, while legally
So what happens now?
binding, has no mechanism for enforcement. That means negotiations will be required to ease the growing
territorial tensions in and around the South China Sea.
If talks dont happen, or go nowhereand
China continues to refuse to back downa military clash could occur. U.S. optimists hope
that after an initial outburst, the Chinese will realize the international community has taken a firm stance
against its claims in the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in trade passes annually. Starting
bilateral talks on fishing and oil rights between China and the Philippines, which brought the case to The
Hague, could ease tensions. The ruling may compel Beijing to curb its dredging in the South China Sea to
China is more likely to

increase its island-building, and perhaps impose a blockade on Philippine sailors
create new islets claimed as Chinese territory. But U.S. pessimists suggest
on a desolate shoal who are based there seeking to declare it as part of the Philippines. The Chinese
blockaded the shoal in 2014. Eventually,
Manila ran that blockade by taking a civilian ship,

stuffing it full of supplies, stuffing it full of foreign journalists and forcing a difficult decision on
the Chinese: `Shoot us out of the water or let us go!and the Chinese backed
off, Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies said last month at a CSIS session.
We
could very well see a repeat of that episode with a stronger

Chinese response. That, in turn, could lead to a stronger U.S. response , given
the 1951 mutual defense pact between Manila and Washington. A
renewed Chinese blockade of the Second Thomas Shoal would carry with it the
highest risk of kinetic interactionguns being fired, missiles being
launched and/or bombs being droppedwith the U.S. Air Force or Navy,
Asian expert Michael Green said at the CSIS gathering. China may also respond by declaring
an air-defense identification zone over the S outh China Sea, as it did over the East China
Sea in 2013. That would require foreign flights to identify themselves to China before entering. While
China has been building airstrips on

islets in the South China Sea, and could deploy fighter aircraft to them shortly before
declaring the sea a second air-defense identification zone. At the end of the day thats an elegant
civilian airlines have complied, the U.S. military has not.
target set for the U.S., CSISs Andrew Shearer said. A pair of U.S. aircraft carriers is now steaming in the
western Pacific. We dont get to do two-carrier operations very often, Admiral John Richardson, the U.S.
chief of naval operations, said last month. Its a terrific opportunity for us to do some [training for] high-
But U.S. warships sailing in or near the South China Sea also
represent a fat target for China. Beijing has spent years developing and
deploying the DF-21D missile, informally known inside the Pentagon as the
carrier killer. The decision also is likely to embolden the U.S. to continueand perhaps step up
end war-fighting.
its naval patrols in the South China Sea. The U.S. has refused to acknowledge Chinas claim of
sovereignty to much of it, and repeated freedom of navigation exercises through the disputed waters will
serve to emphasize the American position, which is widely shared by the non-Chinese nations bordering
both China and the U.S. are

wondering if the other is going to reach for its gun. We have reached a
critical turning point, says Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain now at the Center for a New
the sea. Eyeing one another down that deserted Main Street,
American Security. The U.S. and its Navy, in particular, must now consider plans on how it can best
support the international community and uphold the rule of law. All options must be on the table.
AT: Phillipines Wont Expand

The Phillipines will rapidly expand drives escalation
Denyer and Rauhula 7/12 -- (Denyer and Rauhula, 7/12/16, "Beijings
claims to South China Sea rejected by international tribunal,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/beijing-remains-angry-defiant-anddefensive-as-key-south-china-sea-tribunal-ruling-looms/2016/07/12/11100f484771-11e6-8dac-0c6e4accc5b1_story.html)//A-Sharma
The Philippines took China to the PCA in January 2013 after the Chinese navy
seized control of Scarborough Shoal, a largely submerged chain of reefs and
rocks set amid rich fishing grounds off the main Philippine island of Luzon.
The ruling could lead to more friction between China and the United
States, with the issue seen as a key test of Washingtons ability to maintain
its leading role in Asian security in the face of Chinas rising power. The State
Department said it hopes and expects that both China and the Philippines
will abide by the ruling. In the aftermath of this important decision, we urge
all claimants to avoid provocative statements or actions, said State
Department spokesman John Kirby. This decision can and should serve as a
new opportunity to renew efforts to address maritime disputes peacefully. In
a statement, Philippine Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. welcomed the
ruling, calling it a milestone. But he also urged restraint and sobriety
among all concerned. [China believes it is the real victim in the South China
Sea dispute] The verdict is the best-case scenario that few thought
possible, said Richard Javad Heydarian, an assistant professor of political
science at Manilas De La Salle University. It is a clean sweep for the
Philippines, with the tribunal rejecting China's nine-dashed line and historicalrights claim as well as censuring its aggressive activities in the area and,
among others, the ecological damage caused by its reclamation activity. In
China, Chen Xiangmiao, an assistant research fellow at National Institute for
South China Sea Studies, said he was totally surprised by the decision,
especially on the nine-dash line. The nine-dash line is the foundation of
China's claim to sovereignty activities in the South China Sea, which has been
smashed by the ruling, he said, predicting an intensification of
disputes. It is highly possible that the Philippines will expand its
presence in the South China Sea, which will create conflict.
AT: Phillipines Wont Seek Intervention

The Phillipines will call for US intervention in a crisis
scenario
Gewirtz 7/12 -- Paul Gewirtz is a professor of constitutional law and the
director of the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. (Paul Gewirtz,
Washington Post, "Why law cant solve the South China Sea conflict,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/why-law-cantsolve-the-south-china-sea-conflict/2016/07/12/2c6199d4-485b-11e6-bdb9701687974517_story.html)//A-Sharma
But the Obama administration also must guard against escalation and reach
out to other countries for quiet diplomatic discussions of our options. We
cannot yet predict Chinas range of responses to the tribunal. The possibility
exists that a rebuked China will launch new provocations, leading to a crisis
that serves no ones interests and the United States and its allies must be
ready if China seeks to use force to get its way. Additionally, a legally
empowered Philippines might ask the United States to use its military to
enforce what the tribunal cannot enforce, which would itself create major
risks.
AT: Ruling Solves Conflict

SCS conflicts will continue despite court ruling
arbitration is meaningless because its not binding
Jianfeng 6/29 ( Zhang Jianfeng, 6-29-2016, "Arbitration cannot solve
South China Sea dispute: Austrian expert,"
http://english.cctv.com/2016/06/29/ARTIIfMFQvATmzxUAjtIOLQh160629.shtml
)//A-Sharma
VIENNA, June 28 (Xinhua) -- An Austrian expert has said that arbitration
cannot solve the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines.
"It is a principle of international law that all sides must agree on the
arbitration," Padraig Lysaght said in a recent interview with Xinhua.
"Otherwise, the result of the arbitration is not binding." The Philippines
unilaterally filed in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague, the
Netherlands, an arbitration case against China over South China Sea disputes
in January 2013. China maintains that the tribunal has no jurisdiction over the
case, which is in essence about territorial sovereignty and maritime
delimitation. "It is perfectly legal to simply not accept this award. I don't think
the award can solve the problem," Lysaght said, adding that modern
international law cannot provide a suitable solution to every problem.
OTHER ADVANTAGES
Multilat Adv
War A-O (Diplo)2ac

Multilateral diplomacy is the only explanatory force
behind global order multiple theoretical perspectives
and empirics confirm that we control the internal link to
all global crises
Pouliot, 16Dr. Vincent, Scholar and Professor @ McGill U, Director of the
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies, twice awarded the
Lemieux Prize for the best thesis in political science. International Pecking
Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy, Cambridge Press.
p. 254-9 br
Imagine for a moment that the social world is a bit like an onion- that it is
comprised of several superimposed layers that more or less fit together.
Mapping the shape of one particular layer will tell important things about the
onion but certainly not everything that we need to know. Clearly, we need to
peel off several layers in order to grasp the onion's full complexity. I would
suggest that studying the structuring and structured effects of practices
should be done in an analogous way, by delineating the multiple processes
that make the world hang together. Drawing inspiration from Bourdieu, in this book I
looked into four streams of social forces which, as they combine in and through practice, generate the
opportunities and constraints that structure the diplomatic stage: situations, dispositions, relations and
distinct social layers, which are related though irreducible to one

another, coevolve and interact, a bit like the strings of a giant spider web.
None could exist without the others, as they all rest upon one another. For
that reason, looking for "the one" string that upholds the web - or
analogously, the one social force that explains the world - seems futile.
Capturing the totality of the web, by looking into how strings hang
together, should be the analytical priority. The main argument of this book is
relatively straightfoward: International pecking orders are generated,
reproduced and sometimes contested in and through the process of
multilateral diplomacy. Constrained and enabled by the inherited dispositions of the sense of
place, the peculiar morphology of permanent representation and the field
logics of multilateral sites, state diplomats negotiate over substantive issues
and pursue the so-called national interest against the background of a neverending struggle for practical mastery . International hierarchies of standing emerge out of this
everyday agonistic pattern. As simple as this summary may sound, in actual practice social
processes behind international hierarchy are not only incredibly rich,
analytically speaking; they are also eminently complex in political sociological
terms. One of Kuus' interviewees conveys the point nicely, "'You can never be sure who matters ... You
learn it only by testing. It's not the same person as last time .... It is a flexible construction.'"2 In
positions. These
this concluding chapter, I want to take stock of my argument by revisiting a key concept in this book as
well as in contemporary debates in IR theory: international hierarchy. The practice theory of international
pecking orders that I advance calls for a number of new departures in the way that we conceive of social
stratification in world politics. Using David Lake's seminal book as a foil, I revisit the concept of hierarchy in
order to show the theoretical added value of my framework. In the second half of the chapter, I explore
one intriguing implication of this argument, which paraphrasing Bourdieu I call the "miracle of multilateral
pecking orders." From both an analytical and a normative point of view, the question is worth asking: Why
do subordinate players often partake in their own domination? Put differently, why should so many
countries, through their diplomats posted at IO headquarters, play their part in a multilateral game in
which they are clearly disadvantaged? This phenomenon I call the "tragedy of the competent diplomat. "3
On the one hand, masterful delegates may climb the pecking order by exhibiting skill in the multilateral
game. But on the other hand, this practical mastery hinges on the sense of place, that is, a practical feel
for the possibilities and limits of a given situation. In other words, as essential as the sense of place may
be in order to become a skillful state representative and potentially climb up the pecking order, it
simultaneously leads diplomats to reproduce and reinforce existing hierarchies of standing. The room for
in multilateral
diplomacy it is extremely difficult, if not outright impossible, to challenge
international pecking orders without exhibiting the necessary skills to play a
part in it. Subverting international hierarchy from the inside often amounts to squaring the circle.
Revisiting international hierarchy The concept of hierarchy has recently come of age in
IR. In a sense, this is a rather brutal change: After all, for decades the
discipline was dominated by the realist assumption of anarchy , that is, the lack of a
contestation from the inside is consequently rather small. Tragically, then,
central government or formal authority in the international system. As Waltz explains, "Formally, each
[state] is the equal of all the others. No one is entitled to command; none is required to obey."4
International anarchy was long posited as the opposite of domestic hierarchy and for that reason the
This is no longer the case.

Increasingly, scholars from a variety of theoretical perspectives including realist/ institutionalist/ English School/ constructivist , 8 critical 9 and
eclectic, 10 to use theoretical pigeonholes - defy the age-old assumption of
anarchy in IR to instead depict a highly stratified global sphere. Today, we
find ourselves not only with a rich variety of contending perspectives but also
with a relatively broad analytical scope in terms of the many forms that
hierarchy may take at the global level, from hegemony to the postcolony,
through normative stratification, special responsibilities and several others . In
concept remained off the mainstream radar for decades.
what is arguably the most influential book on the matter, Lake builds on institutional economics (more
specifically contract theory) to conceive of hierarchy in terms of relationships of authority in dyadic
contracts. In order to show the added value of the practice theory of international pecking orders that I
developed in this book, I critically review Lake's volume to show where my framework departs from his.
make four points in turn: hierarchy emerges out of practices; it is conceptually distinct from authority; it
hinges on socially organized principles of vertical differentiation; and at the micro-level it rests on
embodiment. The broader implication is that international hierarchies become much heavier and more
resilient than a number of existing accounts suggest. Hierarchy is a by-product of practice The main
theoretical argument that I advanced in this book is that practices are socially productive. The socially
organized and patterned ways in which world politics are performed are not merely outcomes in need of an
explanation but also dynamic processes that generate effects in their wake. The social world is emergent,
and practice is the key process involved in bringing the many facets of global life into being. Because it
aspires to mutual intelligibility, the regular enactment of deeds within a particular political context of stateto-state relations organizes social interactions along recognizable lines. The critical point is that the
constitutive effects of practices are generally not intended as such; they are by-products of doing social
things. Beyond the immediate task at hand drawing a set of practitioners together, then, practices also
As multilateral diplomats negotiate real-world problems international crises, global public policies, institutional reforms and so ontheir practices serve not only to resolve the issue at hand but also to
produce broader structural effects, which outlast punctual performance.
One can never do only one thing in social settings. Social stratification, in this
view, is a by-product of practice. As practitioners perform their trade, they
also stake a claim as to how things are done .11 Thanks to its social
productivity, practice tends to generate notions of competence or mastery,
which by being upheld and enacted by socially dominant players generates
social stratification patterns. Any social context produces practical logics around what it means
bring the world into being.
to be an able player at the game. Recall from my case studies how "being a good NATO ally" is not the
same thing as "being a responsible Security Council member."
For obvious reasons, one cannot
grasp the social efficacy of practices by reducing them to epiphenomena of

deeper structural forces. This is, in my view, one of the key limitations in Lake's framework. He
writes, "If we but peel back the surface of formal equality, we can see many symbols of obeisance in the
everyday practice of world politics."12 To conceive of practices as "symbols" makes it impossible to grasp
how social stratification is actually also the bottom-up result of practice itself .
Indeed, even admitting that hierarchy causes obedient acts, the following question remains: How could
To put the matter differently, in what

ontological form might hierarchy precede in time the very practices that give
it shape? Practices do not form a superficial varnish atop more fundamental
processes, or a curtain in front of the stage: Practices are the social reality in
and of itself. A focus on macro-structures should never come at the expense
of the social processes out of which they emerge. Practices are the
constitutive building blocks of social life . As Wendt correctly notes, overlooking social
processes "is problematic because macro-level structures are only produced
and reproduced by practices and interaction structures at the micro level ." 13
For instance, the structure of international hierarchy would falter if it were not for
the manifold productive practices that generate it . At the level of action, pecking orders
there be hierarchy without practices of deference?
are very real patterns of interaction, which give structure to world politics. Even the most minor patterns of
action, argues Goffman, tend to convey notions of standing which, in the aggregate, organize social order:
"The expression of subordination and domination through this swarm of situational means is more than a
mere tracing or symbol or ritualistic affirmation of the social hierarchy. These expressions considerably
the aggregate, these

patterns of action form the big picture of social order . As such, international hierarchy
constitute the hierarchy; they are the shadow and the substance." 14 In
is nothing more and nothing less than socially stratifying and stratified practices. This should come as good
as units of analysis practices leave

empirical traces behind them, which may then be used not only to document
the existence of social stratification but also to explain its inner workings . This
view runs counter to Lake, who argues that hierarchy is "an inherently unobservable reality."15 The
political sociology of multilateral diplomacy that I propose in this book seeks
to document the workings of informal hierarchies of standing by
foregrounding practices as key empirical entry points. Because they are
socially recognizable performances, they lend themselves to empirical study.
news for students of international hierarchies. After all,
Swidler describes the operational consequences of focusing on practice eloquently: "To study culture then
becomes to observe closely those publicly accessible practices, either through micro observations of
largely mute and unnoticed practices or through 'thick description' of the publicly observable symbolic and
The research
opportunity that arises from this posture is formidable: Far from being
unobservable, international hierarchy is part and parcel of each and every
practice that makes the world go round.
ritual practices that structure the possibility of meaning in a given 'cultural system."'16
War A-O (LOST)2ac

Failure to abide by LOST leads to conflict
Inquirer Net 7/11 -- (Inquirer.Net, 7-11-2016, "UN law of the sea lays
down the rules for planets oceans," No Publication,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/140830/un-law-of-the-sea-lays-down-the-rulesfor-planets-oceans)//A-Sharma
THE HAGUECenturies before international laws, pirates ruled the high seas,
plundering and pillaging wherever they went. Into this dangerous, unruly
seascape steamed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Unclos), which will be the basis for a historic court judgement tomorrow in a
dispute between China and the Philippines over the South China Sea. Here
are the answers to four questions about the obscure convention known by its
acronym Unclos: What does it do? With at least 320 articles and nine
annexes, the convention covers all aspects of regulating the planets vast
oceans and maritime waters. It is the authority on everything from national
sovereignty over the exploitation of natural resources, navigation and
disputes between nations. According to the UN website, the convention lays
down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the worlds oceans and
seas, establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources.
What are its origins? For many centuries, the only law of the sea was brute
force. In the 17th century, a countrys rights over the seas were limited to a
narrow belt extending from its coastline. The remainder of the seas was
proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none, the United Nations says
on its website. But by the second half of the 20th century, new technologies,
modern oil and gas extraction methods, and a booming population gave rise
to growing tensions around lucrative fishing grounds and competing demands
for the rights to precious resources. In 1945, the United States unilaterally
extended jurisdiction over all resources over its continental shelf, which led to
similar moves by Argentina, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia as well as the
scattered archipelagos of Indonesia and the Philippines. By late 1967, the
dangers were numerousfrom nuclear submarines plumbing the sea depths
to ballistic missiles and increasingly frequent oil spills. In the face of this
looming conflict that could devastate the oceans, Maltas ambassador to
the United Nations, Arvid Pard, called for an effective international regime
over the seabed. When was Unclos born? The first Conference on the Law of
the Sea was held in New York in 1973. For nine years, delegates argued and
bartered as they drew up the text. The UN General Assembly finally adopted
the convention in April 1982. Signed by 150 countries and ratified by 67, it
entered into force in November 1994. How are conflicts resolved? The
convention also established the Hamburg-based International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (Itlos), which along with the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) and the International Court of Justice can rule on matters brought under
Unclos. Among other cases, in 1999, Itlos laid down annual quotas for bluefin
tuna catches in a bitter dispute between Australia, Japan and New Zealand. In
2015, the PCA ruled under the UN convention that Russia must compensate
the Netherlands over the 2013 seizure of Greenpeaces Arctic Sunrise ship
during a protest against Arctic oil drilling. AFP
UQMultilat Decling
Public distrust in multilateralism is massive and still growing
Kituyi 7/11/16 Mukhisa Kituyi is the Secretary General of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN trying to combat
global meltdown in confidence,
http://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/245729979/un-trying-to-combat-globalmeltdown-in-confidence //Deej
Millions of people around the world have lost faith that the world economy
can improve their lives. Instead of seeing value in open borders and the free
exchange of information and ideas, they see only uncertainty about their
futures, growing inequalities and weak productivity gains. Too few people
benefit from new technologies that connect us and make the world smaller,
and too many face the spectre of terror and conflict, forced migration and
rising xenophobia. With globalization in retreat, this dampened mood is
holding back the potential of trade, finance, technology and investment to
improve lives. In the developing world, significant headwinds now cloud
growth prospects, threatening to undo hard fought development gains. In
Asia, with weak external demand and the global trade slowdown, many value
chains are set to shorten and the gains from industrialization look more
difficult to reap. Corporate and household debts are rising, and many
previously fast-growing economies now face what some are calling the
"middle-income trap". In Africa, we are seeing a sharp reversal of the frontier
market "Africa rising" narrative amidst the end of the commodity super cycle,
a drying up of capital inflows, and rising public and corporate debt. Security
threats and failed states are adding to the complexity, and the largest wave
of migrants in more than 70 years is being driven out of the continent. In
Latin America, the region's dedication to inclusiveness is now confronted by
the prospect of another lost decade; lower commodity prices, capital outflows
and declining living standards for the middle class are forcing governments to
re-assess the achievements of the last boom period and how to reignite
industrialization. In the developed world, globalization has left in its wake two
related, major structural problems increased inequalities and slowing
productivity growth. Stagnant median incomes have sparked a backlash
against migration in Europe and explain the anti-trade tone dominating the
U.S. presidential election campaign. Many of the recent "Brexit" votes to
leave the European Union were cast by voters who feel left behind by
globalization. Whistleblower leaks like the "Panama Papers" are also
compounding the distrust that people have in political and economic
institutions, revealing how international trade and investment can be riddled
with illicit flows, hidden transactions and tax havens at times even with the
complicity of political leaders.
UQAT: Brexit Good

Multilateralism on the decline due to Brexit and other sovereign
challenges, Its revival is key to prevent instability and conflict
Voicu 7/13/16 Dr Ioan Voicu is a Visiting Professor at Assumption
University in Bangkok, Crisis of multilateralism,
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=18370 //Deej
The United Kingdoms decision to leave the European Union (EU) is, indeed,
an epochal, theatrical event, but, as recommended by Henry Kissinger, it
must not be treated with the vocabulary of calamity. In reality, Brexit a
hybrid term to denote the British exit from the EU covers the most recent
and striking manifestation of a more profound phenomenon which can be
conventionally called a serious crisis of multilateralism and decline of
diplomacy at the regional and global levels. It is also a crisis to be interpreted
in light of the defective process of implementing multilateral treaties
governing cooperation in a great variety of fields. The Brexit shock can be
fully understood only if it is put in a relevant diplomatic context characterized
by an increased polarity and fragmentation in world politics. In Europe,
multilateralism used to be seen at the origin as a way of life, because it is the
means by which European states have tried, with a visible degree of success,
to harmonize togetherness and diversity, proving by deeds that
multilateralism has to be an essential component of international life.
Diplomacy on the defensive Today, we witness a different situation both at
the regional and global levels. In an important address to the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly, under the title From Turmoil to Peace, SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon warned the highest representatives of 193 member
states that diplomacy is on the defensive. That situation is due primarily to a
declining confidence in the merits of multilateralism, a dramatic reality which
has a negative impact on the very essence of multilateral cooperation. There
is no doubt that multilateral diplomacy is more instrumental than bilateral
one, as it is legitimately expected to function on the basis of universal values
and principles. It embodies rules for greater and closer coordination and
provides a higher effectiveness to international relations. From this
perspective, the EU and ASEAN used to be normally considered and described
as successful examples of multilateral diplomacy in action. Over the years
the structure of world politics has been transformed beyond all recognition
and it generated a different political environment for all countries. Yet,
multilateralism continues to be a remarkable process of evolution, as it
involves today not only states, but also many non-state actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, chambers of commerce and industry, regional
bodies, provincial governments, local government organizations and
professional experts. Under such new circumstances, multilateral diplomacy
is practically covering the world community of nations as a whole and
remains a perennial institution characterized both by continuity and change,
as well as by waves of improvement and deterioration. International life
demonstrates that diplomacy is able to assume greater or lesser importance
and an increasing or decreasing role with the progress or regress of

globalization, while its scope may further widen and deepen, as globalization
simultaneously generates new challenges and conflicting situations.
Globalization has a direct and unavoidable impact on the very nature and
agenda of diplomacy. Under the permanent pressure of the irreversible
process of globalization, in order to remain viable and productive, diplomacy
must fortify its role in world affairs and should avoid and combat an
increasing amateurism, present today in many confrontational cases which,
because of their complexity, demand action guided by genuine
professionalism in order to reach sustainable solutions. This indisputable fact
of life is even more detrimental today, when the multilateral approach to
regional and global issues is increasingly being challenged by some countries
as a result of a deplorable lack of trust among major international actors. A
well-known example: The UN Security Council is in accordance with the
Charter of the world organization the strongest multilateral body in the world,
but its deadlock over Syria shows in a startling way its diminishing ability to
function properly, as demanded by its extremely responsible mandate. On
the economic arena, the crisis of the Bretton Woods institutions and of the
World Trade Organization which could not finalize over decades negotiations
on the Doha Development Agenda is another troubling chapter of the same
crisis of multilateralism affecting the majority of international institutions.
Principles underestimated Historically, multilateralism helped to define a set
of fundamental principles and norms for the conduct of international
relations, including territorial integrity, equality of states and nonintervention. The present international order could not have been established
without efforts deployed under the banner of multilateralism. Effective
multilateralism demonstrated that it is a vital factor to prevent instability and
conflict.
ILCrushes UNCLOS
China refusing to abide by the ruling has devastating
implications on LOST
Rosenfeld 7/12 -- (Everett Rosenfeld, 7/12/16, "'Breathtaking' ruling
against China will have lasting global impact," CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/south-china-sea-breathtaking-rulingagainst-china-to-have-lasting-impact.html)//A-Sharma
China suffered a major defeat Tuesday as an international court rebuked its
claims on distant waters that contain the world's busiest shipping lanes and
declared some of its expansionary tactics illegal. A tribunal at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, issued the ruling in a dispute
between China and the Philippines, a U.S. ally. The decision and the
responses of both those countries and others could mark one of the most
significant geopolitical events in years, according to experts. What's
happening The Philippines brought an arbitration case in 2013 over the South
China Sea, eventually lodging 15 claims against China related to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea a critical piece of international law that
both countries have ratified. China claims almost all of the South China Sea, a
massive body of water that stretches about 1,200 miles from the Chinese
mainland. The sea covers a massive 1.4 million square miles and is abutted
by eight countries with a combined population of about 2 billion people.
Those waters handle about half of the world's daily merchant shipping, a third
of global oil shipping, two-thirds of all liquid natural gas shipments and more
than a 10th of the Earth's fish catch. Many countries object to China's claims
to the region. The Philippines decided to take China to court over them. China
refused to to participate in the arbitration although a 2014 position paper
from Beijing was seen as an unofficial argument in the matter but the
convention specifically allows for a tribunal to make legally binding decisions
even if one party is absent. The Permanent Court of Arbitration is the world's
oldest institution for settling international disputes, established at the First
Hague Peace Conference in 1899. It has decided a number of high-profile
maritime disputes in recent years, including between India and Bangladesh in
2009 and between Russia and the Netherlands in 2013. The tribunals
decision was unanimous, finding that Beijing's claims of historical rights to
the region were not founded on evidence and were counter to international
law. The judges ruled that the specific portion of the South China Sea claimed
by both China and the Philippines belongs to the Philippines alone. None of
the small land features claimed by China is sufficiently large to justify
maritime "exclusive economic zones" for any nation, the tribunal said. The
court concluded that Chinese efforts to create man-made islands on top of
atolls and reefs, as well as its large-scale fishing in the disputed areas, are
illegal. China's interference with the Philippines' fishing and oil exploration of
the region is also unlawful, the tribunal said. "The award is breathtaking in its
scope and the degree to which it gives long-needed clarity to the law of the
sea," Peter Dutton, professor and director of the China Maritime Studies
Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, told CNBC. The so-called law of the
sea is a set of global standards that affect every ocean-going country. "That it
is a unanimous opinion from five of the most learned and experienced
practitioners of international law of the sea is especially important," he
added. "There has been much speculation that the tribunal would be too
careful of the political implications to make such a sweeping ruling. I am
proud to see that only considerations of law, and not politics, affected the
unanimous ruling." As expected, China declared that the decision is "null and
void and has no binding force."
The UNCLOS Ruling Destroyed any Hope of an Effective

International System, China circumvents the International
Order, and the International Order is the Reason that
there has been no major war since WW2
Forbes 7/12/16 J. Randy Forbes is the Chairman of the House Armed
Services Seapower & Projection Forces Subcommittee and Co-Chairman of
the Congressional China Caucus. The Hague Has Ruled against China. Time
to Enforce It., http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-hague-has-ruledagainst-china-time-enforce-it-16939 //Deej
Todays ruling of the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal on the territorial disputes
between the Philippines and China offers two paths forward for China, and
the Asia-Pacific region more broadly. How China chooses to respond to the
tribunals judgement, which sided against Beijings claims on key counts, will
do much to determine the course of Asian security and the post-1945
international order in the decades to come. Since World War II, the United
States and its global partners have sought to cement an international
framework that prizes peaceful resolution of disputes, adherence to
international laws and norms, and rejects the use of coercive force to achieve
national objectives. This order, built out of the ashes of two devastating world
wars, has contributed mightily to the growing prosperity of China and the
Asia-Pacific region, as well as the absence of open warfare between Great
Powers over the past seventy years. Despite Chinas repeated claims of
wishing to become a responsible stakeholder on the world stage, Chinas
recent behavior represents the most serious threat to this order since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Chinas economic clout, expanding military
reach and capabilities, and Orwellian insistence that it is always the victim of
others aggressive intentions pose an especially difficult challenge for an
international system. This challenge has been particularly acute in managing
Beijings territorial disputes with its neighbors. From the East China Sea to the
South China Sea to Chinas disputed land borders with India, Beijing has
undertaken a systematic campaign to change the facts on the ground
through coercion. Whether constructing artificial features in the South China
Sea to strengthen its claims, declaring illegitimate Air Defense Identification
Zones (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, or repeatedly engaging in provocative

militarily behavior near the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing has
repeatedly shown itself to subscribe to the might-makes-right school of
international politics. Todays ruling is a fundamental rebuke to Beijing, not
simply on the facts of the case but simply by the manner in which the
decision was reached. The Philippines decision to bring its claims before the
UNCLOS tribunal is in keeping with the principles and values that have
animated the United States and its partners in the postwar world. That a
small, developing nation like the Philippines can successfully appeal to
international law and norms against the Chinese colossus is a powerful
rebuttal to the famous words of Chinas former foreign minister, who stated
that China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and
thats just a fact in justifying Beijings belligerency. Should China choose to
ignore this ruling, it will show once and for all the hollowness of its pledges to
act as a constructive member of the international community. But it will also
pose a serious threat to the international order itself: the worlds secondlargest economy and largest military openly repudiating the liberal
international order, including the peaceful resolution of disputes. The
consequences for international security will be profound, and Beijings
response will be watched intently in Moscow, Tehran and Pyongyang. Now is
the time for the United States to stiffen its resolve in preparation for Chinas
potential refusal to accept the ruling, or perhaps to even seek a military
solution to its disputes with Manila. The administrations dispatch of two
Carrier Strike Groups to the region in recent weeks has been the appropriate
response thus far. Should China respond rashly to the ruling, Washington
should leave no doubt about its intention to stand with our treaty allies and
partners to resist aggression and uphold both our values and interests. The
tribunal decision is an inflection point in the history of Chinas rise,
representing the most notable clash yet between the values animating the
post-1945 international system and Beijings revisionist approach to world
affairs. While it is up to China how it chooses to respond to this decision, the
United States has only one option: to stand resolutely with our friends in the
Philippines and across the region in defense of universal values and the belief
that no country, no matter the size of its military or GDP, is above the law.
ILSCS x Multilat
The South China Sea Ruling Crushes Hope in Multilateral
Diplomacy
Raby 7/13/16 Geoff Raby is Geoff Raby was Australian ambassador to
China from 2007 to 2011 and is now chief executive of Beijing-based Geoff
Raby & Associates. Why the South China Sea ruling has just made things
tougher for Xi Jinping, http://www.afr.com/opinion/columnists/why-the-southchina-sea-ruling-has-just-made-things-tougher-for-xi-jinping-20160713-gq4lha
//Deej
As a great power in the region, China could do immense damage over this
issue, including to Australia. It could adopt a belligerent attitude towards a
variety of forms of regional cooperation, it could dare the US to challenge it
more directly by more aggressively building and militarising various
structures, it could move more oil exploration and drilling platforms into the
area, and it could increase its harassment of fishing boats from other
claimant states. Such actions, individually and collectively, will all introduce
much greater risk and potential instability into the region. China could also
declare an air identification zone over the area, as it did with the
Daiyu/Senkaku Islands in its dispute with Japan, inviting other states to
challenge it. These are the sorts of measures that Xi and his advisers would
now be contemplating. His political survival might depend on his adopting at
least some of them. None of these things are in Australia's interest, yet there
is little that can be done to prevent them happening. Collectively, or even
individually, they escalate tensions in the region, increase uncertainty, and
work against regional cooperation and integration. International courts
cannot impose their will on sovereign states, no matter how valid the findings
in law, and few if any states would today be prepared to go to war to enforce
the court's judgments. In the end, all that is left is diplomacy. The South
China Sea contains the same disputed territories after The Hague's decision,
even if some claims are not seen to be as strong as others. Negotiation
between claimant states is the only path towards some sort of resolution.
That was true before Tuesday's judgment and remains just as true afterwards.
The Hague has been a detour, which is likely to increase tensions. By denying
China's claims any legitimacy, it will make it so much harder politically for
China's leaders to manage. A great deal of statesmanship within the region
will be needed to find a way back towards the negotiating table. Territorial
disputes in the region will not be resolved by unenforceable court judgments,
let alone by hectoring and lecturing.
ILUNCLOS k2 x War
China threatens to pull out of UNCLOS ignoring the ruling
leads to war
Mollman 7/7 2016(Steve, Alum of Wired and the WSJ, Asia correspondent for
qz The line on a 70-year-old map that threatens to set off a war in East
Asia Quatrtz http://qz.com/705223/where-exactly-did-chinas-nine-dash-linein-the-south-china-sea-come-from/)//masonw
Tensions are escalating in the South China Sea.
On July 12 a UN tribunal will deliver a

long-awaited verdict on Beijings sweeping claims to the vital waterway. Each year more than $5 trillion in
trade passes through the sea, which contains rich fishing grounds and large, mostly untapped reserves of
oil and natural gas. China says it has a historical claim to virtually the entire sea .
The other countries on the seas perimeter argue China is violating international treaties, infringing on
their fishing and exploration rights, and staking out military positions that could give it the edge in a future
conflict. How the tribunal rules, therefore, will influence everything from trade to defense to political
relationshipsand perhaps wars. The South China Sea issue is one of the most important global issues
right now, says Anders Corr, founder of Corr Analytics. Its a tinder box. At the center of Chinas
claims is a curious, dashed-line map drawn up in the 1940s. Knowing its story is essential to understanding
China has also built artificial

islands islands in the South China Sea by pumping sand onto live coral reefs and
then paving them over with concrete. This kind of actionwhich also does great
environmental damagegives China a base (paywall) for air and sea patrols. The next level is to
how China and its neighbors will behave in the years to come.
act as if these artificial islands are real land, with their own EEZs and territorial waters. Under Unclos, such
artificial islands dont have maritime rights, and nor do submerged reefs. But in a freedom-of-navigation
the US sent a naval vessel deliberately within 12 nautical miles

of the Spratly archipelagos Fiery Cross Reef , on top of which China has built an island. (It
operation in May,
has a runway for fighter jets, a hospital with its own garden, and even a farm with about 500 animals.) In
response, China scrambled jets and shadowed the US vessel with three warships, ordering it to leave the
area. The search for some history While Beijing can point to the 1947 map, its struggled to make a
convincing case for how it arrived at the nine-dash line in the first place. In a 2008 US diplomatic cable
published by WikiLeaks, the US embassy in Beijing reported that Yin Wenqiang, a senior maritime law
expert with the Chinese government, had admitted he was unaware of the lines historical basis. That
the state-controlled China

Daily reported on a centuries-old book, purportedly owned by a local fisherman,
describing ancient fishing routes around various parts of the S outh China Sea. The
hasnt stopped the authorities trying to come up with one. In May
report depicted this as proof of Chinas rights to the area. A few weeks later, however, when a BBC team
went to visit the fisherman to verify the claim, he said hed thrown the book away because it was too old
and broken. An even more entertaining example was an animated video shared by state broadcaster CCTV
on social-media site Weibo, which says that China has had jurisdiction over the seas islands for more than
a thousand years. Fuzzy boundaries Part of the problem with the nine-dash line, however, is that Beijing
has never made a specifically defined claim about it. What remains ambiguous, says Ku, is whether its
assertion of sovereign rights refers to all of the waters inside the nine-dash line, or just the waters within
12 nautical miles of its islands (or what China believes to be its islands). A contested sea. (Wikipedia/US
Central Intelligence Agency, public domain) This calculated ambiguity allows Beijing to strike a balance
between antagonizing other countries and maintaining an appearance of patriotic fervor to its domestic
has also helped China with whats often called its salami-slicing
strategythe slow accumulation of small actions, none of which merits a major
reaction from other countries, but which over time add up to a major strategic
change. Finally, this fuzziness allows Beijing to keep its options open. In its modern maps China includes
audience. It
a 10th dash east of Taiwan (pdf, page 5). That puts Taiwan within Chinas vaguely defined territory. Beijing
insists Taiwan is a renegade province. Taiwan considers itself an independent nation, and earlier this year it
elected to president Tsai Ing-wen, a pro-independence candidate who prevailed over a Beijing-friendly
predecessor. The trigger point China reiterated its nine-dash claim in a submission to the UN in 2011 (pdf).
But 2012 was when tensions began to ratchet up, says Ku. That was when China effectively annexed the
Scarborough Shoal, which falls within the Philippines EEZ. After a standoff between Chinese and Philippine
forces, the US mediated a deal in which both sides were to pull back while the dispute was negotiated. The
Philippine forces left but the Chinese ones remained, gaining control (paywall) that they still have today.
The Peace Palace in the Hague, home to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of
Justice.(Reuters/Jerry Lampen) So in 2013 the Philippines filed a case with the UNs Permanent Court of
Arbitration, in The Hague. It asked the tribunal to rule on various aspects of Chinas sweeping claimsin
particular, whether the artificial islands and other features China occupies in the South China Sea, such as
Fiery Cross Reef and the Scarborough Shoal, are entitled to EEZs or territorial waters under Unclos. This is
expected to be addressed in the ruling next week. The moment of truthor just more uncertainty? James
Kraska, an expert in international law at the US Naval War College, has written that the PCA probably wont
Beijings deliberate vagueness

about what the line represents makes it hard to legally challenge. But, he wrote,
rule against the nine-dash line directly. In part, thats because
the tribunal will most likely say that the features China occupies dont have EEZs under Unclos, and in
some cases not territorial waters either. That makes them much less strategically valuable to China. It
might give other nations the confidence to conduct their own freedom-of-navigation operations or join US
ones, to reassert their rights to the sea. It might also, Ku says, encourage other countries bring their own
cases against China to the tribunal. The fear is about how China will respond. Beijing, which has worked
strenuously to discredit the tribunal and refused to participate in the hearings, has insisted it will ignore
the rulingand indeed, there is no international police entity that can enforce it. But China might also feel
compelled to demonstrate that it wont be constrained by the outcome. Here are three things it might do
to up the stakes: Take control of a shoal in the Spratlys called Second Thomas Shoal, a.k.a. Renai Reef in
China and Ayungin Shoal in the Philippines. The Philippines grounded a rusty old warship there in 1999 and
staffed it with a few troops as a way of staking a claim. On July 1 a spokesman for Chinas defense ministry
said China has the ability tow the ship away. Start island-building atop Scarborough Shoal. The reef is
about 200 km (125 m) from a US naval base in the Philippines, and not much further from Manila. The US
and the Philippines have suggested the reef represents a red line, and that any island-building by China
there would be prevented with force. Set up an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China
Sea, as its already done in the East China Sea, where it has competing island claims with Japan. In such a
zone, unidentified aircraft would be interrogated and possibly intercepted. The US has indicated it will
ignore such a zone. Any of these would be a real escalation, notes Corr. Another possibility, which
China has threatened, is to simply pull out of Unclos altogether. Ku says hed be
surprised: China is seeking to gain international recognition for its delimitation of its continental shelf, and
future maritime delimitations with Korea and Japan. It would not be able to use the UN processes for that if
China could easily withdraw from

Unclos. When it signed the treaty in 1996, he notes, it had a much smaller military and
more reason to fear bullying from other nations. Now, leaving the system
actually advantages them because they can bully their way into more territory, he says. I
think theyre now understanding that. In that case, thered be nothing at all to stop
China muscling its way into more territory in the sea, other than a
full-on military showdown.
it withdrew. Corr, on the other hand, believes
AT: Doesnt Violate I Law

Wut its now beyond disputethats the ruling
Javad and Heydarian 7/13 -- (Richard Javad Heydarian In Manila, 713-2016, "China may dispute South China Sea verdict, but it's a huge
setback," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/13/chinamay-dispute-south-china-sea-verdict-but-its-a-huge-setback)//A-Sharma
In effect, the arbitration body nullified Chinas sweeping maritime claims. The
verdict is an unequivocal rejection of Chinas aggressive manoeuvres across
the South China Sea, arguably the worlds most important waterway. While
the majority of Filipinos were ecstatic about this legal and moral victory, the
Philippine government, however, called for sobriety and a subdued response.
After all, the verdict is legally binding but not necessarily enforceable,
especially since China has declared it null and void and the Philippines
lacks the capability to ensure compliance. Nonetheless, the verdict
represents a huge setback for China. First of all, it provides a more
robust legal pretext for the US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded naval
powers to conduct more extensive and multilateral freedom of navigation
operations, which are aimed at challenging Chinas claims now flatly
rejected by the arbitration body. Second, the Philippines case sets a legal
precedent for other south-east Asian countries such as Indonesia and
Vietnam, which have threatened to take China to the court over their
maritime disputes. Now, China faces the prospect of a virtual class suit by its
deeply estranged neighbours. Above all, if China refuses to abide by the
verdict, it will be openly branded as an outlaw, undermining its
longstanding claim to regional leadership as a responsible power. All
eyes are on the Philippines new president, Rodrigo Duterte, who has
expressed his refusal to flaunt the verdict to taunt China in order to avoid
further escalation. For the Duterte administration, it appears more important
to leverage the verdict as a bargaining chip in upcoming high-stakes bilateral
negotiations with China. Most likely, the Philippine government will shun a
strongly worded statement regarding the arbitration verdict to revive longfrayed bilateral ties with China and seek tangible concessions on the ground.
What is clear, however, is that Chinas actions in the South China Sea
are in contravention of international law. That is now beyond
dispute.
AT: Multilat Inevitable

Multilateralism is at a crossroads after Brexit
demonstrated political will can revive it
Wurf, 16Hannah, Research Associate working in the G20 Studies Centre
at the Lowy Institute. Her research interests are global governance and
multilateralism, June 9, Online:
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/06/09/What-the-UK-needs-now-ismore-multilateralism-not-less.aspx, Article: What the UK needs now is more
multilateralism, not less Accessed on: 06-24-16//AWW
Britain leaving the EU could signal a new shift away from
multilateralism as leaders around the world increasingly talk about pulling
up the drawbridge against globalisation and retreating into isolationism. This
would be a mistake. The EU is enfeebled because its members cannot reach
consensus on critical issues, for example, processing refugees. The EU
remains a project of states despite its attempts at designing supranational
institutions. If Britain votes to leave the EU on 23 June, it will turn its back on
the most ambitious attempt at multilateralism in the 20th century. It will
also abandon the opportunity to make the EU function better. Martin Wolf has
observed that multilateral institutions are underperforming across the
board. His frustration is not so much with the current international
architecture as with the lack of political will to make existing
institutions work. In his words, 'systems of cooperation among states are
ultimately dependent on what states are willing to give them, both the
legitimacy and the power'. International pressure has been building against
Brexit, and not just from other EU countries. The G7 and G20 have made
statements about the potential ramifications of Brexit. The G7 concluded last
month that 'a UK exit from the EU would reverse the trend towards greater
global trade and investment, and the jobs they create, and is a further
serious risk to growth'. This follows the G20 Finance Ministers and Central
Bankers' communiqu in February listing 'the shock of a potential UK exit
from the European Union' as one of the downside risks and vulnerabilities for
the global economy. Those campaigning for Brexit believe the UK will have a
menu of other multilateral options outside of the EU. Stewart Patrick from the
Council on Foreign Relations has written about the emergence of
'multilateralism la carte' whereby states choose coalitions and approach
issues case by case, rather than using the international organisations
themselves to hammer out collective agreements. However, for Britain, there
is a lot of evidence that its multilateral menu is more extensive inside the EU.
David Skilling has pointed out that the EU is 'a valuable asset for European
countries, enabling them to negotiate FTAs that they would not get
bilaterally'. Robin Niblett has also made a compelling case for why 'working
through EU institutions, despite their flaws, and with the UK's European
neighbours offers the best prospects of managing the changing global
context'. The UK will not be able to fall back on its bilateral relations as a
substitute for multilateralism either with its post-war ally, the US, or its new
favourite economic partner, China. Both the US and China have made clear
that they would prefer the UK to stay in the EU. President Obama has been
unequivocal about US opposition to Brexit, saying 'the UK is at its best when
it's helping to lead a strong European Union. It leverages UK power to be part
of the EU'. Hillary Clinton agrees. As usual, it is difficult to say what Donald
Trump's position would be. Even China does not like the possibility of Britain
leaving the EU. President Xi said in his state visit to the UK last year, 'Britain,
as an important member of the EU, can play an even more positive and
constructive role in promoting the deepening development of China-EU ties'.
The challenges that the UK faces in the 21st century are global. Like
everyone else, Britons will need to manage unprecedented flows of capital,
goods, services and people. The UK will have to rely on international
cooperation. It will lose out if it does not play a constructive role in
multilateral institutions, including the EU.
Environment Adv
Regs IL1ac**
**note this is KILLER stuff if we had more time in the 1ac above, itd be
there. If you are reading just the env adv these are must-read cards
Cooperation is key to Coast guard shipping regulations

protects resource exploitation
Lamy 16 (Steven L., professor of international relations at University of
Southern California; he has been named professor of the year four times,
Chapter 5: The U.S. Arctic Policy Agenda: The State Trumps Other Interests
Future Security of the Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and
Climate written by Heininen, Lassi, doi: 10.1057/9781137468253.0007. P. 9293)//masonw
US Policy Actors Department of Homeland Security the US Coast Guard The US Coast Guard has been
operating in the Arctic since 1865. As the maritime component of the US Department of Homeland
Security and has specific statutory responsibilities in US Arctic waters.
The Coast Guard
may be the
must
respond to a 118% increase in maritime shipping and transit from 2008 to 2012. They
must also deal with the effects of climate change that will open this territory to
those public and private actors seeking access to oil, natural gas and other natural
resources. This will require surveillance, possible search and rescue missions and
most active participant in Arctic policy. As a security and law enforcement agency the Coast Guard
activities aimed at protecting marine and environmental resources. A major strategic objective of the
the Coast
Guard will need to work with international partners and work within the
rules and regulations that govern this region. In 2013, Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert
Coast Guard is the protection of US sovereignty and sovereign rights. To achieve this goal,
Papp now US Arctic Ambassador released a maritime governance document that would guide US Arctic
strategy over the next ten years. The three strategic objectives Admiral Papp articulated included:
Improving Awareness: there is a need for surveillance, monitoring and shared information systems for
better maritime awareness. There needs to be close collaboration with all stakeholders working in this
Coast Guard will work with regional and global

institutions to improve governance and to foster collective efforts to oversee maritime activities ,
protect natural resources and safeguard national interests . Broadening Partnerships:
region. Modernizing Governance: the
to succeed, partnerships with both domestic and international partners in public and private sectors
need to be developed and strengthened. The Coast Guard needs to work with the Arctic Council, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other relevant actors.
Shipping routes and resource exploitation risk

environmental destruction regulations are key to
prevent sea level rise and ecosystem collapse
The Arctic is an example of a common resource region that faces enormous challenges
due to climate change that will have tremendous costs for the entire world. To
be specific, the Arctic icecap is receding. Though climatologists have warned of melting ice and rising seas for
Introduction
two decades, many began paying attention to it only after the dramatic shrinkage of polar ice in the summer/fall of 2007.
With receding ice and warming weather came renewed focus on two long-standing dreams:
a viable maritime passage between Europe and Asia , and a bonanza of oil and
gas beneath the Arctic seas. Yet both commercial shipping and natural resource extraction raise the specter of
enormous environmental damage, which none of the main Arctic powers Canada, the Russian Federation, the United
States, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Kingdom of Denmark and Finland are fully equipped to handle. Also, both raise
complex territorial and resource claims whose resolution requires a legal framework that exists only in rudimentary, ad
hoc form. The Arctic Council, the UN and various NGOs have begun working to create a set of rules that will govern the
activities of states and non-state actors who are seeking access to resources and transportation routes. It is these
emerging structures of global governance that may determine the future of this region, which covers over one-sixth of
the earths landmass and is the home for some four million people.
The Arctic or the Far North has become
an area where the littoral states, indigenous communities, energy and resource corporations,
environmentalists and external actors like China, Japan South Korea and India are focusing their
attention on creating rules to manage the potential increase in commercial activities
and the new security concerns in the region. To date, most of the concerned actors seek to sustain the environment and
protect the human communities in what the Arctic scholar Oran Young (1992) has called a shared resource region.
The
success of the Arctic Council may have a great deal to do with its lack of
jurisdiction over military or security issues. Yet, all its members are well aware of the potential security challenges
presented by an Arctic thaw. Waters off the coast of Alaska and into Canada are turning into a navigable ocean. Every
major oil company is seeking access to some 90 billion barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of gas deposits. In addition,
drug dealers, arms merchants and even terrorists might use these new routes to gain access to Europe, North America
and Asia. Russia is building its forces for both security and rescue purposes and the US and Canadian
governments are talking about enhancing their forces in their territories. The North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) has gone beyond drills in this region. F-15 fighters have been scrambled over 50
times during the past five years in response to Russian long-range bombers that have flown over US territory. The
Chinese, now with an observer status on the Arctic Council, recently sent an icebreaker, the Snow Dragon, on an
unprecedented voyage across the Far North through the Northwest passage. Climate change may seem great for
transportation and access to resources but how will states deal with the challenges to the environment, the indigenous
cooperation has been

the major policy paradigm. A new Cold War or conflict is unlikely and any saber rattling may be just for
domestic political consumption. In this chapter, the focus will be primarily on the United States, but we will lay the
groundwork for a more comprehensive view of the other Arctic Council members
communities of the Far North and to security within the region? This is an area where
and some of the states granted observer status in 2013. Major impacts of climate change in the Arctic Although
fluctuations in climate patterns in the Arctic have occurred naturally throughout history, there is strong evidence that
neither the
warming trend nor the decrease of ice extent and volume over the last two
decades can be explained by natural processes alone (Johannessen et al. 2004, p. 337). In
particular, Arctic amplification, the phenomenon of faster warming toward the northern pole than at lower latitudes, has
the Arctic region susceptible to the effects of climate change much earlier
than the rest of the world (Overland, 2011, p. 180). This is largely due to the positive feedback loop that is
set in motion with continued warming. As warmer sea surface temperatures cause Arctic sea
ice to melt, the albedo effect of the polar ice is significantly decreased, meaning that more
made
energy is absorbed by the ocean. Absorbing more energy warms the waters even further, creating a cycle of melting and
This
positive feedback loop may cause significant increases in sea level, which
would pose grave risks for coastal communities around the world, not only in Arctic
communities. Studies of the seasonal differences in sea ice cover in the Arctic from 1978 to 2003 reveal
a 79% per decade reduction in the area of thicker, multiyear ice (ice
that has survived at least one summer melt) over the last two decades (Johannessen et al., 1999). Thus, the
increase in global temperatures has a direct effect not only on the total sea ice cover in the
Arctic sea, but also on the sea level around the world. Sea level rise is not the only possible
consequence of melting ice. In recent decades, decreases in ice cover have allowed new
warming that will have a significant effect on the Arctic region as warming continues (Overland, 2011, p. 180).
shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean to open. These shipping lanes could play a vital role in trade
by creating viable alternative routes for the exchange of goods between northern states. If shipping
routes such as the Northeast Passage (NEP), the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) become
the Arctic will see a considerable increase in shipping

traffic. This increase in traffic could alter the region, threatening marine
mammals as well as the communities that rely upon a safe and healthy environment. With climate change,
natural gas, oil and other critical minerals will become more accessible and drilling
commercially feasible routes,
and mining is likely to increase. A study by the US Geological Survey (2008) estimates that 25 percent of undiscovered oil
Climate change may start a scramble for resources

not seen since the 19th-century gold rush in California. Arctic wildlife and organisms are facing
severe habitat loss and endangerment due to the effects of climate change. Arctic species
that will be the most affected by the effects of climate change are those with limited
distributions and specialized feeding habits that depend on ice for foraging, reproduction, and predator avoidance,
including the ivory gull, Pacific walrus, ringed seal, hooded seal, narwhal, and
polar bear (Post et al., 2009, p. 1355). These organisms often rely on native Arctic plants as a food source; thus a
disturbance to the lower trophic level of the Arctic food web could threaten
larger mammals. Although Arctic ecosystems may seem incredibly simple, in reality the systems are
incredibly diverse and complex, and the alteration of one aspect within
the system could affect the entire ecosystem. As such, the interrelated
nutrient cycling between terrestrial, freshwater, and marine
components, which may be subject to rapid modification with future
warming is critical (Post et al., 2009, p. 1357). All this shows that the Anthropocene is at play in the Arctic, as
and gas can be found in the Arctic region.
Finger argues in his chapter. Finally, climate change may have an impact on the security strategies of the Arctic states, as
Heininen discusses in his chapter.
UQArctic
Multiple tipping points in the Arctic
Finger 16
Matthias, Swiss PostChair of Management of Network Industries at the EcolePolytechnique

Fdrale in Lausanne, Switzerland and directs the Florence School of Regulations Transport Area at the
European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The Arctic, Laboratory of the Anthropocene. Future
Security of the Global Arctic. Ed by Lassi Heinenen, Professor of Arctic Politics at the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland. Pg 125-126.
change in the Arctic

climate may well become an accelerator of further global change. For example, and
further building on the third IPCC Reports findings, the Arctic Council and the International
Arctic Science Committee presented the upcoming Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment (ACIA, 2005) to the IPCC. This document brought global attention
to climate warming in the region, which may suddenly accelerate and lead to
possibly catastrophic events with irreversible repercussion s, such as the breakup of a big ice shelf section leading to a rapid increase in sea level (UNEP, GRID,
2007). The metaphor and catchword used to describe this situation when unleashed changes start
But what happens in the Arctic is not only a consequence of global change;
to proceed was the tipping point. For instance, referring to the ice-melt of the summer 2007, Mark
Serreze, scientist from the National Snow and Ice Data Center in Boulder (Colorado, USA), comments that
climate models had underestimated the rate of sea ice loss and that there is a tipping point under which
According to a model developed by Marika

Holland from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, the critical sea ice thickness
maybe 2.5 m. and then you kind of fall over the edge (Serreze cited in Emmerson
2010, pp. 150151). More precisely, the Arctic cryosphere constitutes one of the main
identified tipping points globally (Fleming, 2008; Lenton et al., 2008; Nuttall, 2012; Wadhams,
2012; Young, 2012): if we are to lose Arctic ice cover , and especially Greenlands ice sheet,
then this will trigger an irreversible dangerous change of the global climate
system. More generally, the Arctic holds four such tipping points for the Earth System:
the first one is, as mentioned earlier, the ice cover with its albedo effect ; the second tipping
point is constituted by the effects of methane release both on land (permafrost) and in the sea; the
third tipping point pertains to the acidification of the Arctic Ocean ; and the fourth one to
changing ocean currents. All four tipping points may irreversibly affect the Earth System as a
sea ice loss can no longer recover from year to year.
whole.
ILArctic Council Key

The Arctic council is critical -- observer states are key
center of acidification, permafrost methane, and black
carbon
Kerry 15 (John, Secretary of State, Remarks at the Presentation of the U.S.
Chairmanship Program at the Arctic Council Ministerial, April 24, 2015,
proquest)//masonw
Well, thank you again very, very much, Leona. I really appreciate it. And thank you to everybody for the terrific cooperation with Admiral Papp
and others over the course of the last months to help frame this agenda. And again, congratulations on all you've done during the course of
this. I think Canada has set a high bar, and it's given us a lot of confidence that a lot can be achieved in two short years. We're very honored to
assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council today, and in the nearly two decades now since it was first created, I think it's fair to say that
the council's created a great shared sense of purpose, but it's also created a sense of trust among all the countries and with the permanent
representatives. And I think in doing so, we've laid the groundwork to be able to meet a very tough set of future challenges. With your help, we
have developed what we acknowledge is an ambitious agenda, but we believe it's achievable and it's an important demarcation moving
.S. chairmanship will focus

on three interconnected themes. First, addressing the issue of climate, the impacts of climate
change. Second, promoting ocean safety, security, and stewardship. And third,
improving economic and living conditions for Arctic communities . The theme of our
forward, if you will, at this particular point in the council's history. Broadly speaking, the U
chairmanship is "One Arctic," which is a phrase long used by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which embodies our belief that the entire world -not only the Arctic, not only the eight here plus, but the entire world shares a responsibility to protect, to respect, to nurture, and to promote
the region. And over the next two years, as we work to further strengthen the Arctic Council as the premier intergovernmental forum for
addressing Arctic challenges, we're also going to strive to expand awareness of the links between this region and everywhere else -- and we do
As the observer states know well, all countries have a reason to

care about the future of the Arctic. It's a critical part of the global climate
system, literally ensuring a stable, livable environment from Barrow, Alaska, to
Beijing, China, and the fact is it is rapidly changing . How we as Arctic states, and
indeed as a global community, respond to those changes over the coming months and years can
literally make all the difference. One of the biggest challenges everybody has talked about today
is climate change. The numbers are alarming, and that's putting it mildly. The Arctic is
warming faster than any other region on Earth . Temperatures are increasing
at more than twice the rate of the global average. And what these rising temperatures
mean is that the resilience of our communities and our ecosystems, the ability of future
generations to be able to adapt and live and prosper in the Arctic the way people have for
thousands of years is tragically but actually in jeopardy. Now over the last three decades, both the increase in
temperatures and the corresponding decrease in sea ice observed in the Arctic are
unprecedented in at least the 1,500 years that we can measure. In the American Arctic summer, sea ice could very well
disappear almost entirely by mid-century, which would alter marine
ecosystems and increase the vulnerability of communities in the Arctic -- in the system as a consequence
of coastal erosion. And as permafrost thaws, which we are seeing at alarming
rate, we are witnessing more and more wildfires, collapsing infrastructures, and the potential
release of vast amounts of greenhouse gasses that only speed up the warming,
because methane, as we all know, is 20 times more potent in the damage it does than CO2.
Arctic glaciers in the Greenland ice sheet are shrinking substantially and driving global sea level rise. And this in turn
threatens to unleash flooding and storm surges, causing immeasurable harm
not only to Arctic communities, but to urban and rural settlements along the coasts
of every ocean. I think we saw some record level of billions of dollars -- 110, -20
billion it was last year in damages as a consequence of these kinds of events. Now I want to
underscore: This is not a future challenge. This is happening right now . And as they lose their natural sea ice barrier,
mean everywhere.
permafrost continues to thaw, the

infrastructure that depends on it is becoming more and more damaged. Houses and other buildings
are literally collapsing already. Take the community of Galena, Alaska, for example. In 2013, Galena and a number of other villages
in the state faced terrible hardships after an ice jam caused the Yukon River to
flood, because natural defenses had melted away 90 percent. Ninety percent of
Galena's buildings were completely destroyed. So we're on a dangerous path. And during the U.S. chairmanship,
villages in the Arctic are already being battered by storms. And as the
President Obama and I pledge during the time we're there -- I think we're there for all but about four or five months of it -- my government -- or
three months of it -- my government will work every single day with members of this council to help prepare Arctic communities for the
we'll do everything we can to prevent even worse impacts in years to

which is why we negotiated our numbers last year with China, and why we went to India and
moved to an announcement with India, and are working with other major emitting nations to make
impacts of this change. And
come,
sure we put out our INDCs, our determined contributions, in order to go to Paris in as strong a position as possible. We are calling on the
council to contribute to detailed examinations of the local ecosystem, so we understand them better. And we propose to expand the local
environmental observer group network to encourage citizens to get involved in monitoring their own communities and contributing to our
preventative measures and to our knowledge. We also support the creation of an enhanced digital elevation map of the Arctic, which will
provide much better information to scientists and other experts in sustainable development and help us make wise development decisions as
we go forward. The greater our understanding of forthcoming challenges, then the better we are able to predict the regional impacts on
climate change before they hit, and then the smarter and more collective our response will be able to be. But even as we take necessary steps
to prepare for climate change, we also have a shared responsibility to do everything we can to slow its advance, and we cannot afford to take
The Arctic Council can do more on climate change, especially when it

comes to black carbon emissions. Black carbon is up to 2,000 times more
potent than carbon dioxide. Once it's released, this dark soot collects on the surface of snow, visible to the naked eye -our eye off that ball.
covered sea ice as well -- and it absorbs the solar radiation and then it acts a blanket that traps heat. It doesn't take a PhD to know that the
combination of heat and ice produces melting. So collectively, Arctic Council members in observer states contribute more than 60 percent of
black carbon pollution. So if we want to know where the problem begins, all we have to do is look in the mirror. But that's also where the
solution is staring us in the face. During our chairmanship, the United States intends to press for the full implementation of the Framework for
Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions. And that includes the compilation of national black carbon and methane emission
inventories, national reporting on domestic mitigation efforts, and greater international cooperation on reducing these dangerous pollutants.
We also call on observer states in the Council to join us
in this effort. Because the fact is these

pollutants are a threat to everybody. And our cooperation is particularly timely in the run-up to COP 21 in December in Paris. And I think all of
us are hoping to achieve a broader, more ambitious global agreement on climate action. And doing so really matters deeply for a host of
reasons, but it's also an indispensable part of a responsibility that is shared by every member of this council, and that is the stewardship of the
Arctic Ocean. As many of you know, or maybe -- I know my fellow ministers know this because many attended or sent people to a conference
we did in Washington on the oceans this past year; it'll be followed up by a conference in Chile this year, and then we will pick it up and do it
our oceans, which are overfished and

over-polluted and certainly over-acidified at this point. But the health of the ocean is
critical to all of us. And one of the things we focused on in Washington is ocean acidification. Carbon dioxide does not
just drive climate change. It also gets absorbed by the ocean, although we saw the first
regurgitation by the ocean of CO2 in the Antarctic this past year, so we don't know what the limits of that
absorption are, which is another challenge for all of us on Earth. But to the degree that it does get absorbed by the ocean, it winds
again next year in Washington in order to try to galvanize action about
up threatening marine ecosystems on which we all depend. And the cold temperatures of the Arctic Ocean make it particularly vulnerable to
acidification, science tells us. And the science is actually jarring on this. If current trends continue, scientists predict that by the end of the
century, the Arctic waters will become corrosive to all shell-building creatures. So think about that -- what that would mean to the entire Arctic
ocean
acidification is often an overlooked impact of climate change. A lot of people don't even focus on it. For one thing, we
food chain in addition to the people whose livelihoods depend on those creatures. Despite all of this, incomprehensibly,
actually don't even know enough about it, especially in the Arctic. So during our chairmanship, we're going to call on every Arctic and observer
state to join the Global Ocean Acidification Observer Network to facilitate greater monitoring of Arctic waters. And here as well, the more
information we have about what's happening, the better we will be able to address it. Another effort that's critical to ensuring the stewardship
of the Arctic Ocean is continuing the council's work on developing a pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas. As the ice continues to
melt, navigability of the Arctic Ocean is expanding. And while there are benefits to that -- and there are some -- increased human traffic also
means that even more maritime ecosystems will be at risk of being either disturbed or even destroyed. Creating a network of marine
protected areas throughout the region will help us safeguard areas that are particularly significant both culturally and ecologically. And we can
also create a regional seas program for the Arctic, something that nations have done in other parts of the world to improve cooperation on
marine science and share best practices. Let me add: The stewardship of the Arctic Ocean is obviously critically important, but so is ensuring
the safety and the security. In recent years, the Arctic Council developed two historic agreements to improve the chances that the increase
that we are seeing in human traffic can take place safely and securely. Over the next two years, we intend to use those agreements robustly
through joint operational exercises, training and information exchange, so that we're better prepared to respond to the incidents at sea.
Ultimately the people of this region, as we've said again and again, are our top priority. And we want that to be a hallmark of our
chairmanship. We fully intend to continue Canada's effort to improve the lives of the Arctic indigenous peoples, and that means focusing on
water security and on protecting the freshwater system that the people of the Arctic need and deserve. It means redoubling our efforts to
address the tragically and disproportionately high rates of suicide that plague the Arctic. And we heard discussion a little while ago, and it
means creating tools to improve mental health. It means assessing the region's telecommunications infrastructure, which is absolutely
essential to regional connectivity, health care delivery, scientific observation, navigation, emergency response, and more. And certainly it
means encouraging economic development, including development of natural resources, but insisting that this be done wisely, carefully, and
in a way that doesn't counteract efforts to address other significant challenges, such as, obviously, climate change itself. And along the same
lines, improving the lives of the Arctic indigenous peoples also means expanding access to clean, affordable, and renewable energy
technologies that will provide local communities with alternatives to the costly and dirty diesel-based electricity that too many are forced to
rely on today. A couple of years ago, a massive storm prevented the village of Nome, Alaska, from receiving its last barge delivery of home
heating fuel -- of diesel and gasoline for the winter. By the time the weather calmed down, Nome was already iced in, and it looked certain that
the community was going to run out of fuel in the spring. Well, the fuel eventually arrived thanks to the Coast Guard cutter Healy, but it came
clean
energy is the solution to climate change. If we got the whole world to
embrace clean energy choices rapidly, we can meet our two-degree target. But the
window's closing. The extraordinary thing is all of the technologies we need -- whether it's wind or solar or hydro or
with exorbitant costs and after an enormous amount of stress had been lived through by the entire community. My friends,
whatever, they're all there. It's the economics that don't drive people to make the choice, so we've got a lot of countries putting on coal-fired
burning right now, and the coal-fired burning they're putting on will totally erase the gains that a lot of other countries are making at the same
time. So we have to have a serious conversation about this, which is why President Obama has been pushing our national program so hard,
and why we are so focused on this. Clean energy is the solution to climate change. It also happens to be the world's biggest market. It will
make many people rich. Enormous numbers of jobs will be created. Environmental responsibility can be lived up to. People's health will be
better. And security will be greater for a lot of countries that today are blackmailed by one source of fuel of one kind or another. So many
benefits. How many public choices do you get to make where there are so many plusses on the good side versus the negatives on the
So it is essential, especially in the Arctic, to providing affordable,

reliable energy that is needed here. We got to find the ways to do it. During our chairmanship, we're going to examine every
downside? Very few.
chance for greater circumpolar collaboration to develop renewable energy and promote energy efficiency in Arctic communities. So in closing,
let me just underscore: Again, I say, as I said in the beginning, we understand this is ambitious. But we have to be ambitious. And the
challenges that we're facing require us to try to step up. And we're also aware that our chairmanship comes at a pivotal time for the Arctic and
for the council. The decisions that we make today and in the next two years, the actions that we come together to take, will determine the
future of this region for generations to come. So we have to be ambitious, we have to honor the responsibility that each of our nations has for
the Arctic, we have to make sure the opportunities that we explore help to preserve the sustainability and the vitality of this region and by
extension the rest of the world. And we all know
the clock is ticking and we actually don't have a lot of
time to waste. So we very much look forward to working with all of you -- the Arctic states, the permanent participants, the observer states
-- because we have to meet these goals, and we have to build on the tremendous progress that this council has made over 20 years and write
the history of the next 20. Thank you all.
ILUS-China Key
The Arctic council is critical -- observer states are key
center of acidification, permafrost methane, and black
carbon
Kerry 15 (John, Secretary of State, Remarks at the Presentation of the U.S.
Chairmanship Program at the Arctic Council Ministerial, April 24, 2015,
proquest)//masonw
Well, thank you again very, very much, Leona. I really appreciate it. And thank you to everybody for the terrific cooperation with Admiral Papp
and others over the course of the last months to help frame this agenda. And again, congratulations on all you've done during the course of
this. I think Canada has set a high bar, and it's given us a lot of confidence that a lot can be achieved in two short years. We're very honored to
assume the chairmanship of the Arctic Council today, and in the nearly two decades now since it was first created, I think it's fair to say that
the council's created a great shared sense of purpose, but it's also created a sense of trust among all the countries and with the permanent
representatives. And I think in doing so, we've laid the groundwork to be able to meet a very tough set of future challenges. With your help, we
have developed what we acknowledge is an ambitious agenda, but we believe it's achievable and it's an important demarcation moving
.S. chairmanship will focus

on three interconnected themes. First, addressing the issue of climate, the impacts of climate
change. Second, promoting ocean safety, security, and stewardship. And third,
improving economic and living conditions for Arctic communities . The theme of our
forward, if you will, at this particular point in the council's history. Broadly speaking, the U
chairmanship is "One Arctic," which is a phrase long used by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which embodies our belief that the entire world -not only the Arctic, not only the eight here plus, but the entire world shares a responsibility to protect, to respect, to nurture, and to promote
the region. And over the next two years, as we work to further strengthen the Arctic Council as the premier intergovernmental forum for
addressing Arctic challenges, we're also going to strive to expand awareness of the links between this region and everywhere else -- and we do
As the observer states know well, all countries have a reason to

care about the future of the Arctic. It's a critical part of the global climate
system, literally ensuring a stable, livable environment from Barrow, Alaska, to
Beijing, China, and the fact is it is rapidly changing . How we as Arctic states, and
indeed as a global community, respond to those changes over the coming months and years can
literally make all the difference. One of the biggest challenges everybody has talked about today
is climate change. The numbers are alarming, and that's putting it mildly. The Arctic is
warming faster than any other region on Earth . Temperatures are increasing
at more than twice the rate of the global average. And what these rising temperatures
mean is that the resilience of our communities and our ecosystems, the ability of future
generations to be able to adapt and live and prosper in the Arctic the way people have for
thousands of years is tragically but actually in jeopardy. Now over the last three decades, both the increase in
temperatures and the corresponding decrease in sea ice observed in the Arctic are
unprecedented in at least the 1,500 years that we can measure. In the American Arctic summer, sea ice could very well
disappear almost entirely by mid-century, which would alter marine
ecosystems and increase the vulnerability of communities in the Arctic -- in the system as a consequence
of coastal erosion. And as permafrost thaws, which we are seeing at alarming
rate, we are witnessing more and more wildfires, collapsing infrastructures, and the potential
release of vast amounts of greenhouse gasses that only speed up the warming,
because methane, as we all know, is 20 times more potent in the damage it does than CO2.
Arctic glaciers in the Greenland ice sheet are shrinking substantially and driving global sea level rise. And this in turn
threatens to unleash flooding and storm surges, causing immeasurable harm
not only to Arctic communities, but to urban and rural settlements along the coasts
of every ocean. I think we saw some record level of billions of dollars -- 110, -20
billion it was last year in damages as a consequence of these kinds of events. Now I want to
underscore: This is not a future challenge. This is happening right now . And as they lose their natural sea ice barrier,
mean everywhere.
permafrost continues to thaw, the

infrastructure that depends on it is becoming more and more damaged. Houses and other buildings
are literally collapsing already. Take the community of Galena, Alaska, for example. In 2013, Galena and a number of other villages
in the state faced terrible hardships after an ice jam caused the Yukon River to
flood, because natural defenses had melted away 90 percent. Ninety percent of
Galena's buildings were completely destroyed. So we're on a dangerous path. And during the U.S. chairmanship,
villages in the Arctic are already being battered by storms. And as the
President Obama and I pledge during the time we're there -- I think we're there for all but about four or five months of it -- my government -- or
three months of it -- my government will work every single day with members of this council to help prepare Arctic communities for the
we'll do everything we can to prevent even worse impacts in years to

which is why we negotiated our numbers last year with China, and why we went to India and
moved to an announcement with India, and are working with other major emitting nations to make
impacts of this change. And
come,
sure we put out our INDCs, our determined contributions, in order to go to Paris in as strong a position as possible. We are calling on the
council to contribute to detailed examinations of the local ecosystem, so we understand them better. And we propose to expand the local
environmental observer group network to encourage citizens to get involved in monitoring their own communities and contributing to our
preventative measures and to our knowledge. We also support the creation of an enhanced digital elevation map of the Arctic, which will
provide much better information to scientists and other experts in sustainable development and help us make wise development decisions as
we go forward. The greater our understanding of forthcoming challenges, then the better we are able to predict the regional impacts on
climate change before they hit, and then the smarter and more collective our response will be able to be. But even as we take necessary steps
to prepare for climate change, we also have a shared responsibility to do everything we can to slow its advance, and we cannot afford to take
The Arctic Council can do more on climate change, especially when it

comes to black carbon emissions. Black carbon is up to 2,000 times more
potent than carbon dioxide. Once it's released, this dark soot collects on the surface of snow, visible to the naked eye -our eye off that ball.
covered sea ice as well -- and it absorbs the solar radiation and then it acts a blanket that traps heat. It doesn't take a PhD to know that the
combination of heat and ice produces melting. So collectively, Arctic Council members in observer states contribute more than 60 percent of
black carbon pollution. So if we want to know where the problem begins, all we have to do is look in the mirror. But that's also where the
solution is staring us in the face. During our chairmanship, the United States intends to press for the full implementation of the Framework for
Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions. And that includes the compilation of national black carbon and methane emission
inventories, national reporting on domestic mitigation efforts, and greater international cooperation on reducing these dangerous pollutants.
We also call on observer states in the Council to join us
in this effort. Because the fact is these

pollutants are a threat to everybody. And our cooperation is particularly timely in the run-up to COP 21 in December in Paris. And I think all of
us are hoping to achieve a broader, more ambitious global agreement on climate action. And doing so really matters deeply for a host of
reasons, but it's also an indispensable part of a responsibility that is shared by every member of this council, and that is the stewardship of the
Arctic Ocean. As many of you know, or maybe -- I know my fellow ministers know this because many attended or sent people to a conference
we did in Washington on the oceans this past year; it'll be followed up by a conference in Chile this year, and then we will pick it up and do it
our oceans, which are overfished and

over-polluted and certainly over-acidified at this point. But the health of the ocean is
critical to all of us. And one of the things we focused on in Washington is ocean acidification. Carbon dioxide does not
just drive climate change. It also gets absorbed by the ocean, although we saw the first
regurgitation by the ocean of CO2 in the Antarctic this past year, so we don't know what the limits of that
absorption are, which is another challenge for all of us on Earth. But to the degree that it does get absorbed by the ocean, it winds
again next year in Washington in order to try to galvanize action about
up threatening marine ecosystems on which we all depend. And the cold temperatures of the Arctic Ocean make it particularly vulnerable to
acidification, science tells us. And the science is actually jarring on this. If current trends continue, scientists predict that by the end of the
century, the Arctic waters will become corrosive to all shell-building creatures. So think about that -- what that would mean to the entire Arctic
ocean
acidification is often an overlooked impact of climate change. A lot of people don't even focus on it. For one thing, we
food chain in addition to the people whose livelihoods depend on those creatures. Despite all of this, incomprehensibly,
actually don't even know enough about it, especially in the Arctic. So during our chairmanship, we're going to call on every Arctic and observer
state to join the Global Ocean Acidification Observer Network to facilitate greater monitoring of Arctic waters. And here as well, the more
information we have about what's happening, the better we will be able to address it. Another effort that's critical to ensuring the stewardship
of the Arctic Ocean is continuing the council's work on developing a pan-Arctic network of marine protected areas. As the ice continues to
melt, navigability of the Arctic Ocean is expanding. And while there are benefits to that -- and there are some -- increased human traffic also
means that even more maritime ecosystems will be at risk of being either disturbed or even destroyed. Creating a network of marine
protected areas throughout the region will help us safeguard areas that are particularly significant both culturally and ecologically. And we can
also create a regional seas program for the Arctic, something that nations have done in other parts of the world to improve cooperation on
marine science and share best practices. Let me add: The stewardship of the Arctic Ocean is obviously critically important, but so is ensuring
the safety and the security. In recent years, the Arctic Council developed two historic agreements to improve the chances that the increase
that we are seeing in human traffic can take place safely and securely. Over the next two years, we intend to use those agreements robustly
through joint operational exercises, training and information exchange, so that we're better prepared to respond to the incidents at sea.
Ultimately the people of this region, as we've said again and again, are our top priority. And we want that to be a hallmark of our
chairmanship. We fully intend to continue Canada's effort to improve the lives of the Arctic indigenous peoples, and that means focusing on
water security and on protecting the freshwater system that the people of the Arctic need and deserve. It means redoubling our efforts to
address the tragically and disproportionately high rates of suicide that plague the Arctic. And we heard discussion a little while ago, and it
means creating tools to improve mental health. It means assessing the region's telecommunications infrastructure, which is absolutely
essential to regional connectivity, health care delivery, scientific observation, navigation, emergency response, and more. And certainly it
means encouraging economic development, including development of natural resources, but insisting that this be done wisely, carefully, and
in a way that doesn't counteract efforts to address other significant challenges, such as, obviously, climate change itself. And along the same
lines, improving the lives of the Arctic indigenous peoples also means expanding access to clean, affordable, and renewable energy
technologies that will provide local communities with alternatives to the costly and dirty diesel-based electricity that too many are forced to
rely on today. A couple of years ago, a massive storm prevented the village of Nome, Alaska, from receiving its last barge delivery of home
heating fuel -- of diesel and gasoline for the winter. By the time the weather calmed down, Nome was already iced in, and it looked certain that
the community was going to run out of fuel in the spring. Well, the fuel eventually arrived thanks to the Coast Guard cutter Healy, but it came
clean
energy is the solution to climate change. If we got the whole world to
embrace clean energy choices rapidly, we can meet our two-degree target. But the
window's closing. The extraordinary thing is all of the technologies we need -- whether it's wind or solar or hydro or
with exorbitant costs and after an enormous amount of stress had been lived through by the entire community. My friends,
whatever, they're all there. It's the economics that don't drive people to make the choice, so we've got a lot of countries putting on coal-fired
burning right now, and the coal-fired burning they're putting on will totally erase the gains that a lot of other countries are making at the same
time. So we have to have a serious conversation about this, which is why President Obama has been pushing our national program so hard,
and why we are so focused on this. Clean energy is the solution to climate change. It also happens to be the world's biggest market. It will
make many people rich. Enormous numbers of jobs will be created. Environmental responsibility can be lived up to. People's health will be
better. And security will be greater for a lot of countries that today are blackmailed by one source of fuel of one kind or another. So many
benefits. How many public choices do you get to make where there are so many plusses on the good side versus the negatives on the
So it is essential, especially in the Arctic, to providing affordable,

reliable energy that is needed here. We got to find the ways to do it. During our chairmanship, we're going to examine every
downside? Very few.
chance for greater circumpolar collaboration to develop renewable energy and promote energy efficiency in Arctic communities. So in closing,
let me just underscore: Again, I say, as I said in the beginning, we understand this is ambitious. But we have to be ambitious. And the
challenges that we're facing require us to try to step up. And we're also aware that our chairmanship comes at a pivotal time for the Arctic and
for the council. The decisions that we make today and in the next two years, the actions that we come together to take, will determine the
future of this region for generations to come. So we have to be ambitious, we have to honor the responsibility that each of our nations has for
the Arctic, we have to make sure the opportunities that we explore help to preserve the sustainability and the vitality of this region and by
extension the rest of the world. And we all know
the clock is ticking and we actually don't have a lot of
time to waste. So we very much look forward to working with all of you -- the Arctic states, the permanent participants, the observer states
-- because we have to meet these goals, and we have to build on the tremendous progress that this council has made over 20 years and write
the history of the next 20. Thank you all.
AT: No Follow Thru
The PRC needs to deal with its clean energy goals cooperation shows interest in Geothermal
Guschin 15 (Arthur. non-resident senior analyst at S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies (RSIS). China, Iceland and the Arctic The Diplomat
http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-iceland-and-the-arctic/
5/20/16)//masonw
Beijings interest in the industrial application of geothermal energy is part of
its strategy for improving the environmental situation in the PRC. The use of
coal as the main fuel for industry and residential heating has led to
widespread air pollution and triggered ecological issues with a range of questions
about priorities in the present five-year plan . At the end of 2015, clean energy should
be meeting 11.4 percent of Chinas energy needs, and by 2020, 15 percent. In contrast to the
market for wind and solar energy, where Beijing has been investing heavily since 2003 and 2011,
respectively, the development of geothermal energy was never a possibility until
Wen Jiabao visited Reykjavik. The pilot project using Icelandic know-how in China was launched in
Xianyang City, in Shaanxi province in 2006. The original plan was for heat and electricity for 1 million square meters of
living space. However, this year the overall residential area under geothermal power will exceed 30 million square meters,
and it will reach 100 million in 2020. This will make Xianyang the most ecological city in the PRC. It has been decided to
repeat the projects success in the provinces of Hebei (Baoding City), Shandong, Sichuan, and Yunnan, as well as in Tibet
and Xinjiang. By the end of 2014, 85 percent of all residential space in Baoding (1.6 million square meters) was being
heated by geothermal energy, saving 120,000 tons of coal. Moreover, local household heating expenses decreased to 1518 yuan per square meter, down from 24 yuan when coal was the main source of heat.
AT: Exploitation T/
Chinas arctic interests are not for corporate exploit
theyre for national security
6 Statist, Liberal or Marxist Explanations? Statist Arguments. In his thoughtful study, Defending the
National Interest (1978), Stephen Krasner explores the relationship between state and society and
Krasner wants to
understand the factors and forces that best explain how policy is made in this
policy area. Which model or paradigm best explains policy choices in the area of raw materials
examines 15 case studies in the area of raw materials investments.
investments? Krasners work wonders if a statist, liberal or Marxist model best describes the choices made
by US policy-makers? To further elaborate, are policy choices best explained by the interest of the state
and its various agencies or by the competition among various nongovernmental interest communities
Marxist or critical theory views ask whether

US raw materials policy is controlled by corporations or wealthy capitalist
elites. Krasner argues that the state or national interests shape policy in this area
not special interest groups or private capitalist interests . Thus, the state is an
autonomous actor. Further, the goals of the state cannot be reduced to a summation
of private desires (Krasner, 1978, p. 6). Krasner argues that the material and ideational
interests of the state determine policy and these statists goals overrule
corporate interests and the interests of both domestic and global civil society actors in specific
seeking to control the policy process? Still,
policy areas. His work confirmed this proposition in the area of raw materials investment policies for the
United States. His study found that national leaders representing departments and bureaucratic agencies
are capable of defining and securing the national interest in policy areas where there is not a
great deal of public interest or that public participation in the policy process is constrained or repressed by
public authorities. Krasner (1978, p. 331) found that in the area of raw materials the United States has
three clear goals: Develop policies to maximize the competitive structure of the global market and thus
keep the prices of key commodities low.
AT: Development T/
Development of the Arctic is inevitable security and the
Arctic Paradox
Finger 16
Matthias, Swiss PostChair of Management of Network Industries at the EcolePolytechnique

Fdrale in Lausanne, Switzerland and directs the Florence School of Regulations Transport Area at the
European University Institute in Florence, Italy. The Arctic, Laboratory of the Anthropocene. Future
Security of the Global Arctic. Ed by Lassi Heinenen, Professor of Arctic Politics at the Faculty of Social
Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland. Pg 129-130, LM.
One year after the mentioned 2007 Arctic climate event, t he
US Geological Survey (2008)

released estimates stating that about 25 percent of the worlds oil and gas reserves
lie in the Arctic, most of it offshore in the Arctic Ocean (13 percent of world oil reserves and 30
percent of gas reserves) (Finger-Stich and Finger, 2012). Suddenly, the Arctic paradox became
obvious, as the Arctic is on one hand the place where the effects of climate
change are among the strongest, and on the other, the region where there
are the greatest remaining reserves of hydrocarbons in the world. Furthermore, as the
International Energy Agency recognized that the need for world peak oil was probably reached in 2006,
the pressure to access the few remaining reserves that can be exploited
efficiently (with positive energy return on energy and capital invested) becomes very acute. This
Arctic paradox can also be formulated as follows: global warming, and especially its consequence in the
form of Arctic sea ice melting, leads to a huge temptation. This is the temptation to exploit the submarine
geological resources, in particular oil and gas to the very end, something that will further accelerate
climate change and further endanger the Earths global habitability. The relevant philosophical and
anthropological question is whether Humanity can resist this temptation. Now, this temptation is actually
not specific to the Arctic. Similar temptations exist, such as, for example, the temptation to clear the
Amazonian or the Congolese rainforests and, by doing so, access fossil fuel resources or simply develop
land for biofuels and/or intensive agriculture. Other temptations are a little bit more complicated, yet
equally real. These are the ones that are made possible by scientific and even more so technological
advances, such as in the case of deep sea drilling. The Arctic actually rather resembles this latter category,
given that, even with receding ice, significant technological means (and additional research) will have to
be engaged in order to be able to exploit the available resources. So, what makes the Arctic different? I
the magnitude of the available resources in the Arctic (Gautier and

Pierce, 2008; Kontorovitch et al., 2010). In addition, one has to mention the particular role of nationstates: most of the Arctics territories are actually divided up among nationstates and only very few areas are still being disputed.2 Furthermore, the areas that
have already mentioned
are outside the exclusive 200 nautical miles zone (the EEZ) are said not to be particularly resourcesrich
one must also mention the particular nationstate history in the Arctic, shaped as it is by the Cold War (19501990), and
which has led to a substantial militarization of the Arctic (Fritz, 2013) during that
(Gautier and Pierce, 2008). In this respect,
period. Particular mention must be made here of the United States and Russia, and also of Norway and
little demilitarization has occurred since the end of the Cold War (see
the territorial and military aspects of nation-states
appear particularly clearly and purely in the case of the Arctic, as the Arctic territory
is sparsely populated, and as settlements are used, at least in the case of Russia, as a
means to affirm territorial claims vis--vis indigenous peoples. Security is a military
concept, closely tied to the nation-state and its interests, in particular its
interest in development; epistemologically it is the result of the Western military history emerging
Canada, as actually
Heininen this volume). Moreover,
along the described development path as early as the modern nation-state (17th century); security
underpins the nation-state, scientific rationalism, colonization, the Industrial Revolution and the
domination of nature more generally. As such,
security is a key, if not the key
(epistemological),
driver of much of the development trajectory. The idea is to protect oneself

(the individual, the nation, industrial civilization) from potential threats to (individual, national and
industrial) development. The lack of (fossil) fuels (to sustain the development trajectory
constitutes definitely a security threat. Consequently, industrial civilization especially
its main relevant actors notably the nation-states and the interested firms will thus do whatever
it takes to access and exploit the Arctics resources. Environmental and other
concerns (including the ones regarding the earlier-mentioned tipping points) will certainly be
raised, but they will be sidelined and ultimately ignored, given the
institutionalized development trajectory along which Humanity seems almost
irreversibly engaged. In other words, the development of the Arctic will most likely be
conceptualized and approached as a security issue (see also the other chapters in this volume).
Russia/Arctic Adv
Miscalc Coming
Tensions in between Russia in the Barents sea are rising
--- renewed nuclear operations means risk of miscalc is
high
Luszczuk 16 (Micha, (Ph. D.) s (Ph. D.) in political sciences awarded by
the Council of the Faculty of Political Science of MCSU in Lublin, Military
Cooperation and Enhanced Arctic Security in the Context of Climate Change
and Growing Global Interest in the Arctic published in: Future Security of the
Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate. By Heininen, Lassi.
Chapter 5, pages 38-41 Pdf, 2016)//masonw
major changes are occurring in
Greenland, Iceland and the Barents Sea subregion and that they are actively
shaping the new reality of the whole Arctic region (IISS, 2012). Greenland is shifting toward
Renewed strategic importance of the region It is usually pointed out that
independence from Denmark, a possibility that will seriously determine the future involvement and position of that state
Icelands recent financial crisis and the shutting down of the

United States Keflavik air base in 2006 followed by resumed Russian bomber flights in the Arctic (Watson, 2011)
raised some concerns about what the intentions of Russia might be , and about
in Arctic affairs (Auchet, 2011).
Icelands security and (self-)defense arrangements (Kristjansson and Cela, 2011; Dodds and Ingimundarson, 2012). The
Barents Sea subregion, which is becoming a nexus for the changes taking place in the Arctic (shipping, extraction, military
Norway and Russia extremely important for the

overall geopolitical situation in the region (Moe, 2010). On the contrary, sovereignty claims, the Arctic as a
activity), has made bilateral relations between
strategic nuclear arena, and ballistic missile defense systems currently seem to be the main aspects of the Arctic military
dimension (IISS, 2012; Conley et al., 2012), and as such they require a more detailed presentation. First, when human
activities in the Arctic increase surveillance of territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, search and rescue and
environmental protection activities become instrumental in signalling sovereignty. This approach is generally shared by all
strategic nuclear assets were

concentrated in the Arctic throughout the Cold War, and nuclear operations
never completely ceased (Wallace and Staples, 2010). The ice cap made submarines
difficult or impossible to detect, and this raises the question of whether the ice
melt will erode second-strike nuclear capabilities and render countries more
vulnerable to attacks. Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom are developing or
debating the renewal and revitalization of their SSBN systems. In many capital
cities there has been an intense debate about how the change in the operating
conditions for which these weapons systems were developed will affect operational patterns and strategic stability,
and what effect this will have on investment decisions for the future (Vestergaard, 2010). Third, the BMD
systems are shifting slowly toward more sea-based components, which may
lead to more shipbased systems operating further to the North, and this in turn
may be regarded as manifestations of US and allied naval power. This
carries the risk of misunderstood intentions. The strong Russian reaction to
the proposed missile defense system in Central Europe indicates potential
sensitivities around changes in BMD systems and raises a dilemma around
whether adverse reactions from nations in and around the Arctic would be worth the technological
Arctic states, especially coastal ones (Bailes and Heininen, 2012). Second,
systemic effect of BMD components operating in the Arctic (IISS, 2012). Having drawn the strategic picture of the Arctic, it
is now time to look at the military capabilities of the states in the region. Unique military capabilities for a unique region
the Arctic Ocean coastal, or littoral, states have followed one

model in their new Arctic strategies (as political declarations or projects) and admitted that their main
According to Haftendorn (2011),
safeguarding sovereignty over their Arctic territories and securing a fair

share in the exploitation of the areas resources, while the noncoastal states seem to prefer
mainly the development of international cooperation. They also committed themselves to using hydrocarbons
responsibly in order to avoid destroying the highly fragile Arctic environment, and
to ensuring the well-being of indigenous people in the Arctic In so doing,
they try to blend military preparedness with enhanced cooperation,
Haftendorn (2011, p. 339) remarks. It is worth noting that a similar position
was expressed by the participants of the first NATO seminar on Security
Prospects in the High North organized in Reykjavk on 29 January 2009. They underscored that it remained a
focus is
priority to preserve the current stability in the Arctic as a region of low tension by managing the ongoing limited increase
in military activities in a transparent, deliberate and measured way (Chairmans Conclusions, 2009). The review of
current and projected military forces in the Arctic region, presented by Siemon Wezeman of the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) in March 2012, indicated that the process of modernization and the creation of new capacities to address
environmental, economic and political changes

anticipated in the region, rather than constituting a response to major threat perceptions. Conventional
new challenges was associated with the
military forces especially adjusted to the harsh Arctic environment were projected to remain rather local in range,
especially given the size of the Arctic region, and would remain in some cases very much below Cold War levels
(Wezeman, 2012). An interesting comparison referring only to the Arctic Oceans navy and coastguard ships is presented
by Grtz (2012). As Haftendorn (2011, p. 343) predicts, any new military challenge in the Arctic will be radically different
from that during the Cold War; it will stem from fundamentally changed political interests and ambitions. Norways
General S. Diesen (2008), even suggests that such new challenges

might arise from greater accessibility to raw materials and the opening of
new lines of communication; other sources might be strategic competition,
miscalculation or an accident caused by the military forces deployed in the
region. Taking this into consideration, it bears pointing out that following the reduction of the political and military
former chief of defense,
tensions in the 1990s, some military capabilities are again being restored or redeployed in the Arctic. In many instances,
these capabilities are defensive in nature and linked to intensified activities surrounding either
the extraction of raw materials or new soft security issues. Soft capabilities help to address climate
change, cyber crime, search and rescue, disaster response and humanitarian
assistance. As has already been highlighted, due to the extreme weather conditions, primarily military or coast
guard assets tend to be able to safely operate under Arctic conditions (plus a very limited number of the icebrakers
there is also a growing

awareness of the lack of surveillance capabilities for the territory and for the
purpose of enforcing sovereignty . While Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark, for instance, strive to
capable of operating in the Arctic Ocean). In light of the new possibilities,
build up policing and military capabilities to strengthen their presence in the Arctic areas, Russia, along with upgrading
the Russian Arctic, has also

focused on modernizing its hard capabilities, which are essential not only for
power projection and strategic deterrence , but also for maritime security, aerial
and naval reconnaissance or satellite communication. What is more, Russia has
resumed patrol flights over the Arctic as well as submarine patrols last carried
out during the Cold War, albeit at a lower frequency. This confirms the persistence of a rather traditional
border protection capabilities as a part of the integrated security system in
Russian threat perception (Grtz, 2012), which, however, is occasionally developed through participation in different forms
of military cooperation the main topic of the next section.
ILUNCLOS
UNCLOS obstruction has altered the discourse about the
Arctic and means an increasing risk of miscalc
uszczuk 16 (Micha, (Ph. D.) s (Ph. D.) in political sciences awarded by
the Council of the Faculty of Political Science of MCSU in Lublin, Military
Cooperation and Enhanced Arctic Security in the Context of Climate Change
and Growing Global Interest in the Arctic published in: Future Security of the
Global Arctic: State Policy, Economic Security and Climate. By Heininen, Lassi.
Chapter 5, pages 95-96 Pdf, 2016)//masonw
various complex factors resulting
from the consequences of climate change have raised political concerns over the
future of the Arctic region. A shrinking ice cap that increases accessibility to
resources and potential shipping routes , technological changes facilitating the
extraction of resources from deep seas and the implementation of UNCLOS, which
has allowed countries to extend their sovereign right to harvest resources
into the sea, have put the Arctic back on the geopolitical map and in the
news. This has once again altered the discourse about the Arctic from one being
concerned with only environmental protection to a renewed take in which the
exploitation of natural resources, navigation, territorial claims and, finally, the
military dimension of security have become prevalent. Today we are almost sure that the
Arctic will experience extraordinary and far-reaching environmental, social
and economic transformation over the next several decades (see Finger in this volume). More
extensive drilling for oil and gas in the region, booming shipping and tourism are just a few
Concluding remarks At the beginning of the 21st century,
of the widely known examples of increased human activity anticipated in the Arctic, as new shipping routes
come into existence and the scope of human activity expands. Owing to the extremely harsh polar climate
this renewed activity will still require very special

support and security, both in terms of competencies and technical capabilities (Perry and Andersen,
and almost unpredictable weather conditions,
2012). What is more, it should be emphasized that the new security challenges are quite wide-ranging,
including search and rescue, environmental remediation, natural and man-made disaster response, border
protection and, at a further point in time, even piracy or terrorism (Conley et al., 2012). As the US
operations in the Arctic areas are being

transformed in recent times by the changing physical environment as well as
increased civilian presence and activities (US DoD, 2010) that create a demand for very
special coast guard services in the area. These services include surveillance and maritime
domain awareness; law enforcement, including observing and reporting on fishing activities;
environmental protection, including oil pollution response; and search and
rescue. Delivering these services in the Arctic presents additional challenges, particularly ones
Department of Defense appraises, military
connected with the considerable distances involved. These issues are likely new and prospective domains
for the military forces activities in all Arctic states. As has been suggested throughout this chapter, the
Arctic has been so far an area of low military tension, but it should still be considered paramount to design
how to create forums for discussing hard and soft

security issues, confidence-building and military cooperation (see also Heininen in
this volume). The different examples of military cooperation provided here show that there has been
a growing awareness of these needs among the Arctic states or at least they
plans on how to keep it that way,
manifested such. At the same time, along with the development of the Ukrainian crisis, the issue of the
changing settings for the political cooperation in the Arctic region has been gaining importance. When the
new US and EU sanctions against Russia apply also to security and energy-related projects in the Arctic
and concurrently the Russian military has increased the frequency of its exercises and manoeuvres in the
this quite often used phrase High North with low tension might be
replaced with its new version: High North with growing tension . Of
course, the projection of military power does not have to lead to an open conflict; however, it
may increase the probability of some accidents or the wild cards that will test
the values and effectiveness of the earlier multilateral military cooperation.
region,
AT: DISADS
UQ Tricks
SCS UQ2ac
The US will inevitably engage its kind of a big dealits
only a question of how
Garamone 7/8 -- (Jim Garamone, 7-8-2016, "International Court to Rule
on Maritime Dispute in the South China Sea," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/831560/international-courtto-rule-on-maritime-dispute-in-the-south-china-sea)//A-Sharma
The United States is pursuing a whole-of-government approach to resolving
the problems in the region, he said, noting that the Defense Department is
working with the State Department and others to ensure peace and stability.
Denmark said DoD is working along four lines of effort in the South
China Sea. The first is presence. The United States has a credible,
powerful capability in the region, he said, that creates stability and provides
the space for diplomacy. Weve increased our military presence and were
ensuring our presence is geographically distributed, operationally resilient
and politically sustainable, he added. The second line of effort is an
increase in the tempo of military operations in the region, he told the
panel. Exercises, freedom of navigation exercises and presence operations
mean DoD continues to fly, sail and operate wherever international law
allows so that others can do the same, Denmark said. DoD is also working
with partner nations to enhance their capabilities and capacity, particularly
through work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Denmark said.
Finally, we are engaging China directly to reduce risk. We seek to
keep lines of communication with Beijing open and improve our cooperation
in areas of mutual interest and to speak candidly and constructively when we
disagree, he said.
AT: Elections
Link T/Plan = W
Link turn remilitarization of the arctic is used to rally
support cooperation solves it
Conclusion The issue leaders and issue clusters that formulate and implement Arctic policy in the United
States are state or public actors. Krasners statist model clearly applies here in that the dominant policies
reflect the interests of state agencies and organizations. National debates about the Arctic region have yet
to develop and energy corporations seem to have little opposition outside of Alaska. Recently, indigenous
communities and environmental organizations have stalled some of the oil exploration in this region.
Citizens in the United States are generally not interested in foreign policy and
many US citizens and their elected representatives do not believe the
scientific evidence that climate change is opening the Arctic region .
Others are concerned with the security issues raised by the opening of the Arctic and the activism of
Russia in the region. Russian rhetoric and actions and Chinese interest in the region have raised concerns
to rally domestic
political support, political leaders are not beyond using the remilitarization
of the Arctic by potential enemies to issues in their campaigns for reelection or for support of their policy positions . The Arctic Council has established a
cooperative policy environment open to a variety of state and non-state actors. The United States has
worked to make this institution work effectively in areas of low politics or issues not
related to national security, economic interests and sovereignty. In an effort
directly related to national security. With three great powers the United States, Russia and China
involved in the region, we may soon experience a clash of security cultures from cooperative security to a
strategy of primacy or great power competition. The domestic political climate within the US suggests that
the disdain for global and regional treaties and the reluctance to surrender or share sovereignty is likely to
increase. Unlike, Heininen argues in the introduction of this volume,
it is also entirely possible,
that this region will be remilitarized, and the achieved high political stability and all of the
efforts aimed at building a cooperative culture by the members of the Arctic
Council will be slowed, if not completely stopped. Once again, the Machiavellians may win over
the Grotian gidslands.
No LNo One Cares

Americans do not care about the Arctic
Rosen 5/31/16 --- has been a journalist in Alaska since 1987. For most of that time, she was the
sole Alaska-based reporter for Reuters.(Yereth, has been a journalist in Alaska since 1987. For most of that
time, she was the sole Alaska-based reporter for Reuters., http://www.adn.com/arctic/article/midwaythrough-us-chairmanship-arctic-council-focusing-black-carbon-science/2016/05/08/)//ernst
. What is the Arctic Council? Although governments of all eight nations with Arctic territory are members,
the Arctic Council itself is not a government organization. It does not set policy or pass laws. It does not
control large amounts of money. It does not undertake projects that benefit only one nation. It holds
informational and persuasive powers, but no treaty authority and no ability to impose mandates or engage
in enforcement. Established in 1996, the council is a diplomatic forum for cooperation among
governments, research institutions, businesses and nongovernmental bodies -- part think tank, part
advisory body, part information clearinghouse and part matchmaker, bringing funding organizations
together with research and demonstration projects. It has a permanent secretariat in Troms, Norway, that
was established in 2013. Member states fund the secretariat's operations; in the 2015 fiscal year, the U.S.
State Department chipped in $125,000. For much of its 20-year history, the Arctic Council has focused
heavily on environmental and science issues, as past work shows. Its mandate specifically excludes
military defense and territorial claims. The council issues many reports, the most famous of which are the
2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the first comprehensive and independent analysis of climate
change in the Arctic, and the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, a planning tool for vessel traffic and
service in the far north. It can be difficult to grasp the distinction between the Arctic Council, which has
done fact-finding and information-exchange missions, and the government organizations that are
Papp, the former U.S. Coast Guard

commandant who now serves as the State Department's special
representative for the Arctic. Back when he was leading the Coast Guard and trying to boost
responsible for carrying out policies. So says Robert
U.S. icebreaker capacity, he approached Arctic Council delegations with the mistaken idea that he would
I really didn't understand the

Arctic Council," he said at an April 25 speech to the Brookings Institution.
"What I didn't realize was this term 'international forum,' which is what the
Arctic Council is." In fact, all Arctic Council action and projects are supposed to be relevant across
get support for such a "parochial" goal. "What I found out was
the entire Arctic, and all require agreement of the eight nations. Benefits and drawbacks to consensus
When consensus is reached across North America, the Nordic nations

and Russia -- three Arctic regions with vastly different needs and perspectives
-- that can prompt action from other bodies. A recent example is the Polar Code, a set of
approach
rules for the Arctic and Antarctic regions that the International Maritime Organization approved in 2014
with Arctic Council advice. The IMO, unlike the Arctic Council, can enforce law. The consensus approach has
its drawbacks. It can limit scope of the work, and it can frustrate some advocates. "What they actually
accomplish is what I call the low-hanging fruit," said Jim Stotts, Alaska president of the Inuit Circumpolar
Council, one of the Arctic Council's six "permanent participants" representing indigenous northern people.
Stotts cited the council's past work to help governments cooperate on search and rescue missions and oil
spill prevention and response as examples of useful but noncontroversial accomplishments. A more
difficult potential Arctic Council project, Stotts said, would be to establish Arctic-wide safety and
environmental standards for oil and gas development, which would be followed by binding regulations in
each of the eight nations. There is no such project pending at the council, though the concept has been
endorsed by the Brookings Institution's Energy Security Initiative. Another unachieved goal is council
endorsement of a ban on use of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic, a move that conservation organizations have
urged. Such a ban, which the Polar Code now imposes for the Antarctic but not the Arctic, would reduce
black carbon emissions and the risks of a disastrous oil spill, said Kevin Harun, Arctic program director for
the conservation group Pacific Environment. Council endorsement would nudge the IMO to add an Arctic
ban to the Polar Code in the future, Harun said. There is an obvious impediment to such action: Russia
relies on cheap heavy fuel oil for its ships and for some of its far-north communities. Harun is optimistic
that Russian resistance will eventually fall away. Tangible benefits to Alaska could result from several
council projects that have won consensus, said other Alaska experts. Many cited a project called ARENA,
intended to nurture microgrid renewable energy projects in remote sites. Other projects are focused on
suicide prevention, making inventories of Arctic freshwater bodies or assessing the state of
telecommunications and of water and sewer systems. One project seeks to spread the Local Environmental
Observer network, an Alaska program created by the Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, across the
circumpolar north. US challenge: Raise domestic Arctic awareness Still, there is one parochial aspect to the
Gourley and others involved in U.S. Arctic policy are trying to

use the chairmanship to heighten awareness of the Arctic across the nation.
"We've spent a lot of time on what we call, in the State Department, 'public
diplomacy,' " she said. Gourley said there is evidence of success. There has been a
proliferation of Arctic-related meetings and conferences, not only in Alaska
but also in the Lower 48, she said. The State Department has launched a blog called "Our Arctic
U.S. chairmanship.
Nation" intended to highlight Arctic connections to each of the 50 states. The joint U.S.-Canada statement
produced at a widely covered March meeting between President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau had a heavy Arctic focus. In Alaska, there are mixed views about whether the U.S. awareness goal
is being fulfilled. Evon Peter, vice chancellor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, said he believes the
chairmanship has helped spread the message. "I didn't expect this to be a huge economic boon. But I did
expect it to be bringing more attention to Alaska and the Arctic," he said. "I do think they've been able to
leverage our chairmanship to bring not only greater U.S. attention but global attention to the Arctic."
Margaret Williams, Arctic program director of the World Wildlife Fund, said new domestic interest is evident
in the list of Alaska-related projects President Obama announced last year and the increased funding for
Arctic programs he is seeking from Congress this year, including $400 million for climate-threatened Alaska
villages. Craig Fleener, Gov. Bill Walker's adviser on Arctic issues, said he is thankful for the "big blowout
event" in August when Obama attended the GLACIER conference in Anchorage and toured other parts of
Alaska. Still, Fleener sees signs that Americans are failing to pay attention, possibly because of distractions
like the raucous presidential campaign. He cited a recent event he attended in Washington, D.C., where he
was disheartened when college students admitted they do not know what is going on in the Arctic. " We
are not doing a very good job of getting the word out," he said. Stotts, of the
Inuit Circumpolar Council, said it has always been a challenge to get
outsiders to think about the Arctic. "This sounds terrible, but I'll say it: People
in Anchorage don't even know about the Arctic," he said.
No LOnly Alaskans Care

No link previous council cooperation disproves - the
Arctic is distant to everyone but Alaskans
Climate written by Heininen, Lassi, doi: 10.1057/9781137468253.0007. P.
84)//masonw
Increase the security of supplies of critical natural resources on which the United States depends for
economic and political security and stability. Implement policies that help secure more general foreign and
The
Obama administrations May 2013 National Security for the Arctic sets the strategic
priorities for the Arctic region. The most recent national strategy document repeats many of the
guiding principles of the 2010 National Security Strategy: The United States is an Arctic Nation with
broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic Region: we seek to meet our national security
needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account for
security policy objectives. These three goals apply to the current US policies in the Arctic as well.
indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide
range of issues. Other elements of the 2013 document include advancing US security interests,
protecting and properly managing Arctic resources; promoting scientific research and more traditional
advancing the
interests of all Arctic states and promoting shared Arctic state prosperity
through both bilateral and multilateral institutions (US National Strategy for the Arctic
Region, 2013, p. 2). These may be similar to the interests of private sector actors ;
however, due to the traditional lack of interest in the Arctic region
among the US public, until recently, the US government has been free to
develop its Arctic policies with only minimal pressures from the private
sector or other governments. However, with the growing success of the Arctic Council and
the proliferation of both bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, all Arctic states have
increased their regional, national and collective activities in the Arctic. The Arctic
ways of understanding the Arctic and working to strengthen international cooperation;
states are being pushed by global environmental NGOs and various indigenous communities who that
recognize the political, economic and environmental challenges faced by the Arctic states and the rest of
the world as climate change opens the Arctic to various commercial interests. National and global civil
society actors are working to shape US Arctic policy but their impact is limited because Alaska
the Arctic region is not a priority issue in the other 49 states.
and
No LNo Interest Groups

Voters dont care no interest groups
Climate written by Heininen, Lassi, doi: 10.1057/9781137468253.0007. P.8789)//masonw
The United States is certainly tolerant of interest groups and they do attempt to shape policies
but there is minimal interest about Arctic issues in the United States. Major oil,
mining and fishing interests are active in the US Arctic but so are environmentalists and Alaska Native groups. Marxist Views. A Marxist
perspective would argue that the national policies reflect the interests of the various corporate actors. Thus in all of the Arctic states, oil,
mining, shipping and fishing industries control the policy-making process in these states. There are plenty of oil companies with exploration
and drilling activities in the Arctic region including Shell, Chevron, British Petroleum (BP), Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Exxon Mobil and Russian stateowned companies. With the exception of Russia and Norway, where the oil industry represents the interests of the state, these corporations
compete with other interest communities to shape policy. The corporations clearly have greater support among Republican politicians. The
critical Arctic resource region for the United States is the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas. In 2008, the US Minerals Management Services leased
some 29 million acres of the Chukchi offshore shelf for $3.4 billion. Exploration wells have been drilled but full production will not take place
for several years. BP operates the largest oilfield in the United States in Prudhoe Bay. In 2009, this area produced 400,000 barrels of oil a day.
These corporations clearly have some influence in Alaska because of the jobs they provide; but a recent decision by a US federal court caused
Shell to halt its drilling activities in Alaskas Arctic region suggests that both environmental and indigenous peoples organizations are having
an impact as well. This challenge to the Bureau Ocean Energy Management decision to allow for offshore drilling was led by Earth Justice and
other organizations such as Greenpeace and Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL), a network of Alaskan native
peoples (Worth, 2009, pp. 1012). The more effective groups challenging the status quo in the Arctic tend to be environmental activists like
Greenpeace, Earth Justice and World Wildlife Fund as well as various indigenous groups who that are concerned with how resource exploration
will impact their way of life. The native peoples do not present a unified front in defiance of resource exploration. Some indigenous
communities claim that any attempt to block investment in the Arctic challenges their economic rights. They are also aware of their own
version of the Arctic paradox as they become dependent for employment and commerce on industries that may eventually threaten their very
existence. A Clash of Political Cultures? Political culture and the political structure of a state plays a major role in shaping most policy debates.
The Nordic members of the Arctic Council are progressive social democratic
states. Many citizens and their leaders in these states would describe their country as a mentor or guide state. Although an ideal type,
John Erik Fossum (2006, p. 783) describes these gidsland or guide states as follows: A nation that progressively guides other countries locked
in pitiful nationalist struggles for power, dominance and religious zeal to proper international behavior consisting of respect for the
international legal order, the rights of men, and free trade as the best way of ensuring prosperity for all. In terms of ideational goals, Nordic
states and Canada are all cooperative multilateralists willing to share sovereignty and each of these states works hard to create rule-based
The Arctic Council is exactly the kind of institution middle powers seek
to create and it is where their leaders hope Arctic policy will be debated and
formulated. While Russia and the United States are great powers and generally share a grand strategy that emphasizes primacy or
maintaining both relative and absolute power in order to secure national interests, the remaining members of the
Arctic Council embrace a cooperative security strategy. These states are all strong advocates of
institutions.
creating a rule-based system in the Arctic. While independence, sovereignty and the protection of national interests remain critical priorities
for all of the Arctic states, the 2011 search and rescue agreement may suggest a willingness to share sovereignity in the future. This
combination of Grotian and Kantian thought is built upon a political culture that encourages citizens to be informed and involved in all political
areas. This form of reflexivity encourages citizens to be actively involved in an on-going process of self-examination of who we are, who we
should be and who we are thought to be (Fossum, 2006, p. 826). Thus, Krasners liberal paradigm best explains the Arctic policies of the
But
citizens are more likely to be involved in the articulation of policy concerns, the
actual formulation of policy and the on-going evaluation of the final policy program. In the case of the United States, citizens tend
not to be interested in foreign policy and a significant number are disdainful
of the big government. For most Americans, the Arctic is considered a
distant place that has little or no bearing on their quality of life . The
lack of interest and attention allows the state to frame the critical issues and set the priorities
with only minimal public involvement. In the case of the United States, this gives issue leadership to those
Nordic states. These states do have national interests, and state agencies play a major role in implementing policy decisions.
departments and agencies concerned with security and commercial interests. The recent behavior of the Russian government in Ukraine may
have pushed US Arctic policy back to the same government agencies that guided US Arctic strategies during the Cold War. Likewise, Chinas
growing interest in the region may create a great power rivalry in an area that is now known for in need of cooperation and collaboration now.
Krasners statist argument provides the best explanation for US Arctic policies.
No LA2 FoPo
Public doesnt care about foreign policy - no policy
coalitions
The majority of foreign policy is formulated and implemented largely out of
public eye. Certain high-profile issues or major events may cause the public to pay attention
to a particular issue area. Day-to-day interactions between cabinets and parliaments or the Executive Branch and Congress is where
most foreign and security policies are shaped, debated and finally formulated. In any policy
US Arctic Strategy and Policy
process leaders generally emerge. These issue leaders are likely to emerge when the formal processes of governance are fragmented and polarized. Issue leaders may
also emerge when there is very little interest or awareness in a policy area. In the case of U.S. Arctic security policy, the conditions are just right for the emergence of a
powerful and influential issue leader to guide policy debates (Hersman, 2000, p. 5). During the Cold War, the U.S. military dominated Arctic policy debates and the military
The members of Congress from Alaska may have the

personal drive and political interests to become issue leaders but most of their colleagues in Congress from the lower 48
states do not seem to be interested in the day-to-day issues that define the
Arctic policy landscape. Hersman (2000, pp. 34) labels major clashes or highprofile events in policy areas waves. The day-to-day interactions among policymakers that create a place
where most foreign policy is formulated is called the ocean . Arctic policy
debates and actions during the Cold War fit mostly in the ocean category. Cold War security specialists from Henry
bureaucracy still leads US policy in this policy area.
Kissinger to Jeanne Kirkpatrick and security institutions in the United States as well as political leaders from Eisenhower to Bush kept Arctic policy in the ocean. The US
global grand strategy of primacy meant that fear of Soviet expansion necessitated a global military presence for the United States. In this zero-sum environment, neither
the US nor the Soviet Union were going to allow the Arctic to become a potential battleground. Clearly, with the exception of a few crises or waves, the US security policy
in the Arctic worked effectiveldy as part of the containment of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the analytical and ideological framework and the budget
priorities for global containment of communism ended as well (Hersman, 2000, pp. 67). Yet, many of the policy arguments about containing a great power rival like the
Soviet Union did not die with the end of the Cold War. The norms and values associated with great power rivalry in a potentially contentious shared resource region like the
Arctic still motivate US policy. Concerns over Russia are real for those who still formulate and implement US defense policies. Chinas interest in the region and its focus on
resources and transportation routes in the Arctic further complicates the security debates in the United States. Given that the issue leaders in the United States are state
actors, namely, the US Coast Guard, the US Navy and the Commerce Department. It is to their priorities that we now turn. US National Security Strategy The Obama
Administration released its National Strategy for the Arctic Region in May 2013. This document presents US strategic priorities for the region (see also Corgan, 2014). The
document includes both areas of policy effort and guiding principles. The principles that guide US policy in this area include the following: Safeguard peace and stability by
acting in concert with allies and partners to maintain a conflict-free environment in the Arctic and to maintain the freedom of the seas and airspace for commercial and
security reasons. Use both scientific and traditional or indigenous information and knowledge to make the best policy decisions. Develop partnerships with Alaska, the
Arctic states, other international partners and key private sector actors to develop critical resources and manage economic activities in this shared resource region. Work
with Alaska Native populations, recognizing both their interests and their legal relationship with the United States, to formulate and implement effective Arctic policies.
US strategy is focused on three critical areas of policy. These policy priorities are greatly influenced by climate change and the new Arctic environment such as the
diminishment of sea ice and opening of maritime sea lanes. U.S. Arctic policy priorities include: Advancing US security interests that include safe commercial and
scientific operations and protecting US territory and national interests in this region. Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its resources for future generations.
Working to promote international and regional cooperation through the Arctic Council and other multilateral organizations toward protecting the environment and
providing national and human security and also working toward accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It should be noted that there is no major
there are no
significant policy coalitions or issue clusters made up of members of Congress, the
Executive branch and the private and not-for-profit sectors. It might be that it is too early for a coordinated policy
related to the Arctic. However, climate change and the resulting geopolitical will necessitate a new focus on this region. The three main pillars of US
issue leader emerging outside of the Executive Branch which includes the State Department and the Department of Defense. In addition,
policy are national security, economic development and science and research. Several studies suggest that US policy will be increasingly shaped by economic factors
(CSIS), as is the case with most of the other Arctic states according to their national strategies (see Heininen, 2011).
AT: Appeasement
2ac Arctic T/
Chinese involvement in the Arctic is inevitable Arctic
council involvement ensures it is peaceful and sustainable
CER 13 (China Economic Review, original research works on the economy of
China, and its relation to the world economy, Submissions subjected to
double-blind peer review. China's invitation to the Arctic will help keep the
countrys thirst for resources in check
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/breaking-ice-china-arctic-council May
21 2013)//masonw
When the Arctic Council, a body of eight Arctic states, meets later this month in Iceland to
discuss underwater fiber optics, China is sure to be in the room. The council granted
China located thousands of kilometers south of the North Pole a permanent observer seat
on the council last week, a status the country has long sought out . The wide
coverage of Chinas grandiose-sounding ascendance to the council underplayed that it is essentially a
toothless organization. The Arctic Council doesn't make policy decisions on the region, nor does observer
When it comes to resource deals in a

region estimated to hold 30% of the world's undiscovered gas , the council will
have little sway in keeping players such as China out. China's footprint is already in the snow.
The country has spent the last year wooing a few Arctic powers on resources
deals. Its dealings with Greenland, still technically part of Denmark, are a good example of how it has
status allow China to vote on the body's agenda.
showed up without warning in the region. The Copenhagen Post last year reported that China would invest
US$225.5 in airports and shipping infrastructure in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. Officials on the EU
China has people conducting feasibility studies for

mining projects on the huge but mainly uninhabited piece of land. China and Iceland signed a freeCommission have also noted that
trade agreement last month, but China's interest there go beyond trade. Damien Degeorges, a researcher
the island-state is
seen by some as a future hub for Chinese shipping activity in the region.
at the University of Greenland, told CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW late last year that
China's trip through the Arctic Sea last year would support that suspicion. Last summer, Chinese
icebreaking Snow Dragon sailed north from China, around Russia to an Icelandic port and back again.
Other countries in the region that are more wary of China, such as Norway and Russia, watched carefully
other recourse for nations that are

nervous about China's activity in the region, the Arctic Council's mantra
might as well be 'If you can't beat them, have them join you.' Although the
council has little power to act, it can still play a role in fostering peaceful relations. The
as the ship made its way through the icebergs. With little
council is the primary forum for communication and cooperation on the preservation of the Arctic
the council will be the

arena in which to engage the country. Participation on the council will also fosters a
much-needed understanding between interested nations like China and Arctic
countries, said Lawson Brigham, a governor at the American Polar Society and a senior fellow at the
environment. If problems or abuses arise during China's Arctic expeditions,
Institute of the North in Anchorage, Alaska, in an interview with CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW late last year
that. India, Italy and South Korea ascended to observer status on the council at the same time as China.
Having many key
non-Arctic states in this forum will allow these nations to be

closely abreast of Arctic developments, Brigham said in an email. Also, the non-Arctic
states can participate in the working groups of the council on such subjects climate
change, emergency response, protection of the Arctic marine environment,
sustainability issues and more. Despite the urge to shut China out (something Norwegian
coming face to face with China on environmental

issues will be the most effective way of dealing with the country that at least on
its home turf has shown little regard for the state of its natural environment.
China is in the Arctic, with or without welcome. Now its up to the Arctic Council's member
states to pressure the country to conform to environmentally friendly
practices. Facing off with China in a meeting room should yield more
peaceful results than a confrontation on the ice.
officials reportedly threatened to do),
2acContainment T/
Chinas belligerence is a result of US containment
empirics
Roach 7/12/16 Stephen S., Senior Fellow at Yale Universitys Jackson Institute of Global Affairs and a
Senior Lecturer at Yales School of Management. "Chinas Claims in the South China Sea Rejected."
ChinaFile. www.chinafile.com/conversation/chinas-claims-south-china-sea-rejected
The dirty little secret is that Chinas response has hardly occurred in a
vacuum. It can be traced in large part to the reaction to a muscular China
containment strategy launched by the United States. In an economic summit
in Hawaii in November 2011, the Obama Administration unveiled is so-called
Asian pivotAmericas foreign policy projection back to Asia. At the same
time, the U.S. launched an ambitious pan-regional trade planlater to be
known as the Trans-Pacific Partnershipwhich excluded China, the largest
trading economy in Asia and the world. President Obama made his intent
quite clear by underscoring the significance of TPP with the famous line,
we cant let countries like China write the rules of the global economy.
Needless to say, this didnt exactly dovetail with the China Dream,
President Xi Jinpings own mantra that was unveiled soon after he assumed
CCP leadership in late 2012. The Dream is about rejuvenation and
nationalistic pridesomething China doesnt take lightly after its so-called
century of humiliation that began with the Opium Wars of the mid-19th
century. Mindful of the historic tensions between rising and dominant powers,
and with Sino-Japanese frictions in the East China Sea simmering in the
background, it is understandable how China might view Americas
containment strategy as all the more threateningthereby justifying a
counter-response of its own. Legal skirmishes with the Philippines may well
be a proxy for a more significant and increasingly contentious power struggle
between the United States and China.. For the record, the construction
timeline of Chinas land reclamation and the establishment of military
facilities in the Spratly Islands started at some point in 2014. Given the
forward planning required for such activities, it is safe to say that this more
overt phase of Chinas territorial aggression strategy probably was
formulated during 2013a period that post-dates Americas Asian pivot. Not
by coincidence, it was around the same time when China frimed up its own
Asian pivot in the form of its sponsorship for the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank and its pan-regional One-Belt One-Road campaign.
UQArctic
Chinese Arctic power is growing now its try or die
Scott 16 2016-01-09 Dr. David J. Scott is the Executive Director of the
Canadian Polar Commission in Ottawa, CHINA COMING INTO THE ARCTIC:
SHAPING A FLANKING STRATEGY, http://www.sldinfo.com/china-coming-intothe-arctic-shaping-a-flanking-strategy/ //Deej
In recent years three processes have caught the attention of the world.
Firstly, climate change has brought the Arctic Ocean into prominence, as
melting unlocks its previously frozen waters. Secondly, Chinas economic rise
presents a power-shift challenge for the international system. Thirdly, the
combination of these two processes has generated a further process in which
China is increasingly entering into Arctic affairs. The Arctic primarily consists
of a hitherto largely ice-bound Arctic Ocean and an Arctic littoral made up of
parts of the United States (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland,
Norway (Svalbard/Spitzbergen), Sweden (Lapland), Finland, and Russia, which
lie above the Arctic Circle. Although geographically China is far away from the
Arctic and is not an Arctic state, its own power projection is making it an
Arctic actor, and increasingly a player in Arctic geopolitics. Indeed, on 20 May
2013, the government-controlled Beijing Review carried an article titled How
China became an Arctic State, which contained the assertion that China
has ultimately managed to re-shuffle the Arctic balance of power in record
time. China now refers to itself as a near Arctic state (jin beiji guojia); an
Arctic stakeholder (beiji lihaiguanxguo) with strategic interests to gain,
maintain and, if need be, defend
AT: MotivesEconomy
China is mainly interested in economic development in the
Arctic
Tang and Kuo 15 (Mercy A. Kuo and Angelica Tang, China Arctic
Strategy: The Geopolitics Of Energy Security, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/chinas-arctic-strategy-the-geopolitics-ofenergy-security/) //AS
China has not published any official Arctic strategy, policy or white paper,
which suggest that the region has not been a priority and presently not high
enough on the political agenda in Beijing. Nonetheless, statements by
Chinese officials and Chinas membership as a permanent observer in the
Arctic Council have clarified Chinas position on Arctic affairs and
acknowledged Chinas interests in the region. Chinas growing activism in
the Arctic is primarily shaped by scientific and climate
considerations, commercial interest in the petroleum, shipping and
mineral sector, as well as diplomatic and legal concerns. Chinas
willingness to become an Arctic Council observer supports the view that
China does not challenge the sovereignty of the littoral states in the Arctic
Ocean and remains committed to respecting the rule of law, including
UNCLOS. China is positioning itself, and gaining a foot in the door, in
order to access and extract resources and take advantage of
strategic, economic, military, and scientific opportunities in the
Arctic region in the years ahead. Chinas objectives in the Arctic could
complement the One Belt, One Road Strategy (OBOR). Geographically, the
Indian Ocean and the Arctic Ocean are the southern and northern flanks of
the Eurasian landmass. Investments in shipping and infrastructure along the
Northern Sea Route and the Maritime Silk Road can enhance Chinas Silk
Road Economic Belt strategy. In addition, China remains a huge littoral
state. Consequently, China can add three oceanic frontiers to Mackinders
heartland in Eurasia and overcome some of the challenges in controlling
the heartland envisioned in the past. This could provide China with a
favorable geopolitical position and an opportunity to command the world
islands Asia, Europe and Africa in the twenty first century. However, it
remains to be seen if China can successfully implement the OBOR
strategy and whether Chinese investments in the Arctic region can
complement this strategy. irectly. Sino-Russian energy cooperation is
strongest in the Arctic were Russia is looking for investments. China
and its national oil companies (NOCs) are now one of the few willing
to invest in this high cost producing region. Chinas oil companies are
looking for experience in international project management and are aiming to
advance their technological skills. The Chinese government is seeking to
enhance Chinas energy security through a hedging strategy that
diversifies through investments in more costly petroleum sources and

transportation routes.
AT: MotivesScience
Chinas main goal in the arctic is scientific diplomacy
Lanteigne 15 (Marc []; Affirm the Sciengific: Chinese Diplomacy in the
Arctic; December 23, 2015; https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/opeds/2015/12/23/affirm-the-scientific-chinese-diplomacy-in-the-arctic)//AJ
AT THIS MONTHS COP21 climate change meetings in Paris, the actions of the
participants from China were arguably second in visibility only to the United
States, evidence that Beijing is becoming more of an activist in addressing
global climate change. China remains the worlds largest producer of
greenhouse gases, and has experienced chronic high levels of pollution as
illustrated by recent record levels of poor air quality levels in Beijing.
However, China is seeking to improve its green image on the global
stage and portray itself as an obligatory partner in international cooperation
on various environmental issues. The Arctic has become a notable proving
ground for these policies, especially as Beijing seeks to develop a more
comprehensive set of policies in the Far North that incorporate
environmental, economic and legal issues, in response to the growing
international socioeconomic and strategic interest in the region.
Chinese scholars and policymakers have begun to refer to China as a nearArctic state (jin beiji guojia) and a legitimate regional stakeholder in their
academic papers and speeches. This has caused some consternation among
Arctic states since it leaves the impression that Beijing is seeking to
unilaterally integrate itself into the regions affairs, despite its lack of Arctic
geography. Cognizant of this backlash, Chinese Arctic specialists are
countering the negative impressions by arguing that Arctic environmental
events are having an impact on China and that Beijing must play a role in
developing solutions. Beijing has sought to make scientific diplomacy
the cornerstone of its engagement of the Arctic.
Recent scientific papers published in China have argued that melting Arctic
sea ice has had an impact on Chinas environment and weather and, by
association, the countrys ecology, agriculture and overall economy. Weather
extremes in China, including drought and heavy rainfall, and more severe
winter weather, even in the countrys southern regions, have also been
traced to the altered polar climate. For example, Beijing flooded extensively
during the summer of 2012, and Shanghai and south-central China
experienced harsh snow and ice conditions and unusually cold temperatures
in early 2008. Some climate scientists in China have referred to the link
between the changed circumpolar environment and extreme weather events
in the country as a Blue Arctic effect, namely the effects of the erosion of
polar sea ice on weather patterns further south.
China has a growing number of ongoing scientific endeavours in the
Arctic. It owns an icebreaker, Xuelong (Snow Dragon), which has been
active in both poles, and has plans to commission the construction of a

second icebreaker in 2016. It established a scientific research station in NyAlesund, Svalbard, in 2004 and has entered into an agreement with Iceland to
build an aurora research facility near Akureyri. These projects, along with
recent ship visits by the Xuelong, have made many contributions to
Beijings ongoing science diplomacy in the Arctic in the hopes of
blunting international concerns that China was seeking a more
revisionist, hard power approach to the region.
Beijing has also built up the potential for increased bilateral cooperation with
the eight Arctic governments on the governmental and sub-governmental
levels. At this years Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavk, keynote speaker
Zhang Ming, deputy foreign minister of China, unveiled a shortlist of policies
China would pursue in the region. He began his presentation by explaining
the fragility of the Arctic ecosystem and presenting the idea that the Far
North was an ideal laboratory for international scientific research in a variety
of disciplines including those related to environmental change.
Mr. Zhangs speech also emphasized that the circumpolar region is an area of
importance for both Arctic and non-Arctic states. China has expressed
interest in the emerging potential economic benefits of the region, including
access to fossil fuels, raw materials and polar sea routes. For example,
Chinas largest shipping company, Cosco, announced in October that it
planned to start more regular transits through Russias Northern Sea Route to
cut shipping time between Asian and European markets.
While China remains sensitive to being portrayed as a spoiler in the Arctic,
the country is also wary of being excluded as the region opens up to
international research and economic interests. There is a growing perception
that as China continues to grow in capabilities, it should act as a responsible
great power (fuzeren daguo) by shouldering a more multifaceted role in
Arctic affairs. Although the government of China has recently been more open
to describing its economic interests in the Arctic, scientific diplomacy will
likely continue to take the lead in Beijings regional interests for the
near future.
AT: ImpactCoop > Competition

Trends show China wants to cooperate, not compete
necessary to solve a lot of impacts
Wegge 14 (Njord Wegge, Associate Professor II, UiT The Arctic University
of Norway, China in the Arctic Interests, Actions, and Challenges
83-86)//masonw
Theoretical guidance Chinas rise is a key change with broad implications, playing out in the international system of
today (Lanteigne 2013: 1). The term rise corresponds not only to the fact that China is becoming an economic
superpower; it also refers to how the PRC is becoming more visible in global governance. The example from Arctic
China is joining a large number of international

organizations at a steady pace, gradually becoming more engaged and integrated
governance illustrates a general trend:
in the international community (Johnston 2003: 13). Moreover, the term Chinas rise is also commonly used in describing
how China has improved its position in the international hierarchy of states, evolving into a modern developed state with a
larger middle class and acquiring various types of advanced technology and industrial capacities, including new military
capabilitiesenabling the government to project power far beyond its borders (Ikenberry 2008, Wang 2011, Larson and
Shevchenko 2010). Chinas rise, its new stakes in far-away places, as well as its increased engagement in multilateral
governance around the globe have been interpreted differently in different theoretical traditions. When applying the
realist tradition as the point of departure, one important branch of study focuses on how the ongoing global power-
the question of whether or not China is

satisfied with the current political orderor its status within this orderis a key question,
transition unfolds. According to this theoretical approach
likely to say something about what the future holds with respect to the ongoing shifts in power structures (Chan 2008,
Gilpin 1986: 34, Fravel 2010, Foot 2006: 90-93, Wohlforth 2009). In this respect one should expect a rising power to get
more engaged globally in trying to shape international institutions, laws and norms to reflect the interests as well as social
Another realist informed approach to Chinas rise, typically

advocated by analysts in the USA, is found in the so called China threat theory (Shih and Yin
2013: 60, Lanteigne 2013: 4-5, 33, Ross 2005). According to this approach to Chinas growth, the PRC is usually
portrayed as representing a danger to the West with respect to the following dimensions:
militarily, economically and politically/ ideologically (Yang and Liu 2012: 697). In this
status of the rising power (Fravel 2010: 506).
perspective the PRCs major diplomatic and economic gains in Africa and Latin America are viewed as coming at the cost
This view points out the potential for rivalry between the two
large states, and Europes half millennium experience with great power rivalry is viewed as not unlikely to be
repeated in Asia, with China as a future major pole intending to balance the USA
(Kim 2004: 19). A tense competition for scarce commodities, stretching from the control of
natural resources to struggles for political influence, is likely according to this theory (Lanteigne
of American influence.
2013: 102-103). In this perspective Chinas increasing global engagement might be viewed in the context of rivalry with
the USA, where analysts in Washington argue for the need for China to be watched and possibly contained, while their
Chinese counterparts might display concerns about American attempts to contain Chinese power regionally as well as
internationally (Carter and Perry 2007, Lanteigne 2013: 118). From the perspective of liberal and institutionalist theory,
states engage in international cooperation and regime formation in order to solve mutual challenges. Nordlit 32, 2014
In the absence of a world government, formalized

international cooperation through regimes and international organizations
might therefore function to increase predictability, international stability and
economic development (Young 1998, Kim 2004: 30). As Chinas economic rise has
gradually made the country an interconnected stakeholder in most parts of the
world, Chinas more active foreign policy could be interpreted as an
expression of a desire to cooperate as well as a result of economic
interdependence, rather than an attempt to marginalize other
potential great-power competitors in regions of common interest (Lanteigne 2013: 4- 6, 10-12).
Njord Wegge, China in the Arctic 85
The liberal approach also tends to focus on how the domestic level impacts foreign policy formation. Increased
Chinese participation in multilateral cooperation is then at least partly explained by

domestic developments. As the education level of the population in China has
increased, a strong focus on cross-border challenges such as pollution and

sustainable development has also elicited enormous attention in the Chinese media in
recent years. This is a development that in accordance with liberal IR theory could be interpreted as
having pushed the Chinese government to focus more on multilateral
challenges that see no borders (Lanteigne 2013: 46, 55, PRC State Council 2011: II, H 2011: 70-77).1
China is essentially experiencing its modern rise in an age of globalization, which implies a situation where borders and
distances are decreasing in importance. Such developments are also followed by an increased sensitivity to several new
With
global challenges such as international terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, spreading epidemics such as AIDS or SARS, drug trafficking,
cybercrime and global warming, a liberal approach to IR will often emphasize
the importance of how such challenges have demonstrated certain limits of state
control and sovereignty (Deng and Moore 2004). These are all tendencies likely to influence Beijings view on
threats, as well as an appreciation of the opportunities that follow from extended cross-border cooperation.
the need for participation in international politics in the Arctic. Combining the functional, utility oriented dimension of
foreign policy developments with the domestic sphere is hence vital when analyzing Chinas new interest in far-away
places. Finally, post-positivist
approaches to international relations, with constructivism as the most

emphasize
ideational, non-material factors--such as norms, culture and identity (Wendt 1992,
1999). By arguing that neither state identities or interests are fixed , nor
necessarily derived from power struggles, or ambitions of maximizing utility,
applied version, offers a third major approach to explaining foreign policy outcomes as it tends to
constructivism represents a different epistemological tradition, focusing on the construction of social reality (Wendt 1995,
Katzenstein 1996, Checkel 1998). To understand dominant state actor identities including evaluating subjective
experiences such as social status hence becomes a key task to investigate in an analysis seeking to explain foreign
policy development and actions (Katzenstein 1996). In this respect phenomena such as collective memory or the
construction of threat perceptions become important when seeking to understand state behavior and the potential for
conflict or cooperation in a given situation. The constructivist approach hence offers a powerful method in understanding
a social reality that goes beyond instrumental utility calculations. Constructivism could therefore inform an analysis of
Chinese foreign policy-making by questioning social facts and the construction of possible meanings of material
resources. Hence, if the analyst wants to uncover how cultural biases, where the existence of old, fixed, mental frames
potentially might fuel influential discourses on how Chinas new foreign policies should be interpreted,
constructivism might be a superior approach to that of the rationalist

approaches (Sun 2013, Kim 2004: 41). Nevertheless, while post-positivist and constructivist approaches indeed
have the potential to uncover and explain important aspects of Chinese foreign policy-making, this epistemological
approach will not be applied in any depth in this article due to the article formats constraints and a limited research
object.
Chinas intents are economic and scientific confrontation

is unlikely
Wegge 14 (Njord Wegge, Associate Professor II, UiT The
Arctic University of Norway, China in the Arctic Interests, Actions,
and Challenges
86-88)//masonw
China has in the last few years
increased its interest in the Arctica region where it is repeatedly pointed out as one of the most
China and the Arctic- Why is China getting engaged in the High North?
prominent newcomers (Alexeeva and Lasserre 2012: 82-83, Keil 2013: 2). When seeking to point out why China is getting
several explanations seem valid. First China has a substantial

interest in new potential shipping routes due to decreasing ice coverage in the
Arctic. With the Arctic Ocean increasingly becoming navigable in the summer season, China has, as a major
trade actor deeply integrated in the world economy , a direct economic stake
in this development. Being deeply affected by processes of globalization and with most of its import and export
engaged in the Arctic
being shipped by sea, China might potentially be the greatest future consumer or exporter of goods being shipped
Chinese
manufacturers continue to demand an ever larger volume of the worlds
natural resources and energy. With the Arctic region harboring both large
quantities of oil and gas in addition to large organic and mineral resources,
China is actively assessing the Arctic as a region to supply its growth. This is a
through the formerly closed shipping lanes in the north (Lee 2012). As Chinas economy keeps growing,
development seen most profoundly in Greenland, but also in Iceland--both regions with concrete Chinese investments
taking place today. Thus, one key aspect of Chinas enhanced interest in the Arctic is Chinas demand for natural
resources and the potential supply of these commodities through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (Blunden 2012: 125-126,
As shipping through the NSR can be expected to increase gradually ,

China has a direct interest in following this development closely as a major
potential destination (Blunden 2012). With Chinas ever growing importance in the world economy, a new
demand for influence in global as well as regional governance can also be observed as the PRC gradually is
becoming more active within international organizations . The most prominent
example is its more active role in the UN Security Council , where China yet
always along with Russiahas used its veto right five times since 2007 (UN 2013, Lanteigne
2013: 71). The Chinese use of the veto is a steep increase from previous decades (UN 2013). A
Blank 2013).
more active Chinese role is also seen in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the
a similar tendency
can be observed in the Arctic, where China, along with other Asian states has voiced an interest in taking
part in governance of the region (Blank 2013, Jacobson and Lee 2013). The most recent manifestation
of the Chinese desire to broaden its engagement in Arctic affairs, which is probably
also the engagement with the highest public profile, is its new role as a permanent observer in
the Arctic Council. As the AC usually is regarded as the preeminent circumpolar multilateral forum for political
ASEAN-plus-three organization or the East Asian Summit (Lanteigne 2013: 8). Recently
discussions and debate, obtaining observer status was of great symbolic value for China, just as it has been for other
applicants like the EU. The Chinese role in the AC will therefore be specifically addressed in the next section. Finally, while
the recently acquired observer status in the AC was important not least in the way it legitimated China as a stakeholder in
the Arctic, one should also note that Chinas role in governing institutions pertaining to Arctic politics also include work in
other forums, such as the International Maritime Organizations (IMO). In this respect one should note that representatives
from the PRC have been involved in the process towards establishing a polar code for shipping in ice-covered waters in
the IMO (Blank 2013, Lasserre 2010: 9). While Chinas engagement in the Arctic can be ascribed to economic motives,
where both mechanisms of interdependence as well as a power-dynamic of a geopolitical nature can be discerned,
I will
in the following specifically address the security dimension, as well as the issue of social status. These
are all issues often mentioned when Chinas engagement in the Arctic is debated. With respect to the security dimension
it is interesting to note that discussions of Chinese military interests are

(currently) almost entirely absent, even though references to Chinas interests in the
Arctic stated by the Chinese military personnel might be discussed (Campbell 2012: 4, 8). 2 On the other side, while
traditional notions of security are seldom addressed, environmental security and the need for scientific
knowledge on climate change is often argued as a key interest explaining
Chinese research activities in the High North (Pan and Zhou 2010, Lasserre 2010: 4). Concretely
research on how the summer ice extent in the Arctic Ocean or weather patterns such as the Arctic Oscillation are linked to
weather conditions in China is therefore a concern of great interest (Wu et. al. 2013, Drinkwater and Zhao 2013). If
applying an extended security notion, environmental security concerns should hence be taken into account when seeking
Social status is a concept that has been

identified to matter for states seeking to maximize their influence and standing in
world governance (Holsti 1995: 84, 107- 108, Wohlforth 2009, Welch et. al. 2010). As polar research generally
demands specialized capabilities, and potentially has a high profile domestically as well as on the
global stage, the status dimension should not be ignored when seeking to
understand why China engages in Arctic research . Moreover, a debate on Chinas rise and its
to explain Chinas engagement in the north.
implications for its engagement in the Arctic could also include Chinas status competition with its centuries-long rival
Japan, even though East Asian cooperation in the Arctic might in fact be more practically important. The Arctic
engagement of Japan and even other more remote great powers such as India should nevertheless at least be considered
as one factor partly explaining the increased Chinese interest in the north (Tonami 2013).
AT: XISCS
Link T/ Intl Legit

Chinas hemorraghing support now the plan is a lifeline
Javad and Heydarian 7/13 -- (Richard Javad Heydarian In Manila, 713-2016, "China may dispute South China Sea verdict, but it's a huge
setback," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/13/chinamay-dispute-south-china-sea-verdict-but-its-a-huge-setback)//A-Sharma
In effect, the arbitration body nullified Chinas sweeping maritime claims. The
verdict is an unequivocal rejection of Chinas aggressive manoeuvres across
the South China Sea, arguably the worlds most important waterway. While
the majority of Filipinos were ecstatic about this legal and moral victory, the
Philippine government, however, called for sobriety and a subdued response.
After all, the verdict is legally binding but not necessarily enforceable,
especially since China has declared it null and void and the Philippines
lacks the capability to ensure compliance. Nonetheless, the verdict
represents a huge setback for China. First of all, it provides a more
robust legal pretext for the US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded naval
powers to conduct more extensive and multilateral freedom of navigation
operations, which are aimed at challenging Chinas claims now flatly
rejected by the arbitration body. Second, the Philippines case sets a legal
precedent for other south-east Asian countries such as Indonesia and
Vietnam, which have threatened to take China to the court over their
maritime disputes. Now, China faces the prospect of a virtual class suit by its
deeply estranged neighbours. Above all, if China refuses to abide by the
verdict, it will be openly branded as an outlaw, undermining its
longstanding claim to regional leadership as a responsible power. All
eyes are on the Philippines new president, Rodrigo Duterte, who has
expressed his refusal to flaunt the verdict to taunt China in order to avoid
further escalation. For the Duterte administration, it appears more important
to leverage the verdict as a bargaining chip in upcoming high-stakes bilateral
negotiations with China. Most likely, the Philippine government will shun a
strongly worded statement regarding the arbitration verdict to revive longfrayed bilateral ties with China and seek tangible concessions on the ground.
What is clear, however, is that Chinas actions in the South China Sea
are in contravention of international law. That is now beyond
dispute.
XT Intl Legit T/ 1ar**

Xi pushes for multilat --- and its popular with the CCP
Ying 7-8 ---
Fu Ying is Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Chinas National Peoples

Congress, Chairperson of the Academic Committee of Chinas Institute of International Strategy, CASS; and
Specially Invited Vice Chairperson of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges. She was the
Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2009 (China and the US should be able to cooperate in the South China Sea, Fu Ying, Telegraph, July 8, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/08/china-and-the-us-should-be-able-to-co-operate-in-the-southchina/)//chiragjain
China can say is that we remain committed to closer ties with the UK. We will
the existing world
order is built and led by the United States, the notion of Pax Americana.
What
also continue the policy of supporting European integration. It is commonly accepted in the West that
American power is waning? This order, as I see it, contains three pillars: first, American or Western values; second, a US-led military alignment;
This world order has its roots in the history of international

politics and also has its modern contributions. The US, as the leader for this
order system, has also reaped great benefit from its role. Long alienated politically by the
western world because it follows a different system, China is never fully embraced by this system , even
despite of tremendous progress it has achieved. The US-led military alliance does not
show much interest in accommodating Chinas security concerns either. From a
wider perspective, it is quite questionable if this world order can offer solutions to all
the challenges in todays world, and whether it is actually creating more
problems. Over the years, the global promotion of western values has not always been
successful, especially in countries where new governing structures failed to grow fast
enough to replace original ones that were being brought down. Chaos and disorder can occur and even
spill over, which only reinforce disorder than order. Who thought that terrorists would take semi-state form when the "war on terror"
third, the UN and its institutions.
was launched years ago? Who thought Europe would be faced with millions of refugees when the first sparkle of revolution erupted in the Arab
world? Hungarian border In the area of defence, the US-led military alliance puts its own security interests above others and consequently, has
often led to more complex situations, especially when it comes to regional disputes. This only reinforces the trend of disorder. It is true that
we have seen the

diffusion and shifting of capital, technology and markets from the Western
centre of the developed world to the peripheries , where many in the less-developed world picked up
economic speed. And now we start to see decentralisation in power along the same trend. While the
Western-dominated order is showing signs of weakening and failing to offer
solutions to all the challenges, the newly rising developing countries are expected to participate more in the world
affairs, and take more responsibility. China, as a rising country, now has realized that there is a growing
global expectation for its role. Some people are worrying that China may challenge the world order or create a
globalisation is changing the world, and also bringing challenges to the existing power structure. For decades,
separate order. They also fear that China and the US may enter a power rivalry. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon L and Chinese President Xi
China is committed to the UN What you hear from the Chinese leaders is that, China is part of
the international order. One needs to note that the term we use is international order and what
we refer to is the United Nations and its international institutions, including
the principles of international law. China has a strong sense of belonging to
this UN-led order system, as China is one of its founders and a beneficiary, a
contributor, as well as part of its reform efforts . There is no intention to unravel the system or start all
Jinping
over again, Chinese President Xi Jinping has said. July 1 marked 95 years of the Communist Party of China. In his speech marking that
President Xi (who is also the partys General Secretary) reminded the

whole party not to forget the commitment to serving the people the party has
had from the day of its founding. He also touched on world affairs and reiterated Chinas foreign policy objective as
moment,
promoting world peace and prosperity, as well as Chinas willingness to work jointly with the world to promote the international order, to be
the
creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which Britain has
also signed up to, and the Silk Road economic belt initiative, which would
increase connections between Asia and Europe . In the security field, China proposes to build common,
fairer to all countries. Indeed, China is offering its own ideas and initiatives to improve the international order. For example,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.
AT: Nationalism (ToD)

Nationalism is through the roof in the status quo the aff
is try or die in checking conflict escalation
Xenakis 7/6/16 (John J. Xenakis, World View: South China Sea Tension Set
To Escalate After July 12 Arbitration Ruling, Breitbart,
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/07/07/7-jul-16-world-viewsouth-china-sea-tension-set-escalate-july-12-arbitration-ruling/) //AS
The United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague has
announced that on July 12 it will issue its long-awaited ruling on a case
brought by the Philippines against China on the merits of Chinas claims to
the entire South China Sea. The case is brought under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China claims does not
apply to them. China has said it will ignore any ruling of the tribunal. Its
saying that because it knows it will lose. Indeed, a BBC investigation of some
of Chinas evidence has been shown to be delusional, and possibly a
complete fabrication. ( 22-Jun-16 World View Chinas ironclad proof of
South China Sea claims revealed as hoax) The heavy US intervention
refers to Americas freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea.
Some $5 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea on ships each
year, including $1.2 trillion of US trade. China has flip-flopped among various
positions and threats in the past few years, and some statements in the past
have threatened to block international traffic, or at least to require permission
of Chinese authorities to traverse the South China Sea. So the US has
responded with the freedom of navigation patrols. China is claiming the
entire South China Sea, and is using its massive military force to confiscate
regions that have historically belonged to other nations, especially Vietnam
and the Philippines. China is building artificial islands and converting
them to military bases with advanced missile and radar systems.
( 23-Feb-16 World View Chinas military buildup neutralizes Americas
aircraft carriers) Chinas military is in a highly emotional, irrational
and nationalistic state, which makes them very dangerous. They
believe that the US has been weakened by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and too anxious to risk another war. This is a major historic mistake that they
will regret. They claim to be peace loving, but the way the world works is
that every leader goes to war by claiming to be peace loving, and blaming
the other side. The July 12 ruling will only increase their anxieties. Some
analysts are pointing out that occupying the South China Sea is an existential
need for China and for its neighbors. China, Vietnam and the Philippines have
high population densities and comparatively low amounts of arable land,
further magnifying the importance of food sources outside traditional crops.
Food security is an existential threat to all of these countries. For China,
taking control of all the fish stocks in the South China Sea is seen as a
necessity, and so China sees the need to control access to the South China
Sea by other nations. So all the talk about being peace-loving is really
irrelevant. China will go to war if that is the only way to prevent Vietnam and
the Philippines from fishing in the South China Sea. Out of desperation,
Vietnam and the Philippines will see Chinas military actions as an existential
threat, and an attempt to starve their own people. The July 12 ruling will raise
anxieties on all sides, and move the region closer to war. Global Times
(Beijing) andJamestown and The Diplomat
AT: Nationalism (False)

Nationalism is a bunk Western thesis that vastly oversimplifies and
misunderstands China
**Describing China as nationalist is an oversimplification Peaceful Rise**
Kai 4/11/16 Jin, lecturer at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Yonsei University in
South Korea. "Is Chinas 'Assertiveness' in the South China Sea All About Nationalism?" The Diplomat.
thediplomat.com/2016/04/is-chinas-assertiveness-in-the-south-china-sea-all-about-nationalism/
Describing Chinas stance as merely nationalist oversimplifies Chinas

strategies, policies, and behaviors. These critiques also have a bad habit of
foregoing a discussion of nationalism in a general sense and instead implying
that only Chinas disagreements with others are proof of narrow nationalism
or even expansionism. These misconceptions that Chinas behaviors are
only driven by nationalism, and that Chinese nationalism is somehow distinct
from similar tendencies in, say, Vietnam or the Philippines only cloud an
already complicated situation. When it comes to territorial disputes, states
can be more or less confident or assertive in their behavior, whether they
are nationalist or not. In the South China Sea, the other claimants have
broken their promises, incrementally occupied a majority of the islands and
rocks, and unilaterally changed the status quo; that situation is causing
Chinas reactions now. But accusations against China have dominated,
perhaps simply because China is China. In a statement given to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense David
Shear already made it clear that in the Spratly islands, Vietnam has 48
outposts; the Philippines, 8; China, 8; Malaysia, 5, and Taiwan, 1. No wonder
Greg Austin, writing for The Diplomat in 2015, raised a sharp question: Who
Is the Biggest Aggressor in the South China Sea? There is a clear line
between preserving sovereign rights and using territorial disputes as an
excuse for expansionism. China is often accused of the latter, but the reasons
for China to have reminded relatively restrained (and thus less nationalistic)
are obvious. In both the East and the West, history has proven that extreme
nationalists can go to war with neighboring countries when two driving
factors are present: the accumulation of national power, and the emergence
of a collective identity. Such was the case in the first Sino-Japanese War of
1894-1895. In East Asias modern history, China was a victim of its neighbors
extreme nationalism and imperialism. Now China is rising rapidly in both
economic power and national pride. Given the enduring maritime disputes
between China and its neighbors, some believe that history is going to repeat
itself: a nationalistic China would go for expansionism, and might even
claim its revenge for historical wrongs. This is a misperception or
perhaps a preconception of Chinas firmly intended peaceful rise. This
theory obviously overlooks the fact that, even regarding the disputes over
Chinese sovereign interests to which other claimants had no objections
before, China still had always proposed a peaceful solution through
negotiations. Meanwhile, as Austin pointed out, other countries responded
with incremental occupations and Vietnam even doubled its holdings in

the past years while China has not physically occupied additional features.
So who really is guilty of expansionism?
A2 XiArctic/Climate
Link T/ Arctic
Arctic involvement is viewed as getting leverage over the
U.S. increases Xi popularity
Feldman 15 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at
Harvard University and the author of six books, doctorate in Islamic thought
from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar. Senior fellow
of the Society of Fellows at Harvard. What's Going on With China's Military?
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-06/what-s-going-on-withchina-s-military- SEP 6, 2015)//masonw
Talk about mixed signals. Last week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a 300,000-man reduction in the
size of the Peoples Liberation Army -- a decision at least partly calculated to look like China has no
aggressive intentions toward the rest of the world. Yet at almost the same time, he sent five Chinese ships
into the Bering Sea near Alaska, in an unprecedented maneuver timed to coincide with the last day of
President Barack Obamas visit to the state. This sort of symbolism is pretty close to the textbook
definition of muscle-flexing aggression. So whats going on? Is Xi being peaceful or being hostile? The
answer is complicated -- but so are the circumstances of the cool war between China and the U.S.
Domestically, Xi wants to signal that he has control over the military , that
reforms are needed and under way, and that China wont waste money on a land force that
has little to do with its strategic position. Although these moves arent exactly pacifist, at
least they arent warmongering. Simultaneously, Xi wants to signal to both his
domestic and his foreign audiences that China will continue to press for a
global strategic advantage against the U.S . by focusing its military efforts
where the U.S. hasnt asserted its own power. The Arctic turns out to be a
great example. The U.S. Navy isnt a visible presence in the Arctic, and the
Coast Guards showing there isnt much more significant. In advance of his state visit
to Washington later this month, Xi mustve intended to signal to Obama that he will
aggressively pursue Chinas interests where and when the U.S. hasnt staked
its claim. It will be difficult for Obama to raise the issue of the five-ship convoy with Xi, because Xi can
say that China wasnt treading on any U.S. waters. This pre-summit gamesmanship has an added
benefit for Xi. It shows his senior military brass that the troop reduction isnt truly a backpedaling
from the pursuit of Chinese national greatness. Its been widely noted that Xi has closer ties to the military
than either of his predecessors as Chinas president. What does this delicate two-step mean for the future
of China-U.S. relations? It poses in miniature the profound dilemma that confronts U.S. policy makers
Chinas economic rise has driven a steady but

in many ways cautious expansion of its military capacities . Its military budget has
risen at roughly 10 percent a year according to official estimates, and perhaps more. Chinas
today, and will confront the next president.
well-documented provocations in the seas around it have caused grave concern to its neighbors, almost all
The aggressive U.S. response

would be to embrace openly a strategy of containing China. This would mean
strengthening those bilateral relationships and perhaps increasing country-tocountry military ties within Asia where possible. Advocates of this containment
strategy could, and no doubt will, point to the Arctic episode as an instance of where
some meaningful response is called for -- namely strengthening the U.S.
presence in the Arctic.
of whom rely on bilateral security relationships with the U.S.
Link T/ Climate
Arctic involvement is viewed as getting leverage over the
U.S. increases Xi popularity
Feldman 15 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at
Harvard University and the author of six books, doctorate in Islamic thought
from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar. Senior fellow
of the Society of Fellows at Harvard. What's Going on With China's Military?
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-06/what-s-going-on-withchina-s-military- SEP 6, 2015)//masonw
Talk about mixed signals. Last week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a 300,000-man reduction in the
size of the Peoples Liberation Army -- a decision at least partly calculated to look like China has no
aggressive intentions toward the rest of the world. Yet at almost the same time, he sent five Chinese ships
into the Bering Sea near Alaska, in an unprecedented maneuver timed to coincide with the last day of
President Barack Obamas visit to the state. This sort of symbolism is pretty close to the textbook
definition of muscle-flexing aggression. So whats going on? Is Xi being peaceful or being hostile? The
answer is complicated -- but so are the circumstances of the cool war between China and the U.S.
Domestically, Xi wants to signal that he has control over the military , that
reforms are needed and under way, and that China wont waste money on a land force that
has little to do with its strategic position. Although these moves arent exactly pacifist, at
least they arent warmongering. Simultaneously, Xi wants to signal to both his
domestic and his foreign audiences that China will continue to press for a
global strategic advantage against the U.S . by focusing its military efforts
where the U.S. hasnt asserted its own power. The Arctic turns out to be a
great example. The U.S. Navy isnt a visible presence in the Arctic, and the
Coast Guards showing there isnt much more significant. In advance of his state visit
to Washington later this month, Xi mustve intended to signal to Obama that he will
aggressively pursue Chinas interests where and when the U.S. hasnt staked
its claim. It will be difficult for Obama to raise the issue of the five-ship convoy with Xi, because Xi can
say that China wasnt treading on any U.S. waters. This pre-summit gamesmanship has an added
benefit for Xi. It shows his senior military brass that the troop reduction isnt truly a backpedaling
from the pursuit of Chinese national greatness. Its been widely noted that Xi has closer ties to the military
than either of his predecessors as Chinas president. What does this delicate two-step mean for the future
of China-U.S. relations? It poses in miniature the profound dilemma that confronts U.S. policy makers
Chinas economic rise has driven a steady but

in many ways cautious expansion of its military capacities . Its military budget has
risen at roughly 10 percent a year according to official estimates, and perhaps more. Chinas
today, and will confront the next president.
well-documented provocations in the seas around it have caused grave concern to its neighbors, almost all
The aggressive U.S. response

would be to embrace openly a strategy of containing China. This would mean
strengthening those bilateral relationships and perhaps increasing country-tocountry military ties within Asia where possible. Advocates of this containment
strategy could, and no doubt will, point to the Arctic episode as an instance of where
some meaningful response is called for -- namely strengthening the U.S.
presence in the Arctic.
of whom rely on bilateral security relationships with the U.S.
Straight T/ Arctic
Non-unique xi has already clarified his stance and China
already views itself as an Arctic state
Scott 16 (David, Co-Chair of the Democratic Study Group on National
Security, Masters in business and Bachelors in finance. China Coming Into
the Arctic: Shaping a Flanking Strategy Second Line Defense
http://www.sldinfo.com/china-coming-into-the-arctic-shaping-a-flankingstrategy/ January 9, 2016)//masonw
climate
change has brought the Arctic Ocean into prominence , as melting unlocks its
previously frozen waters. Secondly, Chinas economic rise presents a power-shift
challenge for the international system. Thirdly, the combination of these two
processes has generated a further process in which China is increasingly
entering into Arctic affairs. The Arctic primarily consists of a hitherto largely ice-bound Arctic Ocean and an
2016-01-09 By David Scott In recent years three processes have caught the attention of the world. Firstly,
Arctic littoral made up of parts of the United States (Alaska), Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway
(Svalbard/Spitzbergen), Sweden (Lapland), Finland, and Russia, which lie above the Arctic Circle. Although geographically
China is far away from the Arctic and is not an Arctic state, its own power projection is making it an Arctic actor, and
on 20 May 2013, the government-controlled

Beijing Review carried an article titled How China became an Arctic State,
which contained the assertion that China has ultimately managed to reshuffle the Arctic balance of power in record time. China now refers to itself
as a near Arctic state (jin beiji guojia); an Arctic stakeholder (beiji lihaiguanxguo) with
strategic interests to gain, maintain and, if need be, defend. Chinas Perspectives The Arctic
increasingly a player in Arctic geopolitics. Indeed,
caught Chinas attention in 1995, when a group of Chinese scientists and journalists travelled to the North Pole on foot
and conducted research on the Arctic Oceans ice cover, climate and environment. Chinas first Arctic research expedition
by sea took place in 1999, with further Arctic research expeditions in 2003, 2008 and 2010. The 5th Arctic research
expedition in September 2012 was a particularly significant trip, which saw the icebreaker Xue Long (Snow Dragon), the
worlds largest non-nuclear research icebreaker, became the first Chinese ship to sail through the Arctic into the Barents
Sea. The expeditions scientific research included a systematic geophysical survey, installing of an automatic
meteorological station, and investigating methane content in the Arctic area. The research team also held academic
exchanges with their counterparts in Iceland. Upon return the vessel sailed a straight line from Iceland to the Bering Strait
via the North Pole. The 6th Arctic research expedition in July 2014, again by Chinas icebreaker Xue Long, went across the
Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea and Canada basin.
A new icebreaker is scheduled for delivery in
2016.
Beijings annual spend on polar expeditions has tripled in the last ten years and it is making a massive
investment in polar-related infrastructure, although the Antarctic gets the lions share of Chinas polar budget, 80%
compared to the Arctics 20%. The overall goal of Chinas current five-year polar plan is to increase Chinas status and
influence in polar affairs. This was reflected in the 2013 National Annual Report on Polar Program of China, when Liu Cigui,
director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), described Chinas push as extensive involvement in polar affairs.
Speculation continues on the purpose and impact of Chinas increased polar activities. Such concerns are linked to a wider
debate about Chinas international behavior as it flexes its growing economic and military power. This growing presence is
why Chinese official Liu Cigui stressed in an editorial in China Ocean News in November 2014 that Chinas polar policy was
This goal, first

unveiled by Chinese former president Hu Jintao in 2012, has remained a
foreign policy priority under current president Xi Jinping. Liu also asserted that today, we are
already standing at the starting point of a brand-new historical era , of striding
toward becoming a polar-region power. The context was that President Xi Jinping had
just referred to China as a polar great power (jidi daguo) when he visited
Australia in November 2014. At the governmental level, the Arctic has become very much a
matter for Chinese foreign policy in the last decade. In July 2009, Assistant Minister of
intrinsically tied to the national goal of becoming a maritime power (haishang qiangguo).
Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue arrived in Svalbard as part of his High North Study Tour, which included a formal public
outline of Chinas Arctic interests. This Arctic foreign policy was also demonstrated by the headline-making visit to Iceland
in 2012 of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, as well as by Chinas successful bid for observer status at the Arctic Council in 2013.
Speaking at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland on 1 November 2014, Jia Guide from the Chinas Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stressed Chinas pragmatic approach and noted accurately enough that China-Nordic Arctic co-operation is
increasingly expanding from research areas to economic areas, like shipbuilding, shipping, and resource development. A
quasi-official role is played by the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration

(CAA), set up in 1981 as a subordinate body within the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). Its remit is two-fold: to
pursue scientific research, and peaceful development. Such a polar push is further maintained
at the research level in China by the Polar Research Institute (PRI) set up in 1989,
which handles Chinas research stations in the Antarctica and Arctic. With this aim in mind, the PRI recently opened a new
division devoted to the study of resources, law, geopolitics and governance in Antarctica and the Arctic. It was no surprise
that the PRI noted on 17 December 2014 that besides conducting research into Arctic resources and waterways, the
organization will also aim to participate in relevant working group meetings of the Arctic Council and increase Chinas
influence in Arctic affairs in coming years.
AT: Japan
2acUQ
Tribunal disputes are already happening should have
triggered the link
Johnson 7/08 (Jesse. Beijing turns on Japanese judge as Hague tribunal
ruling over South China Sea nears the Japan Times
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/08/national/politicsdiplomacy/beijing-turns-japanese-judge-hague-tribunal-ruling-south-chinasea-nears/#.V4Rf8rgrI8F)//masonw
STAFF WRITER JUL 8, 2016 ARTICLE HISTORY PRINT SHARE Facing an imminent international court ruling widely expected
Beijing has been taking a multipronged

approach to softening the blow from the verdict including targeting the nationality of the
Japanese judge who oversaw the tribunals formation. The court ruling is on a case filed by the
Philippines with the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague that centers on the
applicability of Chinas vaguely drawn nine-dash line S outh China Sea boundary
under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A decision is scheduled to be announced
to repudiate its position on the South China Sea,
Tuesday, though China has not taken part in the proceedings and has vowed to ignore the judgment. Ahead of the
China has stepped up its rhetoric , portraying the Philippines claims as ancient and
labeling outrage over its land-reclamation projects and alleged militarization of the
disputed waters as the product of Western and Japanese media hype . But
perhaps most surprisingly, it has even alluded to a Japanese conspiracy to steer the decision
announcement,
historic while
away from favoring China. The objections began shortly after the case was filed in 2013, when the then-president of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
the five judges
Shunji Yanai, was required to select four of
on the arbitration tribunal formed to hear the case. While each side has the right to select one
China had ceded its rights by declining to

participate in the arbitration. As a result, UNCLOS rules dictated that Yanai who does not himself sit on
judge and must agree upon three others,
the South China Sea tribunal choose judges on behalf of Manila and Beijing. According to Chinese state-run media,
Yanais role in selecting a panel highlighted bias in the arbitration process. The reports claimed Tokyos own maritime
disputes with Beijing in the East China Sea over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China, made
a Japanese national unfit to play such a key a role in the case. In an editorial last month in The Jakarta Post, Chinas
ambassador to Indonesia, Xie Feng, claimed that Yanai, who served as ITLOS president from 2011 to 2014 and Japans
ambassador to the U.S. from 1999 to 2001, went to great pains to form a temporary tribunal that can hardly be
considered as universally representative. Four of the panels five members are European. This sentiment was echoed in a
spate of interviews in Chinese state media and Op-Ed articles published in foreign newspapers over the past two months.
Peoples Daily blasted the arbitrators

nationality and claimed that the panel members do not represent global ,
diverse perspectives, nor do they offer the outlook of different legal systems. In the commentary, written under
In May, the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece
the pen name Zhong Sheng, a Chinese-language homonym for the phrase voice of China that is often used to express
the papers views on foreign policy, Yanai was again targeted. Four of the judges, the commentary said, were appointed
by Shunji Yanai, a biased Japanese former ITLOS president. Considering the East China Sea dispute between China and
Japan . . . Yanai should have avoided taking part, according to the law, the commentary added. But he deliberately
ignored this fact and clearly violated procedural justice requirements. The editorial did not cite what law or procedural
justice requirements it was referring to. Julian Ku, a professor of constitutional law at Hofstra University in New York, said
that Chinas claims omit an important fact. The only reason then- ITLOS
president Shunji Yanai was

involved is because China refused to exercise its right to appoint a member of
the tribunal and to participate in the appointment of three others, Ku wrote on the influential Lawfare blog
published in conjunction with the Brookings Institution. Because of Chinas boycott of the entire proceedings, Article 3 of
UNCLOS Annex VII empowers the president of ITLOS to appoint members of the tribunal if one party refuses to participate.
This power accrues to him only because of Chinas boycott, Ku wrote. Asked for comment on the Chinese claims, Yanai,
79, told The Japan Times in an interview Thursday that these factors are completely irrelevant to this case. I just
happen to be a Japanese, but the annex to the convention provides that in case the arbitrators are not appointed by the
parties or by agreement by the parties then the president of ITLOS must do it, Yanai said. I followed exactly these
provisions. As the president of ITLOS, I didnt act as a Japanese representative. I dont represent the Japanese at all in the
China could have chosen a Chinese arbitrator for the

tribunal, Yanai said, but instead decided to ignore the process. So in this case, I had to do
tribunal. That is quite obvious.
the job, he said. Asked about the makeup of the tribunal and the number of European nationals on it, Yanai was
unwavering on his decision. This is a legal body. This is not a U.N. political institution. So the first consideration must be
given to the legal capabilities of arbitrators, he said. All
(tribunal members) are very
knowledgeable people, and people of integrity. And in the international community, this constitution was very well
received except by China. Lingering resentment over Japanese militarism and its brutal campaign in World War II
remain a sore point in China, and the ruling Communist Party has often harnessed anti-Japanese sentiment to further its
Yanais nationality and the European judges, Beijing could be

working to dilute the authority of the court as it works to bolster domestic
approval of its policies in the South China Sea, which it calls a core interest. On June 28,
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei blasted Japan over what he labeled as a
disgraceful track record on the South China Sea issue. Hong said that some in Japan were anxious to see
goals. Analysts say that by focusing on
the world in disorder and were running a negative publicity campaign while stoking tensions in the region and sowing
discord among countries there. According to Alex Calvo, a guest professor at Nagoya Universitys Law Department,
Yanais role in the case could put Tokyo in an awkward position. Beijing has a point when she stresses the geographical
imbalance of the tribunal, and we could say, more generally, the postwar international legal architecture, Calvo said.
This is clearly a sore point with the Chinese, and they are working hard to set up their own institutions. As for Yanai
Senkaku and South China Sea disputes are not officially related, they
could cast a shadow over Yanais impartiality. Still, Calvo said, in terms of black letter law, he
himself, Calvo noted that while the
saw no reason for Yanai to have excused himself. Furthermore, the proper way for China to ask that would be to become
a formal party to the proceedings, not through the media, he said. Others see the court as bending over backward to
accommodate a recalcitrant China. Citing the early replacement of one judge tapped for the panel over a reported conflict
of interest, James Kraska, research director at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War
College, said Yanais conduct had been eminently fair. Judge Yanai replaced one of his earlier picks once it was
discovered that the selected jurist was married to a Filipino national, Kraska said. The change underscores the
responsible and fair, unbiased approach by Judge Yanai. The idea that being Japanese makes him a biased or incapable
jurist is incorrect and goes against the idea of universal standards of justice and rule of law that transcend national
More pressing, though, according to Nagoya Universitys Calvo, is Chinas hard-driving

push to present the case as unfair. This, he said, could ultimately result in a diminishing of both
identity.
the tribunal and the UNCLOS treaty. Will this be followed by some sort of alternative to UNCLOS? Calvo said. I would
dare say it will, if Chinas relative power keeps rising.
2acLink
Japan isnt competing with China in the Arctic
Sputnik News 2/29/16 citing Japan's Special Ambassador for Arctic Affairs Kazuko
Shiraishi (Japan Not Considering China as a 'Competitor' in Arctic, http://sptnkne.ws/aJqb)//ernst
MOSCOW (Sputnik) Japan is not competing with China in the Arctic region , Japan's
Special Ambassador for Arctic Affairs Kazuko Shiraishi said Monday. "We don't see any competition in
China's presence in the Arctic region," Shiraishi stated at a press conference in Moscow. China's interest in
the Arctic region has risen in recent years. In September, China reportedly showed interest in Russian
Chinese ambassador to Russia stated that China is

ready to cooperate with Arctic Council members to guarantee the security
and development of the Arctic region. On Friday, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Rogozin stated that Russia is seeking to encourage China to use the Northern Sea
Route for cargo shipping. The Northern Sea Route is a shipping lane running along the Russian
icebreaker technology, while the
Arctic coast, allowing passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific via the Northern coast of Siberia. In June
2015, Russia announced development plans for the Northern Sea Route for the period 2015-2030. Japan
has also stepped up its interest in the Arctic, releasing its first comprehensive Arctic policy in October.
Japan views the melting of Arctic ice in recent

years as an opportunity to develop Arctic Ocean routes and utilize the
region's natural resources. Russia is a member of the Arctic Council, which coordinates the
According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry,
activities of the eight Arctic states, which also include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden
and the United States. Currently, both Japan and China hold observer status in the organization.
Link T/ SCS Pullout

China will back out of China seas in favor of the Arctic
steps now, just need to become a full member
Giraudo 14 --- an editorial assistant for The National Interest, research assistant at the Naval War
College (Peter, 8/4/16, Forget the South China Sea: China's Great Game in the Arctic Draws Near,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/forget-the-south-china-sea-chinas-great-game-the-arctic11013)//ernst
Twenty years from now Chinas gaze will not focus upon the South China Sea
or the Central Asian steppes to fuel economic growth. Instead, Beijing will
look to a far more inhospitable place to satiate its appetite for natural
resources. The vast, barren northern part of the planet called the Arctic Circle holds about
13% of the worlds undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas.
Greenland, sitting on the rim of the Arctic Circle, boasts of one of the worlds most abundant supplies of
rare earths. By September of 2030, when many scientists believe the polar ice cap will have melted, the
region may offer a bonanza for natural resources. By that time a new Great Game will have already
enveloped the worlds most northernmost region. We can be sure that China will be eager to play.
Although it is the worlds second biggest economy, China depends on imports

for many of the raw goods it needs to fuel its relentless pace of economic
growth. In the coming decades, it will have to look for natural resources farther and farther away from
the mainland if it is to continue on its current pace of development. Th is explains Chinas recent
moves into the South China Sea (SCS) and its interest in resource-rich Africa.
But China still risks a catastrophic supply shock if war were ever to break out
in the SCS since most of its trade passes through the Straits of Malacca. The
Northern Sea Route (NSR) that passes through the Arctic Circle thus offers
China an unprecedented opportunity to diversify its trade routes and tap into
untouched natural resources. Furthermore, trade between China and Europe via
the NSR will be faster and cheaper: the NSR shortens the distance between
Rotterdam and Shanghai by some 3,000 miles and saves thousands of dollars
on fuel. Some scenarios suggest that 5-15% of Chinese trade could pass
through Arctic waters by 2020. It is no wonder that China has been making great efforts to
improve its relationships with Arctic Circle states. Yet despite all its advances into the region China is
not an Arctic Circle state and it does not sit on the Arctic Council, which currently
consists solely of Arctic Circle states. So far this has been to Chinas benefit. As a neutral observer of the
Arctic Council, China has avoided the kinds of disputes Russia has had with member stateslike one that
erupted when Russia planted its flag at the North Pole in 2007that have hurt its influence on the council.
China has stuck to its scientific and environmental projects to build credibility. What On Earth Were These
Russians Thinking?? In fact, China is going to spend $60 million dollars a year on polar research at its new
China-Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai. A commitment to conducting rescue missions in the
Arctic has also helped improve its image. But for all its efforts in science it is clear why China is in the
Strengthening bilateral relationships with Arctic

Council members is, therefore, of paramount importance to Beijing. China prefers
Arctic: natural resources and trade.
these types of relationships because it can bring its economic might to bear on smaller states separately. A
new free-trade deal with Iceland and $500 million dollar currency-exchange support program for Icelandic
The more economically dependent these

smaller states are on China the more likely they are to give Beijing a
permanent seat on the Arctic Council, even if it is not an Arctic border state .
banks are just the beginnings of this strategy.
Recent world events also point in Chinas favor as the Great Game in the Arctic becomes an ever more real
phenomenon. It looks as if Russia will become isolated from the West as a result of the Ukraine crisis. This
As the new Sino-Russian gas

deal shows, China is Russias most natural partner in the East when it comes
to energy and large-scale trade. Russian companies, isolated from western
partners, will have to turn to Beijing for money and assistance in the Arctic.
will have major implications for Russias position in the Arctic.
Indeed, China National Petroleum Corporation already has made a deal with Rosneft, the Russian energy
giant, for Arctic oil exploration. Joint deals like this one will be crucial if China is to access the regions
untapped oil reserves because most of the oil along the NSR is within Russias Exclusive Economic Zone.
These trends will only continue as Chinas energy needs grow. The Great Game in the Arctic Circle is just
beginning. For now, it will continue to be shaped by events far away from the polar ice cap. Soon that may
change. The West should recognize Chinas ambitions; the Far North may not remain cold forever.
No ImpactRussia S
Japan still has Russia Arctic ties solves Chinese distrust
Sinclair 14
(Jasmin, JOGMEC Washington Office JOGMEC Washington Office. JOGMEG was
Established on February 29, 2004 pursuant to the Law Concerning the Japan Oil, Gas and
Metals National Corporation, which was promulgated on July 26, 2002. JOGMEC integrates the
functions of the former Japan National Oil Corporation, which was in charge of securing a stable
supply of oil and natural gas, and the former Metal Mining Agency of Japan, which was in
charge of ensuring a stable supply of nonferrous metal and mineral resources and
implementing mine pollution control measures. JAPAN AND THE ARCTIC NOT SO
POLES APART https://oilgas-info.jogmec.go.jp/pdf/5/5225/201403_039a.pdf,

last modified 3/24/14 p. 45)//masonw
Japans open relations with the Arctic nations will put it in good stead in terms
of energy resource development. In particular, talks with Russia could result in ameliorating
tensions over the Kuril Island, which have prevented Russia and Japan from signing a peace treaty formally
ending WW II hostilities.55 Another reason for their cooperation is to compete with China.56
Chinas assertive policies in the Arctic notwithstanding , Japan and Russia are
moving closer to one another in earnest. In early February 2014 Russian President Vladimir
Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met. This was the fifth high-level meeting
between the two countries in less than a year. Russias foray into Asia is for diplomatic purposes and for
securing a diversified energy client base. Closer ties to Japan would ensure Russia leverage in Asian
relations before Chinas ascendancy is cemented. As for energy, China is Russias biggest Asian customer.
Should Japan also become a Russian customer, Russia could use energy both as a diplomatic and
commodity bargaining chip.57 Russias East Asian customer base would be solidified. The
advantages for Japan lie in resources, shipping routes, and diplomacy. Japan
has already scored a plus in resources . In May 2013, INPEX Corporation secured a
partnership with Rosneft to explore two Arctic oil fields.58 In terms of diplomacy and alliances, Russia
lent its weight to support Japans bid to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council, ignoring
China. Moscow also supported Tokyos application to hold the 2020 Olympic Games. Although
China and Japan are currently involved in escalating spats in the East China
Sea, it should be noted that while Moscow and Tokyo are warming to each
other, neither would overtly do something to mar their relations with
Beijing. In spite of recent heated rhetoric in Sino-Japanese relations , Prime
Minister Abe reiterated that the two countries could never clash. We
must not let that happen.
A2 Japan
AT: Russia DA
AT: Russia Adventurism Impact

Defensive realism true Russian expansionism is to
prevent piracy and terrorism risk of conflict low
High North. Norways international position as a responsible and significant actor in the High North. (2006,
the Arctic region is a must-be-seen as a

peripheral policy area for the United States. All of the policy activity has been
shaped by an environment of cooperation and concern for the common challenges
faced by all of the members of the Arctic Council. However, as US and Russian relations sour
p. 49) An emerging security dilemma? In 2014,
over Russias involvement in Ukraine and Syria, some have suggested that a new militarization of the
Arctic and a return to Cold War security policies may be on the horizon (Mitchell, 2014). In 2008, the
Security Council of the Russian Federation emphasized the importance of maintaining a necessary combat
Russian authorities were more

concerned with nontraditional security threats such as piracy and terrorism at sea and human
trafficking. In 2008, the Russians were committed to maintaining the Arctic region
as a zone of peace and cooperation. More recently, Putin and other Russian
leaders have made statements and introduced new policies such as creating a new Northern Fleet
Joint Strategic Command and reopening a military base in the Novosibirsk Islands that might
cause concern among the military realists in the United States. But these actions do not
suggest an expansionist Russian security policy . Instead, they suggest a desire
to protect the vast Russian Arctic territory. Consider the words of Vice Prime Minister
potential to protect national interests (Zysk, 2010). At this time,
Dmitry Rogozin, quoted in an April 2014 Reuters article: It is crucially important for us to set goals for our
national interests in this region. If we dont do that, we will lose the battle for resources which means we
will also lose in a big battle for the right to have sovereignty and independence. (Mitchell, 2014, p. 2)
These are not

direct challenges to peace and stability in the Arctic. There is not likely to be
These are policies that any or all of the Arctic Council members might pursue.
a war for resources in the region because of the success of low-range cooperative security efforts. The
Russian build-up does not provide a security threat for the United States but some politicians may frame it
US
policy interests include the oil and gas resources, Chinese interests in securing
resources in the region and the interests of native peoples and environmentalists. In this chapter,
as such to serve their electoral interests. Other factors pushing the Arctic region to the forefront of
we are asking two questions: First, are US Arctic policies best defined by statist goals or are US Arctic
policies shaped by public and private institutions and interests? Second, who are the issue leaders defining
and promoting US Arctic policies? It is to these questions we now turn.
AT: Russia/Sino Impact

Says no Russia-China relations low now distrust and
aggression
Pezard and Smith 5/6/16 --- Smith --- Assistant Policy Analyst; Ph.D. Candidate, Pardee
RAND Graduate School; Pezard Political Scientist at RAND Corp Ph.D. in political science,
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French
Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political
Science, Paris (Sciences Po). (FRIENDS IF WE MUST: RUSSIA AND CHINA IN THE ARCTIC,
Stephanie Pezard and Timothy Smith, May 6, 2016, War On The Rocks,
http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/friends-if-we-must-russia-and-chinas-relations-in-thearctic/)//VZ
The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic is fragile

changes in
circumstances can alter the cost-benefit calculation of either partner and lead
to a renegotiation of the terms of the relationship, if not a breakup
. As with most marriages of convenience,
. In the short term, the
Sino-Russian relationship could deteriorate if an energy partnership with China in the Arctic proves a poor replacement of the West,. For instance, China cannot help with technology for offshore drilling, which was
largely provided before 2014 by Norwegian companies that have since pulled out of joint projects with Russia. Finally, as both Russia and China are experiencing economic slowdowns with important
Prospects for a mutually beneficial

relationship are even more uncertain in the medium- to long-term. The
Northern Sea Route will become more
accessible and no easier to control,
making Russia increasingly nervous about a foreign presence along its coast.
Russian or Chinese ties with the West may warm up, reducing their
incentives to find a friend in each other China may distance itself
from Russia if Russia becomes more aggressive in the Arctic, threatening
Chinese investments and access
consequences on their bilateral trade opportunities for cooperation may decrease as well.
and more
. And
. This could happen if Russian President Vladimir Putin decides to respond forcefully to some perceived encroachment from
the West in the Arctic, or if he responds with a coup de force to a negative outcome to Russias submission to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which overlaps with similar claims from
As Arctic partners go, China is probably one of the last that

Russia would choose if given a choice Beijing slowly but steadily invests
in a region that clearly represents a long game, a lot can happen to derail a
relationship that is built on little more than fleeting mutual interests
Denmark and Canada.
. As
Arctic cooperation with Russia solves relations --- theyre

low now
Targeted News Release 14 ---- Washington DC released governmental speeches and
reports (U.S. Must Answer Russia's Arctic Challenge, Targeted News Service, June 16, 2014,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1535973990/8DB13CA828D34D2APQ/
2?accountid=14667)//chiragjain
Putin's
Arctic expansionism is a challenge the U.S. must answer with icebreakers,
ports, and territorial claims of our own , Lt. Governor Mead Treadwell said today. Treadwell
Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell, R-Alaska, issued the following news release: Russian President Vladimir
spoke this morning at the 34th Annual U.S.-Russia Forum in Washington, DC, on a panel focusing on foreign
Russia's Ambassador to the U.S.,

Sergey Kislyak, kicked off the program on foreign policy issues between the two
nations, Treadwell talked about the need for cooperation with Russia despite
disputes over Crimea and Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, which have brought U.S.-Russia
policy issues between the two nations. Speaking just after
relations to their lowest point in decades. "My challenge to Russians is this: where we
are neighbors, help bring our relations back to normal . Help us eliminate salmon bycatch in the North Pacific Ocean. Help us work together to prevent oil spills from all these ships coming
through, and help us protect food security in the Arctic. Alaskans depend on this ocean for food and for
don't let Russia go it alone in the Arctic . A

quarter of the world's oil and gas and one of the world's most important
fisheries are located in the Arctic. Let's exercise leadership now , by developing our
jobs. "My challenge to Americans is this:
own energy and building ports and icebreakers, and not let just one country control shipping." "In today's
tough international climate, we can't forget we're neighbors," Treadwell said. " The
Arctic situation
demands cooperation and friendly competition . If we don't exercise stronger Arctic
leadership, we will be sorry later." Treadwell cited an April 22 speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin to
his Security Council, committing for a stronger Russian military presence in the Arctic, and predicting that
shipping in the Arctic would grow from 1.5 million tons in 2013 to four million tons in 2015. Putin also
expressed his wish that ships using the Arctic be primarily under Russian control. " Russian
control of
Arctic shipping is likely to produce more of the same kind of disputes we've
had in the Caspian region," Treadwell said. "To prevent that, U.S. icebreakers, U.S. Arctic ports, and a
stronger U.S. Coast Guard presence will offer the world alternatives, healthy competition, instead of a
monopoly." Treadwell discussed Alaskans' and Russians' shared heritage and close family and cultural ties,
which have grown since the Alaska-Russia border opened in 1988. In addition, Treadwell said Alaska and
Russia cooperate now on commercial aviation, weather, and wildlife management at the border. Both
Treadwell and Kislyak called for expanding Alaska's trade with Russia, which at 10 or 11 million dollars per
year, Treadwell said, is smaller than our trade with Mexico. " There
is much more trust and

cooperation to be built all around the Arctic neighborhood ," Treadwell said.
"Meanwhile, we need to stand up for Alaska's and America's interests in the Arctic, no matter what
difficulties we face with our neighbors."
Sino-Russian relations arent high

Pakhomov and Wagner 15 --- Nikolay Pakhomov is a geopolitical risk consultant and
an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). He is a commentator in a number
of Russian and international media outlets. Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and
author of the book Managing Country Risk. (How Western energy sanctions on Russia have
backfired, Russia Direct, Nikolay Pakhomov and Daniel Wagner, June 23, 2015,
http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/how-western-energy-sanctions-russia-havebackfired)//chiragjain
THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT

BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL REMAIN CONFLICT-FREE Also, given the history between
China and Russia, there is no guarantee that bilateral relations will remain conflict-free, particularly as
there remain some unresolved border disputes b etween the two nations. It is important
to bear in mind that both powers seek to enhance their ability to achieve their
economic and military objectives in overlapping parts of the world , such as
Central Asia, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Japan. They are not natural political allies.
GIVEN THE HISTORY BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA,
Also read: "Russia and China are frenemies both in Central Asia and globally" Russian-Asian cooperation is
also evident from gas pipeline consultations with South Korea, Japanese law makers support for a pipeline
from the Sakhalin fields to Japan, and interest on the part of the Indian government for building a pipeline
from Russia. Russias oil and gas continues to be imperative for Europe as Europe remains dependent on
Russian gas and will grow in importance to Asia. The development of shale gas fields in Europe has
almost completely stopped due to high production costs and environmental concerns. When U.S. shale
starts to be exported, it is likely to be sold mainly to Asia, where prices are higher and the infrastructure to
import the product already exists. Other plans to supply Europe with natural gas including pipelines from
the Caspian region remain at the inception stage, despite nearly two decades of European interest and
support from the U.S. Russia
has no choice but to diversify its energy export s, and its

which will give Russia the
ability to do so beyond its current initiatives appears to be good,
necessary flexibility to hedge against future risks . Russian political and business leaders
have recently stated that despite the sanctions and other issues with Europe (such as the EUs third energy
package) Russian energy companies will continue to work there, which means that it will be harder for
Western sanctions to stand the test of time. The European Union must renew sanctions annually (which it
has just done for the coming six months), whereas the U.S. must specifically stop them. Many European
nations are under pressure from their respective business communities to stop the sanctions, whereas the
U.S. is likely to keep them in place for many years to come, unless there is some fundamental change in
the state of Russia-U.S. relations. Western nations decision not to impose sanctions blocking the export of
Russias oil and gas to the world market was deliberate, as the world needs Russias natural resources. If
Russia had been restricted in this way, the result would have been significantly higher global oil and gas
prices, so they were crafted so as not to have global repercussions. If the West were to try to impose
broader sanctions, such as to restrict Russias banking sector, it could easily blow back in the form of an
alternative currency union between Russia, China and its trading partners that excludes the use of the U.S.
dollar. For some time now, Western critics of European-Russian cooperation in the energy sector have been
questioning Russias ability to support the required level of energy production, yet Russia continues to
fulfill all contracts. Understanding the long-term importance of Russias energy resources, some European
(and American) energy companies are looking for ways around the Western sanctions.
AT: COUNTERPLANSSCS
AT: Phillipines CP
Doesnt SDuterte
You hitched your cart to the wrong horse the suit was
brought by the previous administration Duterte will
immediately fold to China
Representatives. The South China Sea moment of truth is almost here,
http://atimes.com/2016/06/the-south-china-sea-moment-of-truth-is-almosthere/ --br
The Philippines lawfare strategy in the South China Sea disputes is inching
closer to a moment of truth. In coming weeks, an arbitral tribunal, formed
under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), is set to pass a final judgment on the ongoing maritime spats
between China and the Philippines. For the first time, a team of impartial, topcaliber legal experts will officially weigh on the validity of Chinas expansive
claims and growing footprint across arguably the worlds most important
waterway. What is at stake is preventing China from fulfilling a Seldenian
Closed Sea (Mare clausum) in favor of preserving a Grotian Free Sea (Mare
Liberum) at the heart of the Western Pacific. Yet it is ultimately up to the
Philippines incoming president, Rodrigo Duterte, to decide on what to do with
a likely favorable arbitration outcome. And this introduces some element of
uncertainty into the picture. Unlike his outgoing predecessor, Benigno Aquino,
Dutertea self-described socialist with historical ties to Philippine
communistsdoesnt seem to be very keen on confronting China and has,
quite legitimately, expressed doubts vis--vis Washingtons commitment to
its Southeast Asian ally. (In fact, during the recently concluded Shangri-La
Dialogue, which brought together the worlds leading defense ministers and
experts, I asked Admiral Harry Harris, commander of United States Pacific
Command, about the precise extent of American treaty obligations to the
Philippines in an event of contingency in the South China Sea. I wasnt able to
receive an unequivocal answer beyond well-rehearsed semantics.)
Astonishingly, Duterte has even expressed reservations concerning the
wisdom of ongoing efforts to bolster the Philippines minimum deterrence
capability. Fighter jets are good only for ceremonial flybys. Im not in favor of
building up external defense, I will not got to war with China, Duterte
recently told reporters. Though known as often mercurial, he was actually
consistent with his earlier stance during the campaign trail, when he
dismissed the purchase of much-needed jet fighters as a waste of money.
For the incoming president, what matters is internal security operation,
especially in light of the worrying resurgence of extremist groups, tied to
Islamic State, in the southern island of Mindanao. Duterte, meanwhile, has
expressed growing interest in reviving long-frayed bilateral investment
relations with China, even though this may come at the expense of a
compromise on sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. During his

meeting with Chinese ambassador Zhao Jian, among the first dignitaries who
met the president-elect shortly after the elections, Duterte and the Chinese
envoy apparently went down to business right off the bat, discussing
prospects for massive Chinese infrastructure investments in the Philippines.
Obviously delighted by the cordial exchanges, with large-scale Chinese
investments hanging in the balance, Duterte went so far as to praise Chinese
President Xi Jinping as a great leader. Duterte has also expressed doubts as
to the utility of the Philippines arbitration case against China, which has
boycotted the proceedings and questioned the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal to oversee the South China Sea disputes. Encouraged by convivial
exchanges with the incoming Philippine leadership, China recently reiterated
its call on the Philippines to entirely drop the arbitration case as a sign of
goodwill. After all, the verdict is expected to be released a week after Duterte
officially assumes power, so technically the case could still be dropped. And
as Columbia University professor Matthew C. Waxman succinctly explains,
much is also at stake for the whole international law regime, which may
explain the curious timing of the expected release of the arbitration
judgment.
AT: Japan CP
Japan Fails
Their author concedes China will be angered
Chapman 16 --- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Aizu Wakamatsu
International Assoc'iation, JET Programme. Research Associate at Mitsubishi Corporation (Andrew, Winter
2016Japans Proactive Pacifism in Action: Supporting International Law and Stability in the South China
Sea, NEW PERSPECTIVES in foreign policy Journal)//ernst
Expanding Japanese operations and engagement in the SCS is not without

risk. China in particular has already protested Japanese involvement in the
SCS, complaining that Tokyo is stirring up dispute among regional countries
and creating tension at sea.15 Even more concerning, China could respond
to expanded Japanese involvement by increasing paramilitary and military
naval and air activities near the disputed islands between the two countries.
However, the benefits are worth the risk. Japan has a vital national interest in supporting existing
international maritime law. Its strong naval capabilities and popularity in Southeast Asia will help generate
support for U.S. actions within the region and reinforce the unity of the U.S.-Japan alliance. While
Tokyos
actions may cause tension with Beijing, by conducting operations strictly in adherence with
international law and continuing to stress openness to measures designed to reduce the likelihood of
inadvertent conflict, Japan can demonstrate its capacity to function as a responsible stakeholder in the
SCS. In addition, Japan can calibrate its engagement, focusing on VFAs and case-by-case defense
equipment transfers rather than establishing a permanent Japanese military presence in the SCS (an action
likely to be perceived by China as a long-term threat). Tokyo can also stress its continued commitment to
peace and opposition to militarism, a commitment strongly attested to by the Japanese publics continued
wariness toward recent security legislation and defense equipment exports.16
AT: SCOTUS CP
No S2ac
5 reasons the CPP fails
Grunwald 15 --- an American journalist and author; and a senior national correspondent at Time
magazine.(Michael, 5/26/15, 5 reasons Obamas transformative power plan wont transform anything,
http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/obama-transformative-energy-power-plan-000016)//ernst
1. Coal The EPA insists the Clean Power Plan is about limiting carbon from power
plants, not limiting coal. But lets be honest: Limiting carbon from power plants means limiting
coal, which produces 75 percent of the electricity sectors emissions. Thats why
critics have portrayed the plan as a nuclear weapon in the war on coal. The thing is, the draft rules wont
the plan doesnt really aim to accelerate the

decline. One giveaway is the plans projection that U.S. coal generation will drop just 30 percent from
do much to coal. Its already declining, but
2005 levels by 2030. Its already dropped 20 percentand aging coal plants with another 50 gigawatts of
capacity, nearly 15 percent of the U.S. fleet, are already scheduled for retirement. In other words, the EPA
expects the decline of coal to abate somewhat under the Clean Power Plan, even though the average coal
plant is over 40 years old, nobody is planning new coal plants, and the coal industry is already scrambling
to comply with a barrage of new clean-air and clean-water regulations that have nothing to do with carbon.
The Sierra Clubs Beyond Coal campaign is almost on schedule to achieve its goal of retiring every U.S.
coal plant by 2030, yet the EPA plan projects that 30 percent of our power will still come from coal that
year. That would be a disaster for the climate. In fairness, those lame EPA projections are not binding. And
McCarthy herself told me not to put too much stock in them. In a November interview, she predicted that
in the end, you will probably see significantly more emissions reductions than we anticipated. Thats
almost certainly true, because utilities seem likely to keep retiring coal plants at a rapid rate. But Obamas
carbon rules do not seem likely to drive many of those retirementsand the EPAs nationwide projections
2. State targets The Clean Power Plan doesnt

impose strict emissions limits; it merely assigns states targets for
reducing their carbon intensity. The plan doesnt mandate how to achieve those targets,
either; it lets the states chart their own paths. While overwrought critics squeal about
are not the only giveaway.
bureaucratic tyranny, the EPAs documents outlining its plan are almost laughably deferential, full of
references to maximizing flexibility, making sure states have the flexibility they need, offering states
broad flexibility, and so on. This actually makes a lot of sense, practically as well as legally and politically .
Washington bureaucrats dont need to micromanage how states decide to cut

their emissions. They just need to make sure emissions get cut. The glaring
hole in the plan is not the flexibility it gives states to meet targets, but the
targets themselves. The states with the deepest addictions to coalusually in the form of filthy
plants built before the passage of the Clean Air Acthave some of the weakest targets for reducing their
emissions. Its amusing that McConnell is calling for states to rise up and defy the EPA, since his home
state of Kentucky will only have to cut its emissions 18 percent from 2005 levels by 2030, and its already
retiring so many inefficient coal boilers that state officials have said they doubt theyll need to shut down
any more to meet their target. The EPA came up with similarly modest targets for coal-rich states like West
Virginia, Wyoming and Indiana. McCarthy told me the agency was trying to avoid years of negotiations
about what was achievable, but when a plan sets targets that are likely to be achieved even without the
plan, its hard to see the point of the plan. 3. Renewables The U.S. is enjoying a green revolution,
with wind power up threefold in the Obama era and solar power up more than tenfold, thanks to a
remarkable decline in costs that has continued to this day. But Obamas EPA apparently believes this boom
is about to go bust. If
its projections for coal are unambitious, its projections for

renewables are downright ridiculous, essentially assuming a collapse of Americas fastestgrowing electricity sector. For example: At least five statesIowa, Maine, Minnesota, South
Dakota, and North Dakotaare already producing more renewable electricity
than they would be expected to produce under the Clean Power Plan by 2030.
And at least seventeen states already have renewable power targets that are
higher than the EPAs. The Clean Power Plan target for California is 21 percent renewable by 2030,
even though its required by law to reach 33 percent by 2020; the plans target for Hawaii is a mere 10
percent by 2030, while the states official goal is 40 percent. Overall, the draft EPA plan predicted just 21
gigawatts of new renewable-power capacity nationwide by 2030; the U.S. installed about half that much
just last year. I offered to bet McCarthy that the U.S. would beat the draft plans projections for renewables,
but she said she agreed they were too low. Wind and solar power are already much cheaper than the EPA
assumed when devising its models. But the body language out of the EPA, which already faces Clean Power
Plan lawsuits by a dozen states, has not suggested that the final plan will be dramatically stronger .
4.
Bioenergy When environmentalists have aired concerns about the plan, theyve usually focused on its
favorable treatment of nuclear power and natural gas. But nuclear power, setting aside its many
challenges, is carbon-free. Why wouldnt it get favorable treatment in carbon regulations? Natural gas does
emit carbon, but much less than coal, so it would also look like an attractive substitute in just about any
carbon regime. But as I wrote in January, the
plans favorable treatment of bioenergy

power derived from trees, crops, or other plantscould be much more
problematic. The problem is that an EPA policy memo suggested the plan will treat
most bioenergy as carbon-neutral, which could encourage massive amounts
of deforestation, which would not be carbon-neutral at all. The EPA has waffled a bit about the
memo, so its not clear whether the final plans approach to bioenergy will be as generous to the timber
industry. Suffice to say that some bioenergy critics believe a lenient approach could end up producing far
more emissions through the cutting and burning of trees than the rest of the Clean Power Plan would
reduce. 5. Timelines If the Obama administration finalizes the Clean Power Plan this summer, and if
it isnt held up by litigation, states will be required to submit implementation plans by June 2016. Not
really, though. Theyll be allowed to request extensions of up to two years. Then they EPA will have another
They wont be required to begin implementation until

2020assuming no litigation delays, and no reversals by future
administrations. And when McCarthy spoke to the National Association of Regulatory Utility
year to review their plans.
Commissioners in February, she hinted that the EPA might give states even more time. You and I know
the EPA has set

interim goals for 2020 that are much more ambitious than its targets for
2030. Overall power-sector emissions are somehow expected to drop more than 10 percent within the
that flexibility is the key to this proposal, she said. This is all a bit odd, because
next five years, before implementation even begins, then less than 5 percent over the next ten years, after
implementation is in full swing. Its as if the carbon rules were supposed to relieve the pressure on states
to reduce carbon. In fact, they were supposed to minimize the risk of legal and political reversals.
McCarthy is a climate hawk, and Obama cares about his climate legacy; his 2009 stimulus bill helped
create the renewables boom, and a host of other EPA regulations have helped decimate the coal industry.
There
is every reason to believe the U.S. will continue to reduce its emissions
whether or not the Clean Power Plan turns out to be ambitious. But an ambitious
plan would reduce more emissions. And isnt that supposed to be the point?
Fails insufficient
Dokoupil 15 a masters degree in American Studies from Columbia University, and earned a
fellowship towards a PhD in media studies, cites researchers, a reporter for msnbc and the host of
Greenhouse on SHIFT by msnbc (Tony, 8/4/15, Obamas climate policy is practically worthless, says
expert, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obamas-climate-policy-practically-worthless-saysexpert#59468)//ernst
Unfortunately, the current plans dont go far enough, according to Climate Action Tracker, a
group of research organizations dedicated to analyzing the worlds progress. In comments this spring and
summer, the group criticized the plans out of Europe and other advanced economies, calling them
They rated the U.S. plan in particular as about

halfway to whats needed, and hoped urgent revisions would arrive in the months ahead.
inadequate and insufficient.
Related: Environmental racism persists amid EPA inaction In an analysis released Tuesday, CAT reported
some good news, noting that
Obamas plan makes a difference, and will likely
reduce Americas economy-wide emissions by roughly 10% beyond the current

pace. However, researcher Hanna Fekete told msnbc in an email, the targets are not sufficient
for 2C and more will be needed for the U.S. to reach its goals. She reiterated the
groups early warning of large gap between the current pace of carbon emissions, and whats considered
Even with Obamas Clean Power Plan, and the recent plans announced by China and
the world is on pace for about 3 degrees of warming by 2100.
The most vulnerable countries of the world, including many small island
nations, believe they can sustain about half that rate. Some climate scientists say a
safe.
Brazil and others,
war-like mobilization is needed to cut emissions by 80% by 2030, with full decarbonization shortly
thereafteror not even the wealthier countries of the world will be safe. While Republicans have pounced
on Obamas plan, calling it lawless and comparing it to a crusade, commentators on the left agree with
Hansen. Voxs Brad Palmer pointed out that U.S. emissions declines have little to do with policy and, in any
case, have recently begun to creep upward again. Slates Eric Holthaus, meanwhile, is a a meteorologist
Obamas plan cuts emissions only about a third of what

researchers like Hansen say is necessary. Even more worrying: In July, Hansen and 16
who recently estimated that
colleagues published a persuasive and already hotly contest paper, arguing that the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change is too conservative on sea level rise. The study concludes that glaciers in
Greenland and Antarctica will melt 10 times faster than the IPCC estimates, resulting in sea level rise of at
coastal cities like New York and New Orleans

have but a few decades of habitability left.
least 10 feet in as little as 50 years. If true,
Economy T/
Counterplan kills the economy
Lyle and Oritz 15
--- Magruder Lyle is vice president of Strategic Initiatives, American Fuel &
Petrochemical Manufacturers and member of the Job Creators Network and its National Womens Coalition
advisory board. Ortiz is the president and CEO of the Job Creators Network (Sarah K Magruder Lyle, Alfredo
Oritz, 10/18/15, Obamas Clean Power Plan hurts economy, http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/energy-environment/251302-obamas-clean-power-plan-hurts-economy)//ernst
Affordable, dependable energy is crucial to everyone , especially the poor, the elderly,
those on fixed incomes, and local institutions like schools and hospitals. Anything that makes energy more
expensive and less dependable should be viewed with disdain. A case in point is a slightly revised version
of EPAs 111(d) Rule, better known as the Clean Power Plan, that President Obama announced last week
The administrations plan to federally manage the electricity

system and impose higher energy costs on everyone is bad news for
American citizens, the economy, and job creation. The plan requires states to
reduce carbon emissions by nearly one-third from 2005 levels by 2030. States
will be left with little choice but to implement a carbon tax, cap-and-trade, or
dramatic energy efficiency mandates in order to achieve this target, making this
will go forward.
one of the most expensive EPA regulations ever. The administration says the rule is necessary to reduce
carbon emissions that cause climate change. But carbon emissions have already dropped by 10 percent
since 2005. This development is largely because of the countrys increased use of natural gas, as a result
The Clean Power Plan, however, ignores this development

and instead includes mandates and quotas to move from traditional energy to
renewable energy forms like wind and solar. The problem is that energy sources must be
sustainable and while that may be the case in the future, wind and solar make up less than 5
percent of the electricity supply today. The transfer from productive energy forms to
of the domestic shale gas revolution.
relatively unproductive forms puts the nation at a competitive disadvantage with other countries in terms
of creating economic activity. It also threatens the reshoring of manufacturing jobs that
has occurred in recent years as companies are drawn to the U.S. to take advantage of our relatively cheap
energy. For instance, as of June of this year, chemical companies have announced 238 new projects in the
U.S., valued at over $145 billion dollars, which will create over 383,000 direct and indirect jobs by 2023.
The administration should not be creating policies that will increase costs to
manufacturers and deter this much-needed economic growth. In fact, the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the National Economic Research Associates estimate that the Clean Power
Plan proposed by EPA last year would cost the economy tens of billions of
dollars each year. The presidents version, which requires even larger reductions in carbon
emissions, is likely to have an even bigger negative economic impact. The most obvious victim
of the rule will be coal plants, many of which will need to shut down in order for states to come
close to reaching EPAs ambitious targets. This is another step towards the presidents 2008 election
promise to bankrupt the coal industry, despite the fact that millions depend on coal as their main
electricity source. The rules ramifications go beyond just impacting the 80,000 Americans who work in the
By leaving states
with seemingly no other options than to try and transfer to relatively
unproductive energy sources, this rule will jack up the price of electricity by
coal industry and the hundreds of thousands more employed servicing them.
double-digits in NERAs estimate. Given that almost everyone pays for electricity both directly and
this rule will hit the wallet of nearly every

American. And because the economically disadvantaged spend around three
times the percent of their incomes on energy as the rich, the law will
disproportionately hurt them. So much for the presidents talk of reducing income inequality.
indirectly (as an input in other products)
Rather than plowing forward with such a burdensome regulation, the administration and EPA should
support the principles behind the reduction in carbon already taking place by allowing energy development
to occur under a sensible and transparent regulatory environment.
A flourishing energy sector

is a major engine of the economy, providing the country with power,
producing hundreds of thousands of good jobs, and keeping the environment
clean. The Clean Power Plan is a step backward moving us farther away
from this vision.
AT: COUNTERPLANSOTHER
AT: Canada CP
US Key
And US arctic leadership is key to climate change * THIS
DOUBLES AS CANADA CP SOLVENCY DEFICIT
Matthews 15 --- a consultant, eco-entrepreneur, green investor and author of numerous articles
on sustainable positioning, eco-economics and enviro-politics. (Richard, 4/30/15, American Leadership of
the Arctic Council Bodes Well for Climate Action, http://globalwarmingisreal.com/2015/04/30/americanleadership-of-the-arctic-council-bodes-well-for-climate-action/)//ernst
The far north will assume a leading role in the war against climate change now that the U.S. has replaced
Canada as the leader of the Arctic Council. On Friday April 24th 2015, the U.S. assumed the leadership of
the international body that is charged with addressing climate change and other important issues facing
the Arctic. The Councils mandate is to protect the Arctic environment and promote sustainable
development in the northern communities. The Council is composed of the United States, Canada, Norway,
Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Russia and Arctic Indigenous Peoples. Each nation is given the
opportunity to lead the Council for two years on a rotating basis. Leadership is important to the future of
Some of the key interrelated

Arctic issues that need to be addressed are melting sea ice, anomalous
weather, shipping traffic, and warming causing GHGs to leech from the
permafrost. At an April 24th Arctic Council biennial meeting in Iqaluit, ministers signed a Declaration
the Arctic as the region is on the front lines of climate change.
that reaffirmed each nations commitment to maintaining peace in the Arctic, sustaining indigenous
Failed Canadian leadership

Canadas Arctic Council tenure was pro-industry, pro-fossil fuels and proshipping. Going into the Iqaluit meeting, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged that
governments are not moving fast enough to avert a climate disaster. This
statement was directed in part at Canada, one of the worlds most egregious climate laggards. Canada
has failed to show leadership during its tenure on a number of fronts. With
Canada at the helm, the Arctic Council has been anemic on environmental
protection and climate change. Canadas support for fossil fuels and feckless
climate leadership have hindered environmental action from the council.
Canadian inaction on climate change increases the risks from flooding that
could inundate entire northern communities. Several environmental
organizations have criticized Canadas chairmanship of the Council. Greenpeace
communities, and combating climate change in the region.
Canada Arctic spokesperson Farrah Khan said that under Canadas leadership, the Council produced poor
outcomes that saw corporate interest acquire a stronger voice in the pan-Arctic forum, and environmental
protection fall low in the priority list. New agenda Greenpeace is among those that have urged the U.S. to
do more with the chairmanship of the Council than Canada. A number of groups have also asked the US
government to put environmental and climate issues at the forefront of the Council agenda. This was also
the message contained in an open letter from British actor Emma Thompson to retired Coast Guard
admiral Robert Papp, the U.S. special representative for the Arctic. It should be noted that unlike its
the U.S. is at least actively embracing climate change emissions

reduction and environmental protection during its two-year mandate at the
Arctic Councils helm, Thompson said. Greenpeace sent all Arctic Council foreign ministers framed
preceding chair,
copies of its Declaration on the Future of the Arctic. It was signed by almost 2,000 prominent figures
including scientists, politicians, religious leaders, intellectuals and celebrities. Under the leadership of
the U.S. has been taking huge strides to combat

climate change and there is every reason to believe that this will extend to their chairmanship of the
Council. The U.S. has indicated that they intend to shift the priorities of the
Council and focus on climate change and the environment. In his address to the
President Obama and Secretary Kerry,
eight nation ministerial gathering in Iqaluit, Secretary Kerry said Council nations must do everything we
can to prevent worse impacts [from GHG emissions]The Arctic Council can do more on climate change,
Mr. Kerry added. The State Department has an ambitious agenda for the Council over the next two years.
The
U.S. has already made progress securing a pledge to do more to fight

black carbon and methane. Black carbon is soot that settles on snow and ice and makes the ice
absorb more energy from the sun causing it to melt even faster. A major part of the soot problem in the
Arctic comes from diesel generators that are used to supply heat to the four million people that live there.
Secretary Kerry said, one of the most important things we can do for the people of the region is help them
with renewable, clean energy. Other sources of black carbon include oil-well flaring and open burning of
forests and grasslands. The United States theme for its two years on the Council will be One Arctic:
Shared Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities. and climate change will be front and center.
Theres only one Arctic and all of us the United States, other nations, indigenous peoples, and Arctic
communities must join together to ensure responsible stewardship of this incredible region, Kerry said at
the U.S. is making climate change

mitigation and ocean protection a priority for their two year term. Drilling Oil
the meeting. As explained by Khan, were pleased to see
extraction is one of the most contentious Arctic issues. Canada was criticized for its support for Arctic oil
exploration leading Khan to say, during Canadas chairmanship, the oil industry was given unfettered
access to Arctic leaders through the creation of the Arctic Economic Council. It remains to be seen how
much this will change under American leadership. There
are many promising initiatives that

can be expected from US leadership, however a moratorium on Arctic drilling
is not expected to be one of them. The U.S. is providing oil leases despite the risks associated
with drilling for oil in the Arctic. As quoted by Earth Justice, Dan Ritzman, Alaska Program Director for
Sierra Clubs Our Wild America Campaign, warns against drilling in the Arctic: Americas Arctic Ocean is
the last place we should be drilling for oil. The risks to wildlife, to subsistence communities, and to the
climate are clear. Equally clear is the need for the U.S. to take a leadership role on climate, especially as it
takes over the Arctic Council next year. Real progress on climate requires the administration begin leaving
dirty fuels in the ground, starting with the Arctic Ocean. As Thompson explained in her letter to Papp,
Protecting the Arctic from oil drilling goes hand in hand with protecting the world from the worst impacts
of climate change. A number of celebrities are among those who support Greenpeaces call for an Arctic
Sanctuary, which would see the Arctic Ocean protected from oil drilling, industrial fishing and military
activity. With so many nations vying for access to Arctic resources, creating a Sanctuary may be the best
way to protect the region and preempt potential conflicts in the region. Need for cooperation While
cooperation is necessary, it has not been forthcoming under Canadas leadership of the Council. Political
concerns expressed by Canada over events in the Ukraine have resulted in the cancellation of some events
and Russias Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov boycotted the Iqaluit summit. Russia has even allowed a barge
filled with oil to drift across the Arctic Ocean. It is now frozen in the ice about 80 kilometres off Russias
northeast coast and it threatens the summer habitat of Pacific walrus. Unlike Canada, the U.S. understands
the importance of ongoing cooperation with Russia despite the situation in the Ukraine. The
Obama
administration has been very clear that Arctic co-operation must continue,
said Michael Byers, international affairs professor at the University of British Columbia, that the
issues of climate change in the Arctic are simply too important to be caught
up in the tensions in Ukraine and eastern Europe , Byers said. The Finnish foreign
minister Erkki Tuomioja, said, Its in no ones interest to let problems elsewhere impact cooperation in the
Arctic. Hope The future of the Arctic looks far better under U.S. leadership and it may even increase the
prospects of securing a global climate agreement. It is hoped that the world will come together to sign a
global emissions agreement at the forthcoming climate talks planned for Paris at the end of the year. The
Obama administration has expressed hope that the changes observed in the Arctic will add urgency to the
American leadership of the Council may help to lay the

foundation for an agreement in Paris. Secretary Kerry has indicated that he plans to use U.S.
Paris proceedings.
leadership of the Council to highlight the connection between melting ice in the Arctic and environmental
effects around the globe. The Arctic is important to all of us, and this is an opportune time for the U.S. to
take the reigns from Canada. The
fact that America is now at the head of the Council

bodes well for global efforts to address climate change and other
environmental issues.
AT: Russia Sanctions CP
Sanctions fail
Sanctions destroyed the Russian economy --- its
approaching the brink
Wang 15 --- School of Government, Beijing Normal University, China (Impact of Western
Sanctions on Russia in the Ukraine Crisis , Wan Wang, February 17, 2015, Journal of Politics
and Law Volume 8 Number 2)//chiragjain
The domestic impacts on Russia can be divided into the

following three aspects: 4.1.1 The Sanctions against Russia Have Caused a Significant
Impact on Russias Economy Under the sanctions, from early 2014 to the present, the rubledollar exchange rate has fallen by nearly 50 %; on December 16, the rate plummeted 20
4.1 Domestic Influences
% in just one day. Russias domestic inflation rate has been as high as 11.4 %. Devaluation of the ruble
against the dollar has been largely caused by falling oil prices. Russia's oil and gas-related revenue
accounts for approximately 50 % of revenues. The US and European countries specifically targeted
Russias heavy revenue dependence on oil and gas exports and focused their sanctions on the oil industry .
The international price of oil price has dropped from to $ 115/barrel in 2014
to the current price of approximately $ 50/barre l; oil prices plunged precipitously this
past December, severely impacting Russias heavy reliance on oil exports. Russia's foreign exchange
In 2014, Russia's capital outflow reached nearly

$ 130 billion; the Bank of Russia predicted that the capital outflow in 2015 would be
approximately $ 120 billion (Expert Onlin, 2014 December 11). Because the sanctions against
Russias energy, finance and defence sectors have caused tremendous capital
outflows and plummeting foreign exchange reserves , the Russian economy has
been gravely affected; in October 2014, the international credit rating agency Moody lowered
reserves have decreased to $ 416 billion.
Russia's sovereign credit rating from Baa1 to Baa2. Since 2011, Russia's annual gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate has shown a downturn. Under the impact of the sanctions, Russias GDP growth in 2014
was not very optimistic at all, being merely 0.2 % according to the estimate by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), 0.5 % according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and
0 according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Russian experts have
estimated the losses caused by the sanctions at approximately $4-5 billion per year (Inozemtsev, 2014,
December 1). Economic officials believe that the long-term severe sanctions may shake the financial
system and limit scientific and technological modernization due to the restrictions in technology
introduction, investment and application (Yurgens, 2014, October 9).
AT: Icebreakers CP
2ac No S Anything
Icebreakers cant break the ice
Hodges, 10/2/15 (Phillip, Last Resistance, Study: Arctic Sea Ice Too Thick
for Icebreakers, http://lastresistance.com/study-arctic-sea-ice-too-thick-foricebreakers/, //VZ)
Global warming alarmists like to talk mostly about sea ice extent and how its rapidly declining. They fear that as sea ice recedes, that all the melted ice will cover coastal cities and islands. But
what
they conveniently leave out of their discussion is sea ice thickness

Ice might recede, but it can also grow in thickness at the same time.
ice thickness is the most important criterion. If the ice is
extensive but thin, icebreaker ships wont have any trouble getting through.
But even if the ice is receding, it can be nearly impossible for ships to
make their way through the ice if its too thick. We saw this not too
long ago when a team of scientists got stuck in Antarctic sea ice during their
expedition to document the melting ice caps.
.
In terms of gauging how
severe the conditions are for sea travel,
They were stuck there for nine days before they were finally airlifted to safety.
Three other icebreaker ships had tried rescuing them, but they
all
got stuck in the ice. A recent study is showing that ice conditions in the
Arctic are still too dangerous, even for icebreaker ships.
Scientists
found that even in todays climate, ice conditions must still be
considered severe. Scientists with York University carried out
electromagnetic ice thickness surveys during April and May in 2011 and 2015
to measure the thickness of sea ice over the Northwest Passage
The Daily Caller reported:
a system of gulfs, straits, sounds,
and channels in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago connecting the Beaufort Sea in the west with Baffin Bay in the east, according to researchers. These show modal thicknesses between 1.8 and 2.0 m in all regions.
Mean thicknesses over 3m and thick, deformed ice were observed over some multi-year ice regimes shown to originate from the Arctic Ocean, according to the study published by the American Geophysical Union.
Thick ice features more than 100m wide and thicker than 4m occurred
frequently, reads the study.
Results indicate that even in todays climate, ice conditions must still be considered severe. While the study was conducted in late
winter, researchers say their results have major implications for potential shipping lanes during the summertime. Winter ice conditions influence spring ice melt, especially for thick sea ice, and change how
This is the first-ever such survey in the Northwest Passage,

and we were surprised to find this much thick ice in the region
scientists model Arctic summer ice breakup.
in late winter, despite the fact that there
is more and more open water in recent years during late summer, lead researcher Christian Haas said in a statement. This points to the importance of ice transport from the high Arctic and melt processes during
the spring season, which critically depend on weather conditions and how they affect the melting of thick ice, Haas said. Interestingly enough, part of his data comes from late winter 2015 which was marked by
rapid sea ice melt. It was the second lowest April ice extent in the satellite record, according to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). Low April sea ice extent was followed by sea ice extent that was at
sea ice extent is only part of the story. What also

matters in terms of Arctic navigability is sea ice thickness
ice thickness is the most important sea ice property required to assess
hazard potential and to initialize predictions of ice breakup, deformation, and
melt.
daily record low levels during May. But as Haas study shows,
. Haas notes in his study that [a]part from ice coverage
and ice type,
2ac No S Delay
Takes at least 10 years to build 1 icebreaker
Judson 15 --- holds a master of science degree in print Journalism from Boston University and a
bachelor of arts degree in history from Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio, a defense reporter for POLITICO
Pro (Jen, 9/1/15, The icebreaker gap, http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/09/the-icebreaker-gap000213)//ernst
The Department of Homeland Security issued a mission statement in 2013 specifically citing the need for
polar icebreakers. The agency determined the Coast Guard needs three heavy icebreakers capable of
breaking through up to 21 feet of ice and three medium icebreakers, which can tackle eight feet of ice, in
order to meet U.S. icebreaking capability. Today, it has one heavy and one light. The heavy ship is the Polar
Star which only has about six to eight more years of service life left cant take on missions in the
Arctic, according to Zukunft, because its fully committed for five years to liberating Antarcticas McMurdo
Sound for the National Science Foundation from November to April, then returns for maintenance from May
to October. The ships require thick steel, reinforced hulls and enormous horsepower to ram through ice.
Icebreakers also have special onboard tanks and pumps that shift water from one side of the boat, rocking
The Coast Guards total budget request for fiscal 2016

is $9.96 billion; a single icebreaker would eat a tenth of the budget. Some would
it to break the surrounding ice.
like to see the other beneficiaries of icebreakers, like the Navy or the National Science Foundation, help to
fund them. The Healy, Papp noted, was paid for using entirely Navy funding. Zukunft said in order to get
funding for icebreakers outside of the Coast Guard budget, the vessels would need to be seen as national
assetsin the same light as aircraft carriers and nuclear ballistic submarines. At the end of the day it
really is a national asset, where its not just Coast Guard, its the National Science Foundation, the Arctic
Research Council, the Department of the Interior, Transportation, Defense Department, Commerce, a
number of others, that have equities in heavy icebreakers, he said. Alaskan senator Lisa Murkowski, whos
led the charge for new icebreakers for years, wants to see the Navy and Coast Guard partner to fund the
ships. Do you know how many naval ships we are building? A lot, she said. Do you know how many
But even if funding to build new icebreakers came

tomorrow, it would still take too long to build one ship, analysts say. Current
law requires Coast Guard vessels to be constructed in U.S. shipyards unless
the President determines theres an overriding national-security interest to
build a ship outside of the U.S. Lockheed Shipbuilding of Seattle, Washington,
which built the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, is closed. So is Avondale
Industries outside of New Orleans, which built the Healy. One privately owned
icebreaker, leased to Shell, was built by a pair of domestic shipbuilders. But
the domestic industry is kind of thin, Uljua said. He estimated that building a new vessel
stateside would take at least 10 years, and crafting a design alone could take
several years. Another option would be leasing a ship, though according to Uljua, there are no
heavy icebreakers available to lease; one would have to be built.
icebreakers we are building? None.
It still takes a decade

Hunter 6/8/16 --- a Marine Corps veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Duncan, a Marine
Corps veteran of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,,
http://www.navytimes.com/story/opinion/2016/06/08/us-navy-and-coast-guard-need-more-icebreakersnow/85603456/)//ernst
a single icebreaker will still take approximately 10 years

from start to finish. That does nothing to close the gap in capability that has
been created. So what to do in the meantime? The options are limited to refurbishing
existing ships or entering into leases, both of which must be examined and factored into the
Even with full funding,
overall cost of operating in the Arctic. Even so, this must not distract from the pressing objective of
completing a vessel as speedily and efficiently as possible. Another opportunity is presented to not limit
The Senate was right to prioritize icebreaker

production with a $1 billion allocation, but with that funding within reach, why limit ourselves
icebreaker acquisition to one ship.
to one? With that funding, Congress can consider buying a single ship, as the Senate has, or reallocate
available funding for two ships that can be acquired as part of a block buy a more optimal scenario that
better reflects U.S. interests. Beyond this, theres an opportunity to build in the upfront cost of combined
materials for two ships while production commences on the first helping to maximize savings. Ron
ORourke, a Congressional Research Service specialist in this area, has stated that a block buy would
reduce overall costs by 5 percent amounting to $100 million in savings for a two-ship acquisition. There
are even additional cost savings available to the Navy at the margins, depending on which shipyard might
receive the contract for production.
SQ S
Squo solves push for icebreakers now
Smith 16 --- analyst for the Motley Fool (Rich, 1/24/16, Coast Guard Could Double Its
Icebreaker Fleet -- Then Double It Again,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/01/24/coast-guard-could-double-its-icebreakerfleet-then.aspx)//ernst
This is why the new push to get new icebreakers built quickly is so important .
In September, the
President committed to getting at least one new heavy icebreaker built by
2020 -- in five years, not 10. Reportedly, the Coast Guard will request significant
funding for this effort, and perhaps for building the second icebreaker -- as early
as in the 2017 budget. Who will get the loot? Until the Coast Guard issues its official request for proposals,
it's difficult to say for certain. But as we outlined back in September, three big defense contractors seem
best positioned to bid for the icebreaker contracts -- and the $2 billion in revenues that would come with
them: Lockheed Martin (NYSE:LMT), which built the Polar Star, Huntington Ingalls, which built the Healy,
and General Dynamics (NYSE:GD). Of these, General Dynamics may not be not an icebreaker specialist per
se, but it's apparently a favored contractor with the Coast Guard, which recently named General Dynamics
a finalist in its competition to build a new fleet of Offshore Patrol Cutters for the service. Lockheed Martin
and Huntington Ingalls, meanwhile, will need to convince the Coast Guard that, even though they've closed
down the shipyards that actually built the Polar Star and Healy, they still possess the institutional
knowledge to do a good job building new boats.
T/ Warming
Icebreakers make warming worse decrease ice coverage,
increase commercial activity, and open up avenues for
more resource exploitation
1NC Arctic Energy Center 6/22/16 --- Arctic Energy Center subset of
the American Energy Care organization (NEED FOR U.S. ICEBREAKERS AND
ARCTIC INFRASTRUCTURE MORE URGENT THAN EVER, Arctic Energy Center,
June 22, 2016, http://arcticenergycenter.com/need-for-u-s-icebreakers-andarctic-infrastructure-more-urgent-than-ever/)//VZ
Icebreakers are integral to the success of U.S. operations in the Arctic. In order to safely conduct shipping, military, and exploration activities, we need icebreakers to
navigate Americas Arctic waters throughout the year. Unfortunately, there exists a misconception that because there is less ice today in the Arctic than in previous years,
the need for icebreakers has decreased. This is not the case, and the U.S. will continue to fall behind in the Arctic if we chose to believe this fallacy. A recent paper from the
Congressional Research Service clarifies why less ice does not mean fewer icebreakers: Even with the diminishment of polar ice, there are still significant ice-covered
Diminishment of polar ice could lead in coming years to

increased commercial ship, cruise ship, and naval surface ship
operations, as well as increased exploration for oil and other
resources, in the Arcticactivities that could require increased levels of support from polar icebreakers. A 2015 Politico article also
areas in the polar regions.
reiterated this point saying: As northern waters become more accessible, far more ship traffic will be at risk, and their shifting climate conditions make it more likely seas
will freeze unpredictably. Not only will the need for icebreakers continue, but there is a large possibility that we will see an even greater need for these vessels with less
This decrease in ice could lead to a jump in Arctic commercial

activity, which would require icebreakers to ensure transit safety throughout the region. The United States is known for its military and economic prowess, but
ice.
when it comes to icebreakers we are far from leading the pack. According to the Congressional Research Service, only two of Americas three icebreakers are operating at
full capacity, and new Arctic activity could require the use of 6 more icebreakers. As the CRS notes, its time policy makers get moving on budget items for these vital
ships: The current condition of the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet, the DHS MNS, and concerns among some observers about whether the United States is adequately
investing in capabilities to carry out its responsibilities and defend its interests in the Arctic, have focused policymaker attention on the question of whether and when to
acquire one or more new heavy polar icebreakers. Our neighbors around the globe seem to better understand the need for these polar vessels than our lawmakers do.
Russia has over three dozen icebreakers in its massive naval fleet. And just last week, the Russian government unveiled the Arktika, the worlds largest, most powerful
icebreaker, in St. Petersburg. The Arktika provides an excellent example of the positive infrastructure advancements that can occur from long-term planning. In addition to
the icebreaker, Russia is now also constructing new bases and ports in the Arctic region, and updating its ships that are already in use. These projects all encourage
additional investment in the region, benefiting the local towns, while also bringing jobs and tax dollars to the citizens and communities of the region. Meanwhile, funding
for a new US icebreaker is currently tied up in Congress, and it doesnt appear that progress is going to take place anytime soon. Last week, during a hearing hosted by the
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Admiral Charles Michel, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated that America will have limited
icebreaking capabilities until at least 2025. The U.S. is ill prepared for the increased activity in the Arctic that is expected to occur in the coming years. The icebreaker
conversation is gradually beginning to gain traction, due to the recent CRS Arctic paper, congressional hearings spearheaded by Chairwoman Murkowski and others, and
news of Russias steady stream of Arctic infrastructure advances. But unfortunately, we dont have time for a protracted conversation when it comes to icebreaker
construction. In order to adequately plan for our nations Arctic future, we need Arctic investment now.
T/ Great Lakes
Counterplan trades off with Great Lakes icebreakers key
to trade
Spangler 15 --- metro and politics analyst for Detroit Free Press (Todd, 9/15/15, Call for Arctic
icebreakers could hurt Great Lakes, http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/01/callarctic-icebreakers-could-hurt-great-lakes/71507384/)//ernst
WASHINGTON President Barack Obama's call for Congress to speed up funding for increasing the
polar icebreakers could be bad news for efforts to get a new

heavy-duty icebreaker for the Great Lakes. Even though a Lakes icebreaker would likely
nation's fleet of
cost far less about $200 million compared with the $1 billion or more which could be spent on an
icebreaker to be used in Arctic waters, the funding needed to shore up the nation's polar fleet could hurt
chances for finding additional money for icebreakers elsewhere. The Free Press reported last month on
efforts by shipping companies on the Lakes and the businesses they serve, as well as members of
Michigan's congressional delegation, to secure support for a new Lakes icebreaker after two winters of
near-record ice cover and how competing interests including a new polar icebreaker could complicate
its chances. DETROIT FREE PRESS A new icebreaker for the Great Lakes? It's far from certain On a visit to
Alaska, Obama said Monday that he would propose accelerating acquisition of a new polar icebreaker by
two years, to 2020; begin planning for construction of additional icebreakers, and ask Congress to
authorize enough funding to pay for them. A White House fact sheet, accompanying the president's
remarks, said the U.S. fleet of heavy polar icebreakers is effectively down to two, compared with Russia,
which has 40 icebreakers and another 11 planned or under construction as climate change reduces ice
cover in the Arctic and opens up areas for commerce. DETROIT FREE PRESS Shippers: L ast
year's
Great Lakes freeze cost $705 million "The growth of human activity in the
Arctic region will require highly engaged stewardship to maintain the open
seas necessary for global commerce and scientific research, allow for search
and rescue activities, and provide for regional peace and stability, " the White
House said in a statement. "Accordingly, meeting these challenges requires the United
States to develop and maintain capacity for year-round access to greater
expanses within polar regions." Glen Nekvasil, vice president of the Lake Carriers Association, a
trade group representing Great Lakes shipping companies, said while ice breaking capacity in
the polar region is needed, that doesn't lessen the need in the Lakes, where
the Coast Guard has seven smaller icebreakers most of them more than 30
years old and unsuited for breaking thick ice and only one heavy
icebreaker, the 240-foot Mackinaw. It is important that we have adequate ice-breaking resources
wherever they are needed, and that includes the Great Lakes," said Nekvasil. "The past two winters have
been near Arctic (conditions) and cargo movement has slowed to a trickle. Building arctic icebreakers
should in no way minimize the need for or delay going forward on another heavy icebreaker for the Lakes.
AT: Geoengineering
Geoengineering Fails
Geoengineering CPs carry too much risk and too little
research on actual implementation
Keith 16 David Keith is professor of applied physics in Harvards School of
Engineering and Applied Sciences and professor of public policy in the
Harvard Kennedy School Why We Should Research Solar Geoengineering
Now,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/solar_geoengi
neering_is_not_a_quick_fix.html //Deej
Despite this promise, there is little organized research on solar
geoengineering. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences highlighted the
potential of solar geoengineering in 1982. It delved deeper in 1990 and again
in January 2015, when it recommended a broad research program and
suggested that small-scale outdoor experiments could yield valuable
knowledge. Yet there is still no U.S. government research program. There are
now research programs in China and a handful in Europe, but they focus on
social sciencegovernance, risk, and ethics. These are important questions,
but none are focused on ways to improve the technologys efficacy or reduce
its risk. The worldwide effort on finding better, safer ways to do solar
geoengineering probably amounts to fewer than the equivalent of five fulltime people. The overriding concern has been that even talking about solar
geoengineering will raise the prospect of a quick fix, impeding efforts to cut
emissions. I believe this fear has led many scientists to systematically
understate the potential efficacy of solar geoengineering because of political
concerns about its potential misuse. To be clear, this is a real problem that
should not be underestimated. But in a democracy, it should not be the
scientific elite that decides policy. The job assigned to scientists is to explain
the facts as best as they know them and to (separately) explain their views
about ethics and politics. The ethical case for restricting research on solar
geoengineering because of its potential misuse is at best ambiguous. First,
the question of how people and governments react to a risky Band-Aid
technology is an empirical matter. Good theories point in both directions. Its
largely a matter of how solar geoengineering is discussed, not whether. There
are plenty of ways that solar geoengineering could help lubricate rather than
frustrate emissions cuts. Second, the people most likely to benefit from its
use are mostly among the worlds most vulnerable or are yet to be born. We
need to develop institutions that enable democratic debates on the use of
these technologies not to close this debate down prematurely. Perhaps I have
convinced a few of you that we should go out and do solar geoengineering. If
so, I owe you an apology. It would be irresponsiblemaybe crazyto just
start now, even in conjunction with significant emissions reductions. Yes,
there are hundreds of scientific papers, but most simply apply climate models
to simplistic scenarios for injecting sulfates into the stratosphere. There is no
serious plan for implementation, no adequate plan for monitoring. The world
lacks even a rough agreement about how to make decisions about how much
geoengineering to do. There is no focused effort to develop betterlower-risk
technologies, nor is there a focused effort to build a deep technical critique
of the ways that the implementation planthe one with dont havecould go
wrong.
AT: Green Finance CP
2ac Top
Perm do the CP the plan resolves the US-China collab
that is outlined as per the Hart and Ogden
recommendation means its normal means
CP text flaw there are no green finance policies
outlined in the Hart and Ogden card just a
recommendation to devise a common definition for green
finance
Also CP doesnt solve the Hart and Ogden card is
premised on both China and the US redefining and
collaborating over climate coop the CP only mandates
the USFG
2ac GF Fails Externalities

Green finance fails externalities
Zhu et al 15, (Shouqing, World Resources Institute, Non-profit
organization supporting research, conferences, education, training, and policy
initiatives for environmental stewardship and sustainable development;
resources available online include essays, research reports, and powerpoint
presentations, Will China Lead the Way on Green Finance?,
http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/07/will-china-lead-way-green-finance,
7/17/15, //VZ)
Why Is Green Finance Lacking?
Chinas current green investment shortage is
not due to lack of funds: there are enormous sums of money available in the private sector.
According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, funds managed by Chinese and foreign institutional investors in China exceeded RMB 1 trillion ($163 billion)
earlier this year. China enjoys the worlds highest domestic savings rate. And the recent establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS
Development Bank and the Silk Road Fund are indications of Chinas eagerness to find new avenues for its surplus capital, as dwindling prospects at home drive
investors abroad in search of higher returns. The fundamental problem with

attracting investment towards green sectors like renewable energy and
energy efficiency is distorted price signals. The current system fails to take
externalities into account. For example, products such as fuel cell electric
vehicles make a positive contribution to the environment, but these benefits
are not factored into their prices. Conversely, environmental damage from
fossil fuel burning or a chemical plant is not accounted for either.
2ac GF Fails General

Green finance fails
House of Commons 14
--- (Green Fiance, 2/2/6/14,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenvaud/191/191.pdf)//ernst
Even if the investment climate can be improved, there remain questions

about whether finance would be forthcoming for required investments. In
particular, large amounts of finance are required, while balance sheet strength of energy companies
may be limited, and appetite of banks and institutional investors for project
finance is unclear. ... In the absence of finance backed by balance sheets, investment might proceed using project finance
where debt is secured against future project cash flows. However, appetite from banks and institutional investors to provide project
finance during the early stages of projects where risks are high is unclear, and
likely to be even harder to

secure until new market arrangements are proven . ... The risk is that finance
becomes a binding constraint on the level of investment in low-carbon
technologies.32
Green finance marginalizes the people who need it most +

cp fails
Parnell 13 --- a climate analyst (John, 4/4/13, Climate finance could fail those most at risk
report, http://www.climatechangenews.com/2013/04/04/climate-finance-could-fail-those-most-atrisk/)//ernst
Thats the warning from a number of NGOs ahead of a donor government meeting on climate finance next
week. Observers fear a preference for private rather than public funding could skew investment away from
projects to help countries feeling the effects of climate change. And a report from NGO Tearfund this week
says private sector interest in helping countries to cope with changing climatic patterns is minimal,
warning that the emerging climate aid regime could leave a gap in funding for adaptation projects. The UShosted climate finance conference is scheduled to start next week, and is set to focus heavily on
leveraging private flows of capital. Investors are typically keener on more bankable projects to reduce
greenhouse gases, rather than those coping with the aftermath. Karen Orenstein, international policy
campaigner with Friends of the Earth US puts it more bluntly: Many
areas in need of funding,

especially adaptation efforts in the poorest countries, simply will not turn a
profit. Projects to reduce emissions through renewables and energy efficiency programmes can
generate tangible returns from fuel savings, carbon credits and offsetting schemes. This has made
them the focus for private sector investment. But as Tearfunds report observes, these
returns are less obvious for projects to protect against coastal erosion for example, where the benefits
might be longer term such as avoided infrastructure investment, protection of livelihoods and biodiversity.
Evidence for private sector engagement with adaptation is minimal, and what little there is indicates a
number of problems in relying on private finance to deliver adaptation for the poorest communities, says
the Private Gain, Public Interest report. Terraced fields in Bhutan. Agriculture is an important focus for
climate adaptation efforts (Photo: Curt Carnemark/World Bank) A State Department spokesperson told
RTCC they were confident that next weeks meeting could break new ground on what is a difficult issue.
This meeting will bring together for the first time countries that made a commitment to mobilizing
long term finance to promote cleaner, sustainable growth and climate resilience globally, they said.
Developing
countries are key actors in climate finance and we will continue

to work together to implement our international commitments , they added. The
private sector is also more interested in middle income economies where
there are larger emissions to be mitigated and a safer investment
environment. Tearfund warns this could further marginalise the countries most in need. A report by
the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) found that 99% of a sample of climate finance was used for
mitigation and 84% went to middle-income countries. This imbalance is not helped by the guest list at next
weeks meeting says the WWF. Only developed countries are invited. This would be acceptable if they
were talking about how to share the responsibility for dividing up their commitment to mobilize the $100bn
for the Green Climate Fund, but clearly thats not what they are doing, Mark Lutes, policy coordinator,
They are talking about ways to

mobilize private finance in developing countries, without any developing
countries at the table, said Lutes. It is hard to see how this meeting will do
anything but breed cynicism about the willingness of developed countries to
deliver on their financing commitments, he added. The leaked agenda of next weeks
climate finance meeting in Washington reveals that it is dominated by private sector
issues. The document includes just one mention of adaptation. The word private features 16 times.
Green Climate Fund The UNs main climate finance tool, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is
currently under development with arguments brewing over how much private
sector investment should be encouraged. The GCF aims to raise $100bn annually by 2020
WWF Global Climate and Energy Initiative told RTCC.
to help reduce emissions and fund projects to defend against the impacts of climate change. The UK
government has vocally backed as much private sector involvement as possible claiming that this is
essential given the spending constraints placed on many donor governments. The
private sector
will be more interested in investing in emerging markets and middle income
countries than they are in the least developed countries, Steve Herz of the Sierra
Club told RTCC after the GCFs latest meeting in Berlin last month. On the mitigation side thats not such a
problem because thats where the emissions are [in the emerging markets]. T he
bigger problem is
on the adaptation side where the poorest countries are in the worst position
to respond, he said. Loss and damage In the absence of adequate support to defend against the
impacts of climate change, many nations, including the low lying islands, have turned their attention to a
loss and damage mechanism. Put simply, this would provide compensation to those hit by climate change,
although the word compensation was surgically removed from the negotiating text at the international
climate negotiations last year. Its not just about getting money out of developed countries. Mitigation has
failed, adaptation is limited and thats what leads to loss and damage, Harjeet Singh from ActionAid told
RTCC at the talks in Doha, where the concept of loss and damage rose to prominence. Lets create a
mechanism to decide how we will deal with that. The draft text is a step in the right direction, even if it is
not quite as strong as we would like it to be, added Singh. World Bank President Jim Yong Kim told an
audience of students yesterday that dealing with climate change would be key to meeting the
organisations new goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030. He firmly believes there is an important role
for private investment. I was once asked by some high school students what opinion I had changed my
mind on in the last 20 years and I told them without hesitation, the importance of the private sector, Kim
said. The World Bank has been criticised for its record on climate change in the past, in particular for its
funding of fossil fuel projects. In 2010 it gave a $3.75bn loan to South African utility Eskom to build a coalfired power plant.

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DONT CALL IT A COMEBACK

successful, ambitious outcome at the international climate negotiations in

US-China warming cooperation is try or die for human

Two internal links

through the region has increased. Russia, in particular, is keen to expand

Arctic cooperation is vital its the epicenter of glacier

**B US-China Cooperation**

The plan revives US-China cooperation by spurring highlyvisible, lasting changes

US-China cooperation is key theyre the two largest

energy sector might not be sufficient to sustain Sino-US climate change

Acting now is key to reviving US-China Arctic cooperation

presence more visible on every continent including Antarctica, is there room

US-China climate cooperation facilitates mitigation and

Expert consensus that warming is real and existential

Arctic environmental cooperation spills over to boost

conflicts and a race of natural resources, as mentioned earlier. It was much

The plans signal drives cooperation the US has a narrow

Pursuing Chinese full member status in exchange for

Independently, successful management of proxy conflicts

pathway would be evidenced by the emergence of a global security agenda

Institutionalized cooperative norms check conflict

calls political friendship among peoples. The axiomatic practice of

the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because

This summer is the trial of the century American pushes

State to continue negotiations when it concludes that the possibility of a

Giving China a diplomatic off-ramp to settle Law of the

The plan is the perfect bargain to persuade China to

rejection of certain provisions in dispute resolution clauses.68 Offering full

High Arctic Stability is on the brink our impact is reverse

current low-military tension we might have growing political tension in the

ground and a workshop to examine and test soft ways of governance

Expert consensus that warming is real and existential

determine the value of a reduction in preventing a possible future

US-Russia nuclear war would end all life on Earth in half

interview with Sophie Shevardnadze, RT.com, 3/14/16,

Diseases can cause extinction without killing the host

Independently, successful management of proxy conflicts

talking shops, formal and informal ("multilateralism light"). A dual system of

1acSouth China Sea

War is increasingly likely quick diplomatic dialogue is

giving a verdict on the status of your property? Another presenter said:

The SCS is the worlds most dangerous hotspot regional

risk of accidents or small conflicts leading to dangerous escalations

All hell will break loose several scenarios for escalation

seizing islands by force, and building military garrisons on them, which is

South China Sea conflict goes nuclear and is existential

Brief: Getting US-China Relations Right, The Diplomat, -us-china-relationsright/ --br

China says yeseven thought they wont abide now they

The Arctic is the best venue to solve SCS conflict but

Were at a turning point even if China says no, initiating

The South China Sea has instantly become uncharted waters

If talks dont happen, or go nowhere

China has been building

But U.S. warships sailing in or near the South China

both China and the

AT: Say No (Arctic Council)

It also lobbied to create a permanent AC

The foundation of the

Arctic Council says yes studies prove

the full-fledged process of institutional maturation that the Council had

If there is a degree of polar Orientalism in popular narratives of

regarded as ordinary observers is therefore more

China and others are now

B US-China Cooperation