TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 1

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115024. February 7, 1996]
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996]
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a
vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The
facts found by the trial court are succinctly summarized by
the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for
serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00
in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No.
FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home
at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along
Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading
towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars
condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away,
put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side
of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will
help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and
registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial,
Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendants car. Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle
of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the
rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical
Memorial Center where she was found to have a traumatic
amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee). She was
confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the
hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and the cost of the
artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the
car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses
amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of
expected earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on
his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was
raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic
was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner
portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction
of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the
vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights.
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to
avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was midnight
blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device,

and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense

that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it
was then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the
right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He
confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness that after being
bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit
another
car
parked
on
the
sidewalk.
Defendants
counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was
reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiffs car was
near the sidewalk; this witness did not remember whether the
hazard lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice if
there was an early warning device; there was a street light at
the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters
away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen (p. 16,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that
after plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendants car came approaching very fast ten
meters from the scene; the car was zigzagging. The rear left
side of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendants car; as a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved
to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff
was thrown to the windshield of defendants car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that
defendant was under the influence of liquor as he could smell
it very well (pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions
and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and
liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The
trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Lis
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to
Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly and severally
pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits
because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga
restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24,
1990; (b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the
plaintiff in her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month,
for unrealized profits in plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from
July, 1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs.
Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as
depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties cars,
appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed
an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that
there was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial
courts finding that the plaintiffs car was properly parked at
the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by
defendants car.[1] Dismissing the defendants argument that
the plaintiffs car was improperly parked, almost at the center

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 2

of the road, the respondent court noted that evidence which
was supposed to prove that the car was at or near center of
the right lane was never presented during the trial of the
case.[2] The respondent court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Lis testimony that he was driving at a safe speed
of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was
in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that
he was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard
after A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990
when his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to
the plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk
compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li approaching
very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene; defendants
car was zigzagging, although there were no holes and hazards
on the street, and bumped the leg of the plaintiff who was
thrown against the windshield of defendants car, causing its
destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was
pulled out from under defendants car and was able to say
hurting words to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter
was under the influence of liquor, because he could smell it
very well (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that
plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970s, but did
not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable
for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals,
in its decision, however, absolved the Lis employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner Lourdes
Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to
P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary damages, the
respondent court allowed an award of P50,000.00 for the
same, in addition to costs, attorneys fees and the other
damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the
defendants counterclaims.[3]
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent courts
decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be
held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the
accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuelas own negligence.
Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela assails the respondent courts decision insofar as it
absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the
owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces
the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the
trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are hereby
consolidated. It is plainly evident that the petition for review
in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of law.
What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the
Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early
morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of
fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[5]
In the first place, Valenzuelas version of the incident was fully
corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio Rodriguez,
the owner-operator of an establishment located just across
the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that he
observed a car being driven at a very fast speed, racing
towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.[6] Rodriguez
further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of

the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her
against the windshield of the defendants Mitsubishi Lancer,
from where she eventually fell under the defendants car.
Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street,
noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted
from the offending vehicle in order to survey the incident.[7]
Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he observed
Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk,[8]
contrary to Lis allegation that Valenzuelas car was close to the
center of the right lane. We agree that as between Lis selfserving asseverations and the observations of a witness who
did not even know the accident victim personally and who
immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his
testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident,
the latters testimony deserves greater weight. As the court
emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination
of the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial
courts reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating
defendants assertion that he was driving at a safe speed.
While Rodriguez drives only a motorcycle, his perception of
speed is not necessarily impaired. He was subjected to crossexamination and no attempt was made to question his
competence or the accuracy of his statement that defendant
was driving very fast. This was the same statement he gave
to the police investigator after the incident, as told to a
newspaper report (Exh. P). We see no compelling basis for
disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez testimony are not
borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez
testified that the scene of the accident was across the street
where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away
(pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment.
The ownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is not
material; the business is registered in the name of his mother,
but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn.,
June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side of
Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired
(p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc.
Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that
there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has
stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the
accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was
consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it was no longer
raining when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April
29, 1991). It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining
all the way in an attempt to explain why he was travelling at
only 50-55 kph. (p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to the
testimony of Pfc. Ramos that it was raining, he arrived at the
scene only in response to a telephone call after the accident
had transpired (pp. 9-10, tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no
substantial inconsistencies in Rodriguezs testimony that would
impair the essential integrity of his testimony or reflect on his
honesty. We are compelled to affirm the trial courts
acceptance of the testimony of said eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we
note that Lis testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the
accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any
and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuelas
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up
by other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the
course of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a
speed of 55 kph. when out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiffs car. He

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 3

alleged that upon seeing this sudden apparition he put on his
brakes to no avail as the road was slippery.[9]

Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is a no

parking zone.

One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to

Lis disingenuous and patently self-serving asseverations. The
average motorist alert to road conditions will have no
difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed
claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street,
and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample
time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were
alert - as every driver should be - to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
fight or flight[10] mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.[11] Lis failure to react in a manner which
would have avoided the accident could therefore have been
only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was
driving at a very fast speed as testified by Rodriquez; and 2)
that he was under the influence of alcohol.[12] Either factor
working
independently
would
have
diminished
his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would
have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuelas car, rather
than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
brakes. As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by
respondent court):

We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not

guilty of contributory negligence.

Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan

Police immediately after the incident, he said that while
driving along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark
maroon lancer right in front of him, which was plaintiffs car,
indicating, again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very
fast, oblivious of his surroundings and the road ahead of him,
because if he was not, then he could not have missed noticing
at a still far distance the parked car of the plaintiff at the right
side near the sidewalk which had its emergency lights on,
thereby avoiding forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was
then standing at the left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan Police,
he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in front of
him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery, this
goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was,
indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could
have easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the
bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was
wet and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow,
as he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then,
inspite of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided
hitting the plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more
believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the oncoming car with glaring headlights, from the opposite
direction, in order to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped
the car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right
beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to
swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision
with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a
double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white
paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car
was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the
on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in driving
his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next question for
us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was likewise
guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured

party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection. [14] Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to
petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own
protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an
actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held
up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard
of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by
unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.[15] Under the
emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of
Appeals,[16] an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting
two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc
Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] that the driver
therein, Jose Koh, adopted the best means possible in the
given situation to avoid hitting the children. Using the
emergency rule the court concluded that Koh, in spite of the
fact that he was in the wrong lane when the collision with an
oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of negligence.[19]
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by
the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates
thoughtful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled
by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the
entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark
Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the
emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora
Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle
would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In
the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of
Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a
flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in
danger, she did what was best under the situation. As
narrated by respondent court:
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along
the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.
[20] In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the
investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that
Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the sidewalk.[21]
The sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuelas car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 4

Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the
testimony of witness Rodriguez.[22]
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one
of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park
her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own
making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable
precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable
was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident.
Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which
creates an undue risk of harm to others.[23] It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.[24] We stressed, in Corliss vs. Manila Railroad
Company,[25] that negligence is the want of care required by
the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in
the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly
negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis
that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to
show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing
conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Prosser
and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles
at intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb
may be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street,
and his failure to act properly when they appear may be found
to amount to negligence. [26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation
confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his
own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying liability on the part
of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that
the visit was in connection with official matters. His functions
as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform
work outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company
clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he
came from BF Homes Paraaque he did not have business from
the company (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use ofthe
company car was partly required by the nature of his work,
but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a
benefit, apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to
his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of
his employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the
basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the
relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil.
18). Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence
of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage
must have occurred while an employee was in the actual
performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High
School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an
employers liability for the acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that
this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of

the interests of the employer or for the account of the

employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage
(Filamer Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
212 SCRA 637). An employer is expected to impose upon its
employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and
beneficial to their employer (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial
courts finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the
company to use the company car either officially or socially or
even bring it home, he can be considered as using the
company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion
of his functions. Driving the company car was not among his
functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official
purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks
attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted,
there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their
employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion
of their functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at
the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of
the companys business or its interests, or at least for its
benefit. The imposition of solidary liability against defendant
Alexander Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in
question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that
of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the
employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement
with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
[28] we are of the opinion that Lis employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals[29] upon which respondent court has placed undue
reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teachers
supervision of students during an extracurricular activity.
These cases now fall under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally
encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside
or outside school premises.
Second, the employers primary liability under the concept of
pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176)
of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His
liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of
care in selecting its employees, half of the employers burden
is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however,
depends on the circumstances of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation
to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not
expected to exercise supervision over either the employees
private activities or during the performance of tasks either
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes
of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These company
cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the company

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 5

itself or are subject to various plans through which employees
eventually acquire their vehicles after a given period of
service, or after paying a token amount. Many companies
provide liberal car plans to enable their managerial or other
employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the cost of
vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able to
purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and
maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to
the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned
and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing
vehicles to such employees, are companies totally absolved of
responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide
cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road
worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In
other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the
company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the
employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said
company car for company or private purposes will not be a
threat or menace to himself, the company or to others. When
a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to
its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good
father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees
are given the privilege of using a company-issued car. For
large companies other than those cited in the example of the
preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business
purposes either related to the image of success an entity
intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or
for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial
and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach
clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a company car
serves both purposes. Since important business transactions
and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations
and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the business
and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the companys image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of
a company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he
admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not
require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients.[30] These meetings, clearly, were not
strictly confined to routine hours because, as a managerial
employee tasked with the job of representing his company
with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well
as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by
Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well
as the corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful
entity, increasing the latters goodwill before its clientele. It
also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing
the former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road on the
night of the accident because he was coming from a social
visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare allegation
which was never corroborated in the court below. It was
obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his

officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation

that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other
work related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to
our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not the company
took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car.[31] Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the
accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of damages
awarded by the respondent court, except as to the amount of
moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said
damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the
expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be
commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case
we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages
from an amount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the
Court of Appeals was not justified considering the nature of
the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the
injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela underwent
a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at the
distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this,
Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of
the art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of
hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required
to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to
be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her
lower limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for
example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to
the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in
calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal
women. In other words, the damage done to her would not
only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her
body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All
of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of
the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a
vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however
technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount
of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower
limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant
anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and
physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts
discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord
with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 6

negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning
hours of the accident.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the
court of Appeals is modified with the effect of REINSTATING
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152040

March 31, 2006

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE

L. SUELTO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON,
Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
16739 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-93-42629 and Civil Case No. Q93-16051, where Freddie Suelto was convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in damages to property.
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial
apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The
Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the
owner-operator of a passenger bus with Plate Number NCV849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver
of the bus.2
At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving
the aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). The bus suddenly swerved to the right and
struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by
Valdellon located along Kamuning Road.3 Upon Valdellons
request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior
Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to
inspect the damaged terrace. Pontiveros submitted a report
enumerating and describing the damages:
(1) The front exterior and the right side concrete columns of
the covered terrace were vertically displaced from its original
position causing exposure of the vertical reinforcement.
(2) The beams supporting the roof and parapet walls are
found with cracks on top of the displaced columns.
(3) The 6 CHB walls at [the] right side of the covered terrace
were found with cracks caused by this accident.
(4) The front iron grills and concrete balusters were found
totally damaged and the later [sic] beyond repair.4
He recommended that since the structural members made of
concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 7

demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the
safety and stability of the building."5
Photographs6 of the damaged terrace were taken. Valdellon
commissioned Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. to estimate the cost of
repairs, inclusive of labor and painting, and the latter pegged
the cost at P171,088.46.7
In a letter dated October 19, 1992 addressed to the bus
company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of
P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the
cost of the damage to the terrace.8 The bus company and
Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon
refused.9
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property against Suelto. After the
requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed
with the RTC of Quezon City. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of October 1992, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, being then the driver and/or
person in charge of a Marikina Auto Line bus bearing Plate No.
NVC-849, did then and there unlawfully, and feloniously drive,
manage, and operate the same along Kamias Road, in said
City, in a careless, reckless, negligent, and imprudent manner,
by then and there making the said vehicle run at a speed
greater than was reasonable and proper without taking the
necessary precaution to avoid accident to person/s and
damage to property, and considering the condition of the
traffic at said place at the time, causing as a consequence of
his said carelessness, negligence, imprudence and lack of
precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated
by him to hit and bump, as in fact it hit and bump a
commercial apartment belonging to ERLINDA V. VALDELLON
located at No. 31 Kamias Road, this City, thereby causing
damages to said apartment in the total amount of
P171,088.46, Philippine Currency, to her damage and
prejudice in the total amount aforementioned.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10

During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to

the terrace of her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced
in evidence a receipt for P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993,
issued by the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator for
"carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical [work]."14
Pontiveros of the Office of the City Engineer testified that
there was a need to change the column of the terrace, but
that the building should also be demolished because "if
concrete is destroyed, [one] cannot have it restored to its
original position."15
Engr. Jesus Regal, Jr., the proprietor of the SSP Construction,
declared that he inspected the terrace and estimated the cost
of repairs, including labor, at P171,088.46.
Suelto testified that at 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, he was
driving the bus on its way to Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro
Manila. When he reached the corner of K-H Street at Kamias
Road, Quezon City, a passenger jeepney suddenly crossed
from EDSA going to V. Luna and swerved to the lane occupied
by the bus. Suelto had to swerve the bus to the right upon
which it hit the side front of the terrace of Valdellons two-door
apartment.16 Based on his estimate, the cost to the damage
on the terrace of the apartment amounted to P40,000.00.17
On cross-examination, Suelto declared that he saw the
passenger jeepney when it was a meter away from the bus.
Before then, he had seen some passenger jeepneys on the
right trying to overtake one another.18
Architect Arnulfo Galapate testified that the cost of the repair
of the damaged terrace amounted to P55,000.00.19
On April 28, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment finding
Suelto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, and ordered MALTC and
Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to Valdellon,
by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit. The fallo of the decision
reads:

Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto

and the bus company for damages. She prayed that after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused FREDDIE SUELTO Y LIWAG

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court

to issue a writ of preliminary attachment against the
defendants upon approval of plaintiffs bond, and after trial on
the merits, to render a decision in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay

With respect to the civil liability, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of plaintiff Erlinda Valdellon and against defendant
Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation and accused Freddie
Suelto, where both are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff:

a) the total sum of P171,088.46 constituting the expenses for

the repair of the damaged apartment of plaintiff, with
interests to be charged thereon at the legal rate from the date
of the formal demand until the whole obligation is fully paid;

a. the sum of P150,000.00, as reasonable compensation

sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment;

b) the sum of not less than P20,000.00 each as compensatory

and exemplary damages;

b. the sum of P20,000.00, as compensatory and exemplary

damages;
c. the sum of P20,000.00, as attorneys fees; and,

c) the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the sum of

P1,000.00 for each appearance of plaintiffs counsel; and
costs of suit;

d. the costs of suit.

PLAINTIFF further prays for such other reliefs as may be just

and equitable in the premises.11

MALTC and Suelto, now appellants, appealed the decision to

the CA, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove Sueltos
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They averred that the
prosecution merely relied on Valdellon, who testified only on
the damage caused to the terrace of her apartment which
appellants also alleged was excessive. Appellant Suelto
further alleged that he should be acquitted in the criminal
case for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintained that, in an emergency case,
he was not, in law, negligent. Even if the appellate court

A joint trial of the two cases was ordered by the trial court.12
The trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the damaged
terrace, where defendants offered to have it repaired and
restored to its original state. Valdellon, however, disagreed
because she wanted the building demolished to give way for
the construction of a new one.13

SO ORDERED.20

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 8

affirmed his conviction, the penalty of imprisonment imposed
on him by the trial court is contrary to law.

himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil

Case No. Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial court.

In its Brief for the People of the Philippines, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) submitted that the appealed decision
should be affirmed with modification. On Sueltos claim that
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, the OSG
contended that, applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur, the
prosecution was able to prove that he drove the bus with
negligence and recklessness. The OSG averred that the
prosecution was able to prove that Sueltos act of swerving
the bus to the right was the cause of damage to the terrace of
Valdellons apartment, and in the absence of an explanation
to the contrary, the accident was evidently due to appellants
want of care. Consequently, the OSG posited, the burden was
on the appellant to prove that, in swerving the bus to the
right, he acted on an emergency, and failed to discharge this
burden. However, the OSG averred that the trial court erred in
sentencing appellant to a straight penalty of one year, and
recommended a penalty of fine.

Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right

of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of
private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that
the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the
fault of petitioner Suelto.

On June 20, 2000, the CA rendered judgment affirming the

decision of the trial court, but the award for actual damages
was reduced to P100,000.00. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April
28, 1994, rendered by the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the sum of P150,000.00 as compensation
sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her damaged apartment
be reduced to P100,000.00 without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA
denied the same.22
MALTC and Suelto, now petitioners, filed the instant petition
reiterating its submissions in the CA: (a) the prosecution failed
to prove the crime charged against petitioner Suelto; (b) the
prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that
respondent suffered actual damages in the amount of
P100,000.00; and (c) the trial court erred in sentencing
petitioner Suelto to one (1) year prison term.
On the first issue, petitioners aver that the prosecution was
mandated to prove that petitioner Suelto acted with
recklessness in swerving the bus to the right thereby hitting
the terrace of private respondents apartment. However, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden. On the other hand,
petitioner Suelto was able to prove that he acted in an
emergency when a passenger jeepney coming from EDSA
towards the direction of the bus overtook another vehicle and,
in the process, intruded into the lane of the bus.
On the second issue, petitioners insist that private respondent
was able to prove only the amount of P35,000.00 by way of
actual damages; hence, the award of P100,000.00 is barren of
factual basis.
On the third issue, petitioner Suelto posits that the straight
penalty of imprisonment recommended by the trial court, and
affirmed by the CA, is contrary to Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent
People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with
recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of
private respondents apartment. Although she did not testify
to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto

We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as

ruled by the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners
failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused
by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane
of the bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner
Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he
had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a
passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another
vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden
emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court
of Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the
right side of the road or highway:
SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different
course of action is required in the interest of the safety and
the security of life, person or property, or because of
unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith,
every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn
vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting
persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when
overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and
when turning to the left in going from one highway to another,
every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of
the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a
motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful
and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable
and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the
highway, and of any other condition then and there existing;
and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway
at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of
any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to
bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead (emphasis supplied).
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides
that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the
time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his
own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved
the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property
of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos
defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis--vis his
Counter-Affidavit
submitted
during
the
preliminary
investigation:

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 9

It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution
(Exhs. C, D, G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr.
Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being
driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said
damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite
reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the
bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid
the passenger jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the
decision of the Supreme Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA
118, where the Court stated that "physical evidence is of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been
taken immediately after the incident. The damages could not
have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused
not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed
and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he
more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or
even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would
have been less severe.

Consequently, appellants continue, the award of P150,000.00

as compensation sustained by the plaintiff-appellee for her
damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount.

In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting

statements in his counter-affidavit and his testimony in court.
In the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to
the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger
jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his
testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger
jeepney coming from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying
his lane. Such glaring inconsistencies on material points
render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his
credibility. Furthermore, the variance between testimony and
prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such
inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the
witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence.

Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory

damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a
sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and
not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasidelicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss
of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and
the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).27

As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages

sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a
reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not
diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the
accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial
apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full
stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.24
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should
have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the
offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to
escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities
based thereon is, thus, futile.
On the second issue, we agree with the contention of
petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages
to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to
P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to
prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were
the summary computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R.
Regal, Jr. amounting to P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by
the BB Construction and Steel Fabricator to private
respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for carpentry
works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents
failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation. In its fivepage decision, the trial court awarded P150,000.00 as actual
damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual
basis for such award. Indeed, the trial court merely declared
in the decretal portion of its decision that the "sum of
P150,000.00 as reasonable compensation sustained by
plaintiff for her damaged apartment." The appellate court, for
its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of
P100,000.00 in its three-page decision. Thus, the appellate
court merely declared:
With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they
contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely
demolish the apartment in question considering the nature of
the damages sustained as a result of the accident.

The damaged portions of the apartment in question are not

disputed.
Considering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result
of the accident, the reasonable, and adequate compensation
due is hereby fixed at P100,000.00.25
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages
include all the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of
what a person already possesses (dao emergente) and the
other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would
have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated by the
Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:26

The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if

no evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is
to establish ones case by a preponderance of evidence which
means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is
superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not
presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.
Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed
out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises,
speculations or conjectures. As the Court declared:
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover
actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the
actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
available. The burden of proof is on the party who would be
defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He
must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which
means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot
be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out
specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne.28
The Court further declared that "where goods are destroyed
by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to
their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally,
the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market
for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case,
damages for the loss of the use during the period before
replacement.29
While claimants bare testimonial assertions in support of their
claims for damages should not be discarded altogether,
however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution.
Their testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants selfinterest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. Such
assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence. In
the language of the Court:

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 10

For this reason, Del Rosarios claim that private respondent
incurred losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should
be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it
was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent
evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private
respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give
with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and
cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest
therein. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony
as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the
vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity
thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that
his valuation of such equipment, cargo, and the vessel itself
should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore,
examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosarios claim as regards the amount of losses.30
An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice:
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent
proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not
enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be
actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty,
pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory damages are borne. Private
respondents merely sustained an estimated amount needed
for the repair of the roof of their subject building. What is
more, whether the necessary repairs were caused only by
petitioners alleged negligence in the maintenance of its
school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the
house itself, is an essential question that remains
indeterminable.31
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in
their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private
respondent would amount to P55,000.00.32 Accordingly,
private respondent is entitled to P55,000.00 actual damages.
We also agree with petitioner Sueltos contention that the trial
court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty of
one (1) year. This is so because under the third paragraph of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be
sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act shall
have only resulted in damage to property. The said provision
reads in full:
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period, to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor
in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall
commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be
imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done
maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise

their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article 64 (Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner
Sueltos act was to the terrace of private respondents
apartment, costing P55,000.00. Consequently, petitioners
contention that the CA erred in awarding P100,000.00 by way
of actual damages to private respondent is correct. We agree
that private respondent is entitled to exemplary damages,
and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, is
reasonable. Considering
the attendant
circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is
entitled to only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that
petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners are
ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally,
the total amount of P55,000.00 by way of actual damages,
and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 11

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003]
DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. C & A
CONSTRUCTION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court are the June 14, 2002 decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed
the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
46, in Civil Case No. 95-75565, and its November 7, 2002
resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A
Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas
Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.[4] The project was
completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA.
On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and
operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored
at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo
pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of
M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head
operator in Japan[5] that a typhoon was going to hit Manila[6]
in about eight (8) hours.[7] At approximately 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter
at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it
was already congested.[8] At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided
to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away
from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were
already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his
crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging
the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision,
Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.[9] He succeeded
in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was restarted and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent.[10] The damage
caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.[11]
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from
petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Consequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 95-75565. In its answer, petitioner claimed that the
damage was caused by a fortuitous event.[12]
On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was
dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty
of negligence because it had taken all the necessary
precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the emergency
rule, it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had
no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a
threatening situation. It further held that even if the maneuver
chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held
liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent
was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God.[13]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial
court was reversed and set aside.[14] It found Capt. Jusep
guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the
North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus
held petitioner liable for damages.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that
Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the
morning of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to
the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the

transfer been made earlier, the vessel could have sought

shelter.[15] It further claimed that it cannot be held
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because
respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner
was negligent in the selection and supervision of its
employees.[16] Granting that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of
negligence, petitioner is not liable because it exercised due
diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed
and competent Master Mariner.[17]
The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows (1)
Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes, whether
or not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. The test for
determining the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.[18]
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding
that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the
vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As
early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a
report from his radio head operator in Japan[19] that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila[20] after 8 hours.[21] This,
notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of
October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the
North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that
the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor
even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative
success or failure of a decision that determines the existence
of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances.
Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit
Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more
than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change
direction.[22] He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to
rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately
after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling
at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise.
Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose
because, according to him, it was not very cloudy[23] and
there was no weather disturbance yet.[24]
When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding
reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have observed in the same situation.
[25] Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had
greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor
considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very
near North Harbor.[26] Even if the latter was already
congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other
ports.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under
this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
and is required to act without time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence.[27] Clearly, the
emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because
the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his
own negligence.

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 12

Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable
for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the
negligent act of his employee. Thus
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury
to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a
quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof
that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. [28]
There is no question that petitioner, who is the
owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer of
Capt. Jusep who at the time of the incident acted within the
scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner was that it
exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep
because the latter is a licensed and competent Master
Mariner. It should be stressed, however, that the required
diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the
selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not
enough that the employees chosen be competent and
qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to
exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.
In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[29] it was held that due
diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. Corollarily,
in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court stressed that once
negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden
of proving that he observed the diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence
that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance
of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented
and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the
burden, petitioner should therefore be held liable for the
negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of
respondents failure to allege in its complaint that the former
did not exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos
Santos,[31] it was held that it is not necessary to state that
petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its
employees, inasmuch as its negligence is presumed by
operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the
employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[32]

Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages

awarded by the trial court, we find no reason to alter the
same. The interest imposed should, however, be modified. In
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[33] it was
held that the rate of interest on obligations not constituting a
loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum.
If the purchase price can be established with certainty at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%)
interest should be computed from the date the complaint was
filed until finality of the decision. After the judgment becomes
final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount
due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period
being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[34]
Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the respondent
shall earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until
the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the
interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the
interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time the judgment becomes final and
executory until it is fully satisfied.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. The June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc.,
damages in the amount of P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from October 3, 1995, until finality of this decision,
and 12% per annum thereafter on the principal and interest
(or any part thereof) until full payment.
SO ORDERED.

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 13

of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused
physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh
McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while
petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in G.R.
No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the
late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon
the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the
cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben
Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
The antecedent facts are not disputed.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January
1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a headon-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by
private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by
Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the
mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee.
Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one
and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was
seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front
passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons
were seated at the car's back seat.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992

GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

and

G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992

CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO,
ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH
TURLA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 6904041, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous
Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the Decision of
the trial court which dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil
Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled
"Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli
Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and
Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee
vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and
granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were
filed as a result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths

Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was

loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about
10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to
San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from
San Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10)
meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two
(2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and
into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth,
unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn
back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left
and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in
Angeles City; consequently, a team of police officers was
forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation.
In the sketch 1 prepared by the investigating officers, the
bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and
fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide seven (7) "footsteps" from
the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both
sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made
of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete railings on both
sides about three (3) feet high.
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right
rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from
the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was
touching the center line of the bridge, with the smashed front
side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck was
about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the northern end of
the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps"
from the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front
tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid
marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5)

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 14

"footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however,
produced no skid marks.
In his statement to the investigating police officers
immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that he was
traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No.
4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the
then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to
Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the
first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the award
of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh,
P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for
burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for
the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case,
petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the following: (a) in
connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of
P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services,
P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the
case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious
physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for
loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up
to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect
to George McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious physical
injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical
expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00
payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable
to the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses
amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of
attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus
traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with
the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was
filed with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No.
3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same
Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477,
private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car
which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven
by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award
of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and
liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478,
private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and
failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the
truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case
with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same
court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions
were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio
Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer
with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was
the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck
driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane
going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all
traffic
rules and regulations applicable under the
circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they
prayed for an award of damages as may be determined by the
court after due hearing, and the sums of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both
cases.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the

testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal

Case No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which
the court denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to
reconsider the order denying the motion for consolidation, 10
which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September
1978; he then directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court
then presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case
No. 3751.
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli
Koh McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo
Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11
and offered several documentary exhibits. Upon the other
hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben
Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag, Dr.
Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr.
Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo
Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco,
and offered several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other
hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang,
Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and
offered documentary exhibits. 14
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision
against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal
case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and
after applying the provisions of Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code and indeterminate sentence law, this Court,
imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and
indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00
as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida
Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral
expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of
P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to indemnify and
pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in
the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17
November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitioners filed
with Branch III of the court where the two (2) civil cases
were pending a manifestation to that effect and attached
thereto a copy of the decision. 16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the
two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the
private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. 17 The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, these cases
are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the
plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their counter-claim, thru
evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are
hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and litigation
expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for
(sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing for lack of
proof to that effect (sic). 18

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 15

A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the
petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2
December 1980. 19
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R.
Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third Division.
Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise
separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the
appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No.
69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were
assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its
decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction
of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay
Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa
rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the
respondent Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25
November 1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with
this Court; said petition was subsequently denied. A motion
for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the
Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as
the
Intermediate
Appellate
Court,
promulgated
its
consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041,
25 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed
and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
For the death of Jose Koh:
P
50,000.00 as moral damages
P
12,000.00 as death indemnity
P
16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
P
4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April
19, 1979)
P
950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
P
375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
P
P
P
P
P

50,000.00 as moral damages

12,000.00 as death indemnity
1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)

For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:

P
P
1)
P

10,000.00 as moral damages

1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)

In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil

Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees
in Civil Case No. 4478.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's
findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court
further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants (private respondents), as employers of
Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was
further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their
Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said
employee. 27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based
on the following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions,
the determinative issue in this appeal is posited in the fourth
assigned error as follows:
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF
THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED
ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT.
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh
McKee testified thus:
Q
What happened after that, as you approached the
bridge?
A
When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys
tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the highway
going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the
car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew
his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2)
boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way
to come back to our right lane.
Q

Did the truck slow down?

For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:

No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.

P
25,000.00 as moral damages
P
672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
P
4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1
and
D-2)
P
1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B
and B-1)

What happened after that?

For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:

xxx

P
25,000.00 as moral damages
P
1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G
and
G-1)
P
75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2
and G-3)
P
428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
P
114.20 to Muoz Clinic (Exh. MM)

Q
Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the
herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before
the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this
Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)?

A
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go
back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my
father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the
sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or
(Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases).
xxx

xxx

A
It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his
speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 16

(sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or
(Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief).
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to
satisfaction by the following facts and circumstances:

Our

1.
An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio
Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it had
already collided with the car:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in

the criminal case:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation

witness because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene
of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the
injured passengers to the hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants'
witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and
Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary
course of events people usually take the side of the person
with whom they are associated at the time of the accident,
because, as a general rule, they do not wish to be identified
with the person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is
unconsciously created among the several persons within the
same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan.
31, 1962).
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that
he is an accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor
of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the police
authorities about the mishap, but his phone had no dial tone.
Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the criminal case
acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.
2.
Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include
the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance
from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief).
This contention of appellants was completely passed subsilencio or was not refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2
is one of the exhibits not included in the record. According to
the Table of Contents submitted by the court below, said
Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this
light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim that
he stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to
exculpate himself from imprisonment and damages.
3.
Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car
about 10 meters away:
ATTY. SOTTO:
Q
Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of
the fact that you admitted that the road is straight and you
may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any
vehicle, you first saw that car only about ten (10) meters
away from you for the first time?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A
away.

I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters

ATTY. SOTTO:
Q
So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your
oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that ten (10)
meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)

Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement

that Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10)
meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as
revealed in Galang's affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief),
it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.
5.
Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and
not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his proper
lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag, stated
that he found skid marks under the truck but there were not
(sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3,
1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck
was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the
truck and none were found at the rear of the truck, the
reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck
were caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic)
suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap in an endeavor
to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at
barely 10 meters away, a very short distance to avoid a
collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he
abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened
just the same.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in the
selection of their driver or in the supervision over him.
Appellees did not allege such defense of having exercised the
duties of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees in their answers. They did not
even adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of
selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or
negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap.
If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have
sighted the car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10
meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop
when a collision was already inevitable, because at the time
that he entered the bridge his attention was not riveted to the
road in front of him.
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were
amply proven, but the items must be reduced. 28
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of
the facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on
the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3
April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set aside its 29 November
1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment
of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution
was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984. 30
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
I
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM
(sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER'S
ADMISSIONS
AND
CONFESSIONS,
WHO
EXCLUSIVELY
COMMITTED
THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO
DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE
RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS
(ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS,
PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND
WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN
EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT
CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 17

CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED
IN THE ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED.
III
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS
THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
(APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO
PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
IV
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR;
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED
ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE
CASES.
V
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic)
ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
VI
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID
AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
VII
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY
SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES. 31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private
respondents to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said
Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34
thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instant
petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which
they accordingly complied with.
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task
of dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some
observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are
in order.
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery
of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of
Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch
III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt
on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably
concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case
No. 3751 with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may
have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no
specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly
allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil action,
authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be
consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such
consolidation could have been farthest from their minds as

Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall

proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may,
there was then no legal impediment against such
consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to
simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice
with the least expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have
easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the
unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges
appreciating, according to their respective orientation,
perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts
differently, and thereafter rendering conflicting decisions.
Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully,
happen anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or
Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an
independent civil action for the recovery of civil liability
authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code
with the criminal action subject, however, to the condition
that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal
case.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence,
although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than
this Court of his last attempt to set aside the respondent
Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
relevance or importance to this case.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility
arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more concretely
stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the
case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code,
the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39
In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court
stated:
. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil
actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same
manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may
proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a
criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed
independently even during the pendency of the latter case,
the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the
criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil
case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article
33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned,
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action
because of the distinct separability of their respective juridical
cause or basis of action . . . .
What remains to be the most important consideration as to
why the decision in the criminal case should not be
considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents
were not parties therein. It would have been entirely different
if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising
from a delict, in which case private respondents' liability could
only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case against Galang would have
been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of
the private respondents. 41
And now to the merits of the petition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal
issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent
Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 18

evidence or are based on mere speculations, conjectures and
presumptions.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of
facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the
lower courts whose findings on these matters are received
with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions.
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals
may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the
evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material
facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what
was stated in its judgment. 43 The same is true where the
appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on
conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the
conclusions of the lower courts are based on a
misapprehension of facts. 45
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case
qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent
Court in its challenged resolution are not supported by the
evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the
inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The
respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the
correct findings of fact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the
fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and
that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the
presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was
negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's
negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the
road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As
testified to by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:
Q
What happened after that, as you approached the
bridge?
A
When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys
tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the highway
going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the
car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he blew
his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2)
boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to
warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way
to come back to our right lane.
Q

Did the truck slow down?

No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way.

What happened after that?

A
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go
back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my
father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the
sound of impact (sic), sir. 46
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during
cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck
was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that
time, a greater peril death or injury to the two (2) boys.
Such act can hardly be classified as negligent.
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus:

. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as
Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." (Cooley
on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than
seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
law. . . .
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute,
term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great,
a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe
it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing
Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence
and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over
the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding
such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be
several meters away and could very well slow down, move to
the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one
who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty
of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence." 49
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the
lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means
possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying
the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of
negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of
the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 19

circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom. 50

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
From the time you saw the truck to the time of the
impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped?

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that

the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the
chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of
the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in
the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals
given by the former to slow down and give the car an
opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the
proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances,
the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The
truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of
the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car
measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in width.
This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by
side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51
Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have
partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man
finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid
the car instead of meeting it head-on.

A
I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already
collided with the car and it was already motionless. (tsn. 31,
April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief).
55

The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He

himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48
kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per
hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence
to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the
translation by the investigating officer of the truck driver's
response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in
kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that
official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is
proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant
case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.

The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear

chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear
chance means that even though a person's own acts may
have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results,
the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine
is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person
imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco,
Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).

The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established

through the earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of
Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the
herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before
the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit
"1," how did you know?
A
It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his
speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on side
(sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or
(Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)
54
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
Q

When you saw the truck, how was it moving?

It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.

Q
Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know
what happened?
A
I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went
to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)

Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent

negligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree
of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last
clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a
doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof. 56
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held:

The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent

defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a
plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in
peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some
authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable
exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that
of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798799).
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in
the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397
(1958), in this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
[Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber
and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 20

Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989].
The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to
exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to
the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also
be raised as a defense to defeat claim (sic) for damages.
Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We
now rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to
exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law,
the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck
driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads
as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their

employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when

the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence
in the selection and supervision of employees. 60 The
answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477
and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29
November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court
which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed
Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual
moorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity
for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET
ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV
Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that
the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
McKee.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 21

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO
REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors
MANUEL,
BENJAMIN,
NESTOR,
MILAGROS,
CORAZON,
CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD
MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division),
Respondents.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of
Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez
Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a
leaking condition. The media agua was just below the
window of the third story. Standing on said media agua,
Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6
galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to
the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing
his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to
recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial
court rendered judgment in their favor P10,000 as
compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as
actual damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral
and exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
P3,000 as attorneys fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight
modification by reducing the attorneys fees from P3,000 to
P1,000 with costs. The electric company has appealed said
decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are
conclusive are stated in the following portions of its decision
which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated
primary wire stretched between poles on the street and
carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some
two years before Pealozas house was constructed. The
record shows that during the construction of said house a
similar incident took place, although fortunate]y with much
less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter
was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire,
producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith
complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire
presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the
wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the
other end where it was.
At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the
premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from the
electric wire to the edge of the media agua on which the
deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2
feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that all wires
be kept three feet from the building. Appellant contends that
in applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning
should not be from the edge of the media agua but from the
side of the house and that, thus measured, the distance was
almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed. This
contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a media
agua an integral part of the building to which it is attached
but to exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the
purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless,
that even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of
the city regulations, should be measured from the edge of the
media agua, the fact that in the case of the house involved
herein such distance was actually less than 3 feet was due to
the fault of the owner of said house, because the city
authorities gave him a permit to construct a media agua only

one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one

having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the
width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the
distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed
minimum of 3 feet.
It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit
fixed in the permit given to him by the city authorities for the
construction of the media agua, and that if he had not done
so Appellants wire would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than
the required distance of three feet from the edge of the
media agua. It is also a fact, however, that after the media
agua was constructed the owner was given a final permit of
occupancy of the house cralaw .
cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying
a load of 3,600 volts. There was, according to Appellant, no
insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because
there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind
of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand secondly, because the
only insulation material that may be effective is still in the
experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs
would be prohibitive
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the
Plaintiff is that although the owner of the house in
constructing the media agua in question exceeded the limits
fixed in the permit, still, after making that media agua, its
construction though illegal, was finally approved because he
was given a final permit to occupy the house; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was the company that was at
fault and was guilty of negligence because although the
electric wire in question had been installed long before the
construction of the house and in accordance with the
ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with
the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due
diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other
precautionary measures as may be warranted; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat negligence cannot be determined
by a simple matter of inches; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
all that the city did was to prescribe certain minimum
conditions and that just because the ordinance required that
primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any
house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by placing
such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of
other factors. The appellate court, however, refrained from
stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures
could and should have been adopted.
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the
circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree
to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of
Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in
some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua
or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city
and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
media agua. We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although
the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires
from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and
2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of
Pealoza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet
as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting
part thereof, such as a media agua, had the house owner
followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the
construction of his media agua, namely, one meter or 39
3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of
said media agua would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches.
In fixing said one meter width for the media agua the city
authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at
least 3 feet between the wires and any portion of a building.
Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the
permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8
inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 22

Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric wires.
And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner,
was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an
inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a
city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company,
guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The
Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for
any illegal construction which reduces the distance between
its wires and said construction, and after finding that said
distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing
or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It
would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be
ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are
strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present
case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the
media agua was not the direct cause of the accident. It
merely contributed to it. Had said media agua been only
one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on
it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side
of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge
of the media agua and the yawning 2-story distance or
height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided
the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and
the wires.
We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite
close to the house or its media agua was always a source of
danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they
were, but the claim of the company and the reasons given by
it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted as we gather
from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to
accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold
said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due
diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity
to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was
considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city
such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater
distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the
margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such
as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting
them could not be located too far toward the middle of the
street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the
reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was
called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just
below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to
his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he
was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience
for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to
electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience
failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the
6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length,
evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms
with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant
was liable for damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think
the case is exactly applicable. There, the premises involved
was that elevated portion or top of the walls of Intramuros,
Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the
Court, it was a public place where persons come to stroll, to
rest and to enjoy themselves. The electric company was
clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that
without much difficulty or exertion, a person by stretching his
hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing
one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped the
electric wire and was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in
said case was a boy who was in no position to realize the
danger. In the present case, however, the wires were well high
over the street where there was no possible danger to
pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons

standing on the media agua, but a media agua can hardly

be considered a public place where persons usually gather.
Moreover, a person standing on the media agua could not
have reached the wires with his hands alone. It was necessary
as was done by Magno to hold something long enough to
reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person
immature but the father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith
trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs
and media agua. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that although it is a
well- established rule that the liability of electric companies
for damages or personal injuries is governed by the rules of
negligence, nevertheless such companies are not insurers of
the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the
present case the Defendant electric company could be
considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to
the house and media agua in question, and in failing to
properly insulate those wires (although according to the
unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make
the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the
Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
supposed negligence of the company must have been the
proximate and principal cause of the accident, because if the
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal
cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover.
Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that
case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving
scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15year old boy found and carried home. In the course of
experimenting with said fulminating caps, he opened one of
them, held it out with his hands while another boy applied a
lighted match to it, causing it to explode and injure one of his
eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this
Tribunal
in
denying
recovery
for
the
injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the
Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
nevertheless Plaintiffs own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote
cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without
taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet,
considering the latters length of 6 feet. For a better
understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation
helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J.
pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage
(3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a constant
source of danger, even death, especially to persons who

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 23

having occasion to be near said wires, do not adopt the
necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila
authorities and the electric company could get together and
devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. Just as
the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares
may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers
of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even
stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching
said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since
these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at
reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the
outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few
pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires
carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for
the better protection of the public.
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against
the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.

judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

the defendant for the sum of P15,000, and costs.
As is well known, a wall surrounds the District of Intramuros,
in the City of Manila. At intervals, gates for the ingress and
egress of pedestrians and vehicles penetrate the wall. One of
these openings toward Manila Bay is known as the Santa Lucia
Gate. Above this gate and between the wall and a street of
Intramuros is a considerable space sodded with grass with the
portion directly over the gate paved with stone. Adjoining this
place in Intramuros are the buildings of the Ateneo de Manila,
the Agustinian Convent, the Bureau of Public Works, and the
Santa Lucia Barracks. The proximity to these structures and to
the congested district in the Walled City has made this a
public place where persons come to stroll, to rest, and to
enjoy themselves. An employee of the City of Manila, a
number of years ago, put up some wire to keep persons from
dirtying the premises, but this wire has fallen down and is no
obstacle to those desiring to make use of the place. No
prohibitory signs have been posted.
Near this place in the street of Intramuros is an electric light
pole with the corresponding wires. The pole presumably was
located by the municipal authorities and conforms in height to
the requirements of the franchise of the Manila Electric
Company. The feeder wires are of the insulated type, known
as triple braid weather proof, required by the franchise. The
pole, with its wires, was erected in 1920. It was last inspected
by the City Electrician in 1923 or 1924. The pole was located
close enough to the public place here described, so that a
person, by reaching his arm out the full length, would be able
to take hold of one of the wires. It would appear, according to
the City Electrician, that even a wire of the triple braid
weather proof type, if touched by a person, would endanger
the life of that person by electrocution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33380

December 17, 1930

TEODORA ASTUDILLO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. for
appellant.
Vicente Sotto and Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Diaz
Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed
his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole
situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of
Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased
instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
secure from the Manila Electric Company damages in the
amount of P30,000. The answer of the company set up as
special defenses that the death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due
solely to his negligence and lack of care, and that the
company had employed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the injury. After trial, which included an
ocular inspection of the place where the fatality occurred,

About 6 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1928, a group of

boys or young men came to this public place. Two of them
named Juan Diaz Astudillo and Alejo Ponsoy sauntered over to
where the electric post was situated. They were there looking
out towards Intramuros. For exactly what reason, no one will
ever know, but Juan Diaz Astudillo, placing one foot on a
projection, reached out and grasped a charged electric wire.
Death resulted almost instantly.
The matter principally discussed is the question of the
defendant company's liability under the circumstances stated.
It is well established that the liability of electric light
companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by
the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not
insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of
care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising
this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be. The poles must be so
erected and the wires and appliances must be so located the
persons rightfully near the place will not be injured.
Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires and
appliances in places where there is probable likelihood of
human contact therewith. (20 C. J., pp. 320 et seq.; San Juan
Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena [1912], 224 U. S., 89.)
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric
Company in the lower court to the effect that the death of
Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to his negligence. He
only did the natural thing to be expected of one not familiar
with the danger arising from touching an electric wire, and
was wholly unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused
the death of this young man, it would undoubtedly have been
only a question of time when someone else, like a playful boy,
would have been induced to take hold of the wire, with fatal
results. The cause of the injury was one which could have
been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came
from the act of the Manila Electric Company in so placing its

TORTS AND DAMAGES (SET 2) 24

pole and wires as to be within proximity to a place frequented
by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of
them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged
and defectively insulated wire.
As we understand the position of the Manila Electric Company
on appeal, its principal defense now is that it has fully
complied with the provisions of its franchise and of the
ordinances of the City of Manila. It is undeniable that the
violation of franchise, an ordinance, or a statute might
constitute negligence. But the converse is not necessarily
true, and compliance with a franchise, an ordinance, or a
statute is not conclusive proof that there was no negligence.
The franchise, ordinance, or statute merely states the
minimum conditions. The fulfillment of these conditions does
not render unnecessary other precautions required by
ordinary care. (Moore vs. Hart [1916], 171 Ky., 725; Oliver vs.
Weaver [1923], 72 Colo., 540; Caldwell vs. New Jersey
Steamboat Co. [1872], 47 N. Y., 282; Consolidated Electric
Light & Power Co. vs. Healy [1902], 65 Kan., 798.)
The company further defends in this court on the ground that
it has not been proven that the deceased is an acknowledged
natural child of the plaintiff mother. Technically this is correct.
(Civil Code, art. 944). At the same time, it should first of all be
mentioned that, so far as we know, this point was not raised
in the lower court. Further, while the mother may thus be
precluded from succeeding to the estate of the son, yet we
know of no reason why she cannot be permitted to secure
damages from the company when the negligence of this
company resulted in the death of her child.lawphi1>net
We, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to
damages. But the evidence indicative of the true measure of
those damages is sadly deficient. All that we know certainly is
that the deceased was less than 20 years of age, a student,
and working in the Ateneo de Manila, but at what wages we
are not told. We are also shown that approximately P200 was
needed to defray the travel and funeral expenses. As would
happen in the case of a jury who have before them one of the
parents, her position to life, and the age and sex of the child,
varying opinions, have been disclosed in the court regarding
the estimate of the damages with reference to the next of kin.
Various sums have been suggested, beginning as low as
P1,000 and extending as high as P5,000. A majority of the
court finally arrived at the sum of P1,500 as appropriate
damages in this case. The basis of this award would be the
P1,000 which have been allowed in other cases for the death
of young children without there having been tendered any
special proof of the amount of damages suffered, in
connection with which should be taken into account the more
mature age of the boy in the case at bar, together with the
particular expenses caused by his death. (Manzanares vs
Moreta [1918], 38 Phil., 821; Bernal and Enverso vs. House
and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant [1930], 54 Phil., 327; Cuison
vs. Norton & Harrison Co. [1930], p. 18, ante.)
In the light of the foregoing, the various errors assigned by
the appellant will in the main be overruled, but as above
indicated, the judgment will be modified by allowing the
plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P1,500, and
the costs of both instances.