An American Social Science: International Relations

Author(s): Stanley Hoffmann

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 3, Discoveries and Interpretations: Studies in Contemporary
Scholarship, Volume I (Summer, 1977), pp. 41-60
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024493 .
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STANLEY HOFFMANN

An American

In the

past

autonomous
cal

science's

Social

International

Science:

thirty

years,
part of political

international

relations

science. Even

vicissitudes?battles

though
various

among

Relations

as a
has developed
largely
it has shared many of
politi?
orientations,

and

theories,

also has a story of its own. What follows is an attempt at neither a

nor a
a set of reflections on the
complete balance sheet
capsule history?merely
and frustrations of a particular field of
specific accomplishments
scholarship.l

methods?it

in America

Only

Political
attempt at

science has a much

longer history than international relations. The

the patterns of conflict and
studying
systematically
cooperation
actors?a
alien
shorthand
definition of the subject matter?is
among mutually
recent. To be sure, we can all trace our
ancestry back to Thucydides,
just as
can
trace
to
scientists
theirs
was
a
Aristotle.
But
historian.
political
Thucydides
He was, to be sure, a historian of genius, rightly convinced that he was
writing
for

all

times

manent

because

he

logic of behavior.

. . . then"

was

and

propositions,

using

one

to

incident

particular

describe

per?

Yet he was careful to avoid explicit

generalizations,
analytic

categories

or

classificatory

terms.

"if

Modern

themselves from political and social

sociology and political science emancipated
and
law
in the nineteenth
history, political philosophy,
public
century. Inter?
national relations did not, even though the kind of social (or asocial) action de?
never
scribed by Thucydides
from a fragmented world,
and
disappeared
flourished particularly
in the period of the European balance of power. One can
wonder why this was so. After all, here was a realm in which
political philoso?
about the com?
phy had much less to offer than it did to those who wondered
mon
in
the
vast
domestic
order.
for
the
of
Roman
Catholic
good
Except
body
literature preoccupied with just war, and not very relevant to a world of sover?
the marginal comments
eign states, there were only the recipes of Machiavelli;
on

the

international

state

of

nature

in Hobbes',

Locke's,

and

Rousseau's

writ?

two short and

ings; some pages of Hume;
tantalizing essays of Kant; compressed
considerations
and
by Hegel;
oversimplified
fragments by Marx. Even so, the
little political philosophy
that was available should have been
sufficiently pro?
vocative to make students want to look into the realities. For the
philosophers
disagreed about the nature of the international milieu and the ways of making it
41

42

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

more

bearable; and they wrote about the difference between a domestic order
stable enough to afford a search for the ideal state, and an international contest
in which order has to be established first, and which often clashes with any
to justice. Similarly,
the contrast between the precepts of law and the
aspiration
realities of politics was sufficiently greater in the international realm than in the
to the empirical,
domestic realm, to make one want to shift from the normative
a
if only in order to understand
better the plight of the normative. Without
one
of
how
could
understand
the
and
fail?
study
political relations,
fumblings
ures of international
law, or the tormented debates on the foundation of obliga?
tion

among

sovereigns

unconstrained

by

common

values

or

superior

power?

And the chaos of data provided by diplomatic

history did not require any less
masses
of facts turned up by the history of states and societies.
ordering than the
a
of international relations nevertheless
did
social
science
fail to ap?
Why
answer
to
in
the
be
that
The
well
found
may
pear?
discrepancy
sweeping phe?
nomenon which Tocqueville
feature of the modern
identified as the distinctive
to
from their Old Regimes
As domestic
societies moved
ige: democratization.
and
interests
for
the
their modern
of
conditions?parties
competing
allegiance
of previously dispersed subjects;
large classes of citizens; the social mobilization
he politics of large agglomerations
and unified markets; an increasingly univer?
institutions or plebiscitar?an
sal suffrage; the rise of parliamentary
techniques;
or social, within
nations?the
the fall of fixed barriers, whether
geographic
to provide concerned observers
study of flux began in earnest, if only in order
some clues about
and predictions
of
and insecure officials with
regularities
if also less sweeping nature than those grandiosely
less mythical,
somewhat
as Comte had
strewn around by philosophers
of history. With democratization,
was
came the age of positivism
to
mistake
confuse
his own
(his only
predicted,
or his grand speculations,
with positive
brand of metaphysics,
science). But
international politics remained the sport of kings, or the preserve of cabinets?
the last refuge of secrecy, the last domain of largely hereditary castes of diplo?
mats,

relations as the specialized

international
Aron has characterized
Raymond
of
and
soldiers.
However,
soldiers, to paraphrase Clausewitz,
diplomats
activity
have their own grammar but not their own logic. It is not an accident if armies,
and Napole?
by the ordeals of the French Revolution
having been democratized
in Clausewitz,
whereas
the still re?
onic era, found their empirical grammarian
stricted club of statesmen and ambassadors
playing with the fate of nations
found no logician to account for its activities. Indeed, the historians who dealt
with these succeeded only in keeping them beyond the pale of the kind of mod?
to look at societies, by perpetuating
ern science that was beginning
the myth of
There
isolated from domestic politics.
was, to be
foreign policy's "primacy,"
was
one
sure,
put under domestic checks and
country in which foreign policy
balances, knew no career caste, and paid little respect to the rules and rituals of
the initiated European happy few: the United States of America. But this coun?
in the kinds of contests that were the
try happened to be remarkably uninvolved
actors. Either it remained aloof, eager merely for continental
of
fare
other
daily
not by conflicts and
and economic growth; or else it expanded,
consolidation
deals with equals, hut by short spurts of solipsistic exuberance at the expense of
relntions is the science of the tests and
International
much weaker neighbors.

RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL
trials

of

actors.

intertwined

several

Where

43

were

they

no

intertwined,

science

grew. In the United States before the 1930s, there was no reason for it to grow.
to
It was only the twentieth century that brought democratization
foreign
to
from
of
the
few
issues
moved
the
calculations
the
passions
policy. Diplomatic
of the many,
both because more states joined in the game that had been the
a
actors and (mainly extra
small number of (mainly European)
of
preserve
stakes, and above all because within many states parties and interests
European)
links or pushed claims across national borders. And yet, aWorld
established
and slaughter of millions, marked the demise of
War that saw the mobilization
as a kind of debate between Wilson
and
ended
and
the old diplomatic
order,
forth
little
Lenin for the allegiance of mankind,
"scientific
brought
analysis" of
relations. Indeed, the rude intrusion of grand ideology into this
international
realm gave a new lease of life to Utopian thinking, and delayed the advent of
"how it is, and why," but "how things should be improved,
reformed, overhauled," was the order of the day. Old Liberal normative dreams
were
covenant, while at the same time
being licensed by the League of Nations
was
the young Soviet Union
itself.
calling for the abolition of diplomacy
It is against this reassertion of utopia, and particularly against the kind of "as
if thinking that mistook
the savage world of the 1930s for a community,
the
a common
a modern Church,
for
and
collective
for
that
security
League
duty,
E. H. Carr wrote the book which can be treated as the first "scientific" treat?
ment of modern world politics: Twenty Years Crisis2?the
work of a historian
intent on deflating the pretenses of Liberalism,
and driven thereby to laying the
both of a discipline
and of a normative approach, "realism," that
foundations
a future. Two
are worth
was to have
quite
paradoxes
noting. This historian who
was
a social science, did it in reaction
founding
against another historian, whose
not the
normative
Carr
deemed
of
approach
illusory?Toynbee,
philosopher
the Study ofHistory, but the idealistic commentator
of the Royal Yearbook of Inter?
national Affairs. And Carr, in his eagerness to knock out the illusions of the
social science. Not

not

idealists,

Japan

had

such asMussolini's

been

using

ing that idealism

as Pravda

tively,"

some

swallowed

only

sionist powers

the

against

of

the

order

of

arguments

"tough"

Italy, Hitler's

Germany,

aimed

Versailles?arguments

served the interests of the status quo powers?but

would

say,

served

the

cause

of

the

which

revi?

and the militaristic

appeasement.

at show?

also "objec?
was

There

triple lesson here: about the springs of empirical analysis (less a desire to under?
stand for its own sweet sake, than an itch to refute); about the impossibility,
even

for

of

opponents

a normative

to

orientation,

separate

the

empirical

and

the

normative
in their own work; and about the pitfalls of any normative dogmatism
in a realm which
is both a field for objective
and a battlefield be?
investigation
tween predatory beasts and their prey.
But

it was

the United
cumstances

not in
effort bore fruit. It was in
England that Carr's pioneering
that international relations became a discipline. Both the cir?

States
and

the

causes

deserve

some

The

scrutiny.

circumstances

were,

the rise of the United

States to world power, a rise accompanied
obviously,
by
two contradictory
as
renewed
impulses:
utopianism,
exemplified
by the plans
for

postwar

international

organization;

and

a mix

of

revulsion

against,

and

guilt

idealism (as symbolized

about, the peculiar prewar brew of impotent American
doctrine),
(the neutrality
laws),
by the "nonrecognition"
escapist isolationism

STANLEY

44

HOFFMANN

in appeasement.
Two books brought to America
and participation
the kind of
in England. Once was Nicholas
realism Carr had developed
Spykman's America's
was more a treatise in the
tradition of
geopolitical
Strategy inWorld Politics,3 which
than a book about the principal characteristics
Admiral Mahan or Mackinder
of
interstate politics; but it told Americans
that foreign policy is about power, not
or even
merely
primarily about ideals, and it taught that the struggle for power
was the real name for world politics. The other book was Hans
Morgenthau's
If our discipline
has any founding
Politics Among Nations.4
father, it is Mor
a historian
ganthau. Unlike Carr, he was not
by training; he had been a teacher
of international
law. Like Carr, he was revolting against Utopian thinking, past
and present. But where Carr had been an ironic and polemical Englishman
about the nature of diplomacy
in the thirties?a
sparring with other Englishmen
discussion which assumed that readers knew enough diplomatic history to make
pedantic

allusions

was

unnecessary?Morgenthau

refugee

from

suicidal

Eu?

new world power all the lessons it

rope, with a missionary
impulse to teach the
had been able to ignore until then but could no longer afford to reject. He was
in the "sea change," one of the many social scientists whom
but one participant
had driven to the New World,
and who brought to a country whose
Hitler
and conformity
social science suffered from "hyperfactualism"
the leaven of
and philosophical
concerns.5 But he was, among his col?
critical perspectives
one whose
interests made him the founder of a discipline.
leagues, the only
to joust with fellow literati, Mor?
to
educate the heathen, not merely
Eager
in
the terms of general propositions
couched his work
genthau quite deliberately
a
and grounded them in history. Steeped in scholarly tradition that stressed the
difference between social sciences and natural sciences, he was determined
both
to erect an empirical science opposed to the utopias of the international
lawyers
and the political ideologues, and to affirm the unity of empirical research and of
to be nor?
philosophical
inquiry into the right kind of social order. He wanted
norms
in the realities of politics, not in the aspirations of
mative, but to root his
or in the constructs
of lawyers. The model of interstate relations
politicians
and the precepts of "realism" which he presented
which Morgenthau
proposed,
as the only valid recipes for foreign policy success as well as for international
moderation,

were

derived

from

the

views

of

nineteenth-century

and

early

and also Weber).

historians of statecraft (such as Treitschke,
twentieth-century
the paradox of introducing to the America of the cold war, and of making
Hence
a "wisdom" about statecraft
and dogmatically
explicit, notions and
analytically
that had remained largely implicit in the age to which
they best applied, and
mass
whose validity for the age of nuclear weapons,
ideological confrontations,
was at least open to question.
and
economic
interdependence
politics,
that
work played a doubly useful role?one
Be that as itmay, Morgenthau's
one looks at the scene either from the
if
it may be hard to appreciate
fully
or thirty years later, as does the new generation
of
outside
(as does Aron),
to lay down the
scholars. On the one hand, his very determination
American
the
search for the laws, or regularities, of state behavior,
law made Morgenthau
his
of
chief
the
of
power; by tying
sweeping analy?
types
configurations
policies,
ses to two masts, the concept of power and the notion of the national interest, he
a
from
was
boldly positing the existence of field of scientific endeavor, separate
the
of
the
or
breadth
his
other
the
law.
On
brushstrokes,
hand,
very
history

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

45

about power, the sub?

pronouncements
ambiguities hidden by his peremptory
denied by his assertion of an objective national interest, and
jective uncertainties
even more the
sleights of hand entailed by his pretense that the best analytic
scheme necessarily yields the only sound normative
advice?all
of this incited
to

readers

react

and,

by

reacting,

criticizing,

correcting,

on

to build

refuting,

foundations.
Those who rejected his blueprint were led to try
Morgenthau's
other designs. He was both a goad and a foil. (Indeed, the more one agreed with
his approach, the more one was irritated by his flaws, and eager to differentiate
own

one's

product).

less

arrogantly

a writer

scholar,

dogmatic

more

modest

in his empirical scope and in his normative assertions, would never have
had such an impact on scholarship. Less sweeping, he would not have imposed

both
the

that

idea

here

was

not have made

would
two.

One

of

the

a realm

with

many

reasons

of

properties

scholars burn with

why

its own.

Less

Aron's

Raymond

he

trenchant,

the itch to bring him down

a peg or

monumental

Peace

and

in its scope and far more sophisticated

book far more ambitious
in its
no
than
Politics
Nations?incited
reaction
from
analyses
Among
comparable
and modesty
of
scholarly readers may well have been the greater judiciousness

War6?a

Aron's

normative

conclusions.

Humane

invite

skeptics

nods

and

not

sighs,

and fury; and sound and fury are good for creative
scholarship. More?
to
be discouraging;
over, Aron's own scholarship was overwhelming
enough
was
to
Morgenthau's
just shaky enough
inspire improvements.
Still, Politics Among Nations would not have played such a seminal role, if the
ground in which the seeds were planted had not been so receptive. The devel?
relations as a discipline
in the United
States results
opment of international
from the convergence
of three factors: intellectual predispositions,
political cir?
and
institutional
The
are
intellectual
cumstances,
opportunities.
predispositions
those which account for the formidable explosion of the social sciences in gener?
al in this country, since the end of the Second World War. There
is, first, the
in a nation which Ralf Dahrendorf
has called the Applied
profound conviction,
that all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them
Enlightenment,7
sound

is

to

apply

the

scientific

to

method?assumed

be

value

free,

and

to

combine

that the resort

formation, and testing?and
empirical investigation,
hypothesis
to science will yield practical
will
that
is spe?
applications
bring progress. What
is the scope of these beliefs, or the depth of this faith:
cifically American
they
encompass the social world as well as the natural world, and they go beyond the
concern

for

problem-solving

(after

all,

there

are

trial-and-error,

piecemeal

ways

of solving problems): they entail a convicci?n that there is, in each area, a kind of
an intellectual, but an
masterkey?not
merely
operational paradigm. Without
this paradigm,
no continuous
there can be muddling
progress;
through, but
once one has it, the practical
recipes will follow. We are in the presence of a
sort of national
fascinating
ideology: itmagnifies and expands eighteenth-century
What
has
ensured their triumph and their
postulates.
growth is the absence of
on the
or the Left, that
this faith either
any counterideology,
Right
challenges
or
conservative
in
its validi?
(as
did,
radically
thought
Europe)
by subordinating
ty
ence

to a
of

change
economic

reinforcing
Second,

in the

social

development,

system.

Moreover,
social

this set of beliefs.

and as a kind of practical

on

integration,

consequence,

the whole,
and

external

the

national
success

the very prestige

experi?
has
kept

and sophis

46

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

tication of the "exact sciences" were bound to benefit the social ones as well.
voices of gloom or skepticism that lament the differences between the natu?
ral world and the social world have never been very potent in America.
Pre?
one of conflict, precisely
world
social
is
because
the
because
national
cisely

The

history had entailed civil and foreign wars, the quest for certainty, the desire to
find a sure way of avoiding fiascoes and traumas, was even more burning in the
realm of the social sciences. The very contrast between an ideology of progress
reason to human concerns?an
through the deliberate application of
ideology
a social
reason
in
and faith in moral reason?and
which fuses faith
instrumental
reality inwhich the irrational often prevails both in the realm of values and in the
choice of means, breeds a kind of inflation of social science establishments
and
a new
At
the
end
of
the
One
of
the
social
war,
pretensions.
dogma appeared.
was

economics,

sciences,

to have

deemed

met

the

of

expectations

the

national

a science on the model of the exact ones; it was

ideology,
to the solution of the age-old problems of
celebrated for its contribution
scarcity
and inequality. This triumph goaded the other social sciences. Political science,
and to have become

or

the mother
was

that

here

ty.
of

is not

emphasis

or of

community

of a certain
drew

international

on

the

kind of power,
to

it closer

that

effects

of

but

on

association,

science

of

scarcity,

on

creative

and on its interplay with

other

nor

the

and

and

competition,

activi?

structures

coercive

social conflict.

It

spurred.
econom?

realm of human

culture,
the

Like

greatest.

yet specialized

and

origins

particularly

was

economics

a universal

voluntary

was

relations,

to emulate

science deals with

ics, political
Its

of

stepmother
the
temptation

role

This

also
eco?

power,

or
to disciplines
like anthropology
nomics,
sociology, which deal with
more diffuse phenomena
and which are less obsessed by the solution of pressing
means of
central action.
enlightened
problems by
than

in which

Nations

have

whelming

also

grandiose
after
known,

sion of the social sciences.

lever.8

And

political

and

this

But

science

the

the United

abroad

activist

Second

has

ideology

World

War,

States

often

usually

been

of

is less

science

a considerable

expan?

served as model
more

reflective

over?

and as
than

re?

more

than therapeutic;
here and in sociology,
formist,
descriptive
although,
reacted
social
scientists
the
traditional
against
foreign
intelligentsia of moralists,
that
and
aesthetes
(not old-fashioned
by stressing
philosophers,
knowledge
were
not
at
was
least
driven
(or
wisdom)
influence), they
power
by the dream
set in,
disillusionment
when
of knowledge for power. Moreover,
(inevitably)
crises within the professions,
vio?
it took often far more drastic forms?identity
in the United
States. An ideology on probation
lent indictments outside?than
reacts to failure in the
cannot afford a fall. An ideology serenely hegemonial
manner of the work horse inOrwell's Animal Farm, or of Avis: "Iwill try harder."
a
was
A third predisposition
transplanted element: the scholars
provided by
of
who had immigrated from abroad. They played a huge role in the development
the
in
American
science in general. This role was particularly
social
important
an additional
sciences. Here,
injection of talent, but
they provided not merely
talent of a different sort. No social science ismore interesting than the questions
it asks, and these were scholars whose philosophical
training and personal expe?
to
than
ask
far
those much of American
moved
them
rience
bigger questions
so
had
asked
about
social science
far, questions
ends, not just about means;
about

choices,

not

just about

techniques;

about

social wholes,

not

just about

RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL
or

towns

small

of

units

So

government.

they

47

often

as

served

conceptualizers,

their analytic skills with the research talents of the "natives." More?
a sense of history, an awareness of the diversity of
they brought with them

and blended
over,
social

that

experiences,

more

could

stir

only

research

comparative

and

some?

make

social science. In the

there was a galaxy of
the wise and
empiricism:

of the frequently parochial American

relations, in addition toMorgenthau,

universal

thing
field of international

scholars, all concerned with transcending

foreign-born
Ernst Haas, George Lis
Klaus Knorr, Karl Deutsch,
learned Arnold Wolfers,
a few. They
to
name
and
the
and
(and
Brzezinski,
ka,
young Kissinger
only
in
child?
the
Atlantic
their
had
them
who
crossed
those
among
quite especially
to find out the meaning
and the causes of the
hood or adolescence) wanted
a
the
and
that
had
keys to better world.
perhaps
uprooted them,
catastrophe
The last two names bring us to politics. And politics mattered. Hans Mor?
as if truth and power were bound to be enemies
genthau has often written
more categorical). And yet he shaped his truths
even
has
been
Arendt
(Hannah
so as to
in power. The growth of the discipline cannot be separated
those
guide
role in world affairs after 1945. First, by definition
from the American
(or tau?
are fascinated with power?either
because
scientists
they want
tology), political
want
to
or
it
and
understand
the mon?
fear
at
because
least
it,
they
vicariously,
as
with
her
usual
has
ster,
lucidity.9 And in
Judith Shklar
devastating
suggested
was
more
than
the imperial
of
the postwar years, what part
power
interesting
a
the
sole
economic
of
leader
the
sudden
bit? America
coalition,
superpower,
the

nuclear

later

monopolist,

the

nuclear

was

superior,

far more

to

interesting

or the
many students than local politics, or the politics of Congress,
politics of
a
concern
in the
for America's
conduct
group pluralism. Almost
inevitably,
a
for
the
world
of
international
whole
world blended with
relations,
study
seemed

to be

stake

the

of

confrontation.

the American-Soviet

Here

was

a do?

main which was both a virgin field for study and the arena of a titanic contest.
To study United
States foreign policy was to study the international
system.
To study the international system could not fail to bring one back to the role of
the United

States.

the

Moreover,

or to criticize

to

temptation

the official ones was made

give

to offer

advice,

even more

courses

of

by the
spotty character and the gaffes of past American behavior in world affairs, by the
in American
thinness of the veneer of professionalism
diplomacy,
by the eager?
was the one-eyed
ness of officialdom
for guidance?America
leading the
two drives merged,
for the benefit of the discipline
and to its
cripples. Thus,
action,

detriment

also,

in

some

ways:

the

desire

or

to

concentrate

to want

on

irresistible

what

is

the most

to be useful,

not only as
relevant, and the tendency (implicit
explicit)
a scientist, but as an expert citizen whose science can help promote
intelligently
that was not negligible,
the embattled values of his country (a motive
among
newcomers
was all too easy to assume that the
to America
it
For
especially).
values that underlie scientific research?the
respect for truth, freedom of inves?
of
and
of
also those for which Washing?
discussion,
publication?were
tigation,
ton stood in world affairs.
as I have just said, what the scholars offered, the policy-makers
Second,
wanted.
between their
Indeed, there is a remarkable chronological
convergence
needs and the scholars' performances.
Let us oversimplify
the
greatly. What
leaders looked for, once the cold war started, was some intellectual compass

48

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

serve multiple
functions: exorcise isolationism,
which would
and justify a per?
manent and global involvement
in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation
of
of
and
the
methods
of
the
containment
intervention,
power,
appar?
techniques
to a public of idealists
why international
ently required by the cold war; explain
not leave much leeway for pure good will, and indeed besmirches
politics does
force
purity; appease the frustrations of the bellicose by showing why unlimited
or

on

extremism

of

behalf

liberty

was

no

virtue;

and

reassure

a nation

eager

for

about the possibility of both avoiding war and achiev?

accommodation,
critical of specific policies, however (and thus
its
ideals.
however
"Realism,"
ing
in
its
diverse
recommendations,
precisely provided what
self-contradictorily)

ultimate

was

there

Indeed,

necessary.

was

always

sufficient

margin

of

disagreement

and actual policies, and also between

its many cham?
its suggestions
a
war
to
but
of
it
from
rationalization
cold
prevent
pions,
being nothing
policies.
wave
of writings?those
of Morgenthau,
ur-Kiss
And yet the first
Wolfers,
or
both
the
Walt
Rostow,
Kennan,
McGeorge
Bundy?gave
Osgood,
inger,
new intellectual enterprise and the new diplomacy
the general foundations
they
strat?
from 1957 to the mid-1960s?turned
needed. The second wave?roughly,
the discipline. This coin?
egy in the nuclear age into a dominant field within
between

to replace the reassuring

of officialdom
but
the preoccupation
a doctrine
with
that
would
of
massive
retaliation
be
simplicities
implausible
more
that force, in amixture of
it
the
conviction
also
reflected
but
sophisticated;
cided

with

nuclear

and

deterrence

conventional

(or

subconventional)

limited

uses,

re?

a
asset.
important aspect of power and major American
Here again, in the literature, the attempt at finding principles for any "strategy
to devise a
is inseparable from the tendency
in a nuclear world
of conflict"
mass
a
at
sides
had
of
destruc?
both
when
time
for
America,
weapons
strategy
mained

tion,

both

and

when

the most

there

were

serious

problems

of

alliance

management,

guerrilla

or "wars of national liberation." A third wave is quite recent: I refer to the

It coin?
relations.
literature on the politics of international economic
growing
cides with what could be called the post-Viet Nam aversion for force, and with
a
issues to the top of the diplomatic
the surge of economic
agenda, caused by
of the Bretton Woods
of factors: the degradation
combination
system, the in?
in the domestic poli?
creasing importance of economic growth and social welfare
tics of advanced societies, the resurgence of aggressive or protectionist
impulses
the gains from interdependence,
in order to limit the bad effects or to maximize

wars,

the revolt of the Third World.

blend.
policy-making

Once more,

the priorities

of research and those of

stress
States is the factor I would
of the United
The political preeminence
in the
most in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by comparison,
in
and
Soviet
Union
like
the
countries
rest of the world
leave
aside
China,
(I
Insofar as it
itwould be hard to speak of free social science scholarship!).
which
it seems to require the con?
the contemporary
deals primarily with
world,
so to
a
of
of
looking,
speak, at global
capable
vergence
scholarly community
or of
nation's
the
the
of
of
(i.e.,
study
foreign policy,
going beyond
phenomena
concerned with
the interstate politics of an area) and of a political establishment
the political elites are
the other. When
world affairs; each one then strengthens
to their country, because
it lacks the
is happening
obsessed only with what
or
this
of
lack
because
to
what
is
elsewhere,
power has
happening
power
shape

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

49

on another state (such as the United

bred habits of dependence
States), or be?
cause (as in the case of
are
severe
and
West
there
constraints on
Germany)
Japan
the global use of the nation's power, the chances are that the scholars will not
or receive the
to turn individual efforts
have the motivation
impulse necessary
into a genuine scientific enterprise, and will either turn to other fields with more
solid traditions and outlets (such as, say, electoral behavior in France and Brit?
ain) or merely
reflect, more or less slavishly, and with some delays, American
or
else
there will be often brilliant individual contributions,
but uncon?
fashions;
a
a Pierre
nected and unsupported:
Bull in Australia
(and England),
Hedley
name
to
a
in
not
Hassner
make
Even in
France,
just these two, do
discipline.
England and France, which have become nuclear powers, strategic studies have
been to a very large extent the preserve of a few intellectual military men, con?
cerned either with reconciling national policy with the predominant
doctrines of
or with
these.
But
the
doctrines
have re?
deterrence,
predominant
challenging
as if even in the more abstract efforts at
a
mained American,
theorizing about
that has transformed world politics, itmattered
if one was the citizen or
weapon
host of a country with a worldwide
writ. Scholars do not like to think about
on the status of their country, and on the ambi?
their intellectual dependence
to a
tions of its political elite; it disturbs their sense of belonging
cosmopolitan,
science.
of
Even
the
of
free-floating community
sociology
knowledge, which has
often looked at the debts of scholars to their countries, has been
singularly coy
about this particular kind of bond. And yet, the link exists. And it is sometimes
reinforced by institutional arrangements.
In the case of the United
States, there have been three institutional factors
that have acted as multipliers
of political connection?factors
which have not
not
and
most direct and
elsewhere.
One
is
the
existed,
certainly
simultaneously,
visible tie between
the scholarly world and the world of power: the "in-and
outer"

system

of government,

which

academics

puts

and

researchers

not

merely

in the corridors but also in the kitchens of power.

it may be wise to
Actually,
two phases. In the late forties and fifties, those kitchens remained
distinguish
the

preserves

men,
enemy,

of

the

old

and lawyers. They

with

the

travails

deterrence. They needed

ties. This was the age of
was the
period in which
had the biggest resources

establishment:

a mix

had to cope with

of

economic

of

career

the whole

reconstruction

civil

servants,

world,

with

and

the

turmoil

business?

persistent
of

nuclear

both data and ideas, and they turned to the universi?

the academic as consultant
(officially or not), and this
much research got funded by those departments
that
(Defense more than State). The year 1960 was a turn?
became proconsuls
and joined the old boys; often
ing point. Academics
they
tried to prove that they could cook spicier dishes and stir pots more
vigorously
than their colleagues.
If one had some doubts about
these
"policy scientists,"
could only be doubled by the spectacle of scientific
as it
Be
that
policy-makers.
connection
turned an intellectual
a
into
may, the Washington
pro?
interchange
fessional one. In countries with a tight separation between the career of bureau?
and the academic m?tier, such
are limited to
cracy or politics
exchanges
or
occasional formal occasions?seminars
colloquia?and
frequent diners en ville \
but the former tend to be sterile, and the latter hover between
witty debates on
current affairs, and small talk.
A second institutional factor of great
importance is the role of what I have

50

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

of power and the academic

is the network of foundations
that fed international relations research after the war, and whose role is essential
if one wants to understand exactly why the three waves of scholarship coincided
concerns of the statesmen. A combination
so
of in?
aptly with the consecutive
to "frontiers of
to
and
civic
desire
tellectual encouragement
be of
knowledge"
to a
of boards of directors composed,
service, the sociological peculiarities
large
and former officials, the happy accident of vast
extent, of former academics
financial resources that kept growing until the end of the sixties, all this made of
a
and academia.
the foundations
golden half-way house between Washington
as
in
served
the
the
institution?as
well
State; ex-State
Wasps
CIA?pardon,
officials served in the foundations;
and even those professors who had some
reservations
about serving in the government,
had no objection to applying to
It was a seamless pluralism. These precious relays exist virtual?
the foundations.
called
elsewhere
salons. The most

ly

the relays between

the kitchens
important of these dumbwaiters

else.

nowhere

third institutional opportunity was provided by the universities

them?
selves. They
had two immense virtues. They were flexible; because of their
own
and specialization,
and also be?
variety, which ensured both competition
cause of the almost complete absence of the strait jackets of public
regulations,
and intellectual
routine which
traditions, financial dependence,
quasi-feudal
of postwar Europe. The
the universities
latter got
have so often paralyzed
The

caught

in the

contradiction

between

their

own

past?a

combination

of

vocation?

for the elites?and

the sudden demands of
al training and general education
to
mass
from
confusion
could
vacillate
education;
they
collapse, but the
higher
was
to
one
do
innovate.
The
other
could
virtue
of American
rarely
thing they
resulted in part from the fact that mass higher education was al?
universities
a
of political
science, which
ready
fait accompli: they had large departments
In France
could serve as the matrices of the discipline of International Relations.
inter?
until the late sixties, in Britain until the spread of the new universities,
of histo?
national relations remained the handmaid of law, or the laughingstock
to mushroom,
the other
rians; and when political science departments
began
reasons for the development
in America were still missing.
of the discipline
as the
in America
could a creative sociologist write about the university
Only
most characteristic
the
institution of the postindustrial
age,
laboratory of its
In other

discoveries.10

countries,

universities

are

rarely

the

arenas

of

research;

on
concentrates
they are, the research funded by public institutions
for the political
issues of public policy which are rarely international?partly
reason I have mentioned
above, partly because the existence of a career foreign
the tendency to look at inter?
service with its own training programs perpetuates
Civil servants obliged
national relations as if it were still traditional diplomacy.
to deal with radically new tasks such as urbanization,
the management
of banks
think they can learn from the social sci?
and industries, or housing sometimes
ences. Civil servants who deal with so "traditional" a task as national security
and diplomacy do not always realize that the same old labels are stuck on bottles
as well as their content are new. And when diplomats discover
whose
shapes
that they too have to cope with the new, technical issues of technology,
science,
it is to "domestic" specialists of these subjects that they turn?if
and economics,
and when

they

turn

at

all.

RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL

Even

51

in America

If one looks at the field thirty years after the beginning of the "realist" revo?
The remarks which
follow
lution, can one point to any great breakthroughs?
am
more
and
I
are, of course, thoroughly
subjective,
undoubtedly
jaundiced.
struck by the dead ends than by the breakthroughs;
the
often
by
particular,
to
but
nonadditive
contributions
brilliant, occasionally
generally
elegant,
specif?
ic parts of the field, than by its overall development;
that
by the contradictions
of scholars, than by its harmony. The specific contri?
have rent its community
butions have been well analyzed in a recent volume of the Handbook of Political
Science,n and I shall not repeat what is said there. If I had to single out three
I would
list the concept of the international system, an
significant "advances,"
to
do
for
international
relations
what the concept of a political regime
attempt
does for "domestic" political science: it is a way of ordering data, a construct for
describing both the way in which the parts relate, and the way in which pat?
terns of interaction
change. It emerged from the first period I have described
to be of importance. Next,
I would mention
and
continues
the way in
above,
on
has
and
which the literature
deterrence
codified "rules of the game"
analyzed
which have been accepted as such by American
and which have
statesmen,
served as the intellectual foundation of the search for tacit as well as explicit
interstate restraints: MAD
and arms control
("Mutual Assured Destruction")
are the two controversial
but influential offsprings of the doomsday
science.
there is the current attempt to study the political roots, the originality,
Third,
and the effects of economic
in order to establish
interdependence,
particularly
it shatters the "realist" paradigm, which sees international relations as
whether
marked by the predominance
of conflict among state actors. And yet, if I were
to a recluse on a desert island, I
asked to assign three books from the discipline
would have to confess a double embarrassment:
for I would
select one that is
more than two thousand years
old?Thucydides'
Peloponnesian War, and as for
the two contemporary
ones, Kenneth Waltz' Man, the State and War12 is a work
in the tradition of political philosophy,
and Aron's Peace and War is awork in the
tradition
of
historical
grand
sociology, which dismisses many of the scientific
pretenses

of

the

French

postwar

American

of Montesquieu,

disciple
jargon; the two contemporary

is

missing.

How

us return
a field of

more

scholars,

and

emanates

from

the

genius

of

and Weber. All three works avoid

Clausewitz,
ones carry their erudition
lightly: the sweat of toil

unscientific

can

you

get?

to the
ideology I alluded to earlier. There was the hope of
a science, and the
turning
inquiry into
hope that this science would be
useful. Both quests have turned out to be frustrating. The desire to proceed
which has been manifest
in all the social sciences, has run into
scientifically,
three particular snags here. First, there was (and there remains) the
problem of
at
some
I
have
discussed
elsewhere
the
difficulties
scholars
have
theory.
length
encountered when they tried to formulate laws accounting
for the behavior of
states, and theories that would explain those laws and allow for prediction. A
more recent
comes to an
if
analysis, by Kenneth Waltz,
interesting conclusion:
mean
to
in
is
here
it
what
does
then
the
of
inter?
theory
physics,
only "theory"
national relations is that of the balance of power, and it is unfortunately
in?
sufficient to help us understand
the field! The other so-called general theories
Let

52

STANLEY

are not

more

than

HOFFMANN

conceptualizations,

grand

"confused,

using

and

vague

fluctu?

seems to
of variables."13 This may well be the case; Waltz
ating definitions
blame the theorists, rather than asking whether
the fiasco does not result from
the very nature of the field. Can there be a theory of undetermined
behavior,
which

is what

to use

action,"

"diplomatic-strategic

Aron's

amounts

terms,

to?

Aron has, in my opinion, demonstrated

be?
why
theory of undetermined
havior cannot consist of a set of propositions
that
laws
make
explaining general
and can do little more than define basic concepts,
prediction possible,
analyze
basic

out

sketch

configurations,

the

a constant

of

features

permanent

of

logic

in other words make the field intelligible.14

It is therefore not surpris?
behavior,
or vivisected,
if
of
the
theories
are, as he puts it,
dissected,
Waltz,
many
by
ing
such as the theories of imperialism, which are what he had called
reductionist,
in his earlier book "second image" theories (they find the causes of interstate
relations in what happens within the units); or else, the theories he dismisses
were all
(or fetish) stage?of
neophytish
produced during the first phase?the
for
the
of
the
scientific
the philosopher's
search
research:
postwar
equivalent
stone has been far less ardent in the past twenty years. Waltz' own attempt at
so
for theory is conceptually
rigorous as to leave out
laying the groundwork
to account for. I agree with him that a theory
much of the reality he wants
mere
reality must be removed from it and cannot be arrived at by
explaining
so
it
to
that
what
has
little
it
relation
if
removed
is
but
induction;
"explains"
in all politi?
what occurs, what is the use? One finds some of the same problems
is right in stating that international relations suffers from
cal science; but Waltz
a

fascination

instrumental

has

subject

to pursue

scholars

led

power
to

far

clearer

and

recreated,

it is the

science,

the

in

chimera

of

the

realist

actors?the

in vain

tried

in economics.

money

theories

to make

And

they

to a grand

unrelated

the
have

theory

failure.
a

theory

the paradigm

recently,

have

They
as

role

of partial

production

without

"science"

same

the

play

tantamount

behavior.

economic

acted as if the mere

until

is created,

that the study of a purposive activity aimed at a

of ends, political action, could be treated like the study of

action,
of

that

economics

They
variety

bewildering

was

are

variables

key

have believed

masterkey.

concept

"the

on it."15 Still, here as in the rest of political

by those who work

with

the

clues":
here

whereas

systems,

political

sense

common

of

"absence

peculiar
domestic

has been

a science

in

the

absence

with

of

and,

paradigm;

conflict

that of permanent

However,

paradigm.

be

still

may

state

among

theory,

second

to answer: what is it that should be explained? The field

question has been hard
insofar
has both suffered and benefited from a triple fragmentation?benefited,
to each fragment, yet suffered
as much
has
been
research
brought
ingenious
because the pieces of the puzzle do not fit. First, there has been (and still is) the
so-called level of analysis problem. Should we be primarily concerned with the
we
international
system, that is, the interactions among the units? Or should
our

concentrate
potheses
speak,

some

on

efforts
these

behind
sort

of

life

the

units

strategies.
of its own,

themselves?
One
even

postulates
if some

There

are

that

the

the

actors

of

two

so

hy?
to

have

conflicting

system
obviously

has,

in shaping and changing the rules of interaction. The

are the
that the actors themselves
strategic level for
postulates

role than others

greater
other approach
understanding

what

goes

on

among

them.

One

says,

in effect:

Grasp

the

pat

INTERNATIONAL

terns of interaction,
the

one

other

outcomes.

RELATIONS

and you will understand

at

Look

says:

the

of

Students

the

actors'

and

will
you
students

and

system

as they do;

the actors behave

why

moves,

international

53

the

comprehend
of
foreign-policy

never really blended their research. My own conclusion

is that of a
making have
writer who has worked both sides of the street: I am dissatisfied with each, but I
admit that it is hard to be on both at once. The study of the international system
one with a fine framework, but no more?precisely
because the system
provides
for the actors, but does
may well put constraints on and provide opportunities
not "dictate" their behavior; and the
study of the actors tells you, inevitably,
more

about

actors

the

than

about

the

linkage theory (before linkage became

about the bonds between
propositions
has

in the

remained

frozen

of

stage

interactions.

But

what

to be

used

called

that is,

Kissinger-inspired
technique),
foreign policy and international politics,

static

taxonomies.

at each level of analysis. One

there has also been fragmentation
Second,
that each student of international
could say, not so flippantly,
systems has
own version of what that abstract scheme "is." Aron's is not Richard
his
hugged
is not Morton

which

Rosecrance's,

one

each

Moreover,

Kaplan's.

has

to

tended

look at the postwar international

system in a different way (once again, in the
absence of a single theory, it is not easy to determine authoritatively
the dynam?
ics of

that

system

particular

still

unfolds

under

one's

eyes).

dozen

years

scholars acted as if they were competing for a prize to the best discourse
and many
subject: are we in a bipolar system? Waltz, Liska, Kissinger,
me)

(including
In recent

took
the

years,

part,
new

since

but
contest

there

was

no
there
Academy,
or Demise
"Persistence

is about

was
of

ago,

on the
others

no
prize.
the Realist

concept of international politics, with its focus

Paradigm?": Is the state-centered
on the
and its obsession with the use of force,
chessboard
diplomatic-strategic
still relevant to the age of interdependence?
and Robert
Aron, Joseph Nye
are
Edward
and
others
Morse,
Bull,
Keohane,
many
(including myself)
busy
I
As
that
the
will
verdict
be
and
that like
before,
suspect
evaluating.
history's,
in Ionesco's Chairs, it will speak in incomprehensible
the long-awaited Orator
At
of analysis, we have accumulated masses of studies
the
other
level
gibberish.
of concrete foreign policies, and moved from the period of Chinese boxes?the
theories of the 1950s?to
the age of the "bureaucratic politics"
decision-making
model. The former provided endless items for laundry lists; the other one draws
attention to the kitchen where the meal is being cooked, but forgets to tell us
that

matters

what

is whether

the

and assumes

to prepare,

ordered

chefs

cook

what

they

want

or what

they

are

all too readily that what they do is determined

in the kitchen, rather than by what they have

by their particular assignment

learned outside, or their personal quirks.
as well. If there is, or can be,
there has been functional fragmentation
Third,
no
are
if
the
satisfactory
general theory,
"overarching
concepts"
excessively
clothes,

loose-fitting

why

ic level, we have
integration
reached
ries

of

the

practical,

imperialism,

level (although

try greater

thus witnessed

(where,

of transnational

not

for once,

on

rigor

such clusters
the theoretical

ingenuity

relations

accomplishments
race models
and measurements

and

international

it tries to straddle both)

scale?

of research

"real-life"
arms

a smaller

of

the

on

system?

regional
of scholars has far out

statesmen),
of wars,

modern
recent

theo?
studies

At the foreign policy

cluster has been that of strate

economics.

the main

At

as work

54

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

now a
on
in the
growing literature
gic literature; and there is
decision-making
each cluster has tended to foster its own jargon;
United
States. Unfortunately,
has had other effects, which will be discussed
and this kind of fragmentation
below.

the quest for science has led to a heated and largely futile battle of
it iswe want to study,
in answer to a third question: Whatever
methodologies,
a
we
it is double battle. On the one hand, there is
do it? Actually,
how should
those "traditionalists" who, precisely because of the resis?
the debate between
tance the field itself opposes to rigorous theoretical formulations,
extol the vir?
tues of an approach that would remain as close to historical scholarship and to
as
the concerns of political philosophy
taken by
(this is the position
possible
own brand of
all
whatever
their
and
those
who,
Bull),
Hedley
theorizing, be?
not in the
lieve that there can be a political science of international relations?if
form of a single theory, at least in that of systematic conceptualizations,
classifi?
etc.?a
science which can be guided in its questions by the
cations, hypotheses,
discourse
yet finds reliance on philosophical
interrogations of past philosophers,
intuition both insufficient and somewhat alien to the enterprise
and diplomatic
is little likelihood that this debate will ever come to
of empirical analysis. There
Finally,

neither

because

conclusion?especially

side

is

and

consistent,

totally

one

each

tends to oversimplify what it actually does. On the other hand, here as in other
branches of political science, there is the battle of the literates versus the numer?
of
ates; or, if you prefer, the debate about the proper place and contributions
mathematical
models.
The
fact
that
methods
and
the
practitioners
quantitative
of the latter tend to hug the word science, and to put beyond the pale of science
"from the unique to the
all those who, while equally concerned with moving
events and types of entities," believe
of
with
"classes
and
considering
general"
that

cannot

these

"accumulating
to
lead one
fact

has

made

be

to

reduced

coefficients

of

expect

what

kind

for

rather

or

numbers

a connection

of

strained

relations

that

science

. . . "without

correlation"

among
among

not

does

which

in

consist
theories

asking
which
variables"16?this

scholars

of different

methodo?

In domestic political science, behaviorists

and old-fashioned
logical persuasions.
scholars have found coexistence
easier, because their respective approaches fit
behavior or the behavior of legislative bod?
separate parts of the field?electoral
treatment. In international affairs, such a func?
ies lends itself to mathematical
tional division of labor is much harder to apply. As a result, the prophets of
dismiss as mere hunches based on "insight" (aword
quantitative methodologies
were an insult) the elaborate ruminations
as
use
if
it
of their oppo?
often
they
one
turn
that
tell
calculations
in
ridicule
the
and
these
nents,
costly
nothing
about causes or lump together different types of the same phenomenon
(say,
wars), and the endless correlations among variables lifted from their context, that
evidence can be derived from
that ... no conclusive
all too often conclude
them:

endless
If there

asm

for

the

nonanswers
is little
state

to

agreement
of the science

trivial
as

questions.
to what
constitutes

of

international

a science,
relations,

what

and

little

about

enthusi?
the

other

I am struck by one apparent contradiction.

that of usefulness?
great expectation,
a
affairs have, on the whole, declared
of
international
of
science
The champions
to objective empiri?
their
and
from philosophy
their independence
allegiance
to
most
have
for the real
wanted
draw
of
them
cism. And yet,
consequences

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

55

from their research: the greater the drive to predict (or the tendency to
the
and prediction),
equate science, not just with intelligibility but with control
of the engineer. It
to play the role of the wise adviser?or
the
inclination
greater
is in the nature of human affairs, and of the social sciences.
But in this specific realm, there are some very peculiar problems. The first
could be called: advice to whom? Many scholars, especially those whose level of
to a
as if they were addressing themselves
implicitly write
analysis is systemic,
or as if they aimed at reaching those who wish to transcend
world government,
and state calculations
the traditional
(the
logic of national self-righteousness
same can be said, even more strongly, of theorists of regional or functional
to distribute
recipes for going beyong the nation-state).
integration; they tend
is empty, and change comes (if at
Statecraft
of
World
the
chair
Unfortunately,
state
And
of
the
so, scholars of this kind oscillate
all) through
agents.
operations
or retard in?
that make for conflict,
of state practices
from condemnation
world

tegration,

or

promote

injustice,

it is however

or

secretariats

advice

to

international

to state

to advice

limits of the game which

agents

on

how

to transcend

these agents' role and duty

and

subnational

bureaux

on

the

to perpetuate,
the

best

strat?

and turning the resistance of national statecraft. These are

egy for undercutting
for the scholars.
all perfect guarantees of unhappy consciousness
those
whose
level of analysis is national
Other
scholars, especially among
are advising
see themselves as efficient Machiavellians?they
decision-making,
on
to
to
how
best
and
the Prince on how best
promote the
manage his power
case
the
of the strategists, the group which
national interest. This is particularly
and policy?
of researchers turned consultants
proportion
are fully aware of the differences between an
writers
who
"Systemic"
of mankind,
that is, the "realists," do
international
system and a community
national
their best to make advice to the only Prince who still matters?the
with
their
bound to enhance the interests of his state?coincide
statesman,
views of the interests of the whole. They advocate "enlightened" concepts of the
contains

the highest

makers.

national interest, or "world order" policies that would somewhat reconcile the
needs of the part and of the whole. But this is a difficult exercise. The logical
thrust of "realism" is the promotion of the national interest, that is, not unhappy
"Realists" who become
but happy national celebration.
global consciousness
aware of the perils of realism in aworld of nuclear interconnection
and econom?
or myself?suffer
from the addi?
like Morgenthau,
ic interdependence?writers
in
that which afflicts all "systemic" writers
tion of two causes of unhappiness:
search of a radically new order, and that which comes from knowing only too
does not work.
well that utopianism
in their relations which the real world, the scholars are torn
Thus, basically,
irrelevance and absorption. Many do not like irrelevance, and want
between
even the most esoteric or abstract research to be of use. The oscillation
I have
described above is what they want to escape from, and yet they do not want to
the service of the Prince. But
be absorbed by that machine for self-righteousness,
romantic hope that "the people"
their only excuse is the populist dream?the
can be aroused and led to force the elites that control the levers of action, either
out of power altogether or to change their ways. Much of peace research, once it
got tired of advocating for the solution of world conflicts the discrete techniques
in domestic affairs, has been traveling down that route.
used for accommodation

56

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

It is one on which scholarship risks finding both irrelevance and absorption,

for
the policies advocated here do inspire both those intelligentsias
that want to
and those established
elites that
countries,
displace certain elites in developing
are eager to boost national power
dominance.
if
Yet
the
former
against foreign
come

to power, and if the latter follow the advice of

theorists,
"dependencia"
the result is not likely to be a world of peace and justice, but a world of revolu?
tions, and new conflicts, and new inequities.
As for the scholars who want to avoid esot?rica or romanticism
and who set
run
are two
in
their sights on Washington,
into
There
turn,
they,
problems.
so
reasons why the
is
is
There
the
temptation
strong.
Washingtonian
simple fact
or not, in the
that international politics remains the politics of states: whether
abstract, the actor is the shaper of or is shaped by the system, in reality there is
no doubt that the United
States remains the most potent player. And there is
the fact that a science of contemporary
politics needs data, and that in this
much

is public?in
the records of international organizations,
state
documents?a
great deal remains either classified or
speeches, published
accessible only to insiders: the specific reasons for a decision,
the way in which
it was reached, the bargains that led to a common stand, the meanderings
of a
a breakdown. Far more than domestic
of
the
circumstances
political
negotiation,
realm, whereas

relations

international

science,

is an

insider's

even

game,

for

scholars

concerned

with

the systemic level.

But a first problem lies in the fact that gathering information from and about
the most potent actor, creates an irresistible urge to nudge the player: the closer
the greater the temptation of letting oneself be
the Washingtonian
connection,
advice
suffers from oversimplification.
outsider
absorbed.
Second,
always
comes
to
it
the
When
tactical suggestions,
insiders, who control not only all the
facts

but

This

also

the
the

increases

down

the

slope

derived-from-research,
reasons

for

cacy

links

connecting
scholar's
urge

realms
separate
to
in closer.
get

of

once

Third,

to

from

research-with-practical-effects,
to
the
tendency
slight
career
either
of
personal

have

policy,

the
or

research
of

the

one

advantage.
starts
rolling

practical-advocacy
the
and to slant

political

or

advo?

bureaucratic

will become insidious. Which means that the author may still be
opportunity,
as an intelligent and skilled decision-maker?but
not as a scholar.
useful
highly
Either his science will be of little use, or else, in his attempt to apply a particular
a
pet theory or dogma, he may well become
public danger. This does not mean
is fateful to the scholar, that the greatest
that the experience of policy-making
lie in blowing up the bridge that leads across the
hope for the science would
moat into the citadel of power. A scholar-turned-statesman
can, if his science is
it
wise and his tactics flexible, find ways of applying
soundly; and he can later
draw on his experience for improving his scholarly analytical work. But it is a
delicate

exercise which

Because

few have performed

well.

ofAmerica

in America,
I have examined have arisen mainly
because the
problems
so
to
be
relations
of
international
specialists happens
preponderantly
profession
the same difficulties
Insofar as it flourishes elsewhere,
American.
appear: they
result from the nature of the field. But because of the American
predominance,
The

INTERNATIONAL

has also taken some additional

the discipline
and

can,

RELATIONS

in evidence

less

in those

other

57

are

traits which

countries

the

where

essentially

field

an object of serious study.

ing
It explains
The most striking is the quest for certainty.17
mature
the desire to calculate
the
theoretical
formulation,
to
the
but
crusade
discussions
status),
replace
merely power
such

more

data

objective

as word

counts

and

vote

counts,

the

is now

Ameri?
becom?

the rage for pre?

incalculable
(not
of motives with
crowding

of

stra?

are
given, and it becomes a quest for the means).
tegic research (here, the ends
International
relations should be the science of uncertainty,
of the limits of
states
to
never
of
in
which
but
the
action,
ways
try
manage
quite succeed in
own
a
to eliminate
their
There
drive
been
has, instead,
insecurity.
eliminating
a quest for
from the discipline all that exists in the field itself?hence
precision
Hence
that turns out false or misleading.
also two important and related gaps.
One is the study of statecraft as an art. With very few exceptions
(such as A
World Restored) it has been left to historians.
could
much
of
the same
(One
say
about domestic political
The
other
is
the
of
and
science).
study
perceptions
the
of
essential
side
international
Robert
subjective yet
misperceptions,
politics.
to fill that gap, but it is not certain that his
Jervis' work is beginning
example
will be widely followed.18 Almost by essence, the
statecraft
study of diplomatic
and of perceptions
or to a
refuses to lend itself to mathematical
formulations,
small number of significant generalizations
(one may generalize, but the result is
and case studies do not quench the thirst to
likely to be trivial). Taxonomies
to advocate.

and

predict

A second feature, intimately tied to the discipline's

principal residence rath?
er than to its nature, is the
of studies dealing with the present.
preponderance
Historians
continue to examine past diplomatic history in their way. Political
on the
scientists concerned with international affairs have concentrated
politics
of the postwar era; and when they have turned to the past, it has all too often
been either
in the way

summary, I would say almost "college outline" fashion, or

in
long ago denounced
by Barrington Moore,
Jr., which consists
feeding data detached from their context into computers. This is a very serious
weakness.
It leads not only to the neglect of a wealth of past
experiences?those
earlier
of
imperial systems, of systems of interstate relations outside Europe, of
in domestic policies far different from the contemporary
foreign policy-making
ones?but
also to a real deficiency
in our understanding
of the international
system

of

in highly

the

Because

present.

we

have

an

inadequate

basis

for

comparison,

we

are tempted to exaggerate either

continuity with a past that we know badly, or
the radical originality of the present,
on whether we are more struck
depending
we
or
the
features
deem permanent,
with those we do not believe existed
by
before. And yet a more rigorous examination of the past
might reveal that what
we sense as new
some
is
and
that
of
the
"traditional"
features are far
not,
really
more

complex

than

we

think.

are many reasons for this flaw. One is the fear of

"falling back into
we
fear
that
if
we
the
in
indeed
find gener?
history"?the
past
may
study
depth,
alizations difficult and categorization
either endless or pointless;
and we may
lose the thread of "science." A related reason is the fact that American
political
scientists do not receive sufficient
training either in history or in foreign lan?
for work on past relations among states. A third reason is
guages, indispensable
There

58

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

to be found in the very circumstances

of the discipline's birth and development.
In a way, the key question has not been, "What should we know?" It has been,
"What should we do?"?about
the Russians,
the Chinese,
the bomb, the oil
to
as
we
as
tried
to know how
We
have
know
much
in
needed
order
producers.
a motivation
to act?and
more:
we
that
find
in
other
parts of political
rarely
some dis?
science (the study of political development,
for instance), where
illusionment

set

has

in. But

we

can

say

to ourselves

that

are no

there

to

shortcuts

that the United

States cannot build nations for others,
political development,
and that we should go back to the foundations,
that is, to an understanding
of
the

others'

are

We

past.

to

unable

say

to ourselves

that

we

must

stop

having

on our
and impose amoratorium
diplomacy,
advising drive until we have found
out more about the past of
behavior. And the interest
diplomatic-strategic
the
less
which,
and,
government
quite naturally,
wisely but understandably,
the foundations
have shown in supporting research that deals with the present
it into the future, or scrutinizes the near future so as to discern
(or extrapolates
what

would

riveted

on

be sound
the

in the present)

action

has kept

the scholars'

attention

scene.

contemporary

The stress on the present and the heavily American

orientation have com?
several important issues?issues
bined to leave in the dark, at least relatively,
a determination
of the dynamics
whose
of international
study is essential to
not
is
the
relation
of
domestic
One
politics (and
merely bureaucratic
politics.
in far greater detail the
need to examine
politics) to international affairs?we
states
not
of
have
in
which
the
(or not only) from the
way
goals
originated,
of
the
but
from
the
of
domestic
actors,
play
position
political forces
geopolitical
and

economic

interests;

to act primarily
abroad

to

reach

or

the way

for the world

certain

objectives

in which

stage,

statesmen,

nevertheless

within;

or

the way

even

when

also wanted
in which

they

seemed

their moves
external

issues

and affected internal battles. The desire to

alignments
shaped domestic
relations from the rest of political sci?
of
international
the
discipline
distinguish
ence is partly responsible for this gap; scholars who study a given political sys?
to foreign policy,
tem do not usually pay all that much
attention
and the
not
do
know
of
about
international
politics simply
enough
specialists
foreign
political systems. The only country for which the bond between domestic and
in some depth is, not so surprisingly,
the
external behavior has been examined
United States. Here again, an assessment of the originality of the present?with
in the
and foreign policy concerns,
of domestic
its visible merging
especially
a much
realm of international economic affairs?requires
deeper understanding
have

of the past relations between domestic politics and foreign policy. We may dis?
stresses the primacy of foreign policy,
cover that the realist paradigm, which
has to be seriously amended, not only for the present but for the past.
zone of relative darkness is the functioning of the international hier?
Another
nature of the relations between
the weak and the
archy, or, if you prefer, the
a
on
strong. There has been (especially in the strategic literature)
glaring focus
moves
to
it (such
that
undermine
by the presumption
accompanied
bipolarity,
if the
as nuclear proliferation) would be calamitous (it may not be a coincidence
a
on
taken
the whole,
French have,
very different line). Much of the study of
if one may refer to
power in international affairs has been remarkably Athenian,
the famous Melian

dialogue

in Thucydides

(the strong do what

they can,

the

RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL

59

the strong have often dealt with the weak in ways

weak what they must). How
far more oblique, or less successful than the simple notion of a high correlation
between might and achievements would
suggest; how and under what condi?
tions

the weak

have

been

able

to offset

their

are

inferiority?these

until OPEC came along, had not been at the center of research
more historical work
again, far
ought to be undertaken.

issues

which,

and for which,

a celebration of
supposed to be
creativity seems to have degener?
ated into a series of complaints. We have found here an acute form of a general
tension between the need for so-called
problem that afflicts social science?the
basic research, which asks the more general and penetrating questions
that de?
rive from the nature of the activity under study, and the desire of those who, in
What

the

real

was

world,

support,

demand,

or

orient

the

for

research,

quick

answers

to

seems more
than the need, it
pressing issues. And if the desire often
compelling
is because of the scholars' own tendency to succumb to the Comtian temptation
This
is enhanced by the opportunities
of social engineering.
the
temptation
United States provides to scholar-kings
(or advisers to the Prince), or else by the
anxiety which scholars, however "objective" they try to be, cannot help but feel
about a world threatened with destruction
and chaos by the very logic of tradi?
tional interstate behavior.
Born and raised in America,
the discipline of international relations is, so to
to
too
It
close
the
fire.
needs
speak,
triple distance: it should move away from
the contemporary,
toward the past; from the perspective of a superpower
(and a
one), toward that of the weak and the revolutionary?away
highly conservative
from the impossible quest for stability; from the glide into policy science, back
to the steep ascent toward the peaks which the questions
raised by traditional
a
This
would
also
be
represent.
way of putting the frag?
political philosophy
ments into which the discipline
not
if
explodes,
together, at least in perspective.
in the social sciences, are the scientific priorities the decisive ones?
But where,
that exist in this country,
Without
the possibilities
the discipline might well
have avoided being stunted, only by avoiding being born. The French say that
if one does not have what one would
like, one must be content with what one
But
has got. Resigned,
content?
A state of dissatisfaction
is a goad to
perhaps.
in

research.

Scholars

satisfied:

the state of the world,

reasons

always

international

relations

have

two

good

the state of their discipline.

reasons

If only

to

be

dis?

those two

converged!

References
see my
xFor an earlier discussion,
Relations
Contemporary
Theory in International
(Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1960); and my The State ofWar (New York: Praeger,
1965), chs. 1 and 2.
2E. H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan,
1939).
3Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy inWorld Politics (New York: Harcourt,
Brace,
1942).
4Hans
Politics
(New York: Knopf,
1948).
Morgenthau,
Among Nations
5Cf. H. Stuart Hughes,
The Sea
1975).
Change (New York: Knopf,
1962; New York: Doubleday,
1966).
6Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Paris: Calmann-L?vy
7Ralf Dahrendorf,
Die angewandte
(Munich: Piper,
1963).
Aufkl?rung
8See the forthcoming
Ph.D.
thesis (Harvard University,
of History)
of Diana
Department
in Italy and France.
Pinto, who deals with postwar
sociology
in an introduction
to the field of
science written
for Harvard
fresh?
9Judith Shklar,
political
men.

60

STANLEY

HOFFMANN

10Cf. Daniel

Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial

1973).
Society (New York: Basic Books,
llHandbook of Political Science, Vol.
and Nelson
8, International Politics, Fred I. Greenstein
eds. (Reading, Mass,:
1975).
Polsby,
Addison-Wesley,
12Kenneth Waltz, Man,
the State and War (New York: Columbia
Press,
1959).
University
^Handbook ofPolitical Science, Vol.
8, International Politics, ch. 1, p. 14.
14See my The State ofWar, ch. 2.

W.

l5Handbook of Political Science, Vol.

8, International Politics, p. 8.
12.
16Ibid.,p.
see also Albert O. Hirschman,
17On this point,
as a Hindrance
"The Search for Paradigms
to
World Politics, April
1970, pp. 329-343.
Understanding,"
18See Robert
in International
Politics
Princeton
(Princeton:
Jervis, Perception and Misperception
1976).
Press,
University