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STANLEY HOFFMANN
An American
In the
past
autonomous
cal
science's
Social
International
Science:
thirty
years,
part of political
international
relations
science. Even
vicissitudes?battles
though
various
among
Relations
as a
has developed
largely
it has shared many of
politi?
orientations,
and
theories,
methods?it
in America
Only
Political
attempt at
all
times
manent
because
he
logic of behavior.
. . . then"
was
and
propositions,
using
one
to
incident
particular
describe
per?
categories
or
classificatory
terms.
"if
Modern
the
international
state
of
nature
in Hobbes',
Locke's,
and
Rousseau's
writ?
42
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
more
bearable; and they wrote about the difference between a domestic order
stable enough to afford a search for the ideal state, and an international contest
in which order has to be established first, and which often clashes with any
to justice. Similarly,
the contrast between the precepts of law and the
aspiration
realities of politics was sufficiently greater in the international realm than in the
to the empirical,
domestic realm, to make one want to shift from the normative
a
if only in order to understand
better the plight of the normative. Without
one
of
how
could
understand
the
and
fail?
study
political relations,
fumblings
ures of international
law, or the tormented debates on the foundation of obliga?
tion
among
sovereigns
unconstrained
by
common
values
or
superior
power?
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INTERNATIONAL
trials
of
actors.
intertwined
several
Where
43
were
they
no
intertwined,
science
grew. In the United States before the 1930s, there was no reason for it to grow.
to
It was only the twentieth century that brought democratization
foreign
to
from
of
the
few
issues
moved
the
calculations
the
passions
policy. Diplomatic
of the many,
both because more states joined in the game that had been the
a
actors and (mainly extra
small number of (mainly European)
of
preserve
stakes, and above all because within many states parties and interests
European)
links or pushed claims across national borders. And yet, aWorld
established
and slaughter of millions, marked the demise of
War that saw the mobilization
as a kind of debate between Wilson
and
ended
and
the old diplomatic
order,
forth
little
Lenin for the allegiance of mankind,
"scientific
brought
analysis" of
relations. Indeed, the rude intrusion of grand ideology into this
international
realm gave a new lease of life to Utopian thinking, and delayed the advent of
"how it is, and why," but "how things should be improved,
reformed, overhauled," was the order of the day. Old Liberal normative dreams
were
covenant, while at the same time
being licensed by the League of Nations
was
the young Soviet Union
itself.
calling for the abolition of diplomacy
It is against this reassertion of utopia, and particularly against the kind of "as
if thinking that mistook
the savage world of the 1930s for a community,
the
a common
a modern Church,
for
and
collective
for
that
security
League
duty,
E. H. Carr wrote the book which can be treated as the first "scientific" treat?
ment of modern world politics: Twenty Years Crisis2?the
work of a historian
intent on deflating the pretenses of Liberalism,
and driven thereby to laying the
both of a discipline
and of a normative approach, "realism," that
foundations
a future. Two
are worth
was to have
quite
paradoxes
noting. This historian who
was
a social science, did it in reaction
founding
against another historian, whose
not the
normative
Carr
deemed
of
approach
illusory?Toynbee,
philosopher
the Study ofHistory, but the idealistic commentator
of the Royal Yearbook of Inter?
national Affairs. And Carr, in his eagerness to knock out the illusions of the
social science. Not
not
idealists,
Japan
had
such asMussolini's
been
using
tively,"
some
swallowed
only
sionist powers
the
against
of
the
order
of
arguments
"tough"
Italy, Hitler's
Germany,
aimed
Versailles?arguments
say,
served
the
cause
of
the
which
revi?
appeasement.
at show?
also "objec?
was
There
triple lesson here: about the springs of empirical analysis (less a desire to under?
stand for its own sweet sake, than an itch to refute); about the impossibility,
even
for
of
opponents
a normative
to
orientation,
separate
the
empirical
and
the
normative
in their own work; and about the pitfalls of any normative dogmatism
in a realm which
is both a field for objective
and a battlefield be?
investigation
tween predatory beasts and their prey.
But
it was
the United
cumstances
not in
effort bore fruit. It was in
England that Carr's pioneering
that international relations became a discipline. Both the cir?
States
and
the
causes
deserve
some
The
scrutiny.
circumstances
were,
postwar
international
organization;
and
a mix
of
revulsion
against,
and
guilt
STANLEY
44
HOFFMANN
in appeasement.
Two books brought to America
and participation
the kind of
in England. Once was Nicholas
realism Carr had developed
Spykman's America's
was more a treatise in the
tradition of
geopolitical
Strategy inWorld Politics,3 which
than a book about the principal characteristics
Admiral Mahan or Mackinder
of
interstate politics; but it told Americans
that foreign policy is about power, not
or even
merely
primarily about ideals, and it taught that the struggle for power
was the real name for world politics. The other book was Hans
Morgenthau's
If our discipline
has any founding
Politics Among Nations.4
father, it is Mor
a historian
ganthau. Unlike Carr, he was not
by training; he had been a teacher
of international
law. Like Carr, he was revolting against Utopian thinking, past
and present. But where Carr had been an ironic and polemical Englishman
about the nature of diplomacy
in the thirties?a
sparring with other Englishmen
discussion which assumed that readers knew enough diplomatic history to make
pedantic
allusions
was
unnecessary?Morgenthau
refugee
from
suicidal
Eu?
were
derived
from
the
views
of
nineteenth-century
and
early
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
45
readers
react
and,
by
reacting,
criticizing,
correcting,
on
to build
refuting,
foundations.
Those who rejected his blueprint were led to try
Morgenthau's
other designs. He was both a goad and a foil. (Indeed, the more one agreed with
his approach, the more one was irritated by his flaws, and eager to differentiate
own
one's
product).
less
arrogantly
a writer
scholar,
dogmatic
more
modest
in his empirical scope and in his normative assertions, would never have
had such an impact on scholarship. Less sweeping, he would not have imposed
both
the
that
idea
here
was
would
two.
One
of
the
a realm
with
many
reasons
of
properties
its own.
Less
Aron's
Raymond
he
trenchant,
a peg or
monumental
Peace
and
War6?a
Aron's
normative
conclusions.
Humane
invite
skeptics
nods
and
not
sighs,
and fury; and sound and fury are good for creative
scholarship. More?
to
be discouraging;
over, Aron's own scholarship was overwhelming
enough
was
to
Morgenthau's
just shaky enough
inspire improvements.
Still, Politics Among Nations would not have played such a seminal role, if the
ground in which the seeds were planted had not been so receptive. The devel?
relations as a discipline
in the United
States results
opment of international
from the convergence
of three factors: intellectual predispositions,
political cir?
and
institutional
The
are
intellectual
cumstances,
opportunities.
predispositions
those which account for the formidable explosion of the social sciences in gener?
al in this country, since the end of the Second World War. There
is, first, the
in a nation which Ralf Dahrendorf
has called the Applied
profound conviction,
that all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them
Enlightenment,7
sound
is
to
apply
the
scientific
to
method?assumed
be
value
free,
and
to
combine
for
problem-solving
(after
all,
there
are
trial-and-error,
piecemeal
ways
of solving problems): they entail a convicci?n that there is, in each area, a kind of
an intellectual, but an
masterkey?not
merely
operational paradigm. Without
this paradigm,
no continuous
there can be muddling
progress;
through, but
once one has it, the practical
recipes will follow. We are in the presence of a
sort of national
fascinating
ideology: itmagnifies and expands eighteenth-century
What
has
ensured their triumph and their
postulates.
growth is the absence of
on the
or the Left, that
this faith either
any counterideology,
Right
challenges
or
conservative
in
its validi?
(as
did,
radically
thought
Europe)
by subordinating
ty
ence
to a
of
change
economic
reinforcing
Second,
in the
social
development,
system.
Moreover,
social
on
integration,
consequence,
the whole,
and
external
the
national
success
experi?
has
kept
and sophis
46
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
tication of the "exact sciences" were bound to benefit the social ones as well.
voices of gloom or skepticism that lament the differences between the natu?
ral world and the social world have never been very potent in America.
Pre?
one of conflict, precisely
world
social
is
because
the
because
national
cisely
The
history had entailed civil and foreign wars, the quest for certainty, the desire to
find a sure way of avoiding fiascoes and traumas, was even more burning in the
realm of the social sciences. The very contrast between an ideology of progress
reason to human concerns?an
through the deliberate application of
ideology
a social
reason
in
and faith in moral reason?and
which fuses faith
instrumental
reality inwhich the irrational often prevails both in the realm of values and in the
choice of means, breeds a kind of inflation of social science establishments
and
a new
At
the
end
of
the
One
of
the
social
war,
pretensions.
dogma appeared.
was
economics,
sciences,
to have
deemed
met
the
of
expectations
the
national
or
the mother
was
that
here
ty.
of
is not
emphasis
or of
community
of a certain
drew
international
on
the
kind of power,
to
it closer
that
effects
of
but
on
association,
science
of
scarcity,
on
creative
other
nor
the
and
and
competition,
activi?
structures
coercive
social conflict.
It
spurred.
econom?
realm of human
culture,
the
Like
greatest.
yet specialized
and
origins
particularly
was
economics
a universal
voluntary
was
relations,
to emulate
ics, political
Its
of
stepmother
the
temptation
role
This
also
eco?
power,
or
to disciplines
like anthropology
nomics,
sociology, which deal with
more diffuse phenomena
and which are less obsessed by the solution of pressing
means of
central action.
enlightened
problems by
than
in which
Nations
have
whelming
also
grandiose
after
known,
And
political
and
this
But
science
the
the United
abroad
activist
Second
has
ideology
World
War,
States
often
usually
been
of
is less
science
a considerable
expan?
served as model
more
reflective
over?
and as
than
re?
more
than therapeutic;
here and in sociology,
formist,
descriptive
although,
reacted
social
scientists
the
traditional
against
foreign
intelligentsia of moralists,
that
and
aesthetes
(not old-fashioned
by stressing
philosophers,
knowledge
were
not
at
was
least
driven
(or
wisdom)
influence), they
power
by the dream
set in,
disillusionment
when
of knowledge for power. Moreover,
(inevitably)
crises within the professions,
vio?
it took often far more drastic forms?identity
in the United
States. An ideology on probation
lent indictments outside?than
reacts to failure in the
cannot afford a fall. An ideology serenely hegemonial
manner of the work horse inOrwell's Animal Farm, or of Avis: "Iwill try harder."
a
was
A third predisposition
transplanted element: the scholars
provided by
of
who had immigrated from abroad. They played a huge role in the development
the
in
American
science in general. This role was particularly
social
important
an additional
sciences. Here,
injection of talent, but
they provided not merely
talent of a different sort. No social science ismore interesting than the questions
it asks, and these were scholars whose philosophical
training and personal expe?
to
than
ask
far
those much of American
moved
them
rience
bigger questions
so
had
asked
about
social science
far, questions
ends, not just about means;
about
choices,
not
just about
techniques;
about
social wholes,
not
just about
RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
or
towns
small
of
units
So
government.
they
47
often
as
served
conceptualizers,
their analytic skills with the research talents of the "natives." More?
a sense of history, an awareness of the diversity of
they brought with them
and blended
over,
social
that
experiences,
more
could
stir
only
research
comparative
and
some?
make
universal
thing
field of international
nuclear
later
monopolist,
the
nuclear
was
superior,
far more
to
interesting
or the
many students than local politics, or the politics of Congress,
politics of
a
concern
in the
for America's
conduct
group pluralism. Almost
inevitably,
a
for
the
world
of
international
whole
world blended with
relations,
study
seemed
to be
stake
the
of
confrontation.
the American-Soviet
Here
was
a do?
main which was both a virgin field for study and the arena of a titanic contest.
To study United
States foreign policy was to study the international
system.
To study the international system could not fail to bring one back to the role of
the United
States.
the
Moreover,
or to criticize
to
temptation
give
to offer
advice,
even more
courses
of
by the
spotty character and the gaffes of past American behavior in world affairs, by the
in American
thinness of the veneer of professionalism
diplomacy,
by the eager?
was the one-eyed
ness of officialdom
for guidance?America
leading the
two drives merged,
for the benefit of the discipline
and to its
cripples. Thus,
action,
detriment
also,
in
some
ways:
the
desire
or
to
concentrate
to want
on
irresistible
what
is
the most
to be useful,
not only as
relevant, and the tendency (implicit
explicit)
a scientist, but as an expert citizen whose science can help promote
intelligently
that was not negligible,
the embattled values of his country (a motive
among
newcomers
was all too easy to assume that the
to America
it
For
especially).
values that underlie scientific research?the
respect for truth, freedom of inves?
of
and
of
also those for which Washing?
discussion,
publication?were
tigation,
ton stood in world affairs.
as I have just said, what the scholars offered, the policy-makers
Second,
wanted.
between their
Indeed, there is a remarkable chronological
convergence
needs and the scholars' performances.
Let us oversimplify
the
greatly. What
leaders looked for, once the cold war started, was some intellectual compass
48
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
serve multiple
functions: exorcise isolationism,
which would
and justify a per?
manent and global involvement
in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation
of
of
and
the
methods
of
the
containment
intervention,
power,
appar?
techniques
to a public of idealists
why international
ently required by the cold war; explain
not leave much leeway for pure good will, and indeed besmirches
politics does
force
purity; appease the frustrations of the bellicose by showing why unlimited
or
on
extremism
of
behalf
liberty
was
no
virtue;
and
reassure
a nation
eager
for
ultimate
was
there
Indeed,
necessary.
was
always
sufficient
margin
of
disagreement
with
nuclear
and
deterrence
conventional
(or
subconventional)
limited
uses,
re?
a
asset.
important aspect of power and major American
Here again, in the literature, the attempt at finding principles for any "strategy
to devise a
is inseparable from the tendency
in a nuclear world
of conflict"
mass
a
at
sides
had
of
destruc?
both
when
time
for
America,
weapons
strategy
mained
tion,
both
and
when
the most
there
were
serious
problems
of
alliance
management,
guerrilla
wars,
Once more,
the priorities
stress
States is the factor I would
of the United
The political preeminence
in the
most in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by comparison,
in
and
Soviet
Union
like
the
countries
rest of the world
leave
aside
China,
(I
Insofar as it
itwould be hard to speak of free social science scholarship!).
which
it seems to require the con?
the contemporary
deals primarily with
world,
so to
a
of
of
looking,
speak, at global
capable
vergence
scholarly community
or of
nation's
the
the
of
of
(i.e.,
study
foreign policy,
going beyond
phenomena
concerned with
the interstate politics of an area) and of a political establishment
the political elites are
the other. When
world affairs; each one then strengthens
to their country, because
it lacks the
is happening
obsessed only with what
or
this
of
lack
because
to
what
is
elsewhere,
power has
happening
power
shape
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
49
system
of government,
which
academics
puts
and
researchers
not
merely
preserves
men,
enemy,
of
the
old
the
travails
establishment:
a mix
economic
of
career
the whole
reconstruction
civil
servants,
world,
with
and
the
turmoil
business?
persistent
of
nuclear
50
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
ly
else.
nowhere
caught
in the
contradiction
between
their
own
past?a
combination
of
vocation?
discoveries.10
countries,
universities
are
rarely
the
arenas
of
research;
on
concentrates
they are, the research funded by public institutions
for the political
issues of public policy which are rarely international?partly
reason I have mentioned
above, partly because the existence of a career foreign
the tendency to look at inter?
service with its own training programs perpetuates
Civil servants obliged
national relations as if it were still traditional diplomacy.
to deal with radically new tasks such as urbanization,
the management
of banks
think they can learn from the social sci?
and industries, or housing sometimes
ences. Civil servants who deal with so "traditional" a task as national security
and diplomacy do not always realize that the same old labels are stuck on bottles
as well as their content are new. And when diplomats discover
whose
shapes
that they too have to cope with the new, technical issues of technology,
science,
it is to "domestic" specialists of these subjects that they turn?if
and economics,
and when
they
turn
at
all.
RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
Even
51
in America
If one looks at the field thirty years after the beginning of the "realist" revo?
The remarks which
follow
lution, can one point to any great breakthroughs?
am
more
and
I
are, of course, thoroughly
subjective,
undoubtedly
jaundiced.
struck by the dead ends than by the breakthroughs;
the
often
by
particular,
to
but
nonadditive
contributions
brilliant, occasionally
generally
elegant,
specif?
ic parts of the field, than by its overall development;
that
by the contradictions
of scholars, than by its harmony. The specific contri?
have rent its community
butions have been well analyzed in a recent volume of the Handbook of Political
Science,n and I shall not repeat what is said there. If I had to single out three
I would
list the concept of the international system, an
significant "advances,"
to
do
for
international
relations
what the concept of a political regime
attempt
does for "domestic" political science: it is a way of ordering data, a construct for
describing both the way in which the parts relate, and the way in which pat?
terns of interaction
change. It emerged from the first period I have described
to be of importance. Next,
I would mention
and
continues
the way in
above,
on
has
and
which the literature
deterrence
codified "rules of the game"
analyzed
which have been accepted as such by American
and which have
statesmen,
served as the intellectual foundation of the search for tacit as well as explicit
interstate restraints: MAD
and arms control
("Mutual Assured Destruction")
are the two controversial
but influential offsprings of the doomsday
science.
there is the current attempt to study the political roots, the originality,
Third,
and the effects of economic
in order to establish
interdependence,
particularly
it shatters the "realist" paradigm, which sees international relations as
whether
marked by the predominance
of conflict among state actors. And yet, if I were
to a recluse on a desert island, I
asked to assign three books from the discipline
would have to confess a double embarrassment:
for I would
select one that is
more than two thousand years
old?Thucydides'
Peloponnesian War, and as for
the two contemporary
ones, Kenneth Waltz' Man, the State and War12 is a work
in the tradition of political philosophy,
and Aron's Peace and War is awork in the
tradition
of
historical
grand
sociology, which dismisses many of the scientific
pretenses
of
the
French
postwar
American
of Montesquieu,
disciple
jargon; the two contemporary
is
missing.
How
us return
a field of
more
scholars,
and
emanates
from
the
genius
of
unscientific
can
you
get?
to the
ideology I alluded to earlier. There was the hope of
a science, and the
turning
inquiry into
hope that this science would be
useful. Both quests have turned out to be frustrating. The desire to proceed
which has been manifest
in all the social sciences, has run into
scientifically,
three particular snags here. First, there was (and there remains) the
problem of
at
some
I
have
discussed
elsewhere
the
difficulties
scholars
have
theory.
length
encountered when they tried to formulate laws accounting
for the behavior of
states, and theories that would explain those laws and allow for prediction. A
more recent
comes to an
if
analysis, by Kenneth Waltz,
interesting conclusion:
mean
to
in
is
here
it
what
does
then
the
of
inter?
theory
physics,
only "theory"
national relations is that of the balance of power, and it is unfortunately
in?
sufficient to help us understand
the field! The other so-called general theories
Let
52
STANLEY
are not
more
than
HOFFMANN
conceptualizations,
grand
"confused,
using
and
vague
fluctu?
seems to
of variables."13 This may well be the case; Waltz
ating definitions
blame the theorists, rather than asking whether
the fiasco does not result from
the very nature of the field. Can there be a theory of undetermined
behavior,
which
is what
to use
action,"
"diplomatic-strategic
Aron's
amounts
terms,
to?
out
sketch
configurations,
the
a constant
of
features
permanent
of
logic
fascination
instrumental
has
subject
to pursue
scholars
led
power
to
far
clearer
and
recreated,
it is the
science,
the
in
chimera
of
the
realist
actors?the
in vain
tried
in economics.
money
theories
to make
And
they
to a grand
unrelated
the
have
theory
failure.
a
theory
the paradigm
recently,
have
They
as
role
of partial
production
without
"science"
same
the
play
tantamount
behavior.
economic
until
is created,
action,
of
that
economics
They
variety
bewildering
was
are
variables
key
have believed
masterkey.
concept
"the
the
clues":
here
whereas
systems,
political
sense
common
of
"absence
peculiar
domestic
has been
a science
in
the
absence
with
of
and,
paradigm;
conflict
that of permanent
However,
paradigm.
be
still
may
state
among
theory,
second
concentrate
potheses
speak,
some
on
efforts
these
behind
sort
of
life
the
units
strategies.
of its own,
themselves?
One
even
postulates
if some
There
are
that
the
the
actors
of
two
so
hy?
to
have
conflicting
system
obviously
has,
greater
other approach
understanding
what
goes
on
among
them.
One
says,
in effect:
Grasp
the
pat
INTERNATIONAL
terns of interaction,
the
one
other
outcomes.
RELATIONS
Look
says:
the
of
Students
the
actors'
and
will
you
students
and
system
as they do;
why
moves,
international
53
the
comprehend
of
foreign-policy
about
actors
the
than
about
the
in the
remained
frozen
of
stage
interactions.
But
what
to be
used
called
that is,
Kissinger-inspired
technique),
foreign policy and international politics,
static
taxonomies.
which
Rosecrance's,
one
each
Moreover,
Kaplan's.
has
to
tended
that
system
particular
still
unfolds
under
one's
eyes).
dozen
years
scholars acted as if they were competing for a prize to the best discourse
and many
subject: are we in a bipolar system? Waltz, Liska, Kissinger,
me)
(including
In recent
took
the
years,
part,
new
since
but
contest
there
was
no
there
Academy,
or Demise
"Persistence
is about
was
of
ago,
on the
others
no
prize.
the Realist
matters
what
is whether
the
and assumes
to prepare,
ordered
chefs
cook
what
they
want
or what
they
are
loose-fitting
why
ic level, we have
integration
reached
ries
of
the
practical,
imperialism,
level (although
try greater
thus witnessed
(where,
of transnational
not
for once,
on
rigor
such clusters
the theoretical
ingenuity
relations
accomplishments
race models
and measurements
and
international
scale?
of research
"real-life"
arms
a smaller
of
the
on
system?
regional
of scholars has far out
statesmen),
of wars,
modern
recent
theo?
studies
economics.
the main
At
as work
54
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
now a
on
in the
growing literature
gic literature; and there is
decision-making
each cluster has tended to foster its own jargon;
United
States. Unfortunately,
has had other effects, which will be discussed
and this kind of fragmentation
below.
the quest for science has led to a heated and largely futile battle of
it iswe want to study,
in answer to a third question: Whatever
methodologies,
a
we
it is double battle. On the one hand, there is
do it? Actually,
how should
those "traditionalists" who, precisely because of the resis?
the debate between
tance the field itself opposes to rigorous theoretical formulations,
extol the vir?
tues of an approach that would remain as close to historical scholarship and to
as
the concerns of political philosophy
taken by
(this is the position
possible
own brand of
all
whatever
their
and
those
who,
Bull),
Hedley
theorizing, be?
not in the
lieve that there can be a political science of international relations?if
form of a single theory, at least in that of systematic conceptualizations,
classifi?
etc.?a
science which can be guided in its questions by the
cations, hypotheses,
discourse
yet finds reliance on philosophical
interrogations of past philosophers,
intuition both insufficient and somewhat alien to the enterprise
and diplomatic
is little likelihood that this debate will ever come to
of empirical analysis. There
Finally,
neither
because
conclusion?especially
side
is
and
consistent,
totally
one
each
tends to oversimplify what it actually does. On the other hand, here as in other
branches of political science, there is the battle of the literates versus the numer?
of
ates; or, if you prefer, the debate about the proper place and contributions
mathematical
models.
The
fact
that
methods
and
the
practitioners
quantitative
of the latter tend to hug the word science, and to put beyond the pale of science
"from the unique to the
all those who, while equally concerned with moving
events and types of entities," believe
of
with
"classes
and
considering
general"
that
cannot
these
"accumulating
to
lead one
fact
has
made
be
to
reduced
coefficients
of
expect
what
kind
for
rather
or
numbers
a connection
of
strained
relations
that
science
. . . "without
correlation"
among
among
not
does
which
in
consist
theories
asking
which
variables"16?this
scholars
of different
methodo?
endless
If there
asm
for
the
nonanswers
is little
state
to
agreement
of the science
trivial
as
questions.
to what
constitutes
of
international
a science,
relations,
what
and
little
about
enthusi?
the
other
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
55
from their research: the greater the drive to predict (or the tendency to
the
and prediction),
equate science, not just with intelligibility but with control
of the engineer. It
to play the role of the wise adviser?or
the
inclination
greater
is in the nature of human affairs, and of the social sciences.
But in this specific realm, there are some very peculiar problems. The first
could be called: advice to whom? Many scholars, especially those whose level of
to a
as if they were addressing themselves
implicitly write
analysis is systemic,
or as if they aimed at reaching those who wish to transcend
world government,
and state calculations
the traditional
(the
logic of national self-righteousness
same can be said, even more strongly, of theorists of regional or functional
to distribute
recipes for going beyong the nation-state).
integration; they tend
is empty, and change comes (if at
Statecraft
of
World
the
chair
Unfortunately,
state
And
of
the
so, scholars of this kind oscillate
all) through
agents.
operations
or retard in?
that make for conflict,
of state practices
from condemnation
world
tegration,
or
promote
injustice,
it is however
or
secretariats
advice
to
international
to state
to advice
agents
on
how
to transcend
subnational
bureaux
on
the
to perpetuate,
the
best
strat?
the highest
makers.
national interest, or "world order" policies that would somewhat reconcile the
needs of the part and of the whole. But this is a difficult exercise. The logical
thrust of "realism" is the promotion of the national interest, that is, not unhappy
"Realists" who become
but happy national celebration.
global consciousness
aware of the perils of realism in aworld of nuclear interconnection
and econom?
or myself?suffer
from the addi?
like Morgenthau,
ic interdependence?writers
in
that which afflicts all "systemic" writers
tion of two causes of unhappiness:
search of a radically new order, and that which comes from knowing only too
does not work.
well that utopianism
in their relations which the real world, the scholars are torn
Thus, basically,
irrelevance and absorption. Many do not like irrelevance, and want
between
even the most esoteric or abstract research to be of use. The oscillation
I have
described above is what they want to escape from, and yet they do not want to
the service of the Prince. But
be absorbed by that machine for self-righteousness,
romantic hope that "the people"
their only excuse is the populist dream?the
can be aroused and led to force the elites that control the levers of action, either
out of power altogether or to change their ways. Much of peace research, once it
got tired of advocating for the solution of world conflicts the discrete techniques
in domestic affairs, has been traveling down that route.
used for accommodation
56
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
is public?in
the records of international organizations,
state
documents?a
great deal remains either classified or
speeches, published
accessible only to insiders: the specific reasons for a decision,
the way in which
it was reached, the bargains that led to a common stand, the meanderings
of a
a breakdown. Far more than domestic
of
the
circumstances
political
negotiation,
realm, whereas
relations
international
science,
is an
insider's
even
game,
for
scholars
concerned
with
but
This
also
the
the
increases
down
the
slope
derived-from-research,
reasons
for
cacy
links
connecting
scholar's
urge
realms
separate
to
in closer.
get
of
once
Third,
to
from
research-with-practical-effects,
to
the
tendency
slight
career
either
of
personal
have
policy,
the
or
research
of
the
one
advantage.
starts
rolling
practical-advocacy
the
and to slant
political
or
advo?
bureaucratic
will become insidious. Which means that the author may still be
opportunity,
as an intelligent and skilled decision-maker?but
not as a scholar.
useful
highly
Either his science will be of little use, or else, in his attempt to apply a particular
a
pet theory or dogma, he may well become
public danger. This does not mean
is fateful to the scholar, that the greatest
that the experience of policy-making
lie in blowing up the bridge that leads across the
hope for the science would
moat into the citadel of power. A scholar-turned-statesman
can, if his science is
it
wise and his tactics flexible, find ways of applying
soundly; and he can later
draw on his experience for improving his scholarly analytical work. But it is a
delicate
exercise which
Because
well.
ofAmerica
in America,
I have examined have arisen mainly
because the
problems
so
to
be
relations
of
international
specialists happens
preponderantly
profession
the same difficulties
Insofar as it flourishes elsewhere,
American.
appear: they
result from the nature of the field. But because of the American
predominance,
The
INTERNATIONAL
the discipline
and
can,
RELATIONS
in evidence
less
in those
other
57
are
traits which
countries
the
where
essentially
field
more
data
objective
as word
counts
and
vote
counts,
the
is now
Ameri?
becom?
of
stra?
are
given, and it becomes a quest for the means).
tegic research (here, the ends
International
relations should be the science of uncertainty,
of the limits of
states
to
never
of
in
which
but
the
action,
ways
try
manage
quite succeed in
own
a
to eliminate
their
There
drive
been
has, instead,
insecurity.
eliminating
a quest for
from the discipline all that exists in the field itself?hence
precision
Hence
that turns out false or misleading.
also two important and related gaps.
One is the study of statecraft as an art. With very few exceptions
(such as A
World Restored) it has been left to historians.
could
much
of
the same
(One
say
about domestic political
The
other
is
the
of
and
science).
study
perceptions
the
of
essential
side
international
Robert
subjective yet
misperceptions,
politics.
to fill that gap, but it is not certain that his
Jervis' work is beginning
example
will be widely followed.18 Almost by essence, the
statecraft
study of diplomatic
and of perceptions
or to a
refuses to lend itself to mathematical
formulations,
small number of significant generalizations
(one may generalize, but the result is
and case studies do not quench the thirst to
likely to be trivial). Taxonomies
to advocate.
and
predict
of
in highly
the
Because
present.
we
have
an
inadequate
basis
for
comparison,
we
complex
than
we
think.
58
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
set
has
in. But
we
can
say
to ourselves
that
are no
there
to
shortcuts
others'
are
We
past.
to
unable
say
to ourselves
that
we
must
stop
having
on our
and impose amoratorium
diplomacy,
advising drive until we have found
out more about the past of
behavior. And the interest
diplomatic-strategic
the
less
which,
and,
government
quite naturally,
wisely but understandably,
the foundations
have shown in supporting research that deals with the present
it into the future, or scrutinizes the near future so as to discern
(or extrapolates
what
would
riveted
on
be sound
the
in the present)
action
has kept
the scholars'
attention
scene.
contemporary
economic
interests;
to act primarily
abroad
to
reach
or
the way
objectives
in which
stage,
statesmen,
nevertheless
within;
or
the way
even
when
also wanted
in which
they
seemed
their moves
external
issues
of the past relations between domestic politics and foreign policy. We may dis?
stresses the primacy of foreign policy,
cover that the realist paradigm, which
has to be seriously amended, not only for the present but for the past.
zone of relative darkness is the functioning of the international hier?
Another
nature of the relations between
the weak and the
archy, or, if you prefer, the
a
on
strong. There has been (especially in the strategic literature)
glaring focus
moves
to
it (such
that
undermine
by the presumption
accompanied
bipolarity,
if the
as nuclear proliferation) would be calamitous (it may not be a coincidence
a
on
taken
the whole,
French have,
very different line). Much of the study of
if one may refer to
power in international affairs has been remarkably Athenian,
the famous Melian
dialogue
in Thucydides
they can,
the
RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL
59
the weak
have
been
able
to offset
their
are
inferiority?these
until OPEC came along, had not been at the center of research
more historical work
again, far
ought to be undertaken.
issues
which,
a celebration of
supposed to be
creativity seems to have degener?
ated into a series of complaints. We have found here an acute form of a general
tension between the need for so-called
problem that afflicts social science?the
basic research, which asks the more general and penetrating questions
that de?
rive from the nature of the activity under study, and the desire of those who, in
What
the
real
was
world,
support,
demand,
or
orient
the
for
research,
quick
answers
to
seems more
than the need, it
pressing issues. And if the desire often
compelling
is because of the scholars' own tendency to succumb to the Comtian temptation
This
is enhanced by the opportunities
of social engineering.
the
temptation
United States provides to scholar-kings
(or advisers to the Prince), or else by the
anxiety which scholars, however "objective" they try to be, cannot help but feel
about a world threatened with destruction
and chaos by the very logic of tradi?
tional interstate behavior.
Born and raised in America,
the discipline of international relations is, so to
to
too
It
close
the
fire.
needs
speak,
triple distance: it should move away from
the contemporary,
toward the past; from the perspective of a superpower
(and a
one), toward that of the weak and the revolutionary?away
highly conservative
from the impossible quest for stability; from the glide into policy science, back
to the steep ascent toward the peaks which the questions
raised by traditional
a
This
would
also
be
represent.
way of putting the frag?
political philosophy
ments into which the discipline
not
if
explodes,
together, at least in perspective.
in the social sciences, are the scientific priorities the decisive ones?
But where,
that exist in this country,
Without
the possibilities
the discipline might well
have avoided being stunted, only by avoiding being born. The French say that
if one does not have what one would
like, one must be content with what one
But
has got. Resigned,
content?
A state of dissatisfaction
is a goad to
perhaps.
in
research.
Scholars
satisfied:
reasons
always
international
relations
have
two
good
reasons
If only
to
be
dis?
those two
converged!
References
see my
xFor an earlier discussion,
Relations
Contemporary
Theory in International
(Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1960); and my The State ofWar (New York: Praeger,
1965), chs. 1 and 2.
2E. H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan,
1939).
3Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy inWorld Politics (New York: Harcourt,
Brace,
1942).
4Hans
Politics
(New York: Knopf,
1948).
Morgenthau,
Among Nations
5Cf. H. Stuart Hughes,
The Sea
1975).
Change (New York: Knopf,
1962; New York: Doubleday,
1966).
6Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Paris: Calmann-L?vy
7Ralf Dahrendorf,
Die angewandte
(Munich: Piper,
1963).
Aufkl?rung
8See the forthcoming
Ph.D.
thesis (Harvard University,
of History)
of Diana
Department
in Italy and France.
Pinto, who deals with postwar
sociology
in an introduction
to the field of
science written
for Harvard
fresh?
9Judith Shklar,
political
men.
60
STANLEY
HOFFMANN
10Cf. Daniel
W.