Was Ghazali merely an opponent

of Philosophy?
It was long held that Ghazalis Tahafut spelled the end of the philosophical
tradition in the Islamic world. Whilst it is clear now that such a picture is
largely inaccurate, recent scholarship on Ghazali has held diverging views
on his relation to philosophy. Views range from the Straussian charge of
esoterism levelled by Gairdner, now known as the Ghazali problem, to
views of those such as Frank who hold that Ghazali consistently espoused
an Avicennan philosophy over the course of his career. In contrast, in this
essay I will argue that the best way to understand Ghazalis position
towards philosophy is by conceptualizing him as an Ashari. Whilst he did
differ from his Ashari predecessors on some particulars, he agreed with
them on all major issues. Most crucially, he was an embodiment of the
Ashari raison detre: the project of fairly balancing the claims of reason
and revelation in order to steer clear of both textual and rational
literalism. In this way, Ghazali wasnt merely an opponent of philosophy,
but rather someone who took the best from it and integrated it in order to
strengthen Asharism. In this essay I shall first analyse Ghazalis
epistemology, showing that he agreed with many of the philosophers
methods and used them to rigorously systematize the process of
scriptural interpretation. I shall then discuss his conclusions in
metaphysics and spiritual psychology where, having sanitized philosophy
by identifying the 3 conclusions that were incompatible with belief in the
Tahafut, he appropriated philosophical methods to make kalam more
demonstrative.
The reason for the emergence of the Ashari school was the need to
balance the conflicting claims of reason and revelation in the most
appropriate way. Whilst the outcomes of the project had received
significant support from Muslim scholars, its procedure had yet to be
systematized and this task was carried out by Ghazali. What appealed
most to Ghazali about the philosophical tradition was the stratification of
rational arguments based on Aristotles Organon. For him the
demonstration apodeixis - was the gold standard of reasoning and
allowed one to reach definite conclusions. For Ghazali, it was the
demonstration and the demonstration only that carried the force to
demand a reinterpretation of scripture. It was by limiting the scope of
reason in this way that Ghazali was able to preserve the integrity of
scripture in a systematic way. The key challenge came from the falasifa
who claimed to have demonstrated various doctrines which were opposed
to revelation. It was for this purpose that Ghazali composed his Tahafut
the fundamental purpose of which was to elucidate the doctrines where
the philosophers had thought that they had achieved demonstration, but,
by their own standards it was nothing but the sort. He says that In this
book we have undertaken only to muddy their doctrine and throw dust in
the face of their proofs with that which would reveal their incoherence. We

have not taken to defend a specific doctrine1. Given how much of

metaphysics was indemonstrable, with the Tahafut, Ghazali rendered
falsafa indolent to scripture, thus opening the door to literal acceptance.
Ghazalis attack stunted the scope of the posterior analytics and brought
much of metaphysics into the realm of dialectics thus most conclusions
were to be probably true rather than demonstrably true. The most notable
example being the immateriality of the soul, a position Ghazali shared an
affinity for but felt that reason couldnt establish by itself. The
systematization of this approach came later, with the Faysal. In it Ghazali
expounded his Universal Rule of Interpretation. With this approach, each
term in revelation had a referent and these referents could occupy one of
5 levels of being: corporeal, sensible, imaginal, conceptual and
metaphorical. Disbelief would result if someone were to deny that a term
had a referent at any of the levels. Orthodoxy, on the other hand, was
marked by accepting all levels that were possible. Critically, Ghazali
allowed levels of reference to be discounted on account of a
demonstrative syllogism. In this way, the Quranic hand of God would
only have a conceptual and metaphorical reference. Thus, for Al Ghazali,
when it came to interpreting revelation, the intellect had only one role
establishing modality. It may be argued that Ghazalis elevation of the
rank of falsafas demonstrative syllogism above that of revelation is a
huge concession on his part to the philosophers, however, the reality is
that for Ghazali, reason itself took on the form of revelation. Not only did
Ghazali indigenize logic into the Islamic science, he found it at home. In
his book Qistas al Mustaqim he shows the various types of syllogism that
are employed in passages in the Quran and organizes them into a system
that can be used as a new Prior Analytics for interpretation and reasoning.
What is remarkable is that the Qistas only accepted the first 3 syllogistic
figures as valid methods of reasoning, rejecting Aristotles fourth figure as
there were no examples of it in the Quran. It is unsurprising that Ghazali
would feel the need to ground reason in revelation in this way, for him
reason was not something independent from God, in fact the radical
skepticism that had made him call into question the most primary axioms
in his teenage years was only resolved by the effect of a light which God
Most High cast into [his] breast2. For Ghazali, the syllogism was a form of
Gods speech to man, just as the Quran was; he said that after the major
premise and minor premise are formed, the conclusion comes from
God.3 Thus for Ghazali, reconciling reason and revelation was nothing
other than a process of reconciling two forms of revelation.
Ghazali didnt simply challenge the Prior Analytics, he posed a powerful
opposition to the Posterior Analytics too. His Tahafut marks a nominalist
critique of philosophy. Specifically, for him apparent causes were to be
investigated by empirical induction (to find patterns) rather than rational
induction (to find essences), his approach squaring well with his mystical
empiricism also. Ghazalis nominalist critique came from Ashari ontology,
1 GHAZZALI, & MARMURA, M. E. (2000).
2 ORMSBY, E. L. (2008).
3 GRIFFEL, F. (2009). p213

which made him bring into question whether universals have any
existence outside individual minds. Ghazalis nominalism is moderate
though, for he accepts the possibility of objective universals existing in a
sublunar intellect, however for him this is indemonstrable. One could
argue that this attack on epistemological realism severely undermined the
scope of philosophy, however, on the other hand, one could argue that
this perspective greatly expands the scope of investigation: for Ghazali,
even miracles were to be included within customary causal chains and
thus were within the scope of inductive natural sciences, he argues that
the only reason that we cant explain them is because of our ignorance of
physics. His inclusion of particulars into the scope of rational investigation
marks a significant divergence from the Posterior Analytics which focuses
only on universal knowledge. Ghazali here should be contrasted with
Averroes for whom miracles, being particulars, cant even meaningfully be
discussed and are beyond the realm of philosophy. Averroes presents a
solidified and completed view of knowledge, Ghazali on the other hand
brings the scientific method much more in line with the modern method
that which focuses on the particulars and the exceptions unlike the
Posterior Analytics.

When it came to Ashari kalam, Ghazali was seamless at integrating

appropriate philosophical distinctions. His Iqtisad uses the demonstrative
syllogism like no prior kalam text and also incorporates Avicennas proof
of the necessary existent. However, Ghazalis adoption of Avicennas
theology wasnt without reserve. For Avicenna, Gods necessity was both
transitive and intransitive. The transitive aspect of necessity, in Ghazalis
eyes, made God a necessitarian automaton and certainly not a fail by any
sense of the word as he argued in the 3rd discussion of the Tahafut.
Ghazalis God had intransitive necessity but also had eternal attributes
that removed the transitive aspect. The 3rd to 13th discussions in the
Tahafut are devoted to showing the indemonstrability of many of the
philosophers conclusions concerning Gods attributes. Most saliently, for
Ghazali as an Ashari, will is one of the attributes of God with which he
chooses what to create without compulsion. Ghazalis statement in the
Ihya that laysa fi al imkaan laysa mimma kaan has inspired great
controversy with Frank suggesting that a strong interpretation of
impossibility is in order, arguing that Ghazali, as a clandestine
philosopher, thought that the world was necessitated by Gods essence.
However, it is clear that for Ghazali, the universe stems from Gods will as
opposed to Avicenna for whom it stemmed from Gods knowledge. Ghazali
repeatedly emphasizes that the will is an attribute that is additional to the
essence. For this reason, Ghazalis statement should be interpreted as
arguing for necessity through Gods will and not necessity through Gods
essence.

Ghazali heavily incorporates Avicennas concept of modality (arguing in

fact that it is the main role of reason to make a judgement concerning it).
However, modality becomes something quite different with Ghazali as a
result of his Ashari background. Firstly, Ghazali challenges Avicennas
frequentist position on modality, instead espousing the more modern
conception modality as a function of synchronic alternatives, such a
position was based on Ashari kalam which described God as a
particularizing agent that chose between multiple possibilities. Secondly,
like his teacher Juwayni, Ghazali gives modality a nominalist takedown.
This is seen in the 4th position in the 1st discussion of the Tahafut where
Ghazali says that modalities are rational propositions that do not require
an existent so as to be rendered a description thereof4. For Ghazali,
modalities are judgments of the mind and do not have any
correspondence in the real world. This is unlikely just a position that
Ghazali espouses insincerely to refute the philosophers, the origin of such
a position is likely in the Ashari commitment to the impossibility of
potentialities in nature, both because they would limit Gods power and
due to their position that an unrealized potentiality violates the law of
non-contradiction. The inherence of possibility in matter for Avicenna was
seen by Ghazali as a potentiality which could not be real, but solely a
judgment of the mind. Ghazalis rejection of the reality of modalities
strikes at the heart of Avicennas hylomorphism which is based on the
idea of potentialities which manfest in matter. However, Ghazali continued
his critique by arguing that even beyond modality, many of the predicates
that we use to understand reality arent part of the worlds formal or
ontological structure. It is hard to overstate the damage of Ghazalis
disconnection of the world formal structure from our mental predicates, it
crippled the foundations of Avicennas theory of knowledge and the
Posterior Analytics view of reality as ontologically syllogistic. However,
Ghazalis nominalist approach to philosophy also had a startling
consequence monism. Treiger has shown that in his Mishkat al Anwar
Ghazali argues for monism, the idea that there is nothing in existence
other than God. He says that [God] is everything. Moreover, nothing save
He has a he-ness, except metaphorically (la huwiyya li-ghayrihi illa bilmajz)5. Monism is the child of the marriage of kalam and falsafa and it
may be argued that both were necessary to lead to it. Asharism provided
the latent foundations for monism, this was through its nominalism and its
time atomism which highlighted the utter insubstantiality of the cosmos.
In addition, Baqillanis view that the duration (existence) of an atom was
itself an accident that had to be recreated at each instant really seemed
to leave nothing substantial within the atom and by extension within the
cosmos. However, it was only when these principles were unleashed onto
Avicennas essence existence distinction and his conception of God as the
necessary existent for whom essence and existence are one that monism
was born. For if modality was only a judgement of the mind, there were no
contingent existents substantially separate to the necessary existent,
rather there was only existence; and since existence and Gods essence
4 GHAZZALI, & MARMURA, M. E. (2000).
5 GHAZZALI, & BUCHMAN, D. (1998).

were one and the same, there was only God. Such a position would be
developed by Ghazalis student Ibn Arabi and his students further into a
cogent philosophical system characterized by wahdat al wujud. So here
we note that whilst Ghazalis Mishkat is commonly considered to be the
greatest sign of Ghazalis capitulation to philosophy, it is rather the
pinnacle of Ghazalis use of falsafa to transcendentalise Asharism.
A discussion of Ghazalis metaphysics would be incomplete without
recourse to his position on causation. The primary purpose of his rejection
of necessary causation in the Tahafut was to execute a powerful takedown
of the ability of philosophy to discard miracles in scripture. However, there
is disagreement concerning Ghazalis position on the ontological nature of
causality. For a philosopher, the notion that causal connections are not
necessary would imply, based on their frequentist understanding, that
causality is broken in the cosmos, this running the risk of compromising
human knowledge. However, Griffel argues that since Ghazalis
conception of modality is based on synchronic alternatives (prefiguring
Duns Scotus in the Latin tradition), his rejection of necessary causal
connections doesnt demand that causal connections will ever be different
and he uses this to secure empirical investigation. Griffel further argues
that Ghazali left the door open to secondary causation, for while it is God
who wills everything, it is not explicitly specified that God cant create
what he has willed through intermediaries rather than directly. However,
on the contrary I will put forth several arguments in order to suggest that,
based on a more complete understanding of his work, it is incoherent to
argue that he accepted secondary causation as viable:
Argument from the Iqtisad: Many attempts to understand Ghazalis
position on causality are based on the 17th discussion. However,
such an approach is inherently limited for Ghazalis aim in the
Tahafut was not to establish positive doctrine but rather to
undermine the positions of the philosophers. At the end of the 1st
discussion Ghazali says that the he will write another book in which
he will expound the true doctrine. Based on various compelling
reasons, there is consensus that this book is the Iqtisad. Unlike the
Tahafut which in the 20th discussion seems to suggest two
compossible but mutually exclusive conceptions of causality, the
Iqtisad uses unambiguously occasionalist language. The doctrine of
the pervasiveness of divine power links Gods attribute of power
directly to every created being. In addition, the denial of causal
power to created beings is the premise for the discussion on kasb
which is meaningless without such a premise: here Ghazali denies
the efficicacy of the created human power as well, suggesting that
its role is simply to create the perception of efficacy in a human.
Given how Ghazali worked to develop a hermeneutic method of
accepting literal meanings unless one can demonstrate a
contradiction, it does seem fair to apply Ghazalis own hermeneutic
on his own works and not assume duplicity.
Argument from his contemporaries: An analysis of Ghazalis
teachers and students suggests that both were clearly

occasionalists. His teacher Juwaynis Irshad is clear in denying

causality to created beings, a similar state is that of his follower Ibn
Tumart who according to Griffel uses language that is
unambiguously occasionalist6. Furthermore, the concept of
recreation is core to the thought of his student Ibn Arabi, who
espouses an occasionalism so radical that he criticizes some
Asharis for suggesting that atoms may have any substantive nature
at all. Given how committed Ghazalis contemporaries and followers
were to occasionalism, suggesting that he himself was not
committed to it would suggest that he had an esoteric position that
his closest students werent familiar with, this seems very
challenging to establish.
Argument from Atomism: This argument is more challenging to
construct as whilst the discrete nature of space and time are
common features of Ashari discouse, Ghazali, speaks little of it. The
Iqtisad does show, however, that Ghazali does not accept that an
actual infinity is possible, and we also know from his psychological
discourse that he does believe that there exist things which are
indivisible. Thus, it may be suggested that whilst it is not certain
that Ghazali subscribed to the exact form of atomism prevalent in
Asharism, he most likely did believe that there were a finite number
of things in existence at any one moment. In addition, the Iqtisad
does mention the concept of continual recreation, and the Qawaid of
the Ihya mentions that time is made up of moments (awqat). From
this perspective any causation that takes place between subsequent
moments is not possible as it is inconceivable that something would
have a causal effect after it stops existing at the end of a moment.
Thus any type of secondary causation would have to occur within
one moment, such as by an Avicennan essential cause which is
concomitant with its effect. There are a few problems with this
though, not least because Ghazalis epistemology, being empirical,
seems to ignore the idea of essential causes. The 17th discussions
opening paragraph says that both causes and effects are created
side by side7 and not one through another. Moreover, causation
between two things at any one moment would require a connection
between them, however, if things are discrete, then there is no
connection between any two things that exist: a connection would
require an actualised infinite divisibility. Without a connection the
whole conception of causality seems incoherent. However, even if
one accepts that such is possible, there is another issue: If the first
intellect really is an essential secondary cause for everything else in
the cosmos then the only way to explain the changes that occur
from moment to moment in the universe is to suggest that there are
changes taking place in the first intellect itself, a change in its
nature at each moment which results in it causing different things.
However this should be impossible for a fully actualized first intellect

6 GRIFFEL, F. (2009).
7 GHAZZALI, & MARMURA, M. E. (2000).

that, not having the attributes of sight and hearing, doesnt even
know particulars.
Argument from nominalism: At the start of the Iqtisad, Ghazali
begins by stating that the only real things (things with extramental
existence) are atom/substance and accident, all other things are
predicated that we use to understand reality but dont have real
referents. In addition, if Ghazali were to say that relationships
between real things do have ontological reality he would be
suggesting that there are an actual infinite number of real things as
the number of nominal connections between real things is infinite.
Thus causality, being a relation between two real things, doesnt
exist outside the mind and isnt a feature of reality. Furthermore,
secondary causation requires real potentialities and capabilities to
exist in the real world, another type of nominal relationship which
Ghazali denies explicitly.
Argument from Monism: It would seem that having argued that no
connection has any ontological reality, Ghazali has undermined
Gods power as it itself is a nominal relationship between God and
creation. However, the secret to the causal power of the Divine is
within the first paragraph of the 17th discussion. Here Ghazali posits
that the only real and therefore necessary connection between two
things is that of identity. For something to be a true cause, the
essence of the effect must be part of the identity of the cause, in
fact the whole 3rd position in the 17th discussion is a discussion of
what forms of relationship constitute identity. The reason for why
God is power necessarily results in its effect is because the effect is
existence and thus is part of the identity of God, who is existence.
The Divine is all things so that the only real relation is between God
and created things. On the contrary, secondary causation implies a
solidified view of nature without God. Given that in the Mishkat
Ghazali argues that the world only has a metaphorical existence,
secondary causation itself is meaningless, for if the divine is all
things, then there are no intermediary causes other than God that
create.
Having argued this, it remains to be explained why Ghazali seems to play
his position on causality so close to the chest, only explicitly stating it in
the Iqtisad. One reason that he would choose to do this is to appeal to the
philosophers, in order not to alienate them, he explains himself in a way
that philosophers would be able to relate to. Indeed, as Ghazalis key
objective is to open up doors to the truth, he tries to appeal to as many
groups as possible by trying to show that if they use the best of their own
methods they will end up agreeing with him. Having said this, it is likely
that when Ghazali discusses philosophical cosmology and causation, as in
the Mishkat, where one would be forgiven for assuming that he is
practically a faylasuf, he is speaking of nominal processes. Evidence for
this is in the 18th discussion of the Tahafut where after speaking long
about the various faculties of the soul, he concludes by saying that these
are observed matters which God has ordained to flow according to habit8.
8 GHAZZALI, & MARMURA, M. E. (2000).

Thus when speaking in ways reminiscent of secondary potentialities, he is

actually speaking metaphorically in order to avoid repeating himself in an
encumbering way. In general, his position on philosophical cosmology is
that for that which can neither be demonstrated nor is contrary to the
literal meaning of revelation, there is no harm in believing in it, however
one must maintain a general agnosticism concerning it. The almost
definitive cosmology of the Mishkat is repudiated in the Iljam which
highlights that on things that are not demonstrable and not explicitly
mentioned in revelation, judgment should be suspended. On this point
Griffel says that Asharite epistemology developed a nominalist approach
to human knowledge; and in that sense, al-Ghazali is clearly an
Asharite.9 Overall he maintains the general Asharite agnosticism which
continues well after his passing and contributing to the relative comfort
with which Muslim scholars reacted to the heliocentric model and with al
Ijis statement that the natural sciences are imaginary things that have
no internal existence, mere imaginings more tenuous than a spiders
web10.
Another area where Ghazali seems to fuse philosophy with Asharism is
concerning the ontology of the soul. Shihadeh argues that Ghazali was not
commited to the Ashari conception of the mind/soul as an atom and
rather advocated an Avicennan substance dualism. However, I would
argue that his ontology of the soul is well within the Ashari framework.
Ghazali never explicitly says so, but his concept of the soul does seem
very atomic. Specifically, his description of the spiritual heart as the thing
which both perceives reality and is simultaneously the thing which knows
God, the thing which a person refers to when they say I, seems to elide
the Avicennan distinction between the animal soul that grasps sensibles
and the rational soul that grasps intellegibles. In modern terms, Ghazalis
soul seems much more akin to the Cartesian mens than the Aristotelian
rational soul. As stated in the 18th discussion, the faculties within this soul
are mere nominal habits of God. Ghazalis notion of the indivisible soul
does sound a lot like an atom however there are a few key differences
which have led to the suggestion that Ghazali rejected the atomic soul.
Most significantly, it seems that Ghazalis soul does not occupy space and
also does not exist in bodies and therefore is incompatible with atomism.
In fact, Gianotti argues that Ghazalis description of the soul does sound
very much like an atom however he rejects this because of the view that a
single atom cannot exist alone but only in combination with other atoms
as a bod. Such a suggestion, however, offers a very limited conception of
atomism. Firstly, the notion that an atom could not exist save in
combination in a body was a feature of Mutazilite thought, Asharis,
however, generally maintained that an atom could exist alone. In addition,
there was no consensus that an atom had to have spatial extension. In
fact, many advocated the view that the atom was more like the zero
dimensional mathematical point rather than the Democritan atom,
9 GRIFFEL, F. (2009).
10 ORMSBY, E. L. (2008).

Maimonedes himself, when summarizing atomism in his works describes

them as without extension, thus atoms in themselves are incorporeal.
Thus, when Ghazali says that the soul is a member of the alam al
malakut the domain of existents which cant be given quantity, as
opposed to the alam al mulk where things are composed, it does seem
that he is talking about two realms, one with atoms in bodies and the
other a world of singular atoms. Thus Ghazalis ontology of the soul is
neither a case of rejecting Asharism for philosophy, nor a case of
rejecting philosophy wholesale, but rather of using the best of the
philosophical method to navigate amongst the spectrum of view within
the Ashari school.
Whilst Ghazalis soul is ontologicaly Ashaari, functionally speaking, it is
undeniably Avicennan. In fact, whereas most of the areas discussed before
show a Ghazali who is far closer to the Ashari tradition than to falsafa,
Ghazalis psychology is one area that owes a huge debt to Avicenna and is
the main area where, even though he remains well within the Ashari
framework, he departs significantly from the positions of his predecessors.
Most significantly his position on free will ikhtiyar and therefore
determinism is almost indistinguishable from Avicenna and is his biggest
departure from the Ashari school. Ghazali, whilst subscribing to an
occasionalist ontolology, views the world as functionally embodying
secondary causality. Specifically, the universe is seen to be a closed
system with a fixed amount of information that was preeternally ordained
by Gods will. In this lieu, Ghazali argues that, secondary causality is a
function of Gods habit, which according to the Qurran will never change.
Based on this, Ghazali sees ikhtiyar as a deterministic faculty, the function
of which is to simply to select the best alternative based on the
knowledge that an individual has. In this way, man is compelled to choose
the best choice available to him, these choices themselves become the
cause for ones destination in the afterlife. This determinism is also the
origin of Ghazalis assertion that even prophetic miracles arent breaks in
causality, leading him to conclude that miracles arent adequate proofs of
causality since they cannot be distinguished from sorcery (the two only
being distinguished by the ends to which they are used). This is a strong
attack on Ashari epistemology which holds that the miracle is the key
way of establishing the veracity of a prophet. Having undermined his own
schools epistemology in this way, Ghazali is in need of providing a
solution, and he does, by using Avicennas prophetology to
transcendentalise Ashari epistemology. Earlier, I showed how Ghazali
made the demonstrative syllogism itself a form of revelation, extending
the domain of Gods speech to both scripture and reason. Ghazali goes on
to extend revelation further by developing his concept of mystical
cognition ilm al mukashafat. His teacher Al Juwayni writes that All
acquired knowledge is to do with rational enquiry This is as Gods
custom persists yet it is in the realm of the possible to produce
knowledge without previous rational enquiry. Ghazalis genius was to
make such immediate suprarational knowledge, which he termed dhawq,
a third channel of revelation to man. His theory of mystical cognition, as

Treiger argues, is largely an extended version of Avicennas doctrine of

hads, he even uses the same polished mirror metaphor as Avicenna to
describe it. In addition, just as Avicenna, he believed that the polishing of
this mirror is achieved through ethical practice. Even Ghazalis ethics
owes a huge debt to philosophy: after the unification of the Platonic
psychology and ethical teleology with the Aristotelian doctrine of the
mean by Miskawayh, Al Ghazali sanitised ethics by making universal and
therefore compatible with Islam. The key distinction between Ghazalis
dhawq and Avicennas hads, however, is that for Avicenna hads could
never be separated from the middle term. Ghazalis dhawq, however, was
beyond the middle term and can therefore be described as a suprarational
epistemic source. Here again, we see a Ghazali who, operating within the
bounds of the Ashari framework, appropriates what he feels is the best
that philosophy has to offer.
Even after Ghazalis passing, many of those within the tradition such as
Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Taymiyyah commented (both critically and praisingly)
about his engagement and integration of philosophy. His student Ibn
Arabi wrote that Ghazali, having penetrated deep into the bowels of the
philosophers, then labored to pull himself out of there, but failed.
However, an analysis suggests that Ghazali should primarily be seen as an
Ashari mutakallim whose positions are well within the spectrum of views
that the school permitted. Whilst it is true that till the end he did not
rescind his judgment of disbelief upon the philosophers, he evidently
looked very favorably upon their method and in the Mishkat he
subsequently described them as the highest of groups veiled by light. It is
clear from the works of Ghazali that in interacting with philosophy, he took
the most rigorous aspects of its method and used it to fortify his Ashari
project of reconciling reason and revelation, establishing certainty in areas
of prior disagreement and advocating agnosticism in others.

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