Case Digests Admission to Practice

1. IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.
Adm. Case No. 1163. August 29, 1975.
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 1164. August 29, 1975.* IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, xxx and other
Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondents
Key phrase: misrepresentations in correcting bar examination booklets
Doctrines:
1. Attorneys; Admission; Judicial function of Supreme Court in admitting
candidates to legal profession involves exercise of discretion.The judicial
function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires; (1) previous established
rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles. The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained
the required passing grade certainly involves discretion.
2. Same; Same; Requirements for applicants for admission to the bar; Good
moral character; Requirement to produce satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.Section 2 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be x x x x of good moral
character x x x and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. Prior to 1964, or under
the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under
both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicants moral character.
3. Same; Practice of law not an absolute right granted every one who demands it
but a privilege extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion.The
practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary
to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the Bar.
FACTS: This is a disbarment matter with regard to Attorney Victorio Lanuevo, the Bar
Confidant for the 1971 Bar Examinations. Supreme Court received a confidential letter that
speaks of the exam notebooks of a examinee named Ramon Galang who has been reevaluated and re-corrected such that he hurdled the Bar Exams and was admitted to the
Bar.

Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back
to the respective examiners for re-evalution or re-checking. The five examiners admitted
having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant, stating that he
has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and was on the borderline of passing. Ramon Galang was able to pass the
1971 bar exam because of Lanuevos move but the exam results bears that he failed in 5
subjects namely in (Political, Civil, Mercantile, Criminal & Remedial).
Galang on the otherhand, denied of having charged of Slight Physical Injuries on Eufrosino
de Vera, a law student of MLQU.
The five examiners were led by Lanuevo to believe that it is the Bar Committees regular
activity that when an examinee has failed in one subject alone, the rest he passed, the
examiner in that subject which he flunked will review his exam notebook.
Afterwards, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in BF
Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lanuevo should be disbarred?
HELD: YES. In Administrative Case No. 1162, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo is hereby
disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys; and in Administrative
Case No. 1163, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is hereby likewise
disbarred and his name also ordered stricken from the Roll of attorneys.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules
and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals;
and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re:
CunananFlunkers Petition for Admission to the Bar94) The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion.
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the
Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each.
Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and
the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the
same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection
with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must
be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the
final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the
Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered
to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by respondent
Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinees answers merit re-evaluation or re-correction or whether the
Examiners appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited

was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the

proceedings or incidents that led to the candidates admission to the Bar were in accordance
with the rules.
2. FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Mariwasa
Manufacturing, Inc.
Topic: SCs rule-making power
FACTS: MOTION for reconsideration of a decision of the Second Division of the Supreme
Court
sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the
Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Because of the importance of the question
raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the matter for consideration.
The case arose when the Bureau of Investments (BOI) granted the petitioners application to
amend its BOI certificate by changing the scope of its registered product from glazed floor
tiles to ceramic tiles. Eventually, Mariwasa filed an MR of the said BOI decision. Soon
rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed an petition for review with respondent
Court of Appeals pursuan to Circular 1-91.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does
not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of EO 226 (the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987).
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 191, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or
Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of
Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein
runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226 , a substantive right which under the constitution
cannot be modified.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P.
129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27,
1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar
as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be
filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
The substantive right to appeal from decisions or orders of the BOI under EO 226 remains
and continues to be respected. Circular I-91 simply transferred the venue of the appeals
from the decisions of this agency to respondent CA and a different period of appeal 15 days
from notice (sa EO 226 30 days from receipt of decision). It did not make an incursion into
the right to appeal.

Furthermore, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must be directly
appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of 9
of B.P. Blg.129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and
final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the
Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. It is,
therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the
advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been
obtained in providing for the appeal of the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the
Supreme Court.
3. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.
Key phrase: Bar Flunkers Act
Doctrines:
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC.By its
declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid
examinations. The public interest demands of the legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times
become more difficult.
2. ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-atlaw in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated
during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
1. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT
RULES.The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law. The primary power
and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but
the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at- law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court.
FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted
to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked
Republic
Act
No.
972.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

Not

RA

No.

972

is

constitutional

and

valid.

HELD: NO. RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that
in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly
judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative
departments
of
the
government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for
the
license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Likewise, by its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so
as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation
is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor
and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter
and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of
law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is
unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision
as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor

mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify
or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of
its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.
4. Shigenori KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General Rafael Jalandoni, Brigadier
General Calixto Duque, Colonel Margarito Toralba, Colonel Ireneo Buenconsejo,
Colonel Pedro Tabuena, Major Federico Aranas, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port,
respondents
Doctrines:
1. Military Commission; Counsel Appearing Before it not Necessarily a Member of
the Philippine Bar.There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that
counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice
law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in
military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are
neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.
2. Id.; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court Will not Interfere with Due Processes of
Military Commission.The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of
a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of
Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
having said petitioner in its custody; this court will not interfere with the due
processes of such Military Commission.
FACTS: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese
Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
for the period 194301944, is charged with the violation of the laws and customs of land
warfare; particularly, for having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as
such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against
noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces. In this petition, he
challenges the participation of two American attorneys in the prosecution of his case,
namely, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, on the ground that said attorneys are not
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with our Rules of Court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.
The commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines, the validity of which is also challenged by petitioner on
constitutional grounds.
ISSUE: whether or not the appointment of Hussey and Port as prosecutors in the case
against petitioner is valid.
HELD: YES. In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal
governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It
has already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of
such military commissions is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive
order which requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attorneys
qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is
common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who
are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Thus, the Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No.
68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its
custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission.
For all the foregoing, the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
6. OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and Frederick G. Webber,
petitioners, vs. Judge Amador T. VALLEJOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, ALFREDO CATOLICO, and LEONARDO ALCID, in his
capacity as City Sheriff of Manila, respondents
Key phrase: judge at day, legal department head at night
Doctrines:
1. Judges; Prohibition against engaging in private practice as a member of the
Bar; Case at bar.The private respondent should have known or ought to know that
when he was elevated to the Bench of the Court of First Instance as a judge thereof,
his right to practice law as an attorney is suspended and continued to be suspended
as long as he occupied the judicial position.
2. Same; Same; Reasons.Section 35 of Rule 138 was promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate the practice of law. It is based on
sound reasons of public policy , for there is no question that the rights, duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at law are so inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges
of a judge of the Court of First Instance. This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon
the judicial officers concerned to give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and
assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and the desire to promote the
public interest.
FACTS: A complaint was filed by private respondent Alfredo Catolico, then judge of the
Court of First Instance, against Omico Mining and Frederick Webber (president of corp.)
praying, among others the payment of his services as legal counsel for the corporation.
He alleged that the defendants entered into a contract of personal and professional services
with him under the terms of which he was to head defendant corprations legal department
with the condition that he should render such services only after his office hours xxx, and
that in consideration of his services, the defendants will pay him a yearly salary of P35,000
from the date of the contract xxx that pursuant to said contract, he rendered legal services
as head of the legal department of defendant Omico and has attended to the personal
consultation of defendant Webber until the filing of the complaint when by reason thereof,
their official relations were severd. He then prayed, among others, for defendants to render
the corresponding accounting of the amounts due him in accordance with the averments in
the complaint, and to pay him the balance as reflected in the accounting as approved by the
court.
Defendant Omico Corporation filed a motion to dismiss, averring that the contract of
personal and professional services between the petitioners and the private respondent was
illegal, void and unenforceable, the latter being a judge of the Court of First Instance who is

prohibited by Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court from engaging in private
practice as member of the Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract entered into between petitioner Omico Corporation and
respondent
Alfredo
Catolico
is
valid?
HELD: NO. The contract is patently void because it is contrary to law and public policy. The
contract of professional service entered into between private respondent and the petitioners,
while the former was still a judge of the court of first instance, constituted private practice of
law and in contravention of the express provision of Sec 35 of Rule 138.
It is based on the sound reasons of public policy, for there is no question that that rights,
duties, privileges, and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretions and privileges of a
judge
of
the
court
of
first
instance.
Private respondent should have known or ought to know, that when he was elevated to the
Bench of the court of first instance as a judge thereof, his right to practice law as an attorney
was suspended and continued to be suspended as long as he occupied the judicial position.
6. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant VILLANUEVA

vs.

SIMPLICIO

Key phrase: friends counsel as prosecutor for malicious mischief

Doctrines:
1. Attorneys-at-law; Attorneys-at-law employed in the government ;Prohibition to
engage in private practice; Meaning.Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. The
practice of law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of
statute, has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public,
as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
The word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
2. Same; Same; Assistant City Attorney handling case for relative with permission of
superior not prohibited private practice.The isolated appearance as a private
prosecutor, previously authorized by his superior, of an assistant city attorney in a criminal
case for malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where the offended party is
his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
FACTS: In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of
Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston
Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna.
Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said
that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased
to engage in private law practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice and should therefore
be prohibited from doing so.
HELD: NO. The defense counsel has a confused interpretation of Sec. 32 of Rule 127 (now
Sec. 35 of Rule 138) which provides that no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. He claims that City Attorney Fule,
in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe
that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to
be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case
at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant.
7. CONCEPCION DIA-ANONUEVO, complainant, vs. Mun. Judge Bonifacio B. BERCACIO
of Tabaco, Albay, respondent.
Key phrase: refused to return P3,500 for right of redemption
Doctrines:
1. Judges; Prohibition against engaging in private practice as a member of the Bar;
Case at bar.The respondent judge violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, which was implemented by Circular No. 37 of the Secretary of Justice dated June
22, 1971 to the effect that . . no Municipal Judge shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. . . As claimed by the complainant,
it was the respondent judge who dealt with her all along in connection with the conduct of
her case. This is borne out by the letter of Atty. Berango asking the respondent judge to
collect from the complainant the amount of P500 as his attorneys fees and the fact that the
respondent judge invited the complainant to a conference in his office to discuss the matter
with Atty. Berango. If Atty. Berango indeed was the lawyer of the complainant, why did he
have to seek the intervention of
the respondent judge to collect his attorneys fees and why did the respondent judge have to
call the complainant to his office for that purpose?
2. Same; Same; Reasons.The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the
practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office
to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of

public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests of party
litigant.
3. Same; Same; Practice of law; Scope of.The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court or participation in court proceedings but also includes preparation
of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, and giving of legal advice to clients or
persons needing the same.
FACTS: complainant Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Aonuevo,claims to be a co-owner of an
undivided interest of a certain parcel of irrigated Riceland situated iii Cabilogan, Sto. Nio,
Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo
Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and
acknowledged before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent, as ex-officio notary
public.
Complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third undivided
portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof.
Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the
vendee, Alfredo Ong. Requesting the judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to
allow them to redeem the property, complainant gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00
to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but
the latter did not answer.
Forthwith a complaint was with the Court of First Instance of Albay entitled: Concepcion DiaAonuevo et al., plaintiffs, versus Maximo Balibado et al., defendants for annulment of sale
of real property and redemption with damages.
During the pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to
withdraw P1,500.00 from the P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need
of money, but no action was taken by respondent. The request was followed-up by two
letters but no response was had from respondent judge, until Atty. Madrid, complainants
counsel, wrote to respondent demanding the sum of P3,500. Thereafter, an urgent motion
praying that Judge Bercacio be directed to consign in court the amount deposited.
Respondent manifested to the trial judge that he will be ready to deliver the money as soon
as the plaintiffs won the case.
The trial court rendered judgement in favor of plaintiffs, and issued an order directing Judge
Bercario to deposit the amount of P3,500 with the Clerk of Court.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent municipal Judge Bercacio is engaged in the private
practice of law?
HELD: YES. His active interest in the case of Mrs. Anonuevo was manifested in the
following acts:
(a) He gave Mrs. Aonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners
with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong.
(b) He accepted from Mrs. Aonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the
property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental expenses,
(c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Aonuevo and her co-owners offering to
redeem the land in question,
(d) When his attempts at an out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4591, for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal
research; and

(e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although,
as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge
nonetheless took note of respondents presence so that the Order dictated on that occasion
reads: Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial.
Moreover, it has not escaped Our attention that as claimed by complainant herein it was
respondent Judge who dealt with her all along in connection with the conduct of her case.
This is borne out by the letter of Atty. Berango asking respondent to collect from Mrs.
Aonuevo the amount of P500.00 as his attorneys fees and the fact that respondent invited
Mrs. Aonuevo to a conference in his office to discuss the matter with Atty. Berango. If Atty.
Berango indeed was the lawyer of Mrs. Aonuevo, why did he have to seek the intervention
of respondent to collect his attorneys fees and why did respondent have to call Mrs.
Aonuevo to his office for that purpose?
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. Hence, even if
we were to accept respondents explanation that it was Atty. Berango who represented Mrs.
Aonuevo and
her co-plaintiffs in court, respondents actuations as noted above still fall within the
prohibition.
The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid
the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a
litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this
prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude
any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.
WHEREFORE, We find respondent Judge Bonifacio B. Bercacio guilty as charged, and
hereby suspend him from office for a period of six (6) months effective immediately upon
finality of this decision, with the warning that commission of other acts unbecoming of a
Judge will warrant a more severe penalty from the Court.
8. ALEJANDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. VISAYAN RAPID TRANSIT Co., INC.,
NEGROS TRANSPORTATION, Co., INC. and NICOLAS CONCEPCION, respondents.
Key phrase:
Doctrines:
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; SERVICES OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE
NATURE.Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely
administrative and did .not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the
fact remains that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial
results to his clients. It is clear that for these services the petitioner is entitled to
compensation.
2. ClRCUMSTANCES DETERMINING ATTORNEY'S FEES.The following are the
circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an attorney: the amount
and character of the services rendered; the labor, time, and trouble involved; the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; the
responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment, the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; the professional character and social standing of the attorney;
the results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a

recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be
contingent than when it is not. The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered
not to enhance the amount above a reasonable compensation, but to determine whether or
not he is able to pay a fair and just compensation for the services rendered, or as an incident
in ascertaining the importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation.
3. The importance, merits and value of professional services of a lawyer are measured not
alone by his work taken separately, but by his work taken as a whole. There are services
which, when taken separately, may not in themselves have any noticeable special merit, but
when considered in connection with the other works and services of the lawyer to which they
are related, acquire an unquestionable value. That is why even the time employed is not in
itself an appropriate basis for fixing the compensation.
4."It is elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. * * *
That is to say, as long as the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for his
services. * * *"
5.___ID. ; ID. ; ID.The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not
been fixed, but the intention and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this
case. And in any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable
compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services. No hard and fast
rule can be stated which will serve even as a guide in determining what is or what is not a
reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts in each case.
FACTS: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
Respondents Visayan Rapid Transit Co. and the Negros Transportation Co., Inc., were
operating automobile lines in the Province of Occidental Negros. Respondent Nicolas
Concepcion, was at the time the president, general manager, and controlling stockholder of
these two transportation companies. In January, 1933, Concepcion engaged the
professional services of the petitioner, who was then a law practitioner in the City of Manila.
The employment was for the purpose of obtaining the suppression, reduction and refund of
certain toll rates on various bridges along the line operated by the respondent transportation
companies. At the time of the employment of the petitioner, it appears that the respondent
transportation companies had paid the sum of P89,816.70 as toll charges up to December
31, 1932, an amount said to represent one-seventh of their gross income up to that date,
and in view of their high rates, the payment of the toll charges were detrimental to the
transportation business of the respondent if not remedied in time. The herein petitioner
accordingly took steps to obtain first the suppression, and later the reduction of toll rates on
said bridges and also the refund of P50,000 of toll charges already collected by the Province
of Occidental Negros. For this purpose, he appears to have signed Exhibit A which
Concepcion brought to Manila, asking that the Bago and Malogo bridges be declared free,
and said petition was filed with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in
January, 1933.
Believing that the suppression of tolls on the Bago and Malogo bridges could not be
effected, the petitioner filed with the said Secretary of Public Works and Communication,
petition Exhibit B asking for the reduction of toll charges over the eleven (11) bridges in
Occidental Negros.
The Secretary of Commerce and Public Works warned the provincial that "if the toll rates
have not been revised by . . . June 15, 1934, this office, much to its regrets, will be forced to
withdraw its approval of the existing toll rates." The provincial board, on March 7, 1934, with

the conformity of Nicolas Concepcion, adopted a resolution reducing the tolls for 2-ton trucks
or more, the only kind of motor vehicles operated by the respondents, from P1.20 to P0.50
on one bridge, and from P1.20 to 0.40 on the other. And on April 10, 1935 the provincial
board refunded P50,000 as bridge tolls illegally collected from the Visayan Rapid Transit
Company, Inc., and the Negros Transportation Company, Inc., said amount to be applied to
future payments for tolls by said companies. As a result of this reduction of tolls, the
respondents have been benefited with an economy of P78,448 for every eighteen
months.His claim for his professional fees in the lower court is the sum of P20,000. The trial
court awarded him P10,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced this amount to
P3,500.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to reasonable compensation, and to what
extent?
HELD: YES. Although the professional services rendered by the petitioner are purely
administrative and did not require a high degree of professional skill and experience, the fact
remains that these services were rendered and were productive of substantial beneficial
results to his clients.
Section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a lawyer shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services
rendered, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, to the extent
of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the lawyer . . .."
The following are the circumstances to be considered in determining the compensation of an
attorney:
the amount and character of the services rendered;
the labor, time, and trouble involved;
the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered;
the responsibility imposed;
the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy, or
involved in the employment, the skill and experience called for in the performance of
the services;
the professional character and social standing of the attorney;
the results secured; and whether or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a
recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much a larger fee when it is
to be contingent that when it is not.
The financial ability of the defendant may also be considered not to enhance the amount
above a reasonable compensation, but to determine whether or not he is able to pay a fair
and just compensation for the services rendered, or as incident in ascertaining the
importance and gravity of the interests involved in the litigation.
The services of the petitioner in this case were not limited to the preparation and filing with
the authorities concerned of the petitions Exhibits A and B and other papers submitted in
evidence, for he appears to have had various conferences with the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Labor and the
Insular Auditor, and had otherwise taken steps to secure the objectives of his clients. The
importance, merits and value of professional services of a lawyer are measured not alone by
his work taken separately, but by his work taken as a whole.
The amount of the professional fees to be paid to the petitioner had not been fixed, but the
intention and promise to pay him is evidently shown by the records in this case. And in any

case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation
which lawyers should receive for their professional services.
As warranted by the records, it is obvious that as a result of the reduction of the rates of the
tolls of the bridges in the said province, the respondents were benefited with an economy of
P78,448. The refund to the said corporations of the amount of P50,000 is a great relief and
enhancement of their business.
Facts and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that the reasonable
compensation of the petitioner is P7,000, deducting therefrom, however, the sum of P1,280
which the petitioner had already received.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly modified, without pronouncement
regarding costs. SO ORDERED.
9. RENATO L. CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in
his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents
Constitutional Law; Qualifications of COMELEC Chairman; Practice of law defined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23) Interpreted in the light of the various
definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construc-tion intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional requirementthat he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Same; Same; Judicial review of judgments rendered by the Commission on
Appointments.The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsods confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII,
Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall
the Court interfere with the Commissions judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion
for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
FACTS: In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Monsods
appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he
failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the chairman of the
COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:

Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.

Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and
held various positions in various foreign corporations.

In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.

In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUES: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.

:What constitutes practice of law?
HELD: YES. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what is
loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working
day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving
different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator
who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advicegiving, document drafting, and negotiation.
10. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
1. Bar Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of membership dues; Integration
of the Bar, its concept and purpose.An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his
share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to hear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar,
and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. The integration of
the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience
of individual lawyers.

2. Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise of
police power of the State; Practice of law, nature of. Apropos to the above, it must be
stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the Statethe administration of justiceas an officer of the court. The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the
U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression affected with a
public interest is the equivalent of subject to the exercise of the police power.
3. Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules of court to
effect integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration of the Bar.When,
therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit, it did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of the State. The Acts avowal
is to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May
4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a
desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the
general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, Salus populi eat suprema lex. The public welfare is the supreme law. To
this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is
a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
4. Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal profession clothed
with public interest and lawyers must be bound by such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good; Reasons.Thus, when the
respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of
the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation,
he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership
fee
and
suspension
for
failure
to
pay
the
same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as

a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is

admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member
of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program

the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment,
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.
11. ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First
Instance of Davao, respondent.
Doctrines:
Attorneys; Jurisdiction; Court of First Instance has authority to investigate and
suspend erring attorneys.An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the
administration of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the
manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to him. His admission to
the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the right
conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it
appears by acts of misconduct that he has become unfit to continue with the trust reposed
upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust and for the enjoyment of the
professional privilege accorded to him may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend
members of the bar.
Same; Court may itself initiate administrative action against erring lawyer.It should
be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense
a civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public Welfare. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus

be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the
conduct of its own officers. Indeed it is not only its right but its duty to do so.
Same; Ten days notice to erring lawyer in an administrative action against him is
required but same may be waived.It is desirable that a period of ten days be granted by
the Court of First Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in
procedure. We find, however, that in the case at bar, petitioner not only failed to question as
unreasonable the period granted to him by the court within which to answer the complaint,
but actually was not substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint
within the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.
Same; Procedure prescribed for the suspension of a lawyer by the Court of First
Instance differs from that observed by the Supreme Court.Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139
are not applicable to the investigation of complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals
and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of
Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said office by this Court and not to investigations in
suspension proceedings before the Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because
Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to
conduct the investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation by the
Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer.
FACTS: Respondent Judge, in letter addressed to petitioner Tajan, required the petitioner to
explain within 72 hours why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law
for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing factual averments
which petitioner knew were false.
This involved a verified petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title in favor of one Vicente Calongo which was signed by Atty. Justo Cinco
alleging that it was lost by the petitioner Calongo in his house in Mati, Davao and could not
be found despite diligent search but which the petitioner knew very well to have always been
in the custody of Municipal Judge Saludares of Kapalong to whom the same was entrusted
by Calongo, and that as a result of the petition, a new owner's duplicate of TCT was issued.
Petitioner denied the material averments and explained the circumstances under which he
prepared the aforementioned petition. Not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent
Judge had his letter filed and docketed as Administrative Case against petitioner, and,
together with Administrative Case against Atty. Cinco.
Petitioner questioned the propriety of the proceedings, contending that since the case was
one for disbarment, respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as
well as the subject matter thereof for such is vested exclusively and originally in the
Supreme Court and not in courts of first instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming
arguendo that courts of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation of the complaint.
Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge inhibit himself from hearing the administrative
case in view of the latter's conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time.
The oral motion was denied and respondent Judge proceeded to hear the evidence against
petitioner. Petitioner filed the present petition to which the Court gave due course and
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the respondent has the authority to initiate and conduct
disbarment proceedings against the petitioner.
HELD: YES. Court may itself initiate administrative action against erring lawyer. It should be
observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a

civil action where there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act
upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the
court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. Indeed it is not only the right but
the duty of the Court to do so.
Further, Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of complaints
against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of First Instance. The investigation
by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said office
by this Court and not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court of
Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule 138 authorize said
courts and confer upon them the power to conduct the investigation themselves, subject to
another and final investigation by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the
lawyer.
12. JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners, vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
Doctrines:
1. Attorneys; Disbarment; Failure of lawyer to notify his clients of decision rendered in
case; Liability of lawyer for negligence.In failing to inform his clients of the decision in
the civil case handled by him, the lawyer failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present
the need for the clients being adequately and fully informed and should not be left in the
dark as to the mode and manner in which his interests are being defended. It is only thus
that their faith in counsel may remain unimpaired.
2. Same; Same; Disbarment not warranted where although lawyer negligent, no
material or pecuniary damage resulted to clients.While there is no finding of malice,
deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of
negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of the lawyer in his failure to give
timely notice of the decision to the clients. Fortunately for him, his negligence did not result
in any material or pecuniary damage to his clients. For this reason, this Court is not disposed
to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyers career as the extreme penalty of
disbarment.
3. Same; Same; Court authority to impose disbarment should be exercised with
discretion and caution.The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment,
but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the
exercise of disbarment, and the power should be exercised with that caution which the
serious consequences of the action involves.
FACTS: ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

In a civil case for annulment of a sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against Sps.
Alcala on the ground that one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, herein
respondent represented sps. Alcala. Trial Court rendered judgement rescinding the
contract of sale on the ground that Semenchuk was not able to take material
possession of the lot in question and that it has been occupied by one Ruperto
Ludovice and his brothers for a number of years already.
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. De Vera received a copy of the decision but he
failed to inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff
came to complainants' house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally
caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for
the status of case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963,
informed Alcala that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the
decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no
appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the
plaintiff Semenchuk.
Spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera
for having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they
lost their right to appeal from said decision. The court denied it for failure to show
that they indeed suffered damages.
Complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment against their former
counsel.
ISSUE:
Whether or not disbarment is proper.
HELD: NO.
For indifference, loyalty and lack of interest of respondent in handling
complainant's defense.
The evidence proving existence of lot offered by Sps. Alcala which respondent
allegedly failed to present was rendered unnecessary for the commissioner
appointed already reported that the lot existed but the same was in the possession of
other persons. The fact that the plaintiff, Semenchuk, was not awarded any
damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that respondent attorney exerted his
utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.
For gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to
inform his clients of the decision in the civil case.
Petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage
by the failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case
No. 2478 since the decision rendered was fair and justified. It is no less true,
however, that in failing to inform his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said
civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence as men of the
legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment"

The correctness of the decision in the civil case is no ground for exonerating
respondent of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While
there is no finding of malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his
clients, there is, nonetheless, proof of negligence, inattention, and carelessness on
the part of respondent in his failure to give timely notice of the decision in question.
Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not result in any material or pecuniary
damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We are not disposed to
impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme
penalty of disbarment.
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather
intended to protect the administration of justice.
Act of respondent manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest
expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, and the fact that this appears to be the first misconduct of respondent in the
exercise of his legal profession, We hereby hold said respondent GUILTY only of simple
negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of complainants, and We hereby
SEVERELY CENSURE him.
13. ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA,
petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.
Doctrine:
Attorneys; Criminal Procedure; Litigations; Prosecution of criminal actions; Private
Prosecutors; Non-lawyers, including senior law students, can appear in the municipal
trial court as private prosecutors for accused persons under the supervision and
control of the fiscal; Permission of the fiscal not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor.Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid
of an agent appointed by him for the purpose, Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55
Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the
then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property
through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the
municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino
Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not
necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law
does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case
personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not,
in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of
theprivate prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its
approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and control. Further,
We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused
in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear
as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
FACTS: APPEAL from the order of the Municipal Court of Paraaque. Records show that on

April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against

Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries,
respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then
Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainantpetitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration which
states "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party- litigants should be allowed only
in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to
allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in
the guise of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes
for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught. "
ISSUE: Whether or non-lawyers may appear as private prosecutors in a criminal case
RULING: YES. A non-lawyer may appear as a friend of the party before the Municipal Courts
under Section 34, Rule 138 Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear in
court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a
friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney. He may make such appearances either as
defense counsel or private prosecutor under the control and supervision of the fiscal. The
permission of the fiscal is not necessary for the appearance of a private prosecutor, although
if he so wishes, the fiscal may disallow participation in the trial by handling the case
personally.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor resvere his
right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in
said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in
the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of
his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge datedAugust 16, 1979 and
September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and
Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, are hereby SET
ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention
of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the
temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

14. HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LABOR

ARBITER ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN and the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, public respondents, and ROGELIO A. ABAN, private respondent.
Doctrine: Labor; Employer-employee relationship; Lawyers; A lawyer may be an
employee of a private corporation or even of the government.A lawyer, like any
other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the
government. It is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house
counsel, pay them regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise treat
them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may also contract with a law
firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. The two classes of lawyers often work
closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. A similar
arrangement may exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and
other professionals.
FACTS: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission.
Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant and
received basic monthly salary of Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which
gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980, Aban received a letter from the
corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October 4, 1980
because
of
his
alleged
failure
to
perform
his
duties
well.
Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that
Aban was illegally dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this
present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner
corporation
and
Aban.
Held: YES. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban
to his former or a similar position without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years
backwages without qualification or deduction and P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should
reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent termination
benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.
A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation
or even of the government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of
whether or not there is an employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the
manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (2) the mode of payment of
wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or
absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-ofcontrol
test
has
been
held
to
be
the
decisive
factor.
In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the
petitioner, dealt only with legal matters involving the said corporation and its employees and
also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing appointment papers of employees which is
not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed that petitioner has
the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control
over Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in
determining whether or not there is an employee-employer relationship.
15. RENE P. RAMOS, complainant, vs. MOISES R. RADA, respondent.

Doctrine: Court employees; Court messenger engaged in private business reprimanded for
failure to obtain permission of court.Rada has violated the civil service rule prohibiting
government employees from engaging directly in a private business, vocation or profession
or being connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of the Department. But, indubitably, also, his private
business connection has not resulted in any prejudice to the Government service. Thus, his
violation of the rulethe lack of prior permissionis a technical one, and he should be
meted no more than the minimum imposable penalty, which is reprimand.
FACTS: Moises R. Rada is a messenger in the Court of First Instance of Camarines, Norte
He was charged with violation of Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, which provides as
follows:
Sec.12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, that this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government
Respondent Rada was extended appointment by the Avesco Marketing Corporation on
December 15, 1972 as representative to manage and supervise real properties situated in
Camarines Norte which were foreclosed by the corporation.
His acceptance of such appointment was the basis of the administrative complaint against
Rada which was filed with the Department of Justice on October 3, 1973.
Later, on October 27, 1973, Rada requested permission to accept appointment.
It was not indicated that his acceptance and discharge of the duties as administrator has at
all impaired his efficiency as messenger, nor has it been shown that he did not observe
regular office hours.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Rada is guilty of violation of Sec.12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII
Held: YES. The duties of messenger Rada are generally ministerial which do not require
that his entire day of 24 hours be at the disposal of the government. Such being his
situation, it would be to stifle his willingness to apply himself to a productive endeavor to
augment his income, and to award premium for slothfulness if he were to be banned from
engaging in or being connected with a private undertaking outside of office hours and
without forseeable detriment to the Government service.
His connection with Avesco Marketing Corporation need not be terminated, but he must
secure a written permission from proper government authority.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Moises R. Rada is adjudged guilty of a technical violation of
Section 12 of Civil Service Rule XVIII, for which he is hereby reprimanded. He may however
apply, if he so desires, for permission to resume his business connection with the
corporation, in the manner above indicated.
16. RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY.
PROCOPIO & BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant, vs. ELMO S.
ABAD, respondent.
Doctrines:

Attorneys; The report of the Clerk of Court found as a fact that respondent Abad still
continued to practice law despite Courts prohibition. Penalty of P2,000.00 fine
imposed.The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath,
that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts.
This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.
Same; Same.WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00
within ten (10) days-from notice, failing which he shall be imprisoned for twenty (20) days.
He is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized practice of law he shall be dealt with
more severely.
Same; Attorney may be asked to explain why he collaborated to practice law with one
not authorized to do so.Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten
(10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for collaborating and associating in
the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.
FACTS: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court.
Court held respondent Elmo S. Abad a successful bar examinee but has not been admitted
to the Philippine Bar in contempt of Court for unauthorized practice of law and he was fined
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217). He
paid the fine. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO
CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS
NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW. The Report has found as a fact, over the denials
of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and that he made
appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for
perjury. The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the
respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos.
26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit D.) Atty. Jacobe
should be called to account for his association with the respondent.
Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the
signatures therein, denied that he filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He
also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said
trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only
explanation he could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same
could have been effected by Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent)
was still illegally practicing law. As to the motion for examination and analysis of
respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full opportunity to prove his
defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare
respondent's signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the
pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which latter signature he admits as genuine
and as his own. The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above
report of the NBI, have clearly proved that respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the
decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abad can engage in practice of law.
HELD: NO. Only those licensed by the Supreme Court may practice law in this country. The
right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment and even public trust, since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.

The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without license.
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not
constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) The regulation of the practice of law
is unquestionably strict. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. Mr. Elmo
S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.
17. CARMEN E. BACARRO, complainant, vs. RUBEN M. PINATACAN, respondent.
Doctrines:
1. Legal Ethics; Successful bar candidate; Moral turpitude and depravity and lack of
proper character; Requisite for admission to the Philippine Bar that applicant must be
of good moral character; Purpose of requirement.One of the indispensable requisites
for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral character.
This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of
the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of
this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good
moral character.
2. Same; Same; Failure to live up to the high moral standard for membership in the
bar arose by respondent having seduced complainant into physically submitting
herself to him by promises of marriage and his impudence to deny paternity of his
child by complainant.We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to
the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant
into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He even eloped with her
and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and then told her to have an abortion.
When complainant refused, he deserted her. Complainant had to track him down to ask him
to help support their child born out of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to
see him, respondent merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On
top of all these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a
sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complainant.
3. Same; Same; Same; Period of 8 years respondent has been denied the privilege of
being a lawyer well deserved for his acts indicative of his moral delinquency; Eightyear period could be punishment and retribution enough, and also his having legally
recognized and acknowledged complainants child and his undertaking to give
financial support to the child; Case at bar.These acts taken together certainly do not
speak well of respondents character and are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the
years that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved.
Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough. Moreover,
considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainants child
Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to
the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now
prepared to turn over a new leaf.
4. Same; Same; Same; Admonition to candidate that his being allowed to take the
lawyers oath and his admission and continued membership in the Bar dependent on
his compliance with his moral and legal obligations to the child.In allowing
respondent to take the lawyers oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and

continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his
moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
FACTS: This is an administrative case filed against respondent with moral turpitude and
immorality. Complainant gave birth to a baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan;
that because of respondent's betrayal, her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress
and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to become a member of the
Bar. On the other hand, respondent maintains that even admitting the truth of complainant's
allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other, does not justify him for
disqualification
to
the
practice
of
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to take the lawyers oath despite having a case
involving his good moral character
HELD: YES. The court allowed Ruben to take the lawyers oath. considering that respondent
has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro
Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We
hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn
over a new leaf. But he must be admonished that his admission to and continued
membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and
legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant
must be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high
moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this
end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to
be honest and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessary a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen" He sets an example to his fellow
citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. Thus, becoming a
lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations.
18. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
Doctrines:
1. Attorneys-at-law; Admission to bar obtained under false pretenses.Admission to
the Bar obtained under false pretenses must be revoked.
2. Same; Requisites to become attorney-at-law.Before the study of law, an applicant for
admission must have completed the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner.
FACTS:

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court Disbarment.

Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years
later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such
ar Examination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high
Shool training, and neither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing
College in 1941.
Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the
eneral Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma,
lthough he failed to submit certification for such claim from any proper school officials.

The claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did
not obtain his AA degree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously
certified, and asserts that he obtained his AA from Arellano University in 1949.
This claim was still unacceptable, as records would have shown that Diao graduated from
the University in April 1949, but he started his Law studies in October 1948 (second
semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not have been permitted to take the Bar, as it is
provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that Previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (AA) as required
by the Department of Private Education
ISSUE: Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
HELD: YES. Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed
it, and was thereafteradmitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-atlaw; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyers diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
19. RE: Petition of AL ARGOSINO To Take The Lawyers Oath
Doctrines:
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who
possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.The practice of law
is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient
administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to weed out lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to
prevent misfits from taking the lawyers oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
Same; Same; Hazing; Parent and Child; The death of ones child is, for a parent, a
most traumatic experience, and the suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental
but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.Before anything else, the Court
understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of ones child is,
for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced
and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle
between grief and anger directed at the cause of death. Atty. Camaligans statement before
the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find
room for forgiveness.
Same; Same; Lawyers Oath; In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the
Court recognizes that he is not inherently of bad moral fiber.After a very careful
evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following

admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show
that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The
Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the
general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
Same; Same; Same; Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according
to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyers oath.We stress to Mr.
Argosino that the lawyers oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyers oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according
to the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice
will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
FACTS: ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Petition to Take the Lawyers
Oath.
Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the
Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was
granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be
allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required
good moral character he now possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications
among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of
religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a
scholarship foundation in honor of their hazing victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath, sign the
Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.
HELD: YES. Petition granted. Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent
proof that he possessed the required good moral character as required before taking the
Lawyers Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the
premises that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr.
Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyers Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality
before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he had started is expected to
continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.
20. FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY.
VICENTE C. RENOMERON, respondent.
Doctrines:
1. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Misconduct as public official constitutes violation of oath
as lawyer.The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of
deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public
official. The answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyers oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court: People vs.
De Luna, 102 Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. The lawyers oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

2. Same; Same; Same.The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in

government service in the discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them
from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring
the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
their office (Sec. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a
lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest
(Rule 1.03).
FACTS: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Dishonesty and oppression.
This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes,
house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron,
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latters irregular actuations with regard to the
application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment
(in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the
registration of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was that
V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus
P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself
elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio
(of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The
Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the
resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not
adverted in his previous denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for
his malfeasance as a public official
HELD: Yes, a lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for
his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents
and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or
indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (Sec. 7,
subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 1.03).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
official have demonstrated unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law
(Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso,
150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from
the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.