2. People vs.

Dichoso
Christian Bermudez was beaten to death and the taxicab he was driving was taken
by the assailants. His lifeless body, wrapped in a carton box, was recovered several
days later in a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. For the felonies, the above-named
accused were indicted for violation of R.A. 6539, otherwise known as the AntiCarnapping Law, and Murder in two (2) separate Informations, to wit:
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63962 for Violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law:
That on or about August 23, 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, herein accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1)
motor vehicle described as Toyota Tamaraw FX; Motor No. 2C-2983302;
Chassis No. CF50-0014375; Plate No. NYT-243, owned by BIENVENIDO CRUZ,
killing the driver Christian Bermudez in the process, to the damage and
prejudice of the registered owner thereof and the heirs of Christian
Bermudez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. Q-95-63963 for Murder:
That on or about 23 August 1995, in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with intent to kill qualified by treachery, evident
premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength, employing means to
weaken the defense or of means of persons to insure or afford impunity,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use violence
upon the person of CHRISTIAN BERMUDEZ by beating him on the head and
other parts of the body, thereby causing his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
At the arraignment, only Johnny Balalio y Deza and Jimmy Ponce y Tol appeared and
pleaded "Not Guilty."3 The third accused, Rosauro Sia y Dichoso, escaped from
police custody while on the way to the hospital for treatment. 4 As a consequence,
the two (2) cases were subsequently consolidated and jointly tried against accused
Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce only.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment against both accused imposing upon
them the supreme penalty of Death, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as

principals by conspiracy of violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended and hereby

sentences them to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Accused are likewise adjudged jointly and severally [liable] to pay to Agripina
Bermudez, the mother of the deceased Christian Bermudez the sums of:
a. P50,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of Christian
Bermudez;
b. P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in connection
with the death of Christian; and
c. P3,307,199.60 (2/3 x [80-27] x 300 per day x 26 days (excluding
Sundays) x 12 months) representing the loss of earning capacity of
Christian Bermudez as taxi driver.
Costs against accused.
The cases of accused Rosauro Sia who escaped from custody before he was
arraigned and as against Peter Doe who was never apprehended and whose
identity has never been known are hereby ordered ARCHIVED, subject to
activation when they are arrested and brought before the bar of justice.
SO ORDERED.5itc-alf
On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellants raised the lone assigned
error that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR
VIOLATION OF RA 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING LAW) SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED ROSAURO SIA AND JIMMY PONCE
(EXHIBITS C AND D, RESPECTIVELY) WHICH ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. 6
The facts as summed up by the trial court are as follows:itc-alf
The vehicle claimed as carnapped is registered in the name of complainant
Bienvenido C. Cruz of No. 1125 Primero de Mayo Street, Tondo, Manila 7 and
operated as a taxi being Unit 2 of KIRBEE TAXI and bearing the following
description:
The said taxi was taken from the garage and driven by its regular driver, Christian
Bermudez, the alleged murder victim at about 6:00 a.m. on August 23, 1995. The
taxi was last seen at the vicinity of the Pegasus Night Club in Quezon City at about
10:30 p.m. on the said date with an unidentified passenger who surfaced later as
the accused Rosauro Sia, whose true name is allegedly Antonio Labrador (Mang
Tony) and who resides at San Francisco Del Monte. Accused Rosauro Sia appears to
have gypped driver Christian Bermudez to service him the following day (August 24,
1995) in the morning and to be paid P150.00 per hour which was apparently
accepted because Rosauro gave instructions to accused Johnny Balalio and Jimmy

Ponce to wait for him (Christian) that following morning. When Christian returned to
Sia's residence in San Francisco Del Monte that morning, he was told to come back
in the afternoon because that was the instruction given him by accused Rosauro Sia.
When Christian returned in the afternoon in the Sia residence, he was asked to get
inside. As soon as he alighted from the Tamaraw FX taxi he was driving, his hands
were tied by Johnny Balalio and was handed to a certain "Pedro", the accused Peter
Doe who has not been arrested and who told Johnny Balalio and Johnny (sic) Ponce
"Ako na'ng bahala dito". Christian was taken to accused Rosauro and shortly
afterwards, the latter was seen lugging with him a big carton box from which blood
was dripping. Accused Jimmy Ponce saw Rosauro hand the carton-wrapped lifeless
body of Christian inside the carnapped FX taxi. Before leaving with the lifeless body
of Christian loaded in the taxi, accused Sia gave P3,000.00 each to Jimmy Ponce,
Johnny Balalio and "Pedro" and admonished them not to say anything about what
happened. The ring taken from Christians8 was given to accused Jimmy Ponce by
Rosauro Sia.
On August 26, 1995, the lifeless body of Christian Bermudez was found and
retrieved from a fishpond in Meycauayan, Bulacan. This fact was broadcast over the
radio and, after hearing the same, Agripina Bermudez went to see the lifeless body
retrieved from the fishpond and confirmed it to be that of Christian, whom she
claims is her eldest son who was earning about P650.00 a day as a taxi driver.
Photographs were taken on the carton-wrapped body of Christian including one
position which shows the latter's body.9
Dr. Benito Caballero, Medico Legal Officer of Bulacan, conducted a postmortem
examination of the deceased body of Christian and found that the latter's death was
due to shock caused by massive external and intracranial hemorrhage on account of
multiple lacerations on the head and fracture of the skull due to use of hard object,
possibly iron, for which he issued certificates of death and postmortem death
certificate.10
In the meantime, Bienvenido Cruz, the owner of the carnapped vehicle, reported to
the police authorities in Camp Crame the loss of his taxi. 11 On September 21, 1995,
at about 10:30 p.m., the carnapped taxi was intercepted being driven by accused
Rosauro Sia, who was immediately placed in custody of the anti-carnapping
authorities. While in custody, Rosauro Sia managed to escape but he was
recaptured on November 15, 1995 by the manhunt team created for that purpose.
As accused Rosauro Sia claimed that he bought the hot car from his co-accused
Johnny Balalio and Jimmy Ponce, the latter were picked up from their residence in
Baseco, Isla Tawid, Port Area, Tondo, Manila and investigated. Sworn Statement of
the accused Rosauro Sia and Jimmy Ponce were taken 12 narrating their respective
participations such as Sia's instruction to Jimmy to guard his (Sia's) gate to deter
passersby from snooping around and describing what transpired inside Sia's
residence at San Francisco Del Monte when Christian was tied and killed. The Sworn
Statement of Bienvenido Cruz, owner of the missing vehicle, was likewise taken. On
the basis of the sworn statements of accused Rosauro Sia and Jimmy Ponce, Dr.
Benito Caballero, Provincial Health Officer of Bulacan, together with the Certificate
of Registration of the FX Taxi and the Death and Postmortem Certificates mentioned
heretofore, the Special Operations Unit, Traffic Management Command, PNP, Camp

Crame, referred the matter to the authorities of the Department of Justice who, after
finding probable cause in the preliminary investigation, filed these cases of Violation
of R.A. 6539, as amended, and of Murder against the above-named accused which
were consolidated together in this Branch for joint trial. 13
In their lone assigned error, accused-appellants contend in sum that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Rosauro Sia and Johnny Balalio, which the trial court
heavily relied upon, are inadmissible in evidence since they were executed in
violation of their right to counsel. Specifically, accused-appellants argue that the
said extra-judicial statements are inadmissible because they were obtained without
compliance with the requirements of the law for their admissibility. 14
The Solicitor General agrees, stating that during the custodial investigation, Ponce
and Sia were not assisted by counsel as required by the Constitution. The trial
court's finding that Sia and Ponce were assisted by Prosecutor Pormento when they
executed their extra-judicial confessions did not meet the requirement of the law.
The Solicitor General further contends that, during his testimony, Ponce vehemently
denied having voluntarily executed his alleged statement; rather, he maintained
that he was coerced to sign the same and that he did not even know its contents.
Extra-judicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the
Constitution.15 Indeed, a suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal when
taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance
regardless of the absence of such coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily
given,16 is inadmissible in evidence,17 even if appellant's confession were gospel
truth.18
Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial statements of Sia and
Ponce will not absolve accused-appellants from criminal liability because, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, there still is independent evidence to establish their
authorship of the victim's killing on the occasion of the carnapping. The Solicitor
General asserts that while there was no prosecution witness who positively
identified accused-appellants asparticeps criminis, their culpability was nonetheless
proven through circumstantial evidence. We agree.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. 19 The rules on evidence20 and
case law sustain the conviction of the accused through circumstantial evidence
when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 21A circumspect scrutiny of the
testimonies of the witnesses of both prosecution and defense shows adequate
evidentiary bases to establish the aforementioned circumstances.@lawphil.net
First, when the police apprehended accused Rosauro Sia while he was in possession
of the carnapped vehicle, he immediately pointed to accused-appellants as his
accomplices in taking away the victim's vehicle. 22 Notably, accused-appellants
claimed to have met Sia for the first time on August 24, 1995, when Sia supposedly
passed by them looking for a certain person. They saw Sia for the second time on

November 15, 1995, when Sia and some policemen came to their place to arrest
them. If accused-appellants did not actually participate in the perpetration of the
crime, it certainly defies reason why Sia would implicate them in so serious an
offense when they were practically strangers to him. In this regard, it must be borne
in mind that the fact that a witness may have been a co-conspirator in the
commission of the offense is not in itself sufficient to dilute the credibility of or,
much less, be a ground to disregard altogether his testimony. 23 Indeed:
By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself,
because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of
details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate
afterthought.24
Second, defense witness Porferio Fernando testified that accused-appellants were
with Rosauro Sia from August 25-28, 1995. 25 When accused-appellants came back
on August 28, 1995; they informed him that they were to guard a bodega owned by
Sia, which contained a carnapped vehicle. 26 This testimony of Fernando confirms the
fact that accused-appellants were in the company of Rosauro Sia during that critical
period when the crime was perpetrated.
Third, upon his arrest, accused-appellant Jimmy Ponce voluntarily surrendered to
the police authorities a ring, 27admittedly belonging to the victim. 28 It is a well-settled
rule that when a person is found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act, he is presumed to be the taker and doer of the whole
act.29 Thus, when property stolen is found in the possession of a person who is
unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his possession thereof, he may be
deemed to have committed the crime of theft of said property. 30 More apropos to
the peculiar facts prevailing herein is the case of People v. Prado,31 where we stated:
In the absence of an explanation of how one has come into the possession of
stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he
must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the
said person and of the robbery committed on him.
The application of this presumption validly applies to a case of carnapping for,
indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same
and, had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or
robbery.32
All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as
the crimes were committed. What remains to be determined is the propriety of the
penalty imposed on accused-appellants.@lawphil.net
In connection with the penalty imposed, the Solicitor General invites the Court's
attention to the erroneous imposition by the trial court of death on the accusedappellants. He points out that while the sentence was meted upon a finding that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident

premeditation attended the commission of the crime, these were not duly
established in the case at bar.
The observation is well-taken. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances which are
taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty
imposed must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged
as criminal offense.33
With regard to alevosia, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 34 Treachery
is considered present when: (1) there is employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
the means or method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
culprit.35 For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack. 36 Where no particulars are known as to
how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed. 37
In this case, there was neither a description of how the attack was commenced
whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught totally
unaware nor has there been a showing that the method of execution in the
commission of the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by the
malefactors. To reiterate, alevosia cannot be established where no particulars are
known regarding the manner in which the aggression was carried out or how it
developed.38 It must be based on positive or conclusive proof, not mere suppositions
or speculations,39 and must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the killing
itself.40
Similarly, the elements of evident premeditation must be established with equal
certainty as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance.41 These elements are: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of their act. 42 The essence of evident premeditation
is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment.43
In this case, there is no showing that the killing of Christian Bermudez was the
product of cool thought and reflection. There is absolutely no showing how and
when the plan was hatched or how long a time had elapsed before the crime was
carried out. On the contrary, what appears very much evident is that he was killed
on the occasion of the carnapping itself. Without such evidence, mere presumptions
and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice to warrant the
appreciation of this qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. 44
Abuse of superior strength cannot likewise be appreciated. In People v. Flores,45 this
Court pointed out that this aggravating circumstance necessitates the showing of

the relative disparity in physical characteristics, usually translating into the age,
gender, the physical size and the strength of the aggressor and the victim. There is
no proof that accused-appellant utilized any notorious inequality to his advantage.
In other words, mere superiority in number is not enough to constitute superior
strength.46
To be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, what should be considered is not
that there were three or more assailants of one victim, but whether the aggressors
purposely took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the
offense.47 In this case, the prosecution did not present any direct proof that there
was a deliberate intent on the part of accused-appellants to take advantage of the
obvious inequality of force between them and the victim.
In the absence of any qualifying or aggravating circumstances which would merit
the imposition of death, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, viz:
Penalty for Carnapping Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
the term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value
of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment of not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not
less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Italics ours)
On the other hand, Article 63 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:itc-alf
Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.@lawphil.net
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the

commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.itc-alf
Anent the civil indemnity award, this Court finds the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity proper, following prevailing jurisprudence, 48 and in line with controlling
policy.49 The award of civil indemnity may be granted without any need of proof
other than the death of the victim. 50 Though not awarded by the trial court, the

victim's heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages, pegged at P50,000.00 by

controlling case law,51 taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim's
family52 brought about by his death.53
However, the award of P200,000.00 as burial and other expenses incurred in
connection with the death of the victim must be deleted. The records are bereft of
any receipt or voucher to justify the trial court's award of burial and other expenses
incurred in connection with the victim's death. The rule is that every pecuniary loss
must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarded. 54 Credence can
be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts or other credible
evidence.55
The trial court was correct in awarding damages for loss of earning capacity despite
the non-availability of documentary evidence.56 Damages representing net earning
capacity have been awarded by the Court based on testimony in several
cases.57 However, the amount of the trial court's award needs to be recomputed and
modified accordingly.
In determining the amount of lost income, the following must be taken into account:
(1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the
rate of the loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. The second variable is
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased,
meaning total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or
income less living and other incidental expenses. Considering that there is no proof
of living expenses of the deceased, net earnings are computed at fifty percent
(50%) of the gross earnings. 58 The formula used by this Court in computing loss of
earning capacity is:
In this case, the Court notes that the victim was 27 years old at the time of his
death and his mother testified that as a driver of the Tamaraw FX taxi, he was
earning P650.00 a day. 60 Hence, the damages payable for the loss of the victim's
earning capacity is computed thus:
Based on the foregoing computation, the award of the trial court with regard to lost
income is thus modified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, in
Criminal Cases No. Q-95-63963, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (The Anti-Carnapping Law) is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants are SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua; and are ORDERED, jointly and severally.

3. People vs Mauricio

This is an appeal by Sonny Obillo from the Decision [1] dated February 4, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. SJC-64
(92), finding Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel Reyes and Sonny Obillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping with Homicide.
On May 20, 1992, accused Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel and Sonny Obillo were
charged with the crime of violation of R.A. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act, with
Homicide in an Information which reads, to wit:
That on or about April 2, 1992, in the City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away a motor tricycle with Plate No. CV-1275 owned by
and belonging to Miguel de Belen, against the will of the latter; that on the occasion
thereof and for the purposes of enabling them to take and carry away the motor
tricycle above mentioned, the accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, with
evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior strength and with
intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and shoot the aforesaid Miguel de Belen
with an unlicensed firearm, thereby inflicting wounds upon the latter which caused
his instantaneous death. That as a consequence of the death of said Miguel de
Belen, his heirs sustained actual compensatory and moral damages.
CONTRARY TO
commission."[2]

LAW,

and

committed

at

nighttime,

which

facilitated

its

On July 21, 1992, Sonny Obillo was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Trial proceeded against him. Carlo Ellasos escaped from the jail before
arraignment and was only arrested four (4) years thereafter when the prosecution
had already rested its case. [3] Ellasos was thereafter arraigned and pleaded not
guilty to the charges. While the counsel of Ellasos was still reviewing the evidence
presented by the prosecution against Obillo, Ellasos was convicted of another crime
of robbery by the RTC of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. 23-654, and
was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa. [4] Accused Sonny Obillo took
the witness stand, after which the defense rested its case. [5] On July 10, 1997, the
lower court issued an Order separating the trial of the case against the two accused,
and transferring the trial of the case against Carlo Ellasos to the RTC of Muntinlupa
while maintaining that against Sonny Obillo in the RTC of San Jose City. [6]
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) SPO2
Edgardo Santos and SPO1 Apolinario Agustin of the San Jose City Police Station; (2)
Edgardo Galletes, the caretaker of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muoz; (3) Fernando
de Belen, the brother of the victim; (4) Elena de Belen, the widow of the victim; (5)
Antonio de Belen, another brother of the victim who testified as to the damages

sustained by the carnapped tricycle; and (6) Dr. Raul Agliam who conducted the
autopsy on the body of the victim. The testimonies of these witnesses were
summarized by the trial court as follows:[7]
SPO2 EDGARDO SANTOS testified that on April 3, 1992, P/Lt. Agustin of the Muoz
Police Station called by telephone to inform the San Jose City Police Station that the
[probable] suspects in the killing of a tricycle driver at Tayabo, San Jose City were in
the vicinity of the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel at Muoz, Nueva Ecija; that he together
with his co-policemen went to the Iglesia Ni Cristo compound in Muoz and
coordinated with Jaime Dionisio, the Head Minister thereat; that Minister Jaime
Dionisio turned over to them the persons of Sonny Obillo and Carlo Ellasos together
with a .38 caliber revolver paltik with two (2) live ammunitions; that they brought
Sonny Obillo and Carlo Ellasos to the Muoz Police Station, then later on to the San
Jose City Police Station where they endorsed said persons to the Investigator; that
Lt. Agustin was the one who actually received the firearm from Minister Dionisio;
that the gun is a police positive, colored black with rust, about six (6) inches barrel
bearing theMARKING SMITH & Wesson; that he positively identified the gun which
was shown to him as the same gun that was turned over to them by the Minister.
SPO1 APOLINARIO AGUSTIN testified that on April 3, 1992, while he was at the
police headquarters of San Jose City, the Chief of Police of the Muoz Police Station
informed the police of San Jose City that two unidentified persons who [might have
something to do with] the killing of the tricycle driver on the night of April 2, 1992 at
Tayabo, San Jose City were at the Iglesia Ni Cristo chapel in Muoz, Nueva Ecija; that
he together with SPO3 Renato Bautista, SPO2 Edgar Santos and PO3 Edmundo
Afable responded and Muoz Chief of Police Lt. Agustin and Minister Dionisio turned
over to them the persons of Sonny Obillo and Carlo Ellasos; that Minister Dionisio
also turned over to them a .38 caliber revolver bearing theMARK SMITH & Wesson
which was taken from Ellasos.
EDGARDO GALLETES testified that he was one of those who actually apprehended
Carlo Ellasos and Sonny Obillo in the compound of the Iglesia Ni Cristo at Muoz,
Nueva Ecija; that at about 3:00 oclock in the morning of April 3, 1992, he saw
Ellasos and Obillo sleeping at the gate of the church reeking with the smell of liquor;
[8]
that he noticed that Carlo Ellasos had a .38 revolver; that his companions Mario
Cabotaje and Manolo Cabotaje roused Obillo and Ellasos, thereafter, apprehended
them and brought them inside where they were interrogated; [9] that he summoned
the police and informed them about the two persons; that he asked Ellasos why he
was in possession of a gun and Ellasos told him that it was for his defense; that he
asked also Obillo why he was in possession of a tricycle wheel and Obillo replied
that he took the wheel from Muoz; that they turned over the apprehended persons
to the policemen and .38 caliber revolver with three (3) live ammunition.

FERNANDO DE BELEN testified that the deceased Miguel de Belen is his elder
brother; that he does not know Ellasos, but he knows Sonny Obillo; that on April 2,
1992 at about 9:00 P.M., while he was a backrider of a tricycle driven by his cousin,
Edgardo Camps, he saw the tricycle of his elder brother Miguel refueling at the
Caltex Station; that he approached the said tricycle and he saw inside the sidecar
Sonny Obillo seated with his elder brother Miguel while Ellasos was driving the
tricycle; that he talked to his brother, who told him they were bound to [sic] Malasin;
that he was not able to ask why somebody else was driving his tricycle; that Obillo
was seated at the outer place of the side of the sidecar and did not notice anything
unusual about his motion; that his brother and the two (2) accused proceeded
towards the direction of Malasin and he waited for them at the station; that at about
12:00 oclock that same evening, the tricycle of his elder brother passed by without
his elder brother and it was only Obillo and Ellasos who were in the tricycle; that he
and his other elder brother Leonardo de Belen followed the tricycle driven by Ellasos
and Obillo; that they followed them up to the City Plaza, where they observed the
tricycle pick up a passenger, and then sped towards the direction of Metrobank,
then turned right to the direction of Sto. Nio; that they stopped at Tierra Hotel where
they waited and when the accused passed by their place, they confronted Ellasos
and Obillo about the whereabouts of their brother Miguel; that Ellasos told them
that their brother was left behind in Malasin where he was in a drinking session with
his (Ellasos) father; that they proceeded to Malasin but they were not able to find
Miguel; that the following morning, they reported the disappearance of their brother
Miguel at the police station; that while they were at the police station, a certain
policeman arrived and informed them that they were able to recover a cadaver at
Tayabo and he might be their brother Miguel; that he together with the uncle of his
wife and some policemen went to the area, where he saw his brother Miguel tied to
a tree already dead; that the cadaver of his brother was brought to a funeral parlor.
ELENA DE BELEN testified that she is the widow of Miguel de Belen, who died on
April 2, 1992; that the total expenses incurred with respect to the death of her
husband is P30,000.00.
ANTONIO DE BELEN testified that the tricycle cab[10] of Miguel was damaged, both
wheels were disaligned, the windshield, the headlight, the flasher, and the shock
absorbers were all broken, the engine block was disaligned and the cover of the
carburetor was missing; that the expenses incurred for the repair of the tricycle was
P5,000.00 which was covered by receipts, while the repairs amounting to P400.00
for the body repair and P800.00 for the upholstery and P300.00 for labor were
without receipts.
DR. RAUL AGLIAM testified that on April 3, 1992, he conducted [an] autopsy of the
body of Miguel de Belen upon the request of the Chief of Police of San Jose City; that
he prepared an autopsy report, one copy of which was given to the requesting
party, another attached to the death certificate and another one used as file copy;

that the cadaver was in the state of rigor mortis which meant that the deceased had
been dead for more than five (5) hours; that there was a gunshot wound with point
of entry on the left temporal region which was positive for gun powder burns around
the wound; that there was abrasion on the skin and accumulation of blood clots
around the neck caused by a rope; that there was a 3 x 4 cm. abrasion on the left
subscapular region and a 2 x 3 cm. abrasion on the left lumber region; that the
cause of death was irreversible shock due to gunshot wound which damaged the
vital center of the brain; xxx.
For his part, accused-appellant Sonny Obillo interposed the defense of denial
and proffered the following testimony: [11]
xxx on April 2, 1992 at about 6:05 P.M., he arrived at their house at Julia Street,
Abar I, San Jose City and was invited by Rommel Reyes to a drinking session at the
house of Lito del Rosario and Joey Igna also at Julia street; that Rommel Reyes
bought three (3) bottles of Ginebra San Miguel and he together with Lito del
Rosario, Joey Igna and Rommel Reyes consumed the three (3) bottles of Ginebra up
to 8:00 P.M.; that when Joey Igna went home, Rommel Reyes invited him to Adela
street where they continued drinking and consumed four (4) bottles of Red Horse
beer; that he and Rommel proceeded to Tanibong and thereafter they proceeded to
the city plaza where they stayed up to 10:00 P.M.; that after he invited Rommel to
go home, they took a tricycle; that while in the tricycle, Rommel who was seated at
the back of the driver poked a .38 caliber handgun at the driver and ordered him to
get down; that the tricycle driver complied and sat beside him (Obillo) inside the
sidecar; that Rommel Reyes drove the tricycle to the Caltex Station near the
Catholic church for gasoline; that while the motorcycle was being refueled, the
tricycle driver alighted and talked to somebody whom he did not recognize; that the
tricycle driver returned and sat beside him without asking any help from anyone in
that gasoline station; that Rommel Reyes drove the tricycle towards the direction of
Tanibong; that instead of going to Tanibong, they proceeded to Tayabo; that when
they reached the vicinity of Tayabo, Rommel Reyes told him to wait
because Rommel Reyes and the tricycle driver would go somewhere; that while
waiting for them to return, he fell asleep inside the tricycle because he was drunk;
that when he woke up, they were already at the Iglesia Ni Cristo in Muoz, Nueva
Ecija; that the Security Guards of the Iglesia Ni Cristo woke them up with their guns
pointed at them; that he and Rommel Reyes were the only ones there and the
tricycle driver was no longer with them; that they were brought to the Minister
inside the compound and when they were alone he asked Rommel the whereabouts
of the tricycle driver; that Rommel told him that he killed the tricycle driver; that he
was surprised about the disclosure by that Rommel Reyes; that the Minister brought
with him policemen from Muoz Police Station and then they were transported to the
Muoz Municipal jail; that they were manhandled by the policemen; that theywere
brought to the San Jose City jail where they were again manhandled; that they were
investigated, however, they were not informed of their constitutional rights and

were not given a lawyer to assist them; that Rommel Reyes was tortured by the
police officers, thereafter he confessed responsibility in the killing of the tricycle
driver; that Rommel Reyes is the true name of Carlo Ellasos the latter being an alias
used by the accused while inside the jail; that he met Rommel Reyes at Julia street
through a gay named Odessa Ellasos and was acquainted with him for only a
month; that it was only during that incident that they two of them were together;
that he denied any participation in the killing of the tricycle driver.
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment dated February 4, 1999, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Sonny Obillo and
Carlo Ellasos alias Rommel Reyes[12], GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Carnapping with Homicide and hereby sentences both accused to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay to the heirs of Miguel de Belen the
following:
1. P50,000.00 compensatory damages for the death of Miguel de Belen;
2. P30,000.00 as indemnification for funeral expenses;
3. P6,500.00 for damages incurred on the tricycle; and
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Only the accused Sonny Obillo filed the instant appeal which raises the following
errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIME OF CARNAPPING
WITH HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT SONNY
OBILLO CONSPIRED WITH CARLO ELLASOS ALIAS ROMMEL REYES.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SONNY

OBILLO DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the trial judge gravely erred in
rendering a judgment of conviction against both accused Sonny Obillo and Carlo
Ellasos, despite the fact that he had ordered a separate trial of the case against
them, and transferred the trial of accused Ellasos to the RTC of Muntinlupa. In his
Order[14] dated July 10, 1997, the trial judge stated:
As Carlo Ellasos, a co-accused in this case is presently detained at the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City, the Court is constrained to transfer the trial of accused
Carlo Ellasos at the RTC, Muntinlupa and shall decide the case of accused Sonny
Obillo separately from said accused. The records of these cases to be transmitted
forthwith after the decision is rendered in these cases relative to accused Sonny
Obillo.
Considering that the prosecution needs a period of time to study whether or not to
present rebuttal evidence in these cases, he is given a period of fifteen days within
which to inform the Court regarding the matter and if the prosecution fails to
comply within the fifteen-day period granted them, these cases shall be deemed
submitted for decision as against accused Sonny Obillo.
Hence, since the trial of Ellasos did not take place the trial court should have
rendered a decision only against Sonny Obillo.
Upon a review of the records, we affirm the judgment against Obillo.
Upon the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the
essential element of intent to gain was not proven by the prosecution; that had the
purpose of the accused been to appropriate the tricycle, they could have taken the
said vehicle to a place where it could not be easily found; that the taking of the
wheel of the tricycle can. under the circumstances, be conclusively presumed to be
a mere afterthought, and if indeed a crime has been committed it can only be theft
of the wheel of the tricycle.
The contentions are unmeritorious.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as An Act Preventing and Penalizing
Carnapping, defines carnapping, thus:
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things.[Ibid., sec. 2]

Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of carnapping, is

an internal act and hence presumed from the unlawful taking of the vehicle.
[15]
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
[16]

In the case before us, when the victim, Miguel de Belen, who is the registered
owner of the tricycle subject of this carnapping case, [17] was last seen by his brother
Fernando at the Caltex station at 9:00 p.m. on April 2, 1992, he (Miguel) was seated
beside the accused Sonny Obillo inside the sidecar of his tricycle which was being
driven by the other accused Carlo Ellasos. Three (3) hours later, Fernando again saw
the two accused with the tricycle, but this time without his brother. When Fernando
finally asked the accused about the whereabouts of his brother, Ellasos answered
that Miguel was in a drinking session with his (Ellasos) father in Malasin. The
following morning, the lifeless body of Miguel de Belen, with a gunshot wound on
the head, was found in Tayabo. In the same morning, the two accused were found
sleeping at the gate of the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in Muoz, and in possession of a
gun and the wheel of Miguels tricycle. The rest of the tricycle was later recovered in
a culvert.
The chain of proven circumstances leads to the logical conclusion that the
tricycle was unlawfully taken by the two accused from its owner, Miguel de Belen,
and the latter was killed on the occasion thereof. Miguel was last seen with the two
accused; three hours later, the two were again spotted riding the tricycle without
Miguel. The following morning, the two accused were found in possession of a wheel
of the tricycle. Such possession, which remained without any satisfactory
explanation, raises the presumption that the two accused authored the carnapping.
[18]
This presumption remains unrebutted. In fact, the possession of the wheel of the
tricycle subject of this carnapping case is not denied by the accused-appellant who,
in his Brief, even argued thus: The fact that part of the tricycle was found in
possession of Sonny Obillo would not alter our theory [that the element of intent to
gain is wanting] because considering all the circumstances, it could be conclusively
presumed that the taking of the wheel was merely an afterthought. xxx If indeed a
crime has been committed, it can only be theft of the wheel of the tricycle. [19] That
only the wheel was found in possession of the accused and was intended to be
appropriated by the latter is of no moment. The unlawful taking of the tricycle from
the owner was already completed. Besides, the accused may be held liable for the
unlawful taking of the whole vehicle even if only a part thereof is ultimately taken
and/or appropriated while the rest of it is abandoned. In the case of People vs.
Carpio[20], this Court convicted the accused Carpio of theft of a car which was found
abandoned one day after it was stolen but without three (3) of its tires, holding thus:

xxx The act of asportation in this case was undoubtedly committed with intent on
the part of the thief to profit by the act, and since he effectively deprived the true
owner of the possession of the entire automobile, the offense of larceny comprised
the whole car. The fact that the accused stripped the car of its tires and abandoned
the machine in a distant part of the city did not make the appellant any less liable
for the larceny of that automobile. The deprivation of the owner and the trespass
upon his right of possession were complete as to the entire car; and the fact that
the thieves thought it wise promptly to abandon the machine in no wise limits their
criminal responsibility to the particular parts of the car that were appropriated and
subsequently used by the appellant upon his own car. [21]
Anent the second and third assignments of error, the accused-appellant argues
that there was no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Sonny Obillo
conspired with Carlo Ellasos who admitted responsibility for the killing of the
victim. He points out that the evidences of the prosecution merely show that Obillo
was seen with Ellasos on the night of April 2, 1992 and in the morning of April 3,
1992; and that Obillo made no attempt to refute the false statements of Ellasos
regarding the whereabouts of the victim Miguel de Belen. He also stresses that
there is no evidence on record to prove that he (Obillo) performed an overt act in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. [22] Conspiracy need not be
proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, [23] which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. [24]
The following circumstances enumerated in Appellees Brief provide sufficient
basis from which it can be inferred that the two accused, Carlo Ellasos and Sonny
Obillo, acted in concert in the series of events that took place on April 2 to April 3,
1992.
1. In the evening of April 2, 1992, accused flogged down the tricycle of Miguel de
Belen. Accuses Ellasos rode behind him while accused-appellant stayed inside the
sidecar.
2. Around 9 oclock, Fernando de Belen saw Miguels tricycle at the Caltex
Station. Accused Ellasos was at the drivers seat while Miguel was seated inside near
the driver and accused-appellant at the outer side of the sidecar.
3. They left together to the direction of Malasin, but they went to Tayabo, where
Miguels body was later found.

4. At midnight, Fernando and Leonardo de Belen saw accused using Miguels tricycle,
but Miguel was not with them.
5. Upon inquiry by Leonardo, accused told them that Miguel was left behind at
Malasin having a drinking spree with Ellasos father. Accused-appellant who was
awake at that time joined in the conversation but did not correct the wrong
information given by accused Ellasos.
6. Fernando and Leonardo de Belen went to Malasin but did not find Miguel.
7. At 3:00 in the early morning, accused who were both drunk stopped in front of
the Iglesia ni Cristo Church in Muoz where they fell asleep.
8. Around 6:00 in the morning, the INC security guards roused accused from their
sleep as they were blocking the gate.
9. The INC guards found that accused Ellasos was carrying a gun and accusedappellant had a wheel of a tricycle.
10. Accused were brought inside the compound where they were interrogated. They
admitted to be residents of 1st Abar, San Jose City where the de Belens likewise
reside.
11. The San Jose City Police found a dead male person tied hanging to a tree with a
gunshot wound in the head.
12. Fernando and his wifes uncle reported the disappearance of Miguel.
13. The dead person at Tayabo was identified by Fernando to be his missing brother
Miguel.
14. Miguels badly damaged tricycle was found in a culvert. [25]
The testimony of the accused-appellant that he fell asleep while waiting for
Ellasos and Miguel inside the tricycle and that when he woke up he was already in
front of the guards at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel deserves scant attention in light of
the positive testimonies of two witnesses, namely: (1) Fernando de Belen testified
that he saw Ellasos and Obillo riding the tricycle of his brother Miguel at about
midnight of April 2, 1992, and even asked them regarding the whereabouts of his
brother, to which Ellasos answered that Miguel was still in Malasin having a drinking
session with his (Ellasos) father;[26]and (2) Edgardo Galletes testified that at about
3:00 in the morning of April 3, 1992, he saw Ellasos and Obillo arrive by foot at the
Iglesia ni Cristo compound; when he asked the two where they came from, they
answered Munoz.[27] Between the self-serving testimony of the accused-appellant

and the positive testimonies of the two witnesses negating the former, we have no
cogent reason to disturb the trial courts finding giving more credence to the latter.
On the matter of conviction of the accused based on circumstantial evidence,
the following requisites need to be satisfied: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.[28] Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others,
as the guilty person, i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. [29]
A careful perusal of the transcript of the testimonies of witnesses for both the
prosecution and the defense shows adequate evidentiary bases to establish the
aforementioned circumstances. The unbroken chain of these proven circumstances
inevitably point to only one conclusion--that the accused Obillo and Ellasos are
guilty of unlawfully taking the tricycle from its owner, Miguel de Belen, and of killing
the latter. This Court has held that [i]n the absence of an explanation of how one
has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and
treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression
and death of the said person and of the robbery committed on him. [30] The court a
quo, thus, committed no error in convicting the accused beyond reasonable doubt
on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength and nighttime cannot be appreciated as no evidence was
presented to prove the same. To establish the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, it must be shown that there was a period sufficient to afford full
opportunity for reflection and a time adequate to allow the conscience of the actor
to overcome the resolution of his will as well as outward acts showing the intent to
kill.[31] Abuse of superior strength is appreciated when the aggressors purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.[32] As aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not that
there are 3, 4 or more assailants as against one victim but whether the aggressors
took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense.
[33]
With respect to nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, this circumstance
must have specially been sought to consummate the crime, facilitate its success or
prevent recognition of the felon.[34]
The circumstance of treachery was also not proven. Treachery exists when the
offender commits a crime against persons, employing means or methods which

directly and specially insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. [35] It must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, or as conclusively as the killing itself. [36]
When the body of the victim was found, it was loosely tied by the neck to a tree.
However, no one saw the killing, and there is no proof that the victim was tied to
the tree prior to the killing. Neither is there proof that the act of tying was
consciously and deliberately done by the accused to ensure the execution of the
crime without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate. The hands and feet of the victim remained free and untied. At any rate, we
can only surmise as to what actually transpired during the killing of Miguel de Belen,
and thus cannot appreciate treachery which cannot be based on mere presumption.
[37]

[38]

In connection with the penalty imposed, the Solicitor-General invites our

attention to the erroneous imposition by the trial court of the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua upon the accused.
Section 14 of R.A. 6539 provides for the penalty for Carnapping, to wit:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of life
imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping. [Emphasis
supplied]
This was amended by R.A. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law, which took effect on
December 31, 1993, thereby changing the penalty contained in the last clause to
read: and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. [Section
20, Ibid.]
The crime was committed before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. Therefore, we have
to apply the original provision prescribing the penalty of life imprisonment to death
where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping. As there is no aggravating circumstance present in
this case, the maximum penalty imposable for the crime is life imprisonment.

[39]

Hence, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Time
and again, we have emphasized that life imprisonment is not synonymous
to reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment,reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent
and duration.[40] Life imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses
penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with
the Revised Penal Code.[41]
With regard to the indemnification for funeral expenses in the amount
of P30,000.00, records show that the same is only partially supported by
evidence. The receipt presented by the prosecution reflects only the amount
of P15,000.00.[42] Hence, we should limit the award to the latter amount in
accordance with the well-settled rule that only expenses supported by documents
such as receipts and which appear to be expended in connection with the death of
the victim are allowed to be recovered.[43] Bare allegations of witnesses as to the
expenses incurred are not sufficient. As for the indemnification for the damages
sustained by the recovered tricycle, this has no factual basis on record and
therefore should be deleted. [44] The award of exemplary damages should likewise be
deleted as no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. [45]
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that only Sonny Obillo is convicted of Carnapping with Homicide
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of Miguel de Belen. The indemnification for funeral expense is reduced
to P15,000.00, while the awards of P6,500.00 for the damages on the carnapped
tricycle and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted.

4. People vs. Fieldad

Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel
(Pimentel) were charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards
and for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS
GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM,
JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of
Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas,
Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto
kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,

conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting
upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter,
accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A.
8294.3 The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS
GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM,
JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of
Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas,
Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength,
conspiring with one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him
multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1
Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A.
8294.4
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping
committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped
from the BJMP Compound, Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape
armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, did
then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one
(1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without
the latters knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle.
CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended.5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr.
Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto
Gancea, Dionisio Badua, Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy

Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres,
Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland Malenab, Theresa Bacolor,
Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban,
SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2
Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon
Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching area near the main gate
of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2
Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open all
the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his
hearing scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the
telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to
the administration building to answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his
way there, he turned his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on
the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the latter with a short
firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an
armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the
latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice.
Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2
Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates
went out the main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the
main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a
parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon,
without the lattersknowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim)
and Chan along the way. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group
alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When
they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded
the cane field and arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and
concluded that the death was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot
wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno also testified that based on the injuries
sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting was preceded by a fight
between the shooter and the victim.

Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and
concluded that the death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot
wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldads Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of
his cell and ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the
offices, he was told to fix a vehicle parked inside the jail compound. He needed to
prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the jack handle. He went back
toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2
Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa
handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound,
while Fieldad continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia
(Mejia) and the other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa
hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his
gun and fired towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the
outpost. He peeped through the windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward
JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the exchange of fire between Mejia and
JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for help to
push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it
dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was
proceeding towards the main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun
towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go
with him. Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal
to a Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and
ordered the latter to drive the vehicle. Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On
their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentels Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of
his cell. He proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or
three gunshots, but did not immediately mind it because he was used to the guards
firing their guns in the morning. When he saw Leal with an armalite, running after
and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the jailcompound. He
was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire. Inmates were
running in different directions.

Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by
pointing his armalite downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who
ordered him to remove the stone blocking the tire of the jeep parked near the
house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep because Leal told him at gun
point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions
were. Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight
from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornistas Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning,
he was cleaning the jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard
three rapid gunfires followed by consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of
the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal
was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards lying
down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal,
Fieldad and Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot
him if he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and
boarded.Chan also joined them along the way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up,
Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the other
vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and
Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral
damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual
damages and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento,
Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and
Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral

damages, Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual

damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento,
Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution
to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and
Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
CARNAPPING and each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN
YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay
nominal damages of Php15,000.00 and moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are
ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had
died.7 They assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY
IN THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF
THE ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
TESTIMONIES.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the
penalties imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054,

taking into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The

dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
as to the penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos.
U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on
him are reduced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment,
being able to distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the
consequences of his acts." 10 The Court of Appeals enumerated the following acts of
Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the
latters head clearly demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the
situation where Fieldad was also grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of
JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would weaken the latters defenses. Moreover,
his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate
clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established discernment on his
part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.11
Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals decision. In the
interim, Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal 12 dated 15 June 2011, which the
Court granted in a Resolution 13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and
executory as to Cornista on 5 October 2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto
Fieldad and Pimentel only.
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs 15 filed before the Court of
Appeals as their supplemental briefs in this case. 16
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued
with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order
within the compound."17 This argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might take.18

In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a)
at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b)
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of
himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the
danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the
infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds,
one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on the
right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right
iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1
Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was
shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his
death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco, 21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of three
peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and
order. They were attending an event where many armed peace officers were
present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the victims were completely
taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the sudden
attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any
chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled
the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot
the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his
armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboas gun and shot JO1
Bacolor.
Fieldads Identity was Established
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the
killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings
were not established. However, contrary to his contention, Fieldads identity in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was proven by the prosecution. Fieldad
disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and
recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination. 23 Positive identification of the accused is
entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused. 24
In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldads self-serving defense of denial
and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and

difficult to disprove.25 True, the conviction of an accused must rest not on the
weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution evidence. Hence,
whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused
beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by
circumstantial evidence. A careful examination of the record reveals that the
following evidence establish Fieldads active participation in the conspiracy to kill
the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1
Bacolor for the possession of the latters armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally
fell when Cornista struck him at back of the head; 26
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2
Gamboas gun and usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor; 27
3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy
on JO1 Bacolor, testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the
victim may have been preceded by a fight between the victim and the
shooter;28
4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and
Chan by the nipa hut before heading out the main gate; 29
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the
nipa hut but moments before the gun shots rang; 30
6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts 31 of the hands
of Fieldad;32 and
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test
done on Fieldads hands was positive for the presence of gun powder
nitrates,33 as contained in her report. 34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert
the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldads counsel manifested duringtrial
that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance of counsel,
contrary to the right of the accused. 35 However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the
Order dated 3 March 2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not
violate the right of the accused against self incrimination. In People v.
Gamboa,37 we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the
question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence
of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless
he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent

counsel of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the
taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be
examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively thathe just
recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.38 (Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 39 Conspiracy can be inferred
from and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to
a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 40 Once
conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks
on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and
design in the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is
corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion
than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section
3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant
to pay to the heirs of each deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of exemplary damages
must be increased to P30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages are recoverable due to the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the commission
of the crimes.42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the
funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00
and P87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and P178,500.00 to the heirs of
JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the
formula
However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net
earning capacity using the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by
twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of P1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa
and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping

Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to

another without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things. 44 The elements of the crime of carnapping are that:
(1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the
taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things.45
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted
that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle,
BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by
appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot
be considered for being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw
jeep was missing.
Appellants argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he
arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and
that he had to retrieve it from Bactad:
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration
is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived orexpected from
the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owners consent constitutes gain. 48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced
them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal
liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury.49 For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. 50 A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character asto leave no
opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat. 52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was
already armed when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the
Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to
board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In addition, according to

appellants testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court
ofAppeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw
jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they
wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent danger to
their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape individually. Bynot availing
of this chance to escape, accused-appellants allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable.53
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstance. 54The
circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of the
carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an
uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the
circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously
concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent
of its owner.
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping,
as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a
range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special
law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed. 55 Hence, the
penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight
months to sixteen years and two months is in order.
The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of P15,000.00 and moral
damages in the amount ofP25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.

No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may
be adjudicated.56 Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.57 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury.58
The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order.1wphi1 However, we delete
the award of moral damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon
experienced any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any
similar injury.
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the
carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages an interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.59
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3
November 2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is
increased to P30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal
Case No. U-10054 is increased to P30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00
for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal
Case No. U-10053 is increased to P1,836,336.00;
5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the
heirs of JO1 Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased
to P2,142,000.00;
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.