Luzon Development Bank v.
Assoc of their collective agreement, to an
LDB
Issue
Whether or not the company has
violated the Collective Bargaining
Agreement provision and the
Memorandum of Agreement dated
April 1994, on promotion.
At a conference, the parties agreed on
the submission of their respective
Position Papers on December 1-15,
1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator,
received ALDBE's Position Paper on
January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other
hand, failed to submit its Position
Paper despite a letter from the
Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to
do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position
Paper had been filed by LDB. (The
Arbitrator proceeded to rule on the
matter notwithstanding the absence
of the position paper of the petitioner.)
In labor law context, arbitration is the
reference of a labor dispute to an
impartial third person for
determination on the basis of evidence
and arguments presented by such
parties who have bound themselves to
accept the decision of the arbitrator as
final and binding. Compulsory
arbitration is a system whereby the
parties to a dispute are compelled
by the government to forego their
right to strike and are compelled to
accept the resolution of their dispute
through arbitration by a third party.
Under voluntary arbitration, on the
other hand, referral of a dispute by the
parties is made, pursuant to a
voluntary arbitration clause in
impartial third person for a final and
binding resolution.
Ideally, arbitration awards are
supposed to be complied with by both
parties without delay, such that once
an award has been rendered by an
arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by
both parties but to comply with the
same. After all, they are presumed
to have freely chosen arbitration
as the mode of settlement for
that particular dispute. Pursuant
thereto, they have chosen a mutually
acceptable arbitrator who shall hear
and decide their case.
In the Philippine context, the parties to
a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) are required to include
therein provisions for a
MACHINERY FOR THE RESOLUTION
OF GRIEVANCES arising from the
interpretation or implementation
of the CBA or company personnel
policies. 3 For this purpose, parties to
a CBA shall name and designate
therein a voluntary arbitrator or a
panel of arbitrators, or include a
procedure for their selection,
preferably from those accredited by
the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB).
It will thus be noted that the
jurisdiction conferred by law on a
voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
and the appellate jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4
The state of our present law relating to
voluntary arbitration provides that
"(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the copy of the
award or decision by the parties," 5
while the "(d)ecision, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards,
or orders." 6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the
decision of a labor arbiter, Republic
Act No. 6715 is silent with respect
to an appeal from the decision of
a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a
decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is, more often than not,
elevated to the Supreme Court
itself on a petition for certiorari, 7
IN EFFECT EQUATING THE
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR WITH
THE NLRC or the Court of Appeals.
In the view of the Court, this is illogical
and imposes an unnecessary burden
upon it.
***In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v.
NLRC, et al., 8 on the settled premise
that the judgments of courts and
awards of quasi-judicial agencies must
become final at some definite time,
this Court ruled that the awards of
voluntary arbitrators determine
the rights of parties; hence, their
decisions HAVE THE SAME LEGAL
EFFECT as judgments of a court. In
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v.
Romero, et al., 9 this Court ruled that
"a VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BY
THE NATURE OF HER FUNCTIONS
ACTS IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL
CAPACITY." Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator,
whether acting solely or in a panel,
enjoys in law the status of a quasi-
judicial agency but independent of,
and apart from, the NLRC since his
decisions are not appealable to the
latter.
An "instrumentality" is anything
used as a means or agency. 12
Thus, the terms governmental
"agency" or "instrumentality" are
synonymous in the sense that either
of them is a means by which a
government acts, or by which a
certain government act or
function is performed. 13 The word
"instrumentality," with respect to a
state, contemplates an authority
to which the state delegates
governmental power for the
PERFORMANCE OF A STATE
FUNCTION. 14 An individual person,
like an administrator or executor, is a
judicial instrumentality in the settling
of an estate, 15 in the same manner
that a sub-agent appointed by a
bankruptcy court is an instrumentality
of the court, 16 and a trustee in
bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is
an instrumentality of the state. The
voluntary arbitrator no less
performs a state function
pursuant to a governmental
power delegated to him under the
provisions therefor in the Labor
Code and he falls, therefore,
within the contemplation of the
term "instrumentality" in the
aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The
fact that his functions and powers are
provided for in the Labor Code does
not place him within the exceptions to
said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial
instrumentality as contemplated
therein.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators should likewise be
appealable to the Court of Appeals, in
line with the procedure outlined in
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95, just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions
enumerated therein.
Iron & Steel Authority v. CA
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority
("ISA") was created by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9 August
1973 in order, generally, to develop
and promote the iron and steel
industry in the Philippines. P.D. No.
272 initially created petitioner ISA for
a term of five (5) years counting from
9 August 1973. 1 When ISA's original
term expired on 10 October 1978, its
term was extended for another ten
(10) years by Executive Order No. 555
dated 31 August 1979.
Since certain portions of the public
land (The land referred to here will be
used by the National Steel Authority
for the construction of a steel mill in
Iligan City) subject matter
Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied
by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant and related facilities
owned by private respondent Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation
("MCFC"), Letter of Instruction (LOI),
No. 1277, also dated 16 November
1982, was issued directing the NSC to
"negotiate with the owners of MCFC,
for and on behalf of the Government,
for the compensation of MCFC's
present occupancy rights on the
subject land." LOI No. 1277 also
directed that should NSC and
private respondent MCFC fail to
reach an agreement within a
period of sixty (60) days from the
date of LOI No. 1277, petitioner
ISA was to exercise its power of
eminent domain under P.D. No.
272 and to initiate expropriation
proceedings in respect of occupancy
rights of private respondent MCFC
relating to the subject public land as
well as the plant itself and related
facilities and to cede the same to the
NSC. Negotiations between NSC and
private respondent MCFC did fail.
Accordingly, on 18 August 1983,
petitioner ISA commenced eminent
domain proceedings against private
respondent MCFC. On 17 September
1983, a writ of possession was issued
by the trial court in favor of ISA. ISA in
turn placed NSC in possession and
control of the land occupied by MCFC's
fertilizer plant installation.
The case proceeded to trial. While the
trial was ongoing, however, the
statutory existence of petitioner
ISA expired on 11 August 1988.
MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that no valid judgment
could be rendered against ISA which
had ceased to be a juridical person.
Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to
this motion. In an Order dated 9
November 1988, the trial court
granted MCFC's motion to dismiss
and did dismiss the case. The
dismissal was anchored on the
provision of the Rules of Court stating 1987, ISA was "abolished and [had] no
that "only natural or juridical persons more legal authority to perform
or entities authorized by law may be governmental functions." The Court of
parties in a civil case." 3 The trial Appeals went on to say that the action
court also referred to non-compliance for expropriation could not prosper
by petitioner ISA with the because the basis for the
requirements of Section 16, Rule 3 of proceedings, the ISA's exercise of
the Rules of Court. its delegated authority to
expropriate, had become
Petitioner contended that despite ineffective as a result of the
the expiration of its term, its juridical delegate's dissolution, and could
existence continued until the not be continued in the name of
winding up of its affairs could be Republic of the Philippines,
completed. In the alternative, represented by the Solicitor General.
petitioner ISA urged that the
Republic of the Philippines, being Issue
the real party-in-interest, should be
allowed to be substituted for petitioner The principal issue which we must
ISA. In this connection, ISA referred to address in this case is whether or not
a letter from the Office of the the Republic of the Philippines is
President dated 28 September 1988 entitled to be substituted for ISA in
which especially directed the Solicitor view of the expiration of ISA's term.
General to continue the expropriation Ruling
case. (Which was denied on the
ground that the property to be Clearly, ISA was vested with some of
expropriated is not for public use of the powers or attributes normally
benefit but for the use and benefit of associated with juridical personality.
NSC, which will engage in private There is, however, no provision in
business and profit.) P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as
possessing general or
Court of Appeals affirmed the order of comprehensive juridical
dismissal of the trial court. The Court personality separate and distinct
of Appeals held that petitioner ISA, "a from that of the Government. The
government regulatory agency ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a
exercising sovereign functions," did non-incorporated agency or
not have the same rights as an instrumentality of the Republic of the
ordinary corporation and that the Philippines, or more precisely of the
ISA, unlike corporations organized Government of the Republic of the
under the Corporation Code, was Philippines. It is common knowledge
not entitled to a period for that other agencies or
winding up its affairs after instrumentalities of the Government of
expiration of its legally mandated the Republic are cast in corporate
term, with the result that upon form, that is to say, are incorporated
expiration of its term on 11 August agencies or instrumentalities,
sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly
vested with a juridical personality
distinct from the personality of the
Republic. We consider that the ISA
is properly regarded as an agent
or delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Republic itself is a
body corporate and juridical person
vested with the full panoply of powers
and attributes which are
compendiously described as "legal
personality.
When the statutory term of a non-
incorporated agency expires, the
powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of
that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic
of the Philippines, in the absence of
special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such
as, e.g., devolution or transmission of
such powers, duties, functions, etc. to
some other identified successor
agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an
incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must
be looked for, in the first instance,
in the charter of that agency and,
by way of supplementation, in the
provisions of the Corporation
Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is
a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and
liabilities are properly regarded as
folded back into the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and
hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory
provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.
The procedural implications of the
relationship between an agent or
delegate of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Republic itself are,
at least in part, spelled out in the
Rules of Court. The general rule is, of
course, that an action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. (Rule 3,
Section 2) Petitioner ISA was, at the
commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, a real
party in interest, having been
explicitly authorized by its
enabling statute to institute
expropriation proceedings. In the
instant case, ISA instituted the
expropriation proceedings in its
capacity as an agent or delegate
or representative of the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to its
authority under P.D. No. 272. The
present expropriation suit was
brought on behalf of and for the
benefit of the Republic as the principal
of ISA. From the foregoing premises, it
follows that the Republic of the
Philippines is entitled to be substituted
in the expropriation proceedings as
party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the
statutory term of ISA having expired.
Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA's statutory term did not by itself
require or justify the dismissal of the
eminent domain proceedings.
While the power of eminent domain is,
in principle, vested primarily in the
legislative department of the
government, we believe and so hold
that no new legislative act is
necessary should the Republic decide,
upon being substituted for ISA, in fact
to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings. For the
legislative authority, a long time ago,
enacted a continuing or standing
delegation of authority to the
President of the Philippines to
exercise, or cause the exercise of,
the power of eminent domain on
behalf of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. The
1917 Revised Administrative Code,
which was in effect at the time of the
commencement of the present
expropriation proceedings before the
Iligan Regional Trial Court, provided
that: In addition to his general
supervisory authority, the President of
the Philippines shall have such
other specific powers and duties
as are expressly conferred or
imposed on him by law, and also,
in particular, the powers and
duties set forth in this Chapter. To
determine when it is necessary or
advantageous to exercise the right of
eminent domain in behalf of the
Government of the Philippines; and to
direct the Secretary of Justice, where
such act is deemed advisable, to
cause the condemnation proceedings
to be begun in the court having proper
jurisdiction.
Solid Homes v. Payawal
The complaint was filed on August 31,
1982, by Teresita Payawal against
Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119.
The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant contracted to sell to her a
subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9,
1975, for the agreed price of P
28,080.00, and that by September 10,
1981, she had already paid the
defendant the total amount of P
38,949.87 in monthly installments
and interests. Solid Homes
subsequently executed a deed of sale
over the land but failed to deliver
the corresponding certificate of
title despite her repeated
demands because, as it appeared
later, the defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad
faith to a financing company. The
plaintiff asked for delivery of the title
to the lot or, alternatively, the return
of all the amounts paid by her plus
interest. She also claimed moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and the costs of the suit.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction, this being vested
in the National Housing Authority
under PD No. 957. The motion was
denied. The defendant repleaded the
objection in its answer, citing Section
3 of the said decree providing that
"the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree." After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiff.
The private respondent contends that
the applicable law is BP No. 129, which
confers on regional trial courts
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
mentioned therein (such as in this
case.) It stresses, additionally, that
BP No. 129 should control as the
later enactment, having been
promulgated in 1981, after PD No.
957 was issued in 1975 and PD No.
1344 in 1978.
Ruling
This construction must yield to the
familiar canon that in case of conflict
between a general law and a special
law, the latter must prevail regardless
of the dates of their enactment. The
circumstance that the special law
is passed before or after the
general act does not change the
principle. Where the special law is
later, it will be regarded as an
exception to, or a qualification of, the
prior general act; and where the
general act is later, the special statute
will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed
expressly or by necessary implication.
It is obvious that the general law in
this case is BP No. 129 and PD No.
1344 the special law.
We do not read that provision as
vesting concurrent jurisdiction on
the Regional Trial Court and the
Board over the complaint mentioned
in PD No. 1344 if only because grants
of power are not to be lightly inferred
or merely implied. The only purpose of
this section, as we see it, is to reserve.
to the aggrieved party such other
remedies as may be provided by
existing law, like a prosecution for the
act complained of under the Revised
Penal Code.
As a result of the growing complexity
of the modern society, it has become
necessary to create more and
more administrative bodies to
help in the regulation of its
ramified activities. Specialized in
the particular fields assigned to them,
they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from
the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing
vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth
department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their
administrative agencies must be
liberally construed to enable them
to discharge their assigned duties
in accordance with the legislative
purpose.
Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission
Petitioner Lolita A. Dadubo, Senior
Accounts Analyst and Rosario B. Cidro,
Cash Supervisor, of the Development
Bank of the Philippines, Borongan
Branch were administratively
charged with conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
1 The charges were based on reports
on the unposted withdrawal of
P60,000.00 (The withdrawal occurred
for at least 3 times.) from Savings
Account No. 87-692 in the name of
Eric Tiu, Edgar Tiu, and/or Pilar Tiu.
On the basis of these findings, DBP
found Dadubo guilty of dishonesty
for embezzlement of bank funds.
She was penalized with dismissal from
the service. 6 Cidro was adjudged
guilty of gross neglect of duty and
fined in an amount equivalent to one
month basic salary, payable through
salary deductions in not more than 12
installments. Dadubo appealed to the
Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB), 7 which affirmed the decision
of the DBP where it ruled that: There
is nothing in the records to show that
the Senior Manager, Personnel
Services and Vice-Chairman, both of
the DBP, abused their discretion in
deciding the case against the
appellant or that their decision was
made and attended with arbitrariness
or unfairness. To all intents and
purposes, the ensuing decision was a
necessary consequence of the
evidence.
However, DBP was reversed by the
Civil Service Commission in its
Resolution No. 91-642, dated May 21,
1991, 8 which reduced Dadubo's
penalty to suspension for six months:
Although Dadubo made alterations
on the dates in the Ledger Card from
August 13 to August 14, the fact
remains that the bank was defrauded
on account of said ABH withdrawal
(for) which Cidro is held responsible
and accordingly found guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of
Official Duty. It was also Dadubo who
reported on the irreconcilable
P60,000.00. The most that Dadubo
could be charged with is willful
violation of office regulation when she
undertook reconciliation for under the
Bank Manual the tellers are not
allowed access to the savings account
ledger cards. Although subsequently,
it was reversed upon the timely filing
of a MR by the DBP and thus this
petition.
Dadubo has brought her case to this
Court in this petition for certiorari. She
claims that CSC Resolution No. 92-878
failed to comply with the
constitutional requirement to
state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which the
decision is based; CSC Resolution
No. 92-878 conflicts with the
findings of fact in CSC Resolution No.
91-642; the Commission manifestly
overlooked or disregarded certain
relevant facts not disputed by the
parties; and it based its conclusions
entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.
Required to comment, the Solicitor
General argued that CSC Resolution
No. 92-878 did not need to restate the
legal and factual bases of the original
decision in CSC-MSPB No. 497 which
already explained the relevant facts
and the applicable law. The petitioner
had admitted that she changed the
entry of the dates in the subsidiary
ledger card from August 13 to 14 in
the course of her reconciliation work
although she was not authorized to do
this. This admission, along with the
other evidence Presented during the
investigation in the bank, proved
Dadubo's guilt. Moreover, the affidavit
of Albert C. Ballicud was inadmissible
in evidence because he was never
subjected to cross-examination.
Ruling
The petitioner's challenges are mainly
factual. The rule is that the
findings of fact of administrative
bodies, if based on substantial
evidence, are controlling on the
reviewing authority. 10 is settled
that it is not for the appellate court to
substitute its own judgment for that of
the administrative agency on the
sufficiency of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses. 11
Administrative decisions on matters
within their jurisdiction are entitled to
respect and can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law. 12 None of these
vices has been shown in this case.
The petitioner's invocation of due
process is without merit. Her
complaint that she was not sufficiently
informed of the charges against her
has no basis. While the rules
governing Judicial trials should be
observed as much as possible, their
strict observance is not
indispensable in administrative
cases. 13 As this Court has held, "the
standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows
a certain latitude as long as the
element of fairness is not
ignored."
The essence of due process is distilled
in the immortal cry of Themistocles to
Eurybiades: "Strike, but hear me first!"
Less dramatically, it simply
connotes an opportunity to be
heard. The petitioner had several
opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence that she was not
guilty of embezzlement but only of
failure to comply with the tellering
procedure. Not only did she testify at
her formal investigation but she also
filed a motion for reconsideration with
the DBP, then appealed to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), and
later elevated the case to the Civil
Service Commission. Having been
given all these opportunities to be
heard, which she fully availed of, she
cannot now complain that she was
denied due process.
The charge against the respondent in
an administrative case need not be
drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal
prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
apprised of the substance of the
charge against him; what is controlling
is the allegation of the acts
complained of, not the designation of
the offense. We must also dismiss the
petitioner's complaint that CSC
Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply
with the constitutional requirement to
state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which a decision is
based. We have held that this
provision applies only to courts of
justice and not to administrative
bodies like the Civil Service
Commission. 16 In any event, there
was an earlier statement of the
facts and the law involved in the
decision rendered by the MSPB dated
February 28, 1990, which affirmed
DBP's decision to dismiss the
petitioner. In both decisions, the facts
and the law on which they were based
were clearly and distinctly stated. It is
worth adding that inasmuch as Civil
Service Resolution No. 92-878 was
rendered only to resolve DBP's motion
for reconsideration, it was not really
necessary to re-state the factual and
legal bases for the said decisions.
Lianga Bay Logging v. Enage
The parties herein are both forest
concessionaries whose licensed areas
are adjacent to each other. Since the
concessions of petitioner and
respondent are adjacent to each other,
they have a common boundary-the
Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-
whereby the eastern boundary of
respondent Ago's concession is
petitioner Lianga's western boundary.
Because of reports of encroachment
by both parties on each other's
concession areas, the Director of
Forestry ordered a survey to establish
on the ground the common boundary
of their respective concession areas.
Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook
the survey and fixed the common
boundary, which respondent Ago
protested claiming that "its eastern
boundary should be the provincial
boundary line of Agusan-Surigao as
described in Section 1 of Art. 1693 of
the Philippine Commission as
indicated in the green pencil in the
attached sketch" of the areas as
prepared by the Bureau of Forestry.
The Director of Forestry ruled on the
matter, by holding that he claim of the
Ago Timber Corporation runs counter
to the intentions of this Office is
granting the license of Mr. Narciso
Lansang; and further, that it also runs
counter to the intentions of this Office
in granting the Timber License
Agreement to the Lianga Bay Logging
Co., Inc. The intentions of this Office in
granting the two licenses (Lansang
and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.) are
patently manifest in that distances
and bearings are the controlling
factors. If mention was ever made of
the Agusan-Surigao boundary, as the
common boundary line of both
licensees, this Office could not have
meant the Agusan-Surigao boundary
as described under Section 1 of Act
1693 of the Philippine Commission for
were it so it could have been so easy
for this Office to mention the distance
from point 3 to point 4 of Narciso
Lansang as approximately 13,800
meters. This cannot be considered a
mistake considering that the
percentage of error which is more
or less 103% is too high an error
to be committed by an Office
manned by competent technical
men. The Agusan-Surigao boundary
as mentioned in the technical
descriptions of both licensees, is,
therefore, patently an imaginary line
based on B.F. License Control Map.
Such being the case, it is reiterated
that distance and bearings control the
description where an imaginary line
exists. 3 The decision fixed the
common boundary of the licensed
areas of the Ago Timber Corporation
and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as
that indicated in red pencil of the
sketch attached to the decision.
In an appeal interposed by respondent
Ago, docketed in the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as
DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a
decision dated August 9, 1965 set
aside the appealed decision of the
Director of Forestry and ruled that
"(T)he common boundary line of the
licensed areas of the Ago Timber
Corporation and the Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc., should be that
indicated by the green line on the
same sketch which had been made an
integral part of the appealed
decision." And it was reversed by the
Office of the President.
On October 21, 1968, a new action
was commenced by Ago Timber
Corporation, as plaintiff, in the Court
of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II,
docketed thereat as Civil Case No.
1253, against Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc., Assistant Executive Secretaries
Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M. Duavit
and Director of Forestry, as
defendants, for "Determination of
Correct Boundary Line of License
Timber Areas and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction" reiterating
once more the same question raised
and passed upon in DANR Case No.
2268 and insisting that "a judicial
review of such divergent
administrative decisions is necessary
in order to determine the correct
boundary fine of the licensed areas in
question."
Respondent Judge erred in taking
cognizance of the complaint filed by
respondent Ago, asking for the
determination anew of the correct
boundary fine of its licensed timber
area, for the same issue had
already been determined by the
Director of Forestry, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the
President, administrative officials
under whose jurisdictions the
matter properly belongs. Section
1816 of the Revised Administrative
Code vests in the Bureau of
Forestry, the jurisdiction and
authority over the demarcation,
protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation,
occupancy, and use of all public
forests and forest reserves and over
the granting of licenses for game and
fish, and for the taking of forest
products, including stone and earth
therefrom. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
department head, may repeal or in the
decision of the Director of Forestry
when advisable in the public interests,
15 whose decision is in turn
appealable to the Office of the
President.
In giving due course to the complaint
below, the respondent court would
necessarily have to assess and
evaluate anew all the evidence
presented in the administrative
proceedings, 17 which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction. For the
respondent court to consider and
weigh again the evidence already
presented and passed upon by said
officials would be to allow it to
substitute its judgment for that of
said officials who are in a better
position to consider and weigh
the same in the light of the
AUTHORITY SPECIFICALLY VESTED
in them by law. Such a posture
cannot be entertained, for it is a well-
settled doctrine that the courts of
justice will generally not interfere
with purely administrative
matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government
agencies and their expertise unless
there is a clear showing that the
latter acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion or when
they have acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess or
lack of jurisdiction. A doctrine long
recognized is that where the law
confines in an administrative office the
power to determine particular
questions or matters, upon the facts to
be presented, the jurisdiction of such
office shall prevail over the courts.
The general rule, under the principles
of administrative law in force in this
jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not
be disturbed by the courts,
except when the former have
acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies
who have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters are generally accorded not
only respect but at times even
finality of such findings are
supported by substantial
evidence. 20 As recently stressed by
the Court, "in this era of clogged court
dockets, the need for specialized
administrative boards or commissions
with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become well nigh indispensable."
It is elementary that a draft of a
decision does not operate as judgment
on a case until the same is duly signed
and delivered to the clerk for filing and
promulgation. A decision cannot be
considered as binding on the parties
until its promulgation. 23 Respondent
should be aware of this rule. In still
another case of Ago v. Court of
Appeals, 24 (where herein respondent
Ago was the petitioner) the Court held
that, "While it is to be presumed that
the judgment that was dictated in
open court will be the judgment of the
court, the court may still modify said
order as the same is being put into
writing. And even if the order or
judgment has already been put into
writing and signed, while it has not yet
been delivered to the clerk for filing, it
is stin subject to amendment or
change by the judge. It is only when
the judgment signed by the judge is
actually filed with the clerk of court
that it becomes a valid and binding
judgment. Prior thereto, it could still
be subject to amendment and change
and may not, therefore, constitute the
real judgment of the court."
The mere suspicion of respondent
(The 2 decisions by the OP were
signed by 2 different Exec.
Secretaries.) that there were
anomalies in the non-release of the
Leido "decision" allegedly denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and the substitution thereof by the
Duavit decision granting
reconsideration does not justify
judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions
and conjectures cannot overcome
the presumption of regularity and
legality of official actions. 25 It is
presumed that an official of a
department performs his official
duties regularly. 26 It should be
noted, furthermore, that as
hereinabove stated with regard to the
case history in the Office of the
President, Ago's motion for
reconsideration of the Duavit decision
dated August 9, 1968 was denied in 1968 and the order affirming the same
the Order dated October 2, 1968 and dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of
signed by Assistant Executive the President.
Secretary Leido himself (who thereby
joined in the reversal of his own first
decision dated June 16, 1966 and
signed by himself)

It is abundantly clear that respondent

court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 1253
of the Court of First Instance of Agusan
nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the
common boundary of the licensed
areas of petitioner Lianga and
respondent Ago, as determined by
respondents public officials against
whom no case of grave abuse of
discretion has been made. Absent a
cause of action and jurisdiction,
respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion and excess, if not
lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to
dismiss the case under review and in
issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement
of the final decision dated August 9,