APPELLATE LAW PRACTICE
CASE DIGESTS | Cabradilla, Duce, Pabuaya
Villanueva v. CA
G.R. No. 99357, Jan 27, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Villanueva had an insurance policy with Blue Cross Insurance. She was diagnosed with
cholecystitis and subsequently operated on. She sought reimbursement from Blue Cross Insurance
for her hospital and doctors bill. Her request was denied by the insurance company alleging that
cholecystitis was a pre-existing condition hence not covered by her insurance.
The Insurance Commission ruled in favor of Villanueva. On Sept. 21, 1990 the Commission
rendered its decision ordering Blue Cross to pay Villanueva the aggregate sum of her hospital and
doctors bill plus attorneys fees and costs.
Copy of the decision was received by Blue Cross on Sept. 27, 1990. On October 15, more than 15
days from receipt of the decision of the Insurance Commission, Blue Cross filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Insurance Commission on Dec. 13, 1990.
Blue Cross filed a notice of appeal with the Insurance Commission on December 17, 1990. On
March 15, 1991, CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time and respondent
did not file a copy of its notice of appeal with the CA contrary to RA 5434.
Blue Cross moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of its appeal. On May 8, 1991 CA ordered
re-instatement of the appeal in keeping with the ends of substantial justice.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reinstating the appeal.
RULING:
Yes, CA erred in reinstating the appeal.
To perfect an appeal under Republic Act No. 5434, (the law then applicable) the following rules
must be observed:
In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and
Section 22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
Court of Appeals and with the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days from notice of the ruling, award,
order, decision or judgment; or in case a motion for reconsideration is filed within said period, then
within ten days from notice of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Sections 2 and
3 of R.A. No. 5434). No extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is needed, much less
allowed.
In the instant case, even assuming that a notice of appeal was seasonably filed with the Insurance
Commission, no such notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals. The said failure of
petitioner to comply with the requirements of law for the perfection of its appeal is fatal to its present
remedial attempt. It renders the decision of the Insurance Commission final and executory and the
same can no longer be a subject of review.
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The
party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do
so, the right to appeal is lost.
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Teope v. People
G.R. No. 149687, Apr 14, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with 2 counts of violation of B.P. 22 before the RTC and the RTC ordered
that hearings for the reception of petitioner's evidence be set. The petitioner was ordered to present
her evidence on several dates but the Petitioner failed to appear at some of these scheduled
hearings. Thus, the RTC declared her bail bonds forfeited and ordered the bondsman to produce
petitioner.
On June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 21, 1995
order. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the RTC rendered judgment
against the bonds for failure of the bondsman to produce petitioner. The RTC then issued another
order declaring petitioner as a fugitive from justice and a warrant of arrest was issued against her.
Petitioner's counsel then filed an Omnibus Motion dated May 19, 1997, asserting that petitioner
cannot be tried in absentia because she was not notified of the subsequent trials after the forfeiture
of her bail bonds. The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment finding petitioner guilty on both counts of violation
of B.P. 22. On January 20, 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, to which the RTC denied due
course on the ground that, being a fugitive from justice, petitioner has lost her right to appeal.
Unable to convince the RTC to give due course to her appeal, petitioner's counsel sought redress
with the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for mandamus which was subsequently dismissed.
Thus, the present petition was instituted.
ISSUE:
Was the RTC correct in denying the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on the ground that, being a
fugitive from justice, petitioner has lost her right to appeal?
RULING:
YES. Being a fugitive from justice, petitioner has lost her right to appeal.
Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provides that: If the
judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he
shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. xxx xxx xxx
There is no question that petitioner escaped after her arraignment. Subsequently, the trial was
ordered to continue but after the accused failed to appear, the RTC terminated the trial and,
thereafter, promulgated the Joint Judgment of conviction. During that time petitioner was at large.
She remains at large even while her counsel continues to file various pleadings on her behalf
before the RTC, the Court of Appeals and this Court.
Under the Rules of Court, petitioner is barred from availing of the remedies allowed by the rules
against the judgment of the RTC, one of which is the right to file an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or confinement,
or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders
or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court. Thus, having no right to appeal the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals, the petition for
mandamus cannot prosper.

Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings, et al.
G.R. No. 156067, Aug 11, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Madrigal filed two petitions: a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 49 and a Complaint for Damages against respondents before the RTC of Manila, Branch 36.
Subsequently, the RTC declared the petitioner as insolvent. Thereafter, respondents filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, which the RTC granted. According to
the RTC, applying the Insolvency Law, petitioner lost its right to institute the complaint for damages
when it filed for insolvency.
Petitioner filed an MR, however, it was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the Decision and the Order of the RTC. The CA then ruled that since the main issue in the
instant case was purely legal, the Petition could be treated as one for review as an exception to the
general rule that certiorari was not proper when appeal was available. Such ruling was challenged
by the respondents through an MR.
Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Decision granting respondents MR and dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner. It opined that an order granting a motion to dismiss was
final and thus the proper subject of an appeal, not certiorari. Furthermore, even if the Petition could
be treated as an appeal, it would still have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The CA held that
the issues raised by petitioner involved pure questions of law that should be brought to the SC,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 50 and Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy.
RULING:
No. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Rules of
Court to be appealable. On the other hand, certiorari may be taken when the following requisites
concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
There are several distinctions as between an appeal and a petition for certiorari:
1. As to the purpose - Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.
2. As to the manner of filing - Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance
with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.
An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit; while, a petition for certiorari is an original
and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action.
In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes
the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents, respectively).
3. As to the subject matter - Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
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APPELLATE LAW PRACTICE
CASE DIGESTS | Cabradilla, Duce, Pabuaya
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or
where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
4. As to the period of filing - Ordinary appeals should be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from the said notice of judgment or
final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within 15 days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than 60 days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely
filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
5. As to the need for an MR - A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of
a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors.
Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law.
Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained.
Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not
alternative or successive. 52 Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
53 One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. 54 Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Hrs. Of Sps. Reterta v. Sps. Mores
G.R. No. 159941, Aug 17, 2011
FACTS:
Spouses Reterta filed a complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance involving friar lands in the
RTC of Cavite. The RTC dismissed the same contending that they had no jurisdiction over the
action as the same falls under the Land Management Bureau. The spouses timely filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Spouses Reterta then assailed the dismissal
through a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition saying that the special civil action of
certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the remedy of appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
RULING:
No, the CA was not correct. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final
order when appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due
course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader
interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly
unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the
motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement
that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of

law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate,
and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved;
and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an
adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere
absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must
usually determine the propriety of certiorari.
Madarang v. Morales
G.R. No. 199283, Jun 9, 2014
FACTS:
Spouses Morales filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for judicial foreclosure of a house
and lot for failure of the Bartolome Spouses to pay after demand of the whole amount of a loan
secured by a mortgage in favor of the creditor spouses. In its decision dated December 22, 2009,
the trial court ruled in favor of the Spouses Morales ordering the defendants to pay the loan
otherwise the subject property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.
Defendants received a copy of the trial court's decision on January 29, 2010. The defendants filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on May 25, 2010 and held that the
motion for reconsideration and its amendment were pro forma as defendants failed to specify the
findings and conclusions in the decision that were not supported by evidence or contrary to law.
Defendants, through its counsel, received a copy of the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010. On
August 11, 2010, defendants filed a notice of appeal but the trial court denied it for having been
filed out of time. According to the trial court, the defendants had 15 days from June 24, 2010, or
until July 9, 2010, to appeal the trial court's decision. However, they filed their notice of appeal
only on August 11, 2010, which was beyond the 15day period to appeal.
On September 24, 2010, defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, blaming their
80-year-old lawyer who failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period and argued
that their counsels failure to appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and an
excusable negligence which should not be attributable to undersigned defendants. The trial court
denied the petition for relief from judgment and held that it was filed beyond 60 days from the
finality of the trial court's decision, contrary to Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On July 13, 2011, filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but was denied outright.
The Court of Appeals found that petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated
November 10, 2011. Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this court and argued
that they need not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from
judgment because the questions they raised in the petition for relief were pure questions of law.
A comment was filed on the petition for review on certiorari. Respondents contend that the Court of
Appeals did not err in denying the petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
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APPELLATE LAW PRACTICE
CASE DIGESTS | Cabradilla, Duce, Pabuaya
2. Whether the failure of petitioners' former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioners' petition for certiorari for
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment.
RULING:
1. Yes. A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns
of the judgment, final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of
judgment or final order. This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed
out of time. However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for relief
from the date of finality of the trial court's decision.
Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be
counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality
of judgment or final order is the six-month period.
Section 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: A petition provided for in either of
the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after petitioner
learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding
was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly
complied with. A petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is
dismissed outright. This is because a petition for relief from judgment is an exception to the
public policy of immutability of final judgments.
Since petitioners' counsel received a copy of the decision on January 29, 2010, the period to
appeal shall be counted from that date. Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January
29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or
until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment. Since petitioners filed their
petition for relief from judgment on September 4, 2010, the petition for relief from judgment was
filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied the
petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
2. No. Failure of petitioners former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is not excusable negligence. Even if we assume that petitioners filed
their petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove
that their former counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to a mistake or
excusable negligence. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition
for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence:
Section 1. proceedings. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other. When a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only in
exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a motion for new trial
or appeal. To set aside a judgment through a petition for relief, the negligence must be so

gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." This is to
prevent parties from "reviv[ing] the right to appeal [already] lost through inexcusable
negligence."
Petitioners argue that their former counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period was "a mistake and an excusable negligence due to [their former counsel's]
age." This argument stereotypes and demeans senior citizens. It asks this court to assume that
a person with advanced age is prone to incompetence. This cannot be done.
There is also no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary
diligence and prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel's negligence.
Petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal, considering that their former counsel
received a copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision
on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the
trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.
3. No. The Court of Appeals correctly denied the petition for certiorari for petitioners' failure
to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a party before a
petition for certiorari is filed. This section provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
In this case, a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners failed to avail themselves of this remedy. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari. Contrary to petitioners' claim, the questions they
raised in their petition for relief from judgment were not pure questions of law. They raise the
authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome's signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage and the
allegedly excusable negligence of their counsel. These are questions of fact which put at issue
the truth of the facts alleged in the petition for relief from judgment. Petitioners cannot cite
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals where this court held that
"[t]he filing of the motion for reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is
not sine qua non when the issues raised is one purely of law.
Pinausukan Seafood House v. FEBTC
G.R. No. 159926, Jan 20, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner corporations President executed four REM over petitioner corporations properties,
which were subsequently sought to be foreclosed by the respondent upon the formers failure to
pay its obligations. Thereafter, petitioner corporation filed an action for the annulment of the REM,
alleging that the loans were obtained by the President in his personal capacity and that the
mortgage of the corporations properties was not supported by any board resolution.
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APPELLATE LAW PRACTICE
CASE DIGESTS | Cabradilla, Duce, Pabuaya
Thereafter, the parties informed the RTC of their attempts to settle the case; however, the counsels
of the parties did not appear in court on the scheduled hearing. Thus, the RTC rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute, which later on attained finality.
Upon the issuance of a notice of extrajudicial sale by the sheriff, petitioner corporation then learned
that its counsel of record had not informed it of the dismissal of the action; thus, petitioner filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud caused by the
palpable negligence and professional misconduct of its counsel. However, the CA dismissed the
complaint due to the failure to attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the
alleged extrinsic fraud.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment.
RULING:
No. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily
abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus
instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should
show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or
disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the
judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or
to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are
set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or
final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order
the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The
remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final order
is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial
court.
Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final
order, petitioner must be mindful of and should closely comply with the following statutory
requirements for the remedy as set forth in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
1. That the remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of
the petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as "a last remedy," is not an
alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must
aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition
for relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground
for the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic
fraud), simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time
either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred
by laches.
2. That the ground for the action of annulment of judgment is limited to either extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction.

3. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the
extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches
or estoppel.
4. That the petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law
relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
In this case, the petition suffered a procedural defect when it failed to comply with the fourth
requirement regarding the affidavits of witness and documents supporting the cause of action. It
also suffered a substantive defect because the neglect of petitioners counsel did not amount to
extrinsic fraud as it did not emanate from any act of respondent as the prevailing party, and did not
occur outside the trial of the case.
By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it relates to
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the
case, where the defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the cause, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will
not lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer. In the latter
case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case
where judgment had been rendered.
Aranas v. Mercado
G.R. No. 156407, Jan 15, 2014
FACTS:
After Emigdio Mercados death, his 2nd wife, Teresita was appointed administratrix of his estate.
Teresita was ordered to render an inventory of the properties to be included in the estate. After a
series of inventories and re-inventories, with Thelma, a daughter of Emigdio from his first marriage
opposing the properties included in the inventory, the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the RTC as to the issue of what properties should be included. The RTC rendered an order that
Teresita excluded certain properties which were supposed to be included in the inventory. Teresita
and the other heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling contending that the property
sought to be included were already sold prior to the death of Emigdio. When the motion for
reconsideration was denied, Teresita filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in ruling that said properties should be included in
the inventory.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of the petition for certiorari assailing the RTC order for inclusion was proper.
RULING:
YES. The filing of the petition for certiorari was proper.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed
orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing
more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
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is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This
is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the
ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against
the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule
41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable may be the subject of
an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made nonappealable.
Jose v. Javellana
G.R. No. 158239, Jan 25, 2012
FACTS:
Javellana commenced on February 10, 1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against Priscilla in the RTC. Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land he bought; and that Priscilla be ordered to institute registration proceedings and
then to execute a final deed of sale in his favor.
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already barred by prescription; and
that the complaint did not state a cause of action. The RTC initially denied Priscilla's motion to
dismiss on February 4, 1998. However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed
itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration but on June 21, 2000, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24, 1999. Accordingly, Javellana
filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order, which the RTC gave due course to, and the
records were elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Priscilla countered that:
The June 21, 2000 order was not appealable. Priscilla submits that the order of June 21, 2000
was not the proper subject of an appeal considering that Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion for reconsideration;
The appeal was not perfected on time. Priscilla pointed out that Javellana received a copy of the
June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for reconsideration on July 21, 1999
(or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion for reconsideration through the
order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13, 2000; that he had only three
days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to perfect an appeal; and that

having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should have been dismissed for
being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary period.
On November 20, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision in reversing and setting aside the
dismissal of the case and remanding the records to the RTC "for further proceedings in
accordance with law." The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action.
On May 9, 2003, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that it decided to give due
course to the appeal even if filed out of time because Javellana had no intention to delay the
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1. WON the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and
appealable.
2. WON the appeal was made on time.
RULING:
1. Yes .The denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was a final order and
appealable. The prohibition against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration
referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.
First of all, the denial of Javellana's motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of the case. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in
Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held
and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court
with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise,
it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct
remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an
appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies
given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of
the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay
the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as
there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or
issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a
judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
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The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be
resorted to. Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final order or
judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing an order
denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for reconsideration of
an interlocutory order.
2. Yes. The appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA (the fresh period rule).
Adopting the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, an aggrieved party desirous of
appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of the order denying a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the MTCs
to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the CA; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the SC. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution.
In the instant case, a copy of the order denying the MR was received on July 13, 2000. Having
filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal was well within the 15-day period.
Philippine Business Bank v. Chua
G.R. No. 178899, Nov 15, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Chua is a director and the President of CST Enterprises, was given possession of
OCTs for properties owned by the company. It was discovered that a certain John Dennis Chua
obtained a Secretarys Certificate from CST authorizing him to to open a bank account and obtain
credit facilities under the name of CST with Petitioner PBB. Thereafter, John Dennis Chua obtained
loans with the petitioner, signing both as a representative of CST and in his personal capacity, with
respondent Chua signing as a co-maker. The OCTs in possession of the respondent were used as
collaterals for the loans obtained.
When petitioner threatened to foreclose the properties after CST defaulted, a derivative suit was
filed by Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST, against petitioner PBB,
respondent Chua and John Dennis Chua, among others, for the Declaration of Unenforceability of
Promissory Notes and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretary's Certificate, Injunction, Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In its Amended Answer, petitioner PBB included a cross-claim against respondent Chua for the
payment of the promissory notes he signed as a co-maker with John Dennis Chua. In his answer,
respondent denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans; however, he admitted that
he signed as a co-maker for the six promissory notes obtained by John Dennis Chua.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of
the Rules of Court, claiming that since respondent already admitted to the execution of the
promissory notes, insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine
issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. The motion was subsequently granted
by the RTC, which also ruled that respondent could not file a notice of appeal under Section 1, Rule
41 but should have instead filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 However, since
the period for filing a certiorari petition had already lapsed without respondent filing any petition, the
partial summary judgment had become final and executory. Thus, it ordered the issuance of a writ
of execution for the satisfaction of the partial summary judgment in favor of PBB.
Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA. In its decision,
the CA agreed with the RTC and held that respondent could not appeal the partial summary
judgment while the main case remained pending. However, it held that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of execution against respondent. According to the CA,
since a partial judgment does not finally dispose of the action, it is merely an interlocutory, not a
final, order; thus, it could not attain finality. It further noted that certiorari is an independent action
and not part of the appeal proceedings, and failure to file a certiorari petition would not result in the
finality of the judgment or final order.
ISSUES:
1. WON the partial summary judgment was a final judgment.
2. WON certiorari is the proper remedy to assail a partial summary judgment.
RULING:
1. No. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. However, the
rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all
the issues raised in a case. Under Section 4, Rule 35, If on motion under this Rule, judgment is
not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court
xxx xxx xxx shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are
actually and in good faith controverted. xxx xxx xxx The facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
A careful reading of the section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to
be considered a "final judgment," as it does not put an end to an action at law by declaring that
the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for. The Rules
provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the
court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which
are not in dispute. After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial
summary judgment, which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of
trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an
interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.
In this case, the partial summary judgment did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised
in plaintiff Tomas Tan's complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretary's certificate and the validity of
the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed, remained unresolved.
2. No. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct
review, not a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court's judgment. It is
well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judge's findings and conclusions of law and fact. As a legal recourse, the special civil action of
certiorari is a limited form of review. The jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is
restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts
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below act within their jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will
amount to mere errors of judgment correctable by an appeal or a petition for review.
First Bancorp v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 151132, Jun 22 2006
FACTS:
Jane Lightner, widow of Donald Lightner (both American citizens) filed a complaint against First
Bancorp, praying that the court declare her 50% undivided interest over a parcel of land and house
registered under the name of First Bancorp, which as per her allegations was owned by her
husband Donald, and acquired using conjugal funds. Bancorp filed a motion to dismiss on ground
of lack of cause of action as Lightner was an American and therefore has no right to own real
property in the Philippines. RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. Bancorp thus filed a motion for
reconsideration reiterating as one of the grounds therefore Lightners lack of cause of cause of
action. This time, the RTC granted Bancorps Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed Lightners
complaint.
Lightner then filed a notice of Appeal to the CA alleging that the RTCs order was contrary to the
relevant facts and applicable laws and jurisprudence. Bancorp filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the appeal as it involves pure
questions of law cognizable by the Supreme Court. CA denied the motion to dismiss and the
motion for reconsideration filed by Bancorp. Bancorp now went to the Supreme Court via a petition
for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction when it
assumed jurisdiction over the appeal of Lightner which was cognizable by the Supreme Court as it
involved pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
WON Lightners appeal involved questions of fact or law?
RULING:
The Appeal involved pure questions of law, hence jurisdiction lies with the Supreme Court, the
appeal with the CA should have been outrightly dismissed.
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If
the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of
the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
In the present case, respondent appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant
therein), and for prematurity, as the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband
had not yet been liquidated prior to its filing.
With the foregoing premises, we agree with petitioners contention that a question of whether or not
a complaint states a cause of action against defendant or that the action is premature is one of law.
The determination thereof is one of law and not of facts.
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of
fact or "doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply because there are no
findings of fact in the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as

alleged in the complaint, assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal
therefrom could only raise questions of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a
cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on questions of fact. One is
the legal and logical opposite of the other.
Sps. Dadizon v. CA
G.R. No. 159116, Sep 30, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Spouses Dominador and Elsa Mocorro (Mocorros) initiated a case in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel of land. The MTC
rendered judgment on December 6, 1999 in favor of the Mocorros. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Naval, Biliran affirmed the MTC's findings through its decision of May 17, 2001. The
Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. Initially, the CA required the Dadizons to file their appellant's brief.
Later on, however, the Mocorros moved to dismiss the Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the
mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA dismissed
the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003. The CA denied the Dadizons'
motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2003. Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme
Court to assail the dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the CA's dismissal of the Dadizons' appeal was proper.
RULING:
Yes. The mode of appeal adopted by the Dadizons vis--vis the decision of the RTC was
undoubtedly wrong. They should have filed a petition for review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules
of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal, considering that the RTC had rendered the
decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
The error of the Dadizons was inexcusable and inexplicable. The Court has followed a strict policy
against misdirected or erroneous appeals since February 27, 1990, when it issued the following
instructions and caution in Murillo v. Consul:
Appeals to the Court of Appeals from the Regional Trial Courts are perfected in two (2) ways,
both of which are entirely distinct from an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. They are: a) by
ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and b) by petition for review where
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
The petition for review must be filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from notice of the
judgment, and as already stated, shall point out the error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or
modification of the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed. An ordinary appeal is taken by
merely fiing a notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of the judgment, except in special
proceedings or cases where multiple appeals are allowed in which event the period of appeal is 30
days and a record on appeal is necessary.
Under the Rules of Court, Sec. 2, Rule 41, the various modes of appeal are now specifically
delineated, viz.:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal.
a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
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the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
b) Petition for review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in accordance with
Rule 42.
c) Appeal by certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.
Consequently, the CA's dismissal of the Dadizons' appeal was proper. Sec. 2, Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court pronounces that "an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from
the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed." The dismissal was also
unavoidable notwithstanding that the procedural rules might be liberally construed, because the
provisions of law and the rules concerning the manner and period of appeal were mandatory and
jurisdictional requirements essential to enable the appellate court to take cognizance of the appeal.
PCI Leasing and Finance v. Milan
G.R. No. 151215, Apr 5, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against respondents before the RTC of Quezon City
for the latters failure to pay its obligations. Thereafter, summons was issued by the RTC to
respondents, addressed to their place of residence as stated in the complaint; however, the
summons and the copy of the complaint were later returned unserved.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Archive the civil case, asserting that it was then conducting an
investigation in order to ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents. On April 13, 2000, the RTC
denied the Motion sating that the circumstances of the case were not within the purview of the
provisions of paragraph 2(c) of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the Archiving of
Cases): In civil cases, the court may motu proprio or upon motion, order that a civil case be
archived only in the following instances: xxx xxx xxx When defendant, without fault or neglect of
plaintiff, cannot be served with summons within six (6) months from issuance of original summons.
On July 13, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing petitioner to take the necessary steps to
actively prosecute the case within ten (10) days from receipt under pain of dismissal of the case for
lack of interest. Thereafter, on July 31, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias
Summons; however, it was subsequently denied by the RTC for containing a defective notice of
hearing.
On September 5, 2000, another Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons was filed by petitioner,
which the RTC scheduled for hearing. On the scheduled hearing date, there was no appearance
from both counsels of petitioner and respondents. Thus, the RTC issued an Order on October 13,
2000 dismissing the case.
Petitioner sought for the reconsideration; however, it was denied by the RTC on January 4, 2001.
Petitioner then field an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied by the RTC on
April 6, 2001. Thereafter, on May 11, 2001, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the RTC assailing
its Order and Resolutions; however, this was denied by the RTC for having filed beyond the
reglementary period. According to the RTC, since the April 6, 2001 resolution was received by
petitioner on May 3, 2001, petitioner only had seven (7) days or until May 10, 2001 within which to
file the Notice of Appeal.

Without filing for an MR, petitioner assailed the RTCs latest resolution before the CA through a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; however, it was dismissed outright by the CA. According to the
CA, being a petition on question of law, the same should have been raised to the SC by petition
fore review in accordance with Rule 45, as provided under Section 2(c) of Rule 41.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA was correct in dismissing outright the petition.
2. WON the petition was filed out of time.
RULING:
1. No. The CA was unreasonably hasty in inferring its lack of jurisdiction over the intended appeal
of petitioner. The conclusion of the CA that the petition involves pure question of law was simply
uncalled for, notwithstanding the statement in the Notice of Appeal that the RTC order and
resolutions were being assailed for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. Under Rule 41,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a notice of appeal is only required to indicate (a) the parties to
the appeal, (b) the final judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, (c) the court to which
the appeal is being taken, and (d) the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. In
usual court practice, a notice of appeal would consist of one or two pages. Only after the specific
issues and arguments of PCI Leasing are laid out in detail before the Court of Appeals in the
appropriate substantive pleading can it make a conclusion as to whether or not the issues raised
therein involved pure questions of law.
2. Yes. In accordance with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a
judgment by the RTC shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Said period shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a fresh period of 15 days is
allowed within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should
not be reckoned from May 3, 2001, the date when petitioner received the RTC resolution
denying the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration. The said motion was already the second
attempt by petitioner to seek a reconsideration of the RTC order; thus, it is in the nature of a
second MR, which is a prohibited pleading. Consequently, the second MR, being a prohibited
pleading, does not toll the period within which an appeal may be taken. Since petitioner was not
able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed, the RTC Order
dismissing the complaint should be deemed final and executory.
Julian v. DBP
G.R. No. 174193, Dec 7, 2011
The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be
disregarded without the most compelling of reasons.
FACTS:
After the trial court dismissed the case, Petitioner, through his new counsel, timely filed a Notice of
Appeal but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees. CA dismissed the appeal for non-payment
of the required docket and other lawful fees pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Seeking reconsideration petitioner attached to his motion Postal Money Orders in the aggregate
amount of P3,020.00 as payment for the docket fees. He explained that his failure to pay the
required fees was due to oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to pay the said fees since
his counsel did not inform him of such requirement to pay. Petitioner prayed for liberal application of
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the Rules as according to him, a strict enforcement would be tantamount to imposing a penalty not
commensurate to his thoughtlessness or oversight in not adhering to the procedural requisite.
Petitioners submission did not move the CA, which disposed of his motion for reconsideration
through its second assailed Resolution. Petitioner comes before this Court by way of Petition for
Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in strictly applying the rules on the payment of docket fees.
RULING:
Yes. Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is
mandatory.
It is well-established that [t]he right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to
the loss of the right to appeal[
The applicable rule for appeals from judgments issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction is Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which provides:
Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said
fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on
appeal.
The Rules also provide that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal.
The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full amount of
docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is a
condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction
over the case. The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and
should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be
tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or order
final and executory.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in
appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period warrants
only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the court shall exercise
its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of
circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
In the case at bench, the justifications presented by petitioner for the non-payment of the docket
fees are oversight and the lack of advice from his counsel. Unfortunately, the reasons presented
are neither convincing nor adequate to merit leniency. Petitioner submits that he only found out
about the requirement to pay the docket fees when he received the CA Resolution denying his
appeal on April 22, 2005 or three days short of one year from filing of the said appeal. This Court
finds this not to be logically true to human experience. It is unusual for petitioners counsel not to
advice him of the required docket fees. More often than not, counsels are aware of the docket fees
required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior to filing pleadings in
court. This is so because counsels are not expected to shoulder or advance payment for their
clients. Assuming arguendo that petitioners counsel did not inform him of the requirement to pay

the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that petitioner apparently failed to
communicate with his counsel after the filing of said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that
litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and
await the outcome of their case. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from
time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case. Moreover, the counsels negligence
binds petitioner and, for that reason alone the loss of his remedy was caused by his own
negligence. Consequently, a relaxation of the rule cannot be granted. The bitter consequence of
such grave inadvertence is to render the trial courts order final and executory.
Further, the Court notes that petitioner only attempted to perfect his appeal on May 6, 2005 by
appending the postal money orders to his Motion for Reconsideration, or one year and nine days
too late. By that time, the challenged Order has long become final and no longer open to an appeal.
Petitioners reliance on the policy espoused in the case of Yambao is likewise unavailing. The
pertinent portion relied on by petitioner reads:
Thus, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant
is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure to pay the correct amount of
docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant. xxx
xxx xxx
Clearly, the case applies to a situation where payment of the docket fees was made albeit
incomplete. In the instant case, no payment was made by petitioner at all. Even
assuming arguendothat Yambao is applicable to petitioners case, still, the Court sees no
justifiable reason to allow this Court to relax the strict application of the Rules.
Likewise assuming for the sake of argument that consideration be given to petitioners willingness to
comply with the rules since he attached postal money orders to his motion for reconsideration, the
broader interest of justice will still not be served if petitioners appeal is reinstated. On one hand,
petitioner calls for leniency to enable him to establish his case.
Marcelina Gacutana-Fraile v. Domingo
G.R. No. 138518, Dec 15, 2000
FACTS:
Fraile was the registered owner of a parcel of land. She filed a case for quieting of title against
Domingo. While the case was pending, Domingo also filed a quieting of title case against Fraile
with the same court. In the meantime, Fraile hired Atty. Pascua to represent her. Initially Atty.
Pascua filed a motion to dismiss however he convinced Fraile to withdraw the motion to dismiss
and subsequently allowed the presentation of Domingos evidence in advance. The RTC ruled in
favor of Domingo. On the last day for filing of appeal, Atty. Pascua filed a notice of appeal and a
Motion for Reconsideration. Both were denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Denial was proper?
RULING:
YES, it was proper. Below are the reasons for the denial:
1. Respondent judge dismissed the Notice of Appeal and denied the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of proof of service to the adverse party and written explanation why service or filing thereof
was not done personally, in violation of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. The pleadings likewise lacked a notice of hearing.
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3. The Notice of Appeal also failed to comply with Sec. 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure because it failed to specify the court to which the appeal was being taken.
4. Docketing fees were also not seasonably paid upon filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Estrella v. Espiridion
G.R. No. 134460, Nov 27, 2003
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners demanding that they
vacate the portion of her land being occupied by them. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision on
September 3, 1997 in favor of respondent. On October 1, 1997, petitioners' counsel filed an
undated Notice of Appeal stating that the petitioners received a copy of the RTC Decision on
September 19, 1997. However, this was denied by the RTC because it failed to specify the court to
which the appeal is to be taken.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation/Compliance praying for the reconsideration of the order, but the
RTC merely noted said Manifestation/Compliance; hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari, which was referred to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that said
pleading did not contain an explanation why service of the petition upon respondent was not done
personally as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on July 1, 1997. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
WON the denial of the petition was correct.
RULING:
No. The Court finds reasons for a relaxation of the application of the rules of procedure in this case.
In the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al., which was
promulgated on August 5, 2008, it was held that:
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only on 1 July 1997 xxx xxx xxx It has been several
months since the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. In the interim, this Court has generally
accommodated parties and counsel who failed to comply with the requirement of a written
explanation whenever personal service or filing was not practicable, guided, in the exercise of our
discretion, by the primary objective of Section 11, the importance of the subject matter of the case,
the issues involved and the prima facie merit of the challenged pleading. However, as we have in
the past, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, strictest compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13
is mandated one month from promulgation of this Decision.
Thus, the rule requiring a written explanation whenever personal service or filing was not
practicable, should be strictly complied with beginning September 5, 1998. In other words, the
courts are allowed to be lenient to parties in case of non-compliance before said date. In this case,
the petition for review on certiorari was filed in the CA on November 27, 1997, only four months
from the date of effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and nine months before September
5, 1998. Consequently, petitioners should be accorded the same latitude of leniency. The Court of
Appeals should not have dismissed the petition for lack of the required written explanation.
In the same vein, the Court finds reason to give due course to petitioners appeal despite the failure
of petitioners to specify in their notice of appeal the appellate court to which they intended to bring
their appeal. Section 5, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Sec. 5 Notice of Appeal - The notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the
judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the appeal
is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal.

However, considering that the notice of appeal was filed by petitioners on October 1, 1997 or just
three months from July 1, 1997, the date of effectivity of said Rule, the same policy of leniency is
applied as earlier enunciated in the Solar Team case.
Osorio v. Judge Dizon
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1838, Mar 18, 2004
FACTS:
In an affidavit-complaint, Osorio charges presiding Judge Agustin S. Dizon and Branch Clerk of
Court Atty. Reza M. Casila-Derayunan of the Regional Trial Court for grave misconduct and
oppression.
Complainant Osorio is one of the plaintiffs in a Civil Case. The trial court rendered its decision
against plaintiffs-spouses Danilo and Rosita Amor and Spouses Eusebio and Gloria Osorio. Atty.
Florentino L. Quendangan, filed a notice of appeal. Judge Dizon gave due course to the appeal and
ordered the transmittal of the entire records to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
However, the records were not forwarded to the appellate court.
Complainants co-plaintiff, Danilo Amor, filed with the trial court an Urgent Motion to Discharge
Counsel and to Withdraw Notice of Appeal, alleging that plaintiff Rosita Amor had passed away and
none of the heirs including himself are no longer interested to pursue the case to file notice of
appeal. Judge Dizon granted the motion. Subsequently, Amor filed a Motion for Withdrawal of the
urgent motion to discharge counsel and withdraw notice of appeal he had filed earlier. The Order
granting the Urgent Motion to Discharge Counsel and to Withdraw Notice of Appeal is set aside
until further orders from the Court.
Accordingly, the entire records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals on November
13, 2003 per Manifestation filed by Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Casila-Derayunan.
In his complaint, Osorio alleges, as follows: Eleven months had passed without the records of case
being sent to the appellate court, a violation of the Rules requiring transmittal of records within the
period of thirty days from the time the appeal was given due course. Judge Dizon should not have
acted on the motion since the thirty-day period had already lapsed. The granting of the motion
caused him injustice since his interest in the case was different from that of Amors.
In her Comment, Atty. Casila-Derayunan admits her failure to transmit the records within the
thirty-day period citing as reasons the heavy burden of work, her administrative and supervisory
duties, and the fact that the court had been designated as a special drug court and that he
transmittal of the records was interrupted by the filing of Amors Urgent Motion to Discharge
Counsel and Withdraw Appeal which was favorably acted upon by Judge Dizon, and later, by
Amors filing of his withdrawal of motion.
Complainant Osorio filed his Reply alleging that the creation of the court to a special drug court was
not the cause of the delay in the transmittal of the records since after the filing of Amors motion
on May 23, 2003, Judge Dizon acted with dispatch on every proceedings subsequent thereto.
Complainant insists that the motion is a litigated motion since the counsel to be discharged must be
given his day in court to explain his side because his fees might be contingent as it is in this case.
In its evaluation, the Court Administrator found that respondent Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Reza
Casila-Derayunan was remiss in her duty of transmitting the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals; and, that the respondent Judge had jurisdiction to hear plaintiff Amors Motion for
Withdrawal of the motion to discharge counsel and withdraw notice of appeal.
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ISSUES:
1. WON the OCA is correct in finding respondent Branch Clerk of Court remiss in her duty of
transmitting the records of the case to the Court of Appeals We agree with the findings of the
OCA and approve its recommendations.
2. WON respondent Judge violated the Rules of Court when he acted on plaintiff Amors Motion to
Discharge Counsel and Withdraw Notice of Appeal after the perfection of appeal.
RULING:
1. Yes. Anent the failure to transmit the records to the Court of Appeals within the period
prescribed by law, we find that respondent Casila-Derayunan was remiss in the performance of
her duty under Section 10 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 10. Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal. Within thirty (30)
days after perfection of all the appeals in accordance with the preceding section, it shall be the
duty of the clerk of court of the lower court:
..
(d). To transmit the records to the appellate court.
Her explanation that she was saddled with heavy work load is not an excuse for her not to
perform her duties but serves only to mitigate her liability. The fact that complainants co-plaintiff
Amor filed an urgent motion did not exculpate her from liability because eight months had
already lapsed without her transmitting the records to the appellate court when said motion was
filed.
It has been held that the failure of the clerk of court to transmit the records of a case constitutes
negligence and warrants disciplinary action. The clerk of court is an essential officer of our
judicial system. As an officer of the court, he performs delicate administrative functions vital to
the prompt and proper administration of justice. Among the duties of the Branch Clerk of Court is
the prompt and orderly transmittal of appealed cases and the records to the appellate court. As
far as the respondent Judge is concerned, the Court finds him not liable for the delay in the
transmittal of the records. While he has supervision over respondent Casila-Derayunan, he
cannot be expected to constantly check on the latters performance of his duties since Atty.
Derayunan is presumed to be a responsible employee.
2. No. Prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, it can still exercise
residual jurisdiction such as allowing the withdrawal of appeal. Rule 41, Section 9 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. - A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the
subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the
court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties
which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit

appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with section
2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Clearly, upon the perfection of appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, but prior to
the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, it can still exercise residual
jurisdiction such as allowing the withdrawal of appeal. At the time the Motion to Discharge
Counsel and Withdraw Appeal was filed by complainants co-plaintiff Amor, the records were
not yet forwarded to the appellate court. Thus, respondent judge did not exceed the trial
courts jurisdiction when he acted on the motion.
However, the fault of the respondent judge lies in the fact that he treated Amors motion as a
non-litigated motion which he granted without any hearing. While the defendants would naturally
not oppose such a motion, Amor had other co-plaintiffs, herein complainant Osorio and his wife
who could be prejudiced by the withdrawal of their appeal. Thus, the respondent judge should
have set the motion for hearing so as to give the other plaintiffs the chance to be heard; or, he
should have required complainant and his wife to comment on said motion.
Notwithstanding the act of respondent judge in granting the motion without setting the same for
hearing, the Court finds that such action is not tantamount to a grave misconduct. Judges may
not be held administratively responsible for every error or mistake in the performance of their
duties; otherwise that would make their position unbearable.
Villamor v. National Power Corporation
G.R. No. 146735, Oct 25, 2004
FACTS:
NPC filed for expropriation over Villamors property with prayer for issuance of a writ of possession.
RTC granted it. Complaint was later on amended as NPC sought to expropriate 2 lots in the same
vicinity, still owned by Villamor. RTC then rendered a decision awarding Villamor just compensation
based on the Commissioners report as to the value of the land. Villamor filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that no just compensation was granted for 15.23 sq.meters parcel of land
which was included in the expropriation. This was granted by the court. On the other hand, NPC
also filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the just compensation be computed on the
basis of tax declarations over the property. Such was denied by the RTC in a resolution dated Feb.
20, 1998. Villamor was not furnished a copy of the resolution denying NPCs motion for
reconsideration.
On March 2, 1998, NPC filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course on March 9, 1998 by
the RTC and an order was issued for the clerk of court to transmit records to the CA.
On March 16, Villamor filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was granted in a
resolution dated May 12, 1998. NPC filed a motion for recon against said resolution alleging that
RTC had no jurisdiction to grant the motion for execution pending appeal, however it was denied on
June 23. Thus, a Notice of Garnishment on Execution was addressed to PNB and Landbank over
assets, deposits etc. of NPC being garnished in favor of Villamor.
NPC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the May 12 and June 3 order of the RTC. CA
granted the petition and set aside RTCs orders.
Villamor now went to the CA on a petition for review on certiorari alleging that CA acted contrary to
pertinent rules when it rules that the RTC had lost jurisdiction to entertain and grant the motion for
execution pending appeal.
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ISSUE:
WON CA was correct in ruling that RTC had lost jurisdiction to entertain and grant the motion for
execution pending appeal.
RULING:
No, the CA was NOT correct.
Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. - A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may
issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the
appeal.
The mere filing by one party of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction
over a case and to resolve pending incidents, like a motion for execution pending appeal filed by
the party within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal because the court must hear and
resolve such motion for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal.
The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or co-plaintiffs and neither may the
defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff or co-defendants of the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to move for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by immediately filing a
notice of appeal. The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not automatically divest the party
favored by a decision of the right to move for a more favorable decision or to ask for execution
pending appeal. It is only after all the parties respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the
court loses jurisdiction over the case.
As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court does not lose jurisdiction
over the case.
In the present case, when NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal on time, the appeal was deemed
perfected with respect to it only. The appeal did not deprive petitioner of its right to file a motion for
execution within the reglementary period of appeal or fifteen days from his receipt of the trial courts
February 20, 1998 Resolution denying NAPOCORs Motion for Reconsideration. The records do
not show that copy of the said February 20, 1998 Resolution was furnished petitioners counsel.
There can thus be no notice to speak of from which the 15-day reglementary period of appeal is
counted.
When a notice required to be given is not furnished to the attorney of record of a party, the
corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent procedural steps that he may take does not

start. Even if it is assumed that petitioners counsel did receive a copy of the trial courts Resolution
of February 20, 1998 on the same date as the counsel of NAPOCOR did, the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal was still filed within the reglementary period.
Note: However, even if the SC ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction to entertain the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal, the grant thereof in this case was not proper as there was no urgent
need which justified it.
Fortune Life v. CA
G.R. No. 101374, Jul 30, 1993
FACTS:
In a civil case filed by the private respondent against the petitioner, the RTC rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent. Thereafter, private respondent filed a motion for execution pending
appeal, which was supported by a bond. The motion for execution was opposed by petitioner.
While the motion was pending, petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Consequently, the sheriff garnished
petitioners bank deposit and levied upon its properties. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, which later on set aside the RTCs order granting the writ of execution pending
appeal. The CA decision was later affirmed by the SC.
Subsequently, petitioner filed before the RTC an application for damages against the bond and
private respondent, to which the RTC issued an order to receive evidence against the private
respondent on the application for damages.
The RTC then proceeded to receive petitioners evidence, having issued an order ruling that private
respondent had waived its right to cross-examine petitioners witness. Private respondent moved
for the reconsideration of the RTCs orders; however, it was subsequently denied. Another motion
for reconsideration was filed by the private respondent, praying that the records of the case
be elevated immediately to the CA pursuant to the Notice of Appeal which was filed by
petitioner; however, the same was denied by the RTC.
Thus, private respondentfiled a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA
seeking to annul the RTC orders, to prohibit the RTC from conducting further proceedings and to
compel the RTC to forward the records of the case to the CA since it has lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the appeal of petitioner. Thereafter, the CA ruled in favor of private respondent;
hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC still has jurisdiction to hear the application for damages against the bond despite the
Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner.
RULING:
No. There is no controversy that the appeal of petitioner has been perfected. As a necessary
consequence thereof, the trial court was divested or jurisdiction over the case.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mentions three (3) instances when the trial court is
allowed to exercise "residual" jurisdiction after the perfection of the appeal, namely:
1. to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal;
2. to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appeal to
the appellate court; and
3. to permit the prosecution of pauper's appeals.
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Petitioner relies on the first instance as basis for its stand that the trial court has the authority to
hear its application for damages. Its reliance thereon is misplaced. Although the application for
damages is beyond the scope of the matter to be litigated by the appeal, there is no "protection and
preservation" of its "rights" to speak of.
Thus, the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue the disputed orders inasmuch as the case had
already come under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the respondent court.
It is a fundamental rule that a court of justice could only validly act upon a cause of action or subject
matter of a case over which it has jurisdiction and said jurisdiction is one conferred by law; and
cannot be acquired through, or waived by any act or omission of the parties.
De Llano v. CA
G.R. No. 142316, Nov 22, 2001
FACTS:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the Resolution dated June
4, 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners on
procedural grounds as well as its Resolution which denied their motion for reconsideration.
The Regional Trial Court issued a Decision in favor of respondent Tongco ordering San Miguel
Corporation to release to the plaintiff the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 299551 in the same [sic]
of Benjamin A. Tango.
SMC, De Liano and Abrille appealed the aforesaid decision to the Court of Appeals. In due time,
their counsel, Atty. Edgar B. Afable, filed an Appellants Brief which failed to comply with Section 13,
Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. The appellee (herein private respondent) was quick to notice these
deficiencies, and accordingly filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal. Required to comment, the
appellants averred that their brief had substantially complied with the contents as set forth in the
rules. They proffered the excuse that the omissions were only the result of oversight or
inadvertence and as such could be considered harmless errors. They prayed for liberality in the
application of technical rules, adding that they have a meritorious defense.
The appellate court issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the appeal. The Court of Appeals
held that the Brief does not contain a Subject Index nor a Table of Cases and Authorities, with page
references. Moreover, the Statement of the Case, Statement of Facts, and Arguments in the Brief
has no page reference to the record. These procedural lapses justify the dismissal of the appeal,
pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion, or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page references to the
record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44;
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, defendants-appellants, despite having been notified of such defects, still failed to amend
their Brief to conform to the Rules, and instead, argue that these are mere harmless
errors. Simultaneously, through the same counsel, they filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Defendants-Appellants Brief. The appellate court denied the consolidated motions in its Resolution.
From the denial of their motion for reconsideration, only petitioner SMC interposed the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing SMCs appeal on the basis of pure technicalities and
even after SMC has corrected the technical defect of its appeal.
RULING:
No. The premise that underlies all appeals is that they are merely rights which arise from
statute; therefore, they must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law.
In his definition of a brief, Justice Malcolm explained thus:
xxx xxx xxx[L]et it be recalled that the word brief is derived from the Latin brevis, and the French
briefe, and literally means a short or condensed statement. The purpose of the brief, as all law
students and lawyers know, is to present to the court in concise form the points and questions in
controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist the court in arriving at a
just and proper conclusion. The brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the
court in the examination of the record upon which the appeal is heard and determined.
Relative thereto, Section 13, Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the format to be
followed by the appellant in drafting his brief, as follows:
Section 13. Contents of appellants brief. The appellants brief shall contain, in the order herein
indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references,
and a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to
the pages where they are cited;
(b) An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be separately, distinctly and
concisely stated without repetition and numbered consecutively;
(c) Under the heading Statement of the Case, a clear and concise statement of the nature of the
action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the
nature of the judgment and any other matters necessary to an understanding of the nature of
the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading Statement of Facts, a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of
the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of
the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references
to the record;
(e) A clear and concise statement of the issues of fact or law to be submitted to the court for its
judgment;
(f) Under the heading Argument, the appellants arguments on each assignment of error with
page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the
report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
(g) Under the heading Relief, a specification of the order or judgment which the appellant seeks;
and
(h) In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellants brief shall contain, as an
appendix, a copy of the judgment or final order appealed from.
This particular rule was instituted with reason, and most certainly, it was not intended to become a
custom more honored in the breach than in the observance. It has its logic, which is to present to
the appellate court in the most helpful light, the factual and legal antecedents of a case on appeal.
The first requirement of an appellants brief is a subject index. The index is intended to
facilitate the review of appeals by providing ready reference, functioning much like a table of
contents. Unlike in other jurisdictions, there is no limit on the length of appeal briefs or appeal
memoranda filed before appellate courts. The danger of this is the very real possibility that the
reviewing tribunal will be swamped with voluminous documents. This occurs even though the rules
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consistently urge the parties to be brief or concise in the drafting of pleadings, briefs, and other
papers to be filed in court. The subject index makes readily available at ones fingertips the subject
of the contents of the brief so that the need to thumb through the brief page after page to locate a
partys arguments, or a particular citation, or whatever else needs to be found and considered, is
obviated.
An assignment of errors follows the subject index. It is defined in this wise:
An assignment of errors in appellate procedure is an enumeration by appellant or plaintiff in error of
the errors alleged to have been committed by the court below in the trial of the case upon which he
seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment or decree; it is in the nature of a pleading, and performs
in the appellate court the same office as a declaration or complaint in a court of original
jurisdiction. Such an assignment is appellants complaint, or pleading, in the appellate court, and
takes the place of a declaration or bill; an appeal without an assignment of errors would be similar
to a suit without a complaint, bill, or declaration. The assignment is appellants declaration or
complaint against the trial judge, charging harmful error, and proof vel non of assignment is within
the record on appeal.
It has been held that a general assignment of errors is unacceptable under the rules. Thus, a
statement of the following tenor: that the Court of First Instance of this City incurred error in
rendering the judgment appealed from, for it is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence, was
deemed insufficient. The appellant has to specify in what aspect of the law or the facts that the trial
court erred. The conclusion, therefore, is that the appellant must carefully formulate his assignment
of errors. Its importance cannot be underestimated, as Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court will
attest:
Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error
and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
The rules then require that an appellants brief must contain both a statement of the case
and a statement of facts. A statement of the case gives the appellate tribunal an overview of the
judicial antecedents of the case, providing material information regarding the nature of the
controversy, the proceedings before the trial court, the orders and rulings elevated on appeal, and
the judgment itself. These data enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter
entrusted to it for its appraisal.
In turn, the statement of facts comprises the very heart of the appellants brief. The facts
constitute the backbone of a legal argument; they are determinative of the law and jurisprudence
applicable to the case, and consequently, will govern the appropriate relief. When the appellant
has given an account of the case and of the facts, he is required to state the issues to be
considered by the appellate court. The statement of issues is not to be confused with the
assignment of errors: they are not one and the same, for otherwise, the rules would not require a
separate statement for each. The statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be
resolved by the appellate court. What constitutes a question of fact or one of law should be clear by
now:
At this point, the distinction between a question of fact and a question of law must be
clear. As distinguished from a question of law which exists when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on certain state of facts there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts; or when the query necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and

relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and
the probabilities of the situation.
Thereafter, the appellant is required to present his arguments on each assigned error. An
appellants arguments go hand in hand with his assignment of errors, for the former provide the
justification supporting his contentions, and in so doing resolves the issues. It will not do to impute
error on the part of the trial court without substantiation. The mere elevation on appeal of a
judgment does not create a presumption that it was rendered in error. The appellant has to show
that he is entitled to the reversal of the judgment appealed, and he cannot do this unless he
provides satisfactory reasons for doing so. It is therefore essential that as far as possible, the
errors and reasons assigned should be supported by a citation of authorities.
Lastly, the appellant is required to state, under the appropriate heading, the reliefs prayed
for. In so doing, the appellate court is left in no doubt as to the result desired by the appellant, and
act as the circumstances may warrant.
Some may argue that adherence to these formal requirements serves but a meaningless
purpose, that these may be ignored with little risk in the smug certainty that liberality in the
application of procedural rules can always be relied upon to remedy the infirmities. This
misses the point. We are not martinets; in appropriate instances, we are prepared to listen
to reason, and to give relief as the circumstances may warrant. However, when the error
relates to something so elementary as to be inexcusable, our discretion becomes nothing
more than an exercise in frustration.
An additional circumstance impels us to deny the reinstatement of petitioners appeal. We
observed that petitioner submitted an Amended Appellants Brief to cure the infirmities of
the one first filed on its behalf by its lawyer. All things being equal, we would have been
inclined to grant the petition until we realized that the attempt at compliance was, at most,
only a cosmetic procedure. On closer scrutiny, the amended brief was as defective as the
first. Where the first brief lacked an assignment of errors but included a statement of issues, the
amended brief suffered a complete reversal: it had an assignment of errors but no statement of
issues. The statement of facts lacked page references to the record, a deficiency symptomatic of
the first. Authorities were cited in an improper manner, that is, the exact page of the report where
the citation was lifted went unspecified. The amended brief did not even follow the prescribed order:
the assignment of errors came after the statement of the case and the statement of facts. No one
could be expected to ignore such glaring errors, as in the case at bar. The half-hearted attempt at
submitting a supposedly amended brief only serves to harden our resolve to demand a strict
observance of the rules.
Petitioners plea for liberality in applying these rules in preparing Appellants Brief does not deserve
any sympathy. Long ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the
rules.
Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma
G.R. No. 193494, Mar 12, 2014
FACTS:
Zuellig Pharma was a lessee of a parcel of land registered in the name of Lui. During the life of the
lease contract, Zuellig received a letter from Philippine Bank of Communications alleging that it was
the new owner of the land, hence rentals should be paid to it. Lui however insisted on their right to
receive rentals. Zuellig then filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC of Makati. The RTC ruled
that Lui was barred from any claim with respect to the rentals since it was declared in default. Lui
appealed. The CA found Luis appellants brief insufficient as it did not contain a subject index,
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page references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and statement of issues
among others as required under Sec. 13, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Lui then filed a petition for review on certiorari alleging that CA applied the rules of procedure
strictly and dismissed its appeal on technicalities.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in dismissing Luis appeal for lack of subject index, page references to the
record, table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, and statements of issues in his appellants
brief.
RULING:
YES, the CA was CORRECT.
Under Rule 50, Section 1, paragraph (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals
may, on its own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss an appeal should the appellants brief lack
specific requirements under Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f):
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of page references to the
record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.
These requirements are the subject index of the matter in brief, page references to the record, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged and with textbooks and statutes cited:
Section 13. Contents of the appellants brief. The appellants brief shall contain, in the order
herein indicated, the following:
(a) A subject index of the matter in brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and
a table of cases alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the
pages where they are cited;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Under the heading "Statement of the Case," a clear and concise statement of the nature of
the action, a summary of the proceedings, the appealed rulings and orders of the court, the
nature of the controversy, with page references to the record;
(d) Under the heading "Statement of Facts," a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of
the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of
the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page references
to the record;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Under the heading "Argument," the appellants arguments on each assignment of error with
page references to the record. The authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the
report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the citation is found;
Lui Enterprises appellants brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and table of
cases, textbooks and statutes cited. Under Rule 50, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Lui Enterprises appeal.
Except for cases provided in the Constitution, appeal is a "purely statutory right." The right to
appeal "must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law" and requires strict compliance with the
Rules of Court on appeals.Otherwise, the appeal shall be dismissed, and its dismissal shall not be
a deprivation of due process of law.

In Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc.,this court sustained the Court of Appeals
dismissal of Mendozas appeal. Mendozas appellants brief lacked a subject index, assignment of
errors, and page references to the record. In De Liano v. Court of Appeals,this court also sustained
the dismissal of De Lianos appeal. De Lianos appellants brief lacked a subject index, a table of
cases and authorities, and page references to the record.
Exceptions to the Rule:
In Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona International, Inc., the Philippine Coconut Authoritys
appellants brief lacked a clear and concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the
proceedings, the nature of the judgment, and page references to the record. However, this court
found that the Philippine Coconut Authority substantially complied with the Rules. Its appellants
brief "apprise[d] [the Court of Appeals] of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the
issues raised and the laws necessary [to dispose of the case]."This court "[deviated] from a rigid
enforcement of the rules" and ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve the Philippine Coconut
Authoritys appeal.
In Go v. Chaves, Gos 17-page appellants brief lacked a subject index. However, Go subsequently
filed a subject index. This court excused Gos procedural lapse since the appellants brief
"[consisted] only of 17 pages which [the Court of Appeals] may easily peruse to apprise it of [the
case] and of the relief sought." This court ordered the Court of Appeals to resolve Gos appeal "in
the interest of justice."
In Philippine Coconut Authority and Go, the appellants substantially complied with the rules on the
contents of the appellants brief. Thus, this court excused the appellantsprocedural lapses.
However:
In this case, Lui Enterprises did not substantially comply with the rules on the contents of the
appellants brief. It admitted that its appellants brief lacked the required subject index, page
references to the record, and table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. However, it did not even
correct its admitted "technical omissions" by filing an amended appellants brief with the required
contents. Thus, this case does not allow a relaxation of the rules. The Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal.
Purpose of the Requirements:
The subject index serves as the briefs table of contents. Instead of "[thumbing] through the
[appellants brief] every time the Court of Appeals Justice encounters an argument or citation, the
Justice deciding the case only has to refer to the subject index for the argument or citation he or
she needs. This saves the Court of Appeals time in reviewing the appealed case. Efficiency allows
the justices of the appellate court to substantially attend to this case as well as other cases.
Page references to the record guarantee that the facts stated in the appellants brief are supported
by the record. A statement of fact without a page reference to the record creates the presumption
that it is unsupported by the record and, thus, "may be stricken or disregarded altogether."
As for the table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited, this is required so that the Court of Appeals
can easily verify the authorities cited "for accuracy and aptness."
Lui Enterprises appellants brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and a table
of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements "were designed to assist the appellate
court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance the orderly administration of
justice." This court will not disregard rules on appeal "in the guise of liberal construction." For this
court to liberally construe the Rules, the party must substantially comply with the Rules and correct
its procedural lapses. Lui Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.
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Steel Corporation v. Equitable PCIBank
G.R. No. 190462, Nov 17, 2010
FACTS:
Due to financial difficulties, petitioner was unable to service its principal payments for its liabilities.
Thus, respondent filed a creditor-initiated petition to place petitioner under corporate rehabilitation.
Thereafter, the RTC promulgated a decision approving the rehabilitation plan proposed by the
court-appointed received.
Therefrom, several creditors went to the CA via separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari. Some
of the petitions filed by the creditors were consolidated by the CA; however, respondents motion to
consolidate its petition with the other consolidate cases was denied by the CA. Subsequently, the
CA rendered a decision ordering the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings pursuant to
Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation.
Petitioner then filed a supplemental petition for review arguing that the CA deviated from its own
Internal Rules when it failed to consolidate the four (4) appeals arising from the same decision of
the rehabilitation court. Petitioner further contends that the CA denied it its right to procedural and
substantive due process, because it granted a relief entirely different from those sought for by the
parties and on which they were neither heard nor given the opportunity to be heard.
ISSUES:
1. WON consolidation of the cases is proper.
2. WON relief to be granted is limited only to the issues raised in the appeal.
RULING:
1. Yes. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules
of Court:
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the
best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words,
consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the
different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and
adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.
The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse,
prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court. In short,
consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It
contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the
parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it
results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in
two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.
In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve identical parties, subject matter, and issues. In fact,
all four (4) arose from the same decision rendered by the Rehabilitation Court. As such, it
became imperative upon the CA to consolidate the cases. By refusing to consolidate the cases,
the CA, in effect, dispensed a form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the

multiplicity of suits. Such action is not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always
be ordered whenever it is possible.
2. Yes. Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.
Essentially, the general rule provides that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review
and only those assigned will be considered, save for the following exceptions:
a. grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the
contemplation of the law;
c. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving
at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;
d. matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise
or which the lower court ignored;
e. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
f. matters not assigned as errors on appeal but which the determination of a question properly
assigned is dependent.
None of these exceptions exists in this case. It is very plain in the language of the prayers of
respondent that it only requested the CA to modify the existing rehabilitation plan. It never
sought the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Thus, it was inappropriate for the CA,
motu proprio, to terminate the proceedings. The appellate court should have proceeded to
resolve the respondents appeal on its merits instead of terminating the proceedings, a result
that has no ground in its pleadings in the CA.
In Abedes v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the difference of appeals in criminal cases
and in civil cases by saying, "Issues not raised in the pleadings, as opposed to ordinary
appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, are deemed waived
or abandoned." Essentially, to warrant consideration on appeal, there must be discussion of the
error assigned, else, the error will be deemed abandoned or waived.
Further, in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, citing Jose Clavano v. Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, it was held:
". . . It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the
pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on
which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum
allegata et probate. "
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opportunity
to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent
surprise to the defendant.
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Trinidad Go v. Chavez
G.R. No. 182341, Apr 23, 2010
FACTS:
This case stemmed from Chavez complaint for quieting of title with respect to properties he and his
wife owned which were mortgaged by their daughter and son-in-law without their knowledge. Go
was the mortgagee. Chavez prayed that the forged SPA and mortgage be nullified. The RTC ruled
in favor of the spouses Chavez and subsequently ordered Go to surrender the TCT to Mega Farms
and Alice Chavez. Go appealed the RTC decision to the CA of Cagayan de Oro. The CA dismissed
the appeal on the following grounds: 1.) Go spouses failed to serve a copy of their appellants brief
upon the intervenors on time, 2.) their appellants brief did not contain a subject index and that no
copy of the assailed decision was appended to it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA was correct in dismissing the appeal.
RULING:
No, CA was NOT correct.
Even if clearly their counsel committed a number of palpable mistakes which, as a general rule
should bind the client, we shall grant the petition in the interest of justice.
Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the
prompt disposition of unmeritorious cases which clog the court dockets and do little more than
waste the courts time. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure,
rather than suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be
allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case,
rather than lose their property on mere technicalities.
Here, we find that the failure to serve a copy of the appellants brief to two of the adverse parties
was a mere oversight, constituting excusable neglect. A litigant's failure to furnish his opponent with
a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to warrant dismissal of that appeal. In such an instance,
all that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his opponent with a copy of his
brief. Anent the failure to append a copy of the assailed judgment, instead of dismissing the appeal
on that basis, it is more in keeping with equity to simply require the appellants to immediately
submit a copy of the Decision of the lower court rather than punish litigants for the reckless
inattention of their lawyers.
The purpose of a subject index in an appellants/appellees brief obviates the court to thumb
through a possibly lengthy brief page after page to locate whatever else needs to be found and
considered, such as arguments and citations. In the case at bar, notably, the appeal brief submitted
to the CA consists only of 17 pages which the appellate court may easily peruse to apprise it of
what the case is all about and of the relief sought. Thus, the belated submission of the subject
index may be considered excusable. Our discussion in Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona
International, Inc. is apropos:
x x x the purpose of the brief is to present the court in coherent and concise form the point and
questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist the court
in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. A haphazard and pellmell presentation will not do for the
brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the court in examination of the record upon
which the appeal is heard and determined. It is certainly, 'the vehicle of counsel to convey to the
court the essential facts of his client's case, a statement of the questions of law involved, the law he
should have applied, and the application he desires of it by the court'. There should be an honest

compliance with the requirements regarding contents of appellant's brief, and among which is that it
should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page
references."
We do not disagree with the appellate court's above exposition. The requirements laid down in
Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper
conclusion of the case. However, we are of the opinion that despite its deficiencies petitioner's
appellant's brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential
facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition
of the same.
This case involves voluminous records meriting a review on the merits by the CA. Otherwise, the
efforts of the petitioners to protect their collateral in their judicial battle will lead to naught once they
lose their remedy of an appeal just because of procedural niceties.
Ganuelas v. Cawed
G.R. No. 123968, Apr 24, 2003
Note: This case does not involve an issue pertaining to remedial law.
Fuji Television v. Espiritu
G.R. No. 204944-45, Dec 3, 2014
FACTS:
A complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondent against petitioner was dismissed by the Labor
Arbiter, who ruled that respondent is not a regular employee but an independent contractor. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that respondent was a regular
employee with respect to the activities for which she was employed since she continuously
rendered services that were deemed necessary and desirable to petitioners business. The NLRC
ordered petitioner to pay backwages, computed from the date of her illegal dismissal.
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration but both were denied by the NLRC for lack
of merit. Consequently, both parties filed separate petitions for certiorari before the CA, which
consolidated the petitions.
Thereafer, the CA rendered a decision affirming the NLRC decision with modification that petitioner
immediately reinstate respondent to her position without loss of seniority rights.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration; however, it was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Thereafter, respondent filed a manifestation
stating that the SC may not take jurisdiction over the case since petitioner failed to authorize
Corazon E. Acerden to sign the verification. In its comment to the manifestation, petitioner alleges
that Corazon was authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the secretary's certificate to delegate his authority
to sign the necessary pleadings, including the verification and certification against forum shopping.
ISSUE:
WON there was compliance with the rules on verification and certification against non-forum
shopping.
RULING:
Section 4 (e) of Rule 45 requires that petitions for review should "contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42." Section 5 of the
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same rule provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4 is sufficient
ground to dismiss the petition.
In Uy v. Landbank, the Court held that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading,
the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
On the other hand, in Shipside Incorporated v. CA, the Court ruled that the lack of certification
against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. The failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany
the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
Further, in Altres v. Empleo, the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping were
summarized in this manner:
1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping.
2. As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear
to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence
of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6. Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by
his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign,
he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his
behalf.
In this case, the petition for review on certiorari included the secretary's certificate, authorizing Shuji
Yano and Jin Eto to represent and sign for and on behalf of Fuji. The secretary's certificate was
duly authenticated by the Consul-General of the Philippines in Japan. Likewise attached to the
petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon to sign on his
behalf. The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Corazon.
In addition, the case of Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR provides that the following
officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without
need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a
corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an
Employment Specialist in a labor case.

In this case, Corazon's affidavit states that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of the
Manila Bureau of Fuji Television Network, Inc." and that she has "held the position for the last
twenty-three years." As such, Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters
in Fuji's Manila Bureau Office and is in a position to verify "the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations in the Petition." Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the
requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.
Note: The below discussion was included in the decision but was not actually raised as an issue.
Procedural parameters of petitions for review in labor cases
Article 223 of the Labor Code does not provide any mode of appeal for decisions of the NLRC. It
merely states that the decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties. Being final, it is no longer appealable. However,
the finality of the NLRC's decisions does not mean that there is no more recourse for the
parties.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the SC had
the power to review the acts of the NLRC to see if it kept within its jurisdiction in deciding cases and
also as a form of check and balance. Judicial review of NLRC decisions shall be by way of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In accordance with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, such
petitions shall be filed before the CA. From the CA, an aggrieved party may file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where the issue is limited to grave
abuse of discretion. As an original action, it cannot be considered as a continuation of the
proceedings of the labor tribunals. On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited to questions of law. In labor cases, a
Rule 45 petition is limited to reviewing whether the CA correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion and deciding other jurisdictional errors of the NLRC.
In Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was explained that a petition for certiorari is
an extraordinary remedy that is "available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases" and that
its sole office "is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." A petition for certiorari does not include a
review of findings of fact since the findings of the NLRC are accorded finality. In cases where
the aggrieved party assails the NLRC's findings, he or she must be able to show that the
Commission "acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the
controversy."
When a decision of the CA under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by way of a
petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be decided upon.
Angeles v. Pascual
G.R. No. 157150, Sep 21, 2011
FACTS:
Angeles and Pascual were neighbors, owners of adjacent lots in Cabanatuan City. Pascual was
owner of Lot 4 while Angeles was owner of Lot 5. Each built houses on their respective lots
believing such were properly delineated. However, when Lot 3 was foreclosed by Metrobank, it was
found out that Pascual encroached on Lot 3 and was subsequently ejected by Metrobank. Pascual
then caused a geodetic engineer to survey his lot and found out that Angeles encroached on his lot.
Pascual demanded rentals from Angeles or the removal of Angeles house. Angeles refused both.
Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages. During trial Pascual presented,
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Fajardo, the geodetic engineer who conducted an actual survey of the subject lots. For his turn,
Angeles presented Fernandez who testified that he did not go to the actual site but did table work,
based on the sketch plans. RTC ruled in favor of Pascual. Angeles appealed to the CA. CA ruled in
favor of Pascual holding that as between findings of Fajardo who actually went to the site and those
of Fernandez, who based his findings on the TCTs, Fajardos findings should prevail. Angeles filed
a motion for recon but was denied, hence the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Angeles petition for review on certiorari assailing CAs giving credence to Fajardos
testimony and denying the appeal is meritorious.
RULING:
No, petition is NOT meritorious. The Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot review factual issues.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the petition for review on certiorari
"shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth." In appeal by certiorari,
therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose
findings thereon are received with respect and are binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain
exceptions. A question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a given case
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be
rejected as feeble or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs
presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse
party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented
by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious
character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of
such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact. Questions
like these are not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is
confined only to questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.
The credence given by the RTC to the testimony and relocation plan of Fajardo was conclusive
upon this Court especially by virtue of the affirmance by the CA of the RTC. Resultantly, the fact of
Angeles encroachment on Pascuals Lot 4 was proved by preponderant evidence.
Sps. Andrada v. Pilhino Sales
G.R. No. 156448, Feb 23, 2011
An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law. Thus,
the herein petition for review must fail for raising a question essentially of fact.
FACTS:
Respondent Pilhino sued Jose Andrada in the RTC recover the a sum of money plus damages. In
due course, the RTC rendered a decision against Andrada. Pilhino opted to enforce the writ of
execution against the properties of the Andradas. As a result, the Truck was sold at public auction
with Pilhino as the highest bidder. However, the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhinos
name due to its having been already registered in the name of petitioner Moises Andrada and that
Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA Finance Corporation (BA Finance) to secure his own
obligation.

BA Finance sued Moises Andrada for his failure to pay the loan. After a decision was rendered in
the action in favor of BA Finance, a writ of execution issued, by which the sheriff levied upon and
seized the Hino truck while it was in the possession of Pilhino and sold it at public auction, with BA
Finance as the highest bidder.
Consequently, Pilhino instituted this action in the RTC against Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima
Andrada, Spouses Moises Andrada and Clemencia Andrada, Jose Andrada, Sr., BA Finance, Land
Transportation Office and the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City to annul the following: (a)
the deed of sale between Jose Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada; (b) the chattel mortgage
involving the Hino truck between Moises Andrada and BA Finance; (c) the certificate of registration
of the Hino truck in the name of Moises Andrada as well as the registration of the chattel mortgage
with the Registry of Deeds of General Santos City.
Later on, Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife and Pilhino submitted a compromise agreement. They
submitted a second compromise agreement dated because the first was found to be defective and
incomplete. Further proceedings were taken only with respect to Moises Andrada and his wife, and
BA Finance.
The RTC, citing the compromise agreement between Pilhino and Jose Andrada, settling all the
claims of Pilhino against Jose Andrada, Jr., and the good faith of Pilhino and BA Finance in filing
their respective actions, rendered its decision dismissing the case insofar as the spouses
Moises Andrada and Clemencia Andrada, Jose Andrada, Sr. and BA Finance Corporation,
now accordingly BA Savings Bank, including the counterclaims.
Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada appealed the decision to the extent that the RTC thereby:
(a) dismissed their counterclaim; (b) declared that the deed of sale of the Hino truck between Jose
Andrada, Jr. and Moises Andrada had been simulated; and (c) approved the compromise
agreement between Pilhino and Spouses Jose Andrada, Jr. and Maxima Andrada. The Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision declaring valid the sale of the Hino truck by defendant
Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor of defendant-appellant Moises Andrada subject to the rights of BA
Finance as mortgagee and highest bidder.
Spouses Moises and Clemencia Andrada are now before the Court via petition for review
on certiorari to pose the following issues:
ISSUE:
WON the petition for review on certiorari is meritous.
RULING:
No. The Court finds no merit in the petition for review.
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated by the CA to the extent that it denied their claim for
the damages they had sought by way of counterclaim. They anchored their claim on Article 21 of
the Civil Code, which provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for damage.
Article 21 of the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code, is part of the
cause of action known in this jurisdiction as abuse of rights. The elements of abuse of rights are: (a)
there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
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In its assailed decision, the CA found that Pilhino had acted in good faith in bringing Civil Case No.
21,898-93 to annul the deed of sale involving the Hino truck executed by Jose Andrada, Jr. in favor
of Moises Andrada, considering that Pilhino had believed that the sale in favor of
defendants-appellants [had been] resorted to so that Jose Andrada [might] evade his
obligations. The CA concluded that no remedy was available for any damages that the petitioners
sustained from the filing of Civil Case No. 21,898-93 against them because the law affords no
remedy for such damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
Worthy to note is that the CAs finding and conclusion rested on the RTCs own persuasion that the
sale of the Hino truck to Moises Andrada had been simulated.
Yet, the petitioners still insist in this appeal that both lower courts erred in their conclusion
on the absence of bad faith on the part of Pilhino.
We cannot side with the petitioners. Their insistence, which represents their disagreement with the
CAs declaration that the second and third elements of abuse of rights,supra, were not established,
requires the consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise of its
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial. Perforce, the
findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. This restriction of the review to
questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
It is true that the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the restriction. Among the recognized
exceptions are the following, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant reversing or modifying the findings
of the CA, which are consistent with the established facts. Verily, the petitioners did not
prove the concurrence of the elements of abuse of rights.

Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 213847, Aug 18, 2015
Note: This case does not involve an issue pertaining to remedial law.
People v. Mateo
G.R. No. 147678-87, Jul 7, 2004
FACTS:
This involves a criminal complaint for 10 counts of rape filed by a stepdaughter, Imelda Mateo,
against her stepfather Efren Mateo. The RTC convicted Efren Mateo of 10 counts of rape and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. However the Solicitor General assailed
the factual findings of the RTC and recommended the acquittal of Mateo due to various
inconsistencies in the testimony of Imelda which were contrary to the testimonies of the other
witnesses presented during trial. The Sol Gen also noted that a total of 4 judges heard the case
before trial was completed, and posited that the change of judges hearing the case denied the
deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor of the witnesses which
could well be vital in the decision making process, particularly where credibility would, by and large,
constitute the singular issue.
RULING:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt
or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be
overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate
the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and
Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of
the Supreme Court en banc , dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in
cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.
Note: No issue raised in this case; main point is that cases which are subject to automatic review
by the SC (with penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment) must first go through the CA for
intermediate review.
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National Power Corporation v. Paderanga
G.R. No. 155065, Jul 28, 2005
To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed before the Regional Trial Court
a complaint for expropriation. The trial court rendered a decision on the complaint regarding the
payment of just compensation against NPC.
NPC filed a Notice of Appeal but the trial court denied the same for NPCs failure to file and
perfect it within the reglementary period, it having failed to file a record on appeal. NPC then
filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a record on appeal was not required as the trial
court rendered judgment against all the defendants. The trial court denied NPCs motion for
reconsideration. NPC subsequently filed before the RTC a petition for relief from the denial of its
appeal on the ground that its failure to file a record on appeal was due to honest mistake and
excusable neglect, it having believed that a record on appeal was not required in light of the failure
of the other defendant, Enriquez, to file an answer to the complaint. The trial court denied NPCs
petition for relief for lack of factual and legal basis.
NPC thereupon filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order
denying its appeal. The appellate court, however, denied NPCs petition, it holding that under Rule
41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the filing of a record on appeal is required in
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals, as in an action for
expropriation in which the order determining the right of the plaintiff to expropriate and the
subsequent adjudication on the issue of just compensation may be the subject of separate appeals.
Aggrieved, NPC challenged the appellate courts decision via the present petition, contending that
the trial courts questioned orders effectively deprived it of its constitutional right to due process.
NPC argues that a complaint for expropriation is a Special Civil Action under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure, not a special proceeding as contemplated under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; that there is no law or rules specifically requiring that a record on appeal shall be
filed in expropriation case
ISSUE:
WON the filing of a record on appeal is required.
RULING:
Yes. While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the Rules of
Court requires the filing of a record on appeal in other cases of multiple or separate appeal.
Rule 41, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, clearly provides:
SEC. 2. Modes of Appeals.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation. The case of Municipality of Bian v. Garcia vividly expounds on the matter, viz:

There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and
the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be
final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done
by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order
to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise.
Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek reversal of the order by taking an appeal
therefrom.
Thus, in Municipality of Bian, this Court held that in actions for eminent domain, since no
less than two appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of
condemnation is thirty days counted from notice thereof and not the ordinary period of
fifteen days prescribed for actions in general. As such, the complaint falls under the
classification of other cases of multiple or separate appeal where the law or these rules so require
in above-quoted Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in which a record on appeal
is required to be filed and served.
Respecting NPCs claim that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other defendant,
Enriquez, there being no evidence that summons was served on her and, therefore, no appeal with
respect to the case against her arose, the trial courts Order belies said claim:
xxx xxx xxx
In the letter-appeal by defendant Estefania V. Enriquez addressed to the Court, defendant
did manifest no opposition to the right of plaintiff to the use of her land but only which (sic)
that payment be based on the actual market value of the property sought to be expropriated.
In comment to said letter-appeal, plaintiff stressed that the amount deposited was purely to secure
a writ of possession as provided under PD 42. It agreed with defendant that the fair market value or
actual market value shall be the basis for the just compensation of the property.
xxx xxx xxx
That the defendant Enriquez did not file an answer to the complaint did not foreclose the possibility
of an appeal arising therefrom. For Section 3 of Rule 67 provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the
taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a manifestation to that
effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be interested, within
the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings
affecting the same.
xxx xxx xxx
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the interest of
justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the
filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not a
defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount
of the compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the distribution of the
award. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In other words, once the compensation for Enriquez property is placed in issue at the trial,
she could, following the third paragraph of the immediately-quoted Section 3 of Rule 67,
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participate therein and if she is not in conformity with the trial courts determination of the
compensation, she can appeal therefrom.
Multiple or separate appeals being existent in the present expropriation case, NPC should have
filed a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the trial courts decision. The trial courts
dismissal of its appeal, which was affirmed by the appellate court, was thus in order.
Sps. David Bergonia v. CA
G.R. No. 189151, Jan 25, 2012
FACTS:
In a civil case filed by petitioners against private respondent, a decision was rendered by the RTC
in favor of the private respondent. After the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on May 7, 2008.
In a resolution by the CA dated January 30, 2009, petitioners were required to submit their
Appellants Brief within 45 days from the receipt of the resolution. However, such was not complied
with by the petitioners who claim that they did not receive such resolution.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of petitioners failure
to file their Appellants Brief on time, which was later on granted by the CA. According to the CA,
records show that resolution, which was addressed to petitioners counsel, was received by a
certain Ruel de Tomas on February 5, 2009; however, such fact was denied by the petitioners.
They further allege that their counsels law office does not have an employee named Ruel de
Tomas.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was later on denied by the CA; hence, petitioners submitted
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was a proper remedy.
2. WON the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal by the CA was proper.
RULING:
1. No. Petitioners' resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not the
proper remedy to assail the resolutions issued by the CA.
It must be noted that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states that an appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or a particular
matter therein.
Thus, the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would depend on
whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution
issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the
appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Republic v.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), this Court held:
A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy
available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits

of the case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved party's remedy is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of
the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves
substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not
end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights
and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its
application.
Here, the assailed resolutions issued by the CA had considered the petitioners' appeal below as
having been abandoned and, accordingly, dismissed. Thus, the assailed resolutions are in
the nature of a final order as the same completely disposed of the petitioners' appeal with the
CA. Consequently, the remedy available to the petitioners is to file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 with this court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Even assuming that the petitioners' resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper, the
instant petition would still be denied since a petition for certiorari will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. In this case, there was no hint of
whimsicality or gross and patent abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it dismissed the
appeal of the petitioners for the failure of the latter to file their appellants' brief.
2. Yes. Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the CA to dismiss an appeal, on its
own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of failure of the appellant to serve
and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time
prescibed by the rules.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held that the CA's authority to dismiss an appeal for failure
to file the appellant's brief is a matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this
ground is neither mandatory nor ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be
observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case.
Having in mind the peculiar circumstances of the instant case and considering that petitioners
offered no credible evidence to justify their failure to file their brief, the SC finds that the
petitioners' excuse for their failure to file their brief was flimsy and discreditable and, thus, the
propriety of the dismissal of their appeal.
Brgy. Dasmarinas v. Creative Play Corner School
G.R. No. 169942, Jan 24, 2011
FACTS:
Brgy. Dasmarias filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Prosecutor of Makati against
Creative Play Corner School and its owners for Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents (Brgy.
Clearance and Official Receipt). Prosecutor Ochoa recommended the dismissal of the case for
failure to establish probable cause. Brgy. Dasmarias then went to the Department of Justice via a
Petition for Review. DOJ found no error to justify the reversal of the resolution dismissing the case,
and that the petition was filed late, hence said petition was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a
Petition for Review with the CA. Before petitioner could file the petition, it sought for an extension of
time of 15 days by reason of counsels heavy workload, such was granted by the CA. Petitioner
again asked for extension of time for five days from May 28 to June 2, 2005, however petitioner
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only filed the petition by mail on June 7, 2005. Hence, the CA denied the 2nd Motion for Extension
of Time and dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner filed a Motion for Recon
alleging that it filed a Final Motion for Additional Time to File Petition For Review citing as reason
the sudden death in the family of the handling lawyer. CA denied the motion for recon stating that
although the grant of a second extension of time is discretionary on the court, such discretion is
limited to the most compelling reasons presented by the movant. The reason pressure and large
volume of work presented by petitioner are not compelling reasons. Moreover, the final motion was
disregarded by CA as a third motion for extension of time is not allowed by the rules, there was no
showing as to the relationship of the relative who died to the handling lawyer, and the petitioner
was represented by a law firm, and not by the Atty. Bote-Veguillas alone. Petitioner then went to
the CA via a Petition For Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON dismissal by CA on procedural grounds is proper.
RULING:
Yes, Dismissal was proper. Petition for Review not meritorious.
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above, it is clear that the CA, after it has already allowed petitioner an extension of 15
days within which to file a petition for review, may only grant a further extension when presented
with the most compelling reason but same is limited only to a period of 15 days. Thus, when the CA
denied petitioners Second Motion for Extension of five days, it was merely following the
abovementioned provision of the rules after it found the reason for the second extension as not
compelling.
As to petitioners invocation of liberal application of the rules, we cannot heed the same. "It is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly
followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court
may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a partys
substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons."
While petitioner cites several jurisprudence wherein this Court set aside procedural rules, an
imperative existed in those cases that warranted a liberal application of the rules. We have
examined the records of this case, however, and we are convinced that the present case is not
attended by such an imperative that justifies relaxation of the rules. Moreover, as pointed out by
respondents, petitioner had not only once transgressed procedural rules. This Court has previously
held that "[t]echnical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the
deserving." Petitioners low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is undeserving of their
relaxation.

Besides, even if the CA ignores the petitions belated filing, the same would have been dismissed
for being an improper remedy. It has been held that "[t]he remedy of a party desiring to elevate to
the appellate court an adverse resolution of the Secretary of Justice is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. A Rule 43 petition for review is a wrong mode of appeal."
Alfonso v. Andres
G.R. No. 166236, Jul 19, 2010
Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.
FACTS:
The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages before the
Regional Trial and it rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Petitioners, thus, appealed to the
CA.
Petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from
receipt of the notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on
December 8, 2003, petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners
consented to the withdrawal. Petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or until
January 21, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. Then petitioners themselves again
moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3, 2004 or until April 18, 2004 within which to file
their appellants' brief.
On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution granting petitioners' motions for extension of time
to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003 or until March
5, 2004. Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By
that time, the extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired.
On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by petitioners,
entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners. However, on August 10, 2004, the CA
issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal for failure of
defendants-appellants to file their brief within the extended reglementary period which
expired on March 5, 2004, thus the appeal is DISMISSED pursuant to Sec. 1 (e), Rule 50 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration which requested for a fresh period of 45 days from
September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004 within which to file appellants' brief. On October 21,
2004, the brief was filed by the PAO. The CA then issued a Resolution which denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that their failure to file their appellants' brief within the required period was due
to their indigency and poverty. They submit that there is no justification for the dismissal of their
appeal specially since the PAO had just entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners as
directed by the CA, and had as yet no opportunity to prepare the brief. On the other hand,
respondents contend that failure to file appellants' brief on time is one instance where the CA may
dismiss an appeal. In the present case, they contend that the CA exercised sound discretion when
it dismissed the appeal upon petitioners failure to file their appellants' brief within the extended
period of 75 days after the original 45-day period expired.
ISSUE:
WON the CA is correct in dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to file their brief within the
extended reglementary period.
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RULING:
Yes. The CA is correct.
Failure to file Brief On Time
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. - An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or
memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the Court
excused the late filing of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's brief as the
case is impressed with public interest. The cases cited by petitioners are not in point.
In the present civil case which involves the failure to file the appellants' brief on time, there
is no showing of any public interest involved. Neither is there a showing that an injustice
will result due to the application of technical rules.
Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months
to pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a
justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case. Not
only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without
delay.
Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise
choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent
them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to
the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late.
Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty, are the main culprits for the situation
they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their choices
to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural
requirements, which they camouflage with the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the
delay, and hence frustration of justice, in the present case.
No compelling reason to disregard technicalities
Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their
case is strong. A study of the records fails to so convince us.
Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino
Alfonso is required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject
property. We are not convinced. In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the effectivity
of a deed of extrajudicial settlement that was neither notarized nor published.
As found by the RTC, petitioners failed to prove any defect or irregularities in the execution of the
deed of sale. They failed to prove by strong evidence, the alleged lack of consent of Jose to the
sale of the subject real property.
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to overturn the assailed CA resolution. We
find no injustice in the dismissal of the appeal by the CA. Justice dictates that this case be put
to rest already so that the respondents may not be deprived of their rights.