PBMEO v PBMCI

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to property
rights, Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free expression, rights of free assembly and rights of
petition

FACTS:
March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise of their
constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for
redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 to
be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-
5pm respectively)
March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon where
PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company because the union
has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT NO
STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969
The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation since
they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the company.
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees
September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence
of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable
character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts
and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments,
and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment
of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in
the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary
terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is
as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from
work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he
has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management was
adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly
and the right to petition for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging
and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being."
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ...
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of the
freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by
rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because
he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal
services
enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such
human rights. It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require.

MEJOFF VS DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951

Lessons Applicable: characteristics of human rights, constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of liberty without due process of law,

Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights

FACTS:

Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as
a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. (The
petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and
belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the occupation.)
He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army
CounterIntelligence Corps. and later there was an order for his release.
But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had
entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first available
transportation to Russia.
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on October,
1948.
He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the
Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and
none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was
through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a
reasonable time

HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon
these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or
their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace
and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable
and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance
of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the
amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is
authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were
proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and
rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every
one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
 petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if
the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present,
or uncontrollable
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am
loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of such
offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is of
universal application.
As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the
prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.

KURODA V JALANDONI

G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

Lessons Applicable: Generally accepted principles of international law

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed
"to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war"
File a petition seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of
the Philippines:
to enjoin and prohibit Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the
prosecution of his case; and - not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment
as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines and not interested party in the case
to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case - Executive Order
No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provision of our constitutional law but
also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an
adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and
therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international
ISSUE: W/N Executive Order No. 68 is valid

HELD: YES

o President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished

aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68
o Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule
and principle of international law as continued inn treaties to which our government may have
been or shall be a signatory.
It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law.
o when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the Philippines
was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound together with the
United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the treaties between the
belligerent countries
o the appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty.
It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes
against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes

GOVT OF HK VS. OLALIA

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

Lessons Applicable: generally accepted international law, due process, bill of rights, extradition

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
June 20, 1997: Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
effect an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons."
July 1, 1997: Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
 Juan Antonio Muoz charged before the Hong Kong Court of 3 counts in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999: warrants of arrest were issued against him
September 13, 1999: DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest - granted and NBI arrested him
Muoz' Petition for Certiorari w/ the CA questioning the legality of his arrest - order of arrest
void
November 22, 1999: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the extradition
DOJ Petition for Certiorari (became final April 10, 2001) - granted; order of arrest valid
October 8, 2001: Judge Bernardo, Jr. denied bail(then judge inhibited himself)
October 30, 2001: Judge Olalia on motion for reconsideration granted bail
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to nullify:
1. December 20, 2001 Order allowing Juan Antonio Muoz to post bail; and -
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail,
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings
2. April 10, 2002 Order denying the motion to vacate December 20, 2001 Order
ISSUE: W/N there is a right to bail in extradition proceedings

HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. REMANDED to the trial court determine whether private
respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence

Human Rights Law

It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are
not criminal in nature.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While not a treaty, the principles contained in
the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community.
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty under Section II, Article II of our
Constitution. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.
Exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited
to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only.
 the Court relied in Mejoff case upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in
sustaining the detainees right to bail
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not
also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in
extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of
the person detained is not in issue.
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Public International Law

An extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted
of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following:
1) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and
2) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery
of criminal law
This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve
the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of
urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition
of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
By any standard, detention for over 2 years without having been convicted of any crime is a
serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty which prompted the extradition court to
grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution.
 In criminal proceedings, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. While in an extradition proceeding, the assumption is that the
extraditee is a fugitive from justice, thus, he bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is
not a flight risk and should be granted bail. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.
It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations under the time-
honored principle of pacta sunt servanda that the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a
party. We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

People v. Galit (GR No. L-51770, 20 March 1985)

Facts: Francisco Galit was picked up by the Montalban police on suspicion for the killing of Mrs.
Natividad Francisco, a widow. After he was taken by the Montalban police, the case was referred to
the National Bureau of Investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police
station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by
NBI Agent Carlos Flores. The following day, Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime, also implicating Juling and Pabling Dulay as his
companions in its commission. As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide
before the Circuit Trial Court of Pasig.

During trial, a witness stated that he overheard Galit quarrelling with his wife about his
intention to leave their residence immediately because he and his two companions robbed and killed
Natividad Fernando. On the other hand, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime
and also assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him through torture,
force and intimidation. He recounted that he was mauled and tortured by the NBI officers by covering
his face with a rag and pushing his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He had no counsel
when the confession was extracted from him. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him
to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as
directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a re-enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court
found Galit guilty and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.

Issue: W/N Francisco Galit should be acquitted on the ground that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible.

Ruling: YES. The evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the
findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no
state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. The alleged confession and the pictures of
the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner
contrary to law. Galit acquitted.

Issue: How is the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession shown?

Ruling: Through the statement itself. The first question was a very long Tagalog question followed by
a monosyllabic answer. It does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed
of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead, there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
under investigation. The accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands
Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, the accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the
Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver
of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by the counsel of his choice. These constitute gross
violation of his rights.

The correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation, according to Morales v. Ponce Enrile: At the time the person is
arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason of the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient meansby telephone if possibleor
by letter or messenger. It shall be the duty of the arresting officer to see that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of
any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one.
Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. L-14078. March 7, 1919

Facts:

Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao
in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had
been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of
the Provincial Board, extend over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about
300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand
by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by
virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of
their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval of
the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take
up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,
was challenged.

Issue:

Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.

Held:

No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was
said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine
Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could
have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the
general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate
exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the
Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among
landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are
pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

Villavicencio v. Lukban (GR No. L-14639, 25 March 1919)

Facts: Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila, in an effort to exterminate vice, ordered the closure of the segregated district
for women of ill-repute which had been permitted for a number of years. Around 170 women were kept confined to
their houses in the district by the police for a number of days, after which, they were deported to Davao without
previously informing them or obtaining their consent. When they landed in Davao, they were receipted for as laborers
by Francisco Sales, the provincial governor of Davao. The said governor had no idea that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the city of Manila. A petition for habeas corpus was presented to a member of the
Supreme Court for all the deported women.

Issue: W/N the women had been restrained of their liberty.

Ruling: YES. The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued
until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived her right.

Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law.
Remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression: (1) civil action; (2) criminal action; and (3) habeas
corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.

Justice Torres dissent:

If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her
sufficient remuneration for her substance, prefers to put herself under the will of another woman who is
usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously
dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own
knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident
that she cannot join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the
latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights
enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised
within that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance
of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not be
permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions
adopted by the administrative authorities.
In ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the
domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional laws which
guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners do not
absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in
exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.

Valmonte v. De Villa (GR No. 83988, 29 September 1989)

Facts: Ricardo Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Rights seek to have the checkpoints
in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, or elsewhere, declared as unconstitutional and for the dismantling and banning of the
same, or, in the alternative, to direct the National Capital Region District Command to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people.

Petitioners claim that the checkpoints give the NCRDC a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures
without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution, and the installation of the said checkpoints
make the residents of Valenzuela worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious, and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints.

Issue: W/N the checkpoints should be declared unconstitutional.

Ruling: NO. Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before
the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. Valmontes general allegation to the effect that
he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more,
is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmontes right against unlawful
search and seizure. The setting up of the question checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
to thwart plots to destabilize the Government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the
State to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search which
is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable
limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. Petition dismissed.

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.
Not all searches and seizures are forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

Justice Cruz dissent:

The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact
that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground
of national security.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the
barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the deathbed of liberty.

Justice Sarmientos dissent:

The absence alone of a search warrant makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to
constitutional challenges. As it is, checkpoints have become search warrants unto themselves, a roving one
at that.

Marcos v. Manglapus (GR No. 88211, 15 September 1989)

Facts: Former President Ferdinand Marcos, on his deathbed, wishes to return to the Philippines after his exile due
to the 1986 EDSA Revolution. Present President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Marcos filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition for the Court to order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, the Immigration Commissioner, the Secretary of National Defense,
and the Chief of Staff to issue travel documents to Marcos and the immediate members of his family, and to enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issue: W/N the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling: YES. At the outset, it must be stated that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to
travel. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would usually connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to ones country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel.
 The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state, the right to leave a
country, and the right to enter ones country as separate and distinct rights. It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to ones country is not among the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is the Courts well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law, and, under our
Constitution, as part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, against being
arbitrarily deprived thereof.

ALVERO VS DIZON

Facts: While the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces arrested Aurelio Alvero for treasonand
seized and took certain papers from his house. He filed a petition, demanding the return of
the papers allegedly seized and taken from his house which was denied.

(5) That herein petitioner had failed to object properly to the admission of said papers and
documents at the hearing on said petition for bail, and at the trial of the case on the merits,
in not having insisted that the question of the legality of the search and seizure of the
papers and documents taken from his house should have been litigated and finally decided
first, and thus practically waived his objection to their admissibility, as evidence for the
prosecution;

(6) That at the hearing on his petition for the return of the papers taken from his house,
held after they had been admitted as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the
hearing on the petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, herein petitioner
had failed to identify satisfactorily the documents now in question, and his ownership
thereof; and

(7) That petitioner himself in his petition for reconsideration, dated February 26, 1946,
admitted the legality the legality of the seizure of the documents taken from his house, and
at the hearing on his petition for bail, he himself called for some of the documents in
question.

Issue: Whether the documents seized by United States Army Personnel at Alveros home
can be used as evidence against the latter.

Decision: Petition without merit. The right of officers and men of the United States Army to
arrest herein petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers,
without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the
provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of
military papers in the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army,
declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given
aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any
position of political and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint
for the duration of the war.

The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a
crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both
instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed.

When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his
control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to
make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable
grounds to have committed a felony.

People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991
"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"

The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals.
 Its a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law.
It could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint is imposed.

Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages to their friend in Switzerland and
contracted the services of Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused,
assuring that the packages simply contained books and cigars.
However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening,
they suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were
marijuana.
In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened and found dried marijuana leaves
inside.
After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence against him, which, according to him, is
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication.
May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? NO.
The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties granted by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government. Its protection is directed only to governmental action.
This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is no reason why it
should not be admitted to prosecute him.
Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the
packages in compliance with SOP AND b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search.
Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.

Additional notes:
When a private individual violates another persons right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is
admissible; however the violator could be held civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.