SPECPRO ASSIGNMENT (December 6, 2016) - This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the
Justice Santos State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the
Rule 77. Section 4. Estate, how administered.
1. Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
June 8, 2006
I. Relevant Facts:
- Spouses Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens residing in
the Philippines with an adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
- Audrey died leaving a will which bequeathed her entire estate to Richard
and designated him as executor. The will was probated in the Orphans Court
Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Ancheta
(Petitioner) as ancillary executor.
- Richard later married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) in 1981.
- October 12, 1982, Audreys will was admitted for probate in then CFI of
Rizal in a special proceeding No. 9625. Petitioner then made an inventory
on Audreys properties.
- July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by
the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A.
- Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.
- October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed on
October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, apportioning them
between Richard and Kyle.
- The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial
court. The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard
and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest).
testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire
estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati
property should be given to respondent.
- The trial court found merit in the opposition, disapproved the project of
partition and adjudicated the entire undivided interest to respondent.
- October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an
amended complaint for the annulment of the trial courts Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.
- Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since
Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should
be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely thereof, and since Richard
left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition
before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate
succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests
of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive
their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be
annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.
II. Issues:
1. WON the orders can no longer be set aside.
2. WON the project of partition should be allowed.
III. Rulings:
1. The orders may be set aside.
Generally, a decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the
annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988.
The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure
to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good
faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence,
petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the
terms of her will.
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of
Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
of another state or country.

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Records bear the fact that the filing of the
project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto, and the order
of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 were all done in 1991. Since the action for annulment was filed in
1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
2. The project of partition should be disallowed.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys
estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as
ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in
evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances, the
fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with
regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law
of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is
governed by the law of the nation of the decedent."
Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in testate or Whether or not the CA properly determine that the RTC committed
intestate proceeding. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
2. Aranas v. Mercado that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for
corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime.

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, RULING:

v. The answer is in the negative.

TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.

SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, The determination of which properties should be excluded from or
AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents. included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination,
FACTS: the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator
or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to
1. Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita, and
exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
their five children and 2 grandchildren including Thelma, petitioner.
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
2. Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and Cebu Emerson. He assigned
duty.
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty
3. Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdios estate. The properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be
RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. As the submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is
consideration and approval by the RTC. However, claiming that Emigdio had one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
examined regarding it. The RTC granted. settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
4. Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her inventory status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
with copies certificates of stocks from Mervir Realty, the deed of assignment conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
executed by Emigdio involving real properties and the certificate of stock
issued of Cebu Emerson, but again Thelma opposed the approval of the
inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
5. RTC held that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included . The Court hereby denied the
administratrixs motion for approval of inventory and ordered the said
administratrix to redo the inventory of properties.
6. CA reversed the decision of the RTC by GADALEJ and affirmed the
inventory submitted by Teresita.

ISSUE:
3. Lebin v. Mirasol
Lebin v Mirasol
GR No. 164255
07 September 2011
Under heading: Question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
testate or intestate proceedings.
Doctrine:
1. Implicit in the power of the probate court to approve disposition of
property of an estate is the power to rescind, nullify, or modify the
disposition of the sale to conform to law or the standing policies set
and fixed for the purpose.
2. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid
down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. [NOTE: This issue is not
included under the heading of Justices outline, but was consistently
stressed out in the case.]
Facts:
1. Elbe and Erlinda Lebin (Petitioners) offered to purchase from the
Estate of Hodges the lot where their house stands, Lot 18, located in
Iloilo City. The administrator sought approval of the court, stating that
petitioner was the actual occupant of the lot, and the same was
granted.
2. Vilma Mirasol (Respondent) also wanted to purchase the lot where
their house stood, which was initially stated as Lot 4, but after a
survey revealed her house was actually built on Lot 18 and not Lot 4,
filed a petition for relief from the order. Pending resolution of the
petition for relief, petitioners paid the last installment and moved for
the execution of deed of sale, which was apparently not acted upon
by the RTC.
3. RTC ruled that the petitioners and respondents are to be the owners
of the lands where their respective houses stand. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
4. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal and an alleged record on appeal.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the record on
appeal was filed late. RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
a. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the RTC.
b. Petitioners allegedly filed a record on appeal.
c. Petitioners presented an ex-parte motion to approve the
record on appeal.
d. Mirasol filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.
e. RTC granted the motion to dismiss stating that the record on
appeal was filed late.
f. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
g. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
5. Hence this appeal for review on certiorari.
Issue:
1. WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their
failure to timely file a record on appeal
2. WON the RTC committed reversible error in adjudging that Lot 18 be
sold to both petitioners and respondents in equal portions.
Ruling:
1. RTC did not err in dismissing the petitioners appeal for their failure to
timely file a record on appeal. Such appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional, because failure to perfect the appeal within the time
prescribed by the Rules of court causes the judgment or final order to
become final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review the judgment or final order.
2. According to Section 39 of BP 129, the rule stating that filing of a
record on appeal is no longer required does not include special
proceedings.
1. RTC committed no reversible error in allocating Lot 18 to both
petitioners and respondent. The approval of the offer to purchase
would be conditioned upon whether the petitioners were the only
actual occupants.
2. Under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the RTC may authorize the sale,
mortgage, or encumbrance of assets of the estate, which requires
judicial approval before it could be executed. Implicit in the
requirement for judicial approval was that the probate court could (a)
rescind or nullify disposition made without its authority or (b) modify
such disposition to conform to law or standing policies set and fixed
for the purpose, where the same was invalidated based on falsity of
factual basis, mistake, or concealment of material fact (i.e. the claim
that petitioners were the only occupants of Lot 18).
3. Hence, the probate courts modification of approval of petitioners
offer to purchase was within the power of the RTC to nullify or modify
after it was found to be contrary to the condition of approval.
Authors Note:
I included an issue sa case which is not related sa outine (or at least wala
pa nato naabtan) kay gi.balik-balik man gud siya and taas-taas ang
discussion on its importance so gi.apil nalang nako. Basin diay diha ka i.ask
ni Justice. Feel free to omit the irrelevant issue (highlighted parts) when
writing.
4. Romero v. CA
LEO C. ROMERO AND DAVID AMANDO C. ROMERO VS. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, AURORA C. ROMERO AND VITTORIO C. ROMERO
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not
be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should
be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or
exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
FACTS:
Petitioners allege that upon their fathers death, their mother,
respondent Aurora Romero, was appointed as legal guardian who
held several real and personal properties in trust for her children.
Sometime in 2006, petitioners Leo and Amando discovered that
several Deeds of Sale were registered over parcels of land that are
purportedly conjugal properties of their parents.
Petitioners claim that, their brother Vittorio through fraud,
misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the
properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their
mother, Aurora. Vittorio allegedly employed force and threat upon
her, and even administered drugs that rendered her weak and
vulnerable. Thus, Aurora signed the Deeds of Sale without reading or
knowing their contents.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of
Title, and Conveyance of Title (Amended) against private
respondents Aurora C. Romero and Vittorio C. Romero.
Respondents filed their Answer, arguing that the properties in
question were acquired long after the death of their father, Judge
Dante Romero; hence, the properties cannot be considered conjugal.
They allege that some of the lots were paraphernal properties of
Aurora which she had mortgaged.
RTC rendered its Resolution dismissing petitioners complaint.
xxx(T)he case under Special Proceedings No. 5185 remains
pending in that no distribution of the assets of the estate of the
late Dante Y. Romero, nor a partition, has been effected among
his compulsory heirs. Thus, the contending claims of plaintiffs
and defendants in this case could not be adjudicated nor passed
upon by this Court without first getting a definitive
pronouncement from the intestate court as to the share of each
of the heirs of the late Dante Y. Romero in his estate. Even the
claim of defendant Aurora C. Romero that some of the properties
being claimed by plaintiffs in this case are her own, the same
being paraphernal, is an issue which must be taken up and
established in the intestate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
The RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners filed for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. CA
dismissed the Petition, ruling that the properties involved in this case
are part of the estate left to the heirs of Judge Romero, the partition
of which is already subject of an intestate proceeding filed on 6
January 1976 in the then Court of First Instance.
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal, just
because the intestate proceeding has not yet terminated. Petitioners,
as heirs, are purportedly allowed to exercise their option of filing a
separate civil action in order to protect their interests. Petitioners
assert that the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate
court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons or the appointment of executors, but
does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court may rule on issues pertaining to
title over property only in a provisional capacity.
RULING:
The probate court has jurisdiction to
determine the issues in the present case
In Coca v. Borromeo,[14] this Court allowed the probate court to
provisionally pass upon the issue of title, precisely because the only
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, subject of the
proceeding, viz:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter
should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate
jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of
practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should
not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding.
That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That
general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by
expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are
all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an
exception to the general rule that questions of title should be
ventilated in a separate action.Here, the probate court had
already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-
hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its
exclusion from (the) inventory. The only interested parties
are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate
proceeding.
While it is true that a probate courts determination of ownership over
properties which may form part of the estate is not final or ultimate in nature,
this rule is applicable only as between the representatives of the estate and
strangers thereto. Indeed, as early as Bacquial v. Amihan,[16] the court stated
thus:
included in the inventory of the estate. In Civil Case No. 18757, the RTC has
listed the properties alleged by petitioners to have been conjugal properties
of their parents and, therefore, part of the estate that was illegally sold to the
respondent. Some of these real properties identified seem to be the same
real properties that form part of the inventory of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that the
determination of whether a property is conjugal or paraphernal for purposes
of inclusion in the inventory of the estate rests with the probate court:
xxx In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the
question of ownership of certain of the properties involved
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband
exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the
probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is
to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the
proceedings xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. As the properties herein are
already subject of an intestate proceeding, the judgment of CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104025 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
is AFFIRMED.

xxx A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate

proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether
or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom
belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without
prejudice to the right of interested parties, in a proper action,
to raise the question on the ownership or existence of the
right or credit. Xxx There is also authority abroad that where
the court is without jurisdiction to determine questions of title,
as for example, as between the estate and persons
claiming adversely, its orders and judgments relating to the
sale do not render the issue of title res judicata.

In any case, there is no merit to petitioners claim that the issues raised in the
case at bar pertain to title and ownership and therefore need to be ventilated
in a separate civil action. The issue before the court is not really one of title
or ownership, but the determination of which particular properties should be
Exception: General Rule: A probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership.
5. Coca v. Borromeo Exception: Parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of 3rd parties are not impaired, the probate
COCA vs BORROMEO court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
171 Phil 246 Why? It is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one which may
be waived.
DOCTRINE: The probate court had already received evidence on the ownership the
"As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed 12-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from
upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all
in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions appeared in the intestate proceedings.
justified by expediency and convenience."

FACTS:
Pangilinan spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate. They
were in possession of a homestead consisting of 2 parcels of land
located at Calamba, Mis. Occ.
Lot 1927- OCT under the name of Juan Pangilinan
Lot 1112- OCT under the name of Heirs of Juan Pangilinan
3rd lot (Lot 1920) also forms part of estate of Pangilinan Spouses
Special proceedings was constituted in CFI-Mis. Occ. for the settlement
of the estate of Pangilinan spouses
CFI- deferred action on the project of partition until ownership of 12
hectares which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and 6
hectares which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (all 18 hectares were
excluded from the inventory) is determined in an ordinary action.
CFI- noting no separate action had been filed to determine ownership of
the 12 hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but
excluding the 12 hectares claimed by Francisco Pangilinan
-did not bother to decide how remainder should be partitioned and
whether Prima Pangilinan had share on the remainder
CONTENTIONS in Appellate Court:
Appellants(petitioners):
-the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of 12-hectare portion of Lot 1112
Appellees(respondents):
-the lower court did not decide the ownership of the 12 hectares when
it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition

ISSUE:
How the title to the 12 hectares should be decided, whether in a separate
action or intestate proceedings?

HELD: We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Rule 78, Section 1. Who are incompetenets to serve as executors or SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators
administrators No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who

6. Marcelo Investment and Management Corp. v. Marcelo Jr. (a) Is a minor;

MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION V
MARCELO JR.
G.R. No. 209651
November 26, 2014
FACTS:
Jose Sr. died intestate and he was survived by his four compulsory heirs:
Edward, George, Helen and respondent Jose, Jr. MIMCO then filed a
petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration before the RTC Quezon. It
was opposed by Helen, Jose Jr., George who banded with Edward. Each of
them wanted to be the regular administrator. RTC appointed Edward as the
regular administrator. Jose Jr. appealed the appointment of Edward as
regular administrator before the CA but the latter affirmed RTCs decision.
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by
reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity,
or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Because Edward and Jose, Jr. are both compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., they
were, at the time the issue of administration first cropped, equally preferred
to administer Jose, Sr.s estate. Necessarily, the courts also delved into the
question of their suitableness and fitness to serve as administrator, preferring
one over the other, framing it as Edward being more fit and suited to be
administrator: 1.) Edward has kept the Marcelo family corporations and his
own in good financial condition; 2.) The trust reposed by the decedent on
Edward who voted on Jose, Sr.s behalf in a Marcelo corporation; and
3.)Edward being made a co-signatory for money deposited for Jose, Jr.s
own children.

Later on Edward died so Jose Jr. moved for his appointment as new regular Plainly, the RTC found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator,
administrator. However this was opposed by MIMCO, heirs of Edward and more competent than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of
George and they nominated Atty. Reyes as regular administrator. RTC Preference, manifesting none of the disqualifications set by law.
appointed Jose Jr. on the ground that Jose Jr. is not previously declared as Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is unfit and
unfit, there is a necessity to appoint a new regular administrator and as a unsuitable to administer his fathers estate.
legitimate child of the decedent, he has higher interest than Atty. Reyes.
Petiotioners then filed motion for reconsideration and moved for the
appointment instead of George as administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate but it as
denied. CA affirmed stating that RTC appointing Edward as regular
administrator instead of Jose Jr. did not make a finding of Jose Jr.s fitness
and suitableness to serve as regular administrator. Jose Jr. is competent and
not wanting in understanding and integrity to act as regular administration.

ISSUE: Whether Joses Jr. previous non-appointment as regular

administrator bars his present appointment

HELD: NO

The decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the
Estate of Jose, Sr., which decision had the imprimatur of a final resolution by
this Court, was not merely a comparison of the qualifications of Edward and
Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the
unfitness of Jose, Jr.

Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general

disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator:
7. Republic v. Marcos II
Republic v Marcos II
GR Nos. 130371 & 130855
August 4, 2009
Facts:
Jan 11, 1996, RTC of Pasig City issued an order granting letters
testamentary to respondents Ferdinand Marcos II and Imelda Romualdez-
Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand
Marcos.
Jan 15, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for partial
reconsideration for the granting of letters testamentary to respondents.
Respondent Imelda Marcos also filed her own motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence
and validity.
The motions are both denied for lack of merit.
SPECIFICALLY REFERRING SAID PETITION FOR A
DECISION ON THE MERITS.
That the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of
granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any
ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court.
Suarez v. Judge Villarama Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect
at the time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken to
either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong
mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
Petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not
respondents should be disqualified to act as executors is a question
of fact. Hence, the proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to
this Court.
In the case at bar, as found by this Court in its February 5, 1997 Resolution,
therein petition offered no important or special reason for the Court to take

June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the RTC order
granting letters testamentary to respondents.
Mar 13, 1997, CA dismissed the petition for having taken the wrong mode of
appeal.
Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly
provides that:
cognizance of it at the first instance. Petitioner offered no plausible reason
why it went straight to this Court when an adequate and proper remedy was
still available. The CA was thus correct that the remedy that petitioner should
have availed of was to file an appeal under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
which states:

Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to II.

either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall be dismissed.
Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was,
however denied. Hence, herein petition.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENTS IMELDA R.
MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD BE
DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS EXECUTORS.
(main issue)

Assignment of errors: III.

I. THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO

CONSIDER THAT SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENIED AND DISCLAIMED THE VERY EXISTENCE AND
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS VALIDITY OF THE MARCOS WILL.
DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION

Petitioner contends that respondents denied the existence of the will,
and are, therefore, estopped from claiming to be the rightful executors
thereof. Petitioner further claims that said actions clearly show that
respondents lack the competence and integrity to serve as officers of the
court.
Based on the foregoing, considering the nature of their opposition,
respondents cannot be held guilty of estoppel as they merely acted within
their rights when they put in issue legal grounds in opposing the probate
proceedings. More importantly, even if said grounds were later on overruled
by the RTC, said court was still of opinion that respondents were fit to serve
as executors notwithstanding their earlier opposition. Again, in the absence
of palpable error or gross abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the RTCs discretion.
IV.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT ITS ORDER OF JANUARY 11, 1996,
WHICH ADMITTED THE MARCOS WILL TO PROBATE
AND WHICH DIRECTED THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY IN SOLIDUM TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AS EXECUTORS OF SAID MARCOS
WILL, WAS BASED ON THE EVIDENCE OF THE
REPUBLIC ALONE.
The same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant
consideration.
V.
THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT BOTH PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE
OBSTRUCTED THE TRANSFER TO THE PHILIPPINES OF
THE MARCOS ASSETS DEPOSITED IN THE SWISS
BANKS.
The same are mere allegations which, without proof, deserve scant
consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are incompetent to serve as executors
of the will of Ferdinand Marcos
Ruling:
Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are
incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:
Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators. No person is competent to serve as executor
or administrator who:
xxxx
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties
of trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence,
or want of understanding orintegrity, or by reason
of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis Supplied)
The grounds for opposition by petitioner to the grant
of letters testamentary are: 1) want of integrity, and 2)
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner
contends that respondents have been convicted of a number
of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without
integrity, or at least, with questionable integrity.
An appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the action
taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an
executor or administrator unless positive error or gross
abuse of discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the
lower court the duty and discretion to determine whether in
its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor.
Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court
must evaluate the evidence presented or alleged by
petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification.
Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases
against respondent Imelda Marcos have already been
reversed
The CA also acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all
the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his
conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45.
It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered
respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his
income tax return.

The resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed and RTC Pasig ordered to
issue letters testamentary to Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand
Marcos II.

Authors Note:
Guys akong g-include dha ang tanan assignment of errors and below it ang
chika sa Supreme Court. Pued nana dli isulat ang kay for me isa ra ang main
issue. For reference lng na basin i-ask nya sa recits and to fully understand
the case. Relax lang..hehe.. #iwillneverforget(char lang!)
Order of Preference:
8. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
ORDER OF PREFERENCE
DOCTRINE : A VOID MARRIAGE MAY BE ATTACKED BOTH
DIRECTLY OR COLLATERALLY
FACTS
Elesio died intestate on December 2, 1992
On 1994, ELISE Quiazon represented by her mother Lourdes filed a
petition for letters of administration for the estate of Elesio at RTC
Las Pinas
Lourdes is the common law wife of Elesio and Elise is there child
Elise claims that she is the natural child
Elise also claims that Elesios marriage with AMELIA (WIFE) was
bigamous since Amelia had a subsisting marriage with another man
Amelia opposed the petition for the administration by elise
Amelia claims that Elesio was a resident of Tarlac , as stated in the
DeaTH CERTIFICATE and Las Pinas
Rule 73 Sec. 1 : in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death
Resides means actual residence which is different from legal
residence or domicile
Under Rule 73 , residence rather domicile is the significant factor
Even if the word domicile is used, it means residence
This rule is applicable in statutes fixing venues
RESIDENCE : the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode
HENCE, RTC LAS PINA is the proper venue
This is where the deceased stayed in his lifetime
Death Certificate is a proof of residence
But it is not binding to the court
There were sufficient evidences that the deceased resided in Las
pinas
One major factor is that ELESIO went to the court upon discovering
that AMELIA had a subsisting marriage with another man
Hence, it is impossible that Elesio still lived with Amelia in Tarlac
upon his death
ON the marriage of Elesio and Amelia
A marriage that is void ab initio may be attacked directly and
collaterally
The applicable rule if the Civil code and not the family code
Void marriage may be questioned even after death.
There is not prescription

RTC : ELISE is a compulsory heir

Granted the petition of elise
That the claim of Amelia is just a hearsay
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
That the marriage of elesio and Amelia was void
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
CA:
AFFIRMED IN TOTO Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
ISSUE(S) trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
1. WHERE SHOULD THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED BE granted:
SETTLED
2. Was (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
SC: if competent and willing to serve;
 (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may

be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters
of Administration must be filed by an interested person

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be

benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributes

RULING : RTCS DECISION AFFIRMED

9. Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY Ill, v ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTA Y,
G. R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
RESOLUTION
*This case is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision dated 16 June 2010,
directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent
Facts:
1.The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico)
and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein
respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner
Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio
I), who predeceased his parents.
2. Isabels parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in
domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel
Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was Eventually acquitted which in Turn
Emilio I filed a case of legal separation against his wife(Isabel) which the
court ruled that the marriage is null and void.
3. On 27 September 1993 Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita
4. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Cristinas estate
5. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that as thesurviving spouse of
the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedents estate;
and file a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on
the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina,
she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels
parents marriage being declared null and void.
6. However, in the original Decision, it was declared that Isabel and her
siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in
the estate of their legitimate grandmother
the decedent, Cristina.
7. Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Then Emilio II
filed and Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was betterequipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of
the decedent, Cristina
8. On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
9. The trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator
10. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix (Isabel)
11. On appeal by certiorari, The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the
appellate court. decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas
estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate based on the
grounds that Emilio III, as raised by Federico and Cristina (decedent) was
acknowledged by them as a grandchild, and that Emilio III is a legally
adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters
estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in
representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
12. In this MR, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals
Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a
legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Additionally she avers that Emilio III actions since his appointment as
administrator has caused damaged and prejudiced to the estate of Cristina,
hence she (Isabel) should be made the sole administrator of the Estate.
ISSUE: Whether Isabel is better Qualified to be an administrator of the
Estate?
Held: Yes. Isabel is Better Qualified to be an administrator of the Estate .
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. This order
of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.
Thus, the paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrators interest in the
estate and that the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate. In a number of cases, the SC have
sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of
the estate and those interested therein.
The court recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
decedent or rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment.
In this Motion for Reconsideration the SC zeroed in on Emilio IIIs
demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference
set forth in the Rules.
The collected Jurisprudential teaching enunciates that mere demonstration
of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested
person to coadministration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference
set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator
of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with
is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest next of kin, the
appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
Court and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
In the case at bar, based on evidence, the court took note of the following
considerations of the case: 1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing
animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other,
traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive 2.
Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III
working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the
decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof 3. Emilio III, for all
his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not
looked after the estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice
thereof.
In addition, the court said that there considerations do not warrant the setting
aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other
between Emilio III and Isabel Thus, Contrary to the assumption made in the
Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a
suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has
turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Isabel was able to prove that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator
of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the
subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as
evidenced by the following: 1. He did not give a complete inventory as
ordered by the probate court, 2. Emilio did not take action on certain orders
of the Probate court.
Although Emilio was able to refute in court, some of the accusations of
Isabel against him, as acting prejudicial to the estate, The SC has Not found
any clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted
properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and
which he claims to be knowledgeable about. The general denial made by
Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure
to make and return x x x a true and complete inventory which became
proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court
and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas
other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
Thus from foregoing circumstances , established by evidence, of Emilio IIIs
omission and inaction It speaks volumes of his unsuitability as administrator
as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the
estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the
protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent
Isabel have a deep aversion for each other Moreover as the facts of the case
prove that it is impractical, nay, improbable for Emilio III and Isabel to work
together, it would then be detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a
co-administrator (Emilio III) who has show an adverse interest of some kind
of hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, Immediately interested
in the said estate.
RULING:
Therefore the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Previous Decision is Modified that the Letters of Administration over the
estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan,.
Authors Note:
case #9. Suntay Resolution. To better understand the case read case No.
10
10. Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay
Aguinaldo-Suntay V. Conjuangco-Suntay G.R. No. 183053
June 16,2010
I. Relevent Facts:
1) On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
2) At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay.
3) Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot
three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita;
and Emilio II. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was
subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children
out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Ta edo (Nenita),
by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel
Santos, respectively.
4) Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever
since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses
Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child
of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I
and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and
Cristina.
5) Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and
Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City,
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren. It was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted
visits of her grandparents.
6) Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita
7) On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Federico filed
his opposition. Being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is
capable of administering her estate and he should be the one
appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded
legal preference in the administration.
8) After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings
amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999,
nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedents estate on his behalf.
9) The trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene
considering his interest in the outcome of the case. In the
course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
died. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001,
appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of
decedent Cristinas intestate estate.
10) Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III. The CA stated
that the respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin"
referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. Also
that jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the
Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother.
II. Issues relevant to the topic
1) In the appointment of an administrator of the estate under Sec.
6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, whether Art. 992 of The
Civil Code applies.
2) Under the undisputed facts where herein petitioner was
reared by the decedent and her spouse since infancy,
whether Art. 992 of The New Civil Code applies so as to bar
him from being appointed administrator of the decedents
estate.
III. Rulings of Supreme Court per issue
1) The SC stated that it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the
estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the
interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving
spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of
 the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
in the conjugal partnership." The reasoning that Emilio IIIs humanity.
nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and
rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
inapplicable to the case at bar. intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither
The order of preference is under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III
of Court is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts
from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
and circumstances of each case.19 Jurisprudence has long
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for
held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code
discretion of the trial court. 20 In the main, the attendant facts
that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a
descendants of a deceased.
joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship
principal consideration is the interest in the estate and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the
of the one to be appointed. The order of estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question
preference does not rule out the appointment of on who will administer the properties of the long deceased
co-administrators, specially in cases where justice couple has yet to be settled.
and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here. Authors Note:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Decision of First issue lang yata relevant sa topic. Just included second issue for
the CA is reversed and set aside. Letters of reference
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio III
and respondent Isabel.

2) Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate

succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the

presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said,
first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads
sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the
collaterals, always preferring those closer in
degree to those of remoter degrees, on the
assumption that the deceased would have done so
had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default
of anyone called to succession or bound to the
decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is in
accordance with his presumed will that his
property be given to charitable or educational
11. Tan v. Gedorio, Jr.
TAN V. GEDORIO
G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008
I. Relevant Facts
1. Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will.
2. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12.
Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition.
3. Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special
administrator praying that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim
(Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to the said motion arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since
they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contended further
that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who
was already acting as de facto administratrix of Gerardos estate
since his death.
4. On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed
commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto
administratrix. More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC,
acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve
pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the
directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
5. Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez
issued an Order appointing Romualdo as special administrator of
Gerardos Estate. Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one
appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of
the deceased but this was denied on July 17, 2003 by respondent
Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC
Executive Judge.
6. Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again
insisting on petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special
administratix. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Petition on 29
July 2004 as well as the motion for reconsideration on 6 December
2004.
II. Issue Relevant to the Topic
Whether or not petitioners should be given priority in the administration of
the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as
opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate
children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin,
whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of
administrator of the decedents estate.
III. Ruling of the Supreme Court
No, because it has been consistently ruled that the order of preference in
the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. The preference under the said rule for the next of kin refers to
the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable. The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can
pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit
of creditors and heirs.
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a
special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as
special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma
for the position of special administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided
against her appointment because of the documented failure of petitioner
Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a
considerable length of time which certainly militates against her appointment.
12. San Luis v. San Luis
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
Facts:
The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis,
who was previously the governor of the Province of Laguna. During
the lifetime of Felicisimo, he was married to three women. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit who predeceased Felicisimo. The
second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen,
who later obtained a decree granting absolute divorce before the
family court of Hawaii. The third marriage was with the respondent,
Felicidad Sagalongos, who he lived with for 18 years up to the time
of his death.
After the death of Felicisimo, the respondent sought for the
dissolution of their conjugal assets and the settlement of the estate.
A petition for administration was then filed before the RTC of Makati
City.
The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that respondent does not have legal capacity
to sue because her marriage with Felicisimo is bigamous and the
decree of absolute decree is not binding in the Philippines.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration
Held:
Respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or
Article 148 of the Family Code.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the
legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee
as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws
of the U.S.A. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce
and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation
or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
 effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the property regime
under this provision as follows: The regime of limited co-ownership
of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together
as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

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