Religion as a Subject for Sociology

Author(s): Andre Beteille

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, No. 35 (Aug. 29, 1992), pp. 1865-1870
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Religion as
Thesociologicalstudy of religionbringssharplyintofocus certaininterestingquestionsof approachand method
and a discussionof these is of widerinterestin the study of society as a whole, includingthe study of such sub-
jects as class, gender,nation, and, more generally,politics. Thereis, in particular,the issue of the comparative
advantagesof approachesthatfavour detachment,objectivityand value-neutralityas against those thatfavour
commitment,engagementand partisanship.
I pansion, furtherdifferentiationhas come in-
I WOULD like to use the presentoccasion
to discuss the sociological approachto the
study of religion. My purpose will be not
so much to present the principal findings
establishedby the sociology of religion as
to examine the subject from the point of
view of method. I believe that the socio-
logical study of religionbringssharplyinto
focus certain interesting questions of ap-
proachand method, and that a discussion
of thesemay be of widerinterestin the study
of society as a whole, including the study
of suchsubjectsas class,gender,nation,and,
moregenerally,politics. I havein mind par-
ticularlythe comparativeadvantagesof ap-
proachesthat favourdetachment,objectivity
and value-neutralityas against those that
favourcommitment,engagementand parti-
sanship.
Wecannot take it for grantedthat simply
-becausereligionexists, it will be considered
a suitablesubject for sociology by all con-
cerned.Some proponentsof the materialist
interpretation of historymighttreatit lightly
on the groundthat it can tell us little about
thebasicand hardrealitiesof economic and
politicallife; or, they might take it into ac-
count only insofar as it is implicated in
politics, say, in the form of communalism.
But others might deny a claim on it not
becausethey considerreligionunimportant
but becausethey consider it too important
a subject for sociology; that is sometimes
the case in societies governed by a strong
religiousauthority.
I havespokenof the sociologicalapproach
to the study of religion in the singular,but
onecan easilypoint out that thereareseveral
suchapproachesand not just one approach.
I wouldnot like to narrowthe scope of the
dicussion unduly,and wouldlike,moreover,
to take into account the works not only of
sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber
but also of social anthropologists such as
Radcliffe-Brownand Evans-Pritchard.
There are many differences among the
scholarsw1f work within the field of the
sociologyof religion.One has only to men-
tion together the names of Durkheim and
Weber,the two most prominent figures in
the field,to be remindedof thesedifferences.
The field has, moreover, expanded enor-
mously since their time, and, with this cx-
Economic and Political Weekly August 29, 1992
SPECIAL ARTICLES.
a Subject for Sociology
Andre Beteille
follows treat the two together.
to being. Some scholarshavedevotedthem- In drawingattentionto the varietiesof ap-
selves to the study of 'worldreligions' such proaches to the study of religion, it is not
as Christianity, Hinduism and Islam;I my intention to argue that there are or
others have studied religion among the should be rigid boundaries between dis-
simplest communities of hunter-gatherers, ciplines. Such boundariesdo not exist, and
pastoralistsand shifting cultivators.2There are neither.necessarynor desirable. David
havebeen evolutionists,functionalists,struc- Hume, who wrote incisively on religion,4
turalistsand many others among the socio- was not only a celebratedphilosopher but
logists who have undertakenthe study of also an historian. His contemporary and
religion. Nevertheless, certain common friend, EdwardGibbon wroteabout reliion
elementsof approachand method are taken mainly as an historian,5but what he wrote
for grantedwhen religionis made a subject is permeatedby philosophical and, indeed,
for sociology.Thesecommonelementsstand sociological insight. The Varieties of
out when we comparethe sociologicalstudy Religious Experience by William James is
of religionwith the studyof it in other bran- a landmark both in the philosophy and in
ches of learning. the psychology of religion.6Such examples
could be multiplied almost indefinitely.
II
It is easy enough to arrangethe various
Religion has been a subject of study and approaches on a continuum in such a way
reflectionfor a verylong timerThe sociology that one can pass from one approachto the
of religionis, by contrast,a veryyoung sub- next without any clear or noticeable break.
ject; or, if one prefers, a young branch of But it is necessaryalso to makedistinctions.
an old subject. It is necessaryto stress the I wouldlike to begin with the distinctionbet-
diversity of approaches to the study of ween normative and empirical-or, if one
religion in orderto highlight the distinctive prefers,judgmentaland non-judgmental-
featuresof the sociological approach to it. approaches to religious phenomena. The
The oldest branch of study devoted to theologianis concernedprimarilywith ques-
religion, and at least in the Christiantradi- tions of truth and rectitude in religious
tion by farthe most importantone for many beliefs and practices.Questionsof truthand
centuries, is theology. Divinity schools oc- rectitudedo not concern the sociologist in
cupied a prominentplace in medievalEuro- the same way; his primary concern is to
pean universitiessuch as Paris,Oxford and observe, describe,interpretand explain the
Cambridge,and continuedto do so until re- mannerin which religiousbeliefs and prac-
cent times. Theological studies have oc- tices operate. Ah important question from
cupiedan importantplace also in the Judaic the viewpoint of method, to which I will
and Islamic intellectual traditions. The returnlater,is how deeply it is necessaryto
theologicalapproachhas undergoneimpor- be concerned with questions of truth and
tant changes in the present century, parti- rectitudeif one is interestedin the descrip-
cularly in the west, but it stili retainsa cer- tion and analysis of religious beliefs and
tain identity,and, in its pureform,it presents practices. The same question arises with
the sharpestpossible contrast to the socio- regardto other systems of belief and prac-
logical approach to the study of religion. tice, and the answersthat we give to it must
Then, there is the philosophy of religion be consistent from one domain to another.
whichnow occupiessome of the groundheld The distinction between the normative
previouslyby theology. The philosophy of and the empirical orientations comes out
religion looks to theology on one side and most clearly in the coptrast between the
the psychologyof religionon the other. We theologicaland the sociological approaches
have also the very broad and assorted body to the studyof religion.It is no accidentthat,
of work that carriesthe label of the history historically,the sociological approachcame
of religions.3We come finally to the an- into its own with the decline of the theolo-
thropological and sociological approaches gical approach. So long as the study of
to the study of the subject; although they religion was governed by religious faith,
are treatedseparatelyby some, I will in what therecould be little room in it for sociology.
1865
The sociology of religion may in this sense
be regarded as the offspring of religious
scepticism and agnosticism, if not of
atheism.
In a symposium on sacrifice, conducted
jointly by anthropologistsand theologians,
the Jesuit priest M F C Bourdillon put it
thus, "When an anthropologist studies the
moral values of a culture or a society, his
aim is to try to understandthem indepen-
dently of the valuesof his own or any other
culture.. . It is, on the other hand,extremely
tare to find a Christiantheologianwho does
not hold that his disciplineis concernedwith
ideals for living.'7 The atmosphere of
religious discussion, particularly in the
Christianworld,has alteredenormouslybet-
weenthe end of the last centuryand the end
of the present,so that theologiansand social
theorists are more preparedto learn from,
or at least to listen to, each other. But this
should not lead us to obliteratethe distinc-
tion between an orientation to the subject
that is groundedin religiousscepticismand
one that is groundedin religiousfaith. This
distinction was presentedsharply from the
viewpoint of religious scepticismby Meyer
Fortes, one of the two editors of the sym-
posium volume.8
There are two important featuresof the
sociologicalapproachon which I would like
to make a few observations;both features
arecommon to sociology and social anthro-
pology. The first is the extensiveuse of the
comparativemethod; and the second is the
investigationof religious beliefs, practices
and institutionsin relation to other aspects
of society and culture.
The comparativemethod is centralto the
discipline of sociology and, as such, to the
sociology of religion. As Emile Durkheim,
one of the key figures in the subject, wrote,
"Comparative sociology is not a special
branchof sociology; it is sociology itself:'9
Radcliffe-Brown,who was a follower of
Durkheim,spoke of social anthropologyas
comparativesociology. This of course does
not mean that sociologistsdevotethemselves
only to comparisons between different
religioussystems. In fact, most sociologists
and social anthropologists spend most of
theirtime in makingdetailedgtudiesof par-
ticular religions, and both Durkheim and
Radcliffe-Brownare best known for their
case studies,of the AustralianAboriginesby
the first and the Andaman Islandersby the
second.'0 But the case studies do not stand
by themselves;they derivetheir significance
from the comparative perspective that is
characteristicof the discipline as a whole.
Both Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown
believed that the application of the com-
parative method would enable them to
discovergeneral laws about society and its
institutions, including its religious institu-
tions. They believed that sociology and
social anthropology could be developed in
the manner of the natural sciences. Their
strategywas to proceed in a systematicway
throughobservation,descriptionand com-
1866
parison to generalisation." Wenow have as
a result a large body of data on religious
beliefs and practices from all parts of the
world.
The accumulation of a large body of
systematic data from the different parts of
the world has certainlyadvancedour know-
ledge and understandingof religion, but it
has not led to the discoveryof the kind of
general laws that Durkheimand Radcliffe-
Brownhad hoped to discover.What then is
left of the comparativemethod? The com-
parative method remains of great value
because it forces a certain discipline that
does not come naturallyto us when we ex-
amine the varieties of social life. It forces
us to give equalconsideration,at least in cer-
tain respectsand for certainpurposes,to all
societies irrespective of our personal
engagements.In that sense, the comparative
method brings all societies on a level with
each other;it does not admitof any privileg-
ed exceptions.This goes againstour ingrain-
ed habits of mind when we are dealing with
human societies, and particularlywhen our
subject of study is religion. If fair-
mindednessis a virtuein the study of society
and culture, then the comparative method
is an indispensableaid in the cultivation of
that virtue.
Wehaveto distinguishbetweenthe aspira-
tions of the comparative method and its
achievements.Whereindividualor coilective
biases were thrown out by the front door,
they sometimes crept in through the back
door. For Durkheimand his generation,the
comparativemethodwenthand in hand with
a belief in the theory of evolution. Hence,
while all religions might be investigatedby
the same method, some were regardedas
more evolved or more elevatedthan others.
Webertoo differentiatedamong religionsac-
cording to their degree of rationalisation,
placing primitive magical practices at one
end and ProtestantChristianityat the other.
Evolutionary theories are no longer as
popular as in the past, but this does not
mean that personalor ethnocentricbias has
been completelyeliminated from the socio-
logical study of religion.
Theology standsat the opposite end from
sociology in its orientation to the plurality
of religions.At least in its classical form, its
concernwas witha particularreligionwhich
it singledout for specialattention:therewas
thus Christiantheology-and within it Pro-
testant theology and Catholic theology-
or Judaic theology or Islamic theology.
'Theology will defeat its original purpose if
it places all religionson the same plane, for
that purpose was to establish the truth of
one religionand expose the errorsof others.
The theologian wriz-s about religion from
within; it is difficult to think of a Christian
who is an Islamic theologian or a Hindu
who is a Christian theologian. Again, as
Bourdillonhas put it, "Theologiansare part
of the traditionthey study,and must be con-
vincedthat theirritualshavethe effects that
they want them to have."'2The sociologist,
Economic and Political Weekly August 29, 1992
on the other hand, approaches religions
from the outside even when he seeks to
understandtheir inner meaning.
A second important featureof the socio-
logioal approach is that it studies the facts
of religion in association with other social
facts. The sociological approach, as I
understandit, not only does not privilege
one's own religionas againstother religions,
it does not privilege the religious domain
among the various domains of social life.
In the sociological perspective, no matter
how important the religious life may be in
itself, it cannot be made fully intelligible
withoutbeing broughtinto relationshipwith
domesticlife, economiclife and politicallife.
The interconnections among the different
institutional domains is at the centre of
sociological attention.
The position is different for the theo-
logian. For him, the religiousdomain is pre-
eminent, in a way the only one that has real
significance.He is concerned,aboveall, with
the innermeaningof religionratherthan its
externalor institutionalmanifestationwhich
is what engages the attention of the socio-
logist. This does not mean that therecan be
no collaborationbetweenthe theologianand
the sociologist, which there has been, with
very fruitful results as in the case of Ernst
Troeltschthe theologianand Max Weberthe
sociologist.'3 That collaboration deserves
attention, for it brings to light not only the
differences of perspective, but also the
possibility of a reciprocityof perspectives.
Although their intellectual interests
overlapped, Weberstressed the differences
in orientationbetweenhimselfand Tloeltsch.
Despite his considerable erudition in mat-
ters relatingto Christiandoctrine, he spoke
of himself as a non-expert working at
second-hand,and of Troeltschas the expert
best equipped to provide an authoritative
view.14But he obviously believed that the
'non-expert'had an important part to play
in clarifying the relationshipof religion to
economy and society, and in examiningthat
relationshipcomparatively.He probablyfelt
that, as a sociologist, he could deal better
with non-Christianreligionsthan Troeltsch
whose expertiselay in the field of Christian
theology. Is
Weberalso took an interest in the prac-
tical side of religionthroughhis association
with the Evangelical-Social Congress. He
gave freelyof his time and counsel to Pastor
Naumannwho believedthat in Germanythe
reformof religioncould not succeedwithout
the reformof politics, and in particularthe
incorporation of the working class to full
citizenship. What these relationshipsbring
out is that thereare not only many kinds of
sociologists but also many kinds of theolo-
gians. Not all sociologists are militant
atheists or ostentatiously irreligious, and
Weber certainly was neither. Nor are all
theologians intransigent dogmatists, con-
cernedonly with the letterof the creed,and,
indeed,Tleltsch, who was a liberalfromthe
beginning, moved in mid-careerand on his
own choice from a chair in theology to one
in philosophy. The point is not that no
sociologistcan be a religiousbelieverand no
theologiana religiousskeptic,but that there
are characteristicdifferencesof orientation
betweensociologyand theologyas disciplines.
Sociological studies of religious beliefs,
practicesand institutions vary enormously
in scope and emphasis. Some are based on
the analysis of literarymaterialsrelatingto
largepopulationsoverlong stretchesof time;
othersare basedon directobservationof life
in small communities. Some deal mainly
with religiousphenomena;others deal with
them only insofar as they bear upon some
other aspect of life which is the primaryob-
ject of attention. There are studies of the
religious life of natural communities such
as the village or the tribe, and studies of
specificallyreligiousassociationssuch as the
church or the sect.
A good example of the sociological ap-
proach is the study of religion and society
among the Coorgs of South India by M N
Srinivas.6 The principal objective of the
book is to give a coherent account of a
system of religious beliefs and practicesin
its social context. As such, it begins with an
outline of social structureand then proceeds
to give an account of the ritualidiom of the
Coorgs. The central part of the book deals
with cults of the various social units, such
as household,villageand region,whichcon-
stitute the principal components of Coorg
social structurmThe book concludes with
some general observations on the relation-
ship between religion and society.
Srinivas later elaborated the distinction
betweenthe 'book-view'and the 'field-view'
of society. In terms of that distinction, his
workon the Coorgs gives us a field-viewof
Hinduism.Thereare innumerableaccounts
in the ancient, medieval and modern lite-
ratureof Hinduismthat tell us how religious
institutionsought to work. Srinivaswas less
interqted in discussing how they ought to
work than in showing how they actually
work. Such an account might be of con-
siderableinterest to a theologian, but it is
not one that the typical theologian would
himself writ
In studying religion, the sociologist or
social anthropologist tries to observe and
describehow people act as well as to under-
standand interpretthe meaningstheyassign
to theiracts. Thereare importantdifferences
of emphasis here. Durkheim, for instance,
believedin attdndingfirst and foremost to
the external, obs*vable characteristicsof
socal facts before attending to their inner
meanings.In muchthe same vein, Radcliffe-
Brownwrotein his Forewordto the book by
Srinivas,"Socialanthropologyis behaviouri-
stic in the sense that we seek to observehow
peopleact as a necessarypreliminaryto try-
ing to understand how they think and
feel" 7
Others have placed their emphasis else-
where~For Weber,it was always important
to enquireinto the meaningthe actorassign-
Economic and Political Weekly August 29, 1992
ed to'his action in every sphere of society:
what did it mean for the priest or the pro-
phet to choose and pursuea particularway
of life?And, beyondthat, what meaningdid
the world itself have from the viewpoint of
a given religion? At the same time, Weber
never neglected to compare and contrast,
with the maximumpossibledetachment,the
answers given to this question in different
religious traditions. He also examined
systematicallyand with the greatest possi-
ble carethe materialand other externalcon-
ditions associated with various religious
beliefs and practices.
Collaboration between sociologists and
theologians has never been free from pro-
blems since it is neververy easy to reconcile
the committed and the detached points
of view. Among radical social theorists,
Durkheimhas been representedas a conser-
vative who assigned too much importance
to religion.It is true that Durkheimassigned
greatimportanceto religionin social life and
rebukedhis empiricistcolleagues,particular-
ly in the Anglo-Saxon world, for treatingit
lightly.But for Durkheim,religionis impor-
tant not because it is true but because it is
useful, whereas for the theologian, the im-
portanceof religionlies in its truth and not
in its utility.
The Catholic church in France viewed
Durkheim'swork quite differentlyfrom the
way in which it has come to be viewed
among sociologists. His book was attacked
in a long reviewarticle by Gaston Richard,
entitled'DogmaticAtheismin the Sociology
of Religion' Richard maintained, "In the
end, it is incontrovertiblethat this sociology
of religion (ssodologie religieuse), as it is call-
ed, is incompatiblenot only with Christian
faith, but even with philosophical theism,
and indeed with any belief that recognises,
hypotheticallyat least, a divine personali-
ty."18Gaston Richardwas not a theologian,
but had begun his career as a member of
Durkheim's Annee sociologique circle. He
was, however, a believing Christian who,
though born in a Catholic family, had con-
verted to the Protestant faith. Many years
later, a similar attack against Durkheim's
sociology of religion was launched by
another former admirer, E E Evans-Prit-
chard. Evans-Pritchardhad in his religious
life travelled the same road as Gaston
Richard, but in the opposite direction is
father was a minister of the Prote tant
church, but he had found his faith by em-
bracing Catholicism.
One of the arguments of both Richard
and Evans-Pritchard wasthat Durkheimhad
overreachedhimself, that he was claiming
too much for his sociology of religion.
Evans-Pritchard,himself the author of one
of the finest anthropological monographs
on religion, addressedhimself to this very
difficult question at the end of his book.
After describing what the social anthro-
pologist is able to observe and how far he
is able to proceed towards an understand-
ing of the innermeaningof whathe observes,
he concluded, "Atthis point the theologian
takes over from the anthropologist" ;
But Evans-Pritcharddid not rest content
for verylong with the divisionof labourthat
he seemed to be proposing betweenanthro-
pology and theology at the end of his book
on Nuer religion. With the passage of time,
he became increasinglysceptical about the
contribution that social anthropology and
sociology could make to the understanding
of religion. In his Aquinas lecture,delivered
before a Catholic audience, he launchedan
attackon anthropologicalstudiesof religion,
accusing their authors of bad faith.2 A lit-
tle later, he repeated the same attack on
sociological theories of religion, accusing
Durkheimof havingroughlythe samnepers-
pective on religion as Marx and Engels.2'
Evans-Pritchard's later writings on
religionreveala verygreatanthropologistin
a very poor light. I allude to them not out
of ill-will, but in order to suggest that there
might be a possible connection betweenhis
increasingattachmentto the Catholic faith
and his growing disaffection with the
sociology of religion. His own early essay,
'Zande Theology' of 1936 was a masterly
demonstration of how such a meticulous
observer as the Dominican priest, Mgr
Lagae had arrangedhis ethnographicfacts
to fit a theologically convenient argument,
creatinga religiousdoctrine wherenone ex-
isted.22 He had begun from the position
that social anthropologistsand sociologists
must not claim that they can tell us every-
thing about religion; in course of time, he
found such claims as they were making to
be increasingly intolerable; in the end, he
cane veryclose to the position that they can
tell us nothing about religion in the true
sense of the term, or at least nothing of any
real value.
The sociology of religion always, and
perhaps necessarily,comes to grief when it
moves beyondits properempiricalconcerns
under the urge to decide on the truth or
otherwise of a religious doctrine. Whether
or not Ram was the ideal man; whether
Mohammed was a true or a false prophet;
and whether Christ died in vain or for the
redemptionof humankindarequestionsthat
are beyond the purview of the sociology of
religionin the sense givento it here.But that
does not meanthat it has nothing of interest
to say about the place of religion in man's
social life.
Ill
I now return to Max Weberand, in the
light of his work, make some generalobser-
vations on approach and method in social
enquiry. It is Max Weber's sociology of
religion, more than anyone else's, that has
lessons to offer for sociology as a whole
from the viewpoint of method.
Thereis somethingparadoxicalabout the
life and work of Max Weber,his concern
with meaningand understandingon the one
hand, and with objectivity and value-
neutralityon the other.Web%r had verylittle
patience for the kind of nlaturalscience of
1867
 socety that fascinatedDurkheim;he argued
untiringlyfor an interpretivesociology. He
produced an enormous body of work on
religion; yet he declared that he was "ab-
solutely unmusicalreligiously".23Surely,it
is not unreasonableto ask of a proponent
of iKterpretivesociology how far a person
who is religiously unmusical can go in the
interpretationof religion?
No one who declares himself to be reli-
giously unmusical can possibly claim that
he understandsthe whole of religion. But
is it necessaryfor the sociologist of religion
to make such a claim? That kind of claim
will be made only by those who maintain
that we must first grasp the whole-or the
totality-if we are to understandany of its
parts.Weber,it seemsto me, wouldbe deeply
mistrustful of such a claim. Most persons
in fact understandsome bits of life, but few
wouldclaim that they understandthe whole
of its inner meaning.
Wber's accountof himselfas "absolutely
unmusicalreligiously"has to be seen in the
light of the stand that he took on objectivi-
ty and value-neutrality.Value-neutralityin
the study of religion does not mean of
course that one ignores the part played by
valuesin social life; that would be quitecon-
traryto the spirit of interpretivesociology.
It only means that it should be possible, at
least in principle,to understandreligiousin-
stitutions, religious beliefs and religious
practicesfrom the outside, without becom-
ing personally committed to the values by
which they are sustained within a given
,religiousfaith. The understandingand inter-
pretationof, for example,Islamic,or Hindu,
or Christianinstitutionsdoes not requireany
moral commitment to the values of Islam
or Hinduism or Christianity.Or, as Weber
might put it, "One need not have been
Caesar in order to understandCaesar".24
Most contemporarysocialtheoristswould
probably agree that one does not have to
adhereto the tenets of a particularreligion
in order to understandthe institutions of
that religion:the workof Max Weberstands
as a living testimony to that. Indeed, they
would probablyrecommenda healthydose
of religious scepticism and detachment to
those who would makereligiona subjectof
sociology. The problem today does not lie
there, but elsewhere. If it is possible to
understand and interpret religious beliefs
and practices while being 'religiously un-
musical',is it also possibleto understandand
interpretpolitical processesand institutions
while being 'politically unmusical'? The
great debates in social theory that divide
those who subscribe to objectivity, detach-
ment and value-neutrality from those who
recommend commitment, engagement and
partisanship are today not about religion but
about politics. At the same time, the lessons
that social theorists learn from the study of
religion cannot be altogether without value
for the study of politics.
No matter what sociologists might agree
to abosutthe studyof religion,manyof them
1868
would question the advantageto be derived
from objectivity, detachment and value-
neutralityin the study of such secular sub-
jects as class,genderand nation.Theywould
say that it is only through commitment to
a specific set of moral values-and even a
specific political project-that true insight
into these problemscan be attained. Com-
mitment, according to their argument, is
desirable not only from the moral and
political, but also from the intellectualpoint
of view. The attemptto separate'methodo-
logy' from 'ideology',25they would say, is
both disingenuous and self-defeating.
The theoreticalfoundations of the argu-
ment for commitment in social enquiry are
to be found in the writings of Marx26and
certainMarxists,such as Lukacs,27Korsch2s
and Gramsci,29particularlyin regardto the
study of class. In all these writings, a kind
of privilegedplace is assigned to the 'view-
point of the proletariat'. The position
adopted there is that other representations
of bourgeois society are incomplete and,
hence,distortedand false;only the viewpoint
of the proletariatprovidesaccess to a com-
plete and, hence, historicallytrue pictureof
reality.
In an influentialessay designedto demo-
lish the foundations of 'value-free'social
science, Lukacsput forwardthe case for a
method whose central proposition was the
unity of theory and practice.30Similar
arguments were put forward at about the
same time by Korsch,Gramsciand others.3'
Their approach offered new insights into
class structure,consciousnessand ideology,
politics and a host of other subjects. More
than that, they put many of the proponents
of a value-freesociology on the defensive
with their far-reachingclaims about what
could be achieved, both theoretically and
practically,by the method they advocated.
Lukacsand others have maintained that
thereis no way in which true understanding
of social processes can be reached except
through an insight into the totality, an
insight that comes, moreover, only when
theory is combined with practice. Socio-
logistsand social anthropologistshavelearnt
to be wary of that kind of claim in regard
to the understandingof religion.Whyshould
they yield to its temptationsin regardto the
understandingof politics?
It can of coursebe said thatin the modern
world, politics is altogetherdifferent from
religion insofar as no one can remaintruly
indifferent to the demands of politics
whereasit is possible, and sometimes even
desirableto distance oneself from religion,
although that point of view will hardlyfind
favour with the theologian. The attack on
detachment,objectivityand value-neutrality
has often been made on the groundthat the
claims of theirproponentsaredisingenuous
since it is impossible in realityto be wholly
neutralon fundamentalpolitical questions,
and, therefore,those who profess to be so
are in fact promotinga particularcause or
a particular interest undernthe cover of
Economic and Political Weekly
neutrality.At the same time, I remain un-
convincedthat it is in principleeither easier
or more desirableto seek neutralityon mat-
ters of religious faith than on matters of
political ideology.
It is undoubtedlythe case that neutrality
does not come naturallyor effortlesslyto us
in the understandingand interpretationof
our own beliefs, practices and institutions.
Therefore to require or expect the in-
vestigator to 'treat social facts as things'
might indeed appear somewhat dis-
ingenuous. But that does not mean that the
effort itself to achieve neutrality is
misconceived. And if my argument is right,
it is here that the sociology of politics of the
nation, class and gender may have
something to learn from the sociology of
religion.
There are two lessons in particular to
which I would like to draw attention in con-
clusion. The first is that value-neutrality, no
matter how desirable in principle, is very dif-
ficult to achieve in practice, what is achiev-
ed being always incomplete. The exponents
of value-neutrality do not all assert that the
separationof fact and valueis easy to main-
tain in a consistentway;some do and others
do not. Here there appears to be a funda-
mentaldifferencebetweenwhat, for wantof
better terms, I will call 'scientific sociology
as against interpretivesociology. The ex-
ponentsof the former,amongwhom we may
include Durkheim,or at least the author of
The Rules of Sociological Method, tend to
treatthe problemlightlyand to suggestthat
anyonecan solve it providedhe has the right
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 'method' But the exponentsof interpretive for intellectual rigour. But the facts of
a certainadvantage,at least initially,in mak-
sociology do not in general take that view. religion and politics are different, and have
ing sense of symbols and processesthat are
They do not suggest that there is any sim- to be treated differently from the material
not immediately accessible to the external
ple recipefor success in the task which they facts investigated by the physicist or the
observer. But religion, politics and other
rther see as being constantly at risk. Max biologist. In dealing with them, as in deal-
aspects of social life are not merelymatters
W*be raisedand answeredthe generalques- ing with humanbeings generally,we haveto
of experience,they are also subjectsof doc-
tion as follows "Nor need I discuss further be governedby considertions not merelyof
trine A doctrineis not alwaysthe best guide
whetherthe distinction between empirical intellectual rigour but also of fairness.
to experienceand may indeedbe an obstacle
statementsof fact and value-judgmentsisto it. The virtue of defining objectivity as
'difficult' to make. It iS',32 Evans-Pritchardhad reason to castigate fairnessis most manifestin the comparative
his predecessorsto the extent that they, or study of religion.The Catholic anthropolo-
Not only is the prctice of detachment,
objecvity and value-neutrality at least some of them, appearto havedecid- gist has a right to demand of a person who
difticult, but
those who undertakeit ner achiee com- ed in advance that all religions are equally studiesCatholicismthat he should approach
false, for one might say that that too is a his subjectwith respect;but he spoils his case
pletesuccessin their endeavour.This is true
doctzine But the matterdoes not rest there, by being peevish in the face of attempts to
to less in regard to politics than it is in
for it is both complex and delicate What deal even-handedlywith the Geeta and the
regardto religion. It makes the proponents
of value-neutrlity permanentlyvulnerable
reWally disturbed Evans-Pritchardwas the Bible
to alleations of bad faith and duplicity.But
relativismthat followed from the successes Without any prejudiceto whit is due to
of comparativestudies of language, myth rigour and precision, I would like to stress
failureto achievecomplete success in prac-
tice cannot be a compelling reason for and religion. "This pointed to a relativism the perennialneed in social enquiry for ob-
discadisnga pplc HereI will quote what
in which Christianitywas not the one true jectivity as fairness. It is this need for
Maxime Rodinson, at one time a leading faith but just one religionamong others, all fairnessin presenting,or at least takinginto
Marxist intellectual, wrote at the end of
equally false"35He paid a back-handed account, different points of view that gives
his celebrated biography of the Prophetcompliment to Max Mueller for treading to socialenquiryits distinctivecharactel.The
Mohammed:-"But even if pure objectivity warilyon that ground, presumablybecause hardest part of self-discipline in social en-
is u in , it wouldbe a sophismto sug-
he did not wish to fall foul of the Bishop quiry is that which is due to the demand for
gest that it was necessary instead to beof Gloucesterwho had alreadycondemned fairness. For it is not simply that the same
deliberately partial:'33lb me it does not
attempts 'o put into competitionthe sacred subject appears different when observed
seem accidentalthat a Marxistchose to bebooks of India and the Holy Scriptures'".3 from different points of view, but, further,
objectiveratherthan partialwhen he made It should now be clear why I regardthe that the viewpoint of the observermust be
matter to be both complex and delicate. constantly matched with that of the actor.
religionthe subjectof his study;but Rodin-
While no one can hope to understandthe The sociologist can at best bring these
son was an exception, and not very typical
of his generation of Marxists. meaning and significance of a religious various points of view into the open, and
belief or practice unless he approaches his presentthe case for each one of them to the
The second lesson that we learn from the
subject with concern and sympathy, it is best of his ability. He can be candid about
sociology of religion is that sociology can-
neiververy easy to decide how much of the his own values;but he cannot set himself up
not providea complete pictureof the world
as a whole in terms of either fact or value
concern and sympathy is due to the desire as a judge wherequestionsof ultimatevalue,
for understandingand how much of it to the those of his subjects as well as of other
Hereagain, sociology standsat the opposite
fear of a bishop or some other religious observers, are at issues.
end from theology, at least in its classical
form. It is constantly at odds with all those
authority. Parallelswill not be difficult to
who represent the world as a unity and find from the domain of politics. While Notes
maintainthat there is a single key, within
studies of, say, the nation or the working
class undoubtedly benefit from a sympa- [This is a revised version of the O P Kaushik
their reach if not in their grasp, to both
understandingand action. As we haveseen,thetic concern for the subject, it sometimes Memorial Lecture delivered at Hindu CoUege
20, 1992. 1 am grateful
happensthat the concernand the sympathy in Delhi on February
sociologycan say somethingabout religious
to the college for inviting me to deliver the lec-
beliefs,practicesand institutionsin different
are mainly concessions to the demands of ture, and to Rabi Ray and Ramchandra Guha
places at different times, but very little, if
the state and the party. for their comments on an earlier draft of the
anything,as to whether it is better to be aBeing religiously unmusical is not the paper.]
Hindu, a Muslim or a Christian, a believer
same thing as being hostile or even unsym- I Max Weber is the most notable exponent.
or an unbeliever.Likewise,it can say some-
patheticto religion;beingscepticalaboutthe Apart from his well known The Protestant
thing about political processesand institu-
historical mission of the proletariat(or of Ethic and the Rse of Capitalism (London:
tions, but verylittle of practicalutility as to
oppressedminorities)need not depriveone Allen and Unwin, 1930), there are The
whetherit is betterto be a liberal,a conser-
of the capacity for concern and sympathy Religion of China (Glerscoe:The Free Press,
vative or a radical in politics. These latter
for their predicament. But sympathy and 1951),Ancient Judaism (Glencoe: The Free
questions may be the most importantones concernneed not lead to the adoptionof any Press, 1952), and The Religion of India
for a particularindividual at a particular
particular doctrine in either religion or (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).
point of time, but there is no social theory
politics. Again, if one asks if it is easy to 2 A R Radcliffe-Brown, The Andaman
that can tell him-which is the best political
combine sympathy and concern for one's Islanders, Cambridge, Cambridge Univer-
ideology just as there is none that can tell
subjectwith detachmentand objectivity,the sity Press, 1922; E E Evans-Pritchard,Nuer
hfrnwhich is the best religious faith. answer is that it is not. Religion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
I would not like my argumentto be con- The demand for objectivity in the social 3 This approach is well represented in the
strued to mean that a Catholic or a Com-sciences is most typically made in the name journal, History of Religions, published by
of intellectualrigour.lb treatsocial facts as
munistcannot be a sociologistor that he can the University of Chicago Press; see also
at best be a poor one.- A Catholic may thingsis to placeoneself on the same footing Mircea Eliadce,A History of Religious Ideas,
indeed have certain advantages when he with them that the physicistor the biologist Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982,
studies religion and a Communist when hesecures with respect to the facts that he or 2 vols.
she investigates.Here objectivity is viewed 4 David Hume, The Natural History of
studies politics, but it is necessaryto point
Religion, Stanford: Stanford University
out that these advantagescan be easilyabus-
as the separabilityof the investigatorfrom Press, 1957;Discourses Concerning Natwral
ed. It is not unlikely that those who have
the object of investigation,and the clearer Religion, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
dirc experience
of religionandpoliticshave the separation,the greaterthe presumedgain- Co., 1980.

Economic and Political Weekly August 29, 1992 1869

 S EdwardGibbon,A Historyof the Decline
and Fall of the RomanEmpre London:
Dent, 1910,especiay vol 2.
6 WilliamJames,The Varietiesof Religious
E.qprience,London:Macnillan, 1961.
7 M F C Bourdilon and M Fortes (eds),
Scrifce, London:AcademicBooks, 1980,
p4.
8 Ibid. pp v-xix.
9 EmileDurkheim, The Rulesof Sociogwic
Method,London: cmillan,1982,p 157.
10 Radcliffe-Brown, 7he An a Islanders
n 2 Emie Durkheim 7TheElementary
Form qf theReliguw Life,London:Alen
and Unwin 1915.
11 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociologial
Method,n 9; Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural
Scinc of Sockfy,Glene Th FreePress,
1957.
12 Bowudillou andFortes(eds) Sacrire, n 7,
p 6.
13 Wolfgsang J Mommsenand JurgenOster-
hamme (ed), Max WeberandhisContem-
poraris, London:Allenand Unwin,1987,
chapter15;see also MarianneWeber,Max
Weber.A Biography,New York: John
Wiey, 1975.
14 Mommsenand Osterhammel(eds), Max
Weber andHis Contemporaries, n 13,p 221.
15 Marane Webe,Max Weber,p 13, p331.
16 M N Srinvas,Religionand Societyamong
the Coorssqf SouthIndia,Oxford:Claren-
don Press, 1952.
17 Radciffe-Brown,'Foreword'in Srinivas,
Religion and Society, n 16. p vii.
18 GastonRicad, "Dogmatic Athism in the
Sociologyof Religon' in W E S Pickering
(ed), Durkheim on Religion, London:
Routledgeand KeganPaul, 1975,p 229.
19 Evans-Pritchard,
NuerReligion,n 2, p 322.
20 Evans-Ptchard,Essay in SocialAnthro-
pology, London:Faberand Faber,1962,
pp 29-45.
21 Evans-Pritchard,Theorie of Primitive
Religion,Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1965,
chapter3.
22 Evans-Pritchard, Essays in Social
Anthropology,n 20, pp 162-203.
23 In a letter dated February 19, 1909, quoted
m Marianne Weber,Max Weber, n 13,p 324,
he wrote,"It is true that I am absolutely
unmusical eligously and haveno needor
ability to erect any psychicedifiocs of a
redigi diat wihin nc Buta thomgh
self-examinationhas told me that I am
neither anti-relious nor irreligious".
24 Max Weber, Economy and Society,
Berkeley:Univsity of CaliforniaPress,
1978,vol 1, p S.
25 Here I use the term 'idology' in a broad
sene, foranattemptto givetheterma mor
pre n seeA Betalle,'Id ies:
Commitmentand Parsanship',L'Hom,ne
vol 17, nos 34, 1978,pp 47-67.
26 The most famouscxprsso of this view
is in 'Te Theseson Feuerbachb, writtenby
Marxin 1845,frst publishedby Engelsin
an editedformin 1888,and now available
in various editions.
27 G Lukacs, History and Class Con-
sciouse, London:MerlinPress, 1971.
.28 K Korsh, Marxismand Philosophy,New
obrk:MR, 1970.
29 A Orasci, Selectionsfrom the Prison
1870
Notebooks, New York: International sworth:Nnguin Books, 1973,pp 312-3.
Publishers,1971. 34 The argument has been made in the ps
30, Lukacs,Historyand ClassConxiousn, that a Marxistcannot or en -shouldnot
n 27, pticlarly the firs essay,'WhatIs be a sociologist. See for instanc, L
OrthodoxMarxism?' Goldmann,'Y a-t-il une sociolo ma-
31 Outsideof orthodoxMarxism,but always iste?'Lcstentpsmod^ no 140,October
sympathetic to it is Jean-PaulSartre,Sewch 1957.See also my 'Is Ther a Marxli A*-
for a Method, New York:Alfred Knopf, thropology?'in A Beteille,EwyshI Cern
1963. pwatiw Sodobg, Dehi: OxfordUn1veis-
32 MaxWbe, 7he MethodoloVof theSoil ty Press 1987.
Scinces, New York:The FreePress,1949, 35 Evans-Pritchard,Ewys in Social An
p9. thropology,n,20, p 35.
33 MaximeR n, Mohnmed, Harmond- 36 Ibid.
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