CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES

Diaz vs. Gestopa, 652 SCRA 434, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786 June 22, 2011

FACTS: Felicisima Diaz filed an unlawful detainer case before the MTC of Naga,
Cebu. Judge Gerardo Gestopa recommended the case for barangay conciliation,
pursuant to Section 408 (g) of the Local Government Code. Diazs counsel objected
and moved for mediation instead. Judge Gestopa concluded that since the subject
property is in Naga where Diaz resides, the case should be referred for barangay
conciliation. Diaz, on the other hand, claimed that she no longer resides in Naga and
is now actually residing in Dumlog, Talisay City, Cebu. Diaz moved for
reconsideration arguing that the referral of the case to the lupon is a violation of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. Judge Gestopa denied the motion. Diaz filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Gestopa for incompetence, gross ignorance
of the law, neglect of duty, and conduct unbecoming of a judge. Judge Gestopa
argued that the referral of the case to the barangay for conciliation was made in
good faith, to give way for the possible amicable settlement of the parties. The
Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Gestopa guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and procedure.

ISSUE: Is Judge Gestopa correct in referring the case for barangay conciliation?

DECISION: NO. While the last paragraph of Section 408 (g) apparently gives the
Court discretion to refer the case to the lupon for amicable settlement although it
may not fall within the authority of the lupon, the referral of said subject civil
case to the lupon is saliently an unsound exercise of discretion, considering that the
matter falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The reason is because the Rule
on Summary Procedure was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. The fact that unlawful
detainer cases fall under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus
deemed a matter of public policy. To do otherwise would ultimately defeat the very
essence of the creation of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Bacolod-Talisay Realty and Development Corp. vs. Dela Cruz, GR

No.179563, April 30, 2009

FACTS: Romeo de la Cruz was employed as an overseer at the Hacienda Gloria, a

farm owned and managed by petitioner Bacolod-Talisay Realty and Development
Corporation (BTRD). He was later dismissed on charges of payroll padding, selling
canepoints without the knowledge and consent of management and
misappropriating the proceeds thereof, and renting out BTRDs tractor for use in
another farm and misappropriating the proceeds thereof. De la Cruz filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against petitioners BTRD et al. De la Cruz claimed that
he received a letter informing him that he was being suspended for the next 30
days due to the said charges and that there was an ongoing investigation thereof
but he was not given reasonable opportunity to be heard. After 30 days, his wife
received a letter stating that he was terminated from the service on account of the
charges. While a confrontation about the matter was held before the barangay
council, no settlement was reached.

ISSUE: Was the proper procedure for dismissal observed?

NO. While the dismissal of respondent was for a just cause, petitioners did not
comply with the proper procedure in dismissing respondent. The letter of
suspension dated June 3, 1997 sent to de la Cruz did not comply with the required
first notice, the purpose of which is to apprise the employee of the cause for
termination and to give him reasonable opportunity to explain his side. The
confrontation before the barangay council did not constitute the first notice.
Hearings before the barangay council do not afford the employee ample
opportunity to be represented by counsel if he so desires because Section 415 of
the Local Government Code mandates that [i]n all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
his representatives, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by
their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

Pang-et vs. Manacnes-Dao-as, GR No. 167261, March 2, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Pang-et filed an action for recovery of possession of real property
before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province against the spouses
Manacnes. During the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective
counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action due to the refusal of the
Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence
that the case should go to court. Nevertheless, the MCTC ordered that the case be
remanded to the Lupon and for the latter to render an Arbitration award as required
under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. In compliance with the MCTC Order, the
Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on ordering petitioner to retrieve the land
upon payment to the spouses Manacnes.

ISSUE: Are the parties compelled to submit their dispute to arbitration before the
Lupon?

DECISION: NO. The disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy
before the Lupon, as they are free to find recourse in the courts. The object of the
KP Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings
voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties. In this case, there was clear
showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for
arbitration and even insisted that the case should go to court. Absent this voluntary
submission by the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement arrived at
effectively resolving the case. The only necessary pre-condition before any case
may be filed before a court is that there has been personal confrontation between
the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably
settle the dispute. The spouses Manacnes cannot be bound by the Agreement for
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any
agreement submitting the case for arbitration.

Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 155713, May 5, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Milagros Lumbuan leased a certain lot in Tondo, Manila to

respondent Alfredo Ronquillo. The parties also agreed that the leased premises will
be used exclusively for the respondents fastfood business, unless any other use is
given, with the petitioners prior written consent. However, respondent later used
the premises as residence without the petitioners consent. He also failed to pay the
10% annual increase in rent. Petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay
Chairmans office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The Barangay
Chairman then issued a Certificate to File Action. The petitioner filed against the
respondent an action for Unlawful Detainer before MeTC of Manila which ruled in
favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the RTC set aside the MeTC decision and
directed the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for
further proceedings and to comply strictly with the condition that should the parties
fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of the case will be remanded
to MeTC of Manila for it to decide the case anew. In the meantime, the parties went
through barangay conciliation proceedings as directed by the RTC of Manila. Again,
they failed to arrive at an amicable settlement prompting the RTC to remand the
case to the MeTC of Manila. The appellate court, however, dismissed the case for
failure to comply with the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangay
level. The petitioner alleges that the parties have gone through barangay
conciliation proceedings to settle their dispute as shown by the Certificate to File
Action.

ISSUE: Was there sufficient compliance with the required conciliation as a

precondition for filing the case in court?

DECISION: YES. There was sufficient compliance with the precondition. Section
412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a
complaint in court. Here, the Lupon/Pangkat Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat Secretary
signed the Certificate to File Action stating that no settlement was reached by the
parties. While admittedly no pangkat was constituted, it was not denied that the
parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The
efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, there was substantial compliance with
the law.

Quiros vs. Arjona, GR No. 158901, March 9, 2004

FACTS: Petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas filed with the office of the
barangay captain a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land located in San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Petitioners sought to recover from their
uncle respondent Marcelo Arjona their lawful share of the inheritance from their late
grandmother Rosa Arjona Quiros. An amicable settlement was reached between the
parties. By reason thereof, respondent Arjona executed an agreement which seeks
to convey one (1) hectare to petitioners. On the same day, another agreement was
executed by Jose Banda voluntarily surrendering to petitioners the land he is
cultivating. Petitioners filed a complaint with the MCTC with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the compromise agreement. However, the prayer was
denied for failure of the agreement to describe the subject property with certainty.
Petitioners submit that under Section 416 of the said Code, an amicable settlement
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of the court upon the expiration
of 10 days from the date thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been
made before the proper court. Since the amicable settlement had not been
repudiated or impugned before the court within the 10-day prescriptive period, a
writ of execution must accordingly be issued by the court.

ISSUE: Should a writ of execution be issued by the court considering that the
amicable settlement had not been repudiated within the 10-day period?

DECISION: NO. Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation is made during the
10-day period, the amicable settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes
the ministerial duty of the court to implement and enforce it. However, such rule
admits of certain exceptions. The imperatives of substantial justice, or facts that
may have transpired after the finality of judgment which would render its execution
unjust, may warrant the suspension of execution of a decision that has become final
and executory. In the case at bar, the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of
execution is issued considering the uncertainty of the object of the agreement. To
do so would open the possibility of error and future litigations.

Uy vs. Contreras, GR No. 111416-17, September 26, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde a portion of a

building in Makati, Metro Manila where she operated and maintained a beauty
parlor. Upon expiration of the contract, the petitioner was not able to remove all her
movable properties. Two days later, an argument arose between the petitioner and
Atayde which degenerated into a scuffle between the two. The private respondents
later sustained injuries inflicted by the petitioner. The private respondents later filed
a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati. The confrontation of
the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said
date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the
confrontation to 26 May 1993. On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the
petitioner with the MTC of Makati. The petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity
of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings.
Moreover, there was still an ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner
at the barangay level. Petitioner moved to dismiss the said criminal cases for non-
compliance with the requirement of prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Respondent Judge Maximo Contreras of the MTC of Makati denied the motion
considering that the complainants may go directly to the court where their
complaint is about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to
Section 6 of PD 1508.
ISSUE: Was there premature filing of the criminal cases and thus should have been
dismissed?

DECISION: YES. No complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with
the MTC of Makati in view of the private respondents failure to appear at the first
scheduled mediation on April 28 1993 for which the mediation was reset to May 26
1993. Thus, the filing of the two criminal cases on May 11 1993 with the said court
was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to
dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 which states that the parties may go directly to court
where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, pursuant to paragraph (c),
Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from the time when the private respondents filed
their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

Felizardo vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112050, June 15, 1994

FACTS: Private respondent Nemesio Jose filed an action for ejectment with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioner Quintin Felizardo before the MTC of Olongapo City. Petitioner averred that
the private respondents allegations were utterly false and intended only to evade
the requirements of P.D. 1508 for prior barangay conciliation. Petitioner questioned
the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the private respondents cause of
action for non-compliance with the said decree. Subsequently, the MTC rendered
judgment against the petitioner. The petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. That court
issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Later, however, on October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the
ground that certiorari with injunction was not the proper remedy of the petitioner,
appeal being then still available to him.
ISSUE: Did the Municipal Trial Court commit an error of judgment in continuing to
act on the case despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation?

DECISION: YES. When the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it could act on the
complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent even without prior barangay
conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. We have held in many cases that while the referral of a case to the
Lupon Tagapamayapa is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court,
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already
acquired over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant. Hence, the
remedy available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the court a quo in
an ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special action for certiorari.

Candido vs. Macapagal, GR No. 101328, April 7, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners Emiliana and Francisca Candido are the only legitimate children
of spouses Agapito Candido and Florencia Santos. However, petitioners father
eventually left his legitimate family and lived with Sagraria Lozada until his death.
Sagraria Lozada, Jorge Candido, Virginia Candido, Maximina Candido and Eduardo
Candido who represented themselves to be the sole heirs of the late Agapito
Candido executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale covering
parcels of land owned by the latter and sold to private respondent Mila Contreras in
whose name said properties are now registered. Petitioners sought to annul the
Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale and to cancel the title issued in
the name of private respondent Contreras before the RTC of Bulacan. Private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioners failed to
comply with the mandatory conciliation process required under P.D. No. 1508 as she
resides in the same municipality with the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the
case on the said ground. Petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent judge considering that the other defendants in the civil case reside
in different municipalities and cities.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners compulsorily required to comply with the mandatory
conciliation process despite that the other parties reside in different municipalities
and cities?

DECISION: NO. Barangay conciliation not required where other parties reside in
barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces. The fact that petitioners
and private respondent, reside in the same municipality of Obando, Bulacan does
not justify compulsory conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 where the other co-
defendants reside in barangays of different municipalities, cities and provinces.
Hence, petitioners can immediately file the case in court. It would not serve the
purpose of the law in discouraging litigation among members of the same barangay
through conciliation where the other parties reside in barangays other than the one
where the Lupon is located and where the dispute arose.
Boleyley vs. Villanueva, GR No. 128734, September 14, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Angel Boleyley filed with the RTC of Baguio City, a complaint
against private respondent Albert Surla for collection of a sum of money. Private
respondent Albert Surla filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that petitioner did not comply with the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law requiring as a condition for the filing of a complaint in court
referral of the matter to the barangay lupon chairman or the pangkat, for
conciliation or settlement. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that private
respondent was not a resident of Baguio City so that the dispute involving the
parties was not within the authority of the lupon to bring together for conciliation or
settlement. The trial court dismissed the case for being premature, for not having
been referred to the barangay lupon.

ISSUE: Is petitioner bound to refer the dispute to the barangay lupon or pangkat for
conciliation or settlement before he could file an action for collection with the RTC?

DECISION: NO. In the complaint filed by petitioner, he indicated that the defendant
has his postal office address at C-4 Ina Mansion, Kisad Road, Baguio City. The
complaint clearly implies that the parties do not reside in the same city or
municipality, and hence, the dispute is exempted from the requirement of referral to
the barangay lupon or pangkat for conciliation or settlement prior to filing with the
court. In other words, there is no need of prior referral of the dispute to the
barangay lupon or pangkat in the absence of showing in the complaint itself that
the parties reside in the same city or municipality.

Gegare vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83907, September 13, 1989

FACTS: Both petitioner Napoleon Gegare and private respondent Paulino Elma filed
an application for Lot 5989 located at Dadiangas, General Santos City before the
Board of Liquidators. Subsequently, the Board passed a resolution approving a
recommendation to divide the lot equally between the parties. However, petitioner
filed an action for Annulment and Cancellation of Partition of Lot 5989. Private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others,
that there was lack of conciliation efforts pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508. Petitioner argues that the provision is not applicable in said case
for one of the parties therein is the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof (Section 408) which is exempted from this requirement.

ISSUE: Are the parties exempted from mandatory conciliation?

DECISION: NO. The Board is a government instrumentality but the petitioner and
private respondent who are also contending parties in the case are residents of the
same barangay so Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Section 412) should
apply to them. When the government or its instrumentality is only one of the
contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other
parties. The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their
differences amicably. If the other only contending party is the government or its
instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only
one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the
other parties.

Galuba vs. Laureta, GR No. 71091, January 29, 1988

FACTS: Alfredo and Revelina Laureta ceded to petitioner Henry Galuba all their
rights and interests over a house and lot located in Quezon Hill, Baguio City for
P70000. When P18000 of the balance remained unpaid, the parties brought the
matter before the barangay captain of Victoria Village in Baguio City. The parties
entered into an amicable settlement whereby they agreed that the P18000 would
be paid in monthly installments. A month later, petitioner discovered that the house
he had bought was encroaching on the adjoining lot. Consequently, he filed an
unsworn complaint before the barangay captain of Victoria Village for the
annulment of the amicable settlement alleging therein that his consent to said
settlement had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. Petitioner later filed in the RTC of
Baguio City a complaint for the annulment of the amicable settlement with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining order. The Lauretas filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that in praying for a restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner wanted to circumvent the
mandatory provisions of P.D. 1508. The Lauretas averred that without the petition
for preliminary injunction, the dispute between them was subject to amicable
settlement. Lauretas also added that the petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable
settlement. The lower court granted the motion to dismiss ruling that there is no
authorized judicial procedure under P.D. 1508 for the annulment of an amicable
settlement. Petitioner argued that the 10-day repudiation period having expired, he
was left with no recourse but to file the action for nullification in court. He insists
that the provision of the Rules of Court supplements the deficiency of P.D. 1508.
Thus, his remedy against an executory amicable settlement which by analogy is a
final judgment is an action to annul it.

ISSUE: Are the parties compelled to undergo amicable settlement before filing a
complaint in court?

Did the petitioner successfully repudiate the amicable settlement?

Can the RTC annul the amicable settlement?

DECISION: YES. Conciliation process at the barangay level is a condition precedent

to the filing of a complaint in court and non-compliance with the condition
precedent affects the sufficiency of plaintiffs cause of action and makes his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity.
NO. Petitioner failed to repudiate the amicable settlement within the 10-day period
since the parties entered into said amicable settlement on February 10, 1984 and
yet it was only on July 27, 1984 when petitioner repudiated it through an unsworn
complaint for its annulment. Once the parties have signed an amicable settlement,
any party who finds reasons to reject it must do so by filing a sworn statement of
the repudiation with the barangay captain. Any party who fails to avail himself of
the remedy must face the consequences of the amicable settlement as he can no
longer file an action in court to redress his grievances.

NO. PD 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for annulment of an amicable
settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court
annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has
repudiated the settlement since repudiation is a pre-condition to the filing of a
complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa.
Moreover, the petition for nullification under Sec. 11 of PD 1508 refers to an
arbitration award and not to an amicable settlement.

Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-59495-97, June 26, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Gonzales is the owner of an apartment located in

Caloocan City. Three doors were leased to the private respondents for less than
P200.00 a month in rentals. The petitioner filed three separate complaints for
ejectment against the private respondents in the City Court of Caloocan City for he
was in need of the premises for the use of his married children who do not allegedly
have residences of their own, which is a ground for ejectment under the provisions
of Batas Blg. 25. The City Court rendered judgment ejecting the private
respondents. They appealed to CFI of Rizal which affirmed the trial courts decision.
Private respondents further alleged before the CA that the petitioner did not comply
with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508. The CA dismissed the cases on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the City Court for failure of the petitioner to avail
himself of the barangay conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508
prior to filing the complaint in court.

ISSUE: Does PD 1508 confer jurisdiction in the Lupong Tagapayapa?

NO. Conciliation process under PD 1508 is not jurisdictional because PD 1508 does
not vest jurisdiction in the Lupong Tagapayapa, which does not decide cases but is
vested only with conciliation functions. Jurisdiction is conferred by Batas Blg. 129
and the Judiciary Act of 1948. Non-compliance with the condition precedent under
PD 1508 does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its
power of adjudication over a case where defendants failed to object to such exercise
of jurisdiction.

Vda. De Borromeo vs. Pogoy, GR No. 63277, November 29, 1983

Same; Same; Same; PD 1508 or Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Conciliation
process at the barangay level condition precedent for filing actions in
applicable cases under PD 1508; Failure of complaint to allege compliance
with the requirement of referral of case first to the barangay courts under
PD 1508, fatal.While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of
December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint
in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508.
Neither did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation
of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying upon the pro tanto presumption of
regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to our
mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that
there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary
attached to the complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and phrases; Word "individual" in Section 4a
of PD 1508 applies only to cases involving natural persons.Be that as it
may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508,
referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties
thereto are "individuals". An "individual" means "a single human being as
contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to
cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical
person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate,
estate, etc.

Pascual vs. Pascual, 475 SCRA 268

Actions; Katarungang Pambarangay; Where the parties are not actual

residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is
no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon.In the 1982
case of Tavora v. Veloso, this Court held that where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no
requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section
6 vis--vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). [B]y
express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over
disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality,
except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.

Same; Same; Parties; To construe the express statutory requirement of

actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-
plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of real party in interest; Where
the plaintiff is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant
resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior
referral to it for conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.To
construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate
the meaning of a real party in interest as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Court vis--vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted
but misread and misunderstood by respondent. In fine, since the plaintiff-herein
petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where
the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over
their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its
filing in court.

Magno vs. Velasco-Jacoba, 475 SCRA 584

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Local Government Code

(LGC) of 1991 [R.A. No. 7160]; Katarungang Pambarangay; Section 415 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) clearly requires the personal appearance of
the parties in katarungang pambarangay conciliation proceedings,
unassisted by counsel or representative; There can be no quibbling that
laymen of good will can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance
of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse
issues.Section 415 of the LGC of 1991, on the subject Katarungang
Pambarangay, provides: Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person.In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without
the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents
who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. The above-quoted
provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative.
The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to
secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, the exception
being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling
that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers
whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the
participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal
knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the Sumbong was addressed to the
barangay captain instead of the lupong tagapamayapa is of no moment
since the barangay captain chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.The
prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings
was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section
415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the
barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is
specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her
Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice.
That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment
since the latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition in Section 415 of the Local
Government Code (LGC) applies to all the katarungang barangay
proceedings.Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all
katarungan barangay proceedings. Section 412(a) the LGC of 1991 clearly provides
that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As
what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes
between the two parties.