Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, Jr.: Supreme Court Rules on Extradition and Right to Bail

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr.
G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007. *
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON.
FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, respondents.
International Law; Extradition;Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this

jurisdiction.Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question
of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
Same; Same; Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.At
first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of
the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually
attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the
international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance
the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the
primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human
rights.Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of
international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half
of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in
the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of
the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These sig-
_______________
*
EN BANC.
471
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

71
nificant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process;Universal Declaration of Human

Rights;International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; While on a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Universal Declaration of Human Rights are now recognized
as customarily binding upon the members of the international community; Fundamental
among the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are
the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.On a more positive note, also
after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and
importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a
treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as
customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus,
in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951), this Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in
that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly
also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines
signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While this Court in Government of the United States
of America v. Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 (2002), limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a
reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.The Philippines, along with
the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined
in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those
472

72 ANNOTATED
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court
in Purgananlimited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
inPurganan is in order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court
sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition casesclearly, the right
of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights.In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration, 90 Phil. 256 A(1951), this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no
formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an
order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal
declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be
granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked
in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee
to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a
foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender
473
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

73
him to the demanding state.Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government. Extradition has thus been
characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or
convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose
of trial or punishment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is

characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
the machinery of criminal lawobviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.But while extradition is not a
criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of
liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also the machinery of criminal law. This is shown by
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve
the interest of justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case
of urgency to ask for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition; and that release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-
arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is
474

74 ANNOTATED
received subsequently. Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to
the demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should
be reasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; By any standard, detention for an extended period of more
than two (2) years is a serious deprivation of a potential extraditees fundamental right to
liberty; While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to
due process under the Constitution.Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial
court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two
(2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In
fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to
grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The applicable standard of due process,
however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedingsin the latter, the standard
of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused, in the former, the
assumption is that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice; The prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in
criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this
major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee.
This is
475
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

75
based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she
is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of
pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations,
the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process; An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.The time-honored principle of pacta
sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply
with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty,
and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Standard of Proof; An extradition proceeding being sui
generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of
evidence in civil casesthe potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing proof
that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases
nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative
in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion inPurganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
476

76 ANNOTATED
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed clear and
convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
presented evidence to show that he is not aflight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Hon. Secretary and the State Prosecutor for petitioner.
Agabin, Versola, Hermoso, Layaoen and De Castro Law Office for private
respondent Juan Antonio Muoz.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 9995773. These are: (1) the Order
dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post
bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said
Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ),
petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is
no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
477
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 477
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
Colony of Hong Kong signed an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons. It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and
became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three
(3) counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent, in violation of Section
9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the
common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then
forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of
private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained
him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the
Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the
Order of Arrest void.
478
ANNOTATED
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of
the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of
private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 9995733, raffled off to Branch 10,
presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed in
the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high flight risk.
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing
Civil Case No. 9995733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent
judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties.
The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will
at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;
479
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 479
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if
they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further
desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from
his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order,
but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and
that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones
liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not
be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetuawhen evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
480
ANNOTATED
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of
whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan,Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
1
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on
bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is available only in criminal
proceedings, thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail
quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not
apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt (De la
Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows
that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the
rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be
noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings
for the aforementioned offenses. It can
_______________
1
G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, 664.
481
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 481
not be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the
growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the
20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now
being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty
of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly,
the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international
law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international
law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of
the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II
resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts
characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes
against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have
been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the
former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations
and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10,
1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental
rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles
contained in
482
ANNOTATED
the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the
members of the international community. Thus, inMejoff v. Director of
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that
2
under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are
3
part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed
and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purgananlimited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the
_______________
2
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
3
Sec. 2, Art. II states The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
483
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 483
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have 4
likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the
right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in
this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
5
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was

granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that To refuse him bail is to treat him as a
person who has committed the most serious crime known to law; and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used is the
machinery of criminal law. Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to
deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons andChirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this
6 7
Court ruled that foreign nationals

_______________
4
In cases involving quarantine to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, bail is not available.
See State v. Hutchinson, 18 So.2d. 723, 246 Ala. 48; Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So.2d. 267, 153 Fla. 571, Baker v.
Strautz, 54 NE2d. 441, 386 lll. 360.
5
12 Phil. 490 (1909).
6
Supra, footnote 2.
7
90 Phil. 256 (1951).
484
ANNOTATED
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court
in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the
detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply
for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created
by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its
territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him
to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceed-
8
_______________
8
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 US 276, 78 L. Ed. 315, 54 S. Ct. 101; Terlindon v. Ames, 184 US 270, 46
L.Ed. 534, 22 S.Ct. 484; Fong Yue Ting v. US, 149 US 698, 37 L.Ed. 905, 13 S.Ct. 1016; Fitzpatrick
485
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 485
ing. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
9
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition. It issui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
10
treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the

11
guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil
12
action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to 13
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his
return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the

following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee
and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the
machinery of criminal law.This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused if such will best serve the interest of
justice. We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state in case of
urgency to ask for theprovisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition; and that release from provisional
_______________
v. Williams, 46 F2d. 40; US v. Godwin, 97 F. Supp. 252, affd. 191 F2d. 932; Dominguez v. State, 234 SW
701, 90 Tex. Crim. 92.
9
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.
10
US ex rel Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F2d. 955, cert den. 273 US 969, 71 L. Ed. 883, 47 S. Ct. 572.
11
State v. Chase, 107 So. 541, 91 Fla. 413; State v. Quigg, 108 So. 409, 91 Fla. 197.
12
Benson v. McMahon, 127 US 457, 32 L. Ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F2d. 547,
stay den. 314 F2d. 649.
13
Spatola v. US, 741 F. Supp. 362, Affd. 925 F2d. 615.
14
Re Henderson, 145 NW 574, 27 ND 155; State ex rel Tresoder v. Remann, 4 P2d. 866, 165 Wash. 92.
486
ANNOTATED
arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently.
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. Temporary detention may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention
should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and
remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2)
years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a
right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that
in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the
presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is
from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail
arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind
the issuance of the arrest warrant and the temporary detention is the possibility
of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
15
thus
_______________
15
Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1.
487
VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 487
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a
setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate
Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed clear and convincing evidence
should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
trial court to
488
ANNOTATED
determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of clear
and convincing evidence.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
clear and convincing evidence. If not, the trial court should order the cancellation
of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez,Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,Azcuna, Chico-
Nazario, Tinga, Garcia,Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, case remanded to trial court.

Notes.A judge issuing a warrant for the provisional arrest of an extraditee may
rely on the request for provisional arrest accompanied by facsimile copies of the
outstanding warrant of arrest by the requesting government, a summary of the facts
of the case against the extraditee, particulars of his birth and address, and
intention to request his provisional arrest and the reason therefore. (Cuevas vs.
Muoz, 348 SCRA 542 [2000])
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable. (Government of the United States vs.
Purganan, 389 SCRA 623 [2002])
Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (Rodriguez vs.
Hon. Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Br. 17, 483 SCRA 290 [2006])
o0o
489

Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, Jr.: Supreme Court Rules on Extradition and Right to Bail

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Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, Jr.: Supreme Court Rules on Extradition and Right to Bail

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470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

International Law; Extradition;Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this

VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process;Universal Declaration of Human

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

Same; Same; Same; Same; While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

VOL. 521, APRIL 19, 2007 4

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

likewise been detained.

deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was

Court ruled that foreign nationals

treaty obligations between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the

action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to 13

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the

Petition dismissed, case remanded to trial court.

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