LegPhilo Midterms Digests

San Beda College Alabang Legal Philosophy Atty. John R.
Jacome
I. What is Law?
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for
the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length
of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President
issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed
inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating
the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The
Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals
of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of
the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim
National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and
the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
1
Page
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal
Contributors:
Accad, Canones, Cordero, Ignacio, Narvasa, Padilla, & Santuyo
San Beda College Alabang Legal Philosophy Atty. John R. Jacome
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in
a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments,
written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law
shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution
itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence
a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power
has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he
was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as
the legislature.
LegPhilo:
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such
act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
UK vs. ALBANIA
1994 I.C.J. 4
Facts:
On 22 October 1946 in the Corfu Strait, two British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters
and suffered damage, including serious loss of life. On 22 May 1947, the Government of the United
Kingdom filed an Application instituting proceedings against the Government of the People's Republic of
Albania seeking a decision to the effect that the Albanian Government was internationally responsible for
the consequences of the incident and must make reparation or pay compensation. Albania, for its part,
had submitted a counter-claim against the United Kingdom for having violated Albanian territorial waters.
On 9 April 1949, the Court found that Albania was responsible for the explosions and for the resulting
damage and loss of human life suffered by the United Kingdom. The Court also found that the later
minesweeping by the United Kingdom had violated Albanian sovereignty. On 19 December 1949, the
Court ordered Albania to pay the United Kingdom.
2
Page
Issue:
Contributors:
Are international obligations in time of peace created through elementary consideration?
Held:
Yes. International obligations in peace time are created through elementary consideration. Every
state has an obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states.
LegPhilo:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of
force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the
present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still
less inadmissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be
reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of
international justice itself.
MARBURRY vs. MADISON

5 US (1Cranch) 137
Facts:
Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure
Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees.
Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of
Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the
Senate the day before President Jeffersons inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marburys,
were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State
James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme
Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
Issue:
Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?
Held:
No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
As the President signed Marburys commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made,
and Marbury has a right to the commission. Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the
president to deliver Marburys commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive
actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct
an officer of the government to do a particular thing therein specified, mandamus is the appropriate
remedy, if available to the Supreme Court.
To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case)
3
outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

Page
Contributors:
Discussion:
The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes the
traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it
also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of
the federal government.
LegPhilo:
The government of the United States had been emphatically termed a government of laws and
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right. If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must
arise from the peculiar character of the case.
PEOPLE vs. POMAR

G.R. No. L-22008 November 3, 1924
Facts:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to
La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the
City of Manila. under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her
pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before
and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to
pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar
appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed
police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in
factory, shop or place of labor of any description, and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable
support for one month before and one month after their delivery.
Issue:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police
power of the state.
Held:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and
public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in
the growth of public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that
power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express
4
inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended
Page
and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.
Contributors:
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the
employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will
hardly be contended that the person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
labor, who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty
days during which no services were rendered.
LegPhilo:
The constitution or the law of the people of a state is the supreme law of the land. The police
power of the state cannot be exercised in contravention of the inhibitions of the constitution. Neither
public sentiment, nor a desire to ameliorate public morals of the people of the state will justify the
promulgation of a law which contravenes the express provision of the fundamental law of the people.
Amendments to the constitution must first be made.
A definition of the police power of the state must depend upon the particular law and the
particular facts to which it is to be applied. The many definitions which have been given by the highest
courts may be examined, however, for the purpose of giving us a compass or guide to assist us in arriving
at a correct conclusion in the particular case before us. Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest
expounders of the common law, defines the police power as the due regulation and domestic order of
the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to
conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to
be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.
Mr. Jeremy Bentham, in his General View of Public Offenses, gives us the following definition:
police is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or of calamities. Its
business may be distributed into eight distinct branches: (1) Police for the prevention of offenses; (2)
police for the prevention of calamities; (3) police for the prevention of endemic diseases; (4) police of
charity; (5) police of interior communications; (6) police of public amusements; (7) police for recent
intelligence; (8) police for registration.
ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE

43 PHIL 43
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5,
1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand,
by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong
Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who
alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her
daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly complete.
He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las
mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according
to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest)
Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the
5
Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was
Page
the father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom
complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.
Contributors:
The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga. The trial judge reached the
conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent was not sufficient. Cheong Seng Gee
should share in the estate as a natural child. On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion
that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved, but, under
the laws of the Philippine Islands, it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang
and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions,
was that there should be a partition of the property of thedeceased Cheong Boo between the natural
children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia. Thus, both parties appealed.
Issue:
Is the marriage performed according to the Mohammedan Religion valid?
Held:
Yes. A marriage performed according to the rites of Mohammedan religion is valid. We regard the
evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage. We regard the
provisions of section IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of
the Mohammedan religion.
The particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No
marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid
for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated
with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully
married." There is nothing in the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law which would restrict
it to Christian marriages. There is nothing in the curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law
which would restrict it to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities.
Section IX of the Marriage Law, analyzed and found to validate marriages performed according to the
rites of the Mohammedan religion.
In relation to Legal Philosophy:
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by
legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right
to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid
marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
ASIA BREWERY VS. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
FACTS:
On September 15, 1988, San Miguel Corporation (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery
Inc. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and unfair competition on account of the latters BEER PALE
PILSEN or BEER NABEER product which has been competing with SMCs SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN
for a share of the local beer market.
6
ISSUE:
Page
Whether or not there is unfair competition
Contributors:
Held:
NO. Our decision in this case will not diminish our ruling in Del Monte Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals and Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries, 181 SCRA 410, 419,3 that: x x x to determine
whether a trademark has been infringed, we must consider the mark as a whole and not as dissected. If
the buyer is deceived, it is attributable to the marks as a totality, not usually to any part of it. That ruling
may not apply to all kinds of products. The Court itself cautioned that in resolving cases of infringement
and unfair competition, the courts should take into consideration several factors which would affect its
conclusion, to wit: the age, training and education of the usual purchaser, the nature and cost of the
article, whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also the conditions under which it is
usually purchased The Del Monte case involved catsup, a common household item which is bought off
the store shelves by housewives and house help who, if they are illiterate and cannot identify the product
by name or brand, would very likely identify it by mere recollection of its appearance. Since the
competitor, Sunshine Sauce Mfg. Industries, notonly used recycled Del Monte bottles for its catsup
(despite the warning embossed on the bottles: Del Monte Corporation. Not to be refilled.) but also used
labels which were a colorable imitation of Del Montes label, we held that there was infringement of Del
Montes trademark and unfair competition by Sunshine. Our ruling in Del
Monte would not apply to beer which is not usually picked up from a store shelf but ordered by brand by
the beer drinker himself from the storekeeper or waiter in a pub or restaurant. Moreover, SMCs brand or
trademark: SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN is not infringed by ABIs mark: BEER NA BEER or BEER
PALE PILSEN. ABI makes its own bottle with a bulging neck to differentiate it from SMCs bottle, and
prints ABIs name in three (3) places on said bottle (front, back and bottle cap) to prove that it has no
intention to pass off its BEER as SAN MIGUEL. There is no confusing similarity between the
competing beers for the name of one is SAN MIGUEL while the competitor is plain BEER and the
points of dissimilarity between the two outnumber their points of similarity. Petitioner ABI has neither
infringed SMCs trademark nor committed unfair competition with the latters SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN
product. While its BEER PALE PILSEN admittedly competes with the latter in the open market, that
competition is neither unfair nor fraudulent. Hence, we must deny SMCs prayer to suppress it.
In relation to Legal Philosophy:
In resolving cases of infringement and unfair competition, courts should take into consideration several
factors which would affect its conclusion. (BASICALLY THIS IS THE ONE RELATED TO LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY SINCE IT TALKS OF LAW AS PROPOSITION OF LAW. IT SAYS NA WE CAN GO
FURTHER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL MEANING FIND
PROPOSITIONS OF LAW IN THE BINDING AUTHORITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS. THIS IS THE
PROPOSITION OF LAW LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF ASIA BREWERY VS SAN MIGUEL AS
CONTRASTED TO THE CASE OF DEL MONTE CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS.)
DEL MONTE CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States and
not engaged in business in the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the United States are signatories to
7
the Convention of Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants to the nationals of the parties rights and
Page
advantages which their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of infringement and unfair
competition. Petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized
Contributors:
under the laws of the Philippines. On April 11, 1969, Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture,
distribute and sell in the Philippines various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte
trademark and logo. Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of
Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade on April 17,1980, to engage in the manufacture, packing,
distribution and sale of various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. 3 This logo
was registered in the Supplemental Register on September 20, 1983. 4 The product itself was contained
in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent bought from the
junk shops for recycling. Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively
designed bottles and a logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack warned it to desist from doing so
on pain of legal action. Thereafter, claiming that the demand had been ignored, Philpack and Del Monte
filed a complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition, with
a prayer for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. THE RTC DISMISSED THE
COMPLAINT. IT WAS AFFIRMED BY THE CA.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
HELD:
YES. We also note that the respondent court failed to take into consideration several factors
which should have affected its conclusion, to wit: age, training and education of the usual purchaser, the
nature and cost of the article, whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also the
conditions under which it is usually purchased . 21 Among these, what essentially determines the attitude
of the purchaser, specifically his inclination to be cautious, is the cost of the goods. To be sure, a person
who buys a box of candies will not exercise as much care as one who buys an expensive watch. As a
general rule, an ordinary buyer does not exercise as much prudence in buying an article for which he
pays a few centavos as he does in purchasing a more valuable thing. 22 Expensive and valuable items
are normally bought only after deliberate, comparative and analytical investigation. But mass products,
low priced articles in wide use, and matters of everyday purchase requiring frequent replacement are
bought by the casual consumer without great care. 23 In this latter category is catsup.
At that, even if the labels were analyzed together it is not difficult to see that the Sunshine label is a
colorable imitation of the Del Monte trademark. The predominant colors used in the Del Monte label are
green and red-orange, the same with Sunshine. The word "catsup" in both bottles is printed in white and
the style of the print/letter is the same. Although the logo of Sunshine is not a tomato, the figure
nevertheless approximates that of a tomato.
The Court observes that the reasons given by the respondent court in resolving the case in favor of
Sunshine are untenable. First, it declared that the registration of the Sunshine label belied the company's
malicious intent to imitate petitioner's product. Second, it held that the Sunshine label was not improper
because the Bureau of Patent presumably considered other trademarks before approving it. Third, it cited
the case of Shell Co. v. Insular Petroleum, 27 where this Court declared that selling oil in containers of
another with markings erased, without intent to deceive, was not unfair competition. As Sunshine's label
is an infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the cancellation of the private
respondent's registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing the questioned label from the market.
With regard to the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfair competition; hence, the
respondent should be permanently enjoined from the use of such bottles.
8
Page
In relation to LEG PHILO:
Contributors:
UNFAIR COMPETITION IS TO BE FOUND NOT BY DISSECTION OF ELEMNTS IN PRODUCT
PRESENTATION AND DRESS BUT IN THE TOTALITY OF THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE GIVES.
(THIS IS THE PROPOSITION OF LAW OF THIS CASE IN CONSTRAST TO THE CASE OF SAN MIG.)
REPUBLIC VS MERALCO
(THIS IS IN RELATION OT THE RATIONAL BELIEF THEORY)
FACTS:
On 23 December 1993, Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed with the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average
increase of P0.21/kwh in its distribution charge. The application also included a prayer for provisional
approval of the increase pursuant to Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Section 8 of Executive
Order 172. On 28 January 1994, the ERB issued an Order granting a provisional increase of P0.184/kwh,
subject to the condition that in the event that the Board finds that MERALCO is entitled to a lesser
increase in rates, all excess amounts collected from the applicants customers as a result of this Order
shall either be refunded to them or correspondingly credited in their favor for application to electric bills
covering future consumptions. Subsequent to an audit by the Commission on Audit (COA), the ERB
rendered its decision adopting COAs recommendations and authorized MERALCO to implement a rate
adjustment in the average amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to MERALCOs billing cycles
beginning February 1994. The ERB further ordered that the provisional relief in the amount of
P0.184/kwh granted under the Boards Order dated 28 January 1994 is hereby superseded and modified
and the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with MERALCOs billing cycles beginning
February 1994 until its billing cycles beginning February 1998, be refunded to MERALCOs customers or
correspondingly credited in their favor for future consumption. The ERB held that income tax should not
be treated as operating expense as this should be borne by the stockholders who are recipients of the
income or profits realized from the operation of their business hence, should not be passed on to the
consumers. Further, in applying the net average investment method, the ERB adopted the
recommendation of COA that in computing the rate base, only the proportionate value of the property
should be included, determined in accordance with the number of months the same was actually used in
service during the test year.
On appeal (CA GR SP 46888), the Court of Appeals set aside the ERB decision insofar as it directed the
reduction of the MERALCO rates by an average of P0.167/ kwh and the refund of such amount to
MERALCOs customers beginning February 1994 and until its billing cycle beginning February 1998.
Separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners were denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petition before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petitions and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. MERALCO
was authorized to adopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017/kwh, effective with respect to
MERALCOs billing cycles beginning February 1994. Further, in accordance with the decision of the ERB
dated 16 February 1998, the excess average amount of P0.167/kwh starting with the applicants billing
cycles beginning February 1998 is ordered to be refunded to MERALCOs customers or correspondingly
credited in their favor for future consumption.
9
Page
Contributors:
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERALCO COULD PASS ON TO CONSUMERS WHAT IS WAS

PAYING GOVERNMENT AS TAXES
HELD:
NO. Income tax, it should be stressed, is imposed on an individual or entity as a form of excise
tax or a tax on the privilege of earning income.[27] In exchange for the protection extended by the State
to the taxpayer, the government collects taxes as a source of revenue to finance its activities. Clearly, by
its nature, income tax payments of a public utility are not expenses which contribute to or are incurred in
connection with the production of profit of a public utility. Income tax should be borne by the taxpayer
alone as they are payments made in exchange for benefits received by the taxpayer from the State. No
benefit is derived by the customers of a public utility for the taxes paid by such entity and no direct
contribution is made by the payment of income tax to the operation of a public utility for purposes of
generating revenue or profit. Accordingly, the burden of paying income tax should be Meralcos alone and
should not be shifted to the consumers by including the same in the computation of its operating
expenses.
IN RELATION TO LEG PHILO:
IT WAS NOT CITED KASI SA CASE BUT THIS CASE FALLS UNDER THE RATIONAL BELIEF
THEORY THAT MAINTAINS THAT A STATEMENT IS TRUE WHEN THERE IS JUSTIFICATION FOR
IT. ONE OF THE GUIDES COURTS INVARIABLY USE IN DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A
CONSTRUCTION IS BY LOOKIING TO ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENES AND RESULTS. WHRE
ABSURDITY RESULTS, THE PROPOSITION IS REJECED. THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE
LEGISLATURE NEVER INTENDS TO BE UNREASONBALE OR TO LEGISLATE ABSURDITY.
PIO DURAN vs. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, Judge of People's Court, respondent.
G.R. No. L-99, November 16, 1945
FACTS:
Petitioner Pio Duran is a Filipino political prisoner under the custody of the Director of Prisons in
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa Rizal for not less than three months without any information having
filed against him. He filed a petition for his release on bail with the People's Court. Solicitor General
recommended that the petitioner be provisionally released on P35,000.00 bail. After hearing the
statements of Special Prosecutor V.D. Carpio, in representation of the Solicitor General and Atty.
Marciano Almario, counsel for the petitioner, Judge Salvador Abad Santos denied the petition for bail on
October 12, 1945 and refused to reconsider his order although not stating any reason on the issued on
October 15, 1945.
The denial of the petition is a flagrant violation of the Constitution of the Philippines and of Section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682 and that the judge has committed grave abuse of discretion for which
petitioner has no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in ordinary course of law.
The respondent judge denies abuse of discretion and stated the reason for denying the petition for bail on
his order on October 15, 1945 and the grounds are the detainee's adherence to the enemy as
10
manifested by his utterances and activities during the Japanese domination historical facts of
Page
contemporary history and of public knowledge which the petitioner cannot deny makes the case against
him quite serious and may the necessitate the imposition of the capital punishment.
Contributors:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion for denying the
petitioners petition to bail as pursuant to section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682.
RULING:
NO. Petitioner was charged for treason which is "the highest of all crimes". As pursuant to section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 682:
. . . Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the aforesaid
political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People's Court, after due notice to the Office of Special
Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail, even prior to the presentation of the corresponding
information, unless the Court, finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense . .
The recital by the special prosecutor of the supposed acts committed by the petitioner and referred to by
the respondent judge in his order of October 15, 1945, above quoted which acts were not rebutted by
counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on the petition for bail, supports the conclusion and ruling of the
People's Court.
The petitioner denied the imputation that the petitioner was the Executive General of the "Makapili," but
he openly admitted that at the hearing before the People's Court he did not make any effort to deny or
disprove the said imputation or the others appearing in Appendix E of the petition. In view thereof, how
can we expect the People's Court not to take into consideration what had been stated then, appearing in
said Appendix E?
Counsel's contention that strong evidence have been presented to prove that there was a commission of
a capital offense before People's Court could deny bail in this case was substantially complied with,
although the information charging the commission of the crime of treason had not as yet been filed. We
are of the opinion and so hold that hearing set and held for the purpose was amply sufficient for the
People's Court to be informed and to determine whether there was strong evidence of the commission of
a capital offense.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be stated that the petitioner has been deprived of his liberty without due
process of law, because his petition for bail had been set for hearing and he was given an opportunity to
be heard when the above circumstances were submitted to the People's Court, where it was made to
appear satisfactorily that he was being detained due to highly treasonable activities against the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United States, which activities would be charged in the
information for a capital offense and punishable by death, and that the evidence in the case strong.
Philosophical Reference:
DISSENTING OPINION
"With the formal surrender of the Japanese Empire today, September 2, 1945, the long and terrible war is
11
at an end," said President Osmea in an official message to the Filipino people, adding: "Our effort has
Page
been devoted toward the paramount task of winning the war. Today the task is done. We must devote
ourselves to the tasks of winning the peace." (41 Off. Gaz., Sept. 1945, p. 499.) But that peace cannot be
Contributors:
won until and unless the fundamental human freedoms for which millions of lives were offered in the
recent gory holocaust are firmly secured and guaranteed.
More than two millennia ago the following words were written in the pages of the Book of Books, held the
most sacred by the most civilized countries in two hemispheres: "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land
unto all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a jubilee unto you and ye shall return every man unto his
possessions, and ye shall return every man unto his family." (Leviticus, 25:20.)
Are we Christians? Do we believe in the teachings of the Bible? Have we faith in the biblical doctrines
which are the most vitalizing essentials of Democracy? How can we "return every man unto his family" if
we deprive him of his personal freedom in utter violation of the cardinal mandates of our Constitution,
wherein it is solemnly enjoined that "No person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of
law"? How can we "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants", when we are keeping
in bondage one of the citizens of our country in complete disregard of the laws of the land?
"Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure" asked Jefferson "when we have removed their only
firm basis, a conviction in the mind of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God? That they are
not to be violated but with his wrath? Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that
his justice cannot sleep forever; that considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of
the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation is among possible events; that it may become probable by
supernatural interference. The Almighty has no attribute which can take sides with us in such a contest."
That is why he wrote in the Declaration of Independence of the United States these immortal words: "All
men are created equal, they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; among these
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving
their powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter it."
We borrow the following from Senator Elbert D. Thomas:
"Had the social and political significance of Jesus's teachings of the worth of the individual soul borne its
fruit in the practice of the Church, the world might long ago have seen a lasting free society. For Jesus, all
men were brothers and equally precious in the sight of God, their Father. Jew and Gentile, bond and free,
black and white, each was free to work out his own salvation. In the realm of the spirit the early Christian
philosophy exalted the individual, giving him freedom to choose and to 'bear testimony.'"
"The torch of freedom has often been lighted; it has been burned brightly for brief periods. The flame has
been often burned low, sometimes flickered, but has never been quite extinguished. Always again it has
raised, here in the cause of religious liberty, there in the cause of political freedom. It remained for the
founders of the American Republic to plan a society wherein all phases of freedom, of religion, of speech,
and of person, should become a reality. And Thomas Jefferson's as the embodiment of the spirit of
Americanism, combining in himself the zeal of all the past apostle of freedom, thus becomes one of the
world's great leaders in man's ancient quest. Because he gathered together the aspirations of all the
fighters for freedom who had gone before, all phases of liberty were equally important to him. Building
upon the foundation laid throughout all past ages, he became America's first world citizen." (Thomas
Jefferson, World Citizen, p. 142.)
12
Convinced that the principles of human liberty are imperishable, we write this opinion as an appeal to the
sense of justice of the majority.
Page
Contributors:
II. Natural Law: The Classic, Scholastic, Enlightenment & Postmodern Philosophers
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Maj. General Josephus Ramas et al
GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003
FACTS:
The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel. Based on
its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition
for forfeiture against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant. After so
many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private respondents filed their
motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does
not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without
showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the
amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It remanded
the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants and also
referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Dimaano. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition
against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
Whether or not it was proper to dismiss the case before the presentation of evidence and as to
the legality of the search and seizure.
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The Court
ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not a "subordinate" of President
Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not
make him a "subordinate" as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close
association with former President Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the
Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's
evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it
still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and
extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to
13
complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items seized. The
Page
Contributors:
seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are contraband per se, which they are
not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized them.
PHILOSOPHICAL REFERENCE:
II. Natural Law and Natural Rights
As early as the Greek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural standard or law to which a
state and its laws must conform. Sophocles unmistakably articulates this in his poignant literary piece,
Antigone. In this mid-fifth century Athenian tragedy, a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending
Thebes, and the other, Polyneices, died attacking it. The king forbade Polyneices' burial, commanding
instead that his body be left to be devoured by beasts. But according to Greek religious ideas, only a
burial even a token one with a handful of earth could give repose to his soul. Moved by piety,
Polyneices' sister, Antigone, disobeyed the command of the king and buried the body. She was arrested.
Brought before the king who asks her if she knew of his command and why she disobeyed, Antigone
replies:
". . . These laws were not ordained of Zeus, And she who sits enthroned with gods below, Justice,
enacted not these human laws. Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man, Couldst by a breath annul and
override The immutable unwritten laws of heaven. They were not born today nor yesterday; They die not;
and none knoweth whence they sprang."
Antigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order of the king. Aristotle also wrote in his
Nicomachean Ethics: "Of political justice part is natural, part legal natural, that which everywhere has
the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally
indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be mina,
or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular
cases, . . ." Aristotle states that "(p)articular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its
own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there
really is, as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men,
even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles' Antigone
clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she
means that it was just by nature."
Later, the Roman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first century B.C. in this wise:
"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and
everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it
does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the
wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is
impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we
need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at
Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will
be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for
he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing
14
from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst
penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment."
Page
Contributors:
This allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law continues from classical antiquity to this day.
The face of natural law, however, has changed throughout the classical, medieval, modern, and
contemporary periods of history.
In the medieval times, shortly after 1139, Gratian published the Decretum, a collection and reconciliation
of the canon laws in force, which distinguished between divine or natural law and human law. Similar to
the writings of the earliest Church Fathers, he related this natural law to the Decalogue and to Christ's
commandment of love of one's neighbor. "The law of nature is that which is contained in the Law and the
Gospel, by which everyone is commanded to do unto others as he would wish to be done unto him, and
is prohibited from doing unto others that which he would be unwilling to be done unto himself." This
natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if
contrary to law, were to be held null and void.
The following century saw a shift from a natural law concept that was revelation-centered to a concept
related to man's reason and what was discoverable by it, under the influence of Aristotle's writings which
were coming to be known in the West. William of Auxerre acknowledged the human capacity to recognize
good and evil and God's will, and made reason the criterion of natural law. Natural law was thus id quod
naturalis ratio sine omni deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse faciendum or "that which natural
reason, without much or even any need of reflection, tells us what we must do." Similarly, Alexander of
Hales saw human reason as the basis for recognizing natural law and St. Bonaventure wrote that what
natural reason commands is called the natural law. By the thirteenth century, natural law was understood
as the law of right reason, coinciding with the biblical law but not derived from it.
Of all the medieval philosophers, the Italian St. Thomas Aquinas is indisputably regarded as the most
important proponent of traditional natural law theory. He created a comprehensive and organized
synthesis of the natural law theory which rests on both the classical (in particular, Aristotelian philosophy)
and Christian foundation, i.e., on reason and revelation. His version of the natural law theory rests on his
vision of the universe as governed by a single, self-consistent and overarching system of law under the
direction and authority of God as the supreme lawgiver and judge. Aquinas defined law as "an ordinance
of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated." There
are four kinds of laws in his natural law theory: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
First, eternal law. To Aquinas, a law is a dictate of practical reason (which provides practical directions
on how one ought to act as opposed to "speculative reason" which provides propositional knowledge of
the way things are) emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Presupposing that
Divine Providence rules the universe, and Divine Providence governs by divine reason, then the rational
guidance of things in God the Ruler of the universe has the nature of a law. And since the divine reason's
conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, this kind of law is called eternal law. In other
words, eternal law is that law which is a "dictate" of God's reason. It is the external aspect of God's
perfect wisdom, or His wisdom applied to His creation. Eternal law consists of those principles of action
that God implanted in creation to enable each thing to perform its proper function in the overall order of
the universe. The proper function of a thing determines what is good and bad for it: the good consists of
performing its function while the bad consists of failing to perform it.
Then, natural law. This consists of principles of eternal law which are specific to human beings as rational
15
creatures. Aquinas explains that law, as a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way,
it can be in him that rules and measures; and in another way, in that which is ruled and measured since a
Page
thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Thus, since all things
Contributors:
governed by Divine Providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, then all things partake of
or participate to a certain extent in the eternal law; they receive from it certain inclinations towards their
proper actions and ends. Being rational, however, the participation of a human being in the Divine
Providence, is most excellent because he participates in providence itself, providing for himself and
others. He participates in eternal reason itself and through this, he possesses a natural inclination to right
action and right end. This participation of the rational creature in the eternal law is called natural law.
Hence, the psalmist says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, thus implying that
the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the
natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural
law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." 22 In a few words, the
"natural law is a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man's nature, whereby man can discern how he
should act."
Through natural reason, we are able to distinguish between right and wrong; through free will, we are
able to choose what is right. When we do so, we participate more fully in the eternal law rather than being
merely led blindly to our proper end. We are able to choose that end and make our compliance with
eternal law an act of self-direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a rule and measure and no
longer a rule and measure imposed from an external source. The question that comes to the fore then is
what is this end to which natural law directs rational creatures?
The first self-evident principle of natural law is that "good is to be pursued and done, and evil is to be
avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason
naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precept of the natural law as something to be
done or avoided." Because good is to be sought and evil avoided, and good is that which is in accord with
the nature of a given creature or the performance of a creature's proper function, then the important
question to answer is what is human nature or the proper function of man. Those to which man has a
natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good and must thus be pursued, while their
opposites are evil which must be avoided. Aquinas identifies the basic inclinations of man as follows:
1. To seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal happiness with God.
2. To preserve himself in existence.
3. To preserve the species that is, to unite sexually.
4. To live in community with other men.
5. To use his intellect and will that is, to know the truth and to make his own decision." 28
As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in procreation; and as rational

creatures, in living in society and exercising our intellectual and spiritual capacities in the pursuit of
knowledge." God put these inclinations in human nature to help man achieve his final end of eternal
happiness. With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature, we can determine by
practical reason what is good for us and what is bad. In this sense, natural law is an ordinance of reason.
Proceeding from these inclinations, we can apply the natural law by deduction, thus: good should be
done; this action is good; this action should therefore be done. Concretely, it is good for humans to live
peaceably with one another in society, thus this dictates the prohibition of actions such as killing and
16
stealing that harm society.

Page
From the precepts of natural law, human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determinations
or specialized regulations to declare what is required in particular cases considering society's specific
Contributors:
circumstances. These particular determinations, arrived at by human reason, are called human laws
(Aquinas' positive law). They are necessary to clarify the demands of natural law. Aquinas identifies two
ways by which something may be derived from natural law: first, like in science, demonstrated
conclusions are drawn from principles; and second, as in the arts, general forms are particularized as to
details like the craftsman determining the general form of a house to a particular shape. Thus, according
to Aquinas, some things are derived from natural law by way of conclusion (such as "one must not kill"
may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man") while some are
derived by way of determination (such as the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished,
but that he be punished in this or that way is not directly by natural law but is a derived determination of
it). Aquinas says that both these modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things
derived as a conclusion are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but having
some force also from the natural law. But those things which are derived in the second manner have no
other force than that of human law.
Finally, there is divine law which is given by God, i.e., the Old Testament and the New Testament. This is
necessary to direct human life for four reasons. First, through law, man is directed to proper actions
towards his proper end. This end, which is eternal happiness and salvation, is not proportionate to his
natural human power, making it necessary for him to be directed not just by natural and human law but by
divinely given law. Secondly, because of uncertainty in human judgment, different people form different
judgments on human acts, resulting in different and even contrary laws. So that man may know for certain
what he ought to do and avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a God-given
law for it is certain that such law cannot err. Thirdly, human law can only judge the external actions of
persons. However, perfection of virtue consists in man conducting himself right in both his external acts
and in his interior motives. The divine law thus supervenes to see and judge both dimensions. Fourthly,
because human law cannot punish or forbid all evils, since in aiming to do away with all evils it would do
away with many good things and would hinder the advancement of the common good necessary for
human development, divine law is needed. For example, if human law forbade backbiting gossip, in order
to enforce such a law, privacy and trust that is necessary between spouses and friends would be severely
restricted. Because the price paid to enforce the law would outweigh the benefits, gossiping ought to be
left to God to be judged and punished. Thus, with divine law, no evil would remain unforbidden and
unpunished.
Aquinas' traditional natural law theory has been advocated, recast and restated by other scholars up to
the contemporary period. But clearly, what has had a pervading and lasting impact on the Western
philosophy of law and government, particularly on that of the United States of America which heavily
influenced the Philippine system of government and constitution,is the modern natural law theory.
In the traditional natural law theory, among which was Aquinas', the emphasis was placed on moral
duties of man both rulers and subjects rather than on rights of the individual citizen. Nevertheless,
from this medieval theoretical background developed modern natural law theories associated with the
gradual development in Europe of modern secular territorial state. These theories increasingly veered
away from medieval theological trappings and gave particular emphasis to the individual and his natural
rights.
N.B. (Lockes theory of natural law was likewise discussed; please refer to your full text. The Editor
deleted it as it was not part of the syllabus in order to shorten the digest thank you.)
17
III. Natural Law and Natural Rights in Philippine Cases and the Constitution
Page
Contributors:
Although the natural law and natural rights foundation is not articulated, some Philippine cases have
made reference to natural law and rights without raising controversy. For example, in People v. Asas, the
Court admonished courts to consider cautiously an admission or confession of guilt especially when it is
alleged to have been obtained by intimidation and force. The Court said: "(w)ithal, aversion of man
against forced self-affliction is a matter of Natural Law." In People v. Agbot, we did not uphold lack of
instruction as an excuse for killing because we recognized the "offense of taking one's life being forbidden
by natural law and therefore within instinctive knowledge and feeling of every human being not deprived
of reason." In Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Diocares, et al., Chief Justice Fernando acknowledged the
influence of natural law in stressing that the element of a promise is the basis of contracts. In Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court invoked the doctrine of estoppel which
we have repeatedly pronounced is predicated on, and has its origin in equity, which broadly defined, is
justice according to natural law. In Yu Con v. Ipil, et al., we recognized the application of natural law in
maritime commerce.
In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the judge's personal preference, invites
criticism that the decision is a performative contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would point out
that while the decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted with
what it abhors as it stands on the judge's subjective and arbitrary choice of a school of legal thought. Just
as one judge will fight tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosophy, another judge will match his
fervor in defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking natural law because the
history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether different
story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the people are the source of all government
authority, and the courts are their creation. While it may be argued that the choice of a school of legal
thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact against which one cannot argue and it would not be
turning somersault with history to say that the American Declaration of Independence and the consequent
adoption of a constitution stood on a modern natural law theory foundation as this is "universally taken for
granted by writers on government." 275 It is also well-settled in Philippine history that the American
system of government and constitution were adopted by our 1935 Constitutional Convention as a model
of our own republican system of government and constitution. In the words of Claro M. Recto, President
of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution is "frankly an imitation of the American Constitution." Undeniably
therefore, modern natural law theory, specifically Locke's natural rights theory, was used by the Founding
Fathers of the American constitutional democracy and later also used by the Filipinos. 276 Although the
1935 Constitution was revised in 1973, minimal modifications were introduced in the 1973 Constitution
which was in force prior to the EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be asserted that the spirit
and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of Rights
were concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution ratified
less than a year from the EDSA Revolution retained the basic provisions of the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions on the system of government and the Bill of Rights, with the significant difference that it
emphasized respect for and protection of human rights and stressed that sovereignty resided in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.
The case at bar merely calls us to determine whether two particular rights the rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence obtained therefrom have the
18
force and effect of natural rights which private respondent Dimaano can invoke against the
Page
government.
Contributors:
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty
and property. Our well-settled jurisprudence that the right against unreasonable search and seizure
protects the people's rights to security of person and property, to the sanctity of the home, and to privacy
is a recognition of this proposition. The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that
his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property dates back even earlier than the modern
philosophers and the American and French revolutions, but pervades the whole history of man. It touches
every aspect of man's existence, thus it has been described, viz:
"The right to personal security emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of
life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."
The individual in the state of nature surrendered a portion of his undifferentiated liberty and agreed to the
establishment of a government to guarantee his natural rights, including the right to security of person
and property, which he could not guarantee by himself. Similarly, the natural right to liberty includes the
right of a person to decide whether to express himself and communicate to the public or to keep his
affairs to himself and enjoy his privacy. Justice Douglas reminds us of the indispensability of privacy in
the Hayden case, thus: "Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual needs both to
communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself." A natural right to liberty indubitably includes
the freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part of his being and the
extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to express himself, the natural right to liberty demands that
he should be given the liberty to be truly himself with his family in his home, his haven of refuge where he
can "retreat from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world," to
borrow the memorable words of Chief Justice Fernando. For truly, the drapes of a man's castle are but an
extension of the drapes on his body that cover the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures,
the prying eyes and the invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying his
freedom to keep to himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy. Finally, indispensable to the
natural right to property is the right to one's possessions. Property is a product of one's toil and might be
considered an expression and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessary to the
enjoyment of his life. With unreasonable searches and seizures, one's property stands in danger of being
rummaged through and taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los Reyes, persons are subjected to
indignity by an unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it is a violation of a person's natural
right to life, liberty and property. It is this natural right which sets man apart from other beings, which gives
him the dignity of a human being.
19
The right to protect oneself against unreasonable search and seizure, being a right indispensable to the
right to life, liberty and property, may be derived as a conclusion from what Aquinas identifies as man's
Page
natural inclination to self-preservation and self-actualization. Man preserves himself by leading a secure
Contributors:
life enjoying his liberty and actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to freely express
himself and associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing himself. For after all, a reflective
grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his
human nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private space. Only
he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life, knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.
Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government
cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there
was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was conducted. This right of the private
respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend on positive law. It is part of natural rights. A
violation of this right along with other rights stirred Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the
Filipinos' natural rights that justified the establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the
1987 Constitution. I submit that even in the absence of a constitution,private respondent Dimaano had a
fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.
We now come to the right to the exclusion of evidence illegally seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we
can distill that the exclusionary rule in both the Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which in turn is "an essential part of the right to privacy" that the Constitution
protects. If the exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to "grant the right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Thus, the inevitable conclusion
is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a natural right that private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in
the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right.
To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is admittedly not as indisputable as the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported by philosophy and deeply
entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments have been raised on the constitutional status of the
exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis of United States v. Calandra, that it is only a "judicially-
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Along the same line, others contend
that the right against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires some effective remedy, and thus
Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it could replace it with other remedies of a
comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit only if it is conceded that the
exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence.
Formulated in the Aquinian concept of human law, the debate is whether the exclusionary right is the first
kind of human law which may be derived as a conclusion from the natural law precept that one should do
no harm to another man, in the same way that conclusions are derived from scientific principles, in which
case the exclusionary right has force from natural law and does not depend on positive law for its
creation; or if it is the second kind of human law which is derived by way of determination of natural law,
in the same way that a carpenter determines the shape of a house, such that it is merely a judicially or
20
legislatively chosen remedy or deterrent, in which case the right only has force insofar as positive law
creates and protects it.
Page
Contributors:
In holding that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental and natural right, we
were aided by philosophy and history. In the case of the exclusionary right, philosophy can also come to
the exclusionary right's aid, along the lines of Justice Clarke's proposition in the Mapp case that no man
shall be convicted on unconstitutional evidence. Similarly, the government shall not be allowed to convict
a man on evidence obtained in violation of a natural right (against unreasonable search and seizure) for
the protection of which, government and the law were established. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
the brazen violation of natural rights and allow law enforcers to act with more temerity than a thief in the
night for they can disturb one's privacy, trespass one's abode, and steal one's property with impunity.
This, in turn, would erode the people's trust in government.
Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent Dimaano as she invoked it
when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP Board
issued its resolution on Ramas' unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGG's petition for
forfeiture against Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the petitioner's
stance upheld by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the Constitution, then it could be
invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and
later, when the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,1987.
Ateneo De Manila University vs. Capulong

G.R. No. 99327. May 27, 1993.
FACTS:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its
initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was
hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board
formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven
students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the
said students.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such
students pursuant to its rules.
RULING:
YES. Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it
had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such
as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on students
21
currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the
school which includes:
Page
Contributors:
a. freedom to determine who may teach;
b. freedom to determine what may be taught;
c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;
d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, thus: (1) who
may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has
deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free
intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just
man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged
"corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the
forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:
"Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like
to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are
plenty of persons, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or
nothing; and then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are angry
with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody
asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that
they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all
philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making
the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has
been detected which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in
battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate
calumnies."
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures
of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas.
Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the
Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost
their autonomy.
22
In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized
Page
in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This
Contributors:
was exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as
the Universities of Leiden (1575), Helmstadt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to
freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of the 19th and
20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to
intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the
press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors,
researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates,
"to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure.
But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does
not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have
stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of
autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been
categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu
with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by
external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what
shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.
In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the
American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made
no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most
especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the
Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious not in the sense that the founders or charter
members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as
the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and
reverence." It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila
University has been lost on the respondent students.
TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA, petitioner, vs. WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States
Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.
G.R. No. L-129. December 19, 1945
23
FACTS:
Page
Contributors:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of
America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal
charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer,
Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be reinstated to his former
status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He
questions, among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case.
2. Whether or not the Military Commission was validly constituted by respondent, therefore having
jurisdiction over the war crimes.
RULING:
1. NO. 2. YES.
1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not sought. It seeks no discharge
of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be
interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter
of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot
issue against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt.
Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although
it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings
requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if the commission be joined
as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), . . . an attempt of our civil courts
to exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be
considered as a violation of this countrys faith, which this Court should not be the last to keep and
uphold.
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint and convene a military
commission. This is upon the theory that since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of
24
waging war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn from them.
Page
Contributors:
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United States has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try
offenders or offenses against the laws of war in appropriate cases.
Prisoners of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of the
State into whose hands they have fallen. (The Hague Convention of July 29, 1899.)
Many of the basic ideas which prevail today in the customs and usages of nations and became part of the
international law emerged from the human mind centuries before the Christian Era. Such is the idea that
prisoners of war are entitled to humane treatment, that treasons of war should be discountenanced, and
that belligerents must abstain from causing harm to non-combatants.
Poets, philosophers, artists, and men of intellectual distinction in general, even though they became
invested with enemy character on the outbreak of war, were honored and respected. In 335 B. C.
Alexander the Great destroyed Thebes, but he left Pindar's house uninjured and honored the poet's
descendants. In ancient Hellas was already known the practice of neutralizing cities and protecting them
from the ravages of war. Temples, priest, and embassies were considered inviolable. The right of
sanctuary was universally recognized. Mercy was shown to suppliant and helpless captives. Safe-
conducts were granted and respected. Burial of dead was permitted, and graves were unmolested. It was
considered wrong to cut off or poison the enemy's water supply, or to make use of poisonous weapons.
Treacherous stratagems of whatever description were condemned as being contrary to civilized warfare.
Poets and philosophers, orators and historians proclaimed humane doctrines. Plato constructed his ideal
republic on the basis of what he conceived to be perfect justice. Aristotle condemned the principle of
retaliation as being antagonistic to true justice. Euripides speaks of excesses in war not only as acts of
intrinsic wickedness and transgression against universal law, but, indeed, as a suicidal folly on the part of
the offender. In one of his dramas he makes Poseidon declare: "But foolish is the mortal who lays waste
cities, temples, and tombs, the sanctuaries of the dead; for having consigned them to solitude, he is one
himself to perish afterwards."
Impelled by irrepressible endeavors aimed towards the ideal, by the unconquerable natural urge for
improvement, by the unquenchable thirstiness of perfection in all orders of life, humanity has been
struggling during the last two dozen centuries to develop an international law which could answer more
and more faithfully the demands of right and justice as expressed in principles which, weakly enunciated
at first in the rudimentary juristic sense of peoples of antiquity, by the inherent power of their universal
appeal to human conscience, at last, were accepted, recognized, and consecrated by all the civilized
nations of the world.
Under these principles, petitioner General Tomoyuki Yamashita is entitled to be accorded all the
guarantees, protections, and defenses that all prisoners should have, according to the customs and
usages, conventions and treaties, judicial decisions and executive pronouncements, and generally
accepted opinions of thinkers, legal philosophers and other expounders of just rules and principles of
25
international law. The seriousness or unfathomable gravity of the charges against him, the unthinkable
Page
magnitude of the wholesale murders, rapes, and destructions for which he is called to answer, the beastly
massacres and horrors by which he was thrown from the pedestal of military glory as the "Tiger of
Contributors:
Malaya" into the bottom of perversity of a human monster, must not be taken into consideration, must all
be forgotten, in order that true justice may be administered in this case.
CARAOS vs. DAZA

G.R. No. L-442; May 23, 1946
DE JOYA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Caraos was found guilty of the crime of homicide, committed on the person of one
Leoncio Ylagan, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal. On May 3,
1944, he commenced serving his sentence in the provincial jail of Batangas. And on November 9, 1944,
petitioner was released "by order of the Provincial Governor of Batangas, pursuant to a pardon issued by
the authority concerned on those days of Japanese military occupation. According to the testimony given
by petitioner, certain relatives and friends of his, upon whom he depended to work for his release or
pardon, approached the provincial governor of Batangas to intercede, on his behalf, for his release or
pardon; that one week before he was actually released there had been bombing and strafing in the in the
vicinity of the provincial capitol of Batangas, where the provincial jail was located; and that he received his
release papers, but lost them. Maximo M. Malvar, provincial governor of Batangas at the time, testified
that he ordered the release of all prisoners in December, 1944, on account of continuous bombing and
scarcity of food; and that others had been released pursuant to executive clemency prior thereto, but he
could not remember whether herein petitioner was included among them.
On March 6, 1946, Estrella Punzalan Vda. de Ylagan, wife of the deceased Leoncio Ylagan request the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioner to continue serving the unexpired portion of the
penalty imposed upon him which was granted by Judge Inigo S. Daza. Alleging that he is deprived of his
personal freedom by the Director of Prisons pursuant to the orders of respondent judge, petitioner comes
now to ask relief by writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE:
Whether or not such pardon or executive clemency had really been extended to herein petitioner
by the proper authorities.
RULING:
NO. Under the law, the only authority that could have granted pardon or executive clemency to
herein petitioner, during the Japanese occupation, was the President of the so-called Philippine Republic,
or the Commander in Chief of the Japanese imperial forces. (Sameth vs. Director of Prisons, p.
613, ante). But no competent or satisfactory evidence has been presented to show that such pardon had
been granted. The order issued for his arrest was, therefore, legal and proper. (People vs. Ponce de
Leon, 56 Phil., 386, 391.)
If herein petitioner had really been pardoned either by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese
26
imperial forces or by the President of the so-called Philippine Republic, on November 9, 1944, he should
Page
have presented certificate copies of his petition for pardon and of the alleged pardon extended to him.
There must be records of such official acts, if they had really taken place; and herein petitioner has failed
Contributors:
to present any, coming either from the Insular Government or the provincial government of Batangas. And
if petitioner had been pardoned at all, it must have been extended to him by the provincial governor of
Batangas, who had absolutely no right or authority to extend to him executive clemency. In case of an
invalid pardon, the original sentence imposed upon the prisoner must be carried out. (Cabantag vs.
Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.).
The other possible and logical conclusion is that herein petitioner was among the prisoners whose mass
release ordered by the provincial governor of Batangas, sometime in December, 1944, for their own
safety and protection, due to the continuous bombing and strafing of the vicinity in which the provincial jail
was located, by the American Air Force, and the scarcity of food; in which case it was his duty to
surrender himself upon the restoration of normalcy.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
It is evident that respondents were and are unable to point out any law upon which respondent judge's
authority to order the rearrest and the recommitment of the petitioner can be supported. In fact, no such
law exists. Much more, its existence is incompatible with the present legislation and the principle of
separation of powers, one of the pillars of our system of government and democracy established by our
Constitution, and recognized by all civilized nations as one of the fundamental safeguards of civil liberties
since Montesquieu developed and perfected it upon the fecund germinal ideas firstly enunciated by the
encyclopedia genius of Aristotle in the following words of his "Politics":
"All constitutions have three elements, concerning which the good lawgiver has to regard what is
expedient for each constitution. When they are well-ordered, the constitution is well-ordered, and as they
differ from one another, constitution differs. There is one (1) element which deliberates about public
affairs; secondly (2) that which concerned magistracies the questions being what they should be, over
what they should exercise authority, and what should be the mode of the electing to them; and thirdly (3)
that which has judicial power." (Book IV, Ch. 14.)
"In great states it is possible, and indeed necessary, that every office should have a special function . . .
certainly every work is better done which receives the sole, and not the divided, attention of the workers."
(Book IV, Ch. 15.)
Under the principle of separation of powers, government functions are divulsed and apportioned among
the three departments - legislative, executive, and judicial and within the province of each one of them
no encroachments are allowed without violating the tripartite division established by the Constitution.
TECSON vs. DESIDERIO, JR
G.R. No. 161434; March 3, 2004
VITUG, J.:
27
FACTS:
Page
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his certificate of
candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
Contributors:
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his certificate of
candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
It should be helpful to first give a brief historical background onthe concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to
322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be
adequate in number to achieve a self- sufficient existence.
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In its ideal setting, a
citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept
was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th
century to include political citizenship , which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid
emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship
has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing
and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
internationalization of citizenship .
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

28
Page
Contributors:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the
Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who
in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11,
1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a
person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. Considering that the allegations of
petitioners are not substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the
en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe
father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of the
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate
US vs. Guendia
G.R. No. L-12462; December 20, 1917
STREET, J.:
FACTS:
An assault with intent to kill was committed by the defendant at the time and place mentioned in the
record upon the person of his querida; but the proof shows, in our opinion, that the defendant was crazy
at the time and has remained so since. He has now been committed by order of the Governor- General to
the San Lazaro Hospital for confinement and treatment. The trial judge says, "I really believe that this
man is crazy; or he appeared so, at least, during his trial in this court;" and the action of the trial judge in
passing sentence upon the defendant must have been in part due to a desire to keep a dangerous insane
person in confinement until proper disposition might be made of him. It is clear from the evidence
submitted at the trial that the defendant was insane at the time of the perpetration of the act, and he is
therefore exempt from criminal liability under subsection 1 of article 8 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court should reverse judgment and acquit the accused of the offense with which he is
charged.
29
RULING:
Page
YES. In Blackstone's Commentaries we find the following passage:
Contributors:
"Also id a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for it, he becomes
mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution
that he ought; and if after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can
he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment,
judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-sane memory, execution
shall be stayed; for peradventure says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound
memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment of execution."
There were good reasons for this tenderness or "humanity" of the English law, as the reader will
appreciate when reminded of the fact that until modern times no prisoner arraigned before the bar of an
English court was ever permitted to have counsel to assist him in his defense; that until within the
memory of living man no accused person was ever permitted to give testimony in his own behalf; and
finally that it was only in our own day that a person convicted of a crime in an English court has been
allowed an appeal for a review of the facts.
When Blackstone here speaks of madness he refers to a general perversion and obliteration of the
mental powers much more pronounced than that which is considered sufficient to exempt from criminal
responsibility. This is apparent from the fact that the courts have always treated a person as sane for the
purposes of being tried if he has sufficient powers to comprehend. The conclusion to which we arrive is
that when a judge of first insane is informed or discovers that an accused person is apparently in a
present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be
found that by reason of any such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a
proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper
place of detention until his faculties are recovered. If, however such investigation is considered
unnecessary, and the trial proceeds, the court will acquit the accused if he be found exempt from criminal
responsibility by reason of imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his commitment to an asylum
should be made pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code.
US vs. Santos
G.R. No. 12779; September 10, 1917
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS:
Dionisio Santos, a policeman of Pateros, Province of Rizal, acting under the orders of his chief who
desired to put a stop to pilfering in a certain locality, patrolled this district, and about midnight, seeing two
persons in front of an uninhabited house and then entering an uninhabited camarin, arrested them without
warrant, although no crime had been committed, and took them to the municipal presidencia where they
were detained in the jail for six or seven hours when they were released.
30
ISSUE:
Page
Whether or not the accused is guilty of coercion as found by the trial court.
Contributors:
RULING:
NO. The accused herein cannot justify the arrest by reason of acting in obedience to legal
process which it was his duty to obey. He must justify, if at all, under the rule that peace officers may
pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious
circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any
crime or breach of the peace.
One should however not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the
subtle reasoning o a judicial officer. Often he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must
act in haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. To err is human. Even the most
conscientious officer must at times be mislead. If, therefore, under trying circumstances and in a zealous
effort to obey the orders of his superior officer and to enforce the law, a peace officer makes a mere
mistake in good faith, he should be exculpated. Otherwise, the courts will put a premium on crime and will
terrorize peace officers through a fear of themselves violating the law.
The Common Law rule as to the arrest without warrant of suspicious nightwalkers is of particular interest.
Blackstone says, "Watchmen, either those appointed by the statute of Winchester (13 Edw. I, c. 4) to
keep watch and ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to the
constable, may virtue officii (by virtue of their office) arrest all offenders, and the particularly night-walkers,
and commit them to custody till the morning." (II Cooley's Blackstone, p. 1445.) The cases hold that a
peace officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night
whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been
committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent and there were no
reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the ofcer. (Miles vs. Weston [1871], 60 Ill., 361, citing
English decisions.) The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about streets
and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention
of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. surely the ofcer must not be forced to
await the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is supported by the necessities of life.
People vs. Pomar
No. 22008. November 3, 1924
FACTS:
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela. She was granted a vacation leave by
reason of her pregnancy. However, during those days, her employer who is Pomar failed to pay her
salary pursuant to Section 13 of Act No. 3071 which provides: Every person, firm, or corporation owning
or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman
employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, 30 days vacation with pay before and another 30 days
after confinement. The law was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police power
with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in factory or place of labor of
any description, and insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and
31
one month after their delivery. Hence, Fajardo filed a case against Pomar wherein the latter contested the
constitutionality of Act No. 3071
Page
Contributors:
ISSUE:
Whether the Act No. 3071 is constitutional
HELD:
No. The law is unconstitutional. The provisions of said sections had not been adopted within the
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state.
Sir William Blackstone, one of the greatest expounders of the common law, defines police power as the
due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a
well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good
neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective
stations.
The provision creates a term or condition in every contract made by every person firm, or corporation with
any woman who may, during the course of her employment, become pregnant and a failure to include in
said contract the terms fixed by law, makes the employer criminally liable and subject to a fine and
imprisonment. Clearly, therefore, the law has deprived, every person xxx owning or managing a factory
xxx of his right to enter into contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree
upon. The law creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons
are therefore deprived of their liberty to contract which is protected by the due process of law clause of
the constitution.The police power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend
or violate express inhibitions of the peoples law the constitution.
In re: Columns of Amado Macasaet in Malaya
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC. August 8, 2008
FACTS:
In a newspaper of general circulation of which Amado Macasaet was the publisher, 4 different
articles contained statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court.
Macasaet in his articles stated that a niece of the retired and deceased SC Justice Munoz-Palma who
was working as secretary at that time to a certain Lady Justice discovered 5 boxes of milk one of which
contained a 10 million peso bribe from a Chinese Businessman. When it was reported to the Lady
Justice, the secretary was instead fired because the Lady Justice allegedly does not want others to know
the bribery transaction. This lady Justice referred to by Macasaet was allegedly SC Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. Hence, Macasaet sanctioned by the SC for indirect contempt
32
ISSUE:
Page
Contributors:
Whether Macasaet was wrongfully sanctioned for indirect contempt.
HELD:
No. Sir William Blackstone aptly described the twin aspects of press freedom: xxx Every
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to
destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as
was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or offensive
writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid
foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the
object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty
of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments dest4ructive to the
ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.
People vs. Velasco
G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000
FACTS:
Honorato Galvez who was then the Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and his body guard was
charged for 1 count of murder and 2 counts of frustrated murder. In the RTC, Galvez was acquitted.
Herein petitioner would want the Supreme Court to reexamine the evidence because allegedly, the judge
deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. According to the
petitioner, this elevation to the Court would not be considered violative of the constitutional right of the
accused against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether there is violation of double jeopardy.
HELD:
Yes. The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when
brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x" Thus, Green [v. United States] expressed the concern
33
that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
Page
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
Contributors:
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose,"
a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
In Vauxs case, it was accepted as established that the life of man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or connected of the
same offense is a good plea xxx Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a
formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a
consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment or other prosecution
before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any
subsequent accusation for the same crime.
Laurel vs. Misa
G.R. L-409. January 30, 1947
FACTS:
The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered
to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his
allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty
RULING:
Yes. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No
transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government stil had the
power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced.
34
Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.
Page
Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change
Contributors:
since the sovereign- the Filipino people- is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of
government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.
Allegiance as defined by Blackstone, is the tie or ligament which binds the subject to the Kind, in return
for that protection which the Kind affords the subject. Allegiance, both expressed and implied, is of two
sorts, the one natural, the other local, the former being perpetual, the latter temporary. Natural allegiance
is such as is due from all men born within the Kings dominions immediately upon their birth, for
immediately upon their birth they are under the Kings protection. Natural allegiance is perpetual, and for
this reason, evidently founded on the nature of government. Allegiance is a debt due form the subject
upon implied contract with the prince that so long as the one affords protection the other will demean
himself faithfully. Natural-born subjects have a great variety of rights which they acquire by being born
within the Kings liegance, which can never be forfeited but by their own misbehavior; but the rights o f
aliens are much more circumscribed, being acquired only by residence and lost whenever they remove. If
an alien could acquire a permanent property in lands, he must owe allegiance equally permanent to the
King, which would probably be inconsistent with that which he owes his natural liege lord; besides. That
thereby the nation might, in time, be subject to foreign influence and feel many other inconveniences.
Indians within the state are not aliens, but citizens owing allegiance ot the government of a state, for they
receive protection from the government and are subject ot its laws. They are born allegiance to the
government of the state.
Manzanares vs. Moreta
G.R. No. 12306. October 22, 1918
FACTS:
A male child named Salvador Bona, 8 or 9 years of age, was killed through the negligence of
defendant in driving his automobile. The mother of the dead boy is a widow, a poor washerwoman. She
brings action against the defendant to recover damages for her loss.
Issue:
Whether the loss of a human life could be compensated in money.
HELD:
Malcolm, J. concurring.
Yes. Grotius said Any man slaying another, unjustly, is bound to discharge the expenses, if any
are contracted, for physicians, and to give to those whom the slain was in duty accustomed to main- such
as parents, wives, children- as much as that hope of maintenance regardbeing had to the age of the
35
deceased- was wort: thus, Hercules is said to have made reparation (paid fine) to the children of Iphitus,
slain by him, in order that expiationmight more easilybe made.
Page
Contributors:
th
Michael, the Ephesian, says upon the 5 of Nicomachii of Aristotle: but also the persons lain receives, in
some sort, for what the wife or children or relations of the speaking of an unjust manslayer: that is, one
who had not the right of doing that from whence death follows
Wherefore, if any one may have had the right, but has sinned against charity,as when one (being
assaulted) has been unwilling to free, he shall not be bound. But of life, in case of a free man, no
valuation is made, otherwise, in case of a slave who can be sold.
Both because of the civil origin of the applicable law in the Philippines, because we are not fetterd by the
harsh common law rule on the subject, because it is the modern and more equitable principle, and
because reason and natural justice are eloquent advocates, we hold that an action for damages can be
maintained in this jurisdiction for the death of a person by wrongful act. It can be admitted, since objection
has not been made, that the primary right of action is in the parent.
III. Civil Law: Roman Jurists to Contemporary Thinkers
Kasilag vs. Rodriguez
No. 46623. December 7, 1939
FACTS:
The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory contract of
mortgage. The executed accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece of land, the land
having been acquired by means of homestead. Petitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.
Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands Petitioner, acting in good
faith took possession of the land. To wit, the Petitioner has no knowledge that the enjoyment of the fruits
of the land is an element of the credit transaction of Antichresis.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based upon
Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith, the petitioners lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis
36
RULING:
Page
Contributors:
Yes. The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is valid. The verbal
contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void. Section 433 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines provides Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith. And in this case, the
petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his
apparent acquisition thereof.
Justinian, who, by his Corpus Juris Civiles, still speaks through practically all the civil codes of
Continental Europe, considers both as having acted in good faith. Article 364 of our Civil Code then
comes into play. When there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sewed, or
planted on anothers land, but also on the part of the owner of the latter, the rights of both shall be the
same as if they had acted in good faith. Bad faith on the part of the owner is deemed to exist whenever
the act has been done in his presence, with is knowledge and tolerance, and without opposition on his
part. The codal section is evidently based upon the venerable maxim of equity that one who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. A court which seeks to enforce on the part of the defendant
uprightness, fairness, and conscientiousness also insists that, if relief is to be granted, it must be to a
plaintiff whose conduct is not inconsistent with the standards he seeks to have applied to his adversary.
Jain vs. IAC
No. L-63129. September 28, 1984
FACTS:
Herein petition Jain was accused of Theft. It was alleged that Jain, who is a small planter of the
San Carlos Milling district using the Honob loading station, in conspiracy with the accused tresfuentes,
Bermejos cane guard, withdrew the said trainmans receipts were deposited after the loading and
substituted them with other trainmans receipts in the name of the accused Jain, thereby making it appear
that the said cane cars belonged to the accused Wayne Jain and not the real owner Bermajo. Petitioner
contended that he did not actually and/or physically, take , steal, and carry away cane cars loaded with
sugar cane hence, no theft.
ISSUE:
Whether Jain is criminally liable for theft.
HELD:
No. In the Institutes of Justinian a more elaborate definition of theft is given as follows: Theft is
the fraudulent handling of a thing with the object of acquiring gain either from the thing itself or from its
37
use, or from possession of it. The corresponding provision of the Partidas follows the definition given in
Page
the Institutes but contains the additional qualification that the taking must be without the consent of the
owner.
Contributors:
Evident from the foregoing is the condition sine qua non that for theft to be committed there must be
physical handling for personal property. Such a condition is not present in the case at bar for at no time
did the petitioner lay his hands on the sugar canes which belonged to others. The petitioner is right; he
did not commit theft but he committed estafa.
People v. Hon. Velasco (Civil)
GR No. 127444
FACTS:
There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex Vinculado
and seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. Three (3)
criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed against
Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the alleged bodyguard of the mayor.
However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed against the same accused upgrading the
crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD 1866
for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.
The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges
due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its
finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government before this Court in a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the
judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-
examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not
transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because
the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause
permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required
should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from
American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United
38
States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on appeal
Page
is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.
Contributors:
ISSUES:
Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional
interdict against double jeopardy is permissible
HELD:
NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be
had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal
charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do
not involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.
United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the
evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at bar, the records show that respondent trial judge
based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence
presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case.
The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench
trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.
Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the
level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-
acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an acquittal is
final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or
before the Court of Appeals.
39
Page
Contributors:
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy
may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process.
The "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely
to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Side note: Acquittal must be valid an error of jurisdiction is the only valid ground for review. If appeal is
based on error of judgment, it will amount to double jeopardy.
LegPhilo:
Justinian on Codification of Law:
Jeopardy, itself a fine poetic word, derives from the Latin jocus meaning joke, jest or game,
and also from the French term jeu perdre which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the
Middle English word iuparti orjupartie means an uncertain game. The genesis of the concept itself
however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman legal
concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in
the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same
issue.
The Justinian Digest providing that (a) governor should not permit the same person to be again
accused of crime of which he has been acquitted, suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed
to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th century B.C. reflecting mans
tragic vision or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously pitted
against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken in the
sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek
sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune
resolving itself into a final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the
same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
Cicero: De Legibus:
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized as a
maxim of common law based on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which
the Roman Cicero commented: Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another
th
in the future, but among all nations, it is the same. But even as early as the 15 century, the English
courts already began to use the term jeopardy in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials.
In Vauxs Case,it was accepted as established that the life of a man shall not be twice put in jeopardy for
one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or convicted of the
same offense is a good plea x x x Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a
formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England that (n)o man is to be
40
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a
consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution
Page
Contributors:
before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any
subsequent accusation for the same crime.
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the
right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule
establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is part of the paramount importance criminal justice system
attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction. The interest in the finality of
acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for repose,
a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system
has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jurys
leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
IV. Criminal Law: Christian & Contemporary Philosophers
Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601 (Crim)
Same:
Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice
will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The
flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society.
Facts:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be
imposed upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied.
Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a
Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of
the Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added
equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
41
Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
Page
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier
Contributors:
to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
Issues:
1. Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held:
1. No
2. Yes
3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal
injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s
into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and
suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal
injection inherently cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the
execution by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or inhuman? The Court believes not.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will fix the time and date
of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already
knows, the court which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the accused.
The procedure is that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for
execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to
the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out not
earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing the
death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can
seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. Petitioner also contends that
the infliction of wanton pain in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection that
respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal
injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
42
unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required
the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are
Page
unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal
Contributors:
injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever. Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense, anything is cruel
which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict,
it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for
this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely.
2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The punishment was subject to
the limitation that it be imposed for the most serious crimes. Included with the declaration was the
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The
Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory. SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that Section 17 amends
the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall
not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any
person over seventy years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year
period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which
is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioners view, tantamount to
a gender-based discrimination. Being an implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to implement.
Legal Philosophy:
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." This primary right of the
43
people to enjoy life life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor is not only reiterated by the 1987
Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution
Page
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, expressly
Contributors:
prohibits any form of torture which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right
to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception and
establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education.
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and
for life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against
the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion.
But the most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights
cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign
Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our
people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly
limits such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), "punishment
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to
defend society . . . (which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death
penalty. Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and
above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution
reluctantly allows capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the
Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity",
which are very rare and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-
defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
Santos v. CA and Bedia-Santos
GR No. 112019 (Psychological Incapacity - Family Law)
FACTS:
Leouel Santos, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with
Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as
Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the
interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
44
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
Page
departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in
Contributors:
July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program
under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no
avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE:
Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
__________
Notes:
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Legal Philosophy: On Psychological Incapacity
VITUG, J.:
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the codes enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
45
construction of the codal provision.

Page
Contributors:
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treatise, giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon
1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, o
broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first: Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave psychosexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then
a broader one followed: . . .
. . .because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049); then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon
1095, 3); finally, a new version was promulgated: because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae). So the progress was from psychosexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the
cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy
person should be able to assume the ordinary obligationsof marriage. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term
psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety. In a book, entitled Canons and Commentaries on Marriage, written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real
inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to
enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could
be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive
the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Estrada v. Escritor, AM P-02-1651 (On the Separation of the Church and State)
Facts:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not
46
her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman,
Page
died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to
another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but
Contributors:
of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained
the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor
and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower
Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral
conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator)
memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person,
to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged
by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects
it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore,
the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also
apply the compelling state interest test.
47
Page
Contributors:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that
the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's
receipt of this Decision.
Legal Philosophy:
PUNO, J.:
We ascertained two salient features in the review of religious history: First, with minor exceptions, the
history of church-state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed,
and war, all in the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace. Second, likewise with minor
exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to promote secular
purposes and policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for
the favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in exchange for religions
invaluable service. This was the context in which the unique experiment of the principle of religious
freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional democracy and in
human history.
Strictly speaking, the American experiment of freedom and separation was not translated in the First
Amendment. That experiment had been launched four years earlier, when the founders of the republic
carefully withheld from the new national government any power to deal with religion. As James Madison
said, the national government had no jurisdiction over religion or any shadow of right to intermeddle
with it.
The omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom and other natural rights, however, nearly
prevented the ratification of the Constitution. The restriction had to be made explicit with the adoption of
the religion clauses in the First Amendment as they are worded to this day. Thus, the First Amendment
did not government; its intent was to make express the absence of power. It commands, in two parts (with
the first part usually referred to as the Establishment Clause and the second part, the Free Exercise
Clause), viz.:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.
48
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goalto promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
Page
practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
Contributors:
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment Clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words,
the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick
to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the movement of establishment of
religion as an engine to promote state interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free
exercise of religion.
People vs Dela Cruz

L-52 feb 21, 1946
Facts:
Appellant is charged with the crime of robbery in band committed on June 25, 1946. The Court of
First Instance of Manila sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of not less than six months
nor more than six years, ten months and one day of imprisonment, to indemnify the offended party in the
sum of P8,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He appealed
from this sentence, praying that he be acquitted. The prosecution recommends affirmance, with the
elimination of the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the principal penalty imposed being
higher than prision correccional.
At about 8:30 p. m., on July 25, 1945, while Dr. Gregorio B. Sison was closing the door of his drug store
at 389 Dimasalang, Manila, four men armed with revolvers got near him, stuck revolvers over his ribs,
pushed him inside the drug store, and ordered him and all other persons inside to lie down face
downward. One remained to watch the door, another, who was manipulating his revolver several times,
kept watch of the persons lying down, and the remaining two went upstairs. The one watching the door
called several times the other watching the persons lying down, telling him to shoot their heads if they
moved.
The malefactors were able to get P200 from the cash register, P7,000 in bills, P500 in silver coins, and
one pair of earrings with diamonds valued at P300, all located in one of the drawers in the kitchen.
Issue and defense of Dela cruz: The main question in this case revolves on appellant's identity. He
denies having participated in the commission of the crime. At the hour and on the day the robbery was
committed, appellant does not remember whether he was at home or at Felix Huerta;,. He alleges that he
lives by selling bread, shoes, pomade, and other things in the market, and admits that he gambles.
HELD:
The analysis of the testimonies given in this case convinces us that appellant was
conclusively identified as the robber who kept watch of the people inside the drug store while
lying down; who, upon entering the drug store, was one of those who stuck a revolver at the ribs
of Dr. Gregorio B. Sison; who, during the watch, was manipulating his revolver to the extent of
dropping two bullets to the floor, and who was being named as Doro.
49
The fact that the prosecution witnesses singled him out as the only one among the four robbers they
could identify, it appearing that there were circumstances which made his identification possible, and that
Page
Contributors:
no unreasonable motive was shown why they should point him out, instead of any one of the three
remaining gangsters, only serves to strengthen the credibility of said identification.
There are no words strong enough to condemn banditry and gangsterism. During the enemy occupation,
our peaceful citizenry had to endure the scourge of frequent wanton robberies. The abnormal conditions
then reigning, the example of outlawry given by the masters of the situation, hunger and misery in some
cases, the moral distress or mental disequilibrium in others, which produced the extraordinary situation,
might explain the robberies and lootings perpetrated under the regime of greatest looters ever known in
our country. But now, when everybody is given full opportunity to earn an honest and decent living, under
a regime of law and freedom, of peace and justice, of noble principles and high ideals, and act such as
the one committed by appellant and his cogangsters does not merit the least attenuation. The authors of
such acts must be branded forever with the stigma of infamy. They are the shame of a race and the
ignominy of a people, the disgrace of humankind.
One of the geniuses who flourished in the thirteenth century, the philosopher and
theologian whose exalted native endowment and original creative power in the intellectual field is
the admiration of Christian world, Saint Thomas Aquinas, maintained that the appropriation of
others' goods which they (the owners) do not need, if made in obedience to extreme necessity,
does not constitute robbery. He declared that the superfluous things in the possession of some
persons, by natural law, are goods for the maintenance of the poor. Evident and urgent necessity
makes the one who appropriates the goods of another for the maintenance of his own life the
legal owner of said goods (Summa Theologica, 2d part, Question LXVI. Art. VII). To strengthen his
position, he quoted from Saint Ambrose (serm. 64, De temp. Decret. 47, cap. Sicut hi) the following: "The
bread you are retaining belongs to the hungry; the cloth you are keeping aside belongs to the naked; the
money you are hiding underground is for the redemption and absolution of the unfortunate." But, without
subscribing necessarily to the above propositions of the two saintly authors, in the present case, there is
absolutely no showing that extreme necessity impelled accused to perpetrate the robbery here in
question. There is not the remotest hint that appellant would have died of hunger without the money and
jewel which he and his fellow gangsters took from complainants' drug store, or that he would face an
imminent danger of losing any vital limb or right. On the contrary, he testified that he was engaged in
selling foodstuffs, such as bread; wearing apparel, such as shoes; and even articles of luxury, such as
pomade. And it is evident that he earned more than enough to satisfy his prime needs, for he allowed
himself the leisure and the spare money for gambling. He robbed, therefore, not because he was
compelled by any pressing necessities, but by following impulses of moral perversity. For such individual,
and for all individuals belonging to his depraved tribe, there is no reason to waste any pity or leniency.
The race of robbers, bandits, gangsters, and other male factors of the same brand, should be ostracized
perpetually from human society until the shame shall have disappeared completely from memory.
V. Mercantile Law: From Customs to Law
US vs Tan Quingco Chua

50
GR. L-13708 January 29, 1919

Page
Facts:
Contributors:
How a lean little debt of P100 contracted in the year 1911 grew and grew until, after the lapse of
five short years, interest had made of it the fat and respectable sum of approximately P700, is the story
told by this record.
The tale opens on April 29, 1911, with one, Pedro Andres, borrowing of Francisco Constantino Tan
Quingco Chua, the instant defendant, the sum of P100, with interest of 24 cavanes of palay. In less than
three months, or, to be exact, on the 9th of July of the same year, the debt was raised to P125, with
interest of 30 cavanes of palay. Two years pass, and on June 28, 1913, it has become P226.70, secured
by a pacto de retro, with the interest at 44 cavanes of palay annually. The day of reckoning came on
October 17, 1915, when the debt was liquidated with the result that Andres had an obligation of P474.20,
which he promised to pay on the 25th of the same month. One year later, action was brought to recover
this sum and the corresponding judgment rendered therefor. Then, on October 25, 1916, Andres and Tan
Quingco Chua executed a document by which Andres sold to Tan Quingco Chua under pacto de retro a
certain parcel of land and a female carabao for the amount of P684.20; the period of redemption was to
be five months; Andres was to hold the land during this time as lessee and as such lessee to pay a rent of
90 cavanes of palay, each cavan to weigh 44 kilos, in the month of February, 1917, and all charges
during the existence of the lease. Execution on the judgment of October 25, 1916, resulted in Andres
paying to the Chinaman P474, and turning over to him 98 cavanes of palay.
The outcome of these various transactions was the filing of an information by the provincial fiscal of
Nueva Ecija, charging Francisco Constantino Tan Quingco Chua with the crime of usury, predicated
specially on the document of October 25, 1916, above described. The trial court, the Honorable Vicente
Nepomuceno, in a very able and fair decision, found that the accused had been proved guilty and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P25, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
The taking of excessive interest for the loan of money has been regarded with abhorrence from the
earliest times. Usury, as such unlawful profits were known, was prohibited by the ancient laws of the
Chinese and the Hindus, by the Mosaic Law of the Jews, by the Koran, by the Athenians and by the
Romans, and has been frowned upon by distinguished publicists throughout all the ages.
Issue: Did the accused violate the Usury Law by the accomplishment of what purports to be a
pacto de retro, now in evidence as Exhibit B?
HELD:
Usury laws, ordinarily, are to be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. Nevertheless, the courts
may look into prior occurrences in order to understand the particular fact which is claimed to be a violation
of the law, and in order to ascertain the criminal intent.
We entertain little or no doubt that Exhibit B was not a true pacto de retro, but was a sham
document to cover usurious financial manipulation. This document, framed with legal precision, was
a token of a debt originally of P100, grown to be P474.20, to which in this document was added P210 as
interests, to make a total of P684.20. Then on top of this latter sum was dumped 90 cavanes of palay,
denominated as rent, but which in reality was interest valued at P25 for the use of P684.20 for five
51
months.
Page
In moving toward a conclusion, we have not forgotten the canon of construction which should govern
penal statutes of this character. The rule is as stated by the Supreme Court of Alabama, namely:
Contributors:
When operating on the contract or the security taken, it (the statute) is not, strictly speaking, punitive in its
character, and we should so construe it as to repress the great evil the legislature has in view in its
enactment. But when the punishment of the person who has committed usury is sought, according to the
benignant principle which pervades our jurisprudence, it should be construed in all cases of doubt and
uncertainty in favor of the accused." (Metcalf vs. Watkins [1834], 1 Port. [Ala], 57.)
A document, legal in form, purporting to be a pacto de retro, accomplished on October 25, 1916, found to
be a sham document to cover usurious financial manipulation.
No doubt and uncertainty exists in this case. If the facts as found by the trial court are true, and we think
they are, and if the law as enunciated in this decision is correct, and we think it is, then, this surely is
usury, if there ever was usury. The money lenders did not alone pursue their calling in old Judea. The
Shylocks have not merely strutted or skulked on the Shakesperian stage. The Philippines abound with
such who exact their pound of flesh and for these the law was intended and for these shall be
enforced.
Most of the ordinary contracts, when entered into in good faith, do not come within the pale of usury. Any
person owning property may sell it at such price and at such terms as to the time and mode of payment
as he may see fit, and such a sale, if bona fide, cannot be usurious however unconscionable it may be.
Lord Mansfield characteristically says: "I lay the foundation of the whole upon a man's going to
borrow under colour of buying: there the contract is usurious; but where it is a bona fide sale . . . it
certainly is not." (Floyer vs. Edwards, 1 Cowp., 112, 116; 98 Eng. Reprint, 995.) Rent charges, as in the
document before us, may be created or transferred without regard to the usury laws as long as such
forms of transaction are not used as mere covers for usurious loans. A hard bargain need not necessarily
be a void bargain.||| (U.S. v. Tan Quingco Chua, G.R. No. 13708, [January 29, 1919], 39 PHIL 552-559)
Philippine National Bank v. The National city bank of new york Motor Service Co., Inc.,
G.R. No. 43596, [October 31, 1936], 63 PHIL 711-746
Facts: : On April 7 and 9, 1933, an unknown person or persons negotiated with Motor Service Company,
Inc. (MSCI), two checks in payment for automobile tires purchased from MSCI's stores, purporting to
have been issued by the 'Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. (Pantranco) by J.L. Klar, Manager and
Treasurer', against the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and in favor of the International Auto Repair Shop,
for P144.50 and P215.75. Said checks were indorsed by said unknown persons in the manner indicated
at the back thereof, the MSCI, believing at the time that the signatures of J.L. Klar, Manager and
Treasurer of Pantranco on both checks were genuine. The checks were then indorsed for deposit by
MSCI at the National City Bank of New York and the former was accordingly credited with the amounts
thereof, or P144.50 and P215.75. On April 8 and 10, 1933, the said checks were cleared at the clearing
house and PNB credited the National City Bank for the amounts thereof, believing at the time that the
signatures of the drawer were genuine, that the payee is an existing entity and the endorsements at the
bank thereof regular and genuine. The PNB then found out that the purported signatures of J.L. Klar, as
Manager and Treasurer of Pantranco were forged when so informed by the said Company, and it
accordingly demanded from the National City Bank and MSCI and the reimbursement of the amounts for
which it credited the National City Bank at the clearing house and for which the latter credited MSCI, but
52
MSCI and National City Bank refused, and continue to refuse, to make such reimbursements. Pantranco
objected to have the proceeds of said check deducted from their deposit. PNB filed the case in the
Page
municipal court of Manila against National City Bank and MSCI. Upon PNB's motion, the case was
Contributors:
dismissed before trial as to the National City Bank. A decision was thereafter rendered giving PNB
judgment for the total amount of P360.25, with interest and costs. From this decision MSCI appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the drawee bank should be allowed recovery, as MSCI's position would not
become worse than if the drawee had refused the payment of these checks upon their
presentation
HELD: A drawee of a check, who is deceived by a forgery of the drawer's signature may recover
the payment back, unless his mistake has placed an innocent holder of the paper in a worse
position than he would have been in if the discover of the forgery had been made on presentation.
Forgeries often deceived the eye of the most cautions experts; and when a bank has been so
deceived, it is a harsh rule which compels it to suffer although no one has suffered by its being
deceived. Herein, MSCI has lost nothing by anything which the drawee has done. It had in its
hands some forged worthless papers. It did not purchase or acquire these papers because of any
representation made to it by the drawee. It purchased them from unknown persons and under suspicious
circumstances. It had no valid title to them, because the persons from whom it received them did not have
such title. MSCI could not have compelled the drawee to pay them, and the drawee could have refused
payment had it been able to detect the forgery. By making a refund, MSCI would only be returning what it
had received without any title or right. And when MCSI pays back the money it has received it will be
entitled to have restored to it the forged papers it parted with. There is no good reason why the accidental
payment made by PNB should inure to the benefit of MSCI. If there were injury to MCSI said injury was
caused not by the failure of PNB to detect the forgery but by the very negligence of MCSI in purchasing
commercial papers from unknown persons without making inquiry as to their genuineness.
(The court held in the case (1) That where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is
drawn, the bank is estopped to deny the genuineness of the drawer's signature and his capacity to issue
the instrument; (2) That if a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified
by the said bank it cannot recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and did not have
actual notice thereof; (3) That the payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the
sense that this word is used in section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law; (4) That in the case of the
payment of a forged check, even without former acceptance, the drawee can not recover from a holder in
due course not chargeable with any act of negligence or disregard of duty; (5) That to entitle the holder of
a forged check to retain the money obtained thereon, there must be a showing that the duty to ascertain
the genuineness of the signature rested entirely upon the drawee, and that the constructive negligence of
such drawee in failing to detect the forgery was not affected by any disregard of duty on the part of the
holder, or by failure of any precaution which, from his implied assertion in presenting the check as a
sufficient voucher, the drawee had the right to believe he had taken; (6) That in the absence of actual
fault on the part of the drawee, his constructive fault in not knowing the signature of the drawer and
detecting the forgery will not preclude his recovery from one who took the check under circumstances of
suspicion and without proper precaution, or whose conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee or
induce him to pay the check without the usual scrutiny or other precautions against mistake or fraud; (7)
That one who purchases a check or draft is bound to satisfy himself that the paper is genuine, and that by
indorsing it or presenting it for payment or putting it into circulation before presentation he impliedly
asserts that he performed his duty; (8) That while the foregoing rule, chosen from a welter of decisions on
the issue as the correct one, will not hinder the circulation of two recognized mediums of exchange by
53
which the great bulk of business is carried on, namely, drafts and checks, on the other hand, it will
encourage and demand prudent business methods on the part of those receiving such mediums of
Page
exchange; (9) That it being a matter of record in the present case, that PNB is no more chargeable with
Contributors:
the knowledge of the drawer's signature than MCSI is, as the drawer was as much the customer of MSCI
as of PNB, the presumption that a drawee bank is bound to know more than any indorser the signature
nature of its depositor does not hold; (1) that according to the undisputed facts of the case MSCI in
purchasing the papers in question from unknown persons without making any inquiry as to the identity
and authority of the said persons negotiating and indorsing them, acted negligently and contributed to
PNB's constructive negligence in failing to detect the forgery; and (11) that under the circumstances of the
case, if PNB is allowed to recover, there will be no change of position as to the injury or prejudice of
MCSI.)
The old rule which was originally announced by Lord Mansfield in the leading case of Price vs. Neal (3
Burr., 1354), elicited the following comment from Justice Holmes, then Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in the case of Dedham National Bank vs. Everett National Bank (177 Mass.,
392). "Probably the rule was adopted from an impression of convenience rather than for any more
academic reason; or perhaps we may say that Lord Mansfield took the case out of the doctrine as to
payments under a mistake of fact by the assumption that a holder who simply presents negotiable
paper for payment makes no representation as to the signature, and that the drawee pays at his
peril."
Such was the reaction that followed Lord Mansfield's rule which Justice Story of the United States
Supreme Court adopted in the case of Bank of United Statesvs. Georgia (10 Wheat., 333), that in B.B.
Ford & Co. vs. People's Bank of Orangeburg (74 S.C., 180), it was held that "an unrestricted
indorsement of a draft and presentation to the drawee is a representation that the signature of the
drawer is genuine", and in Lisbon First National Bank vs. Wyndmere Bank (15 N.D., 299), it was
also held that "the drawee of a forged check who has paid the same without detecting the forgery,
may upon discovery of the forgery, recover the money paid from the party who received the
money, even though the latter was was a good faith holder, provided the latter has not been
misled or prejudiced by the drawee's failure to detect the forgery.
Compagnie Franco-Indochinoise v. Deutsch-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, G.R. No.

13954, [January 17, 1919], 39 PHIL 474-494
FACTS: The question now before the court relates to the liability of the defendant company, as owner of
the steamship Esslingen, for damages resulting from the illegal detention of cargo belonging to the
plaintiff embarked upon that ship at Saigon and brought to the port of Manila at the outbreak of the
European War.
By the former decision of this court the cause was returned to the court of origin with instructions to grant
a new trial wherein the inquiry should be limited to the determination of the amount which could have
been gotten for the cargo taken on board in Saigon, if such cargo had been offered for sale in an
undamaged condition in Manila Bay at the time when the damaged cargo was sold, judgment to be
entered, thereafter, in conformity with the rule of liability enunciated in said decision.
The case was accordingly reheard in the Court of First Instance upon proof submitted by the respective
parties; and that court found that the 119,831 cavanes of rice meal contained in said cargo would, if
undamaged, have sold for 30 centavos more per cavan than was received when the cargo was sold on
November 6, 1914. Judgment was accordingly rendered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff
for the amount of the loss thus determined, to wit, P35,949.30, with interest from November 6, 1914.
54
From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiff insisting that the trial court had awarded too little
and the defendant that the court had awarded too much.
Page
Contributors:
The only question is thus upon the point of damages. Part of the cargo of the Esslingen consisted of
cargo meal, and it is admitted that this portion of the cargo, being by nature less subject to deterioration
than rice meal, was sold by the receiver in an undamaged condition for its full value, to wit, P4,729.62.
The subject-matter of the dispute is therefore narrowed to the question of the price which the 119,831
cavanes of rice meal ought to have brought, if it had been offered for sale on November 6, 1914, in an
undeteriorated condition.
RULING: The law in force in these Islands is more favorable to penalties than the law of England
and the United States; and it is unnecessary here to adopt the exact reasoning followed in the
cases above cited. It is perhaps enough for present purposes merely to say that the clause under
consideration is not applicable to the situation before us. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten
that this charter party is not to be construed exclusively by the law of the Philippine Islands, nor
even by the local law of the country in which it was executed. It must be considered as governed
by the general maritime law (Watts vs. Camors, supra). In this connection it is well to be reminded
that, as was said by Lord Mansfield, in Luke vs. Lyde ([1759], 2 Burr, 887), the maritime law "is not
the law of a particular country, but the general law of nation." Again, said he, quoting the eloquent
words of Cicero: "Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et apud omnes
gentes et omne tempore una eademque lex obtinebit."' (There shall not be one law at Rome,
another at Athens; one now, another hereafter; but among all nations one and the same law shall
prevail.)
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, there speaking through Ward, Circuit Judge, said:
"It is of the utmost importance that commercial documents of familiar form going into all parts of
the world should as far as possible be understood everywhere in the same way, which makes us
the more content to follow the English decisions." (Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet vs.
Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 Fed. Rep., 935, 938.)
As already stated, we are of the opinion that the damages assessable in this case should not be limited
to the amount contracted to be paid for freight, and the damages must stand at the higher amount of the
proven damages, or P87,777.56. When the case was before us at the prior hearing, we were not
satisfied, in the absence of all proof as to the market value of rice meal in Manila, to allow the finding of
the trial court on the question of the amount of the damages to stand, but now that further proof has been
taken and the fact established that the cargo of rice meal in Manila, if undamaged, was reasonably worth
as much, or more, than its original cost, we have no hesitation in sustaining the damages as proved on
the basis of the cost price.
Our conclusion is that the judgment appealed from must be modified in respect to the amount of damages
awarded to the plaintiff, and it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of
P87,777.56 instead of P35,949.30, with interest from November 6, 1914. So much of the judgment
appealed from as awards to the plaintiff the sum of P57,823.35, less the commission of the clerk, the
same being the proceeds of the receiver's sale, is hereby vacated, it appearing that this part of the
judgment has already been satisfied. As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed, without express finding
as to costs of either instance.
55
1. JUDGMENT; "RES JUDICATA;" LAW OF THE CASE. When a cause is remanded by the Supreme
Court to the Court of First Instance for the determination of the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled,
Page
the rule of liability enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court becomes the law of the case and is
Contributors:
not subject to review or reversal either in the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court upon
subsequent appeal.
2. DAMAGES; VALUE OF COMMODITY IN GIVEN MARKET. In ascertaining the value of a

commodity in a given market at a certain time, or the price which such commodity ought to have brought if
then offered for sale, it is necessary to assume the presence of a buyer at the hypothetical sale, able and
willing to buy the commodity in question, at its fair and reasonable valuation, in the quantity and with the
qualifies in which it is supposed to be offered for sale.
3. ID.; ID.; ABNORMAL, TRANSACTIONS NOT CONCLUSIVE ON QUESTION OF VALUE. In

attempting to fix the market value of any article by reference either to actual or hypothetical transactions
in a given mart of trade, account is to be taken of ordinary and normal transactions; and no sale which
has been effected under accidental and extraordinary conditions should be accepted as determinative on
the question of value.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE AS TO COST. Proof of the original cost price of a cargo of rice meal in the port of
Saigon, which is an export mart for that commodity, is relevant upon the question of the value of such
cargo in the port of Manila, allowance being made for the differential of freight between the two ports.
5. CHARTER PARTY; PENALTY FOR NONPERFORMANCE. Where the master of a ship unlawfully
refuses to deliver cargo to the owner and in effect converts such cargo, the liability thereby incurred is
based upon a positive misfeasance and not a mere nonfeasance such as is contemplated in a penal
clause of the charter party limiting the damages, in case of nonperformance, to the amount of the freight.
Therefore, in case of such conversion, the recoverable damages are not limited to the amount of the
freight but extends to the full amount of the damage actually incurred and proved.
56
Page
Contributors:

LegPhilo Midterms Digests

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

LegPhilo Midterms Digests

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

San Beda College Alabang Legal Philosophy Atty. John R.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC

Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

MARBURRY vs. MADISON

Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE vs. POMAR

ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE

Is the marriage performed according to the Mohammedan Religion valid?

In relation to Legal Philosophy:

ASIA BREWERY VS. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

Whether or not there is unfair competition

In relation to Legal Philosophy:

DEL MONTE CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

In relation to LEG PHILO:

WHETHER OR NOT THE MERALCO COULD PASS ON TO CONSUMERS WHAT IS WAS

IN RELATION TO LEG PHILO:

We borrow the following from Senator Elbert D. Thomas:

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Maj. General Josephus Ramas et al

GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003

II. Natural Law and Natural Rights

2. To preserve himself in existence.

3. To preserve the species that is, to unite sexually.

4. To live in community with other men.

As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in procreation; and as rational

stealing that harm society.

Ateneo De Manila University vs. Capulong

a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;

c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;

d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

CARAOS vs. DAZA

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

TECSON vs. DESIDERIO, JR

G.R. No. 161434; March 3, 2004

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

G.R. No. L-12462; December 20, 1917

YES. In Blackstone's Commentaries we find the following passage:

G.R. No. 12779; September 10, 1917

People vs. Pomar

No. 22008. November 3, 1924

Whether the Act No. 3071 is constitutional

In re: Columns of Amado Macasaet in Malaya

A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC. August 8, 2008

People vs. Velasco

G.R. No. 127444. September 13, 2000

Whether there is violation of double jeopardy.

Laurel vs. Misa

G.R. L-409. January 30, 1947

Whether the accused is guilty

Manzanares vs. Moreta

G.R. No. 12306. October 22, 1918

Whether the loss of a human life could be compensated in money.

III. Civil Law: Roman Jurists to Contemporary Thinkers

Kasilag vs. Rodriguez

No. 46623. December 7, 1939

Jain vs. IAC

No. L-63129. September 28, 1984

Whether Jain is criminally liable for theft.

People v. Hon. Velasco (Civil)

Requisites for invoking double jeopardy: